3.

Implied Consent
a) Government Enters into Business Contracts- US V. GUINTO 2/26/90;

Facts: The case of US vs. Guinto involves a series of consolidated cases in the
Philippines, where individuals filed legal actions against officers of the United
States government who were stationed in the country as part of the U.S. military
presence. These cases raised questions about the immunity of the United States
government and its officers from legal actions in Philippine courts.

Case of Genove: One of the cases involved Genove, who worked as a cook at
the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, known as the Open Mess Complex, at
John Hay Air Station. Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Lamachia, the manager of the complex, alleging that he was wrongfully
dismissed from his employment.
Case of US vs. Ang Tang Ho: This case centered on disputes related to
barbershop concessions on a U.S. military base in the Philippines. Private
individuals who held these concessions brought an action against the U.S.
government and its officers, alleging irregularities in the grant of these
concessions.
Case of US vs. Guinto et al.: Another case involved several individually-
named petitioners who were officers stationed in the Philippines. These officers
conducted a buy-bust operation to combat illegal drug activities, and the
complainant sought damages for alleged misconduct during the operation.

Main Issues: The primary legal issues in these consolidated cases were as
follows:

1. Sovereign Immunity: Whether the United States government and its

officers stationed in the Philippines were immune from legal actions and
lawsuits in Philippine courts based on the principle of sovereign
immunity.
2. Personal Liability of Officers: If the United States government and its
officers were not immune from suit, whether the officers could be held
personally liable for their actions in the cases brought against them.
Court's Ruling and Reasoning:
1. Immunity from Suit: The court acknowledged the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which generally protects a state and its officers from being sued in
the courts of another state without its consent. However, the court clarified that
sovereign immunity is not absolute and can be waived, either expressly or
impliedly.
Express Consent: The court noted that the Philippine government had enacted a
general law (Act No. 3083) and special laws that permitted the government to
be sued for moneyed claims arising from contracts or alleged torts. This
constituted the express consent of the state to be sued under specific
circumstances.
Implied Consent through Business Contracts: The court articulated the concept
that when a government, including the United States, engages in business
contracts in its proprietary or private capacity, it implicitly consents to be sued
in relation to those contracts. Implied consent applies when the contract
involves the government's commercial activities or economic affairs.
Distinction between Sovereign and Proprietary Acts: The court drew a clear
distinction between sovereign acts (jure imperii) performed in the exercise of
governmental functions and private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure
gestionis) related to commercial or business activities. Sovereign immunity
applies to the former, but not to the latter. The court determined that some of the
actions involved commercial enterprises operated by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity, such as barbershops and restaurants. As
these activities were commercial in nature and not solely for the benefit of the
military, the United States government was not immune from suit in these cases.
2. Liability of Officers: The court clarified that even when the government is
suable, it does not automatically imply liability. Liability depends on applicable
law and established facts. Officers may be held personally liable for their
actions if they exceeded their authority, acted improperly, or violated the law.
Officers Acting within Official Duties: The court emphasized that officers who
were acting within their official duties and in accordance with the law could not
be personally impleaded in the lawsuits. These officers were protected from
personal liability. For some officers, the court found that further investigation
was necessary to determine if they had acted properly. It was not immediately
clear whether their actions fell within the scope of their official duties or
involved misconduct.
In summary, the case involved a series of legal actions against officers of the
United States government stationed in the Philippines. The court upheld the
concept of Implied Consent when the Government enters into Business
Contracts, asserting that when the government engages in commercial activities,
it implicitly consents to be sued in relation to those activities. This distinction
between sovereign and proprietary acts allows for legal action against the
government in specific cases. The court also clarified that officers could be
personally liable if they acted improperly, even when the government was
suable.
FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN, 2/27/91;
On August 21, 1976, at approximately 6:30 P.M., an incident occurred along the
Maharlika Highway in Maasin, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. A pickup truck
bearing Plate No. IN-651, owned and operated by the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), a government agency in the Philippines, was involved in
a collision.
The said NIA vehicle was being driven by Hugo Garcia, an employee of NIA
who held a valid professional driver's license. Hugo Garcia was a regular driver
officially employed by NIA, and he had previously passed written and oral
examinations on traffic rules and vehicle maintenance administered by NIA
authorities, making him qualified for employment as a regular driver. The
collision occurred when the NIA pickup truck struck a bicycle carrying two
individuals, Francisco Fontanilla (the son of the petitioners) and Restituto
Deligo. The impact of the collision resulted in severe injuries to Francisco
Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo. Francisco Fontanilla was thrown a significant
distance away from the point of impact, and both victims required immediate
medical attention.
Francisco Fontanilla was initially taken to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. However, due to the seriousness of his injuries, he was
subsequently transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital. Unfortunately,
despite medical efforts, Francisco Fontanilla succumbed to his injuries and
passed away.
Following the tragic incident, the parents of the deceased, Spouses Jose
Fontanilla and Virginia Fontanilla, initiated legal proceedings by filing a
complaint for damages on April 17, 1978. This complaint was filed against the
National Irrigation Administration (NIA). After a trial, on March 20, 1980, the
trial court rendered its judgment, holding that the NIA was liable for damages.
The court ordered the NIA to pay the heirs of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla
P12,000.00 for his death, P3,389.00 for the expenses incurred by the parents for
his hospitalization and burial, and the costs of the case.
Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, the NIA filed a motion for
reconsideration on April 21, 1980, seeking to have the judgment overturned or
modified. The trial court, in its Order dated June 13, 1980, denied the NIA's
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that they were entitled to an
award of moral damages, relying on Article 2206 of the New Civil Code, which
allows the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and ascendants of the
deceased to claim moral damages for mental anguish resulting from the death of
the deceased.
Main Issues: Whether the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-
delict that resulted in the death of Francisco Fontanilla.
Whether the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency,
can be held liable for the damages caused by the accident and the alleged
negligence of its driver. The court first establishes that NIA is a government
corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government.
NIA performs non-governmental or proprietary functions, particularly in the
operation of irrigation systems and collecting fees from users. As such, NIA
assumes the liability of an ordinary employer for the damages caused by its
employees. The court emphasizes that the assumption of liability by NIA is
predicated upon the existence of negligence on its part. In this case, the
negligence being referred to is the negligence in the supervision of its driver-
employee, Hugo Garcia.
Duty of Due Diligence: The court highlights that NIA, as an ordinary employer,
has a duty of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
including drivers. The court finds evidence of negligence on the part of NIA due
to the circumstances of the accident. The accident occurred within the city limits
of San Jose City, an urban area, and the victim, Francisco Fontanilla, was
thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, indicating a high-speed
collision. The NIA vehicle suffered substantial damage, including dents and a
cracked radiator, indicating the severity of the impact. The NIA personnel did
not stop immediately after the accident to render assistance, but rather, they
were "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible."
The court cites precedent (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co.) to establish that
even if an employer proves diligence in the selection and supervision of an
employee, if the employer ratifies the wrongful acts or fails to avert further
damage, the employer can still be held liable. Award of Damages and Attorney's
Fees: Based on the above considerations, the court ruled as follows: The
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is directed to pay the petitioners-
spouses the necessary amounts. In summary, the court's decision in this case
underscores the principle that when a government agency engages in proprietary
functions, it assumes liability for the damages caused by its employees,
provided that negligence in selection and supervision is established. The court
found evidence of negligence in this case and awarded damages
accordingly. This case demonstrates the concept of implied consent when
the government enters into business contracts, indicating that government
agencies can be held liable for their actions in such contexts.

