Śa Kara and Buddhism

ŚAṄKARA AND BUDDHISM
Author(s): FRANK WHALING

Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (MARCH 1979), pp. 1-42
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23440361
Accessed: 05-07-2016 18:21 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Indian
Philosophy
This content downloaded from 131.172.36.29 on Tue, 05 Jul 2016 18:21:41 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
FRANK WHALING
SAÑKARA AND BUDDHISM
The various facets of Sañkara's relationship towards Buddhism have been a

lively topic of debate from his own time until now. He is said to have been
responsible for driving the Buddhists out of the land of their birth; and now
that the Buddhist tradition is increasing at a much faster proportionate rate
than any other tradition1 in India, it may be timely to look again at 'Sañkara
and Buddhism'.
Before starting our study proper, we will look at the many different views
that have been given in relation to Sañkara's attitude towards Buddhism. The
first one has already been mentioned, namely that Sañkara was responsible for
the demise of Buddhism in India. Hindus of the Advaita Vedan ta persuasion
(and others too) have seen in Sankara the one who restored the Hindu dharma
against the attacks of the Buddhists (and Jains) and in the process helped to
drive Buddhism out of India. According to this school of thought, Sañkara was,
as it were, the symbolic representative of'Hinduism' against 'Buddhism' and it
is largely due to him that the Buddhist tradition died out in India. Needless to
say, not all schools of thought within the Hindu tradition would subscribe to
this extreme view. But most of them would agree that the work of Sañkara —
along with that of Kumirila and others played some part in the withering
away of that tradition in India.
A second view of extreme significance is that Sañkara was himself a crypto
Buddhist. Bhaskara caricatured Sañkara's system as "this despicable, broken
down mâyiï-vâda that has been chanted by the Mahâyâna Buddhists"2. In so
doing, Bhiskara unknowingly began a Une of thought that has continued from
800 A.D. to our own day. This has taken many forms. For Bháskara, Sañkara
was undermining Vedic orthodoxy with its stress on ritual duty and an ordered
society as well as a right understanding of the Upanisads by his revolutionary
innovations introduced as a result of his unfortunate dallying with Mahâyâna.
For Râmânuja and Madhva, Sankara was the underminer of bhakti; and they
were reacting against the supposed Buddhist influence upon Sañkara which had
diverted Vedânta from its rightful development in the direction of bhakti. In
modern times, Belvalkar, Dasgupta, Hiriyanna, Radhakrishnan and Thibaut
Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979) 1-42. 0022-1791/79/0071-0001$04.20.

Copyright © 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co. , Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.
FRANK WHALING
would follow Bhâskara and Râmânuja in describing Sañkara's pMosophy under

the title of mâyàviïda. Radhakrishnan would admit the tremendous power and
sublety of Sañkara's thought, but would also claim that he has included certain
Buddhist elements in his system and that he has been deeply influenced by
Buddhism.3 Dasgupta would go even further and claim that Sañkara's innova
tory doctrines "were anticipated by the idealistic Buddhists, and looked at
from this point of view, there would be very little which could be regarded as
original in Sañkara"4. There is a deep implication here which is not fully spelled
out by Dasgupta. He has to admit Sañkara's "influence on Hindu thought and
religion became so great that he was regarded in later times as being almost a divine
person or an incarnation"5. If this is so, Buddhism lost the battle in that it disap
peared from India6, but it gained the victory in that it won its way, through
Sañkara, into the very heart of the Hindu faith. Suffice it to say, there is a very
long tradition that Sañkara was influenced by Buddhism.
A third view which I intend to introduce into this paper is that Sañkara
consciously or unconsciously introduced the Buddhist systematic monastic organi
sation into the Hindu fold. Most exploration of Buddhist influence upon
Sañkara has been confined to the realm of ideas. It seems to me that we ought
also to take more seriously Buddhist influence upon Sañkara's practice.
A fourth view is that Sañkara just did not understand Buddhism. This charge
is often advanced by Buddhists who are understandably hurt by comments such
as that of Sañkara on Vedânta Sütra 2.2.32,
From whatever new points of view the Buddha system is tested with reference to its
probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in
fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in
the practical concerns of life are mere folly.7
This charge is sometimes extended to that of wilful ignorance. According to

this view, Sañkara did understand but for his own purposes was not willing to
admit that he understood. "His debt to Sünyata doctrine was so great that he
quietly passed over it"8.
A fifth view is that Sañkara was not directly influenced by Buddhism at all.
This is often the more traditional Advaita view, the logic appearing to be that
if Sañkara was the Hindu par excellence, how could he have been influenced
by the utterly different Buddhist Weltanschauung? As Singh puts it, "His
philosophy is an embodiment of the cultural spirit of Hinduism and he appears
before us as an exponent and guardian of this cultural spirit"9.
SANKARA AND BUDDHISM
Sixthly, the problem has also been treated historically. According to this
view, it is necessary to try to see what Sañkara himself said rather than what
Advaita Vedânta as a system says — to see Sañkara as a historical figure dealing
with concrete problems in his own day, rather than as a representative of one
'system' over against another 'system'. When this is done, according to Hacker
it is possible to see development within Sankara's thought itself of his attitude
towards Buddhist categories. When this is done, it is also possible to see Sañkara
as affected by the philosophical currents of his time which included Buddhist,
quasi-Buddhist, and non-Buddhist elements.
Seventhly, a combination of different views is of course possible. It has been
said that the practical element of the doctrine of Sañkara was opposed to Budd
hism, but the idealistic and acosmic element was not. Murti claims that Sañkara
followed Mahâyâna in the form of his argument but not in the content. And
many other combinations of the above alternatives are also possible.
These, then, are some of the possibilities open to us, and some of the dif
ferent views that have been offered concerning Sañkara and Buddhism. What
procedure will we adopt in order to create order out of this welter of interpre
tations?
In the first place we will look at what Sañkara himself said about Buddhism
and from that try to determine whether he understood it or not. Secondly, we
will look at the historical development of pre-Sañkara Vedânta and Buddhism
to determine the background against which Sañkara wrote; we will examine
the development within Sañkara himself in relation to Buddhism; and we will
place his attitude to Buddhism in historical context.
Thirdly, we will examine the practical influence of Buddhism upon Sañkara's
work with monasteries. Fourthly, we will look briefly at the basic differences
and similarities of the two 'traditions'.9 Finally, we will determine to what
extent if any Sañkara was responsible for the demise of Buddhism in India.
Underlying our argument will be a continuing debate as to what we mean by
'Sañkara' — was he just the man 'as he was' as determined largely by western
scholarship or was he the Sañkara who has come down to us from tradition?
There will be a continuing debate also as to what we mean by 'Buddhism' —
was there such a thing as 'Buddhism' against which Sañkara was writing, or is
the very concept Buddhism a reification of the modern western mind?
What then did Sañkara himself say about Buddhism? And here right at the
very start we confront the problem of the concrete Sañkara. For there are two
aspects to this problem. Sañkara is known to many present-day traditional
FRANK WHALING
Hindus not through his own writings but through Vâcaspati's 'Bhâmatî' on
Sañkara's commentary on the 'Vedanta Sütras'. In other words they are familiar
not with Sañkara himself, but with Sañkara as seen through later Vedànta
(Advaita) eyes. Also it is clear that in much of Sañkara's writing he was follow
ing a Vedàn ta tradition that was already in existence. Many of his ideas about
Buddhism are not original: he is merely passing on the tradition which has
come down to him. In this analysis, I will try to examine what was original in
Sañkara's criticism of the Buddhists, and also what was a 'repetition' of what
had come down to him. It is possible to do this by following a method, which
D. H. H. Ingalls followed, of comparing the commentaries of Sañkara and Bhâs
kara on the 'Vedànta Sütras' — where they agree they follow the older tradition
of the Vrttikara and other commentators; where Bháskara criticises Sañkara this
means that Sañkara has departed from the older tradition and is original9b.
Sañkara's main comments on Buddhism are to be found in his comments
upon the 'Vedànta Sutras' 2.2.18—32, and in some of his comments upon the
'Brhadâranyaka Upanisad' especially in chapter 4.3.7 on "Which is the Self? "
Sañkara classifies the Buddhists into three main schools at the beginning of
his comment on Sütra 2.2.18.; Sarvâstivâdins, Yogâcârins and Mâdhyamikas10.
He deals, in Sütras 2.2.18-27, with the Sarvâstivâdins. His arguments against
them coincide virtually with those of Bháskara, and we may assume that they
both drew their arguments from the same common source. The question is then
not so much what Sañkara thought of the Sarvâstivâdins but what the whole
tradition thought about them. Sañkara and Bháskara employ basically five
arguments against the Sarvâstivâdins. Against the Buddhist doctrine of aggre
gates, that all entities are collocations of atomic particles categorised in two
or five aggregates, they argued that there was no conscious agent in this theory
to effect a combination of the atoms into aggregates, and therefore no satisfac
tory explanation of causality. Moreover, if the basic elements did exist and act
independently, then there was no reason why they should ever cease to do so,
thus the conditions for cessation of activity in the sense of nirvana would be
jeopardised.103 This was basically a theistic argument being used against a non
theistic one, and was used by the Vedântans with equal cogency against the
Sâmkhya and early Vais'esika schools.
They argued next against the Chain of Causation (pratïtya-samutpâda) in
which twelve links of causes and effects revolve ceaselessly like pots on a water
wheel and so explain samsara. This line of argument, they claimed, is only valid
to explain how one preceding link is the cause of one succeeding link, but it
doesn't give the cause of the aggregates and chain as a whole.

