The Regulation of Complex Organized Systems

Author(s): Michel Crozier and Jean-Claude Thoenig

Source: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), pp. 547-570
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell
University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391716 .
Accessed: 03/09/2013 00:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Inc. and Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Administrative Science Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Regulationof Com-
plex OrganizedSystems
Michel Crozier and
Jean-Claude Thoenig
Anearlierversionof this paperappearedas
"LaRegulationdes Systemes Organis6s
Complexes." RevueFrancaisede
Sociologie,janvier-rnars1975-XVI-4:3-32.
December 1976, volume 21
This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM
In this study French local government is analyzed. The
analysis shows that French public affairs at the local level
are managed by a complex, stable system of groups and
institutions. The analysis also lends support to the conten-
tion that interorganizational relations are regulated by a
complex, and more or less organized, system rather than
by an interorganizational network.e
The relationshipbetween organizationsand their externalen-
vironmenthas long been considereda sociologicalproblemto
be exploredeitherthrougha culturalistapproachderivedfrom
social anthropologyor throughan approachbased on political
economics or history.The heuristicvalue of these approaches
is limitedbecause they are based more or less implicitlyon
the assumption that there is a homologous relationshipbe-
tween the specific organizationstudied and the global socie-
ty. They also suggest a deterministicview of social change.
Not satisfied with these older approaches,organizational
sociologists have adopted alternativeapproaches.One has
been to applythe modes of reasoningand the methods of
analysis employed in the study of the relationbetween the
units or members of an organizationvis-a-visthe relation
between the organizationand its environment.This new ap-
proachbecame possible in the early 1960s, when realprog-
ress was made in understandingthe organizationas an open
system (Emeryand Trist,1965; Katzand Kahn,1966).
Implicitin this new approachis the recognitionthat the rela-
tionshipbetween an organizationand its environmentis
based on dependence. Levineand White (1961) showed that
the organizationmaintainsrelationswith the outside world
because of its dependence on the scarcityof availablere-
sources. Litwakand Hylton(1962) stated that, in fact, the
dependence is reciprocal;the organizationacts on the envi-
ronmentat least as much as it is affected by it. Weick (1969)
pointedout that withincertainlimitsthe organizationcan
structureand mold its own environment.Thompsonand
MacEwen(1958) proposed four possible organizational
strategies for acting on the environment.Thompson(1967)
stressed the fact that the environmentconstitutes an uncer-
taintywhich the organizationtries to controland reduce.
The environmentexhibits differentcharacteristicsaccording
to the situation.Hall(1972) made a distinctionbetween the
general and-thespecific environmentof the organization.
Duncan(1972) showed that, in additionto an externalenviron-
ment, the organizationcan also have an internalone.
Emeryand Trist(1965) classifiedthe environmentaccording
to four differenttypes based on theircomplexityand fluidity.
Burnsand Stalker(1961), Aikenand Hage (1968), and Law-
rence and Lorsch(1967) emphasized that the internalstruc-
tures of the organizationmay vary radicallydepending on the
natureof the environment.
A turningpointwas reached when the concept of environ-
ment was conceived as a universeof specific, differentiated
units which must be defined. Evan(1966) proposed the con-
cept of the organizationalset which should identifyand
specify the organizationswhich form the particularenviron-
547/AdministrativeScience Quarterly
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ment of the focal organization.Warren(1967) emphasized
that the environmentis a structuredfield consisting of a
series of organizations.Turk(1970) specified that this field
constitutes an interorganizational networkwith particular
characteristicsand that it exists by virtueof some degree of
social integration.Crozier(1972) showed that this network
can be consideredas a more or less structuredorganized
system and that it can be analyzedas such by the methods
developed by the sociology of organizations.Aldrich(1974)
adopted the same idea. Inthis perspective, the concept of
environmentbecame a residualcategory identifyingall that
does not belong to the network.
As Benson (1974) noted, however, contributionsmade in the
literatureare more conceptualthan empirical.They take the
form of abstracttypologies, stating theoreticalconditionsor
criticalprogramsratherthan proposingempiricalanalyses or
testing the concrete data of the new approaches.And even
when such empiricalanalyses are set forth,they are com-
parativelyweak and quite inadequatein view of the scientific
objectives stated. The descriptionoutweighs the analysis.
Causalityis inferred,ratherthan demonstrated.The most
commonly used methods are, on the one hand,the study of
communicationflows and resource exchanges, and, on the
other, the comparisonof formalcharacteristicsof the
organization-structureandoutput-and the types of environ-
ment. The problemof change remainsuntouchedsince
the social universes studied are treated in a static manner.
The present articleis designed to make an empirical,as well
as a methodological,contribution.Its purpose is to bridgethe
gap between theory and empiricismin this new field of com-
plex and partiallyorganizedinterorganizational systems. Its
objective is to show, througha concrete case study, the
advantageof one mode of reasoningin understandingthe
subtle regulationswhich govern interorganizational milieus.
The concept of a complex and more or less organizedsystem
seems preferableto the idea of an interorganizational net-
work. Fora system means regulation,integration,and
homeostasis. To claimthat an organizationis partof a larger
system is to requiresociologicalproofthat the system means
more than the sum of its parts, and that there is a collective
game which exists independentlyof the individualgames
playedby each of the organizations.
To test such an approach,a special case of collective decision
makingin Franceis analyzed.This case shows that public
affairsat the local level are managed by a complex, but stable
and organized,system of institutionsand groups. Such an
analysis relies largelyon the results of researchon the sys-
tem of power at the level of the d6partement(departments)
and the role of political,economic, and administrativeelites
(Thoenig,1975).
The researchwas directedby Jean-ClaudeThoenig. Between
December 1973 and March1974, a survey was carriedout in
three departments-Somme, Allier,and Herault.Five hundred
twenty-seven officialswere interviewedwho belonged to the
maininstitutions-state bureaucracies,economic association,
and so forth-or who were mayorsor other elected officials
in these departments.
548/ASO

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

Inaddition,this case also draws upon the results of other

researches previouslymade by the fellows of the Centrede
Sociologie des Organisationsin Parisunderthe directionof
MichelCrozier,particularly by PierreGremion(1976).
COLLECTIVE DECISIONMAKINGAND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTIN FRANCE
Variousapproachescan be used in the study of collective
decision makingin publicaffairs.Some of the paradigms
frequentlyappliedto the study of localgovernment, particu-
larlyin and about France,are administrativescience, political
sociology, and class conflicttheory. A differentapproach,that
of system analysis, is suggested here.
A System Based on Interdependence
At first sight, a coordinatedstyle of management of public
affairsat the local level seems impossible in France.Numer-
ous institutionsand groups are in charge of localgovernment
at each territoriallevel. Thereare two basic levels of local
government: the commune-there are approximately34,000
communes in France-and the department-there are 96. In
addition,other publicauthoritiesexist which are inter-
mediariesbetween the commune and the department,but
which do not have much importance,such as the arron-
dissement and the districturbain.
The commune is managedby a municipalcouncilelected by
the population.The municipalcouncilis headed by a mayor
who is chosen from its members. Eachcommune, whether a
city of a millioninhabitantsor a smallvillage, is organizedin
the same way.
The departmentis governed by a legislativebody, the conseil
general, elected popularly,whose majortask is to vote the
budget for publicworks, welfare, education,and the like.