DEPT V. OÑATE 6/8/07

Facts: In the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Celso Oñate, the dispute
revolves around a piece of land, Lot 6849, located in Daraga, Albay,
Philippines. The Municipality of Daraga, Albay, claimed ownership of this land,
asserting that it had acquired it from the original owner, Claro Oñate, and had
held continuous possession since 1940. In 1988, the Municipality donated a
portion of Lot 6849, known as Lot 6849-A, to the Department of Education,
Culture, and Sports (DECS, now DepEd), which subsequently built and
operated an elementary school on the land.

In 1993, Celso Oñate, a descendant of the original owner Claro Oñate, filed a
lawsuit against the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, and DECS, seeking to
recover possession and title to Lot 6849. Celso Oñate argued that his family
never sold the land to the Municipality and that the donation to DECS was
invalid. In response, DECS raised the issue of laches, contending that Celso
Oñate and his predecessors had been aware of the Municipality's possession of
the land for more than five decades but took no action to assert their ownership
rights.

Main Issues: Whether DECS can be sued without its consent and whether it
can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines.; Whether the
doctrine of laches applies to bar Celso Oñate's action to recover possession and
title to Lot 6849.

Court's Ruling: Implied Consent in Government Business Contracts: In

this case, the court considered the consent given by the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) when it accepted the donation of land
from the Municipality of Daraga, Albay. The court argued that when DECS
voluntarily accepted the donation, it essentially consented to be treated like an
ordinary citizen in matters related to the disputed property. In other words,
DECS had implicitly given up its immunity from suit and could be sued as a
result of its involvement in the Deed of Donation.

Court's Reasoning: Non-Suability of the State: The court addressed the issue
of whether DECS could be sued without its consent. It held that DECS, as a
government agency, could be sued because it had voluntarily accepted the land
donation from the Municipality of Daraga, Albay. By doing so, DECS shed its
immunity from suit and could be treated like an ordinary citizen in legal matters
related to the property.