They next went on to refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness which
used the analogy of the flame of a lamp to show that particles which were
momentary could yet form a continuum. They said that this train of thought
was contradictory because the action of one particle would stop before the
rise of the next one — there was nothing to relate cause to effect.
After that, they went on to consider the Buddhist view of asamskrta dharmas as
being non-momentary. These were three in number, namely space (âkâs'a), cessation
through intellectual power (pratisamkhy&nirodha), and cessation through the
absence of productive cause (aprati-samkhyanirodha). Sañkara claims that the
Buddhists see these three as "non-substantial, of a merely negative character,
devoid of all positive characteristics"11. He attacks this and points out that space
is positive 'air' or 'ether' rather than negative absence of obstruction. "There
is", he writes, "a self-contradiction in the Buddha statements regarding all the
three kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are
not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal"12.
Following the text, they both return to the doctrine of momentariness of the
perceiver and claim that memory proves it to be impossible. Sañkara's argument
is original at this point for he attacks the Buddhist argument from similarity.
Not only, he argues, is the idea of one mind necessary to grasp two successive
moments, one mind is also necessary to grasp two similar things involved in a
statement such as 'this is that'. He thus strengthens his basic doctrine of the
permanent reality of the self. Finally, Sañkara and Bhâskara oppose the Buddh
ist idea that bhava can come from abhâva, origin from destruction. Nothing,
they argue, can come from nothing. "The whole Buddha doctrine of existence
springing from non-existence has to be rejected"13.
Such, in brief, is a summary of the then Vedan ta arguments against the
Sarvâstivâdins. Were they fair? Did Sañkara understand Buddhism? Or perhaps
we ought rather to ask, did the Vedantins understand Buddhism? And this
brings us immediately to our second underlying problem, namely what is
'Buddhism'? What is 'Sarvâstivâda Buddhism'? Sañkara appears to have thought
that the Buddha had personally taught Sarvâstivâda, Yogâcâra and Mâdhyamikâ
philosophy.
Moreover, the Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching
respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothing
ness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions,
or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting
which men would become thoroughly confused14.
FRANK WHALING
While it is true that the Buddhist schools themselves claimed that the Buddha
had given to them their doctrines, this statement shows a complete unaware
ness on Sankara's part of the historical development of Buddhist thought.
Perhaps it shows something more than this. He was anxious to defeat the
Buddhists, as can be seen from the virulence of this statement, and in order to
do so it was necessary for him to stress that his case was based upon revelation
whereas his opponents' was not. He shared with the Buddhists their two sources
of knowledge at that time concerning the external world, namely perception
and inference; in regard to absolute knowledge, his authority was revelation —
theirs was the Dharma as mediated largely through the Buddha. If he could
emphasize that the Buddha was a mere man and that his teachings were contra
dictory and that they were mere teachings, that is speculations, rather than a
path to be followed, then the triumph of revelation over Dharma would be
likely. Sankara's primary motivation was not to teach a philosophy but to guide
men to moksa by the path of perfect knowledge. In his zeal to do this, he was
understressing the fact that Buddhism too was a path not a philosophy. He
gives the appearance of a man who has a reasonable grasp of the exterior of
Buddhist thought, but who does not recognize it as a faith with its own inner
symbol system. The whole of his attitude is coloured by this bias. He is treating
Buddhism as a speculative philosophy rather than as a 'path' philosophy, and
his own system as a 'path' philosophy rather than as a speculative philosophy.15
He is applying rational criticism to a system whose epistemology and ontology
are not reducible to rational and empirical grounds, and he is assuming that
his own acceptance of the authority of the Upanisadic texts is beyond rational
criticism. If this is so, we can say that Sañkara did reasonably understand the
Buddhist philosophy but he did not really understand the Buddhist path. As
we analyse his criticisms of Buddhist speculative philosophy, this deeper
'misunderstanding' reveals itself.
What then of his criticisms of the Sarvâstivâdins? In general, his argument
is philosophically fair and cogent; but in certain places it is not. He is attacking
a school that was no longer in his time a living force in India, and we are not
sure what contemporary Sarvâstivâdins taught. But Sañkara does seem to be
treating as one what were really two separate schools, namely the Sautrântikas
and the Vaibhâsikas, and this is typical of his indifference to history. The earlier
Sarvâstivâdins had denied the pudgala (transmigrating self) and asserted the
doctrine of momentariness, but they qualified both these statements by a pan
realism which by using the doctrine of possession, germs (bija) and suffusion
(vasanâ), pointed to a kind of self and a kind of permanency. As Conze puts it,
" 'Possession' implies a support which is more than the momentary state from
moment to moment, and in fact a kind of lasting personality, i.e. the stream
as identical with itself, in a personal identity, which is here interpreted as
continuity"16. The Vaibhasikas had later modified this as being too realistic,
but even they had a more positive notion of reality than Sañkara gave them
credit for. For them, the asamskrta dharmas were not mere nothing or non
existence as Sañkara claimed. They saw them as positive entities even though
they could not be described in words, and they saw the pratisamkhyâ nirodha
as the goal of spiritual efforts.
Sañkara was therefore lumping different schools together under the heading
of Sarvâstivâdins; he was making the unwarranted logical assumption that some
thing that was 'undefinable' was therefore 'unreal'; and he was ignoring the
soteriological purpose behind the theory. He also seems to have been unfair in
imputing to the Buddha the idea that "an effect may arise even when there is
no cause"17. This was unwarrantable even in a philosophical 'game', for con
ditioned co-production (pratîtyasamutpdda) was one of the highest insights
of Buddhist thought, and while the Buddhists may have denied permanent
causes they would certainly not deny the causal relation between things.
The central question-mark in Sañkara's treatment of the Sarvâstivâdin posi
tion and of the Buddhist position in general is his use of the term nihilism.173
He sums up all three Buddhist schools as being nihilism, not merely the Mâd
hyamikas. As he writes later, "We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines,
viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world,
and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist"18. We will look at this more
closely later. Suffice it to say at this stage that the central Buddhist thrust from
the time of the Buddha onwards had been to stress the Middle Way between
eternalism and nihilism, 'is' and 'is not'. Sañkara was not examining Buddhist
philosophy in the light of its own presuppositions; he was examining it in the
light of the threat it posed to his own basic doctrine of the âtman as a perma
nent self. To this extent, he did not understand it even in a philosophical sense,
and in this he was one with his Vedânta predecessors.
What then of Sañkara's view of the Yogâcâra system? He deals with it in his
comments on Vedânta Sütras 2.2.28—32. Bhâskara diverges from Sañkara here
and attacks him as being a follower of Dharmaklrti. While Sañkara is still con
cerned with the Buddhists, Bhâskara is concerned with the Buddhists as well
as with Sañkara as a crypto-Buddhist. We may assume that these arguments of
FRANK WHALING
Sañkara are therefore of unusual importance for our study. We note that Sañkara
is again indifferent to history in that he deals with the Yogàcârins before the
Mâdhyamikas even though the latter appeared before the former.
In this section Sañkara attacks five arguments on the unreality of the world
taken from Dharmaklrti. According to DharmakTrti, as interpreted by Sañkara,
only consciousness is real. The usual distinctions of object, subject and the
process of knowing are all aspects of the consciousness itself. There is no need
to posit anything outside of consciousness for the witnessing subject and the
particularised object are ideas in the mind rather than things in themselves.
When we perceive something, the subject, object and knowledge of both all
appear together and the reason is that they are identical.
Sañkara counters this reasonable presentation of the system in the following
way. He says that we still need to posit an object, for if knowledge takes the
form of an object from its containing it this would still not be possible if in
fact there were no object. He goes on to say that the fact that an idea and an
object occur together in perception proves nothing except the fact that they
stand to each other in the relation of means and end; it certainly does not prove
that they are identical. He also appeals to common sense and experience in
claiming that we recognise something as it is; we see a real object; we do not
say that A is like B, we say that A is B. He goes on to say that there must be
something beyond cognition, namely a cognizer. There is the need for a witness
in order to have cognition. Self-luminous cognition could not be reached with
out a witness nor could it have anyone to understand it without a witness. This
does not mean that the witness, or grasper, then needs something else to grasp
it; for the witness stands self-proved. If the Yogâcârin then goes on to say that
the self-validity of the knower is his own theory, Sañkara then denies this on
the basis of the Buddhist claim that cognition is momentary and multiple and
therefore there can be no self-validity of the knower.
Dharmakïrti had also claimed that the experience of dreaming proved his
theory. In dreams and when we are awake we have the idea that there is a
perceiver and the perceived. But dream ideas are seen to be false on waking,
and therefore waking ideas must be false also. The dreaming state is the para
digm for the waking state. Sañkara counters this argument also with a common
sense view which stresses that waking experience of objects is not negated in
any other state of consciousness, and that waking ideas are acts of immediate
consciousness rather than of dream recollection. The waking and the dream
state, though comparable, are not identical.
Finally, Sañkara refutes the idea of the alaya-vijñana (reservoir consciousness).
If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (Slayavijñána) assumed by you may
constitute the abode of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also
being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impres
sions any more than the quasi-external cognitions. For unless there exists one continuous
principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, or an absolutely
unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance,
recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time
and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare y our Slayavijñána to be something permanent,
you thereby abandon your tenet that the Slayavijñána as well as everything else is moment
19
ary .
In other words, Sañkara sees the concept of the Slayavijñána as an inadequate

attempt to avoid the 'nihilism' inherent in the whole Buddhist system.
To what extent was Sañkara's criticism of the Yogacarins fair? His descrip
tion of their system seems to be reasonably accurate. But we face some of the
same problems that we faced in evaluating his refutation of the Sarvâstivâdins.
He assumed that idealism was the real teaching of the Buddha, and that his
teaching of realism as found in the Sarvâstivâdin system was an accommodation
to inferior minds.20 There is of course no evidence for this. He also lumped
together under the heading of Yogâcâra some very different strands of Buddhist
idealism. The idealism of the Lankâvatâra Sutra, and of Asañga and Vasubhandu
who lived in the fifth century A.D., stressed the experience of the Absolute
as Consciousness, of the Slayavijñána in which all our experiences are latently
present, of the continuous stream of universal consciousness, and of Suchness
(TathatS) as Absolute Reality transcending the dualities of subject and object.
But the later idealism of Dignâga and Dharmakîrti was different from that of
Vasubhandu on important matters such as the nature of the real and the appa
rent, the nature and cause of error, and other related matters. It was more
interested in logical and epistemological questions, and placed less stress on the
Buddhist scriptures. It was more interested in affirming the reality of an ultimate
goal and a liberated state than in the reality of the soul. When Sañkara claims to
be refuting Yogâcâra, what he is really doing is attacking the later idealists and
not the whole of the Yogâcâra School. In fact, his own ideas were fairly close
in some ways to some of the ideas of the earlier idealists, and we will investi
gate this similarity later. Sañkara does not give credit to the positive features
in the Yogâcâra system which could hardly be described as nihilism. These
features were present even in the more logical approach of the later idealists,
and Sañkara is either unfair or lacking in understanding to claim otherwise. He
FRANK WHALING
again appears to fall into the error of assuming that the idealists' scriptural
authority was negligable whereas his was paramount; that their system could
be judged by reason whereas his own could not. This seems to be suggested in
his comment that "this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all
the means of knowledge, cannot be denied, unless someone should find out
some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence)"21. The implica
tion seems to be that he is free to deny the apparent world because he has the
scriptures to warrant this, but the idealists do not have that scriptural authority
and therefore they ought to accept the apparent world. Sañkara misunderstood
even the later idealist logicians in assuming that Buddhism could be summed up
and refuted on logical and epistemological grounds alone. As Conze writes,
"Dignâga's 'Pramànasamuccaya' admits that 'the Dharma is not an object of
logical reasoning', and adds, 'he that leads to the absolute truth by way of logi
cal reasoning will be very far from the teaching of the Buddha, and fail"22. We
will return to the concerns of this section later in estimating the influence of
Buddhism upon Sañkara. We can say at this stage that while Sañkara had a
qualified understanding of Yogâcâra philosophy qua philosophy, he did not
really understand it as a path.
The third school of Buddhist philosophy reviewed by Sañkara was that of
the Mâdhyamikas. His comments on this school were inhibitingly brief. "The
third variety of Buddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that
absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and
therefore requires no special refutation"23. This dismissal in one sentence of
the mighty SQnyata philosophy of the Mâdhyamikas seems astounding, and
appears to lend weight to those who would argue that Sañkara did not under
stand Buddhism. Before we proceed to investigate the matter, we are led by
the incredible nature of Sañkara's statement to attempt to defend him.
In the first place, we are not sure what kind of Mâdhyamikas, if any, Sañkara
himself actually knew. In other words we face the same difficulty as we saw
earlier in regard to the Sarvâstivâdins and Yogâcârins. Did Sañkara know and
dispute with any members of these schools personally; if so, what kind of
representatives were they? ; or was he engaging himself in a purely philosophical
enterprise that had no counterpart in practice? It is difficult to imagine that
Sañkara would not have met with different varieties of actual Buddhists, but
we have no means of knowing the real truth of the matter. If Sañkara did
meet Mâdhyamikas they would have been different from Nàgârjuna himself.
About 450 A.D., the Indian Mâdhyamikas had split into two different schools.
The Pràsangikas interpreted Nàgàijuna as having preached a universal scepticism

which had the sole aim of refuting the position of the opponent. On the other
hand, the Svatantrikas upheld the view that the purpose of argument was posi
tive as well as negative and that the iünyaiá doctrine was capable of establishing
truth. Sañkara may have been of the opinion that the Pràsangikas were the
Màdhyamikas, and if so his scathing view is more understandable.
To be honest, it is also possible that Sañkara may have had a wider contact
with Màdhyamikas than he reveals. In the last 100 years scholarship has opened
up a vast amount of Buddhist sources in non-Indian languages that have not
yet been fully explored by students. On the face of it, we may then be in a
better position than Sañkara to understand Buddhism. By the same token, it is
also possible that there were numerous Buddhist Sanskrit sources available to
Sañkara (not to mention living Indian Buddhists) that are lost to us for ever
due to the depradations of the Muslims and other causes. In addition to this
possibility, it is also likely that the differences Sankara and the other Hindu
thinkers impute to the Buddhist schools were by no means so clear cut and
simple as they assert. An example of this is the existence of the so-called
Yogâcàra- Mâdhyai 11 ika school which combined both viewpoints; another is the
suggestion that Sântaraksita and KamalasHa "were attempting a synthesis of
Mâdhyamika, Yogâcâra and Sautrântika tenets"24. It appears likely, therefore,
that Sankara was isolating a Mâdhyamika viewpoint for refutation that no
longer existed in its purity; and that he was equating that viewpoint with the
universal scepticism of the Pràsangikas.
Secondly, in his defence, we may say that Sañkara was not primarily a
speculative philosopher; he was mainly a 'path' philosopher. His main concern
was not to show that moksa was possible, but rather to show how moksa was
possible. He knew that it was possible — the point was to demonstrate how it
was possible and what were the barriers to its attainment. For Sañkara the way
to its attainment was perfect knowledge, and one of the barriers to its attain
ment was Buddhist 'nihilism'.
Thirdly, although Sañkara may have contributed to the downfall of Buddhism

in India, there are signs that this decline was already begun by his time. If Sañ
kara treated Buddhism as a philosophy rather than a way, it is likely that the
Buddhist logicians often tended in the same direction of 'proving' Buddhism
and 'disproving' their opponents by rational means alone. Along with this
change of direction as we shall see later, there was the growth of Vajrayâna
and Tan trie elements at the popular level with a growing tendency towards
FRANK WHALING
eroticism, magic and pseudo-mysticism. There was therefore some justification