A complex mosaic of privateand publicauthoritiesact as

representativesof economic and social interests, such as the
chambersof commerce, the chambers of agriculture,work-
ers' and farmers'unions, employers' associations, the politi-
cal parties,and citizens' committees. Even the centralstate
intervenes directlyin localaffairsand it does so through
several autonomous bureaucracies.Eachstate ministryhas
its own field agencies located in each department.Formally,
one state field agency, the prefecture, has playeda particu-
larlyimportantrole and more specifically,its director,the
prefet (prefect).There, high publicservants are appointedby
the state to be the representativesof the centralgovernment
in the departments.Simultaneously,they are also the execu-
tive branchof the general council.Fieldagencies of the state
bureaucraciesalso playa double role; they implementthe
decisions made by their ministryin Parisand they check the
decisions made by localauthoritiesto determine if these
decisions conformto the technicalrules of the state. Co-
ordinativemeasures are taken regularlyby the centralgovern-
ment and its technocrats to improvethe level of cooperation,
but they are hardlyadequate, as shown in the case of the
1964 reform,which was supposed to increase the power of
the prefect as the coordinatorof publicmanagementat the
departmentlevel (Gremion,1966). Everybodycomplainsof
549/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 isolationfrom other units; fragmentationis a basic charac-
teristic of localgovernment; and the informationflow is very
low. Historicrivalries,conflicts of interests, and reluctanceto
cooperationare common.
Despite the lackof coordinationand communication,how-
ever, the activitiesof the numerousinstitutions,organizations,
and groups are interdependent.They are all involvedin the
same game, although,to a large extent, it is a game of
defense, protection,and noncommunication.If there is
steady resistance to coordinationand formaladjustments, it is
not because the playersdo not know one another,nor be-
cause they are farfrom one another,but because they belong
to an informal,but complex and stable, system which has
other forms of regulation.This system may be only a partly
explicitone, but it is nevertheless efficient.
The first sign indicatingthe existence of a game common to
these organizationsis the presence of a series of paired
relationshipsbetween some of the key participants,as
Worms (1966) noted in his skillfulanalysis of the relations
between prefects and mayorsof middle-sizecities. The ap-
parenthostilityof mayorstowardtheirprefects and the crit-
icism that prefects directtowards their mayors conceal a
deep complicity;efficient prefects know how to listen to their
mayorsand efficient mayors are naturallyattentive to their
prefects. Theiractivitiescomplement each other and are
comprehensibleonly if one studies the pairformed by the
two partners.Althoughthe mayors must take the initiative,
they allow themselves to be promptedby the prefects, pro-
vided that the prefects agree to let the mayorsreceive the
recognitionand the prefects take their mayors'needs and
wishes into account. The subtlety of the relationcan lead to
misunderstandingsand problems in communicationand it
does not facilitaterationaland formalcoordination.There is
interdependence,however, and to understandthe results of
this jointactivity,it is more importantto understandthe
functioningof the system than to focus on the a prioriprefer-
ences of the decision makers.
The case of the prefect and of the mayoris not an exceptional
one. There are manyother cases in which state bureaucrats
and local elites have established close interpersonalrelation-
ships. Everydirectorof the field agencies of state ministries
has some localpartners,such as politicaland economical
officials;every localofficialhas privilegedpartnerswithinthe
state bureaucracy.The directorof the field office of the minis-
tryof agriculture,locatedat-thedepartmentlevel, for
instance, and the directorof the localchamberof agriculture
are one such pair.Anotherpairis composed of the mayorsof
small towns and the heads of localoffices of the ministryof
publicworks located at the infradepartmental level.
The present researchsuggests that, generally,communica-
tion is easier between state officialsand localpoliticaland
economic elites-even if formallythey are independentand
their respective institutionsare rival-than is the case among
themselves in theirown organizations,where conflicts be-
tween hierarchicallevels result in a low level of communica-
tion. To some extent these pairsof individualsbelongingto
differentinstitutionsare more integratedwith each other than
550/ASO

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

I
The Frenchterm of notablehas no con-
venienttranslationin English.The French
notableis the localor regionalpersonof
influencewho has been grantedinformal
recognitionby the state authority.The
notablesare membersof the local6lite
whose prominence-because they have
acquireda strategicpositioneitherby
popularelectionor by representationof
powerfulinterests-makes them a
necessary partnerfor decisionmaking.
Mayorsor generalcouncilmenare not-
ables.
This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM
Regulation
they are to each of their respective institutions.Differences
between state officialsand local leaders and between
bureaucratsand notables1are considerablyless than they
appearto be. In many ways, the bureaucratis a notable. As
forthe localnotable, he is often a better expert in bureaucratic
affairsthan his partner,the state bureaucrat(Gremion,
1975).
There emerges complicityamong these groups based on the
sharingof a mutualexperience and complementaryinterests
and on the adherence to the same collective norms. Such
complicityis strong and enduring.The frequencyof inter-
personalrelationshipscorrelateswith attitudes towardthat in-
stitutionto which each partnerbelongs. The more notables
have a personal relationshipwith state representative,the
less they are dissatisfiedor criticalaboutthe state bureau-
cracies. Negativeattitudesand aggressive criticismare com-
mon among localofficialswho do not have frequentand
direct personalaccess to department-levelstate officials.To a
certainextent, the networkof state agencies that spreads
over the nationalterritoryis a basic mechanism through
which interdependencebetween apparentlyrivaland even
conflictinglevels of government is achieved. State bureau-
crats accept the fact that political,partisan,or parochial
strategies are importantdimensions in the games playedby
the notable. Localnotables recognizethe legitimacyof the
norms and rationalizations the state bureaucratsuse to de-
velop their policies or justifytheirdirect interventionin local
affairs.
General Rules of the System
As in any complex system, no decision can be made unilater-
allyby any one of the actors. Interdependenceis particularly
visible every time an institutionhas to act or make a decision.
Partiesmust reach acceptable compromises and take into
account the existence and the strategies of other actors.
Inthe Frenchsystem of localgovernment and bureaucratic
action, a compromise cannot be negotiated directlyby the
partiesimmediatelyinvolved.It is broughtabout throughthe
interventionof a thirdparty,an externalactor, an individual
who does not belong to any of the groups to which the
parties belong. Such a mechanismfulfillsthe functions of
coordinationand of integration,throughwhich compromises,
and thus decisions, can be made. Integrationand coordination
are maintainedby an institution,or more preciselyby indi-
vidualswhose activityand whose sources of legitimacyare
derivedfrom groups other than those they seek to reconcile.
Often, the coordinatorimposes a preconceivedsolution on
the parties,one which takes into account the differentin-
terests but is imposed without open negotiation.Such a solu-
tion succeeds even more when it is presented in the name of
anotherrationality:technical imperatives,legal constraints,
the general interest.
Eachunit in such a system acts by itself throughchannels
open to it, withoutworryingabout its neighbors,without
communicatingwith them-eventually by concealing itself
fromthem-and without seeking to create a common front
with them against the interventionof outsiders. Avoidanceof
cooperationamong the units involvedis the norm. Each
551/ASQ
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 seeks to resolve its own problemswith the interventionof
outsiders, especiallythose from a differentgroup ratherthan
by direct bargainingwith its peer groups. Interventionof an
externalforce is therefore crucialto coordinatethe units and
to allow them access to the center.
The General Rule in Practice
To understandhow this ruleworks, one has to study how
each unitsolves its decision-makingproblems.The French
system is structuredaroundthe interventionof specific out-
siders in the decision-makingprocess of each unit. One can
drawa somewhat distorted,but more lively,descriptionby
beginningwith the centralfigureof the mayorof a villageor
of an average-sizedtown. Mayorsare the only people who
fulfilla functionof integrationand coordinationin the com-
munitywhich they head. As a result,they are in an excep-
tionalpositionof power. This power does not flow directly
from theirofficialposition. Rather,it derives from the fact that
the differentsocial categories and interest groups in their
communities, even if represented in the municipalcouncil,
are not capableof reachingcompromises by themselves. It is
the mayorwho, perceivedas uninvolvedin any of the groups
and therefore of anothernature,makes decisions for the
generalgood (Kesselmann,1966). Inpractice,mayorsselect
their municipalcouncilmenmore than the municipalcouncil-
men elect them. Mayorstake care to includein the list sub-
mittedto the constituency representativesof variousinterest
groups who are, in fact, their hostages. Municipalelections
are highlypersonalizedin mayoralelections, even if the mayor
is not elected by the populationbut by the municipalcouncil.
No externalgroupor leadercan reallyorganizea coalitionof
interests against the mayoronce in office. Interestgroups
intervenebut, even if they are capableof puttingpressure
directlyon the mayors,they have great difficultyin manipulat-
ing theircounselors against them. Shouldthey succeed, dis-
orderbegins and the communityis torn apart.
But these powerfulmayorsare nevertheless handicapped,
perhaps more than others, when they have to take positive
action.They have limitedmonetaryresources at their dispos-
al, and no recourse to an independenttechnicalexpertise to
carryout theirundertakings.They cannot obtainsufficient
resources unless they receive a subsidy from the state. To
get the subsidy they must present good technicaland finan-
cial dossiers, ones developed by such field officers of state
bureaucraciesas the ministryof publicworks or of finances.
The administration'sbureaucratshave a de facto monopolyof
expertise in matters such as publicworks, housing, public
finance, and trafficpolicy.They are the best advisorsto en-
sure the success of any demand in these fields. They know
how to plana roadprojector to present a municipalbudget so
that they fit the state bureaucracies'standards.Most of the
localofficers of the state do not hesitate to give valuable
advice to the mayors.
Mayorsare largelydependent on state bureaucratslocated in
field agencies. Withoutthem, they can accomplishnothing.
The head of the local subdivisionof the ministryof public
works, for instance, determines the publicworks policyof the
mayor,with the help of the state tax-collectorwho oversees
552/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation
the amount of the community'sdebts and resources. Some
state bureaucratseven act as if they were partof the execu-
tive branchof the commune. Mayorsask them to buildcity
facilitiesor maintainthe municipalnetworkof roads.These
bureaucratsact as the mayors'officers and they receive fees
in return(Thoenig,1973). Inexchange for such a dependency,
the mayoris guaranteedsupposedly sound management.
Communitypolicyis not only the responsibilityof the mayor,
but it becomes a field in which state bureaucratsplayan
importantrole and interveneas if they were the actualbosses
of the commune.
The fact is, however, that the mayorsfeel that the state
bureaucratswho intervene in their municipalaffairsare not a
threateningdanger, but a positive help. Theirhelp is needed if
the mayorswant to succeed and be perceived by the popula-
tion as efficient and prestigious. On theirside, state bureau-
crats tend to have theirown localpolicywhich they imple-
ment and impose all the more as they are welcomed by the
mayors.They also receive such benefits as consultingfees
and power in the community.
The system is by no means closed. Power is not shared by
the state bureaucratsof the field agencies alone. Contraryto
a mythicalimage of Frenchcentralization,they do not receive
directivesfrom their hierarchicalsuperiorsin the departmental
agencies or in the headquartersin Paris.They first take into
account the wishes, orientations,and strategies of the local
politicalclass. They dominateeach mayorindividually but,at
the same time, they are prisonersof theirclientele, the
elected officials.Theirautonomysuffers, therefore, some im-
portantlimits.They cannot affordto antagonizeundulythose
whom they influence,because of the riskof destroyingtheir
rightto intervene.They adopt a politicalapproach.They are
conditionedby the environmentin which they govern. It is
particularly importantfor them to take into account the
strategies and goals of the most powerfulpoliticaland
economic leaders at the local level, such as the general coun-
cilmen. They have to accept the leadershipof these people
when they intervene. Being, in theirturn,members of a
milieuin which the partiesbecause of the fragmentationare
unableto achieve compromises, the state bureaucratsat the
local level are coordinated,in fact, by some of the most
influentialnotables. The interventionof these notables in the
inneraffairsof the field agencies of the state administrationis
so strong that some hierarchicalsuperiorsof the state
bureaucratscan interferein the activitiesof theirsubordinates
only by acting on a politicallevel, by influencingthe notables
who controlthe policies of the state field agencies.
Hence, the process of power and decision makingis neither
hierarchicnor democraticnor contractual.It is an intersecting,
zig-zaggingprocess particularly conduciveto shunningre-
sponsibilities.Deeply anchoredin local life, it extends to the
departmentallevel and even to Paris.The positionof the
prefect and the principaldepartmentaldirectorson the one
handand the general councilmenon the other is similarto
that of the mayorsand the lower levels of the state bureauc-
racies. The game is identicalin the sense that decisions
which form the policies of the general councilare drawnup
by the representativesof the state. At the same time, the
553/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 lattermust make allowances; they are stronglyinfluencedby
the politicalmilieu,particularly
by the two or three most
importantnotables in the departmentwho know how to play
at partitioningdifferentadministrativechannels and how
to assert theirpositions as coordinators,setting themselves
up as indispensableintermediariesbetween the department
and the ministersin Paris.Overallverticalcommunicationis
very weak in such a system. Localstate agencies and their
headquartersand mayorsand general councilmenoperate at
a very poor level of cooperationand communication.For
politicaland economic officialsand state bureaucratsat each
level in each channelintegrationis achieved by individualsand
groups belongingto other channels.
Political and Economic Channel Bureaucratic Channel (State)
(Local)
National Headquarters of the
Ministries
Members of the Parliament and
of the Senate"
Prefects and Other Directors of
the Departmental Field Agencies

