CASE DIGEST

IN

ELECTION LAW

HISTORY OF ELECTION LAW

MOYA VS DEL FIERO
GR NO. L-46863
Ponente: Justice Jose Laurel

Facts:
Petitioner Irineo Moya and Respondent Agripino Del Fiero are candidates for
mayor of Paracale, Camarines Norte.
During the elections held in 1937, Del Fiero was proclaimed as winner with a
majority of only three votes. Thereafter, petitioner filed a protest to question the election
result, alleging that:
a. A ballot in precinct no. 1 had the respondent’s name written on the space for
vice-mayor and that only an arrow was drawn to connect respondent’s last
name to the word mayor;
b. In a ballot in precinct no. 5, the respondent’s name was written on the space
for provincial board member;
c. In a ballot in precinct no.2, the respondent’s christian name appeared on the
space for provincial board member and only his surname is written on the
space for mayor;
d. A ballot in precinct no. 2 had Agripino F. Garcia written as mayor;
e. Seven ballots bear the name Rufino Del Fiero instead of Agripino Del Fiero;
f. On 72 ballots, P. Del Fiero was written on the space for mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the discrepancies in the ballots warrants their invalidity.
Decision:
No. For the following reasons:
a. On the ballot where the elector wrote the respondent's name on the
space for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake, he placed
an arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor"
(Alcalde) printed on the left side of the ballot. The intention of the
elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus
evident, in the absence of proof showing that the ballot had been
tampered with;
b. Although the name of the respondent is written on the first space for
member of the provincial board, said name is followed in the next line
by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name is followed in the next
 line by word "consehal" and the name of a candidate for this position.
The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of
mayor being manifest.
c. On the ballot where the Christian name of the respondent was written
on the second space for member of the provincial board, but his
surname was written on the proper space for mayor with no other
accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector is manifest;
d. The ballot wherein "Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper
space, is valid for the respondent. In his certificate of candidacy the
respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion
is that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the contraction
"Ga." is not without justification.
e. The seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was voted for the office
of mayor is correctly adjudicated for respondent. There was no other
candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar
name and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his surname
on these ballots, the intention of the voters in preparing the same was
undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the office for which he was a
candidate.
As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must
continue to be the manes by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied
into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in
the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far
as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily
points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government
and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to
stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read
and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.

BADELLES VS CABILI
GR NO. L-29333
Ponente: Justice Enrique Fernando

Facts:
Mariano Badelles and Camilo Cabili were candidates for mayor of Iligan City
during the 1967 elections. Cabili was elected as mayor.
Badelles filed a petition impugning the results of the election on the ground of
blatant violations of election law. According to him, 8,300 illegal voters were allowed to
vote which resulted to more than 8,000 qualified voters being unable to vote.
The trial court dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court should try the cases.

Decision:
No. The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are
also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment
of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle
emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections, assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a
free, orderly and honest manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not
rest with the Commission on Elections but in "some other agencies of the Government."
More specifically, with reference to provincial and municipal officials, election contests
"are entrusted to the courts.

A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the
consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded,
and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate
sources of established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their
unfettered choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a
free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption
and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If
there be a failure to observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties
should not be left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election
protest that fitly serves that purpose.
PURISIMA VS SALANGA
GR NO. L-22335
Ponente: Justice Jose Bengzon

Facts:
Petitioner Amante Purisima and private respondent Gregorio Cordero are
candidates for board member of Ilocos Sur.
During the canvassing, Purisima called the attention of the canvassers about the
erasures observed in the votes for Cordero. However, the canvassers continued the
canvass and proclaimed Cordero as the winner. Later, Purisima filed a petition to annul
the canvass and proclamation of Cordero.
The Commission on Elections issued a resolution on November 30, annulling the
canvass and proclamation, as regards Cordero and Purisima.
Purisima, on December 10, filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for
recount. After a preliminary hearing on the motions to dismiss, the Court of First
Instance dismissed the petition for recount and Cordero filed in the Commission on
Elections a motion for resumption of the canvass.
In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge stated that some of the
requisites were not present, namely: first, that it appears to the provincial board of
canvassers that a discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between the
copy submitted to the board and another authentic copy thereof; third, that said
authentic copy must also be submitted to the board.
Alleging that the Commission on Elections was about to order the canvass
resumed, Purisima filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Petitioner
asked that the lower court's order dismissing his petition for recount be set aside and
that the Commission on Elections be enjoined from ordering resumption of the canvass
until after the judicial recount.
Issue:
Whether or not the canvassing should continue.

Decision:
No. It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of
patent irregularity in the election returns. In the present case, there were patent
erasures and superimpositions, in words and figures on the face of the election returns
submitted to the board of canvassers. It was therefore imperative for the board to stop
the canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic copies and recourse to the
courts. A canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without
awaiting proper remedies, is null and void.
Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the
electorate. Patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes
stated in the election returns strike at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass
and proclamation. A comparison with the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a
recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns as
well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.

CAUTON VS COMELEC
GR NO. L-25467
Ponente: Justice Calixto Zaldivar

Facts:
During the canvassing of votes for the 2nd Congressional District of Ilocos Sur in
the 1965 elections, respondent Pablo Sanidad, who is among the candidates for the
said office, brought to the attention of the Board of Canvassers that there are
discrepancies in the entries on the election returns from the municipalities of Candon,
Santiago and Sta. Cruz.
Respondent Sanidad filed a petition with the Commission on Elections praying
for the opening of the ballot boxes in all the precincts of Candon, Santiago and Sta.
Cruz, in order to retrieve the election returns deposited therein so that those election
returns might be used in the canvass of the votes.
After hearing, the Commission on Elections found "that it had been clearly
established that the copies of the election returns for the Municipal Treasurer, for the
Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Santa
Cruz have uniform alterations in the entries of the votes cast for representative showing
different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party copies.
The respondent Commission on Elections then issued an order providing the
opening of the ballot boxes of the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago.
The petitioner contends that under Section 157 of the Revised Election Code the
Commission on Elections has authority to order the opening of the ballot boxes "only in
connection with an investigation conducted for the purpose of helping the prosecution of
any violation of the election laws or for the purely administrative purpose but not when
the sole purpose is, as in this case, to assist a party in trying to win the election.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to order the opening of the ballot
boxes to enable to establish the discrepancies raised by the respondent.

Decision:
Yes. The Court in a line of decisions has ruled that the Commission on Election
has the power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the canvass of
election returns made by the board of canvassers.
The power of the Commission on Elections in this respect is simply
administrative and supervisory — intended to secure the proclamation of the winning
candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. When the Commission on
Elections exercises this power the purpose is not for the Commission to help a
candidate win the election but to bring about the canvass of the true results of the
elections as certified by the boards of election inspectors in every precinct. The object of
the canvass is to determine the result of the elections based on the official election
returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the
people's will in the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on true,
genuine, correct, nay untampered, election returns. It is in this proceedings that the
Commission on Elections exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the
enforcement of laws relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass
is based on the election returns as actually certified by the members of the board of
inspectors. Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the elections returns in
the hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining
the true result of the elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to order the taking
of such steps as may be necessary in order that the proper basis for the canvass is
obtained or made available.
In this case, the Commission on Elections issued the questioned resolution "after
hearing the arguments of the petitioner and the opposition thereto and considering that
it has been clearly established that the copies of the election returns for the Municipal
Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the
municipality of Sta. Cruz have uniform alteration in the entries of the votes cast for
representative showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party
copies, while the copies of the election returns for the Commission of Elections and the
Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago have likewise
uniform alterations and showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party
copies ..."Indeed, in the face of this finding by the Commission on Elections, which
indicates a clear violation of the election law, and which indicates an attempt to procure
the proclamation of the winner in the elections for Representative in the second
congressional district of Ilocos Sur by the use of tampered election returns, can the
Commission on Elections be remiss in the performance of its duties as a constitutional
body committed with the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections? The Revised Election Code gives to the
Commission on Elections the direct and immediate supervision over provincial,
municipal and city officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections — and included among these officials are members of the provincial board of
canvassers. The Commission on Elections has a duty to enforce this law and it has the
duty to see to it that the election returns to be used for canvassing must be genuine and
authentic, not falsified or tampered with. Where the election returns produced by the
provincial treasurer have been shown to have been tampered, and all the other copies
outside the ballot boxes have also been shown to have been tampered or falsified, it is
certainly within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such order as would
ascertain the existence of the genuine, authentic and untampered election returns, and
thus open the way for the summary recount of the votes, in accordance with law, for the
purposes only of the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the candidate found
to have obtained the highest number of votes. In this case, it is found by the
Commission on Elections that no other copies can be had except those deposited in the
ballot boxes. Hence, the necessity for the Commission to order the retrieving of the
copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes. An order to this effect does not
affect the right to vote or the validity of any vote cast, so that it is perfectly within the
power of the Commission on Elections to issue such an order in the exercise of its
exclusive power to administer and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
It would indeed be absurd to say that the Commission on Elections has a legal duty to
perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary means to perform said duty.

ROQUE VS COMELEC
GR NO. 188456
Ponente: Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.

Facts:
Petitioners sought to declare the contract-award of election automation to TIM
and Smartmatic null and void.
According to petitioners, under the contract, the Comelec abdicated its
constitutional mandate to decide all questions affecting elections when, under the poll
automation contract, it surrendered control of the system and technical aspects of the
2010 automated elections to Smartmatic in violation of Sec. 26 of RA 8436.
Issue:
Whether or not in entering into the poll automation contract, the COMELEC has
abdicated its constitutional function to have the overall supervision and control of the
elections.

Decision:
No. Suffice it to state that, under the automation contract, Smartmatic is given a
specific and limited technical task to assist the Comelec in implementing the AES. But
at the end of the day, the Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service provider and
lessor of goods and services to the Comelec, which shall have exclusive supervision
and control of the electoral process. Art. 6.7 of the automation contract could not have
been more clear:
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued by the
Commission En Banc, the entire process of voting, counting, transmission,
consolidation and canvassing of votes shall be conducted by COMELEC’s personnel
and officials and their performance, completion and final results according to
specifications and within specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of
COMELEC and the PROVIDER.
The aforequoted provision doubtless preserves Comelec’s constitutional and statutory
responsibilities. But at the same time, it realistically recognizes the complexity and the
highly technical nature of the automation project and addresses the contingencies that
the novelty of election automation brings.

ARROYO VS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

GR NO. 199082
Ponente: Justice Diosdado Peralta
Facts:
Due to the discovery of massive election fraud during the 2004 and 2007
elections, the COMELEC issued a resolution creating a joint committee with the DOJ to
conduct a preliminary investigation on these alleged offenses.
After the investigations, it was found out that there are enough evidences to
indict former President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo for electoral sabotage.
The COMELEC filed the necessary complaint before the RTC. On the same day,
the RTC issued. Petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for
reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a Hold
Departure Order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She,
likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam praying that its
Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC nonetheless issued a warrant
for her arrest which was duly served.

Issue:
Whether or not the creation of the joint committees undermines the
independence of the COMELEC.

Decision:
No. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is
intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and
honest conduct of elections. The failure of the Comelec to exercise this power could
result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of
the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in
Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, to wit:
Section 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal [public
prosecutor], or with the Ministry Department of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation
is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of
the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors
had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated
authority given by the Comelec. The reason for this delegation of authority has been
explained in Commission on Elections v. Español:
The deputation of the Provincial and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the
need for prompt investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable
part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the petitioner does not
have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute
such cases.
Moreover, as we acknowledged in People v. Basilla, the prompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of
nationwide elections would simply not be possible without the assistance of provincial
and city fiscals prosecutors and their assistants and staff members, and of the state
prosecutors of the DOJ.

LICO VS COMELEC
GR NO.: 205505
Ponente: Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno

Facts:
Ating Koop, a registered party-list, participated and won a seat in the 2010
elections and consequently, Isidro Lico, the party’s first nominee, assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list
organizations, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution which incorporated a
term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico
was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term.
Petitioner failed to honor the term-sharing agreement, thus, the party’s Central
Committee expelled him for the party.
 Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Interim Central
Committee, which subsequently denied the same.
While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the Lico Group
held a special meeting in Cebu City on 19 December 2011. At the said meeting, new
members of the Central Committee, as well as a new set of officers, were elected. The
election was purportedly held for the purpose of implementing the 5-5-5 equal
representation amendment made during the Second National Convention.

On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in

Parañaque City at which a new Central Committee and a new set of officers were
constituted. Members of the Rimas Group won the election and occupied all the
corresponding seats.
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico which prayed that petitioner Lico be
ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the
succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative
in the House.
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012,the COMELEC Second Division upheld the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the duly
qualified nominee of the party-list group.The Second Division characterized the issue of
the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-party
leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register political
parties.
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the
Second Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied. In arriving at its
Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel
Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion
from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it
was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over
the Petition.

At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from
Ating Koop.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to expel a member of the house of
representatives.
Decision:
No. In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the
House of Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which
necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have
been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership in
the party-list group is a continuing qualification. The court have ruled that qualifications
for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but
during the officer's entire tenure.

This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET
jurisdiction over the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list organization.
In Abayon v. HRET, it was argued that the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized
and under-represented sectors that they should represent; as such, they could not be
properly considered bona fide members of their respective party-list organizations. The
Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona
fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.

Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to
sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible
by a writ of certiorari, the COMELEC should not have encroached into the expulsion
issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

ESTRELLA VS COMELEC
GR NO. 160465
Ponente: Justice Conchita Carpio- Morales
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Estrella sought the nullification of Status Quo Ante Order
issued by the COMELEC against him.
In the issuance of the said status quo, five (5) of the then incumbent seven (7)
members of the COMELEC participated: Commissioners Benjamin Abalos, Sr.,
Luzviminda Tangcangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ressureccion Z. Borra and Ralph C.
Lantion.
Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion voted for the issuance
of said order, while Commissioner Borra dissented.
Commissioner Lantion previously inhibited in SPR No. 21-2002, a case pending
before the COMELEC Second Division involving the same parties.
In the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, Commissioner Lantion stated
in his handwriting that "his previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not
in the EAC" and that "as further agreed in the Second Division, [he] will not participate in
the Division deliberations but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en banc.
In the Supreme Court’s decision, it ruled that Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary
piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En
Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.

Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary
votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The
order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement
of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
In seeking a reconsideration of the above-quoted Resolution, private respondent
cites Cua v. Commission on Elections3 wherein this Court ruled:
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court
holds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under
Article IX-A, section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to
affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and
voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional
provision. x x x
Private respondent argues that "[f]ollowing the doctrine laid out in Cua, three (3)
votes would have been sufficient to constitute a majority to carry the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc as provided by the Constitution and the appropriate rules.
Issue:
Whether or not a vote of 3 COMELEC commissioners en banc is sufficient to
carry an en banc decision.

Decision:
No. Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all
its members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained.5 Since the above-quoted constitutional provision states "all of its members,"
without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the Constitution, counting out
Commissioner Lantion’s vote from the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would
leave just three (3) votes out of "all" seven (7) members of the COMELEC.
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the members who participated
or deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to the Supreme
Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution:

SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid
down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter
brought before it by a majority vote of "all its members," and NOT majority of the
members who deliberated and voted thereon.

SEVILLA VS COMELEC
GR NO. 203833
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion
Facts:
Petitioner Sevilla and respondent So were candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay. The election tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner. Later, So filed an
election protest on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies, and
irregularities and prayed for a manual revision of the ballots. However the RTC
dismissed the election protest.
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC
for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a
clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a certain group of
ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two persons.
In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So’s
petition.
The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the Comelec Second Division’s
ruling and directed the respondent judge to conduct another revision of the contested
ballots. Hence, this petition.
He emphasizes that the Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority
decision considering that three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for
reconsideration and the three others voted to grant the same. So notes that the assailed
October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by six (6) Commissioners
because the 7th Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President at that time.

Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a
majority decision required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Decision:
No. The court previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four
members of the Comelec en banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, it was
declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7
of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the
Comelec en banc, and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or
ruling."
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en
banc appears to have affirmed the Comelec Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect,
denied Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three
Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote
that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for a valid
pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the
Comelec Second Division’s findings.

IBRAHIM VS COMELEC
GR NO. 192289
Ponente: Justice Ruben Reyes

Facts:
Petitioner Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy for vice mayor. However, the
COMELEC Law Department discovered that he is not a registered voter and thus,
recommended his disqualification. The COMELEC En Banc then issued a resolution
disqualifying the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc can disqualify a candidate upon
recommendation of the Law Department.

Decision:
No. The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay.
Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition
for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after
due notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the
quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first
decide. More so in this case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a
petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of the
candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies
due process to the candidate.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed
resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification even when no complaint or petition was
filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the
OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim
considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of Datu Unsay disqualified
him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible
candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover,
even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc
still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by
both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to
one of its divisions.

THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE

ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 2. Applicability. - This Code shall govern all election of public officers and, to
the extent appropriate, all referenda and plebiscites.

LUNA VS RODRIGUEZ
GR NO. L-13744
Ponente: Justice Elias Finley Johnson

Facts:
Petitioner Luna and respondent Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of
Rizal. Rodriguez was proclaimed winner. Luna protested the result.
The lower court found that the inspectors did not close the polls at 6 o'clock p.m.,
and that a large number of persons voted after that time, and directed that the total vote
of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced by the number of such votes, without
ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. By
deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock
p.m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna
had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the
provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly.

Issue:
Whether or not the ballot of an innocent voter, who is prevented, through no fault
of his, from casting the same before 6 p.m. be annulled for the simple reason that the
polls were kept open, after the hour designated by the law, for the purpose of giving
such voter an opportunity to vote.

Decision:
No. Experience and observation has taught legislatures and courts that, at the
time of a hotly contested election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and unscrupulous
politicians will lead them beyond the limits of honesty and decency and by the use of
bribery, fraud and intimidation, despoil the purity of the ballot and defeat the will of the
people at the polls. Such experience has led the legislatures to adopt very stringent
rules for the purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his
ballot to guard the purity of elections.
It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the
conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce
them after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially
where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes
without any fault on their part.
In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that when the Election Law
does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such
departure has been due to an honest mistake or misrepresentation of the Election Law,
and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices and it is
clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will
be held to be directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity.
However, the irregularities may be so numerous as not to be attributed to ignorance or
honest mistake, but to a design to defeat the will of the voters or to such careless
disregard of the law as to amount not only to laches but to fraudulent intent. In such
cases, the election officers should be punished, the election should be declared null and
a new election held.
It has been held, therefore, very generally, that the provisions of a statute as to
the manner of conducting the details of an election are not mandatory, but directory
merely, and irregularities, in conducting an election and counting the votes, not
proceeding from any wrongful intent and which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will
not vitiate an election or justify the rejection of the entire votes of a precinct.
 The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs
of their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in
deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters
should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is
done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the
election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their
participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the
election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make
the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty
itself.
The errors and irregularities which warrant the rejection of ballots and the
annulment of an election and thus deprive lawful voters of their legal right to vote,
should be such as to fully justify that result. It has been held that even great
irregularities on the part of election officers will not of necessity vitiate an election,
where no fraud is committed or attempted, or no illegal vote was polled was no legal
voter was deprived of his vote.
No complaint is made that any fraud was committed nor that any person voted
who had no right to vote, by reason of the fact that the polls were kept open after the
hour fixed by the law. It is admitted that the polls were kept open after the hour, by the
consent of all parties concerned, for the reasons and purposes above indicated. In view
of such facts, should the vote of the innocent voter be annulled and he thereby deprived
of his participation in the affairs of the government when he was guilty of no illegal act?
If the inspectors may, for one reason or another, prevent the opening of the polls or
delay the commencement of the voting until 11 o'clock in the morning and then close
the polls in the evening so as to prevent all those who desire to vote from voting, without
incurring criminal liability for a violation of the election laws, the same motives will
induce them to delay the opening of the polls until later and thus prevent any to vote
except those whom they desire.
The court is not inclined to the belief that the legislature intended that a failure to
comply with the law in this jurisdiction should render the entire election void, nor nullify
the votes cast after the period mentioned in the law, unless the polls were kept open
after the hour for the purpose of permitting some fraud to be committed, or for the
purpose of permitting some person to vote who had not appeared during the regular
voting hours.

LAMBONAO VS TERO
GR NO. L-23240
Ponente: Justice Jose Bengzon
Facts:
Petitioner Benedicto Lambonao was a candidate for municipal councilor of
Anahawan, Leyte.
After respondents were proclaimed, petitioner filed a petition to disqualify the
respondents, claiming that they are ineligible because their certificates of candidacy
were not signed nor ratified by them.

Issue:
Whether or not an unsigned certificate of candidacy is a ground for annulment of
a winning candidate’s proclamation.

Decision:
No. Section 31 of the Revised Election Code states that:

Certificate of candidacy for only one office. No person shall be eligible unless, within the
time fixed by law, he files a duly signed and sworn certificate of candidacy, nor shall any
person be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and, if he
files certificates of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them.
The above-quoted provisions are indeed mandatory in terms. As regards election
laws, however, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory, after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate.
And in Lino Luna v. Rodriguez, the Court laid down the following doctrine:

"‘It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the
conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce
them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially
where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes
without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of Election Law
were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government
and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the
election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty.
The defects in the certificates of candidacy of respondents should have been
questioned by petitioners on or before the election and not after the will of the people
has been expressed through the ballots.
VILLANUEVA VS COMELEC
GR NO. L-54718
Ponente: Justice Pacifico De Castro

Facts:
On January 4, 1980, which is the last day for the firing of certificates of candidacy
in the January 30, 1980 elections, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed with the Election
Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, his sworn certificate of candidacy for the office of vice-
mayor of said municipality. Subsequently, however, but on the same day, Mendoza filed
an unsworn letter withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy.
On January 25, 1980, herein petitioner filed with the Election Registrar of
Dolores, Quezon, his sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution" of the
aforementioned Narciso Mendoza, Jr. for the office of vice-mayor of said municipality.
On January 31, 1980, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed, on the basis of the results of its canvass, respondent Vivencio Lirio as the
duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon. Respondent Board considered all the
votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the ground that his certificate of
candidacy was not given due course by the Commission on Elections, Manila, and his
name was not included in the certified list of official candidates.
On February 6, 1980, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the
proclamation of respondent. He likewise prayed that COMELEC should order the official
counting of the votes that may have been cast in his favor and thereafter, to proclaim
him as the duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.
On February 21, 1980, COMELEC issued the herein questioned resolution
denying the said petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitoner’s candidacy in substitution is valid.
Decision:
No. Sec. 27. Withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy. - No
certification of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or cancelled unless
the candidate files with the office which received the certificate of candidacy or with the
Commission, a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation at any time before the
day of election.
 There is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity of the above provision, as to the
need of a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation of a duly filed certificate of
candidacy. That the withdrawal of Mendoza's certificate of candidacy was not made
under oath is not disputed. As such, the withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure
to comply with the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law. Mendoza, therefore, for all
legal intents and purposes, remained to be a candidate for vice. mayor of Dolores,
Quezon, up to January 30, 1980, the date of the elections, as correctly ruled by the
COMELEC.
Even assuming that the questioned withdrawal is effective, under a liberal
construction of the law as invoked by petitioner, which should not be the case when the
terms of the statute are clear and unmistakable, still petitioner may not derive comfort
therefrom for Mendoza's withdrawal was made on January 4, 1980, on the very last
day for filing certificates of candidacy. Substitution of a candidate by reason of
withdrawal is proper only when such withdrawal is made after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy.

PARAS VS COMELEC
GR NO. 123169
Ponente: Justice Ricardo Francisco

Facts:
Petitioner Danilo Paras won in the 1994 Barangay Elections. A petition for his
recall was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The COMELEC made two prior
schedules for the conduct of the recall but it did not push through because of petitioner’s
opposition. The third and last one was on January 13, 1996, five months before the
scheduled Barangay and SK Elections as mandated by RA 7808. In view of this
petitioner filed this petition arguing that Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take
place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and
every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union
v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK
election from the recall election.
Issue:
Whether or not SK Elections are regular elections.

Decision:
No. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local
official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the
end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular
local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the
said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.

ARTICLE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 5 Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free,
orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties
are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to
a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Section 6 Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 7 Call of special election. -
(1) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more
before a regular election, the Commission shall call a special election to be held
within sixty days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the
unexpired term.
(2) In case of the dissolution of the Batasang Pambansa, the President shall call
an election which shall not be held earlier than forty-five nor later than sixty days
from the date of such dissolution.
The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of
the election to its provincial election supervisors and election registrars for
dissemination, who shall post copies thereof in at least three conspicuous places
preferably where public meetings are held in each city or municipality affected.

SISON VS COMELEC
GR NO. 134096
Ponente: Justice Flerida Ruth Romero
Facts:
While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers, petitioner filed a petition to declare a failure of elections on the following
grounds:
1. The Board of Canvassers announced that election returns with no inner
seal would be included in the canvass;
2. Board of Election Inspectors brought home copies of election returns
meant for the City Board of Canvassers;
3. Petitioner, through counsel, raised written objections to the inclusion in
the canvass of election returns which were either tampered with, altered or
falsified, or otherwise not authentic;
4. According to the minutes of the City Board Canvassers, there were
precincts with missing election returns:
5. Several election returns with no data on the number of votes cast for
vice mayoralty position;
6. Highly suspicious persons sneaking in some election returns and
documents into the canvassing area;
7. Concerned citizen found minutes of the counting, keys, locks and
mental seal in the COMELEC area for disposal as trash;
8. Board of Election Inspectors have volunteered information that they
placed the copy of the election returns meant for the City Board of Canvassers in
the ballot boxes deposited with the City Treasurer allegedly due to fatigue and
lack of sleep.
9. Ballot boxes were never in the custody of the COMELEC and neither
the parties nor their watchers were allowed to enter the restricted area where
these boxes passed through on the way to the basement of the City Hall where
they were supposedly kept;
10. In the elections in Barangay New Era, there was a clear pattern of
voting which would show that the election returns were manufactured and that no
actual voting by duly qualified voters took place therein.
While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the
winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it.

Issue:
 Whether or not the grounds cited by petitioner is sufficient to declare a failure of
elections.

Decision:
No. Under the pertinent codal provision of Omnibus Election Code, there are only
three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a)
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any
polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
We have painstakingly examined petitioner's petition before the COMELEC but found
nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He
never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore,
petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive
support to describe just exaclty how the failure to elect came about.

SOLIVA VS COMELEC
GR NO. 141723
Ponente: Justice Santiago Kapunan

Facts:
Herein petitioners and private respondents vied for the local posts in RTR during
the local elections of May 11, 1998. Petitioners belonged to the Lakas-NUCD party
while private respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP) banner.
On May 12, 1998, all the LAKAS candidates (herein petitioners) were proclaimed
as the winning candidates. Six days after, or on May 18, 1998, respondent Alexander
Bacquial filed a petition to declare a failure of election due to alleged "massive fraud,
terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes
by respondent Soliva, his wife and men from several precincts to the supposed
canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in the precincts or polling places upon
instructions of respondent Soliva and other anomalies or irregularities, not to mention
the alleged attempt of one of Soliva’s men later on identified as Eliseo Baludio to
assasinate Mr. Bacquial when he was about to cast his vote.
 Copies of several election returns which did not bear the signatures of the
LAMMP pollwatchers were likewise presented to prove that such watchers were not
allowed inside the municipal gymnasium where the canvassing of votes was conducted.
The COMELEC declared a failure of election in the municipality.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in declaring a failure of elections.