for Sañkara to feel that Buddhist philosophy was speculative philosophy rather
than the purveyor of a way. The flaw in this argument is that there were equally
obvious popular 'corruptions' among the Hindu Tantras and the members of
sects such as those of the Pas'upatas and Kâpâlikas.
Fourthly, there were hints of nihilism among the Buddhists and especially
among the Madhyamikas. This can be traced back to the basic Buddhist doc
trine of anâtman, not-self. There is dispute about the Buddha's own position.
For Murti, the Buddha was knowingly revolting against the Upanisadic doctrine
of the âtman. For others, the Buddha was merely being silent about the self and
not necessarily denying it. "The Buddha never taught that the self 'is not', but
only that 'it cannot be apprehended'25". The same kind of ambiguity has
remained in some Buddhist teaching ever since. Conze claims that there are two
facets to the doctrine of anâtman, "It is claimed that nothing in reality cor
responds to such words or ideas as 'I', 'mine', 'belonging' etc. In other words,
the self is not a fact. We are urged to consider that nothing in our empirical
self is worthy of being regarded as the real self'26. The latter statement implies
that the nihilism that is promulgated in regard to the self is merely a means to
assert and to gain an ultimate reality that is beyond this empirical world. If so,
it is not nihilism. However, the starting-point for later Buddhists (whatever the
Buddha himself may have believed) does seem to have been anâtman. We can
see this most easily in the attempts of later schools to bring in a 'person' as
opposed to the merely impersonal dharmas of the Abhidharmists. The Pudgala
vâdins did this in a thorough-going way by positing the pudgala, person, as a
continuing entity who does deeds, receives fruits, and wanders in samsâra.
Other Buddhist schools rejected the pudgala, but incorporated the idea of
personal continuities in other ways. These included the idea of the unconscious
and subliminal life-continuum of the later Theravâdins, the very subtle conscious
ness of the Sautrântikas, the basic consciousness of the Mahâsânghikas, the innate
wholesome dharmas of the Yogâcâras, the ideas of Dharmahood, Suchness and
the Dharmabody of the Buddha, still later the embryonic Tathâgata, and finally
the store-consciousness of Asañga as a kind of Buddha-self. In other words,
while the Buddhists rejected the word âtman, in other ways they retained some
thing of the idea. But as far as Sañkara was concerned, they had begun with
nihilism and were trying to patch it up with these later ideas.
What then was the Màdhyamika position? Was it nihilism? According to
Sañkara, iünyatá meant complete non-existence and non-reality. What did it
mean to the Màdhyamikas? Conze makes the important point that sunyatâ
from within the Buddhist Weltanschauung can only make real sense to a Budd
hist from within the soteriological context. He describes five stages of insight
within the soteriological framework corresponding to thirty two kinds of
emptiness. According to this, one first understands what a dharma is and one
takes the everyday world seriously; then by meditating upon the dharmas one
sees them as empty and lacking in a true self, and one also sees one's own
spiritual desire for eternity, bliss and omnipotence; next, having seen the
conditioned dharmas as not worth having, one seeks for nirvana and the Path
as opposed to the world; then, within the soteriological context, the stage of
paradox is truly reached in which the distinction between the world and
nirvana is undone, and they are now seen to be dialectically identical — the aim
is now to transcend their identity and difference, and at this stage there is an
identity of the world and nirvana, yes and no; finally, these paradoxes remove
all attachment to logical modes of thought which are now left behind — silence
prevails, words fail, spiritual reality communicates directly with itself.27 At
each stage it is this soteriological context and motivation that Sartkara fails to
comprehend. He sees it from without where it seems to indicate emptiness;
had he seen it from within it would have also meant 'fullness'.
For the Màdhyamikas, emptiness was more of a religious than a philosophical

term. The key to life was the fact of suffering; the aim of life, to escape it; the
cause of suffering was our clinging to various things as absolutes. Some of the
Hînayàna Buddhists had rejected the âtman but kept the theory of dharmas as
ultimate elements. The Màdhyamikas now rejected both absolute theories and
absolute entities. All was empty, including dharmas, nirvana, Buddahood and
sunyata itself. They do not exist in themselves and we cannot cling to them.
However, even in their soteriological eagerness to do away with all clinging
and attachment whatsoever, the Màdhyamikas were also careful to preserve
the Middle Way between eternalism and nihilism. As the 'Mûlamâdhyamikakâri
kâs' 15.10 puts it, " 'It is' is a notion of eternity. 'It is not' is a nihilistic view"28.
Sañkara ignores both the soteriological intent, and the consistent Buddhist stress
on the middle way.
Scholars are agreed that the Mâdhyamika technique was mainly negative.
The Màdhyamikas used logic to show the weakness in the theories of others.
They doubted that words and concepts could be used to explain Absolute
Reality. As Nâgâijuna puts it, "If I would hold some proposition or other,
then by that I would have a logical error; But I do not hold a proposition; there
FRANK WHALING
fore I am not in error"29. The real question is whether there was behind the
negative element of éûnyatâ, a positive thirst for ultimate truth; a desire for a
sense of beyond, a true freedom, a desire to see things as they really are. Did
their stress upon the fact that we can construct no doctrine about reality mean
that they felt there was no reality, or was it rather an attempt to save the trans
cendent nature of Absolute Reality? On this question there is dispute among
scholars. It has continued from the time of de La Vallée Poussin who stressed
the negative character, of nirvana and emptiness over against Stcherbatsky who
stressed the desire to emphasise the inexpressible character of Absolute Being.
Murti was influenced by Stcherbatsky in his attempt to indicate the positive
intent of sünyatd(also by a Kantian concern with epistemology alone!); recent
scholars have also reverted to the negative idea that sünyata IS absolute nothingness
which is an absolute being without the connotation of a static reality.30 Streng
expresses a variation upon this when he says that emptiness in Nâgârjuna has the
negative function of destroying dependence upon logic and speech as means to
Ultimate Truth, and the positive function of using logical and discursive struc
tures to probe and expand the scope of the meanings present in ideas and sym
bols.
This dialectic, however, is not simply a destructive force which clears the ground foi a
constructive formulation of truth, nor even a dissipation of the fog surrounding an essence
of truth or reality. The dialectic itself provides a positive apprehension, not of a 'thing',
but of the insight that there is no independent and absolute thing that exists eternally,
nor a 'thing' which can be constructed. The dialectic itself is a means of knowing.31
If this were so, Sañkara would be right in supposing that for the Mâdhyamikas
not merely âtman, but Brahman also, is really anâtman. K. V. Ramanan, basing
his estimate upon the 'MahâprajfiSpâramitâs'âstra' as well as the 'Karikas', sums
up Nâgârjuna's work rather differently, "Negation is not an end in itself; its
end is the revelation of tathatâ ... The way the Mâdhyamika employs to reveal
the true nature of things is negative ; but the truth that is thus revealed is the
nature of things as they are"32. It seems to me that by analysis even of the
'Kârikâs' a case can be made out for there being a more positive element in
Nâgârjuna that could not be summarised as mere nihilism. On the one hand he
stressed dependent co-origination, the idea that things are not real in themselves,
but dependent, and can be seen to exist only in relation to other things. "The
producer proceeds being dependent on the product, and the product proceeds
being dependent on the producer. The cause for realisation is seen in nothing
else"33. This doctrine gave the thrust to the Bodhisattva ideal with its stress on
compassion and helping others insofar as we are inextricably inter-related with

them. However, it does not deny existence, it merely denies self-existence; and
Nâgàrjuna works this out in some detail. He even goes further than this in a
positive direction. He seems to suggest that dependent co-origination does not
apply to the ultimate reality. " 'Not caused by something else', 'peaceful', 'not
elaborated by discursive thought', 'Indeterminate', 'undifferentiated': such are
the characteristics of true reality (tattva)"34. "How, then will 'eternity', 'non
eternity', and (the rest of) the tetralemma apply to bliss (santa)?"35. "Those
who describe in detail the Buddha, who is unchanging and beyond all detailed
description - Those, completely defeated by description, do not perceive the
'fully completed' (being)"36. And in the final verse of the 'Kàrikàs' he writes,
"To him, possessing compassion, who taught the real dharma for the destruction
of all views - to him, Gautama, I humbly offer reverence"37. And so, from
Nâgàrjuna's view point, Sañkara did not understand that "He who perceives
dependent co-origination also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction
as well as the path (of release)"38; nor did he understand the Màdhyamika inten
tion to 'save the Absolute'. Sañkara did not understand Màdhyamika philosophy,
although we may perhaps excuse him insofar as many modern scholars have held
widely divergent views of it as well.
What is more remarkable in Sankara's inability to understand the deeper
implications of Madhyamika is that it is based upon a theory of two levels of
truth that he inherited indirectly. As Nâgàrjuna writes in answer to those who
accuse him of denying the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha, "The teaching by the
Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths; the world-ensconsed truth
and the truth that is in the highest sense. Those who do not know the distribu
tion of the two kinds of truth do not know the profound 'point' in the teaching
of the Buddha"39. It is strange that Sañkara did not comment upon this point.
In essence, Nâgàrjuna is positing the empirical world with its everyday, specific,
distinct nature; then by the symbol of emptiness he is pointing out the non
ultimate, relative, conditioned categories basic to that world; and finally, at the
level of ultimate truth he is pointing out the emptiness of emptiness and attempt
ing to see the universe from the viewpoint of the ultimate. This is certainly not
nihilism, and it is not very different from what Sañkara himself did.
To sum up this part of the discussion, we may say that Sañkara did not
understand Buddhism as a way, nor did he fully understand it as a philosophy.
He was reasonably accurate in his summary of Yogàcàra; less so in the case of
Sarvàstivàda; and not at all so in the case of Mâdhyamika. We have given reasons
FRANK WHALING
why this may have been so. Sañkara was refuting not the Buddha himself, nor
the original Sarvàstivâda, Yogâcâra, or Mâdhyamika, but the versions be hap
pened to know in his own day. The later Buddhist stress on logic aided and
abetted Sartkara's bias in treating it as a speculative philosophy rather than a
way. The corruption of popular Buddhism that was becoming evident in his
day, along with this increasing intellectualism, must have strengthened Sañkara
in his view that Buddhism was not a dynamic way but an effete philosophy.
The stress by all three schools on the impermanence of the soul, however they
might stress Reality or 'continuities', confirmed Sañkara in his impression that
they were implacably opposed to the Âtman tradition of the Upanisads and
therefore nihilistic. The fact that DharmakTrti and Dignâga understressed scrip
ture and revelation (although they did not as he wrongly supposed abandon
scripture altogether) again confirmed him in his bias that Buddhism was not a
way but could be treated on rational grounds. Had not the Buddha already
admitted that no one had 'revealed' his Enlightenment to him? "I have no
teacher; none is like me; in the world of men and spirits none is my compeer.
I am a saint in this world, a teacher unsurpassed; the sole supreme Buddha ,.."40.
Sañkara himself was more of a 'path' philosopher than a speculative philosopher
and was concerned to refute the Buddhists not for argument's sake, but to safe
guard moksa403 In spite of all these and other reasons that could be advanced to
defend Sañkara, we have explained in detail why it appears to us that Sañkara
was deficient in his understanding of Buddhism.
Let us pass on next to consider to what extent if at all, Sañkara was influenced
by Buddhism. This brings us back immediately to our definitions of 'Sañkara' and
'Buddhism'. We have seen how Sañkara was repeating in his criticisms of the
Buddhist schools some of the thoughts passed on to him by his Advaita Vedan ta
predecessors. It is equally possible that he inherited from his Advaita Vedânta
predecessors some of the ideas that they may have borrowed from the Buddhists.
If this were proved to be the case, it would still be true to say that Sañkara was
influenced, if only indirectly, by Buddhism. The problem is to determine to
what extent pre-Sañkara Vedànta was influenced by Buddhism; and also to
what extent Sañkara himself was influenced by Buddhism independently of the
inheritance he received from his predecessors. Equally, it is tempting but wrong
to read back into Sañkara's situation the modern concepts of 'Buddhism' and
'Hinduism'. I have argued that Sañkara under-rated the religious, or faith, ele
ments in Buddhism, and that he treated it more as a philosophy than a way —
in fact that he did not take seriously enough the symbol systems and different
emotional factors that constituted the Sañgha as a religious community rather

than a thinking community. However, it is possible to go to the other extreme
and to posit that 'Buddhism' (which for Sañkara meant mainly a form of
Mahâyàna Buddhism) was a system completely separate in India from another
mental construct 'Hinduism'. In fact, of course, it was not so. So-called 'Budd
hism' which included HTnayàna, Mahâyàna and Tantra in their various schools,
and so-called 'Hinduism' which included Nyaya-Vais'esika, the Pürva Mïrnàmsà
of Kumârila and Prabhàkara, the remnants of Sàmkhya-Yoga, and the various
sects, were both part of the whole culture of India which was unified at this
stage by a common language Sanskrit. There was far more historical interaction
between the various systems as a matter of course than we can easily imagine.
In different ways they were all influencing each other, and Sañkara, as part of
the historical situation, was involved in this interaction in an interesting way.
The method of this enquiry, then, will be primarily historical.
Sañkara's three basic sources were the Upanisads, the GTta, and the Vedànta
Sütras. But these 'in themselves' did not teach the Advaita Ved an ta system
which Sañkara later taught. As his system was the last of the great systems to
be formulated, he was influenced in one way or another by the systems of
thought that preceded him — Nyaya-Vais'esika, Pürva Mïmâmsâ, Sâmkhya
Yoga, Jainism and Mahâyâna Buddhism. Obviously the main direct influence
was that of the Vedan ta teachers who preceded him, and we will begin our
enquiry by looking at them. Four are especially worthy of mention, namely
Bhartrprapañca, Bhartrhari, Brahmadatta and Gaudapada. Bhartrprapafica is
mentioned several times in Sañkara's commentary on the Brhadaranyakopani
sad41, and he appears to have been a forerunner of Bhaskara. He was like Bhls
kara not an advaitin. He was a Bhedâbhedin who advocated the view of
identity-in-difference. While he recognised the distinction between the higher