General Councilmen"

Officers of Local Field Agencies

Mayors

Municipal Councilmen

Notables sometimes-but not always-occupy these positions.

Figure 1. Cross-regulation mechanism.

The Exception to the General Rule

One basic characteristicof the system which transcends polit-
icaloppositionand geographicaldifferences is the prevalence
of the pluralityof elected offices. A numberof mayorsac-
cumulatethe functions of a general councilmanand of a
member of the nationalparliament.Moreprecisely, most
members of Parliamentand the general councilmenare
simultaneouslymayors. Pluralityof offices is the absolute
requisitefor a successful politicalcareer.These mayors
naturallyplaythe roleof informalleaders.They have attained
a positionof influenceby the simple fact of occupyingoffices
which carrywith them varyingdegrees of influence.Plurality
of offices cannot be understoodaccordingto electoraland
partisanreasoning.It exists for organizationalreasons, with
strategies playedby localgroups withinthe cross-regulation
system.
If localpoliticalfigures can holdthree or four offices, whose
incumbentscommunicatepoorlyamong themselves, their
positions become enormouslystrengthened.They can play
several games simultaneouslyand are certainof winning
since, inasmuchas these games are interdependent,the
practicalknowledge they develop in one role is the decisive
554/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

factorfor success in the other. Elected officialswho handleall

the functions and base their negotiationswith ministers,de-
partmentaldirectors,and local representativesupon this are
in a much better positionthan theircolleagues who can
communicatewith each publicofficialonly throughindirect
pressure on theirindispensableintermediaries.Therefore
elected officialsare in a positionto exert their leadershipas
politicalfigures in a more acceptable manner.They are able to
rewardtheirfriends without punishingtheir enemies too
much and without rousingthe animosityof the public.They
can obtainsatisfactionalmost without askingfor it and, with
no effort on theirpart,serve as an extremely powerfulinte-
grativeforce. Intermediariesare importantin a system in
which favors are essential, but in which favoritismis greatly
disapprovedby the politicalculture.
However, elected candidateswho hold several offices at the
same time are not antagonists of the administration;on the
contrary,influencedepends largelyon personalaccess to the
most importantofficers in the bureaucraticchannel.They
become accomplices and know how to influencestate rep-
resentatives so that they take into account theirdesires and
their influence. Holdingseveral offices simultaneouslymay be
an exception to the general ruleof cross-regulationbut in fact
it fulfillsan importantfunctionin the system. It reinforcesthe
whole structureof relationshipsand the rules of the game
because it offers a possibilityof fluidityand homogeneity in a
system that is otherwise rigidand fragmented.
The Functions of the System
The networkof organizationswhich intervene in local man-
agement of publicaffairsis a complex system structuredby
the interpenetrationof differentchannels. These includethe
administrativechannelof the centralstate, the worldof the
localcommunitiesand theirpoliticalbodies, and economic
associations.They are intertwinedaccordingto a general rule
andare connected even when there is an exceptionto that rule.
Eachchannelregulatesthe otherone as well as being regulated
by it. Between each channelthere is communicationand
integrationthroughthe hierarchyof the alternatechannel.
Hierarchyandleadershipare neverdirect.Substitutionis essen-
tialin this system of cross-regulation.
The corollaryto this process of cross-regulationis partitioning.
Eachunitis sustained and maintainedby pressures from
the system and each totallydisregardsother units. It is advan-
tageous for a unitto-communicateas littleas possible with
others in its own channelthat are potentialcompetitorsor
superiorto it, since they could reduce it to a positionof
dependence. Its possibilitiesof success derive from a skillful
use of the cross-controlsystem throughwhich it can bargain
for influence.Thanksto such a system, directconfrontations
are avoided. Formally,relationshipsare easy and friendly,but
no one speaks to anyone and all cope by themselves. The
result is isolationor atomizationof the politicalfabric.
Such a system favors and even demands a strong concentra-
tion of power and privileges.The rarefactionof communica-
tion and the scarcityof passageways producea kindof social
rent for the few groups and individualswho controlpositions
where communicationand access to anotherlevel are possi-
5551ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ble. Influenceand initiativeare limitedto a small group:the
mayor,the notable who accumulates offices, the prefect and
the presidentof the generalcouncil,and a few politicalfigures
with a nationalstandingin Paris.At each level power and
influenceare polarizedin the hands of two or three leaders
who integrateall the units in the area (Gremion,1975;
Thoenig, 1975). The game is closed and secret. The system
constantlyproduces exclusions. Nonparticipation is so well
groundedin the psychology of the leaders that it seems
consubstantialto theirgame. The members of the system
fear publicopinionand hide from the sanction of electoral
suffrage as much as it is possible. Empiricalevidence shows
that the notables as well as the bureaucratsperceive ordinary
citizens as lackingin self-responsibility,interested only in
individualand parochialissues, and being reluctantto partici-
pate more in the management of publicaffairs.Citizenpar-
ticipationcan only be self-destructiveand the publicis seen
to follow demagogues.
Such a system is centralized.By centralizationwe mean a
structuraldivisionof laborbetween the hierarchicallevels
where decisions are made and the levels where these deci-
sions are implemented.Those who decide at the center are
not those who are affected by the decision at the periphery
(Crozier,1964). Butthe decision makersare not free to do
whatever they want and even if they wield great power, they
are to some extent dependent on the hierarchicallevels at the
periphery.Infact they decide but they do not have the rele-
vant informationto make wise decisions. The system is cen-
tralizedbut there is poor circulationof information.Informa-
tion is always mediatedand transmittedfrom tier to tier by
thirdparties. Hence, decision makers receive informational-
readyobsolescent or biased and those who execute the deci-
sions have firsthandinformationbut do not have access to
the decision making.
The notable or the state bureaucratis in fact a mediator,the
defender of localinterests, ratherthan a decision maker.If,
for example, it is so importantfor a departmentto have a
powerfulleadership,to elect politicalfigures, or to have a
prefect who has directaccess to the highest level in Paris,it
is because these representativesserve as a pressure groupin
Paris.Forthe populationof the village, the mayoris the one
responsiblefor promotingthe community'sinterests at higher
levels in the system. The best mayoris not the one who
achieves the most, northe one who is most politicallyattrac-
tive; it is, rather,the individualwho has best access to those
who make decisions at the highest possible level. Infact, the
honeycomb structurefunctions as the structureof access to
the top. Cross-regulationcreates relaysthroughwhich de-
mands and pressures can be introducedand processed
(Gremionand Worms, 1970). The dependence of inferior
levels on higherlevels does not stem from the existence of
formalhierarchicalauthority;it comes from the mere fact that
the lattermonopolizethe promotionof the formers'interests
in the rightplaces. Such a mechanism is not a subterfuge.
Indeed,the regulatingforce identifiesitself with the interests
in its control.Both the notables and state officialsperceive
the field agencies of the state ministries,as being repre-
sentatives of localinterests in the state apparatus,as well as
556/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