Decision:
Yes. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code also provides:
Section. 6. Failure of Election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections, we held that before the COMELEC can
act on a verified petition for the declaration of a failure of election, two conditions must
first concur: (1) that no voting has taken place on the date fixed by law or even if there
was, the election results in a failure to elect, and (2) the votes not cast would affect the
result of the election.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates three instances when the
COMELEC may declare a failure of election and call for the holding of a special
election. First, when the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases.
Second, when the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting. And third, after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect.
We agree with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of election
in the municipality, as the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the election
returns was clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism and harassment. Findings
of fact of administrative bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are afforded
great weight and respect by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that
such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they
are conclusive and should not be disturbed.
It is not controverted by the petitioners that the counting of the votes was
transferred from the polling places to the multi-purpose gymnasium without the
knowledge and permission of herein private respondents or their representatives and
that the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the election returns were done
without the latter’s presence. Thus, the COMELEC was correct in finding that:
The counting by the BEI and the canvassing by the MBC were done without the
accredited watchers or duly authorized representatives of the petitioners thus making
the election returns and the statements of votes not worthy of faith and credit and not
reliable documents to gauge the fair and true expression of the popular will.
The rights of watchers as embodied in our election laws are not ineffectual rights.
They are part and parcel of the measures to protect the sanctity of the sovereign will.
To cite a few of these rights:
1. witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the board;
2. take note of what they may see or hear;
3. take photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if any, during the
counting of votes, as well as the election returns, tally board and ballot
boxes;
4. file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they believe
have been committed by the board or by any of its members or by any
person;
5. obtain from the board a certificate as to the filing of such protest and/or of
the resolution thereon;
6. read the ballots after it shall have been read by the chairman, as well as
the election returns after it shall have been completed and signed by the
members of the board without touching said election documents; and
7. be furnished, upon request, with a certificate of votes casts for the
candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and all
members of the board.
It is likewise not denied that the transfer of the counting from the polling places to
the multi-purpose gymnasium was without the authority of the COMELEC as required
by law. The irregularity of the transfer of venue was highlighted by the fact that the
same was not recorded by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). The COMELEC
learned of said transfer only from the answer of Mr. Mangontra to the petition filed with
the COMELEC by the herein-private respondents. Truth to tell, the Commission’s
authority was never sought to effect the transfer of venue. Thus, we accord respect its
finding on this matter:
Apparently, when the venue for the counting was transferred without notice to or
conforme by the petitioners or their duly authorized representatives or accredited
watchers and more so, when the counting by the Board of Election Inspectors and the
canvassing by the Municipal Board of Canvassers were both conducted without their
presence, their aforesaid rights were violated. This therefore put the integrity of the
ballots to serious doubt. What is more glaring is the absence of the signature and
thumbmark of the petitioners’ assigned poll watchers on the election returns from the
different precincts.

AMPATUAN VS COMELEC
GR NO. 149803
Ponente: Justice Bernardo Pardo

Facts:
Petitioners and respondents were candidates for the elective positions in the
Province of Maguindanao. Petitioner’s slate emerged as winners.
Later, respondents filed a petition with the COMELEC for the annulment of
election results and for declaration of a failure of elections in several municipalities.
Petitioners claimed that the ballots were filled-up en masse by a few persons the night
before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots and other
election paraphernalia were not delivered at all.
The Comelec issued an order suspending the proclamation of the winning
candidates for congressman of the second district, governor, vice-governor and board
members of Maguindanao.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a motion to lift the suspension of proclamation.
On June 14, 2001, the Comelec issued an order lifting the suspension of proclamation
of the winning candidates for governor, vice-governor and board members of the first
and second districts.
Petitioners’ assumption into office notwithstanding, on July 26, 2001, the
Comelec ordered the consolidation of respondents’ petition for declaration of failure of
elections. The COMELEC further ordered a random technical examination on four to
seven precincts per municipality on the thumb-marks and signatures of the voters who
voted and affixed in their voter’s registration records, and forthwith directed the
production of relevant election documents in these municipalities.
 On September 26, 2001, petitioners filed the present petition. 19 They claimed
that by virtue of their proclamation pursuant to the June 14, 2001 order issued by the
Comelec, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition for declaration
of failure of elections but an election protest.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to hear the petition for
declaration of failure of elections.

Decision:
Yes. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive
the Comelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In the case
at bar, we cannot assume that petitioners’ proclamation and assumption into office on
June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were
held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results
and/or declaration of failure of elections.

Respondents’ allegation of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the May
14, 2001 election in the affected municipalities cannot be taken lightly as to warrant the
dismissal of their petition by the Comelec on the simple pretext that petitioners had
been proclaimed winners. We are not unmindful of the fact that "a pattern of conduct
observed in past elections has been the pernicious ‘grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-
protest’ slogan of some candidates or parties" such that even if the protestant wins, it
becomes "a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to
expire or has expired.." . . "We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of
a proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has
assumed office.

BAO VS COMELEC
GR NO. 149666
Ponente: Justice Conchita Carpio- Morales

Facts:
Petitioner, a mayoralty candidate of Butig, Lanao Del Sur, filed before the
COMELEC a petition for suspension of counting of votes and declaration of failure of
elections.
 Petitioner alleged that:
1. in Precincts 1A-13A, Philippine National Police personnel bearing high-
powered firearms were seen escorting persons who are not voters therein;

2. in Precincts 9A-10A, ballot boxes were missing during the period of casting of
votes;

3. in Precincts 14A-15A, the wife of vice-mayoralty candidate Pundaracab Ander

forcibly took possession of the Book of Voters and acted as Board of Election
Inspectors and conducted the voting by herself;

4. in Precincts 20A-27A and 46A-49A, the casting of votes was stopped early
because non-registrants and flying voters insisted on voting, thus causing fighting and
shooting among voters;

5. in Precincts 28A-29A, all the registered voters were not able to cast their votes
because the ballot boxes were brought to the second floor of the school building and
when the boxes were brought down, the ballots and the Book of Voters were already
filled up and thumbmarked by non-voters;

6. in Precincts 1A-21A and 42A-43A, voting was closed at 3:30 p.m., but was
illegally reopened; and

7. in Precincts 64A-65A, official ballots issued to voters were forcibly filled up by

one person.

To substantiate his claim, he submitted a copy of the narrative report of the

election officer.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the petitioner is sufficient to declare failure of
elections.

Decision:
No. In the present case, the allegations-bases of both the petition and Langco’s
petition-in-intervention before the COMELEC are mostly grounds for an election contest,
not for a declaration of failure of election. While there are allegations which may be
grounds for failure of election, they are supported by mere affidavits and the narrative
report of the election officer.
General allegations, without sufficient evidentiary support, do not warrant a
declaration of a failure of elections. Election results are the expression of the will of the
people whose welfare and interests must immediately be served by those upon whom
the people have placed their trust. Peripherally but not trivially, elections need be
consummated with dispatch because the losers or even those just lagging behind in the
counting, more often than not, file all kinds of protests and complaints and objections
that delay the election process and threaten to deny the people their representation in
government.

PANGANDAMAN VS COMELEC
GR NO. 134340
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares- Santiago

Facts:
There was a failure of elections in several municipalities of Lanao del Sur. Thus,
the COMELEC issued a resolution for the holding of special elections on July 18, and
25, 1998. However, petitioner opposed, arguing that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by insisting on holding special
elections on July 18 and 25, 1998 more than thirty (30) days after the failure to elect, in
certain municipalities, in contravention of the clear and explicit provisions of Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions for special elections under section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code is mandatory.

Decision:
No. In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.]
it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the
failure to elect. The first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in
the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. Thus, the holding of elections within
the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement, suspension
or failure to elect may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election
not held."
In this case, the COMELEC can hardly be faulted for tardiness. The dates set for
the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure of
elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of
the challenged Omnibus Order. Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by
the COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a few days away from the
time a total/partial failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were "dates
reasonably close" thereto, given the prevailing facts herein. Furthermore, it bears
stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect the integrity of
elections, the COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules
in the exercise of its discretion to resolve election disputes.

BENITO VS COMELEC
GR NO. 134913
Ponente: Justice Sabino De Leon, Jr.

Facts:
Petitioner, a mayoralty candidate in Calanogas, Lanao Del Sur, filed a petition to
declare a failure of elections before the COMELEC. According to him, on the day of the
elections, voting was ongoing when 30 armed men appear at the school premises and
fired shots, causing panic among the voters and election officials. Because of the
incident, voting never resumed, causing a low voter’s turn out.

Issue:
Whether or not a low voter turn out is a ground for declaring a failure of elections.

Decision:
No. In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of
votes cast vis-à-vis the number of registered voters in the subject election precincts.
However,there can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority
has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be
accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that
a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a
winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual
number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned
precincts cast their votes, the same must still be respected.
As we also explained in Sardea v. Commission on Elections,
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost
care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the
disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of voters have been prevented by
violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise.
There is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted
and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as
far as possible be respected.

CAWASA VS COMELEC
GR NO. 150469
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Facts:
During the 2001 elections, four precincts in the Municipality of Nunungan did not
function, resulting in a failure of elections in these precincts.
A special election was set on May 30, 2001 where petitioner Cawasa was
declared the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent Manamparan later filed a petition to annul the results of the special
elections. The COMELEC granted respondent’s petition after it found out the following:
a. the special elections in the contested precincts were not genuinely held and
resulted in failure to elect on account of fraud;
b. the special elections were not held in the designated polling places in
Nunungan but were transferred to the municipalities of Sapad and Sultan
Naga Dimaporo without any authority from the Comelec.
c. members of the Philippine Army 26th Infantry Battalion served as election
inspectors without authority from the Comelec.

Issue:
Whether or not the special elections held was valid.
Decision:
No. Sections 152, 153 and 154 of the Omnibus Election Code shed light on this
matter, to wit:

SEC. 152. Polling Place. — A polling place is the building or place where the
board of election inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters shall cast
their votes.

SEC. 153. Designation of polling places. — The location of polling places

designated in the preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the
Commission may find necessary, after notice to registered political parties and
candidates in the political unit affected, if any, and hearing: provided, That no location
shall be changed within forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a
special election or a referendum or plebiscite, except in case it is destroyed or it cannot
be used.

SEC. 154. Requirements for polling places. — Each polling place shall be, as far
as practicable, a ground floor and shall be of sufficient size to admit and comfortably
accommodate forty voters at one time outside the guard rail for the board of election
inspectors. The polling place shall be located within the territory of the precinct as
centrally as possible with respect to the residence of the voters therein and whenever
possible, such location shall be along a public road. No designation of polling places
shall be changed except upon written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct
or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Commission upon prior
notice and hearing.

A public building having the requirements prescribed in the preceding paragraph

shall be preferred as polling place.

The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of Comelec Resolution No.
4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and
154 of the Election Code. As clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places
shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, changes may be
initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of
all the political parties or by resolution of the Comelec after notice and hearing. But
ultimately, it is the Comelec which determines whether a change is necessary after
notice and hearing.

The Comelec has unequivocally stated that "nothing in the records showed that
notice was given to the political candidates and registered voters affected by the
transfer.
 The pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has
been held in any precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes and (2) that the votes not cast therein are sufficient to
affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these two circumstances justifies
the calling of special elections. 29 Here, the Comelec found that the special elections
were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of the polling places and the
appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. Inevitably, the Comelec could
not ascertain who voted during the special elections. The circumstances were such that
the entire electoral process was not worthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect
no election was held.

HASSAN VS COMELEC
GR NO. 124089
Ponente: Justice Santiago Kapunan

Facts:
Petitioner Hassan and respondent Buatan were candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur. However, due to threat of violence and terrorism, there was a
failure of elections in the six out of 24 precincts in Madalum. Thus, the COMELEC set a
special election on May 27, 1995. On the said date however, the BEI members failed to
report to their polling places. The special elections was reset Hence, the COMELEC
team was constrained to appoint police and military personnel to act as BEI.
On June 10, 1995, petitioner Hadji Nor Basher L Hassan filed a petition with the
COMELEC docketed as SPA 95-283 assailing the validity of the May 29 re-scheduled
special elections on the following grounds:
a) The voting which started at 10:00 A.M. was forcibly ended at around 2:00 p.m.
because of exchanges of rapid gunfiring and grenade launching between unknown
elements and the Army or PNP soldiers;
b) The voting was moved to Liangan Elementary (Arabic) School, located about
15 kilometers away from the respective polling places;
c) Notices in the transfer of venue of the voting was sent only on the "night" of
May 28, 1995 and only to a "few" but not to all concerned;
d) Only 328 out of the 1,645 registered voters of said 5 precincts were able to
vote constituting only about 21.1% and disenfranchising 78% of the registered voters
thereof, and
 e) The regular members of the BEI did not report for duty and were substituted
by military personnel.

Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient grounds to declare a failure of elections.