Non-Impleader of the Republic of the Philippines: While DECS technically

required the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against it,
the court deemed this procedural technicality as moot due to its resolution of the
main issue. The court emphasized that the Republic of the Philippines need not
be impleaded because it had implicitly approved DECS's involvement in the
Deed of Donation, granting DECS the authority to enter into such contracts and
to sue and be sued in its name.
Laches and its Elements: The court explained that laches involves the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do what
could or should have been done earlier. The elements of laches include conduct
by the defendant that gives rise to the situation, delay in asserting the plaintiff's
rights, lack of notice to the defendant about the plaintiff's intention to assert
those rights, and injury or prejudice to the defendant if relief is granted.
Application of Laches: The court ruled that laches had indeed set in. It found
that DECS had possessed Lot 6849-A in the concept of an owner since the
donation in 1988 and had continuously used it for public education. The court
also noted that Claro Oñate, the original owner, or his successors did not take
any action to question the ownership and possession by the Municipality of the
disputed lot for over five decades. Respondent Celso Oñate and his
predecessors-in-interest also did not take any steps to recover the lot for an
extended period. The court concluded that laches barred Celso Oñate's action to
recover possession of the disputed lot.
Different Treatment for Different Portions of Lot 6849: The court
distinguished between different portions of Lot 6849. Laches applied to Lot
6849-A, which DECS possessed, but not to other portions that were cultivated
by agricultural tenants. DECS's claim of laches was upheld only with respect to
Lot 6849-A.
Validity of Transfer Certificates of Title: The court rejected DECS's
argument that the reconstitution of the original certificate of title (OCT) was
invalid, stating that a reconstitution proceeding is binding on the whole world. It
also noted that tax declarations alone could not defeat a registered title.
Therefore, transfer certificates of title (TCTs) for portions of Lot 6849 were
validly issued.

Relating it to the Concept of Implied Consent in Government Business

Contracts: In this case, the concept of implied consent arises from DECS's
voluntary acceptance of the land donation. By accepting the donation and
involving itself in the Deed of Donation, DECS essentially consented to be
treated like an ordinary citizen in legal matters concerning the property. This
implied consent allowed DECS to be sued without its express permission and
without the need to implead the Republic of the Philippines. Furthermore, the
court's ruling highlights the government's implied consent when entering into
business contracts and the related concept of laches. It recognizes that, like any
other party in a contract, the government agency involved must act in good faith
and cannot remain inactive for an unreasonable period while knowing that its
actions or inactions may adversely affect other parties involved.

b) Inequitable to Claim Immunity- EPG V. VIGILAR 3/16/01

Facts:

1. In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement initiated a housing project on

a government property in Pasig City. The Ministry of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with the Ministry of Human Settlement to develop the housing site and
construct 145 housing units.
2. The DPWH then entered into individual contracts with several
construction companies, represented by petitioners, for the construction
of these housing units. These contracts covered only around "2/3 of each
housing unit."
3. Despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts, the
petitioners agreed to undertake "additional constructions" for the
completion of the housing units based on the verbal request and assurance
of then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would
be available.
4. After completing the work under the written contracts, the petitioners had
an unpaid balance of P5,918,315.63, representing the expenses for the
"additional constructions."
5. The petitioners sent a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary, claiming
that their payment was favorably recommended by DPWH Assistant
Secretary for Legal Services Dominador Madamba, who recognized the
existence of implied contracts covering the additional constructions.
6. The COA initially returned the money claims to DPWH, stating that
funds should be made available first before considering the claims.
7. Eventually, the DBM released the amount of P5,819,316.00 for the
payment of petitioners' money claims.
8. In 1996, DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the money claims,
leading the petitioners to file a Petition for Mandamus in the Regional
Trial Court seeking payment.

Main Issues:
 1. The core issue in the case is whether the petitioners are entitled to
compensation for the "additional constructions" on the public works
housing project.
2. The case also raises the question of whether the State can be sued in this
matter, considering the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the
State.

Court's Ruling with Reasoning:

The court, in this case, ruled in favor of the petitioners, allowing them to be
compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public works housing
project. Here's the reasoning behind the decision:

1. Implied Consent and Quantum Meruit: While the court acknowledged

that the "implied contracts" between the DPWH and petitioners for the
additional constructions were void due to violations of applicable laws
and lack of legal requirements, it recognized the principle of quantum
meruit. Quantum meruit is a legal doctrine that allows a party to recover
the reasonable value of goods or services provided even in the absence of
a formal contract. In this case, despite the illegality of the contracts, the
court upheld the petitioners' right to be compensated for the actual work
performed and services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit.
2. Good Faith and Government Benefit: The court noted that the
petitioners acted in good faith when they undertook the additional
constructions. They believed, based on verbal assurances from a DPWH
Undersecretary, that appropriations for the additional work would be
available. The completion of the housing units was for the benefit of the
government and the public. As a result, it would be unjust to deny the
petitioners' claim for compensation for work done in the public interest.
3. State Immunity from Suit: Respondent argued that the State cannot be
sued in this case, citing the doctrine of Non-suability of the State.
However, the court clarified that this doctrine has exceptions. It stated
that the State's immunity from suit does not apply when upholding such
immunity would result in injustice. In this case, the court found that
justice and equity demanded that the State's immunity from suit be
waived to allow the petitioners to receive compensation for their work.
4. Ends of Justice: The court emphasized that it cannot allow an injustice
to be perpetuated by upholding the State's immunity from suit when the
State and the public have already benefited from the petitioners' work.
Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners and directed the
Commission on Audit to determine and ascertain the compensation due to
them on a quantum meruit basis.
In summary, the court's decision in this case was based on the principles of
quantum meruit, good faith, government benefit, and exceptions to the State's
immunity from suit. It allowed the petitioners to receive compensation for their
work on the public works housing project, despite the void nature of the
contracts, in the interest of substantial justice and equity.

RP V. UNIMEX 3/9/07;
Facts: In April 1985, Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a
40-foot container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges,
duplicators, expanders, remote controllers, parts, and accessories to Handyware
Phils., Inc., which were transported by Don Tim Shipping Corporation with
Evergreen Marine Corporation as the shipping agent. Upon arrival at the Port of
Manila on July 9, 1985, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that
the shipment did not match the description on the cargo manifest, leading to
seizure proceedings against Handyware and a warrant of seizure and detention
against the shipment.
 The Collector of Customs issued a default order against Handyware on
June 5, 1987, for failing to appear in the seizure proceedings, and
subsequently forfeited the goods in favor of the government.
 Unimex, as the shipper and owner of the goods, filed a motion to
intervene in the seizure proceedings on June 15, 1987, which was
granted. However, the Collector of Customs declared the default order
against Handyware as final and executory, confirming the forfeiture of
the goods.
 Unimex filed a petition for review against the BOC Commissioner in the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), resulting in a decision on June 15, 1992,
which reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the
shipment to Unimex, subject to the payment of customs duties.
 Unimex's counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA
decision and instead filed separate claims for damages against the
shipping companies, both of which were dismissed.
 In 2001, Unimex filed a petition in the CTA to revive the 1992 decision,
seeking the immediate release of its shipment or payment of its value plus
damages.

Main Issues: whether the CTA had the authority to modify a final and
executory judgment, which initially ordered the release of the shipment to
Unimex but was sought to be altered due to subsequent events.
 whether the doctrine of laches applied, given the delay in securing a writ of
execution and the subsequent petition to revive the 1992 decision.

The third issue concerned the imposition of legal interest, whether it was
justified, and the basis for calculating it.
1. Government Liability for Actual Damages: whether the government could
be held liable for actual damages and whether there was a legal basis for the
government's obligation to pay Unimex.

Court's Ruling and Reasoning: The court held that while it is a general rule
that final and executory judgments cannot be altered or modified, there are
exceptions. In this case, the fact that Unimex's goods were inexplicably lost
while in the custody of the BOC constituted a supervening event that warranted
the modification of the CTA decision. The court reasoned that even if the
original decision had been maintained, the BOC would have been unable to
comply with it due to the loss of the goods. Therefore, modification was
justified.

Application of Laches: The court determined that laches did not apply in this
case. Laches involves the failure to assert a right within a reasonable time, and it
was clear from the records that Unimex had diligently pursued its claim without
negligence or omission. Unimex had not abandoned its claim, and it filed the
petition to revive the judgment within the period specified by the Rules.
Imposition of Legal Interest: The court ruled that the imposition of legal
interest was not justified. Interest may be paid either as compensation for the
use of money (monetary interest) or as damages (compensatory interest). Since
the case did not involve a monetary obligation between the parties, there was no
basis for the imposition of legal interest. The court held that interest is
chargeable only when it has been stipulated in a contract, allowed by legislation,
or in eminent domain cases where damages take the form of interest at the legal
rate.
Government Liability for Actual Damages: The court acknowledged that
while the government is generally immune from liability for governmental acts,
in this case, the circumstances did not allow the court to reject Unimex's claim
solely based on the doctrine of state immunity. The BOC's ineptitude and
negligence in the safekeeping of the goods were evident, and the government
could not avoid its liability in such a situation. The court ruled that upon
payment of customs duties by Unimex, the government's liability would be
satisfied from the sale of goods or properties seized or forfeited by the BOC.

In conclusion, the court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals, with
modifications, and ordered the government, represented by the BOC
Commissioner, to pay Unimex the value of the subject shipment, to be
computed in Philippine currency at the prevailing exchange rate at the time of
actual payment, subject to customs duties. The court rejected the imposition of
legal interest and held that the government's liability was justified due to its
negligence.