being the representativesof the centralstate in the local

community.
Paradoxically, those who impose theirwill from the top are, at
the same time, the representativesof the subordinateunits
they are supposed to control.The back and forth process of
decision making,however, is not simple. The representation
of the interests of one specific unitwithinone specific chan-
nel is managed by the leaders of anotherspecific unitfrom
anotherchannel.This is essentially a process of inter-
mediariesin which the intermediariesare indispensableand
exact a high pricefor performingtheirfunctions.This means
also that the mainactors, the notables, whether elected offi-
cials or bureaucrats,are basicallyintermediarieswho jealously
guardthe sources of theirpower, the monopolies of access
and communications.
Mayorswill not relinquishto anyone the responsibilityfor the
city's relationswith the notables of the bureaucratic,as well
as of the elective or representative,channels. This makes
them indispensablefigures and enables them-if they are
skillfulenough-to outwit possible opponents who will al-
ways appearas lackingthis basic expertise. Similarly,prefects
jealouslyguardtheir personalcontacts in Parisand the three
or four most influentialnotables of the departmentare power-
ful only because they alone have access to the key political
and administrativelevels in Paris.
Individuals and the System
At first sight, the Frenchsystem of collective decision making
is oppressive and inefficient.As a matterof fact it causes
considerablefrustrationand strong criticismsamong its
members, as well as among the population.Yet nobody really
works to overthrowit and it continues to be ratherwell
accepted.
To understandsuch a situation,the behaviorand attitudes of
the members of the system have to be reconsideredas they
are expressed in day-to-dayrelationships.In such a perspec-
tive, it is evident to the externalobserverthat the system is in
fact a less rigidand a more humanway of governingpublic
affairsthan expected. Despite the unequaldistributionof
privilegesand lackof participation,it maintainsstrong equality
and a relevantdegree of autonomyfor each of its members.
Moreover,it is pressure from its members that reinforcesand
stabilizesthe system.
The system is oppressive and authoritarian but, at the same
time, oppression is anonymous and authorityimpersonal.One
or two particularindividualscannot arbitrarily impose their
personalwill and dictate theirown rules to others. The game
is collective and does not depend on the strategies of particu-
larpersons; it is a consequence of a system which imposes
its general rules and norms on all individuals,even the most
powerful. Its regulationdepends on the stabilityof a set of
relationshipsbetween units and not on the controlover
specific individuals.Therefore,oppression is impersonaland
diffused. Consequently,it is tolerable.Simultaneouslyand
independentof specific stakes they have in the collective
game, individualscan form friendlyrelationshipswith others
belongingto differentunits. The conflictis one between
557/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 roles, not individuals;hence, it does not hinderindividuals
from communicatingin other matters.
The system is based on dependence and passivity.So while
conceding their initiativeand independence, individualsobtain
other kindsof advantages. Insideeach channel,the cross-
regulationmechanism permitsthe superiorechelon to evade
the too direct pressures from the lower ranks,while the latter
to choose not to submit to the too obvious dominationof the
former.Thanksto the intrusionof individualsfrom a com-
pletely differentlevel and channel,the sources of conflict
between peers in the same channelare suppressed by avoid-
ing the face-to-face negotiationof compromises. All mem-
bers are guaranteedthey will not lose even if they err. No
sanction is possible since the individualresponsibilitiesare
neitherevident nor direct.The blame always falls on the
outside regulator,or better still, on the system. Eachindi-
vidualis not held accountablebut autonomous, and pro-
tected. Allnotables are guaranteedsome measure of suc-
cess, even if they have made no effort. Success is highly*
personalizedand individualcharismais an importantproduct
of this collective game. Those who wish to escape the sys-
tem, may do so, but at a considerablerisk.Ifthey take the
initiative,they immediatelybecome answerable and are no
longerprotected by the system in which they have become
deviants because they do not playthe collective game.
Hence, for the individualthe best strategy is to do as littleas
possible. The person who starts last has an advantageover
the one who wishes to start first.The race is one of slow-
ness. Apathyand nonparticipation constitute a rational
strategy.The notables mobilizethemselves only after the
system has given the green light. But once it is given, they
hasten to the pointwhere they can no longerbe stopped.
Once the system is set into motion, no one is able to controlit.
The system causes exclusion and favoritism.The ruleis most
useful as a reference for the possible exceptions. The excep-
tion, however, and the privilegeit offers to those who take
advantageof it, providesjealousy. Eachone tries to have an
exception, as if the system existed in orderto legitimize
exceptions to its own rules.Thenotables expect the state
bureaucratsto adopt the role of rulebreakers,of exception-
facilitators.Inthe end, everyone manages to have his
privilegebut, at the same time, everyone is somewhat
excluded. Inshort, the system produces exclusion and
privilegeswhich create discontent and uneasiness. But all is
done in a sufficientlywell-balancedmanner,so that com-
plaintsagainstthe system do not go beyond the acceptable
threshold,that is, do not create imbalancein the personal
benefits each member expects to receive.
Insuch a system, centralizationitself is maintainedand in-
creased by the impulse of those excluded from decision mak-
ing. The localcommunitydelegates allpoliticalpower to one
person, the mayor,because this is the best means for the
communityto be well representedat high levels, while being
also protectedfrom externalpressures. By the same token, if
the ruraltownspeople agree so frequentlyto entrust the
office of counselorto mayorsin the majortowns in their
districts,it is because of the power they exert throughtheir
558/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