Decision:
Yes, the COMELEC can not turn a blind eye to the fact that terrorism was so
prevalent in the area, sufficient enough to declare that no voting actually occurred on
May 29, 1995 in the areas concerned.
It must be recalled that elections had to be set for the third time because no
members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) reported for duty due to impending
threats of violence in the area. This then prompted COMELEC to deploy military men to
act as substitute members just so elections could be held, and to thwart these threats of
violence, the COMELEC Team, rnoreover, decided to transfer the polling places to
Liangan Elementary School which was 15 kilometers away from the polling place.
Nonetheless, voting on May 29 had to be suspended before the hour fixed by law for
the closing of the voting because of threats of violence, grenade launching and gunfires.
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers or the
constituents must be charged with notice of the special elections to be held because of
the failure of the two (2) previous elections. To require the voters to come to the polls on
such short notice was highly impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was
necessary for the voters to be given sufficient time to be notified of the changes and
prepare themselves for the eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some
form, either actual or constructive of the time, place and purpose thereof. The time for
holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance. The requirement of notice even
becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was called by some authority
after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be a substantial
compliance therewith so that it may fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the
statute has been carried into effect. The sufficiency of notice is determined on whether
the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and purpose of the elections so
as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and express their will or on the other
hand, whether the omission resulted in depriving a sufficient number of the qualified
electors of the opportunity of exercising their franchise so as to change the result of the
election.
From the foregoing, it is not difficult for us to rule that there was insufficiency of
notice given as to the time and transfer of the polling places. The low turnout of voters is
more than sufficient proof that the elections conducted on that day was vitiated. A less
than a day's notice of time and transfer of polling places 15 kilometers away from the
original polls certainly deprived the electors the opportunity to participate in the
elections.
Finally, in Lucero v. COMELEC, we stated that:
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1)
it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the
postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in
failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in
the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case.
The re-scheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done in
uncommon haste and unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the
changes, not only as to the date but as to the designated polling place. In the absence
of proof that actual notice of the special elections has reached a great number of voters,
we are constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid. If only to ascertain the
will of the people and to prevent that will from being muted, it is necessary that a special
election be held in view of the failure of elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur.

BASHER VS COMELEC
GR NO. 139028
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban

Facts:
Petitioner Hadji Rasul Batador Basher and Private Respondent Abulkair
Ampatua were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Barangay
Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the May 12, 1997 barangay election.
According to the Comelec, the voting started only around 9:00 p.m. on August
30, 1997 because the prevailing tension in the said locality. Election Officer Diana Datu-
Imam reported that she was allegedly advised by some religious leaders not to proceed
with the election because "it might trigger bloodshed." She also claimed the town
mayor, "being too hysterical, yelled and threatened me to declare [a] failure of election
in Maidan." Subsequently, the armed followers of the mayor pointed their guns at her
military escorts, who responded in a like manner towards the former. The parties were
then pacified at the PNP headquarters. With the arrival of additional troops, the election
officer proceeded to Maidan to conduct the election starting at 9:00 p.m. until the early
morning of the following day. The holding of the election at that particular time was
allegedly announced "over the mosque."
The Comelec ruled against a failure of election because the two conditions laid
down in Mitmug v. Comelec 8 were not established. It held that the "election was
conducted on the scheduled date. The precinct functioned. Actual voting took place,
and it resulted not in a failure to elect.

Issue:
Whether or not the election held was valid.

Decision:
No. First, the place where the voting was conducted was illegal. Section 42 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that "[t]he chairman of the board of election tellers
shall designate the public school or any other public building within the barangay to be
used as polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct. Petitioner, citing
an Affidavit supposedly executed by the members of the Board of Election Tellers (BET)
for Barangay Maidan, alleges that the election of officials for said barangay was held at
the residence of former Mayor Alang Sagusara Pukunun, which is located at Barangay
Pandarianao, instead of the officially designated polling precinct at Cagayan Elementary
school. If this allegation were true, such "election" cannot be valid, as it was not held
within the barangay of the officials who were being elected. On the other hand, it is
admitted that there was a public school or building in Barangay Maidan the Cagayan
Elementaryhool, which was the earlier validly designated voting center.
Second, as to the time for voting, the law provides that "[t]he casting of votes
shall start at seven o'clock in the morning and shall end at three o'clock in the afternoon,
except when there are voters present within thirty meters in front of the polling place
who have not yet cast their votes, in which case the voting shall continue but only to
allow said voters to cast their votes without interruption.
However, the "election" for Barangay Maidan officials was supposed to have
been held after 9:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the wee hours of the following day.
Certainly, such schedule was not in accordance with law or the Comelec Rules. The
Comelec erred in relying on the second sentence of Section 22, Article IV of Comelec
Resolution 2971, which states that "[i]f at three o'clock [in the afternoon], there are still
voters within thirty meters in front of the polling place who have not cast their votes, the
voting shall continue to allow said voters to cast their votes without interruption." This
sentence presupposes that the election commenced during the official time and is
simply continued beyond 3:00 p.m. in order to accommodate voters who are within thirty
meters of the polling place, already waiting for their turn to cast their votes. This is
clearly the meaning and intent of the word continue "to go on in a specified course of
action or condition." The action or condition already subsists and is allowed to go on.
Otherwise, the law should have stated instead that "the voting may also start even
beyond 3:00 p.m. if there are voters within thirty meters in front of the polling place.
Third, the Comelec scheduled the special election on August 30, 1997. Any
suspension or postponement of an election is governed by Section 2 of RA
6679, which states that "[w]hen for any serious cause such as rebellion, insurrection,
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia, and any analogous
causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should
become impossible in any barangay, the Commission on Election motu proprio or upon
sworn petition of ten (10) registered voters of a barangay, after summary proceedings of
the existence of such grounds, shall suspend or postpone the election therein to a date
reasonably close to the date of the election that is not held or is suspended or
postponed, or which resulted in a failure to elect, but not later than thirty (30) days after
the cessation of the cause for such suspension or postponement of the election or
failure to elect, and in all cases not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the
original election."
Election Officer Diana Datu-Imam of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur practically
postponed the election in Barangay Maidan from the official original schedule of 7:00
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 to 10:00 p.m. of August 30, 1997 until the early
morning of August 31, 1997. She attempted to justify her postponement of the election
by citing threats of violence and bloodshed in the said barangay. Allegedly because of
the tension created by armed escorts of the municipal mayor and the military, Datu-
Imam declared a failure of election in order "to ease their aggression." However, as
election officer, she has no authority to declare a failure of election. Indeed, only the
Comelec itself has legal authority to exercise such awesome power. An election officer
alone, or even with the agreement of the candidates, cannot validly postpone or
suspend the elections.
Finally and very significantly, the electorate was not given ample notice of the
exact schedule and venue of the election.
Such abbreviated announcement "over the mosque" at such late hour did NOT
constitute sufficient notice to the electorate. Consequently, not the entire electorate or
even a respectable number could have known of the activity and actually participated
therein or voluntarily and discerningly chosen not to have done so.
Indeed, the Court in Hassan v. Comelec held that the notice given on the afternoon of
the election day resetting the election to the following day and transferring its venue was
"too short." We said that "[t]o require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice
was highly impracticable. It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have
notice in some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place and purpose
thereof. 21 The time for holding it must be authoritatively designated in advance."
In the case at bar, the announcement was made only minutes before the supposed
voting. If one-day notice was held to be insufficient in Hassan, the much shorter notice
in the present case should all the more be declared wanting. It should in fact be equated
with "no notice.

BATABOR VS COMELEC
GR NO. 160428
Ponente: Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez

Facts:
In the synchronized July 15, 2002 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, Hadji Rasul Batabor, Petitioner, and Mocasim Abangon Batondiang, private
respondent, ran as opposing candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in
Barangay Maidan, Tugaya, Lanao del Sur.It was petitioners re-election bid being then
the incumbent Punong Barangay.
Bewailing the outcome of the election, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a
petition to declare a failure of election in Precincts 3A, 4A and 5A of Barangay Maidan,
docketed as SPA No. 02-295 (Brgy.) .The petition alleges that during the election, the
voting started at around 8:30 oclock in the morning.It was temporarily suspended during
the lunch break and was to resume at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of that day.But after
lunch, the Chairwoman of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Precincts 3A, 4A
and 5A suddenly tore all the unused official ballots.Thus, the voting was not
continued.The BEI then padlocked the ballot boxes.At that time, petitioner was not
present.Despite the note of Election Officer Taha Casidar directing the BEI to resume
the voting, the latter did not allow the remaining voters to vote.Thus, petitioners relatives
and followers, numbering more than 100, were not able to cast their votes.
The COMELEC En Banc denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC may declare a failure of election of only one
elective position.
Decision:
No. The Commission may not, on the ground of failure of elections, annul the
proclamation of one candidate only, and thereafter call a special election therefor,
because failure of elections necessarily affects all the elective positions in the place
where there has been a failure of elections.To hold otherwise will be discriminatory and
violative of the equal protection of the laws.

SARDEA VS COMELEC
GR NO. 106164
Ponente: Justice Carolina Grino- Aquino

Facts:
On May 12, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon
canvassed the first batch of election returns.
In the afternoon of the same day, while the canvassing was on going,
sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea stormed the municipal building and destroyed .
all election materials and paraphernalia including, among others, the copies of election
returns furnished to the board.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on May 18, 1992, informed the
parties that it would continue the canvassing of the election returns based on the copies
from the MTC of Mauban. Atty. Romeo Devera, counsel of LAKAS-NUCD, objected.
Later, he filed a petition in behalf of petitioner Edwin Sardea to stop the proceedings of
the Board of Canvassers on the ground that it had no authority from the COMELEC to
use the copies of the election returns obtained from the MTC of Mauban.
As Sardea manifested that he would appeal the ruling, the Board of Canvassers
suspended the proceedings in order that he may formalize his appeal. On May 19,
1992, he filed a notice of appeal.
On May 24, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened and dismissed
Sardea's appeal.
On June 10, 1992, petitioners filed Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, seeking
to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon, based on the grounds that:
I. The attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial grounds to declare
a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.
 II. Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in canvassing the impugned election returns without prior authority from
the Honorable Commission.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s grounds are sufficient to declare a failure of elections.

Decision:
No. The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on account of violence committed on May 13, 1992 is
not one of the causes that would warrant the declaration of a failure of election because
voting actually took place as scheduled on May 11, 1992 and other valid election
returns still existed. Moreover, the incident did not affect the result of the election.
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost
care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the
disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish and what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at
any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented
by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise.
The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any evidence within
reach, to ascertain the true result - when neither from the returns nor from other proof,
nor from all together can the truth be determined.
There is a failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted
and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same must as
far as possible be respected.
Since in this case copies of the election returns submitted to the MTC of Mauban,
Quezon were extant, and their authenticity was not questioned, they were properly used
as basis for the canvass.

ARTICLE II
ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Section 15 Canvass of votes for President and Vice-President by the provincial or
city board of canvassers. - The provincial, city, or district boards of canvassers in
Metropolitan Manila, as the case may be, shall meet not later than six o'clock in
the evening on election day to canvass the election returns that may have already
been received by them, respectively. It shall meet continuously from day to day
until the canvass is completed, but may adjourn only for the purpose of awaiting
the other election returns. Each time the board adjourns, it shall make a total of
all the votes cast for each candidate for President and for Vice-President, duly
authenticated by the signatures and thumbmarks of all the members of the
provincial, city or district board of canvassers, furnishing the Commission in
Manila by the fastest means of communication a copy thereof, and making
available the data contained therein to mass media and other interested parties.
Upon the completion of the canvass, the board shall prepare a certificate of
canvass showing the votes received by each candidate for the office of the
President and for Vice-President, duly authenticated by the signatures and
thumbmarks of all the members of the provincial, city or district board of
canvassers. Upon the completion of the certificate of canvass, the board shall
certify and transmit the said certificate of canvass to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa.
The provincial, city and district boards of canvassers shall prepare the
certificate of canvass for the election of President and Vice-President, supported
by a statement of votes by polling place, in quintuplicate by the use of carbon
papers or such other means as the Commission shall prescribe to the end that all
five copies shall be legibly produced in one handwriting. The five copies of the
certificate of canvass must bear the signatures and thumbmarks of all the
members of the board. Upon the completion of these certificates and statements,
they shall be enclosed in envelopes furnished by the Commission and sealed,
and immediately distributed as follows: the original copy shall be enclosed and
sealed in the envelope directed to the Speaker and delivered to him at the
Batasang Pambansa by the fastest possible means; the second copy shall
likewise be enclosed and sealed in the envelope directed to the Commission; the
third copy shall be retained by the provincial election supervisor, in the case of
the provincial board of canvassers, and by the city election registrar, in the case
of the city board of canvassers; and one copy each to the authorized
representatives of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party.
Failure to comply with the requirements of this section shall constitute an
election offense.

BRILLANTES VS COMELEC
GR NO. 163193
Ponente: Justice Romeo Callejo, Jr.

Facts:
 In order to implement the election automation required under RA 8436, the
COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 02-0170 for an automated election system in 2004.
The modernization project consist of three phases. Phase III involves the electronic
transmission of results including the advanced unofficial results of the 2004 presidential
elections. Because of this, petitioners filed a petition to nullify the said resolution,
contending that the resolution violates Article VII, Section of the Constition.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0170 is constitutional.

Decision:
No. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation
of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution provides in part:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
Such resolution directly infringes the authority of Congress, considering that
Section 4 thereof allows the use of the third copy of the Election Returns (ERs) for the
positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and
transmission of advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.
Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436 confirms the
constitutional undertaking of Congress as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for
the President and Vice-President. Section 24 thereof provides:
SEC. 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-
President. -- The Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint public session,
shall compose the national board of canvassers for president and vice-president. The
returns of every election for president and vice-president duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to
the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the president of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty (30) days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress upon determination of the authenticity and the due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass all the results for president
and vice-president by consolidating the results contained in the data storage devices
submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of canvassers and thereafter,
proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president.