ATCI V. ECHIN, 10/11/10;

Facts:

1. Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation to

work for the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait as a medical
technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly salary of
US$1,200.00.
2. The employment contract stipulated a probationary period of one year
and was governed by Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment Contract
No. 2.
3. Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000, but was terminated on
February 11, 2001, for allegedly failing to pass the probationary period.
4. The Ministry denied respondent's request for reconsideration, and she
returned to the Philippines on her own, shouldering her airfare.
5. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against ATCI, represented by
Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry.

Main Issues:

1. The legality of respondent's termination - Whether respondent was

illegally dismissed or validly terminated for failing to meet the
performance rating within the one-year probationary period under
Kuwait's Civil Service Laws.
2. Liability of the local recruitment agency (ATCI) - Whether ATCI should
be held jointly and severally liable with the foreign principal (the
Ministry).
3. Liability of Amalia Ikdal - Whether Amalia Ikdal, as an officer of ATCI,
should be held liable for money claims and damages awarded to overseas
workers.

Court's Ruling with Reasoning:

1. Liability of the Local Recruitment Agency (ATCI): The court ruled

that ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility
for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) it deploys
 abroad by claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency with
immunity from suit. Republic Act No. 8042 provides for the joint and
solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign
principals. This ensures that OFWs receive immediate and sufficient
payment of what is due to them. The court emphasized that the
obligations under the recruitment agreement extend until the expiration of
the employment contracts, and invoking immunity or waiting for a
foreign principal's liability to be judicially determined renders the law on
joint and solidary liability ineffective.
2. Applicability of Philippine Labor Laws: The court rejected the
argument that the terms of the employment contract stipulated that
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations govern respondent's
employment. The court held that the party invoking the application of a
foreign law must prove that law. In this case, petitioners failed to provide
a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials. Therefore, Philippine labor laws applied
in determining the issues.
3. Liability of Amalia Ikdal: The court affirmed Amalia Ikdal's joint and
solidary liability as a corporate officer under Republic Act No. 8042,
which mandates the joint and several liability of the principal/employer
and the recruitment/placement agency for money claims and damages
awarded to overseas workers. This provision is a condition precedent for
the approval of overseas employment contracts, and corporate officers
and directors may be held liable.

In summary, the court ruled against the petitioners, finding ATCI jointly and
severally liable with the Ministry, applying Philippine labor laws, and affirming
Amalia Ikdal's liability as a corporate officer. The concept of implied consent as
inequitable to claim immunity was not directly addressed in this case, but the
ruling emphasized the importance of joint and solidary liability to protect
OFWs' rights.
MMDA V. DM CONSUNJI, 2/20/19
The case involves a dispute between the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) and D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) and R-II Builders, Inc.
(R-II Builders) regarding a waste management project. Here are the key facts:

1. MMDA initiated a selection process for the development and operation of

a new sanitary landfill under the Build-Operate-Own (BOO) scheme.
2. Legal actions by concerned groups delayed the project.
3. An interim waste disposal site was chosen for a two-year period,
endorsed by then MMDA Chairman Jejomar C. Binay to the Presidential
Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects, and approved by then
President Joseph E. Estrada.
4. DMCI and R-II Builders won the public bidding and were awarded the
contract for an integrated solid waste management facility/sanitary
landfill project.
5. They signed a contract for the project on January 4, 2001, but it had not
yet been approved and signed by the President.
6. Respondents proceeded with the project under MMDA's instruction, but
temporary restraining orders (TROs) were issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Antique, halting the operation.
7. Respondents demanded reimbursement from MMDA for expenses
incurred.
8. Legal opinions differed on whether respondents should be compensated
based on quantum meruit (reasonable value of services).
9. MMDA rejected the reimbursement claim, citing various contractual and
legal reasons.
10.Respondents filed a lawsuit against MMDA for sum of money based on
quantum meruit.
11.Respondents argued that once the decision holding MMDA liable on
quantum meruit becomes final, they would file their money claim with
the Commission on Audit (COA) to enforce the final judgment.

Main Issues: The main issues in the case are as follows:

1. Jurisdiction: Whether the Commission on Audit (COA) has primary

jurisdiction over the case.
Court's Ruling with Reasoning: The Court's ruling primarily revolves around
the issue of jurisdiction and its relation to the concept of implied consent as
inequitable to claim immunity.

Jurisdiction Issue and Implied Consent: The central issue in this case is
whether the COA has primary jurisdiction over the money claim against
MMDA, particularly based on quantum meruit. The court held that the COA
indeed possesses primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities, as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 327
and Presidential Decree No. 1445.