and lower Brahman, he said that they were both equally real, and that God,
soul and matter were all real but not independently so. Like Bhaskara, he was
a samuccayavâdin, who advocated both ¡ñaña and karma for the achievement
of release. This was obviously the traditional Vedânta view against which
Sañkara was reacting, and to which Bhaskara was heir. Bhartrhari, the author
of the Vâkyapadïya, was probably the first Advaitin known to history. He is
famous as a grammarian but is important also as a forerunner of Sañkara. He
taught that ultimate reality is non-dual, and that the everyday world is a
transformation of ultimate reality. It would be interesting (but unprofitable
now) to pursue the question of whether there was Buddhist influence upon
FRANK WHALING
Bhartrhari; he is also different from Sañkara in his stress upon the soteriologi
cal function of grammar, his sphotavâda, and his stress on Sabda-Brahman
rather than nirguna-Brahman. Brahmadatta42 believed in the essential identity
of Âtman and Brahman, and that the supposed distinction between them was
the result of maya. However, he also believed that the soul is not eternal, and
that release is not possible until the time of death and then only if meditation
has been continued until the end. In other words, although Bhartrhari and
Brahmadatta were advaitins, they were conceptually closer to Mandana Mis'ra,
the author of Brahma-siddhi, than to Sañkara. The case is very different with
Gaudapàda, and he is crucial to an analysis of the influence of Buddhism upon
Sañkara. At this point we enter the realms of scholastic controversy, for the
question of whether Sañkara was influenced by Buddhism is partly contingent
upon the question of whether Gaudapàda was influenced by Buddhism. Upon
this matter there are two schools of thought represented by V. Bhattacarya and
T. M. P. Mahadevan. Bhattacarya argues that there was considerable Buddhist
influence upon Gaudapàda, and hence upon Sañkara; Mahadevan argues that
there was no Buddhist influence upon either. As Mahadevan puts it, Gaudapàda
"is to be regarded as a lineal descendant of sages like Yajñavalkya, and not of
Bauddha teachers like Nâgârjuna and Asañga"43. It seems to me that Mahadevan
is conceding the gist of Bhattacarya's point when he writes, "the main aim of
the teacher is to expound the philosophy of the Upanisads, and ... he does not
deviate from his purpose even when he adopts the arguments of the Bauddha
Idealists and dresses his thought in Buddhist terminology"44. The essential
question is not whether Gaudapàda and Sañkara were Buddhists, but whether
they were influenced by Buddhism; not whether they were lineal descendants of
Nagârjuna and Asañga, but whether they were influenced by them in their
reinterpretation of the Upanisads. The polemical endeavours of Buddhist
writers to prove that Advaita Vedânta is heavily influenced by Buddhism, and
of Hindu Writers to prove that there is no influence at all, are unnecessary if
we give full weight to the historical background of Gaudapàda and Sañkara. As
Carpenter admirably puts it,
That Buddhists and Brahmans should be affected by the same tendencies of speculation
can occasion no surprise. They constantly met each other in debate; converts passed from
one school into another; they used the same language, if they did not always employ the
same terms with precisely the same meaning45.
It is only fair to mention in passing that there has been considerable controversy
about the Gaudapàda Kârikâs and about Sankara's commentary on them. The
date, authorship authenticity, and composition of the 'Kârikâs' have all been
disputed. Walleser doubted whether there was a Gaudapada, and thought that
the 'Mândûkya Upanisad' itself was part of Gaudapada. It has been argued that
the fourth chapter of the Kârikâs was by a Buddhist ; that Gaudapada himself
was a Buddhist; and that Sañkara's commentary was not by Sañkara. In order
to save time, I intend to follow the general consensus that Gaudapada DID
write the Kârikâs, and that he wrote ALL of them, and that Sañkara did write
the commentary on Gaudapâda.453
What then is the importance for our study of Gaudapâda's Kârikâs on the
Mândûkya Upanisad? Sañkara saluted Gaudapada as the guru of his guru, the
great teacher, the ultimate guru, the adored of the adored, the one who churned
the ocean of the Veda. He claimed that it was Gaudapada (rather than Bâdarâ
yana the author of the Vedânta Sutras) who had recovered the meaning of the
Upanisads. He wrote a super-commentary upon the Mândûkya Upanisad together
with the Gaudapada Kârikâs. He realised the magnitude of Gaudapâda's historical
vision in reinterpreting the Upanisads in the light of the thought of Nâgârjuna and
Vasubandhu (whether he knew the connection or not), and he built upon Gauda
pâda's vision the greater edifice of Advaita Vedânta.
What then was the relationship of Gaudapâda to Buddhism? In the first place,
his Mândûkya Kârikâs were probably modelled, especially in the fourth chapter,
upon the Mâdhyamika Kârikâs of Nâgârjuna; and show all the signs of having
been written as a response to Nâgârjuna and the later Vijñánaváda developments.
He must have lived around the early fifth century A.D. after Nâgârjuna, Âryadeva
and Asañga, and he was probably a contemporary of Dignâga.
In the second place he uses Buddhist concepts and terms. In chapter one of
the Kârikâs he introduces the idea of non-origination, that creation is only
appearance, that it is maya "When the jlva sleeping on account of illusion
which has no beginning is awakened, he realises (the state of Türya) which is
unborn and in which there is neither sleep nor dream nor duality"46. He admits
that the idea of creation and the lower Brahman are useful as secondary and didac
tic devices to help the dull-witted who are not yet capable of arriving at the higher
truth. But at the higher level of truth, "There is no disappearance, nor origination ;
no one in bondage, no one who works for success; no one who is desirous of emanci
pation, no one who is emancipated — This is the highest truth"47. The idea of maya
and the two-truth theory are, as we have seen, present in Buddhism.
In the second chapter on falsity, Gaudapada again seems to borrow from
Nâgârjuna and Vijñánaváda. He points out that the experience of duality is a
FRANK WHALING
false experience. He gives the paradigm of the dream as giving a vivid but false
experience of something out there. Similarly the external world is objective
but not real. The fact that we see it does not justify its existence metaphysically.
Likewise, the âtman deludes itself by its own mâyâ into imagining itself to be
something that it is not. In a verse very reminiscent of Nâgârjuna, he points out
that the world is a construct of the imagination, "As dream and illusion are seen,
and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who are
well-versed in the Vedantas"48. The whole argument in this chapter which is
based upon the dream analogy and the idea of mental construction through
mâyâ has similarities to the Vijñanaváda mode of thought. The idea of vikalpa,
was one of the great achievements of the Buddhists; and it is now introduced
by Gaudapâda into Advaita.
In the third chapter, Gaudapâda introduces the idea which would be developed
by Sañkara that certain passages of scripture are basic, others are secondary. Some
passages which suggest creation are valid at their own level of truth but are second
ary to the ultimate truth of non-duality. "The creation which is urged in different
manners with the illustrations of earth, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means for an
introduction (to the truth). There is in no way any distinction (between Atman
and Jïva)"49. This idea was already present in Nâgârjuna. In the next Kârikâ,
Gaudapâda points out that there are different spiritual stages, and one should
apply the teaching which is relevant for the particular stage. "There are three
spiritual stages, viz., of lower vision, of middle vision, and of higher vision; and
this upâsanâ 'worship' is laid down for them out of kindness"50. As we have
seen this also was already present in Mâdhyamika.
The fourth chapter is modelled on Nâgârjuna's Mâdhyamika Kârikâ and seems
almost to be a parody. Gaudapada uses the same sort of destructive dialectic,
and the mode of argument seems to be taken from Nâgârjuna and the content
from Vijfiânavâda. He refers to three kinds of knowledge such as are discussed
in Yogàcâra texts,
That which consists of the two, the object and (its) perception, is regarded as mundane;
one without the object, but with the perception is regarded as pure mundane; while one
without the object and the perception is said to be supra-mundane - This is to be under
stood to be the knowledge and the knowable as is always declared by the Buddhas51.
He refers also to the image of the fire-brand as illustrating the idea that subject
and object are manifestations of mind, "As a firebrand being moved appears to
be straight, or crooked, and so on, even so the mind when it moves appears as
the perceived (i.e. subject) and the perceptible (i.e. object)"52. Many of the
kârikâs of this chapter are taken up with a justification of the doctrine of

ajâti, non-origination, on the lines already followed by Nâgârjuna. Gaudapàda
refers to the three levels of reality, empirical, imagined and perfect, such as
were found in Buddhism, "One (held) to be unborn is so in empirical truth
which is imagined, but in absolute truth it is even not unborn; for that which
is dependent comes into being in empirical truth, the cause of appearance"53.
There is also use of the term asparsayoga, non-touch yoga, such as is associated
with the last of the nine Buddhist meditations. In this fourth chapter, Gauda
pàda often mentions the Buddha and the Buddhists in an approving manner
and in the first verse he offers what appears to be a salutation to the Buddha
himself. However, it is important to realise that Gaudapàda does not accept
the conclusions of the Buddhists in this chapter even though he accepts their
terminology and modes of argument. The opening salutation could equally
well be directed to Nâràyana or Visnu. Having used the arguments of the
idealists against the realists he then proceeds to destroy the argument of the
idealists by stressing the âîman over against Vijñana momentariness, and Abso
lute Being over against Emptiness.
And so Bhattacarya is right in asserting that Gaudapàda "has quoted almost
fully, partially or substantially from works of some celebrated Buddhist
teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D."54 But this does not
mean that he has become a Buddhist or that he has forsaken Vedânta. He merely
reinterpreted the message of the Upanisads in the language and thought forms
of his day, and in so doing he paved the way for Sañkara to carry on his work
in a more systematic way.
What exactly was the nature of the revolution that Gaudapàda had accom
plished within Vedânta thought? We can see it most clearly by comparing
Gaudapâda's Vedânta with what had gone before. His predecessors had taught
the sole reality of Brahman, but they had also allowed the possibility of modi
fications in Brahman, and even of parts to Brahman. They had taken the Upani
sadic creation texts literally, and seen the jfva and the world as parts of Brahman.
Gaudapàda insisted that duality was unreal and that advaita was ultimate, "this
duality is mere illusion, in absolute truth there is non-duality"55; "the supreme
reality is non-duality"56. He also insisted that there was no creation or parcelling
out of Brahman, and that the accounts of creation were secondary devices. His
predecessors had taught that Brahman had qualities and aspects, and that within
Brahman there was both unity and diversity. While not admitting difference in
kind within Brahman they did admit internal diversity and even individual
FRANK WHALING
distinctions according to the philosophy of bhedabheda (identity and differ

ence). Gaudapâda denied this, and stressed that any form of duality or differ
ence was illusory. His predecessors gave due weight to meditation (upâsanâ)
and works or ritual {karma) as well as knowledge in the obtaining of release,
and they suggested that in mukti (release) there was not complete identity
between the jTva and Brahman but only similarity. Gaudapâda stressed the
way of knowledge through yoga and rejected other methods to release, "When
by the knowledge of the truth of âtman it (the mind) ceases from imagining
it goes to the state of non-mind being non-cognizant in the absence of the
things to be cognized"57. He also stressed the identity of the jTva and Brahman,
and insisted that their difference was only apparent. His predecessors had seen
Vedânta as a sequel to the earlier portion of the Vedas, and having a close
affinity to them. Gaudapâda begins the process of rejecting the earlier Vedas
as authority, and he also begins the distinction between lower and higher texts
within the Upanisads that Sañkara would pursue. Gauçiapâda's predecessors
had been vague in their notion of avidyâ. They had admitted the function of
Brahman to become many, and they had admitted that there was a real trans
formation of Brahman into the world and the world into Brahman. They had
no doctrine of appearance. Gaudapâda used the analogies of the dream and
the rope-snake to show that a thing can appear and be taken as real when in
fact it is not. His notion of appearance and maya were very important. And
so Gaudapâda effected a revolution within Vedânta and, as Murti puts it,
"ajâtivâda, vivartavâda and mâyâvâda are all established as the true import of
the Vedânta"58. While it is theoretically possible that this could have been an
internal revolution effected by an inner dynamic within Vedânta itself, and
that there may have been a school of Vedânta that had influenced Mâdhyamika
and Vijñanaváda and which now became dominant due to Gaudapâda, there is
no evidence for this. By far the most reasonable explanation for this transforma
tion within Vedânta is the obvious one that Gaudapâda was influenced con
sciously or unconsciously by Buddhism.
It does not matter too much whether Gaudapâda's purpose was apologetic
and missionary, as Mahadevan claims,
Gaudapâda lived and taught in an age when the MahSyina was having a great hold on the
minds of the people. The task of a teacher of Vedânta at such a time would naturally be
twofold - to convince the followers of the Upanisads that their path was sound, and to
spread the knowledge of the Vedânta among the Bauddhas themselves. To secure this
twofold objective, it would seem, Gaudapâda adopted the logical method of (argumenta
tion in) expounding the Vedânta and the Bauddha modes of expression and argumentation.59
or whether he was consciously borrowing directly from Vijfiânavâda and