Section 20 Proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect. - Upon

the completion of the canvass of the votes by the Batasang Pambansa, the
persons obtaining the highest number of votes for President and for Vice-
President shall be declared elected; but in case two or more shall have an equal
and the highest number of votes, one of them shall be chosen President or Vice-
President, as the case may be, by a majority vote of all the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa in session assembled.
In case there are certificates of canvass which have not been submitted to
the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa on account of missing election returns, a
proclamation may be made if the missing certificates will not affect the results of
the election.
In case the certificates of canvass which were not submitted on account of
missing election returns will affect the results of the election, no proclamation
shall be made. The Speaker shall immediately instruct the boards of canvassers
concerned to obtain the missing election returns from the boards of election
inspectors or, if the returns have been lost or destroyed upon prior authority from
the Commission, to use any authentic copy of said election returns for the
purpose of conducting the canvass, and thereafter issue the certificates of
canvass. The certificates of canvass shall be immediately transmitted to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa.
Proclamation shall be made only upon submission of all certificates of
canvass or when the missing certificates of canvass will not affect the results of
the election.

TECSON VS COMELEC
GR NO. 161434
Ponente: Justice Jose Vitug

Facts:
 Respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President in
the 2004 elections. Thereafter, petitioners filed a disqualification case against
respondent, alleging that the latter made a material representation in his COC by
claiming that he is a natural-born filipino citizen when in truth and in fact, his parents are
foreigners. His mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Alan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, who is a Spanish subject.
Petitioners further argued that granting that his father Allan was a Filipino, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
The COMELEC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argued that since FPJ’s father was legally married before his father
married his mother, FPJ was illegitimate and thus, his father could not have transmitted
his citizenship to him.

Issue:
Whether or not FPJ was a Filipino Citizen.

Decision:
Yes. There was no such term as Philippine Citizens during the Spanish Regime.
It first appeared in 1902, years after the Philippines has been ceded to the US in
accordance with the Treaty of Paris.
In the Philippine Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was described to be one
who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April
1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was
a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship
as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during
the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution, jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be
assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines
was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no
existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office.
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. That being said,
Lorenzo’s son, Allan – the father of FPJ is a Filipino.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship
of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

ARTICLE III
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA
Section 24. Apportionment of representatives. - Until a new apportionment shall
have been made, the Members of the Batasang Pambansa shall be apportioned in
accordance with the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, as follows:
National Capital Region:
Manila, 6;
Quezon City, 4;
Caloocan, 2;
Pasay, 1;
Pasig and Marikina, 2;
Las Piñas and Parañaque, 1;
Makati, 1;
Malabon, Navotas and Valenzuela, 2;
San Juan and Mandaluyong, 1;
Taguig, Pateros and Muntinglupa, 1.
Region I:
Abra, 1;
Benguet, 1;
Ilocos Norte with Laoag City, 2;
Ilocos Sur, 2;
La Union, 2;
Mountain Province, 1;
Pangasinan with the cities of Dagupan and San Carlos, 6;
Baguio City, 1.
Region II:
Batanes, 1;
Cagayan, 3;
Ifugao, 1;
Isabela, 3;
Kalinga-Apayao, 1;
Nueva Vizcaya, 1;
Quirino, 1.
Region III:
Bataan, 1;
Bulacan, 4;
Nueva Ecija with the cities of Cabanatuan, Palayan and San Jose, 4;
Pampanga with Angeles City, 4;
Tarlac, 2;
Zambales, 1;
Olongapo City, 1.
Region IV:
Aurora, 1;
Batangas with the cities of Batangas and Lipa, 4;
Cavite with the cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Martires, 3;
Laguna with San Pablo City, 4;
Marinduque, 1;
Occidental Mindoro, 1;
Oriental Mindoro, 2;
Palawan with Puerto Princesa City, 1;
Quezon with Lucena City, 4;
Rizal, 2;
Romblon, 1.
Region V:
Albay with Legaspi City, 3;
Camarines Norte, 1;
Camarines Sur with the cities of Iriga and Naga, 4;
Catanduanes, 1;
Masbate, 2;
Sorsogon, 2.
Region VI:
Aklan, 1;
Antique, 1;
Capiz with Roxas City;
Iloilo with Iloilo City, 5;
Negros Occidental with the cities of Bacolod, Bago, Cadiz, La Carlota, San Carlos
and Silay, 7.
Region VII:
Bohol with Tagbilaran City, 3;
Cebu with the cities of Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue and Toledo, 6;
Negros Oriental with the cities of Bais, Canlaon and Dumaguete, 3;
Siquijor, 1;
Cebu City, 2.
Region VIII:
Leyte with the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban, 5;
Southern Leyte, 1;
Eastern Samar, 1;
Northern Samar, 1;
Samar with Calbayog City, 2.
Region IX:
Basilan, 1;
Sulu, 1;
Tawi-Tawi, 1;
Zamboanga del Norte with the cities of Dapitan and Dipolog, 2;
Zamboanga del Sur with Pagadian City, 3;
Zamboanga City, 1.
Region X:
Agusan del Norte with Butuan City, 1;
Agusan del Sur, 1;
Bukidnon, 2;
Camiguin, 1;
Misamis Occidental with the cities of Oroquieta, Ozamis and Tangub, 1;
Misamis Oriental with Gingoog City, 2;
Surigao del Norte with Surigao City, 1;
Cagayan de Oro City, 1.
Region XI:
Surigao del Sur, 1;
Davao del Norte, 3;
Davao Oriental, 1;
Davao del Sur, 2;
South Cotabato with General Santos City, 3;
Davao City, 2.
Region XII:
Lanao del Norte, 1;
Lanao del Sur with Marawi City, 2;
Maguindanao with Cotabato City, 2;
North Cotabato, 2;
Sultan Kudarat, 1;
Iligan City, 1.
Any province that may hereafter be created or any component city that may
hereafter be declared by or pursuant to law as a highly urbanized city shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of the
inhabitants and on the same uniform and progressive ratio used in the last
preceding apportionment. The number of Members apportioned to the province
out of which the new province was created or where the new highly urbanized
city is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission, but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred twenty
days before the election.

CENIZA VS COMELEC
GR NO: L-52304
Ponente: Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr.

Facts:
In 1973, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted BP 51, providing for local
election on January 1980. Section 3 of the law provides that any city with an income of
at least 40 million shall be classified as highly urbanized city. Section 3 of the said law
provides that registered voters of a component city may be entitled to vote in the
election of the officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter so
provides. However, voters registered in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined
shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the province in which the
highly urbanized city is geographically located.
Pursuant to the act, the COMELEC issued a resolution enumerating the cities not
entitled to vote for provincial officials. The Cities of Cebu and Mandaue are included.
Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is classified as a
highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the election of the
elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu, although the Charter of Cebu
City allows the qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of the provincial officials
of the Province of Cebu.
 The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than ?40
million, is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the city cannot
vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter expressly provides that the
registered voters of the city cannot participate in the election of the provincial officials of
the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor.
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the
Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan group
known as D-O-E-R-S (an accronym for "DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION: RESOLVED
TO SUCCEED) which counts lawyers among its members, and extends free legal
assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social status in meritorious cases
involving violation of civil liberties and basic human rights. They vigorously assail
Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as
the basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the province
where the city is geographically located.
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 insofar as it classifies
cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its
electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in
that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose
of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage,
and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition of voters in a highly urbanized city from voting
provincial officials is unconstitutional.
Decision:
No. The constitution places the highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory
powers of the province where they are located because of the complex and varied
problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic
activity which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial
officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any governmental
jurisdiction and authority over said city.

Section 25. Voting by province and its component cities, by highly urbanized city
or by district in Metropolitan Manila. - All candidates shall be voted at large by the
registered voters of their respective constituencies. The candidates
corresponding to the number of Member or Members to be elected in a
constituency who receive the highest number of votes shall be declared elected.

CODILLA VS DE VENECIA
GR NO: 150605
Ponente: Justice Reynato Puno

Facts:
Petitioner Eufrocino Codilla and Respondent Ma. Victoria Locsin were candidates
for the position of Representative for the 4th District of Leyte.
A disqualification case was filed against petitioner. However, during election day,
the disqualification case has not yet been acted upon and the petitioner was declared
winner.
Respondent filed an urgent motion to suspend petitioner’s proclamation. Thus,
the Board of Canvassers suspended petitioner’s proclamation. Eventually, the
COMELEC Second Division ordered petitioner’s disqualification and by virtue of said
resolution, petitioner’s votes were declared stray even before the resolution gained
finality. As a result, Locsin, the 2nd placer, was declared winner.

Issue:
Whether or not Locsin’s proclamation was valid.

Decision:
No. The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be
considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot
be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that
the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before
but even after the elections.

Section 28. Selection of sectoral representatives. Not later than twenty days after
the election of provincial, city or district representatives, the most representative
and generally recognized organizations or aggroupments of members of the
agricultural labor, industrial labor, and youth sectors, as attested to by the
Ministers of Agrarian Reform and of Agriculture and Food, the Ministers of Labor
and Employment, and the Ministers of Local Government and of Education,
Culture and Sports, respectively, shall, in accordance with the procedures of said
organizations or aggroupments of members of the sector, submit to the President
their respective nominees for each slot allotted for each sector. The President
shall appoint from among the nominees submitted by the aforementioned
organizations or aggroupments the representatives of each sector.
In recognizing the most representative and generally recognized
organizations or aggroupments, the Ministers of Agrarian Reform and of
Agriculture and Food, the Minister of Labor and Employment, and the Ministers of
Local Government and Education, Culture and Sports shall consider:
(a) The extent of membership and activity of the organization or
aggroupment which should be national;
(b) The responsiveness of the organization or aggroupment to the
legitimate aspirations of its sector;
(c) The militancy and consistency of the organization or aggroupment in
espousing the cause and promoting the welfare of the sector consistent with that
of the whole country;
(d) The observance by such organization or aggroupment of the rule of law;
and
(e) Other analogous factors.
The President of the Philippines shall, in writing, notify the Secretary-
General of the Batasang Pambansa of the appointment made by him of any
sectoral representative.
Except as herein otherwise provided, sectoral representatives shall have
the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, qualifications and
disqualifications as the representatives from the provinces and their component
cities, highly urbanized cities or districts of Metropolitan Manila.

VETERANS’ FEDERATION VS COMELEC

GR NO: 136781
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban

Facts:
On May 11, 1998, the first party-list elections was held. Out of 123 parties, 13
party-list representatives from 12 organizations were proclaimed for having obtained at
least two percent of the total number of votes cast for party-list.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division granted PAG-ASA's Petition.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the
party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941,
only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for
the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had
garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had
hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban
poor, veterans, women and peasantry. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does
not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list seats in Congress is
mandatory.
2. How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined.
Decision:
FIRST ISSUE
No. It is merely a ceiling. The pertinent provision of the Constitution on the
composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who
shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As
said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation"
in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats
in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:
"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling
for party-list seats in Congress.
SECOND ISSUE
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution
is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.
The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party
is entitled is as follows:

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal
to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the
first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
 Step Three. The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. It is
expressed in the following formula:

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW VS COMELEC

GR NO: 147589
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban

Facts:
In the 2001 elections, the COMELEC proclaimed 47 party-list groups as winners.
However, several hundreds have been disqualified for failing the eight-point guidelines
for party-list.
Petitioner filed a motion for proclamation, contending that the disqualification of
many party-list organizations has reduced the "total number of votes cast for the party-
list elections." Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law
has now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their
proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.

Issue:
Whether or not the votes cast for disqualified party-list groups will be included in
the total votes cast for determining the seat allocation of party-list groups.

Decision:
No. Section 10 of RA 7941 clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a
sectoral organization or a coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted:
SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. – Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote
is a vote for candidate for membership of the House of Representatives in his legislative
district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants
represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party,
sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted:
Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May
1998.
Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the
total votes cast under the party-list system will reduce the base figure. This means that
the two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified marginalized and
under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of disqualified party-list
participants will increase and broaden the number of representatives from these
sectors. Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to the policy declaration in RA
7941.

PIMENTEL VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

GR NO: 141489
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Facts:
After the May 1998 elections, the compositions of the HRET and CA are
constituted. In practice the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of
House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From available
records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in
the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo, as Chairman of the HRET.
The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives
to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA,
its Chairman and Members. Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
to wit:
"Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
"Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members,"

Issue:
Whether or not the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal and the
Commission on Appointments violates the constitution.

Decision:
No. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution24 explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would
fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998
Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
"Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the House of Representatives who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices of the Supreme Court
and the election of the Members of the House of Representatives who are to compose
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of
Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its organization and adoption of
such resolutions as it may deem proper."
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides:
"Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments. Within thirty (30) days
after both Houses of Congress shall have organized themselves with the election of the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Commission
on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented herein.
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number
and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their
primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with this
Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives
must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the
directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the
HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under
its power of judicial review.

ATONG PAG-LAUM VS COMELEC

GR NO: 203766
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Facts:
Approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their
desire to participate in the 2013 elections. However, petitioners and several others were
disqualified either because they are either not marginalized or underrepresented.
Issue:
Whether or not only the underrepresented and marginalized groups are qualified
to join as party-list groups.