The court emphasized that this jurisdiction is not waived by the parties' actions
or inactions. It also cited various precedents to underline the expertise of the
COA in adjudicating money claims against government entities and the
importance of adhering to its jurisdiction.

The concept of implied consent as inequitable to claim immunity comes into

play here. Implied consent refers to a situation in which a party, through its
actions or conduct, implicitly agrees to be subjected to a particular jurisdiction
or authority. In this case, the court reasoned that by entering into a contract with
the government (MMDA), DMCI and R-II Builders implicitly consented to the
jurisdiction of the COA for the resolution of any money claims arising from that
contract.

The court's rationale for this conclusion is that when private parties enter into
contracts with government agencies, they effectively consent to the
government's rules and procedures for the resolution of disputes or claims
arising from those contracts. In this context, it would be inequitable for private
parties to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the COA when they have
benefited from the government contract.

The court's decision aligns with the principle that government contracts should
be treated in a manner that ensures fairness and accountability. By requiring
money claims related to such contracts to be adjudicated by the COA, the court
reinforces the notion that parties entering into agreements with government
entities cannot selectively choose which jurisdiction to submit to based on their
convenience.

Conclusion: In this case, the court ruled that the COA has primary jurisdiction
over the money claim based on quantum meruit against MMDA, emphasizing
that implied consent as inequitable to claim immunity applies when private
parties enter into contracts with government agencies. This decision underscores
the importance of adhering to established government procedures and
jurisdiction for resolving disputes related to government contracts.

c) Government Initiates Complaint- LIM V. BROWNELL, 3/24/60;

1. The case involves four parcels of land in Tondo, City of Manila, totaling
29,151 square meters.
2. These lands were registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, a national of
Japan, during or after World War II.
3. The Alien Property Custodian of the United States issued vesting orders
for two of these lots on March 14, 1946, and for the remaining two on
July 6, 1948, under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
4. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator and the
President of the Philippines executed agreements transferring all four lots
to the Republic of the Philippines.
5. Benito E. Lim claimed that the lots originally belonged to Arsenia
Enriquez, his mother, and were unlawfully taken by Kagawa during the
war.

Main Issues:

1. Jurisdiction: The Court of First Instance of Manila initially dismissed the

case for lack of jurisdiction. It considered whether the court had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
2. Enemy Property Claims: The main issue revolved around whether Benito
E. Lim could recover the properties that were vested under the Trading
with the Enemy Act.
3. Immunity of the United States: The case raised questions regarding the
United States' immunity from lawsuits and whether the United States had
consented to being sued in this case.

Court's Ruling with Reasoning:

1. Jurisdiction: The initial dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction was
partially upheld and partially revoked by the court.
 With regard to Lots 1 and 2, the court upheld the dismissal. These
lots were vested by the Alien Property Custodian on March 14,
1946. The two-year period for filing a suit for their return expired
on March 14, 1948. As the claim was not filed within the
prescribed period, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action for these lots.
  However, for Lots 3 and 4, the court revoked the dismissal. These
lots were vested on July 6, 1948. The two-year period for filing a
suit for their return expired on July 7, 1950. The complaint for
these lots, filed on November 13, 1950, was within the prescribed
period. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to proceed
with the case regarding Lots 3 and 4.
2. Enemy Property Claims: The court ruled that Benito E. Lim could not
recover the properties that were vested under the Trading with the Enemy
Act for Lots 1 and 2 due to the expiration of the two-year period for filing
a suit. However, for Lots 3 and 4, the court allowed the case to proceed to
determine whether Lim could recover these properties.
3. Immunity of the United States: The court held that the action against the
United States was permissible under the Trading with the Enemy Act
when brought by a person who was neither an enemy nor an ally of an
enemy to establish their right, title, or interest in vested property. The
United States had consented to such suits.
 The court also upheld the dismissal of the claim for damages
against the Attorney General of the United States, as the Trading
with the Enemy Act did not authorize such a claim.
 The claim for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, to
which the properties were transferred, could not be maintained due
to the immunity of the state from suit. The Republic intervened in
the case only to resist the claims against it, and it had not waived
its right of non-suability.
In summary, the court partially upheld the dismissal of the case based on
jurisdictional issues regarding the expiration of the two-year period for Lots 1
and 2 but allowed the case to proceed for Lots 3 and 4. It recognized that certain
claims could be brought under the Trading with the Enemy Act against the
United States but not for damages. Additionally, it upheld the immunity of the
Republic of the Philippines from certain claims. The court's ruling considered
the limitations and consent provided by the Trading with the Enemy Act.