personalrelationsor theirsocial origins.The prefect who

represents the centralstate in the departmentis perceivedby
the notables not as an unbearabletyrant,butas the representa-
tive of localinterests vis-a-visthe centralstate.
The localcommunityfeels better protected inasmuchas the
centralgovernment is more directlyinvolvedin its growth and
development. The interventionof Parisin local affairsis not
just desired, but demanded. One complainsof Parisnot be-
cause it does not leave initiativeto localpeople, but because
it does not interveneenough. The interventionof the center
in the affairsof the peripheryis not a threatbut an advantage.
The advantageis won because of the efforts of the notables
who have the easiest access to the highest level possible.
Not to be represented by efficient mediatorsis a majorhand-
icap. Inthis case, the alternativeis for local leaders to
politicizethe problem,to make an appealto publicopinionin
the hopes of being heardat the top. This strategy is danger-
ous, however, and the chances of success very uncertain.It
is much better to go throughthe cross-regulationmechanism.
Therefore,collective decision makingin publicaffairsis struc-
tured by a very stable system. Everyoneis a prisonerof it, but
each member gains something in return.The advantages are
financialand technical,as well as being symbolic, political,
and even affective. The consequence of all members tryingto
win theirown game and to beat the system is that everybody
upholdsthe general ruleof the collective game.
The Dynamics of the System
The interorganizational networkof local management of pub-
lic affairsis a homeostatic system. Faced with new demands
or the changes of society, it hardlyadapts itself. On the
contrary,it puts pressure on each of its parts in an effort to
maintainitself. Forinstance, in the last two decades, as a
result of rapidand importantsocioeconomic transformations
in France,new social groups have appearedand the general
populationhas expressed more forcefuldemands for partici-
pationin publicaffairs.Ratherthan makingitself more open,
the system has closed in upon itself. Ratherthan stimulating
more initiativefrom the peripheryand broadeningits base, it
has sought to preserve its secretive and restrictivepractices.
The notables and the state bureaucratshave remainedblind
to its performancesas a whole and to externalpressures
which could threatenthe general game. They are so well
socializedby the system that they are incapableof adaptingit.
No solution other than the traditionalones can move them.
Forinstance, they oppose decentralizationof government-
seeing it as a dangerouspolicy. Participationcauses politiciza-
tion which is perceived by the political,as well as the
bureaucratic,notables as the worst possible state of affairs.
Indeed,the sole solutionthat they accept and implement
consists in narrowingthe numberof members and of making
the system more rigid.Evenwhen strong pressure for
change comes from the outside, as in the case of the reforms
passed by the centralgovernment in March1964, the nota-
bles and bureaucratsare able, as members of a system, to
alterand radicallychange the goals and consequences of the
centralgovernment(Gremionand Worms, 1970). The crea-
tion of the region,conceived of as a level of integration
559/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

2 been caused by the cumulativelag in urbaninvestments.
An exceptionis the cityof Paris,which,
paradoxically,finds itself closer to the
ruralworldthanto the intersectingworld
of largecities.
This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM
superiorto the department,did not bear fruit.On the con-
trary,it reinforcedthe department.Elected officials,using the
pluralityof offices, have succeeded in takingcontrolof the
regionand have reinforcedtheir privilegesand their impor-
tance as regulators.Prefects of departmentsare stronger
than they were before because, as intermediariesbetween
each departmentand Paris,they can beat the region.The
game today is even more restrictedand exclusive than it was
a few years ago (Crozieret aL, 1975).
The Case of the Cities
Recent socioeconomic changes-massive industrialization
and urbanization-however, have been so importantthat the
system as a whole could not help but adjustto these pres-
sures for change. When its equilibriumis in jeopardy,its
members react in a very specific way. They preferto keep the
structureof the system as it is, even if they have to pay a
price.There can, for instance, be a general decrease of their
influencein Frenchsociety and a sharp restrictionof the
domainundertheir control.They preferto have certaintasks
taken away from the system ratherthan face threats to the
present equilibrium.This has been the case with the massive
growth of urbanareas and largecities in the 1960s.
Traditionally treated as an exception to the ruralrule,large
cities have developed rapidlywith the largest populationand
the greatest needs. Ratherthan makingthe necessary ad-
justments, members of the localsystem-notables, bureau-
crats, and economic leaders-fell backuponthe traditional
game and allowed the large cities to elude the system even
if, in turn,they had to resign themselves to being no more
than the councils of small towns and villages. An autonomous
new system for administeringurbanproblemsevolved under
the sponsorshipand controlof the centralgovernmentfrom
which the old notables painstakinglyholdthemselves apart.
As a consequence, there developed two differentadministra-
tive networks of publicmanagement at the local level, one for
ruralFrance,the other for the metropolitanareas (Thoenig,
1973).
Generally,the system tends to disassociate itself from prob-
lems which it finds too threateningor insolvable,and concen-
trates on the problemswith which it is capable of dealing. In
this way its members can stillfeel that all is going well and
perhapsgetting better, even if the system controls less and
less substance.
Unlikethe case of the marginalplayerwho refuses the pro-
tection of the system, the fact that urbanaffairsare excluded
is not perceived as a disadvantageby the largecities. On the
contrary,not only do their mayorsevade the system, but,
because they are excluded, they draw much more substantial
benefits than they could have obtainedwithina system that is
fearfulof them. Theirvery rejectionputs them in a favorable
situation.First,they have directaccess to Parisand Parisis
obligedto playan active role in solving problemsthat have
Second, they have the immense advantageof unityof action.
Likeruralcommunities and small towns, large cities entrust
theirgovernmentto one man: the mayor.2But mayorsof big
560/ASQ
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

cities become much more powerfulthan theircolleagues in

small cities because they stand alone in dealingwith a com-
plex world of fragmentedfield offices and warringgovern-
ment bureaus.This loneliness makes it possible for mayorsto
serve as naturalcoordinatorsand necessary regulatorsof the
system. This role is allthe more crucialin urbanaffairsand
metropolitanareas where the conflictinginterests are more
numerousand the bureaucraticapparatusof the state more
complex. Bigcity mayorsalone have directaccess to Paris
and have that contact ex-officio,without intermediaries.They
are relativelyfree people in a worldensnared in networks of
dependence and obligations.As a result of their role as reg-
ulators,mayorsof largecities can exert influence and control
over the territorialsystem from which they are excluded.
They dictate theirwishes to the localbranches of state agen-
cies. They act as regulatorsof neighboringcommunities, and
the equal of the prefects-the prefects havinglost their ad-
vantages as the naturalspokesmen in Paris.The mayors can
even be on bad terms with prefects without havingto suffer
negative consequences. Even in theirdealings with Paris,the
mayors are not completely dependent. Inworkingwith the
multipleagencies which in Parishandleurbanaffairs,they are
the sole representativesof their metropolisand the only ones
in theircities who can take the initiative.They benefit from all
the advantages of pluralitywithout bearingany of the respon-
sibilities.
Other Exceptions to the System
Mayorsof largecities are not the only people who are excep-
tions to the general system. Othergroups such as farmersor
industrialistsare marginalor are excluded from the system
and thus are in a positionto beat it. The Frenchsystem of
localgovernmentconceals other systems, parallelarrange-
ments which are set up outside of it and even working
against it. But the systems are deeply connected and exist
only by virtueof one another.
Groupsand individualsstruggle among themselves to seize
the opportunityto develop such games and to occupy the
positions which grantthe privilegesassociated with these
games. Despite its inflexibility,the basic system reveals cer-
tain dynamics and a genuine fluidity.The competitionis keen
and no one is assured of victory.The value of privilegesis
enhanced in a worldwhere pressure toward egalitarianismis
strong and constant. To hold several offices concurrentlyor to
organizeoneself in a corporatemannerrequiresmuch time
and effort. But it is-also difficultto maintainthe privileges
which are the rewardsfor the pluralityof offices orthe cor-
porateorganization.Those who succeed are those who know
how far they can go, those who create advantagesfor them-
selves without provokingtoo strong a counteraction.Insuch
a system, it is essential to have an intuitionof the accepted
limitsof the game to playthese second-orderstrategies.