Mâdhyamika, as Bhattacarya claims. It is a matter of historical fact that the
Advaita Vedânta set forth by Gaudapada was different from the Vedânta that
had gone before, and much of that difference can be explained by reference to
his conscious or unconscious debt to Mahay an a Buddhism. The important
point for our purposes is that Sañkara regarded Gaudapada (traditionally the
guru of Govinda, his own guru) as the one who gave him the key to unlock
the door of the Upanisads, and that key had as its elements some of the facets
that Gaudapada had incorporated in his system through his 'dialogue' with the
Buddhists - the idea of mâyâ\ the two truth theory; the higher and lower
Brahman; creation as a secondary didactic device; primary and secondary
classes of scripture; three classes of knowledge, and spiritual stages, and levels
of reality; and so on. To the extent that Gaudapada was influenced by Mahà
yàna, Sañkara also was influenced by Mahàyàna.
Indeed, in spite of Mahadevan it seems true to say that Gaudapada was more
influenced by Buddhism than Sañkara, and while he was not unaffected by
Buddhists who lived later than Gaudapada such as Dignâga and Dharmaklrti,
part of the story of Sañkara's own development is his own reaction against the
undue Buddhist influence he felt he had received from Gaudapada. Mahadevan
is not altogether accurate when he claims, "Doctrinally, there is no difference
whatsoever between what is taught by Gaudapada in the Kârikâ and what is
expounded by Sañkara in his extensive works"60. This statement ignores three
important facts. In the first place, Sañkara lived later than Gaudapada61. In the
meantime, Mahàyàna had begun to decline, Dharmaklrti and Dignága had lived,
Kumârila had mounted his own powerful attack upon Buddhism, the entire
Mîmâmsâ tradition had been built up, the historical conditions were very
different. In the second place, Sañkara commented on not merely the Mândûkya
Upanisad along with Gaudapâda's Kârikâs, but also the other major Upanisads,
the Vedânta Sutras, and the Gïtâ. While Sañkara applied Gaudapâda's key to
his interpretations, the very fact that his canvas was so much wider, and his
task more varied, meant that he could not follow Gaudapada in every detail.
For example, his incorporation of the Gïïâ as one of the three authorities of
Vedânta involved him with wrestling with a theistic text, and as Otto and
Hacker have shown the theistic element in Sañkara is more than mere veneer62.
In the third place, Mahadevan is assuming (along with most other Indian com
mentators on Sañkara) that there was no development within Sañkara's own
thought, but that it was a monolith. In other words, for such commentators,
FRANK WHALING
Sañkara was not so much a person as a structure or a system of thought. He

WAS Advaita Vedânta, as indeed on a minor level was Gaudapâda. Perhaps
there is now enough evidence to analyse Sañkara historically as well as structur
ally. We will attempt to see where he differed from Gaudapâda, and how his
own development was in some ways a development away from Gaudapâda and
Buddhism.
An attempt to analyse Sañkara historically bristles with difficulties of

interpretation and yet it is very worthwhile in this study and in other future
studies of Sañkara. Professor Ingalls some years ago put forward this idea,
It seems to me likely that Sankara was brought up in the Bhedàbheda tradition and that
he later turned away from it under the influence of a much more phenomenalistic school
that is now represented only by the Gaudapâda Kârikâs. But Sankara never went so far in
the direction of phenomenalism as Gaudapâda63.
He bases this surmise upon the innovations introduced by Sañkara into previ
ously handed down commentaries on the Vedânta Sütras which were technic
ally bhedàbheda in framework. However, it does not seem necessary to deduce
that because Sañkara was reacting against bhedàbheda (which he certainly was)
that he must himself have formally been a follower of bhedàbheda. In view of
the close resemblances between him and Gaudapâda, it seems more reasonable
to suppose that he began as a close follower of Gaudapâda, and then began to
react against him. Paul Hacker has analysed this development within Sañkara's
thought in an ingenious and impressive way.
Before pursuing this, we will examine the ways in which Gaudapâda seems
more Buddhistic than the Sañkara of the Vedânta Sütras. In the first place,
Gaudapâda openly approved certain aspects of Buddhist thought especially in
the fourth chapter of the Kârikâs; Sañkara did not do this, and even in his
commentary on the Mândukya Kârikâs he plays down the 'Buddhist' elements
in Gaudapâda. In the Sütras, he verges on the abusive. In the second place,
Gaudapâda equates the dreaming and the waking experiences, "The same is
declared of the things in waking on account of the fact that they are inside;
for, as there (i.e. in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not
differ"64. Sañkara, as we saw earlier, insists that there is a genuine difference
between dream impressions and waking ones; and in his refutation of the
Yogâcârins he is also (in effect) refuting Gaudapâda. Thirdly, Gaudapâda is
close to sharing the subjectivism of the Vijfiânavâda, "The mind does not
touch (i.e. relate itself to) an object, nor does its appearance, for the object
is unreal and its appearance is not different from it'65. Again Sañkara in effect
refutes Gaudapâda in his anxiety to escape from Vijñána subjectivism. Fourthly,

Gaudapâda uses the concept of maya in different ways: to indicate the inex
plicability of the relation between the âtman and the world, to show the
power of /s'vara, and to suggest the apparent dreamlike character of the world.
Sañkara also uses it in different ways, but his stress is more upon the first,
whereas Gaudapâda stresses more the third (Mâdhyamika) concept. Fifthly,
Gaudapâda encourages the path of yoga-, in the commentary on the Vedànta
Sütras, Sañkara writes, "thereby the yoga is refuted"66. Sixthly, Gaudapâda
uses the Buddhist language of images, vikalpa, and non-origination; in the
commentary on the Sutras, Sañkara repudiates such a stand. Seventhly, Gauda
pâda appears to employ a genuine illusionism in his use of the idea of avidyâ
which would include the later Buddhist idea that release involves not merely
cessation of rebirth but also cessation of the world; Sañkara agrees that rebirth
is removed by knowledge of the identity of âtman and Brahman, but he does
not agree that the world is removed.
Hacker has shown by literary analysis, that the early Sañkara was close to
these concepts of Gaudapâda mentioned above that he later repudiated, and
that he was therefore in his early days much closer to Buddhism than he was
later when he wrote the commentary on the Vedânta Sütras. This is an import
ant insight because it helps to explain why Sañkara refuted Buddhist concepts
which he himself seemed to hold. If Hacker is right the fact is that Sañkara
HAD held them, but he did not hold them at the time when he was writing
the later commentary.
Hacker writes,
Let us assume tentatively that in order to leam this new doctrine of OM and this new
Yoga, Sankara went to school with an Advaita master, who instructed him in the Màn
dûkya Kârikâs and introduced him to the Advaita system, that as a result he became a
monist and was finally given the task of writing a commentary on Gaudapâda's work by
his teacher. This assumption enables us to order certain facts in a quite meaningful way67.
This assumption, which Hacker proceeds to justify, is of course a large one.

Like Ingalls, Hacker assumes that Sañkara was not at first a follower of
Gaudapâda. He was rather a yogin who was attracted to Gaudapâda by his
desire to wrestle with the mysticism of the Om sound and by Gaudapâda's
aspars'a yoga. Without agreeing with this part of Hacker's thesis, one can still
accept what Hacker says in relation to the development of Sañkara's thought
from his Buddhist Gaudapâda phase to his later reaction against it. This early
phase of his thought is found in his commentaries on the Mândukya Upanisad
FRANK WHALING
and Kârikàs, his commentary on the Taittirïya Upanisad, and parts of the
Upadesasâhasrî, and also possibly his commentary on Vyâsa's commentary on
the Yoga Sutras. At this stage, Sañkara followed Gaudapâda's interest in
asparía yoga and Vijnânavâda Buddhism. He used the same sort of language
and synthesis as Gaudapâda had done in his combining of Vedánta, Vijñanavada
and Yoga. This was natural in that he was commenting upon Gaudapâda, but
the very fact that he chose to comment upon Gaudapâda, and that he chose
him as his guru of gurus was significant in itself. At this stage, the Om symbol
which lay at the centre of the Mândûkya Upanisad was for him a central expres
sion of God, and a symbol for ultimate reality, and asparsayoga was the path
towards obtaining the ultimate reality. For him as for Gaudapâda it was a
way of transforming mind into no-mind. In his comment on Kârikâ 3.31 he
explains that this annihilation of the inner sense occurs either in deep sleep or
"through the practice of intuiting distinction and through the shedding of
passions"68. Later as we have seen he rejects yoga as a means to liberation and
thereby departs from Gaudapâda. At this stage, he makes frequent use of
Buddhist language such as vikalpa to denote the unreality of the world
(Upadesasâhasrî 19, etc.), vairagya to denote the shedding of passions, non
origination, and so on. Later this language virtually disappears from his
writing, and therefore in this also he departs from Gaudapâda. At this stage,
he appears to share the Vijñana leanings of Gaudapâda. Upadesasâhasrî verse
9 says, "for, there is no evidence for an object distinct from knowing" and
verse 10, "Or (one may also say): the fiction is equally duality-less; for it is
not bound up with a thing. That is like a swinging torch"69.
The swinging torch allusion was a favourite one of the Buddhists and of
Gaudapâda; and Sañkara refers here to the Vijfiânavâda view that subject,
object and process of knowing are an illusion simulated by the inner sense —
the very view that he was later to refute in the commentary on the Sütras! In
his comment on the Mândûkya 4.99 he accepts the Buddhist doctrine of a
consciousness which seemingly divides into subject and object but in reality
remains pure; later he repudiates it. In his introduction to the Yogasîitrabhâsya
vivarana, he divides the contents of yoga into four sections which are very
similar to the four noble truths of Buddhism, namely disease; cause of disease;
treatment of disease; and liberation from disease; later he repudiated any con
nection with either Buddhism or yoga. At the earlier stage, he seems to be on
the side of the Buddhist idealists who deny the external world as being an
illusion, and who assert with Gaudapâda that as a result of the ending of
avidyâ there is the cessation of both rebirth and the world. In the sütras, as
we have seen, he argues for a commonsense view of the external world, and
splits avidyâ into two separate senses denoting the cause of rebirth and the
cause of the world.
And so we see that the differences between Gaudapàda and Sañkara are
essentially the differences between the early Sañkara and the later Sañkara.
There is a development within Sañkara from his early Buddhist-Yoga-Gaudapáda
stage to his later mature Vedan ta stage. This deserves fuller treatment than we
have time to give it, but it goes far to explaining why Sañkara's seeming hypoc
risy in his refutation of the Buddhists was not what it seemed to be, for he was
also refuting to a lesser extent Gaudapàda and his earlier self.
Sañkara, then, was influenced by Mahay an a Buddhism through Gaudapàda,
and even when he departed from Gaudapàda and Buddhism in the ways we have
mentioned, he still used the key given to him by Gaudapàda in the working out
of his whole system. If there had been no Buddhism it is very doubtful whether
there would have been any Advaita Vedânta as taught by Gaudapàda and
Sañkara.
In order to explore more fully the inter-relationship between Sañkara and