RP V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 2/28/90;

Facts:

1. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (Civil
Case No. 0025) in the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos and
others for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages.
 2. Simplicio A. Palanca, a stockholder of Bacolod Real Estate Development
Corporation (BREDCO), and other similarly situated stockholders, filed a
motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 0025, attaching their "Answer in
Intervention."
3. In their motion, the intervenors claimed a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, particularly concerning the properties listed in the complaint as
BREDCO lots and shares of stock in Bacolod Real Estate Development
Corporation.
4. They argued that the complaint did not mention any anomalous
transactions involving BREDCO or its lots and stocks and that the
defendants were not the registered owners of these properties.
5. The intervenors also contended that any interest the defendants had in
BREDCO was an accommodation by BREDCO stockholders to secure
financing for a reclamation and port development project.
6. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to intervene and admitted the
Answer in Intervention, which prompted the Republic of the Philippines
to file a petition to annul these decisions.

Main Issues: The main issues in this case are as follows:

1. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the action for

intervention, and if so, did it act with grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the intervention?
2. Is the action for intervention equivalent to a suit or counter-suit against
the sovereign state, the Republic of the Philippines?

Court's Ruling with Reasoning: The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution, held the
following:

1. Jurisdiction: The Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction

over cases involving the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees, as mandated by Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, and 4. The court
also asserted its jurisdiction over "all incidents arising from, incidental to,
or related to, such cases," including disputes over property like the
BREDCO lots and shares. As intervention is an ancillary and
supplemental proceeding to an existing litigation, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over private respondents' action for intervention in Civil Case
No. 0025.
2. Legal Interest and Right to Intervene: The court found that the
intervenors had a legal interest in the matter in litigation. They were
stockholders of BREDCO who transferred their shareholdings to Marsteel
 Consolidated Inc. (MCI), enabling MCI to secure financing for a
reclamation project. They claimed a 35% interest in the excess revenues
from the project. This legal interest qualified them for intervention under
Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The intervenors were also
situated to be adversely affected if the court ordered reconveyance of the
BREDCO lots and stocks, which were now in custodia legis.
3. Sovereign Immunity: The court rejected the argument that the
intervention amounted to a suit or counter-suit against the sovereign state.
It emphasized that private respondents' intervention was defensive in
nature; they merely joined the defendants in resisting the claims of the
Republic of the Philippines. Their action for intervention did not seek
affirmative relief against the state.
4. Non-Suability Waiver: The court cited precedents to support the notion
that when the state intervenes in a case and participates in resisting claims
against it, it waives its right to non-suability. In this case, the intervenors
did not initiate the action but united with the defendants in resisting the
claims, which amounted to a waiver of non-suability.

In conclusion, the Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of allowing the intervention,

asserting its jurisdiction over the matter, and rejecting the argument that the
intervention amounted to a suit against the sovereign state. The court
emphasized the defensive nature of the intervention and the waiver of non-
suability by the state in such circumstances.

This case illustrates the principle that intervention can be permitted when a
party has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, even if the state is involved,
as long as it does not result in a direct suit against the sovereign state. The
court's decision highlights the importance of legal interest and the distinction
between defensive and offensive interventions.

RP V. SANDIGANBAYAN 3/6/06;
Facts:

1. Civil Case No. 0034 was filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others.
This case was part of several suits concerning ill-gotten or unexplained
wealth, filed by the PCGG pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14,
series of 1986.
2. The PCGG issued writs to sequester all business enterprises and
properties registered in the name of Roberto S. Benedicto or corporations
 he controlled, including 227 shares of the Negros Occidental Golf and
Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI).
3. PCGG representatives became members of the NOGCCI Board of
Directors and passed a resolution in October 1986, changing the policy to
assess monthly membership dues on each NOGCCI share.
4. Subsequently, in March 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another
resolution, increasing the monthly membership dues.
5. PCGG did not pay the membership dues totaling P2,959,471.00 on the
227 sequestered shares, leading to their declaration as delinquent and set
for auction.
6. PCGG filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, but it was dismissed, and the auction sale of the
shares proceeded on August 5, 1989.
7. On November 3, 1990, the Republic and Benedicto entered into a
Compromise Agreement, which included a general release clause. This
agreement led to a Sandiganbayan decision on October 2, 1992,
approving the agreement and rendering judgment accordingly.
8. Disagreements arose regarding the implementation of the Compromise
Agreement, leading to motions and resolutions from both parties.

Main Issues:

1. Whether PCGG is liable for not paying the membership dues on the
sequestered NOGCCI shares, which eventually led to their foreclosure
sale.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan's resolutions holding PCGG liable amounted
to a grave abuse of discretion.

Court's Ruling with Reasoning:

The Sandiganbayan ruled against the PCGG and held that it was at fault for not
paying the membership dues on the sequestered NOGCCI shares, which
resulted in their foreclosure sale.