A SYSTEM APPROACHOF INTERORGANIZATIONAL

NETWORKS
Althoughstimulatingprogress is alreadysuggested by studies
made in fields as differentas the theory of the firm(Lawrence
and Lorsch,1967; EmeryandTrist, 1965; Dill,1958); the
561/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 study of health,welfare, and educationinstitutions(Aikenand
Hage, 1968; Turk,1970 and 1973; Clark,1965; Litwakand
Hylton,1962); or the sociology of urbanaffairs(Warren,
1967); there is consensus among researchersthat inter-
organizationalnetworksare specific levels of integrationand
interdependencebetween units. Turk(1970) underlinedthe
fact that what must be studied are the collective rules and the
processes of integration,the games of conflictand coopera-
tion in such networks.
Such a strategy of researchis stimulatingnot only in under-
standinginterorganizational networks as specific phenomena,
but in improvinga general theory of organizations.Regulation
is the basic mechanism of organizations.Fromthat pointof
view, there is no difference in kind,but only a difference in
degree between an organizationand an interorganizational
network. Both are social and humansystems, more or less
stable and structured,integratingvariousunits, regulating
their behaviors,and imposinga collective game on their
members. Whiledevising a paradigmof the regulationof
organizationalsystems is a worthwhileway of developinga
theory of organizations,researchin this field, however, is
slowed because there is a lackof alternativesto the two
dominatingtrends. This is especiallythe case of the American
tradition:organizationalstudents tend either to tryto buildan
abstracttheoryfrom which they deduce from a set of
cyberneticaxioms and derive normativeprescriptionsor to
measure those empiricalrelationshipsabout which one can
get reliabledata even if they are meaningless for understand-
ing how the system reallyfunctions. Both these approaches
now have lost any power to stimulate.Approachescan be
developed which would not put the emphasis on the fre-
quency of the relationshipsor on the formalstructures,but on
the strategies of the partners,the collective games to which
these strategies correspond,and the rules of regulationwhich
govern these games. Interorganizational systems and single
organizationsare both more or less stable and structured
networks of social and human relationships.
Power and Bargaining
The basic postulate on which systems analysis should be
founded is that allsystems structureand regulatethem-
selves aroundthe power relationsestablished between their
members and their units.
Systems are based on interdependence.This interdepen-
dence is not symbolic, it is-builton relationsof concrete
dependence which cannot be understoodas the inevitable
consequence of objective situations,but ratheras the result
of constantlyquestioned relationsof power. To analyzethese
relationships,one should not measure the resources as an
accountant,but make a qualitativeassessment of the actions
open to the partnersand of the dynamicsof theirgames. It is
equallyindispensableto focus on the relationshipas such and
not on each partner'srespective power. Even if one partner
appears completely to dominatethe other, the dependence
remainsreciprocal-no matterhow absolute the rightof life
and death is held by masters over theirslaves. Masters are
dependent on theirslaves' survivalin orderto retainlordship
over them.
562/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

Literaturein the field has rightlyunderscoredthe fact that the

relationof the organizationto its environmentis a relationship
of dependence (Levineand White, 1961; Yuchtmanand
Seashore, 1967; Thompsonand McEwen, 1958). Yet studies
usuallydescribe and classify the resources of power
employed in this relationmore than show the mechanisms of
the game between the partners.They cling to the objective
resources and have been content to accept the channeland
the natureof the exchanges as a validempiricalindicator
(Aldrich,1974).
Such an approachis lacking.The natureof the relationship
does not depend on the resources of each player,but on the
powers which they use in the game. The approachsuggested
here demonstrates the significanceof the relevantcapacities
of the playersby exploringthe areas of uncertaintyaffecting
the respective aims and the common objectives which they
can control.Such general, but empirical,criteriaof analysis on
the one hand can help measure the forces or, more precisely,
the relevantmeans of actions. On the other, it can make it
possible to understandand describe the maneuversof the
playersand the dynamics of their relationships(Crozier,1964,
1974).
Power exercised in a relationshipcannotbe deduced by an
objectiveanalysis of opposing forces. But one can appreciate
its weight and its meaningfrom the feelings and attitudes of
the protagonists.
These feelings can be found just as readilywith in-depth
interviews as throughquestionnairesof attitudes. They reflect
in detailthe realpower situation,the sensitive points of the
relationship,and the characteristicsof the game. Those inter-
viewed do not abstainfrom rationalizing theirfeelings, yet
their rationalizationsare particularly revealingsince they can
be comparedwith those of colleagues and partnersin the
same and opposite situations.
Thus, by using theirstatements one can deal with rough,but
relativelyfaithful,indicatorsof the directionof the power
relationsbetween the differentpartnersand of the problems
aroundwhich these relationscrystallize.Yet, to analyze
power or the power relationshipis not an end in itself; by
consideringthis relationship,one has to describe the players'
strategy and understandthe games in which they develop
these strategies.
The informationgathered on the conflicts of power and the
problemsaroundwhich they crystallizemake it possible to
understandthe mannerin which the partnersbargainand
how transactionstake place between them. Fromthis one
can infertheirconscious or unconscious strategy.Then, by
using this knowledge to analyze majordecisions and by com-
paringthe cross-relationsdata with the objective data of the
situation,one can reconstructthe explicitor implicitgame
which underliesthe strategies and relationships.
These games can differgreatlyand not correspondat allto
formalappearances. Playersderivingstrength from the au-
thoritylegallyvested in them can findthemselves blocked in
games in which theirbest strategy consists of minimizing
their losses. In general, of course, powerfulpartnershave
563/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 more chances of winningbecause they deal with various
resources and can thus engage in a largernumberof different
games. Being better able to allottheirstakes and runmore
riskswith reason, they have more chance of makinga much
better than average score in a long set of contests, and thus
win in the end. The opportunitiesopen to each partnerfor
bargainingand cooperationtend to stabilizethe games into
relativelypermanentstructures.The partners,however, re-
mainvulnerableto the constant changes that affect the un-
certaintiesthey control.The possibilitiesof reopeningthe
question are proportionatelymuch greaterwhen these con-
trols are less rigorous.
One seeks to understandthe strategy of each partnerby
analyzingthe juxtapositionof theirconvergingand contradic-
tory attitudes and feelings. One postulates that these
strategies are rationalin relationto the situation.Fromthe
objectivedata about the situationand the way each of the
playersexperiences it, one tries to reconstructwhat their
game is practicallyand what the rules are that can fit the
strategies which have been hypothesized(Crozier,1972).
Games, Regulations, and System
If a system is postulatedas existing, there has to be a type of
regulationwhich can be either explicitor implicit.Inother
words, relationshipsbetween parts of the system are gov-
erned by collective rules which are relativelystable. No part
can develop its own game independentlyfrom the way the
other partsplaytheirgame and from the general rules. Indi-
vidualbehavioris constrainedby a set of rules.At the system
level, it is therefore possible to find the same rules that
govern the power relationsas at the interpersonallevel.
Some behaviorsare penalized.Some strategies cannot be
played.The gains and losses are, if not determined,at least
defined and limitedby the existence of social rules.There-
fore, each member of the system is in a positionto work out
a rationalcalculus and to formulatea strategy.
Insociologicalterms, a system is characterizedby the means
of regulationit uses. It is a system inasmuchas it influences
members by regulatingthe games they play. Fromthat point
of view, regulationis its mode of government,with "govern-
ment" used not in its legal or formalmeaning, but in its
cyberneticsense.
This study uses system analysis to understandthe games
which are playedat the bottom of the system. Then it pro-
ceeds to discover and reconstructthe more general mode of
regulationthroughwhich these games are articulatedto one
another.Finally,it tries to ascertainthe basic mode of gov-
ernment and the values that make it possible for the system
to exist by legitimizingthese rules.
This approach,a progressivediscoveryof the latentstructure
of a system, will raise a numberof basic problems.There is
first a problemof rationality.This problemis logicallythe
same as encountered in dealingwith the strategies at the
operationallevel. Empirically, however, it is much more dif-
ficultbecause the analystmust enter intoa much less con-
strainedfield in which the freedom of individualsin relationto
the roles they assume is much greater.The rationalityof
564/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