Decision:
No. The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in
the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section
5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The
commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional
parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national
and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national
and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could
not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the
sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves
no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea
that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-
list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the
end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list
system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of
a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency
is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of
citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests
or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers
to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A.
No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in
R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens
who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." The sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,
"professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the
elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves
into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
 Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that
the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties
in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of
parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No.
7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or
parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret
that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented"
would lead to absurdities.
 QUALIFICATIONS

UGDORACION VS COMELEC
GR NO: 179851
Ponente: Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura

Facts:
Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty
candidates in the Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007
elections.
On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion's
declaration of eligibility for Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because
Ugdoracion is actually a "green card" holder or a permanent resident of the United
States of America.
It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on
September 26, 2001. Accordingly, the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Services (USINS) issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.
For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to
residence, and he retained his domicile of origin notwithstanding his ostensible
acquisition of permanent residency in the USA. Ugdoracion then pointed to the following
documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the residency requirement: (1) a
residence certificate dated May 5, 2006; (2) an application for a new voter's registration
dated October 12, 2006; and (3) a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent
Resident Status dated October 18, 2006.
On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a resolution
canceling Ugdoracion's COC and removing his name from the certified list of candidates
for the position of Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Ugdoracions’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
Ugdoracion's argument focuses on his supposed involuntary acquisition of a
permanent resident status in the USA which, as he insists, did not result in the loss of
his domicile of origin. He bolsters this contention with the following facts:
1. He was born in Albuquerque, Bohol, on October 15, 1940 and as such, is a
natural-born Filipino citizen;
2. He was baptized in the Catholic Church of Sta. Monica Paris in Albuquerque,
Bohol on February 2, 1941;
 3. He was raised in said municipality;
4. He grew up in said municipality;
5. He raised his own family and established a family home thereat;
6. He served his community for twelve (12) years and had been the former Mayor
for three (3) terms;
7. From 1986 to 1988, he was appointed as Officer-in-Charge;
8. He ran for the same position in 1988 and won;
9. He continued his public service as Mayor until his last term in the year 1998;
10. After his term as Mayor, he served his people again as Councilor;
11. He built his house at the very place where his ancestral home was situated;
12. He still acquired several real properties at the same place;
13. He never lost contact with the people of his town; and
14. He secured a residence certificate on May 5, 2006 at Western Poblacion,
Albuquerque, Bohol and faithfully paid real property taxes.

Issue:
Whether or not Ugdoracion isqualified to run for mayor.

Decision:
No. It has been held in Caasi v. Court of Appeals that a Filipino citizen's
acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the "green card" status in the USA is
a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.
The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when
there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such
purpose. In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a lawful permanent
resident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of
his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of
origin, which was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.
The contention that Ugdoracion's USA resident status was acquired involuntarily,
as it was simply the result of his sister's beneficence, does not persuade. Although
immigration to the USA through a petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed
by USA immigration laws, the petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the
grant of resident status. Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the
unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is not bestowed by operation of law. And to reiterate, a
person can have only one residence or domicile at any given time.
Moreover, Ugdoracion's contention is decimated by Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives
his status.

DOMINO VS COMELEC
GR NO: 134015
Ponente: Chief Jusitce Hilario Davide, Jr.

Facts:
Petitioner Juan Domino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for representative of
Sarangani. Later, respondents filed a petition to cancel petitioner’s COC. They alleged
that contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. In support
of their allegations, respondents presented the following evidences:
1. Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997
indicating respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara,
Quezon City.
2. Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the
3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections.
3. a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION
RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent dated August
30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel,
Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating among others, that "[T]he
undersigned's previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights,
Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter" and
"that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned has transferred
and conducts his business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel,
Province of Sarangani prior to this application.

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January
 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the
COMELEC the following:
1. Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor
and Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses Maximo and
Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed on January
15, 1997.

2. Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of

sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased spouses Maximo
and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and
Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997.

3. True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City
declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-
A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely
erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but
of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since December
1996.

4. Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to

Change of Residence addressed to Mantil Alim, COMELEC Registrar,
Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997.

5. Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous

Registration.

6. Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No.
31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No.
14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani.

7. Certification dated April 16, 1998, of COMELEC Quezon City stating

that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer
registered voters of District III, Quezon City.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for representative.

Decision:
 No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing
as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent
for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a
question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three
rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a
man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos
Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio
St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for
the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon
City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel,
Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house
and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under
oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing
in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that
from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given
place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode,
one's home.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the
locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish
a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent.
Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in
acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's
intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract of
lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997,
cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the
one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon
City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his
former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public
assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a
doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. The
fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to
determine the status of his domicile.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters
in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the
determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of
compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are
summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant
conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the
precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC.
Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question
necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and
residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion
from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all
matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to
remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in
relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion
proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of
Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct
No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an
exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered,
specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order
the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the
function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No.
8189.

PEREZ VS COMELEC
GR NO: 133944
Ponente: Justice Vicente Mendoza

Facts:
Respondent Rodolfo Aguinaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
representative for the Third District of Cagayan. Four days later, petitioner filed a case
for disqualification against petitioner on the ground that he failed to comply with the
residency requirement.
Petitioner alleged that private respondent filed an application for the transfer of his
registration as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan (First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third
District) only on December 17, 1997 and that said application was approved only on January 7,
1998. Petitioner prayed that in the event the case was not finally decided before the elections
and private respondent obtained the highest number of votes, the latter's proclamation be
suspended.

In his answer, private respondent claimed that while he had been a resident of
Gattaran, Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by
renting an apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to
hide his mistress from public view because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife
was still subsisting. In support of his claim, he presented the affidavit of the owner of the
apartment, Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, in which it is stated that private respondent had
been his lessee since July 1990. In addition, private respondent presented the contract
of lease of another residential apartment at Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996, between him, as lessee, and
Tomas T. Decena, as lessor; his marriage license dated January 7, 1997; the marriage
certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma Dumaguit, dated January 18,
1998; the birth certificate of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo; and various
letters, all of which show that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at
least one (1) year before the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,
dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified
to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.
On May 11, 1998, private respondent was elected Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan, with 65,058 votes over his rival Manuel N. Mamba's 58,507
votes. Accordingly, on May 16, 1998, he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998,
he was sworn in office.
On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Her motion was,
however, denied by the COMELEC en banc in its resolution of June 11, 1998. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner contends that transfer of residence to the place where private
respondent is keeping his mistress cannot amount to a change of domicile because
one's domicile is the place where one and one's legitimate family resides.
Petitioner avers that in the absence of clear and positive proof, one's domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue and that to successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must prove an actual change of domicile, a bonafide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and of establishing a new one, and
unequivocal acts which correspond with the intention.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is qualified to run for representative for the Third
District of Cagayan.

Decision:
Yes. Art. VI, §6 of the Constitution states:
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently
in our decision in Aquino v. COMELEC, as follows:
. . . [T]he place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this
deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs.
Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of
the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent
of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a
candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That
purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area
either by origin or by choice.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his
residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the
basis of the following: (1) the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of the
residential apartment at 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private
respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the contract of lease between private respondent, as
lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a residential apartment at Kamias St.,
Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996; (3) the
marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private respondent and Lerma
Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of live birth of private respondent's second daughter; and
(5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all show that
private respondent was a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.
There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent
had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to
detract from the merit of this factual finding. The fact that a person is registered as a
voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district.

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
GR NO: 151914
Ponente: Justice Vicente Mendoza

Facts:
Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla was born with Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar. In 1965, he joined the US Navy and became a naturalized US citizen. Fron that
time until his retirement he stayed in the US and visited the Philippines only thrice. He
applied for repatriation and took his oath as Filipino citizen on Nov. 10, 2000.
On Nov. 21, 2000, he applied for voter registration which was approved. Later in
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Oras.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run formayor.

Decision:
No. In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a
U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November
10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any
right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to
stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a
U.S. citizen.
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United
States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that
country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then
does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in
this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras
by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to
his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14,
2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either
separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien,
an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a
non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization
under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case
he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the
country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23,
2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S.
passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription
"good for one year stay." Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting
a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had
been naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so,
he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one
(1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the
dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was
valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as
an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to
qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

FAYPON VS QUIRINO
GR NO: L-7068
Ponente: Justice Sabino Padilla

Facts:
Eiseo Quirino was born in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur. Later, he went to the US to
study and returned to the Philippines after. On his return, he taught as professor in the
University of the Philippines for four years. He became owner and editor of the
Intelligence, a newspaper published in Manila. He went to Iloilo as editor of the Iloilo
Times. He became executive secretary and general manager of the NEPA from 1936
until December 31, 1951. He was editor of Commerce, an official organ of the Chamber
of Commerce in Manila. He registered as a voter in Pasay City in 1946-1947. He owns
a house and resides at 55-11th Street, Quezon City. He ran and was proclaimed by the
provincial board of canvassers elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur.
A petition for quo warranto was filed against respondent anchored on the
respondent's ineligibility for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur because he
lacks the residence in the province, as required in section 2071 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent lost his residence of origin.

Decision:
 No. The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party
who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin must show and
prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss. If we are to take literally the meaning
of the voter's oath 3 which he files with the board of inspectors for his registration as
such, there is no doubt that the respondent having registered in 1946 and 1947 as voter
in Pasay City must have acquired residence in that city and must be deemed to have
abandoned his residence of origin. But in several decisions we have laid down the rule
that in which he is elected is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of his
residence of origin. In Yra vs. Abano, the election of the protestee to the office of the
municipal president of Meycauayan, Bulacan, was upheld, notwithstanding the fact that
he had registered as voter in Manila. In Vivero vs. Murillo, where the protestee had
registered as voter in the Municipality of Buraruen, Leyte, we held that such registration
had not caused the loss of his residence of origin (La Paz, same province), where he
has elected municipal president. In Laurena vs. Teves, we upheld the election of Pedro
Teves to the office of the municipal president of Dumaguete where he was born,
because he had his residence of origin which was Dumaguete, "notwithstanding the fact
that in the year 1919 he registered in the list of voters of the municipal of Bacong; run
for representative for the second district of Oriental Negros to which said municipality of
Bacong belongs; again ran for reelection in the year 1992; and launched his candidacy
for member (membership) of (in) the provincial board of Oriental Negros in 1925, stating
under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a resident of said municipality of
Bacong, Oriental Negros, without having ever registered as elector in any of the
precincts of the municipality of Dumaguete from said year, 1919, up to the present, and
having ordered the cancellation of his name in the list of voters of said municipality of
Bacong only on April 5, 1934." And in the case of Gallego vs. Verra, where it appears
that Pedro Gallego worked in several provinces other than his native town (Abuyog,
Leyte), registered as elector and voted in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in 1938, took his
residence certificate in Malaybalay in 1940 where it appeared that he had resided in that
municipality for one and a half years, we held that he had not lost this residence of
origin and the protest against his election in 1940 to the office of municipal mayor of
Abuyog was dismissed.
The rule laid down in the foregoing cases is not devoid of reason and
justification. A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as
the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course, includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may
not be absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities; so there
he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up
or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially
in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his
domicile or residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation
why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been
deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.

ROMUALDEZ VS RTC OF TACLOBAN

GR NO: 104960
Ponente: Justice Jose Vitug

Facts:
The petitioner is the son of former Leyte Governor Benjamin Romualdez and the
nephew of the First Lady Imelda Marcos. Because of his intention to establish his
residence in Tolosa, Leyte, he constructed his house therein. He then became
Barangay Captain of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or
were about to come to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President,
fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or not, "fled" the country. Petitioner
Romualdez, for one, together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought
"asylum" in the United States which the United States (U.S.) government granted.
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb,
District Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that
he should depart from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992.
Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez departed from the U.S. for the Philippines,
arriving on December 1991 apparently without any government document.
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his
residence at Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the
Commission on Election ("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized
National and Local Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself
anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
On 21 February 1992, herein private respondent Donato Advincula filed a petition
with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying that Romualdez be excluded
from the list of voters. Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a resident of
Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he
had just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-
year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to
register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has deemed to have abandoned his residence when he
voluntarily left the country.

Decision:
No. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous
terms, thus: "the term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in the case of the
petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of
domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3)
an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must
have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious
concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into
self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described
as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms
are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice."

SANCHEZ VS DEL ROSARIO

GR NO: L-16878
Ponente: Justice Jose B.L Reyes

Facts:
Respondent Oscar Del Rosario was only 21 years old on the date of the election
in 1960. He was thus disqualified from running. However, he ran and won the election.
This prompted petitioner Juan Sanchez to file a petition for Quo Warranto against
respondent.
Respondent opposed, contending that petitioner having already known
respondent's age disqualification before the elections and having then failed to question
the latter's candidacy, is estopped from instituting these proceedings for quo warranto.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is already estopped from questioning respondent’s
election.

Decision:
No. Estoppel is untenable; indeed, this Court has already made the observation
that the right to an elective municipal office can be contested, under existing legislation,
only after proclamation, and that there is no authorized proceedings upon which an
ineligible candidate could be barred from running for office. Petitioner merely followed
the steps outlined under Section 173 of the Revised Election Code.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
GR NO: 120295
Ponente: Justice Artemio Panganiban

Facts:
Juan Frivaldo filed his COC for Governor of Sorsogon in the 1995 elections. His
opponent, respondent Raul Lee, filed a disqualification case since according to him,
Frivaldo is not a Filipino Citizen. The COMELEC granted Lee’spetition and cancelled
Frivaldo’s COC.
 As a result, Lee was proclaimed as the winning candidate despite finishing 2nd
place next to Frivaldo, on the evening of June 30, 1995.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed a petition praying for the annulment of Lee’s
proclamation, alleging that at 2:00 in the afternoon of June 30, 1995, he took his
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines and as a consequence, there was no longer a
legal impediment for his proclamation as governor.
Lee opposed, arguing that the citizenship requirement must be possessed by the
candidate at the time he registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring
the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter". And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly registered one -- if
he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.

Issue:
Whether or not citizenship must b possessed by a candidate at the time of his
registration as a voter.

Decision:
No. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official
must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends
to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date
or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which
must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or
to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates
his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995
-- the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he
was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge
the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was
already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the
purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government
Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates.

JACOT VS DAL
GR NO: 179848
Ponente: Justice Minita Chico-Nazario

Facts:
Petitioner Nelson Jacot was a natural-born Filipino citizen who became a
naturalized citizen of the US. He sought to reacquire his flipino citizenship under RA
9225. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
California. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request,
and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the
Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for
Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner,
arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held.
Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its
Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.
The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any
person the privilege to run for any elective public office.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the COMELEC
En Banc.
Petitioner sought remedy from this Court where he presented for the first time an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for Vice-Mayor.