The court reasoned as follows:

1. PCGG's Duty as Receiver: PCGG did not dispute that it was considered
a receiver for the sequestered NOGCCI shares. As a receiver, it had a
duty to pay outstanding debts related to the sequestered property. The
court held that membership dues attached to the shares and were
essentially obligations of the shares themselves. PCGG, as a receiver, was
 duty-bound to preserve the value of the shares, and this included taking
timely measures to prevent their loss.
2. Inaction and Delay: PCGG's filing of an injunction complaint (Civil
Case No. 5348) to stop the foreclosure sale was deemed too little and too
late. The court criticized PCGG for allowing delinquency to set in before
taking action, and for not opposing the changes in membership dues
policy made by the NOGCCI Board, of which PCGG representatives
were part.
3. Finality of Liability: The issue of liability for the shares had already
become final and executory. The Sandiganbayan cited previous
resolutions and pleadings that formed the basis for its decisions. The
resolutions in question were clarificatory and reiterated PCGG's
obligation under the Compromise Agreement.
4. State Immunity: PCGG invoked state immunity from suit, arguing that
paying for the delinquent shares would necessitate the appropriation of
public funds. However, the court ruled that when the state initiates a
lawsuit against a private party, it waives its immunity from suit. In this
case, PCGG had initiated Civil Case No. 0034 and entered into the
Compromise Agreement, thereby relinquishing its immunity.

In conclusion, the Sandiganbayan's resolutions were upheld because they were

based on facts and the law. PCGG's failure to act prudently and its waiver of
immunity in the course of litigation led to its liability for the loss of the
sequestered NOGCCI shares.

PIDACAN V. ATO, 8/25/10

In the case of Heirs of Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo v. Air Transportation
Office (ATO), the main issues revolve around the payment of just compensation
for a parcel of land that was expropriated by the ATO for the construction and
expansion of an airport. The case also touches on the concept of implied consent
as inequitable to claim immunity.

Facts:

1. In 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo acquired a 22-hectare

parcel of land in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. An Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 2204 was issued in their favor.
2. In 1948, the ATO used a portion of this land for an airport. Over the
years, they expanded and developed the airport facilities on this property.
 3. The Pidacan heirs (petitioners) demanded compensation for the land and
rental payments for its use, but ATO refused to pay.
4. In 1988, OCT No. 2204 was canceled, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-7160 was issued in favor of the Pidacan heirs.
5. The Pidacan heirs filed a complaint against ATO for the payment of the
land's value and rentals. The RTC initially ruled in their favor in 1994,
but the case went through appeals.
6. In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Pidacan heirs, declaring
that the ATO's actions amounted to eminent domain, and just
compensation was owed to the heirs. The Court ordered the payment of
compensation based on the 2001 valuation.
7. The ATO made various attempts to avoid payment, including invoking
government immunity from suit and arguing that the matter should be
settled with the Commission on Audit (COA).

Main Issues:

1. Whether the ATO is in legal estoppel to oppose the execution of the

Supreme Court's decision, considering its prior litigations.
2. Whether the final decision of the Supreme Court can be executed by the
trial court despite the provisions of P.D. No. 1445, COA rules, and
Administrative Circular No. 10-2000.
3. Whether the ATO is legally obligated to pursue and obtain the monetary
claim awarded by the Supreme Court from other government offices.

Court's Ruling and Reasoning: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Pidacan
heirs, setting aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and directing
the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce its earlier decision. The Court
provided the following reasoning:

1. Judicial Determination of Just Compensation: The determination of

just compensation is a judicial function, and the Supreme Court had
already ruled on the matter in its 2007 decision. A final and executory
decision left nothing to be done except for its execution.
2. Earmarked Funding: The Director General of ATO informed the
Pidacan heirs that funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of
the property was earmarked in the 2007 General Appropriations Act for
ATO's Infrastructure Program. This constituted the required appropriation
by law to pay the just compensation to the heirs.
3. State Immunity: The principle of state immunity from suit does not
apply in this case. While the state is generally immune from suit, this
immunity has exceptions. In this instance, justice and equity demand that
the state's immunity not be used to perpetrate an injustice against the
 citizens. The state cannot hide behind immunity when it is obligated to
pay just compensation for expropriated property.
4. Execution of Judgment: The Court emphasized that execution is the
fruit and end of the suit and that the winning party should not be deprived
of the fruits of the verdict. Courts should not allow any attempt to prolong
litigation. In this case, the Pidacan heirs had been deprived of the
beneficial use of their property for a long time, and withholding payment
of just compensation would be unjust and inequitable.

In summary, the Court's ruling in this case underscores the importance of

enforcing final and executory judgments, especially in cases involving just
compensation for expropriated property. It also clarifies that the principle of
state immunity from suit has exceptions when justice and equity demand it. The
ATO was directed to pay the just compensation awarded by the Supreme Court,
as the necessary funding had been earmarked, and the Pidacan heirs were
entitled to the execution of the judgment.