individualsdoes not necessarily correspondto the rationality

of the groupthey represent. Not only do individualshave
many more possible strategies withinthe game in which they
are engaged, but they also have several games availableto
them. They can consider committingthemselves more or less
to one or the other. The reasoningused in discoveringthe
meaning of the game-by postulatingthat the meaningof the
game is what makes the variousstrategies equallyrational-
proves to be much more difficultto put into action. By observ-
ing the recurrencesand by analyzingthe possible impactof
change it is possible to reduce the relativeconfusion imposed
by the fluidityof the game and the freedom of the individual.
A second problemis raisedby the lackof a homologous
relationshipbetween the games one finds at operational
levels and the game which regulatesthe system. Thereis a
great temptationto extrapolatefromthe repetitionof the same
games at the operationallevel a general model of regulation
for the whole. This conclusionis not totallyfalse and the
empiricalanalysis of the system as described here shows
that there are indeed certainsimilarities.Butthis does not
mean that the game which regulatesthe whole is of the
same sort as the games analyzedat the bottom. Forexample,
it was shown that the regulationof a system in which games
at the operationallevel are of a defensive bureaucraticnature
operates accordingto a much more open model. People in
that model have to assume risksdirectly.Conversely,the
basic cross-regulationsystem-analyzed here at the local
level-may be regulatedby a charismaticor authoritarian
structureat the top.
The Example of French Local Government
Using the case of the Frenchlocal government,the meaning
of the present results, the relevance of the mode of reason-
ing suggested and the uncertaintiesit still involves can be
understood.The Frenchsystem is characterizedby the small
numberof participants,the permanence of their roles, the
secrecy of their relationships,and the closed natureof the
whole with respect to outsiders and the publicin general.
These characteristicscan be deduced neitherfrom the formal
legal structureof administrativeand politicalpowers, norfrom
the values professed withinthe politicalcommunity.They can
also be derivedfrom the motivationsof any of the parties
involvedin the politicalgame. Nevertheless, these charac-
teristics appearto be perfectlyrationalif one admits that the
games playedby the actors reallyexist. It is rationaland even
very democraticfor mayorsof small towns to monopolizethe
relationshipwith administrativepartnersand not informtheir
councils, since in this game, the majortrumpthey hold is the
unityof the communityin relationto the diversityof its
partners.It is rationalto select someone who occupies a
pluralityof offices. Untimelypublicityor intrusionof new
partners,farfrom reinforcingthe mayors,can only put in
question the privilegesthey have been able to accumulate
and which alone allow them to succeed in the game.
Obviously,individualstrategies can be found to be different,
but their rationalitycan be discovered only after the rationality
of the collective game has been well analyzed.It is in terms
of this regularitythat the exception becomes meaningfuland
565/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 can be hypothesizedas being rationalin view of the specific-
ity of the situation.
Mayorswho play on the openness and participationof citizen
groups can maintaintheir influenceonly inasmuchas they
find partnersin the games they playat other levels who will
rewardtheir initiatives.This may be possible if they represent
for them a useful exception. Theirbehaviorthen appearsto
be rational,even if they act in oppositionto traditional
strategies. But for such a behaviorto predominate,the gen-
eral regulationof the system, that is the whole system, must
change.
Several rationalstrategies are always possible in most of
these games, especially inasmuchas several games inter-
penetrate or the personalitiesof the partnersenter into the
picture. Even if the structureof the game presupposes that
the relationbetween mayorswho hold only one office and
mayorswho holda pluralityof offices is relativelyloose, it can
become very rationalfor the first ones to give their al-
legiances to the second. They may do so to reinforcetheir
own power when dealingwith the local state bureaucrator to
seek in theirturnto hold anotheroffice, always on the condi-
tion that they find themselves in a sufficientlypowerfulbar-
gainingposition. Besides, the conditionsfor this bargaining
and its rationalitywill depend directlyon the structureof the
collective game they will be contradicting.
At the level of regulationof the whole, there are two main
characteristicswhich at firstglance are not at allcongruent.
On the one hand,there is the generalityof cross-controls,a
phenomenon accordingto which the regulationof a relation-
ship or an organizationalchannel is performedby the mem-
bers of anotherorganizationwhich is itself eventuallyregu-
lated by the former.On the other hand,there is the decisive
importanceof exceptions to the prevalentgame. This means
that the reallypowerfulare always those who can escape the
rules of the system and can therefore exert pressure more
directlyon its nodalpoints where the decisions have to be
taken.
Thus, the way the whole system is regulatedcannot easily be
extrapolatedfrom an analysisof the basic model of cross-
controls,since those who win in the game of regulatingthe
whole are those who manage to elude the dominantmode of
regulation.As a result, one can formulatethe following
hypothesis: the essential propertyof the system is that its
regulationrelies on the existence of a double series of
games which evolve naturallyfromthe uncertaintiesof inter-
dependent activities(Crozier,1964). Butthis reasoning
the opportunitiesoffered by the difficultiesof articulationbe-
tween the intersectinggames at the operationallevel. This is
achieved only by manipulatingexceptions to the predominant
rules. But these exceptions are at the same time recognized
and coded and they themselves tend to develop intoother
games. They move towardanother kindof rigidityeventually
requiringsome new exception.
These hypotheses cannot be generalized.But they draw at-
tention to the crucialmeaning of new phenomena requiring
furtherexplorationboth withininterorganizational systems
and withinorganizationswhich, underthe circumstances,can
566/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

be consideredas special cases in the class of general sys-

tems.
Firstto consider is the phenomenon of controlor cross-
regulation.The prevalentthinkingabout the problemof au-
thorityor governmentwithinorganizationsand systems has
always tended to focus on hierarchicalrelations.Is it not
sensible to put this logic into a question? Haven'tresearchers
been misled by the prevalenthierarchicalideology, even
when they were fightingit, and haven'tthey accepted a priori
a roughequivalencebetween hierarchicauthorityand social
control?Maybethese phenomena of cross-relationswhich
constrainthe playersnarrowlywithout puttingthem in a posi-
tion of directdependence are finallymuch more important
than hierarchicalauthority.
A second phenomenon, regulationby exception, should at-
tractfurtherattention. By successfully escaping the rulesthat
govern its fundamentalgames, one is able to participatein
the governmentof a system. Such a hypothesis calls for a
reconsiderationof the relationsbetween the formaland the
informal.Traditionalreasoningon this subject has been that
the field is structuredby the formaland that the informalthat
develops out of the loopholes constitutes a more or less
tolerableexception in the formalstructure.Later,human rela-
tions reasoningdeveloped aroundthe view accordingto
which the reallife of an organizationlies in the informaland
that the formalis but a superstructureof littleimportance.
Anotherkindof reasoningshould be appliedto the analysis of
organizations.It consists of consideringthe formalas a
necessary response to the pressures of informalblackmail,a
means of governingby structuringand stabilizingthe power
games which evolve naturallyfromthe uncertaintiesof inter-
dependent activities(Crozier,1964). But this reasoning
should be completed by a complementarydistinction.Instead
of opposing only the formaland the informal,one should also
oppose the regulargame which is made up of a formal
structureand an informalgame, and a second game for
initiateswhich grows out of the first.Thatis the game of the
exception throughwhich one can solve the extremely difficult
problemof the relationshipsbetween the games. It is through
the weaknesses in their models of social controlthat most
systems govern themselves and solve their contradictions.
Above all, systems analysisshould endeavorto discoverthe
propertiesand consequences of this second kindof game.
Such hypotheses contradictthe approachof traditionalinstitu-
tionalanalysis, accordingto which actualbehaviorscan be
deduced from the historyof the structures,the historyof the
mentality,or from the recurrentrenovationof formalinstitu-
tions by oppositionand revolt.
The Problem of Change
The problemof change is generallynot taken into account in
the literatureon the organization-environment relationsor
even interorganizational systems. In appearance,the line of
thought inspiredby the structuralcontingency model seemed
to be able to offer an opening for understandingchange. If
sufficientcorrelationis foundbetween a certainkindof environ-
ment and certainkindof organizationalstructure,one
can deduce a naturaltendency toward evolutionand sources
567/ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 of change. This mode of reasoningis tempting, but danger-
ous. The regularitiesbetween certainstates of the environ-
ment and certainstates of the organizationand its perfor-
mance do not make it possible to propose general laws. At
most, they suggest normativeprescriptions.This orientation
was emphasized by such authorsas Burnsand Stalker(1961),
and Lawrenceand Lorsch(1967). But behindthe normative
aspect, there remainsalways a certainkindof determinism.
An environmentof a certainnaturecalls for an organizationof
a certainnaturewhich alone will give the best possible re-
sults. Ifat any given moment an organizationdoes not have
the structuralpropertiescorrespondingto the demands of the
environment,it is assumed to be in a very bad positionand to
have to change its natureunless it accepts the riskof being
wiped out. But generalizedin this way, the logicalproposi-
tions of the structuralcontingency model do not resist empir-
icalverification.As suggested by Pennings (1974), organiza-
tions succeed very well when transgressingthe laws of the
model and the normativeconclusion cannot be supportedby
any empiricaldeterminism.These studies have certainly
broughtabout a decisive change in the dominantuniversalis-
tic model. But theirauthors and even those such as Perrow
(1972) and Thompson(1967) free themselves with difficulty
from its logic. Whatthey failto do is considerthe organiza-
tionalor systemic capacityto solve the problemsof an or-
ganization'srelationsto its environmentas a complex human
phenomenon and not as a dependent variableor a subject
matterfor decision making.
A model for government-based on a doubleseries of con-
tradictorygames with a dominantmode of defensive
strategies but with a possible opening for the offensive
strategies of a small groupof leaders who have been
selected because of theirintuitivecomprehensionof the
system-cannot be consideredas determinedby an environ-
ment which it is structuring.Noris it the resultof deliberate
decisions developed with the help of wise consultants. It
representsa collective capacitybuiltup throughthe trialsand
errorsof historytosolve the problemof the internaland external
environments.
One mightargue that the example of localpublicinstitutions
in Franceis a very specific one and that organizationswith
cleareraims and which are more directlysubject to the sanc-
tion of the environmentdo not develop such complexities.
This issue cannot be solved too hastily.Forcomplex as well
as for more simple organizations,the decisive variablefor
theiractivityis their collective capacity.Inother words, the
set of games played in an organizationor in an interorganiza-
tionalnetwork,and their regulation,constitute a system. It is
this system which has the capacityto find solutions to the
problems of the environment.A system dominatedby defen-
sive or bureaucraticgames has greaterdifficultyin solving
problems raisedby the adaptationto a turbulentenvironment.
But if the regulationof these games is put into effect in such
a manner,charismaticfigures will emerge and offer intuitive
solutions to the problemof change and adaptation.Therefore,
any normativeadvice should take into account the learning
capacityof the system. Undercertainconditions,for instance,
if the participantsare not able to playthe new games im-
5681ASQ