Decision:
No. Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of
Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain
their Philippine citizenship:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize
and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
 By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance
to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has
dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his
foreign citizenship.
Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or reacquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos,
who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior
or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates
in Philippine elections.

POE-LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC
GR NO: 221697
Ponente: Justice Jose Portugal Perez

Facts:
Petitioner Grace Poe was found abandoned as a new born infant in the parish
church of Jaro, Iloilo. She was found by a certain Edgardo Militar who later registered
her as a foundling. When she was still 5 years old, spouses Fernando Poe and Susan
Roces adapted her.
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, the petitioner's adoptive mother
discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled
petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay,
petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo.
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a
voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she
received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F927287 by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the
U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991.
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She
obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna
to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during
this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S.
with her two daughters on 8 July 2004.
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to
the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate.
In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the
first quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines; and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
 Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without
delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July
2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's
name and in the names of her three (3) children.
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship"
before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, in satisfaction of the legal
requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010
petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American
passport.
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States." On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice
Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21
October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship. In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside
of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and
from May 2005 to present.
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years
and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on
16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached
to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo)
filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC. Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status
and Filipino citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not
qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.
In another petition filed by Francisco Tatad, he petitioner lacks the requisite
residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to
exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born
citizen.
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to
support her claim that foundlings have a nationality. According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary
in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed
that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, who was registered as a foundling, is a filipino citizen.

Decision:
Yes. The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
 At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a
whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient
evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner
is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral
matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not
dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population
in Iloilo was Filipino.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact
that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.She also
has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped
eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence,
that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be
a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based
are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as
the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not
face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame
our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly
average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as
opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This
means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for
us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are
known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even
be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps,
shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines
thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this
country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best
left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical
certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen,
a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There
is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to
sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create
a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be
unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that,
given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
"for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that
the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across
the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings.
On the contrary, all three Constitution’s guarantee the basic right to equal protection of
the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are
several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the
"State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic
of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles
of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of
the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this
Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State. Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change
his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth
to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and
be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and
the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the
rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory
of the State in which it was found.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing
the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of
which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to
Article 15(1) of the UDHR.

MERCADO VS MANZANO
GR NO: 135083
Ponente: Justice Vicente Mendoza

Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and respondent Eduardo Manzano were candidates
for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the 1998 Elections.
Although respondent won, his proclamation was suspended due to his pending
disqualification case on the ground of his dual citizenship.
 In his answer, respondent he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US
Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship.
The COMELEC En Banc ruled in respondent’s favor, holding that he was also a
natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his
father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He
was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of
his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take
an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he

registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which
effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he
no longer had U.S. citizenship.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is qualified to run for vice-mayor.

Decision:
Yes. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

RISOS-VIDAL VS COMELEC
GR NO: 206666
Ponente: Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro

Facts:
 In 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Joseph Estrada of
plunder. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalty of perpetual and absolute disqualification.
In the same year, President Arroyo granted pardon to Estrada. In 2012, Estrada
filed his COC for Manila Mayor.
Petitioner Atty. Risos-Vidal filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada,
contending that he is disqualified to run for public office because of his plunder
conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not President Estrada is qualified to run for public office.

Decision:
Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the
petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada,
docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation
to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President
Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding
the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of
perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by
Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of
the President to grant executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a
statute there should be no departure. It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of
express restoration.

JALOSJOS VS COMELEC
GR NO: 205033
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

Facts:
The Supreme Court previously convicted petitioner Romeo Jalosjos of 2 counts
of statutory rape. Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal with the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification. In 2007, President Arroyo issued an order commuting his sentence to
16 years, 3 months and 3 days.
On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City.
However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting
City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board, prompting him to file a Petition
for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012,
seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled
on May 13, 2013.
On October 18, 2012, the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of
his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in
any election.
Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and
Second Divisions (COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending resolution, the COMELEC En
Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 denying due course the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City due to his
perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter
registration requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to hold public office.

Decision:
No. Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all
should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and
reasonable interpretation.
On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective
candidates, provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:

ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. -

The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:

1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have
held, even if conferred by popular election.

2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to
be elected to such office.

3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any
of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.

4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court
observes that the conflict between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled.
In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local
elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the
said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty,
either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run
for elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal:

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. -
The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of
civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even
though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the
privilege to run for elective office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of
similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous
by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is
unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which the State grants
only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common
good.
Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of
the RPC is more direct and specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to
run for elective office due to his conviction – as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC
which broadly speaks of offenses involving moral turpitude and those punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment without any consideration of certain disqualifying
effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be
considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield to the more
definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali
– general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject,
and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special
provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefor should
prevail.

In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties
of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn,
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As
discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision
– such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from
running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s
service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as
mayor for Zamboanga City.

Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously
convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues
to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have
been expressly remitted in the pardon.In this case, the same accessory penalty had
not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon
and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.

Further, it is well to note that the use of the word “perpetual” in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect,
does not depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal
penalty.

SOCRATES VS COMELEC
GR NO; 154512
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio

Facts:
In 2012, a petition for recall was filed against petitioner Victorino Dennis Socrates
who was the incumbent mayor of Puerto Princesa.
The COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petition for a recall
election. Later, Eduward Hagedorn filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor in the
recall elections.
 A petition for his disqualification, claiming that Hagedorn, having previously
served three consecutive full terms immediately prior to the recall election, cannot run
for the same post.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition and declared Hagedorn qualified to run.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a candidate who had served three full terms immediately prior to
a recall election, is qualified to run for the same post in the said recall election.

Decision:
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected."
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-
term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.
First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court had occasion to explain interruption of
continuity of service in this manner:
"x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-
term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation
of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. x x x."
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although
short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his
service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full
term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long
as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official's continuity of
service.

PAMATONG VS COMELEC
GR NO: 161872
Ponente: Justice Dante Tinga

Facts:
Petitioner Elly Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for president. However
he was declared a nuisance candidate.
Petitioner then filed his present petition, seeking to reverse the COMEELC’s
decision, arguing that the same is a violation of his right to equal access to opportunities
for public service.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC’s act of denying petitioner’s COC is
unconstitutional.

Decision:
No. Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring
"equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional
right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency.
There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates
the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article
are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for
according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the
policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.

RULLODA VS COMELEC
GR NO: 154198
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago

Facts:
In the 2002 barangay elections, Romeo Rulloda and Remegio Placido were
candidate for barangay chairman. Before the elections, Romeo died. Thereafter,
Romeo’s widow, petitioner Petronilla Rulloda wrote to COMELEC seeing permission to
run as a substitute candidate.
Placido opposed, arguing that since the barangay election is non-partisan,
substitution of candidates is not allowed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is allowed to substitute.

Decision:
Yes. In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates
to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials
which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment
of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. The winner is
the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast
in the election.
Contrary to respondent’s claim, the absence of a specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections can not be inferred as a prohibition
against said substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law
where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved than when political considerations or
party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested
election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to
stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public
officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

ENGLE VS COMELEC
GR NO: 215955
Ponente: Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
Facts:
Petitioner Marcelina Engle and respondent Winston Menzon vied for the position
of vice-mayor. It was originally petitioner’s husband who was the original candidate but
unfortunately, he died. For that reason, petitioner became the substitute candidate.
Respondent opposed her substitution, arguing that she misrepresented that she
is qualified to substitute when in fact, her husband was an independent candidate. It
was respondent’s claim that James L. Engle's Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
(CONA) was signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD) Leyte Chapter
President, Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez (Romualdez). However, Lakas-CMD failed
to submit to the COMELEC Law Department the authorization of Romualdez to sign the
CONAs of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6(3) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department considered all
Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed by Romualdez as independent
candidates. For this reason, private respondent charged petitioner with violation of
Section 15, COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 which disallows the substitution of an
independent candidate. He argued that petitioner's declaration that she was a member
of the political party, Lakas-CMD, was intended to deceive the electorate that she was
qualified to substitute her husband.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was qualified to substitute for her husband.

Decision:
Yes. Under Section 78 of the OEC, a petition to deny due course to, or cancel a
COC may be filed on the exclusive ground of false material representation in said COC.
For reference, we quote the full provision here:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may
be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
Section 74 of the OEC in turn enumerates the items that should be stated in a
COC, to wit:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which
he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of
birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the
facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned
therein pertain [s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision
would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would
be considered as a material representation, the court has interpreted this phrase in a
line of decisions applying Section 78 of BP 881.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated
by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of
having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent
the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation
of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person
of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just
any innocuous mistake.
Undeniably, private respondent failed to demonstrate that petitioner made a false
statement regarding her qualifications or concealed any disqualification for the office to
which she sought to be elected in her COC to warrant its cancellation under Section 78.

BORJA VS COMELEC
GR NO: 133495
Ponente: Justice Vicente Mendoza

Facts:
Respondent Jose Capco was elected as vice mayor by operation law due to the
mayor’s death. In 1992 and in 1995, he ran for and won as mayor. In 1998, he again
filed his COC for mayor but petitioner sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that
the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from
September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full term,
and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should
be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art.
X, §8 of the Constitution and §43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner stresses
the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private
respondent became the mayor and thereafter served the remainder of the term.
Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by
succession because the purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of
terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is disqualified to run for another term.

Decision:
No. Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in §43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office. — . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected. . . .
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of
enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in
office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office — whether by election
or by succession by operation of law — would be to disregard one of the purposes of
the constitutional provision in question.
 Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, §8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much
concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put
forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or
nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials.
Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that
such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the of the
succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.
Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people
should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. 11 To bar the
election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first
as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to
violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office
of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than three
consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official
may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected." The term served
must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of
this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an
elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

LATASA VS COMELEC
GR NO: 154829
Ponente: Justice Adolfo Azcuna

Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Latasa was mayor of the Municipality of Digos. During his third
term, Digos was converted into a component city. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated
therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for
three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for
the first time for the position of city mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, who has already served three consecutive full-terms as
mayor of a municipality, may run for mayor in the immediately succeeding election as
city mayor after the municipality has been converted into a component city.

Decision:
No. For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code
provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land are shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more island. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there
is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit
when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect
the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
 As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion
of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such
creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on verifiable
indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department
of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a
component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and
bounds of the Municipality of Digos.
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:
Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of the
Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until such a
time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already
qualified and assumed their offices.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of
the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective
officials of the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions
until elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying
the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As
stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa
to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine
years.

MONTEBON VS COMELEC
GR NO: 180444
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago

Facts:
Sesimando Potencioso is a candidate for municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu.
Petitioners filed a disqualification case against him. They allege that he has already
served three consecutive terms and is thus prohibited from running for a fourth term.
In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected councilor for three
consecutive terms but his second term was interrupted upon his assumption as vice-
mayor by virtue of succession.
In their memorandum, petitioners maintain that
respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not
be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a
voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that,
according to the law, voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the official concerned was elected.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is qualified to run for a fourth term as councilor.

Decision:
Yes.
The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving
more than three consecutive terms in the same post. Section 8, Article X
thereof states:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the
term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the
disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three
consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the
same position.
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor
for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have
fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor
of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section
44 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the
highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. Thus:
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor,
Mayor, and Vice Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor
or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office
shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein. x x x
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice
mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the
highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It
is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be
considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the
concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
‘Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term
does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service.
Thus, respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004
was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting
in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of
law. We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –
The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to
accept the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code
makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently
unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession.
Under no circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be
considered as permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially
therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is
mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some
reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC
GR NO: 184836
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion
Facts:
Respondent Wilfredo Asilo was a three-term councilor. During his third term, he
was suspended in relation to a criminal case filed against him. However, the suspension
order was lifted later.
In the elections immediately after his third consecutive term, he ran again for
councilor, prompting petitioner to file a disqualification case against him since petitioner
is already running for his fourth term.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s
favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit
rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

Issue:
Whether or not suspension is an interruption of a term of office for the purpose of
the three-term limit.

Decision:
No. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and
any difference in wording does not assume any significance in this case.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office
and limits an elective official’s stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms.
This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time – three years –
during which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals, 3 a
Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a "term"
connotes, as follows:
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time
which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem,
the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of
the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most
and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the
expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis
supplied].1avvphi1
A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,4 reiterated that "[T]he term
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another."
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative – "no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms." This
formulation – no more than three consecutive terms – is a clear command suggesting
the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to "serve. . .
three consecutive terms" exactly connotes, the meaning is clear – reference is to the
term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation
refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provision’s express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office;
it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office "shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect
"continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure
declaratory statement of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term,
but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is not without significance in
determining constitutional intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. It is an act that emanates from its
author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition
of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the
constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term,
i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word "voluntary" linked together with
"renunciation" signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee’s own freely
exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context
of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it
is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.

LONZANIDA VS COMELEC
GR NO: 135150
Ponente: Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes

Facts:
Petitioner won three terms as mayor. On his third term, a failure of elections was
declared. After the election, petitioner lost and vacated the post for mayor.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a
petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998
elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the
First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for
disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same
post for the fourth time.