Buddhism, we must look a little bit more closely at the historical period in
which Sañkara lived. It was an incredibly complex age; it was also an age of
giants. Dharmakîrti, following on the work of Dignâga, improved Buddhist
logic and dialectics; Kumârila inaugurated one of the two great schools of
Pûrva Mimâmsâ and refuted the Buddhists in terms possibly more compre
hensive than those of Sañkara himself; Bhâskara continued the tradition of
Bhedâbheda shortly afterwards. Sañkara was involved in controversy with all
these three schools. He used Mahâyâna Buddhism in order to transform
Bhedâbheda into Advaita Vedânta; he used Kumârila in order to refute the
Buddhists; and he used Buddhist thought and practice in order to oppose
MTmâmsâ. Insofar as Mahâyâna was entering into decline, and insofar as this
period was witnessing "a great rise of ritualism, materialism and elaborate
temple worship" 70, it is probably true to say that his more significant work
was done in relation to Bhedâbheda and Kumârila rather than in relation to
Buddhism. At any rate, all this was inextricably interrelated, and Sañkara was
very much a man of his time.
Sañkara's relationship to the work of Kumârila is especially important in
connection with his interaction with Buddhism. In two long chapters of his
great work, the Slokavârttika, Kumârila refuted Vijñánaváda and Mâdhyamika
Buddhism. His motives were different from those of Sañkara for he was con
FRANK WHALING
cerned to defend the infallibility of the Veda and the eternality of Sabda (the
word of revelation). In so doing he attacked the Buddhist doctrines of the
omniscience of the Buddha, the no-soul idea, momentariness, the idea of the
'unique particular', and the theory of external reality. Sañkara was influenced
by Kumârila's writings, and it is likely that one of the reasons for his retreat
from his early Vijñánavada leanings was his contact with the work of Kumârila.
He was especially influenced by Kumârila's stress upon the reality of the exter
nal world against the Buddhists. Kumârila stressed that the specific and norma
tive character of our waking consciousness is much more valid than anything we
know through dreams, and that we really see things rather than our own percep
tion of things. In other words, he held a common sense view point which stressed
that there was no higher experience empirically than our experience of the
waking and external world. After his early Vijñánavada phase, Sañkara reformu
lated his view of the external world upon common sense lines, although he still
kept his central view of avidyâ that he had received from Gaudapâda. In the
sütras he writes, "it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking cons
ciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming conscious
ness; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of
what is directly evident to themselves"71. His two original arguments for iden
tity and for witness are based upon common sense. In fact, a major part of
Sañkara's argument against the Buddhists is reminiscent of Kumârila. The
logic is that we cannot argue away the empirical world when taken on its own
terms. On its own level it is undisputed reality through common sense. If we
start with human experience we cannot go beyond the world to reach the
transcendent because the world cannot show its own unreality. Sañkara and
Kumârila saw the Buddhists as trying to do just this — to understand the
world, to get beyond it, to see it as unreal from within their own experience.
Their enlightenment was not from without but from within. But for Sañkara
and Kumârila transcendental truth could not be arrived at immanently. If the
Buddhists countered by saying that the Buddha was omniscient, Kumârila
would reply how can a human being be omniscient? Even if the Buddha
claimed to know the central truth about everything, whence did that principle
of truth come? Where was its transcendental origin? For Sañkara and Kumârila,
transcendental truth could only come from without — from sruti, revelation.
The revelations of sruti are trans-empirical. Experience cannot confirm or falsify;
reason cannot supply the criteria for truth outside of its own sphere; only sruti
can awaken to transcendental truth. The world cannot be denied from within,
as the Buddhists claimed, and Sañkara did not begin by denying the world —
he was forced into it to explain the unchanging Brahman of the sruti. He began
with the reality of Brahman through sruti ; the Buddhists began by questioning
the reality of the world. And so Sañkara was greatly helped by the arguments
of Kumárila. But the same objections that we raised earlier still apply to this
new perspective. Sañkara's argument is reminiscent of that of Kraemer in
modern times who argues that revelation is God's downward coming to seek
out man as found in Christianity, whereas religion is man's upward groping to
seek out God, found in the other religions. According to this, one judges others in
the light of one's own standard of revelation so that one's own perspective is trans
cendental whereas the perspective of the others is human. This is unwarranted
special pleading; it ignores the possibility that the revelation of others may be real
although set up differently from one's own; it ignores the human factors in one's ow
system of revelation and the transcendental factors in the system of others.713
Equally important for our purposes is the help which Sañkara received from
Buddhism in his 'struggle' with the followers of Kumárila, and Bhedàbheda. At
the level of reason, he utilised the later Buddhist stress upon logical and epis
temological enquiries, and upon the pramânas. At the level of doctrine, he
utilised Gaudapada's key taken from the Mahâyànists to transform the old
realist Vedân ta. At the level of authority, he finally followed the original
Buddhist intuition which rejected the stress of the Vedas on rituals, (although
of course he kept the Upanisads and accepted them as constituting the essence
of the Veda). At the level of practice, we see "his intransigent stand against the
necessity of ritual and social duty, his insistence upon complete samnyâsa, on
giving up all marks of caste or distinction, this despite the fact that he was a
brahmin by birth and his pupils were brahmins" 12. Especially significant in this
respect were the reforms that Sañkara introduced into the Hindu monastic sys
tem which for the first time gave it what might be called its own sañgha. This
aspect of Sañkara's work has not been commented on as being of significance
and yet its far-reaching importance probably rivals the importance of Sañkara's
thought. Indian asceticism dates back to before the time of Mahàvîra and the
Buddha. Even then there were ascetics who spent the fourth âirama (period)
of their life in the prescribed search for Brahman in isolation; and there were
also naisthika brahmacârîs, lifelong celibates, who had heard the call to an
ascetic life in their early years. But the Buddha transformed this situation by
his establishment of the Sañgha, and his raising it to such an important position
that it became one of the three refuges. He committed the monks to preaching,
FRANK WHALING
and during the rainy season to study and contemplation. The monastic organisa
tion became therefore an arbiter in matters of doctrine; a place of congregational
living for at any rate part of the year; and an institution of learning. During the
long years up to the time of Sankara, there were developments within the life
of non-Buddhist asceticism but none of equal importance. In his time, Indian
ascetics belonged to the Jain or Buddhist communities; or they were solitary
life-long ascetics or fourth airama ascetics; or they belonged to the Pâs'upatas
or Kâpâlikas who were corrupt Saivite sects. The Buddhist orders were entering
into decline; there were no worthy non-Buddhist orders to take their place.
Sañkara transformed this situation, and incorporated into Hindu asceticism
some of the distinctive features of the Buddhist sañgha.
It would not seem that Ingalls is completely accurate when he claims that
Sankara insisted upon complete samnyâsa for in effect, as Ghurye puts it, he
"carved out a working compromise between renouncing this world and carry
ing on its routine duties"73. However, he did stress lifelong celibacy and gave a
new lease of life to those who felt this call but had been inhibited by the
Mïmâmsâ and Bhedâbheda emphasis upon dutifully living through the four
prescribed stages in the daily life of the world. He also set up four centres in
the four corners of India in order to consolidate and spread his ideas. Dwârakâ,
Purr, Badri"and Srñgeri perhaps represented symbolic sacred space in Sañkara's
mind for the eventual establishment of true monasticism throughout India. These
centres were given responsibility for the religio-philosophical affairs of their
regions. As a result of Sañkara's organisational activity, temple-colleges began
to spring up, and monasteries became recognised as having an educational
function. Traditionally, Sañkara is said to have organised the ascetics into ten
orders with the names; Aranya; As'rama; Bhárati; Girl"; Parvata; Pun; Sarasvati;
Sâgara; Tîrtha and Vana. Each centre had its own special deity, sacred water,
Veda, etc. They became centres for the spread of Advaita Vedánta in India,
and for the spiritual welfare of the four corners of India that were assigned to
them. Other centres were later set up and many of them still exist in India to
day. In other words, Sañkara introduced Buddhist principles of organisation
and lifelong asceticism into Hindu monastic life, and provided for the first
time some sort of guiding authority to lay down and preach right principles
of philosophy and religion. This was not only useful in his amending the work
of Kumarila and the realist Vedántins; it provided the stimulus for the growth
of Indian monastic life from that time onwards. Sañkara took his principles
from the Buddhist monastic organisation and applied them creatively in his
own situation.
Although this reform of Sankara's was of far-reaching importance, one

should not stretch it as far as Professor Ingalls has done in the comment quoted
above74. Sañkara was not overthrowing the work of Kumarila who had himself
said in the Slokavârttika that he was looking for others to apply the implica
tions of his work beyond the sphere of dharma, and who was "a veritable link
between Prabhâkara and Sañkara, between the Pürva and Uttara Mimàmsâs"75.
Sañkara granted the general efficacy of Kumârila's work in the empirical sphere
of dharma; but he did not agree that it applied to the sphere of moksa. It is in
this sphere that his reform of monasticism applied. In one respect he was follow
ing the Buddha who had revolutionised the life of the 'extraordinary norm' stage
of life without meddling too much in the affairs of the 'ordinary norm'. However,
one would have to say that the Sañgha as conceived and achieved by the Buddha
was of deeper importance than the monasticism conceived and achieved by
Sañkara because the Buddha gave less stress to the 'ordinary norm' than did
Sankara - at its own level. In another sense, Sañkara was following Nàgàijuna
and the two-truth theory which stressed the radical discontinuity of the realms
of dharma and moksa, the empirical and the absolute. Nàgàrjuna had directed
his dialectic against "the laws of pre-moksa thought"76, but he had not inveighed
against the pre-moksa morality directly but rather strengthened it though the
thrust he gave to the Bodhisattva ideal. Sañkara, having stressed with Kumarila
the morality and works of the world of dharma at its own level, then points out
the radical discontinuity between the world of Brahman and this world (which
seen from the perspective of the partless, universal Brahman and from the pers
pective of the immediate knowledge of the Àtman which is Brahman — is un
real). At this higher level, both the pre-moksa thoughts and the pre-moksa
actions no longer apply. In other words, he was more thoroughgoing than
Nâgâijuna in accepting the world of commonsense at its own level; more
thoroughgoing also in stressing the discrepancies between the two realms at
the level of action. He followed the Buddha in his monastic reforms organisa
tionally; he followed Nàgàrjuna philosophically (without necessarily being
conscious of it).
And so Sañkara used the work of Kumarila in his arguments against the
Buddhists, and he used the monastic ideal of the Buddhists to extend the work
of Kumarila and to correct its defects. It was part of the genius of Sankara to
be able to criticise the tenets of other systems while incorporating the merits
of these systems into his own. If there were time, we could investigate his
criticisms of the Sâmkhya, Jaina, Nyâya-Vais'esika, and Bhedábheda systems —
FRANK WHALING
sometimes by means of quasi-Buddhist arguments - while at the same time he

incorporated features from them, such as the vivartavâda theory of Bhartrhari,
and the adhyàsa theory of Sâmkhya, into his own system. Sañkara's refutation
of the Buddhists and his being influenced by them were by no means the whole
of his work; it was merely part of a complex series of inter-actions and syntheses.
It was achieved by Sañkara in the historical conditions of his time which we must
understand if we are to understand him.
Finally, let us come back to the question of whether Sañkara was responsible
for the demise of Buddhism in India. During this paper, we have given hints of
what we feel may be the answer to this question. Now we proceed to draw them
together. In the first place, there is external evidence that the decline of Budd
hism in India had begun before the time of Sañkara. The question is not whether
he started that decline, but what was his part in its continuance. We will look at
this evidence and the reasons for this decline and then try to fit Sañkara's work
into this overall picture.
Hie evidence for the decline of Buddhism in India is provided by Chinese
pilgrims who visited that land from the 5th to the 7th centuries; they were :
Fa-Hsien, Sung-Yun, Hsuan Tsang and I-Ching. In the 5th century A.D., Fa
Hsien generally found a prosperous state of affairs, but the succeeding travellers
testify to a deteriorating situation. As I-Ching put it, "the teaching of the
Buddha is becoming less prevalent in the world from day to day"77. This was
not merely the disappointed pique of a visiting pilgrim but typical of the
judgments of all the other later travellers. This deterioration manifested itself
in different ways. The numbers of Buddhists were becoming less; thousands of
monasteries that had been in use were abandoned; the decline was evident
throughout the subcontinent with a few honourable exceptions such as Nâlandâ;
there was a corresponding increase in the influence of Hindu sects and also of
Jains in the south; the quality of the remaining Buddhists did not compensate
for the decline in numbers; but rather, ignorance and debauchery are mentioned
fairly frequently. Morale was further weakened by legends forecasting the decline
of Buddhism at various intervals (from 500 years upwards) after the final nirvana
of the Buddha. This, of course, is in no way 'final' historical evidence, but it
does show that Buddhism was not on the offensive and not optimistic in spirit
when Sañkara arrived on the scene.
What then were the reasons for this decline? Partly they were internal if
our sources are in any way accurate. In the first place, the spiritual and moral
standards held by a significant number of the monks and nuns were deficient.
Apart from examples of self-indulgence hardly fit for the upholders of the
Buddhist ideal, there were more obvious problems connected with the large
monasteries and the consequent divorce of monks and laity. As more monks
went to live on the tax-free lands of the growing monasteries, there were fewer
bhiksus left to beg and preach in the villages. As more monks who had with
drawn into the larger establishments became engaged in intellectual activity,
they became less concerned about setting an example of disciplined moral
living to the laity. This divorce of priest and laity, teacher and audience, never
occurred among the Hindus, who also practised a more vital ritual life. Laymen
in Indian villages tended, therefore, to gravitate slowly from the Sangha to the
Hindu temple, and this process was exacerbated when there were cases among
the Buddhist monks of lapses into open immorality, meddling in non-religious
affairs, and ignorance of and opposition to basic Buddhist tenets. This sort of
inadequacy was also evident in the Saivite Pâs'upatas and Kâpàlikas, but it was
not so serious among them because they did not form a class of such religious
and symbolic importance as did the Buddhist Sañgha. In the second place,
there was internal rivalry and schism within the Buddhist community itself.
Hsuan Tsang described how each of the eighteen schools claimed to be superior
intellectually, and how there was special rivalry between Hmayâna and Mahá
yâna. Even within Mahâyâna there was opposition between Mâdhyamika thin
kers such as Candrakrrti and Vijñánavada thinkers who, in effect, held different
views. Within Vijñánavada itself, there was a doubly unfortunate tendency.
Dharmakïrti and Dignâga (quoted by Sañkara) and Sántaraksita (referred to
by Sañkara) were stressing logic and epistemology at the expense of scripture
and more 'spiritual' matters and thereby aiding the fraternal and anti-Hindu
strife, as well as intellectualising 'too' thoroughly. They were also modifying
Vasubandhu's Idealism by ignoring his stress upon dlayavijùâna and Tathâgata
garbha, and they were modifying his theory of Reality being Pure Conscious
ness by applying to It as well as to phenomena the theory of momentariness.
Sañkara was heir to the philosophy of Nâgârjuna and Vasubandhu, and he did
not refute them but the 'Sautrántika-Vijñánavada' of the later Yogácáras. He
therefore avoided the real comparison (between his own absolutism and the
philosophy of Mâdhyamika and Vijñánavada) as well as being aided by the
internecine strife of the Buddhists themselves. This is one of the reasons why
the blanket term 'Buddhism' can be so misleading. Thirdly, this later period
also had seen the rise of Buddhist Tantrism and Vajrayana in India, and these
had contributed to the decline. Apart from increasing the Mahâyâna tendency
FRANK WHALING
to assimilate Hindu gods, image-worship, ritualism and litany, they also courted
antinomianism by making the world of the senses the true medium of spiritual
progress. Their latent hedonism and superstition diverted a number of Buddhists
away from the healthier Buddhist concern for morality, reason and intuition.
Although claimed as the proclamation of the Buddha, the Buddhist Tantras
were very similar to the Hindu ones — and Vajrayâna not only contributed to
Buddhist internal decline but also helped on the process of the 'assimilation'
of Buddhism into Hinduism. And so, internal moral and spiritual weakness,
internal rivalry, and the abuses of Vajrayâna were part of the reason for
Buddhist decline at the time of Sañkara.
Another set of reasons for this decline were external. In the first place, the
attitude of the Indian kings towards Buddhism had changed. Up to the time
of Harsavardhana, there had been a number of Indian kings who had regarded
it as their privilege to support Buddhism from the side of the state. From that
time onwards, when royal support was offered to Buddhists at times during
the Pala dynasty it was offered equally to Hindus. More than this, the sources
give examples of occasional persecution of monks or damage to property on
the part of the kings. No doubt the sources, being Buddhist themselves, exag
gerated this aspect of persecution, and yet the general point is still valid. As
Joshi puts it, "No king came forward to protect the Buddhists of Sindh when
they were attacked by the Arabs; no Indian army came forward to protect
Nâlandâ when it was sacked by the soldiers of Bakhtyar Khalji"78. The Buddhists
could no longer count on royal support or help. Even where they received equal
patronage along with Hindus, this tended to promote the process of assimilation
which gradually absorbed aspects of Buddhist life into Hinduism. Sañkara was
not directly involved in the process suggested hitherto concerning the decline
of Buddhism. However, there are three other external reasons for the decline
of Buddhism in which he was involved, namely philosophical attacks upon
the Buddhists; the growing strength of the Hindus; and the assimilation of
Buddhist elements into Hinduism.
We have examined closely Sañkara's refutation of the Buddhists and had