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Regulation

posed by these transformations,it is preferableto reinforce

an integratingcentralizationmechanism aroundindividuals
and groups capableof rapidadaptation,ratherthan to trans-
form the whole structureso that it fits the natureof the
problem.
A new orientationis indispensablein a review of a theory of
organizations.Verylittleis known about the process of collec-
tive learningof new models of human relations.Whatis
knownof learningat the grouplevel-and which is itself
quite speculativewith respect to what is known
about individuallearning-is often extrapolatedtoo
hastilyto the level of the organizationas such. The literature
on change has, untilnow, hardlytaken into account the sys-
temic dimensionof organizations(Bennis, 1966; Bennis,
Benne, and Chin,1964). The time has come to progress in
such a direction.Unfortunately,experimentationat that level
is very difficult.An alternativeway to proceed involvesthe
study of reformscontinuouslyattempted, and rarelysuccess-
ful, in the field of publicgovernment.Overand beyond the
difficultiesit raises, such a strategy requiresa much less
formalizedapproachand puts into question, at least partially,
progress made in the field of quantification.It has the advan-
tage of remainingclose to the experimentalmethod and it
may producecumulativeconclusions on the conditions,pos-
sibilities,and limitationsof collective learningprocesses in
organizationsand in organizedsystems.

Michel Crozieris Director of the Center for Sociology of

Organizations at the National Center of Scientific Re-
search in Paris, France. Jean-Claude Thoenig is a profes-
sor of sociology at the Federal Institute of Technology in
Lausanne, Switzerland.

REFERENCES

Aiken, Michael, and Jerald Hage
1968 "Organizational interdepen-
dence and intra-organizational
structure." American Sociolog-
ical Review, 33: 912-930.
Aldrich, Howard
1974 The Environment as a Net-
work of Organizations:
Theoretical and Methodologi-
cal Implications. Toronto: VIII
World Congress of Sociology.
Bennis, Warren
1966 Changing Organizations. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Bennis, W., K. D. Benne, and R.
Chin
1964 The Planning of Change. New
York: Holt Rinehart and
Winston.
Benson, Kenneth
1974 The Organizational Network as
a Political Economy. Toronto:
VIIIWorld Congress of Sociol-
ogy.
Burns, T., and G. M. Stalker
1961 The Managementof Innova-
tion. London:Tavistock.
Clark,Burton
1965 "Interorganizationalpatternin
education."Administrative
Science Quarterly,10: 224-
237.
Crozier,Michel
1964 The BureaucraticPhenome-
non. Chicago:ChicagoUniver-
sity Press.
1972 "Therelationshipbetween
microand macrosociology."
HumanRelations,25: 239-
251.
1974 The StalledSociety. New
York:VikingPress.
Crozier,Michel, ErhardFriedberg,
CatherineGremion, PierreGrem-
ion,Jean-ClaudeThoenig,and
Jean-PierreWorms
1975 Ou,va I'AdministrationFran-
qaise. Paris: Editions d'Or-
ganisation.
569/ASQ
Dill,William
1958 "Environment as an influence
on managerialautonomy."
Administrative Science Quar-
terly,3: 409-443.
Duncan, Robert
1972 "Characteristicsof organiza-
tionalenvironmentsand per-
ceived environmentaluncer-
tainty."AdministrativeScience
Quarterly,17: 313-327.
Emery,F. E., and E. L.Trist
1965 "Thecasual textureof organi-
zationalenvironment."Human
Relations,13: 21-32.
Evan,William
1966 "Theorganization-set."In
James D. Thompson(ed.),
Approachesto Organizational
Design: Pittsburgh:University
of PittsburghPress.

This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Gremion, Pierre
1966 "Introductiona une etude des
systemes politico-administratif
local. " Sociologie du Travail,3:
51-73.
1976 Le pouvoir peritherique. Paris:
Le Seuil.
Gremion, Pierre,and Jean-Pierre
Worms
1970 Les Institutions Regionales et
la Societe Locale. Paris:
Centerfor Sociologyof Or-
ganizations.
Hall, Richard
1972 Organizations,Structuresand
Processes. EnglewoodCliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Katz,Daniel, and Robert Kahn
1966 The Social Psychologyof Or-
ganization.New York:Wiley.
Kesselmann, Mark
1966 FrenchLocalGovernment:
The Politicsof Consensus.
New York:Knopf.
Lawrence, Paul, and Jay Lorsch
1967 Organization and Environment. 1967 Organizationsin Action.New
Boston: HarvardUniversity
Press.
This content downloaded from 194.214.27.178 on Tue, 3 Sep 2013 00:07:39 AM
Levine, Sol, and Paul White
1961 "Exchangeand interorganiza- MacEwen
tionalrelationships."Adminis- 1958 "Organizational
trativeScience Quarterly,10:
583-601.
Litwak,Eugene, and LydiaHylton
1962 "Interorganization analysis:a
hypothesison coordinating
agencies." Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly,10: 395-420.
Pennings, Johannes
1974 Environment,Structureand
Performanceof ComplexOr-
ganizations.Toronto:VIIWorld Warren,Roland
Congress of Sociology.
Perrow, Charles
1972 ComplexOrganizations: A Crit-
ical Essay. Glenview,Ill.:Scott
Foresman.
Thoenig, Jean-Claude
1973 L'Ere des Technocrates. Paris:
Editions d'Organisation.
1975 "La relation entre le centre et
"
la peripherie en France. Bul-
letin de l'lnstitut International
d'Administration Publique, 36:
77-124.
Thompson, James D.
York:McGraw-Hill.
570/ASQ
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Thompson, James D., and William
goals and en-
vironment."American
SociologicalReview,23:
23-31.
Turk,Herman
1970 "Interorganizationalnetworks
and urbansociety." American
SociologicalReview,35: 1-19.
1973 "Comparativeurbanstructure
froman interorganization
perspective."Administrative
Science Quarterly,18: 37-55.
1967 "Theinterorganizational field
as a focus of investigation."
AdministrativeScience Quar-
terly, 12: 396-419.
Weick, Karl
1969 The SocialPsychologyof Or-
ganizing.Stanford,Ca.:Addi-
son Wesley.
Yuchtman, Ephraim,and Stanley
Seashore
1967 "Asystem resourceapproach
to organizationaleffective-
ness." AmericanSociological
Review,32: 891-903.
Worms, Jean-Pierre
1966 "Leprefet et ses notables."
Sociologiedu Travail,3: 249-
275.