Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Carollo Motion
Carollo Motion
WILLIAM FULLER
MARTIN PINILLA II, and
DENISE GALVEZ TURROS
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Defendants.
_________________________/
EMERGENCY MOTION TO EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS AND
REMOVE JOE CAROLLO FROM THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION
Plaintiffs respectfully move this Honorable Court for an order setting “speedy hearing” for
no later than March 7, 2024 under Florida Statute § 86.111, and an “immediate hearing” under the
principles enunciated in Fla. Stat.§102.168(7) and Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215(h), in order to
determine if Miami City Commissioner Joe Carollo “shall forthwith forfeit his or her office or
1. The City of Miami Charter provides that any public official “who is found by the
court to have willfully violated” certain rights—including “interfer[ing] with the right[ ] of
freedom of speech”—“shall forthwith forfeit his or her office or employment.” City of Miami
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“Forthwith” (11 ed. 2019) (“immediately” or “without delay”); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, “Forthwith” (5th ed. 2022) (“at once; immediately”).
3. In even run of the mill declaratory judgment actions the “court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar. Fla. Stat. §
86.111.
4. This case is much more urgent. In fact, Fla. Stat. §102.168(7) provides that a
taxpayer contesting a public official’s election to office “is entitled to an immediate hearing.” And
the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration state that “[e]very judge has a duty to expedite priority
cases” and that “[p]articular attention must be given to . . . challenges involving elections”). Fla.
5. Here, removal of an elected official found by a court to have willfully violated the
right to freedom of speech is even more urgent than an action contesting the election of a public
official or enforcing a public records request. For instance, a contested election usually involves
the counting of votes or a candidate’s residency, not the willful violation of the fundamental rights
that all U.S. citizens have under the U.S. Constitution, as this case does.
6. This action can be set for a hearing in as little as 30 days, as it not only requires no
discovery, but it does not even require any testimony or other evidence, because it presents pure
legal issues over which there can be little dispute, and because the prejudice inflicted on Plaintiffs
and the public outweigh any possible justification for any additional undue delay.
7. First, the fact that City of Miami Commissioner Joe Carollo violated the freedom
of speech of Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla has already been established by virtue of a unanimous
jury verdict and entry of a federal court’s final judgment following a multi-week trial which
expressly found that Defendant “Joe Carollo intentionally commit[ed] acts that violated [Plaintiff
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Fuller and Pinilla’s] right to free speech.” Fuller, et al. v. Carollo, No. 18-CV-24190 (S.D. Fla.)
(“Fuller I”). That judgment cannot be questioned but rather must be enforced by this Court. As the
First District Court of Appeals has held: “Supremacy Clause considerations require that the
judgment of the federal court be respected” and a “fully enforceable federal judgment that
overrides any conflicting state law or state court order.” Fla. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Services
v. State, 616 So. 2d 66, 68–69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (quoting Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33
8. Second, although Carollo has indicated that he may challenge Plaintiffs’ standing,
9. For instance, the Charter provides: “Residents of the City shall have standing to
bring legal actions to enforce the City Charter, the Citizens' Bill of Rights, and the Miami-Dade
County Citizens' Bill of Rights as applied to the City.” There is no dispute that Plaintiff Denise
Galvez Turros is a resident of the City of Miami and thus has standing under the plain terms cited
above.
10. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla were the Plaintiffs in the Fuller
v. Carollo trial who were injured by Carollo’s intentional violation of their rights to free speech,
and whether that injury provides standing to enforce the Bill of Rights in the Miami Charter is a
11. Contrary to any argument that Carollo may raise to the contrary, the fact that the
City of Miami Charter confirms that its residents have standing to sue to enforce its provisions in
no way limits standing to exclude traditional standing principles that grant standing to
non-residents like Fuller and Pinilla, who were injured when Carollo’s First Amendment retaliation
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campaign targeted the multitude of businesses and properties that they own and operate in the City
of Miami.
12. Third, a hearing on removal forthwith is even more critical in this case as Defendant
Carollo has only accelerated and expanded his First Amendment retaliation campaign against
Plaintiffs.
13. Thus, every day that Carollo impermissibly remains in office as a City of Miami
Commissioner represents another day that he is capable of wielding unauthorized power to chill
the free speech and political association rights of every Miami resident. In other words, allowing
such a patent abuse of municipal authority to persist not only presents a direct threat to Plaintiffs
in this case, but also discourages other members of the public from similarly exercising their
constitutional rights in opposition to Carollo, causing widespread and irreparable harm to the
community in clear contravention of the foundational principles enshrined in the City of Miami
Charter and United States Constitution. See, e.g., Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 981 F.3d 854,
870 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing cases) (“‘[D]irect penalization’ of protected speech” by government
officials, . . . ‘for even minimal periods of time,’ constitutes a per se irreparable injury”).
14. Fourth, any delay in rendering the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in this case would
be detrimental to the parties and the public. The elected officials subject to the removal provisions
of the Citizens’ Bill of Rights in the City of Miami Charter under term limits, including Defendant
Carollo, whose current term in office is scheduled to expire in 2025, merely a year away. If elected
officials like Carollo are permitted to drag their feet to evade a timely, final adjudication of
declaratory actions like this one, then it will deprive citizens of judicial guidance on substantial
questions that are subject to repetition, while also undermining the remedial and deterrent effects
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15. In sum, the federal proceedings which ultimately resulted in a final adjudication
that Carollo intentionally violated Plaintiff and Fuller’s First Amendment rights in Fuller I were
burdened by five years of prejudicial delay that Carollo managed to impose over Plaintiffs’
objections, while he continued to engage in punitive measures to further chill their freedom of
speech and political association in the interim. Now that Fuller I has finally concluded with a
finding that Carollo intentionally violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
this Court should not countenance any further gratuitous delay in imposing the consequences of
Carollo’s misconduct that are mandated under the City of Miami Charter.
16. Thus, particularly given the absence of any good-faith legal or factual disputes in
this case, and because it concerns an issue of manifest public interest—the holding of public office
by an elected official found by a federal court to have intentionally violated free speech rights
protected by the United States Constitution and City of Miami Charter—Plaintiffs respectfully
request a final hearing on legal argument forthwith, or immediately, and by no means later than
March 7, 2024, consistent with numerous provisions of Florida law. See City of Miami Charter,
Citizens’ Bill of Rights (“Any public official, or employee who is found by the court to have
willfully violated this section shall forthwith forfeit his or her office or employment”) (emphasis
added); Fla. Stat. § 86.111 (“The Court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory
judgment and may advance it on the calendar”) (emphasis added); Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215(h)
(“Every judge has a duty to expedite priority cases,” and “[p]articular attention must be given
immediate hearing”) (emphasis added); Fla. Stat.§ 119.11(1) (“Whenever an action is filed to
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enforce [a public records request], the court shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court set this action for declaratory
relief for a “speedy hearing” and “advance it on the calendar” to ensure its prompt resolution by
Respectfully submitted,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this Emergency Motion to Expedite was
personally served on the parties along with the Summons and Compliant and that, on January 22,
2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court
by using the Florida eportal system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to all counsel and
parties of record.