occasion to disagree with some of it on different grounds. However, there is
little doubt that it was not unimportant in helping on the decline of Buddhism.
The Puranas had already attacked the Buddha at a more popular level by
painting the Buddha (in the Visnu Purâna especially) as the one who deluded
the people by trying to steal the Veda from them and by teaching the doctrines
of ahimsâ and nirvana. Sañkara himself added his authority as we have seen to
the idea of the Buddha as a deluder of the people. Kumârila had mounted his
own attack upon Dignàga and prepared the way for Sankara's later work. He
helped in four ways — by responding to Dignàga's and Dharmakirti's work
against the Nyâyas and Mïmâmsâs with a counter-refutation which began a
round of philosophical struggle which would 'exhaust' the Buddhists and
leave Sañkara to emerge supreme; by the sheer merit of his arguments, especially
those against the Buddha's omniscience and for the reality of the external world;
by providing a theological backing for the revival of Vedic authority, householder
religion, the Brahmin priesthood and ritualism; and by the actual foundation he
gave to Sankara's own arguments. Sañkara built upon all this, and the
authority he built up by his reform of monasticism, the merit of his own
attacks on Buddhism, his strengthening of Hinduism, and his incorporating
of some good features of Buddhism into his own system, gave to his
philosophical arguments greater weight than perhaps they intrinsically had.
This was especially so when Vâcaspati's commentary on Sañkara established
his system, including his attack on the Buddhists, as a leading force in the
intellectual life of India. Traditionally Sañkara is thought to have led an expedi
tion against the Buddhists which drove them out of India from the Himalayas
to the sea. This was an allegorical way of saying that his philosophical attack,
although not necessarily fully fair or cogent, had played its part in the demise
of Buddhism in India.
Secondly, Sañkara not merely refuted the Buddhists negatively, he also played
played his part in the Hindu renaissance which was loosening the popular hold
of Buddhists over the people. There were different aspects to this point. The
growth of the Puranas; the rise of bhakti cults such as the Bhâgavatas; the new
stress upon the caste system and the four âsramas of Kumârila and others; the
popularisation of Hinduism by the new stress upon temple-worship, festivals
and the songs of the Tamil saints - all this played its part. There are different
theories about Sañkara's part in all these facts. Bhâskara79 thought Sañkara
had undermined Vedic orthodoxy by his denial of ritual and householder
religion at the moksa level, and Râmânuja thought he had undermined bhakti.
One could equally claim that Sañkara, by elevating the Gîtâ to a place of
authority with the Upanisads and Vedânta Sütras and by means of his hymns
(if composed by him), gave intellectual undergirding to bhakti\ that he restored
the Hindu dharma, by his stress with Kumârila on dharma at that level; and
that he saved Hinduism from the worst excesses of Tantra by objecting to
animal sacrifices, the morality of the left-handed Tantras, and the ritual
FRANK WHALING
practices of the Tantra schools. It is unnecessary at this stage to investigate

this more closely, but we can say that Sañkara's work was part of the whole
complex which went to make up the Hindu renaissance which further contri
buted to the Buddhist decline in India.
Thirdly, Sañkara incorporated some of the elements of Buddhism into

Hindu thought and practice. We have examined at length the importance of
his work in reforming Hindu monasticism on lines foreshadowed in the Buddhist
Sañgha. This not merely incorporated Buddhist monastic organisational ideals
into Hinduism, it also helped to reform Hindu asceticism such as it was in his
time. When we consider that by this time the Buddha had been included as
an avatâra in the Hindu pantheon (in the Matsva Purâna of the 6th century
A.D.); that Tantra was common to both; that many of the Hindu and Buddhist
gods were by now common to both pantheons; we see that Sañkara's monastic
reforms fit into a pattern of assimilation that would weaken the necessity for
the continuing survival of Buddhism as a separate faith in India. The same is
equally true of his philosophical appropriations through the mediating aegis
of Buddhism. The mysticism of Nâgârjuna and Vasubhandu now became
available to anyone desiring mysticism and absolutism in Sañkara's creative
synthesis of Advaita Vedànta. To be sure, it was not the same form of mystic
ism or absolutism. Even at the highest level where only silence is appropriate
and where the level of words and concepts has been transcended and where
transcendental reality is experienced by immediate and unitary cognition,
there is a sense in Vedânta that the unitary cognition is of a more positive
nature than certainly that of Mâdhyamika. At the lower level of words and
concepts, the Advaita absolute vision that Brahman is Atman is at the centre
of a different symbol system from that of Mâdhyamika and Vijfiânavâda.
They differ on avidyâ — Mâdhyamika rejects conceptualism, Vijfiânavâda
objectivity, and Vedânta difference. As Murti puts it,
Brahman is the Absolute of Pure Being; and the method of approach is from the stand
point of knowledge. Vijñáptimátratá is Pure Act (Transcendental Ideation), and the
approach is from the standpoint of the will consciousness. Sünyata is Prajñá, non-dual
Intuition, and the approach is from the standpoint of philosophical reflection of criti
cism"80.
In spite of these differences, and others we have alluded to earlier in the paper,
Sañkara offered a vision of the non-dual Absolute which had not been there
in Vedânta before the time of Gaudapâda. If the seeker for the Absolute, or
the would-be-Buddhist, from this time on desired to obtain what had earlier
only been available to him in the Buddhist vision - he could attain it in a

more positive and appealing form in the guise of Advaita Vedánta. If he desired
a theory of maya (applied to the creation of the world as well as individual
avidya); if he desired a two-truth theory; if he desired primary and secondary
divisions of scripture; if he desired a hierarchy of three classes of knowledge
spiritual stages and levels of reality; if he desired creation as a secondary didac
tical device; he no longer had to depend upon Buddhist thinkers alone for
these insights. The form and technique of Nagárjuna was now available through
the thought of Sañkara, and part of the vision and content of Vijñánaváda was
available in the same source.
There is no need to labour the point any longer. Sañkara did play his part in
the demise of Buddhism in India by his own attacks on the Buddhists, by his
strengthening of Hinduism as a living force, and by his appropriating of monas
tic Buddhist ideals and Mâdhyamika and Vijñánaváda insights. His work was
not the only reason for the demise of Buddhism in India, as we have seen; but
neither was it an unimportant reason. By the time that the Muslim depreda
tions added a new dimension to the situation, the Buddhism which by Sankara's
time was already declining had through him become weaker still. His work finds
its place in a complex series of reasons for the retreat of the religion of the
Buddha from the land of its birth. We conclude that Sañkara did not under
stand Buddhism as a way, and while he did largely understand the Sarvástivá
dins and later Vijñánaváda he did not understand or answer Mâdhyamika or
earlier Vijñánaváda. He was influenced (albeit unconsciously) by Maháyána
Buddhism through Gaudapáda. He himself at the start of his thinking was
more influenced by Gaudapáda, and more Vijñánaváda and yogic in tendency,
than he became later when he reacted against all three. He must be understood
within the historical conditions of his time in that he was influenced by Kumár
ila in his refutation of Buddhism and he was influenced by Buddhist monasticism
in his extending of the work of Kumárila. His relationship with Buddhism was
only part of the whole of his lifework albeit an important part. He helped to
accentuate the decline of Buddhism in India.
This paper has stressed that Sañkara was not merely the archetype of the
Advaita Vedánta system but a living person whose own historical development
and environment are crucial to his understanding. Also 'Buddhism' did not
exist in Sankara's India as a separate monolithic system over against 'Hinduism',
but was rather part of the whole culture of India and itself divided into differ
ent schools. Sañkara being dead still liveth. Buddhism having died in India is
FRANK WHALING
being born again. Its rebirth will necessitate the re-evaluation of many questions
which by default have been seen through largely Brahminical perspectives. The
old Buddhist monks fled from India into the vastnesses of Tibet, but now they
have fled back again prodded on by a new hostile situation to rediscover the
land of their origin.
New College,
Edinburgh University
NOTES
1 Since Indian Independence, Buddhism has increased proportionately (although not of

course numerically) at a much greater rate than the other religions. This has been partly
due to the influx of 'outcastes' under Dr. Ambedkar. It has piso been due to the influx of
Tibetan émigrés. But it has also been due to a revival of interest in Buddhism as an Indian
religious tradition, and part of the Indian heritage. One wonders to what extent Dr. Radha
krishnan's view of Buddhist influence upon Advaita Vedan ta has influenced or unconsciously
been influenced by his desire to reappropriate Buddhism as part of the Indian heritage.
1 Bhaskara's comment on Vedanta Satra 1.4.25 quoted by Ingalls 'Bhaskara the Vedantin'
p. 65 Philosophy East and West (PEW) XVII Nos. 1-4.
3 Many examples could be quoted from Dr. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy. See for
example II p. 471, 472. London 1927.
4 Dasgupta Indian Idealism p. 195. Cambridge U.S.A. 1962.
s Dasgupta History of Indian Philosophy I p. 437. Cambridge 1957.
6 It has recently been claimed that it remained in India through the so-called siddhas of
Bengal. This is somewhat dubious and depends upon what we mean by 'Buddhist'. See
G. W. Briggs. Gorakhnàth and the Kanphata Yogis Delhi 1973, p. 150
I Safikara Vedanta Sutras (Thibaut) 2.2.32. I, pp. 427-428, Oxford 1890.
8 L. Joshi Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India p. 297, Delhi 1967.
9 R. P. Singh The Vedanta of Sahkara p. 11. Jaipur 1949.
,a This point would require a whole paper as a separate treatment and is covered not separ
ately but during the course of dealing with other points.
913 See D. H. H. Ingalls 'Bhaskara the Vedantin', PEW XVII 1967, pp. 61-69. 'Sañkara's
Arguments Against the Buddhists', PEW III, 1954, pp. 291-306. 'The Study of Sankarâ
chàrya', Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Inst. XXXIII 1952 pp. 1 — 14.
10 Dr. Radhakrishnan claims (I p. 612) that Hindu thinkers cite 'four chief Buddhist
schools', introducing the Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas for Sañkara's 'blanket term'
Sarvastivâdin.
103 This is similar to Nagarjuna's argument against Sarvastivadin's 'realistic pluralism'.
II Vedanta SOtras Thibaut I p. 410.
12 Vedanta SOtras Thibaut I p. 413.
13 Vedanta Sutras Thibaut I p. 417. Nagarjuna also pivots his thinking on the problem of
the transition from bhdva to abhdva.
14 Vedanta SOtras Thibaut I p. 428.
15 See Karl Potter's distinction between path philosophy and speculative philosophy in
Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey, 1963.
¿ANKARA AND BUDDHISM
16 E. Conze Buddhist Thought in India, p. 141. University of Michigan, 1967.

17 Vedanta SQtras Thibaut I, p. 409.
1,3 'Nihilism'. This is an ambiguous translation of nâstika. Nihilism, I take it, has three
meanings: the doctrine that there exists no God; the political doctrine that there should
be no government; the metaphysical doctrine that the objects of our perception are not
real.
Nastika has also different meanings. A nâstika is first of all one who opposes the Veda
(Mahabharata 12.162.7; 12.15.33; 12.12.4). Secondly, he denies the supremacy of the
Brahmin caste. Finally, he denies the working out of karma (Mahabharata 12.146.18).
He believes that there is no retribution or reward in the next world; accordingly he
exerts himself to gain karma at the expense of dharma and artha (12.123.15).
I have included only notes on nastika from Mahabharata 12, but much the same will
appear from other texts. We will readily see that the Sarvastivadins were generally ndstikas
but were not wholly nihilists. On the other hand, many of Sankara's followers (e.g. Sri
Harsa) were partly nihilists, but they were not nitstikas.
I retain the translation 'nihilist' for Sankara's use of the word nastika, partly for want of a
better word, but also because Sankara DID accuse the Buddhists of denying the existence
of Brahman and atman, and he did question whether they believed that the objects of our
perception are real.
18 Vedanta Sotras Thibaut I, p. 427.
19 Vedanta Sotras Thibaut I, p. 427.
20 Dutt Aspects of Mahâyâna Buddhism pp. 69-73. London, 1930. However this is
Yogacara doctrine.
21 Vedanta Sotras Thibaut, I, p. 427.
22 E. Conze Buddhist Thought in India, p. 265.
23 Vedanta Satras Thibaut, I, p. 427.
24 L. Joshi Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India, p. 247.
25 E. Conze Buddhist Thought in India p. 39.
26 E. Conze Buddhism Its Essence and Development p. 19. New York, 1951.
II See E. Conze Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 244-249.
28 F. Streng's translation of 'Mülamadhyamikakarikas Fundamentals of the Middle Way'.
Appendix A, 15.10. Emptiness, A Study in Religious Meaning Nashville, 1967.
29 Nagarjuna 'Vigrahavyavartani' in Streng Appendix B, verse 29.
30 See for example the argument of K. Nishida in 'Intelligibility and the Philosophy of
Nothingness: Three Philosophical Essays'.
31 F. Streng Emptiness p. 148.
32 Ramanan has been criticised for accepting at its face value Nagarjuna's full authorship
of the 'Sastra'. Most critics (for example Hikato) would differentiate three layers: one by
Nagarjuna, the second by Kumarajlva as an addition, the third questionable but possibly
by Nagarjuna. See Ramanan, K. V. Nagarjuna's Philosophy Tokyo, 1966.
33 Streng's translation of Nagarjuna's 'Mùlamàdhyamikakàrikàs' 8.12.
39 Streng's translation of Nagarjuna's 'Mùlamàdhyamikakàrikàs' 24.8-9.
40 J. G. Jennings The Ved an tic Buddhism of Buddha pp. 63-64, London 1948.
FRANK WHALING
403 This point has interesting implications for the modern age. If one fully understands a
'path philosophy' as a path, why should one argue against it? Argument is always on a
rational, intellectual level. One might of course say, 'Your path is not mine', or 'My path
will be better for my disciple Smith than yours', but the first of these statements would
need no proof and the second could be proved only by Smith.
I think we are faced here with a problem that is proving somewhat intractible for modern
theological students. The new fashion is to seek a man to man dialogue. But such dialogues
are time consuming and spirit consuming. Most of us are capable of only a few of them in
our lifetime. Meanwhile there is much that can be done with 'arguments' that put idea
against idea, and sentence against sentence. I suppose all such 'arguments' reveal a defici
ency of understanding, but given our human limitations, is this necessarily a fault?
41 An account of his philosophy is given in the 'Indian Antiquary' LIII, pp. 77-86.
42 M. Hiriyanna 'Brahmadatta: an old Vedàntin' JORM 1928 pp. 1-9.
43 T. M. P. Mahadevan Gaudapada, p. 223. Madras 1954.
44 T. M. P. Mahadevan Gaudapàda, p. 219.
45 J. E. Carpenter Theism in Medieval India, p. 303, London 1921.
453 The difficulty is this:
In the concluding verses of the commentary on the Gaudapada Karikas the author speaks
of Gaudapada as his paramaguru. This has sometimes been interpreted as 'teacher's teacher'.
But the author of the Karikas cannot have been Sañkara's teacher's teacher, as the Karika
is quoted in Buddhist texts of the fifth century. However, 'teacher's teacher' may have a
different meaning, and the Karika may have quoted from the Buddhist texts.
Certainly Sañkara felt himself to be in the tradition of Gaudapada, whom he refers to as
sampraddyavid.
Whether the extant commentary on the Gaudapada Karikas is by Sañkara is not fully
clear. Also it is arguably possible that the last chapter of the Karikas is of different proven
ance from the others.
46 Gaudapada'Agamasastra' 1.16 V. Bhattacarya p. 7 Calcutta 1943.
47 Gaudapada'Àgamas'astra' 11.32 V. Bhattacarya p. 39.
48 Gaudapada'Àgamas'astra' 11.31 V. Bhattacarya p. 38.
49 Gaudapada 'Àgamas'astra' 111.15 V. Bhattacarya p. 58.
50 Gaudapada 'Àgamas'astra' 111.16 V. Bhattacarya p. 58.
51 Gaudapada 'Àgamas'astra' IV.87, 88 V. Bhattacarya p. 196.
52 Gaudapada'Agamasastra' IV.47 V. Bhattacarya p. 155.
53 Gaudapada'Âgamasastra' IV.74 V. Bhattacarya p. 175.
54 V. Bhattacarya pp. lxxvi-lxxvii.
55 Gaudapada 'Âgamasastra' 1.17 p. 7.
56 Gaudapada 'Àgamas'astra' III. 18 p. 59.
57 Gaudapada 'Àgamas'âstra'III. 32 p. 67.
58 T. R. V. Murti The Central Philosophy of Buddhism p. 112, London 1955.
59 T. M. P. Mahadevan 'Gaudapada' pp. 239-240.
60 T. M. P. Mahadevan 'Gaudapada' pp. 231-232.
61 Probably later than the two generations presupposed in the tradition that Gaudapada
was his guru's guru.
62 See R. Otto Mysticism East and West where he compares Eckhart and Sañkara.
63 D. H. H. Ingalls 'The Study of SankaracSrya' p. 12. Annals of Bhandarkar ORI Vol.
xxxiii pp. 1-14.
64 Gaudapada 'Agamas'astra' II.4. pp. 17-18.
65 GaudapSda 'Agamas'astra' IV.26 p. 135.

66 Vedanta Stltras Thibaut II.3 p. 296.
67 See Hacker, p. 7.
70 Ingalls 'The Study of Sankarîcarya' p. 13.
71 Vedanta Stltras Thibaut II.2.29 p. 425.
713 The parallel is not completely exact but it is illuminating in four ways:
(a) Kraemer is using the same argument against Buddhism AND Advaita Vedanta that
Sankara is using against the Buddha.
(b) Sankara was justified in using this argument against the Buddha who himself rejected
'revelation' as a category, although he did not reject the Dharma.
(c) Sankara was not so justified in using this argument against the Mahayana Buddhists
who had built up a sort of system of revelation, in fact if not in name, based on the Dharma,
the three Buddhas, and the SQtras.
(d) Both Kraemer's and Sankara's concept of 'revelation' is too narrow.
72 Ingalls 'The Study of Sañkaracarya' p. 13. This is too dogmatic as will appear.
73 G. S. Ghurye Indian Sàdhus p. 53 Bombay 1953.
74 See quotation 72. Not this actual statement but others like it have been used.
75 C. Sharma Indian Philosophy pp. 328-329 Bañaras 1952.
76 D. H. H. Ingalls 'Dharma and Moksa' p. 46 PEW VII 1957 pp. 41-47.
77 Quoted L. M. Joshi Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India p. 383.
78 Quoted L. M. loshi Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India p. 402.
79 See two above. Part of the reason for the decline of Buddhism was that the Brahminical
monopoly of the religious institutions of birth, marriage and death was beginning to weigh
more heavily at this period.
80 T. R. V. Murti Central Philosophy of Buddhism p. 326 London 1955.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bhattacharya, V. The Agamasistra of Gaudapâda Calcutta 1943.

2. Briggs, G. W. Gorakhnath and the Kànphata Yogis Delhi 1973.
3. Burch, G. B. 'Principles of and Problems of Monistic Vedanta' from 'Philosophy East
and West' XI, 4, 1961-62 pp. 231-237.
4. Carpenter, J. E. Theism in Medieval India London 1921.
5. Conze, E. Buddhism, Its Essence and Development New York 1951.
6. Conze, E. Buddhist Thought in India University of Michigan 1967.
7. Conze, E. 30 Years of Buddhist Thought Oxford 1967.
8. Conze, E. Ed. Buddhist Texts through the Ages New York 1964.
9. Coomaraswamy, A. K. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism London 1928.
10. Dasgupta, S. Indian Idealism Cambridge U.S.A. 1962 (first published 1933).
11. Dasgupta, S. A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. 1 Cambridge 1957.
12. Deussen, P. An Outline of the Vedanta System of Philosophy According to Sahkara
New York 1906.
13. Dutt, S. Early Buddhist Monachism New York 1960.
14. Dutt, N. Aspects of Mahàyàna Buddhism London 1930.
15. Ghurye, G. S. Indian Sâdhus Bombay 1953.
FRANK WHALING
16. Hacker, P. 'Sankara the Yogin and Sankara the Advaitin, a Few Observations' trans
lated by J. L. Mehta from 'Beitrage zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens' 1968 Leiden.
17. Hiriyanna, M. 'Bhartrprapañca: An Old Vedàntin' 'Indian Antiquary' 1924 LUI, pp.
77-86.
18. Hiriyanna, M. 'Brahmadatta: An Old Vedàntin' JORM 1928, pp. 1-9.
19. Hiriyanna, M. Outlines of Indian Philosophy London 1970 (first published 1932).
20. Ingalls, D. H. H. 'Sañkara's Arguments against the Buddhists' PEW III, 4, Jan. 1954
pp. 291-306.
21. Ingalls, D. H. H. 'Whose is Avidya?' PEW III, 1, April 1953, pp. 69-72.
22. Ingalls, D. H. H. 'The Study of SafikaracSrya' Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Inst. XXXIII 1952 pp. 1-14.
23. Ingalls, D. H. H. 'Bhaskara the Vedantin' PEW XVII, 1-4. Jan.-Oct. 1967 pp. 61-69.
24. Ingalls, D. H. H. 'Dharma and Moksa' PEW VII, 1 & 2, April & July 1957, pp. 41-47.
25. Jennings, J. G. The Vedàntie Buddhism of Buddha London 1948.
26. Joshi, L. M. Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India Delhi 1967.
27. Madhavananda, Swami. Translation of Sañkara's commentary on Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad Calcutta 1965.
28. Mahadevan, T. M. P. Gaudapàda: A Study in Early Vedànta Madras 1954.
29. Morgan, K. W. (Ed.) The Path of the Buddha New York 1956.
30. Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, A Study of the Mâdhyamika
System London 1955.
31. Potter, K. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1963.
32. Potter, K. 'A Fresh Classification of India's Philosophical Systems' JOAS XXII, 4,
1961 pp. 25-33.
33. Otto, R. Mysticism East and West New York 1970 (first published 1932).
34. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy (Two Volumes) London 1927.
35. Ramanan, K. V. Nàgàrjuna's Philosophy as Presented in the Mahaprajnaparamitasastra
Tokyo 1966.
36. Robinson, R. H. Early Mâdhyamika in India and China Madison 1967.
37. Sarma, D. S. Hinduism Through the Ages Bombay 1961.
38. Sharma, C. Indian Philosophy Bañaras 1952.
39. Singh, R. P. The Vedanta of Sankara Jaipur 1949.
40. Stcherbatsky, F. Th. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana London and Paris 1965.
41. Streng, F. J. Emptiness, A Study in Religious Meaning Nashville 1967.
42. Suzuki, D. T. The Lahkavatara Siitra London 1932.
43. Suzuki, D. T. On Indian Mahayana Buddhism New York 1968.
44. Thibaut, G. Translation of Sañkara's commentary on the Vedanta Sutras Vol. I 1890
Vol. II 1896 Oxford.
45. Thomas, E. J. The History of Buddhist Thought New York 1967.

Śa Kara and Buddhism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Śa Kara and Buddhism

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Śa Kara and Buddhism

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ŚAṄKARA AND BUDDHISM

Author(s): FRANK WHALING

SAÑKARA AND BUDDHISM

The various facets of Sañkara's relationship towards Buddhism have been a

Journal of Indian Philosophy 7 (1979) 1-42. 0022-1791/79/0071-0001$04.20.

would follow Bhâskara and Râmânuja in describing Sañkara's pMosophy under

This charge is sometimes extended to that of wilful ignorance. According to

doesn't give the cause of the aggregates and chain as a whole.

Finally, Sañkara refutes the idea of the alaya-vijñana (reservoir consciousness).

In other words, Sañkara sees the concept of the Slayavijñána as an inadequate

The Pràsangikas interpreted Nàgàijuna as having preached a universal scepticism

Thirdly, although Sañkara may have contributed to the downfall of Buddhism

eroticism, magic and pseudo-mysticism. There was therefore some justification

For the Màdhyamikas, emptiness was more of a religious than a philosophical

compassion and helping others insofar as we are inextricably inter-related with

emotional factors that constituted the Sañgha as a religious community rather

identity-in-difference. While he recognised the distinction between the higher

kârikâs of this chapter are taken up with a justification of the doctrine of

distinctions according to the philosophy of bhedabheda (identity and differ

or whether he was consciously borrowing directly from Vijfiânavâda and

Sañkara was not so much a person as a structure or a system of thought. He

An attempt to analyse Sañkara historically bristles with difficulties of

refutes Gaudapâda in his anxiety to escape from Vijñána subjectivism. Fourthly,

This assumption, which Hacker proceeds to justify, is of course a large one.

In order to explore more fully the inter-relationship between Sañkara and

Although this reform of Sankara's was of far-reaching importance, one

sometimes by means of quasi-Buddhist arguments - while at the same time he

We have examined closely Sañkara's refutation of the Buddhists and had

practices of the Tantra schools. It is unnecessary at this stage to investigate

Thirdly, Sañkara incorporated some of the elements of Buddhism into

only been available to him in the Buddhist vision - he could attain it in a

1 Since Indian Independence, Buddhism has increased proportionately (although not of

16 E. Conze Buddhist Thought in India, p. 141. University of Michigan, 1967.

65 GaudapSda 'Agamas'astra' IV.26 p. 135.

1. Bhattacharya, V. The Agamasistra of Gaudapâda Calcutta 1943.

You might also like