Issue:
Whether or not Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor from May 1995 to
March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying
the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

Decision:
No. Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
 The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit
which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to
be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from running for the same
position after serving three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily
intended to forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The
delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of the electorate of the
candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by
disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. The
mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a
powerful chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political
dynasty. The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local
government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to
perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine consecutive
years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted
upon, it was agreed that an elective local government official should be barred from
running for the same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one
term, he may again run for the same office.
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective local officials with the
exception of barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms was
discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr.; vs. COMELEC and Jose
Capco, Jr. where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office
of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of the incumbent mayor and served the
remainder of the term should be considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of computing the three term limit. This court pointed out that from the
discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded
from the premise that the official's assumption of office is by reason of election.
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral
elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of
mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the
COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the
petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995
elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as
winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume
office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election
protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely
assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the
COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998
term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The
respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full
term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the framers of
the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.
 In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold
office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot
be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit.

ONG VS ALEGRE
GR NO: 163295
Ponente: Justice Cancio Garcia

Facts:
In the 1998 elections, petitioner Francis Ong and respondent Joseph Alegre were
opposing each other for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. Ong was proclaimed
the winner. However, Alegre protested Ong’s victory. The RTC did not act on the protest
until Ong has fully served his term. The RTC later rendered a decision declaring Alegre
as the duly elected mayor.
In the 2004 elections, petitioner again run for mayor against the respondent.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition
to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis.
Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the
three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995,
May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and
discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those
elections.
Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis’ certificate of
candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered
on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution reversing the March
31, 2004 resolution of the COMELEC’s First Division and thereby declaring Francis as
disqualified to run for mayor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the aforecited
May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek the assistance of his political
party, the Nationalist People’s Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother,
Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same
day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his
own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his
brother Francis.
 However, the COMELEC recommended that the substitute certificate of
candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the election
officer be directed to delete his name from the list of candidates.
The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement of
Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya which states that there can no valid substitution
where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.

Issue:
Whether or not Rommel’s substitution was valid.

Decision:
No. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that
he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein,
thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about
petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May
1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998
and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves
around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis
ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served
the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-
elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed,
therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full
term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the
full term", and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-
term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term
for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No.
6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and,
therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it
must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern.
Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral
protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made
in due course after an election.

ARTICLE VI
ELECTION OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS
Section 43. Official barangay ballots. - The official barangay ballots shall be
provided by the city or municipality concerned of a size and color to be
prescribed by the Commission.
Such official ballots shall, before they are handed to the voter at the polling place,
be authenticated in the presence of the voter, by the authorized representatives
of the candidates and the chairman and members of the board of election tellers
who shall affix their signatures at the back thereof. Any ballot which is not
authenticated shall be deemed spurious.
DAYAG VS ALONZO
GR NO: L-66427
Ponente: Justice Amuerfina Melencio- Herrera

Facts:
Petitioner EMILIO Dayag and private respondent GLORIA Guiawan were the
only candidates for Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) of Gobgob, Tabuk, Kalinga-
Apayao in the Barangay elections of May 17, 1982.
There were two voting centers in that Barangay. There was no question in
respect of the election results in Voting Center No. 2 where EMILIO obtained 163 votes
while GLORIA garnered 166 votes.
In Voting Center No. 1, however, a controversy arose regarding the correct
appreciation of votes where the names of the candidates for Punong Barangay were
written not on the proper space but elsewhere in the ballot. The Board of Election
Tellers considered the votes as invalid, which action sparked a commotion. To prevent
an aggravation of the situation, the Board padlocked the ballot box, and together with
the ballot box for Voting Center No. 2, took them to the Municipal Building under the
safekeeping of the Police Station Commander.
The Board of Election Tellers verbally referred the controversy to the Municipal
Election Registrar, who informed the Board that the votes should have been
appreciated for the candidate whose name was written since there was no showing that
the ballots were marked.
The next day, or on May 18, 1982, the Provincial Election Supervisor issued a
memorandum to the Board of Canvassers to complete the canvassing and to proclaim
the winning candidate. With a plurality of 43 votes, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed
EMILIO as the duly elected Punong Barangay.
GLORIA filed an Election Contest with the Municipal Trial Court, to declare the
recounting and proclamation null and void and for her declaration as the winning
candidate. In a Decision, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed the Protest for lack of
merit thereby upholding the recounting of votes and the proclamation of EMILIO.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the Municipal Trial Court and held
that the recounting of votes on May 19, 1982 was void since the Board of Election
Tellers had acted beyond its authority, and on the basis of the first counting, declared
GLORIA as the duly elected Punong Barangay.
Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Election Tellers had the authority to conduct a
recounting for the re-appreciation of the votes previously excluded, after a tally had
been made, but before the accomplishment of the election returns and announcement
of the results.

Decision:
Yes. Section 160 of the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296), which is applicable
in a suppletory character to the election of B Barangay officials (Sec. 2 1, Barangay
Election Law), provides:
SEC. 160. Alterations and corrections in the election returns. - Any correction or
alteration made in the election returns by the committee before the announcement of
the results of the election in the voting center shag be duly initialed by all the members
thereof.
After the announcement of the results of the election in the voting center has
been made, the committee shall not make any alteration or amendment in any of the
copies of the election returns unless so ordered by the Commission upon petition of the
members of the committee within five days from the date of the election or twenty four
hours from the time of copy of the election returns concerned is opened by the board of
canvassers, whichever is earlier. ...
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Board of Election Tellers may
make alterations and corrections in the election returns before the announcement of the
results. In the case at bar, the alteration and correction was made in the tally stage and
even before the preparation of the election returns. The Board of Election Tellers,
therefore, acted within its prerogatives in making a recount specially considering that
the Municipal Election Registrar had informed the Board in response to its query that
the votes should have been appreciated for the candidates whose names were written
even in the wrong space since there was no showing that the ballots were marked.

MALABAGUIO VS COMELEC
GR NO: 142507
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares- Santiago

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay.
Private respondent was declared the winner.
 Dissatisfied with the results of the canvass, petitioner filed an election protest
case. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the COMELEC reversed
the RTC and declared respondent the winner for having garnered the highest number of
VALID votes of One Thousand One Hundred Eighty One (1,181) AS against protestant-
appellee Alfredo U. Malabaguio who obtained One Thousand One Hundred Twenty
Seven (1,127) VALID votes, or a margin of Fifty Four (54) votes over the latter.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this
petition, alleging that COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
INVALIDATING FIFTY SEVEN (57) BALLOTS CAST IN FAVOR OF MALABAGUIO
WHICH DO NOT BEAR THE SIGNATURE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF
INSPECTORS. IN VALIDATING THESE BALLOTS RESPONDENT COMELEC
UTTERLY DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL AND STATUTORY RULE IN THE
APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS THAT "ABSENCE OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE
CHAIRMEN OF THE BEI AT THE BACK OF THE BALLOTS DOES NOT INVALIDATE
IT.

Issue:
Whether or not the Fifty-seven (57) ballots cast in favor of petitioner-protestant
which do not bear the signatures of the chairmen of the board of election inspectors
should be counted in his favor.

Decision:
No. Article VI, Section 43 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides that:

SECTION 43. Official Barangay Ballots — The official barangay ballots shall be
provided by the city or municipality concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by
the Commission.

Such official ballots shall, before they are handed to the voter at the polling place, be
authenticated in the presence of the voter, by the authorized representatives of the
candidates and the chairman and members of the board of election tellers who shall
affix their signatures on the back thereof. Any ballot which is not authenticated shall be
deemed spurious.

and Section 6 of R.A. No. 6679 entitled An Act To Amend Republic Act No. 6653 To
Postpone The Barangay Elections to March 28, 1989, Prescribing Additional Rules
Governing The Conduct Of Barangay Elections And For Other Purposes, which
provides:

SECTION 6. The official ballots for the barangay elections shall, before they are handed
to the voters at the polling place, be authenticated by the Chairman and the poll clerk
who shall affix their signatures at the back thereof. Any ballot which is not authenticated
shall be deemed spurious.

It is conceded that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an

administrative agency like the COMELEC over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, their findings of fact in that
regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts. It bears
emphasis, however, that even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared
"final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. Factual findings of
administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.

Section 14 of B.P. 222 provides:

SECTION 14. Official barangay ballots. — The official barangay ballots shall be
provided by the city or municipality concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by
the Commission on Elections.

Such official ballot shall, before it is handed to the voter at the voting center, be
authenticated in the presence of the voter, the other Tellers, and the watchers present,
by the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers who shall affix his signature at the back
thereof.

Indeed, the above provision relied upon by the majority opinion of the COMELEC
does not categorically state that the absence of the authenticating signatures at the
back of the ballots invalidates the same.
However, on February 5, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a new set of rules to
implement the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections, i.e., Comelec Resolution No. 2888
(Rules and Regulations for the Conduct of the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections). The
relevant section of this rule provides:

SECTION 73. Signature of the Chairman at the Back of Every Ballot. — In every case,
the Chairman of the Board shall, in the presence of the voter and before delivering the
ballot to the voter, authenticate the same by affixing his signature at the back thereof.
Failure to so authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the board and shall constitute
an election offense.

It is clear, therefore, that under the rules prevailing during the 1997 Barangay
Elections, the failure to authenticate the ballots shall no longer be cause for the
invalidation thereof. Rather, the Board of Election Inspectors shall merely note such
failure in the minutes and declare the failure to authenticate the ballots as an election
offense.
It is not too difficult to discern why these two provisions quoted above so provide
that any ballot not so authenticated by the Chairman and the poll clerk by their
signatures shall be deemed spurious. This is so because the signatures were the only
security marking in the ballot produced either by a mimeographing machine or any
ordinary printer. The local government units which were tasked to produce them were
not expected to put intricate security markings on the ballot paper such as phantom
markings, watermarking or printing security marks. As the Supreme Court intimated in
Libanan v. HRET, the difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern
considering that in those official ballots supplied and furnished by the local government
units themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited might not have
been discounted. Hence, the requirement that the chairman and poll clerk authenticate
by their signatures at the back of such ballots prepared by the local government units.
However, in the 1997 Barangay elections, the ballots were not provided by the
local government unit themselves. It was this Commission that furnished and provided
the official barangay ballots during the 1997 Barangay Elections and these ballots were
printed with security markings. Although the COMELEC General Instructions
(Resolution No. 2888) requires the chairman of the board to authenticate the ballots, the
same does not provide for the invalidation of the ballot in the event that the board failed
to so authenticate it. Instead, their failure was only considered as an election offense. It
is, therefore, inappropriate to apply the aforequoted legal provisions in this case and
rule that these unsigned ballots are spurious. As these ballots were provided and
furnished by this Commission and not by the local government unit concerned, the evil
sought to be avoided by these provisions, are more imaginary than real.

ARTICLE VII
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections, and shall:
(a) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local
officials or employees, including members of any national or local law
enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize
CMT cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its deputies for the
purpose of enforcing its orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who
violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions
or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission,
the corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all
of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of
such violation or failure.
(b) During the period of the campaign and ending thirty days thereafter, when in
any area of the country there are persons committing acts of terrorism to
influence people to vote for or against any candidate or political party, the
Commission shall have the power to authorize any member or members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Integrated National Police or any similar agency or instrumentality of the
government, except civilian home defense forces, to act as deputies for the
purpose of ensuring the holding of free, orderly and honest elections.
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or
other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, and
require the payment of legal fees and collect the same in payment of any
business done in the Commission, at rates that it may provide and fix in its rules
and regulations.
Rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission to implement the
provisions of this Code shall take effect on the sixteenth day after publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least daily newspapers of general circulation. Orders
and directives issued by the Commission pursuant to said rules and regulations
shall be furnished by personal delivery to accredited political parties within forty-
eight hours of issuance and shall take effect immediately upon receipt.
In case of conflict between rules, regulations, orders or directives of the
Commission in the exercise of its constitutional powers and those issued by any
other administrative office or agency of the government concerning the same
matter relative to elections, the former shall prevail.
(d) Summon the parties to a controversy pending before it, issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or hearing before
it, and delegate such power to any officer of the Commission who shall be a
member of the Philippine Bar. In case of failure of a witness to attend, the
Commission, upon proof of service of the subpoena to said witnesses, may issue
a warrant to arrest witness and bring him before the Commission or the officer
before whom his attendance is required.
Any controversy submitted to the Commission shall, after compliance with the
requirements of due process, be immediately heard and decided by it within sixty
days from submission thereof. No decision or resolution shall be rendered by the
Commission either en banc or by division unless taken up in a formal session
properly convened for the purpose.
The Commission may, when necessary, avail of the assistance of any national or
local law enforcement agency and/or instrumentality of the government to
execute under its direct and immediate supervision any of its final decisions,
orders, instructions or rulings.
(e) Punish contempts provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure
and with the same penalties provided therein. Any violation of any final and
executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall constitute contempt
thereof.
(f) Enforce and execute its decisions, directives, orders and instructions which
shall have precedence over those emanating from any other authority, except the
Supreme Court and those issued in habeas corpus proceedings.
(g) Prescribe the forms to be used in the election, plebiscite or referendum.
(h) Procure any supplies, equipment, materials or services needed for the holding
of the election by public bidding: Provided, That, if it finds the requirements of
public bidding impractical to observe, then by negotiations or sealed bids, and in
both cases, the accredited parties shall be duly notified.
(i) Prescribe the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic
devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose: Provided, That the Commission shall notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas
affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less
than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.
(j) Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of
general circulation, radios and other media forms to educate the public and fully
inform the electorate about election laws, procedures, decisions, and other
matters relative to the work and duties of the Commission and the necessity of
clean, free, orderly and honest electoral processes.
(k) Enlist non-partisan group or organizations of citizens from the civic, youth,
professional, educational, business or labor sectors known for their probity,
impartiality and integrity with the membership and capability to undertake a
 coordinated operation and activity to assist it in the implementation of the
provisions of this Code and the resolutions, orders and instructions of the
Commission for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections in any
constituency.
Such groups or organizations shall function under the direct and immediate
control and supervision of the Commission and shall perform the following
specific functions and duties:
A. Before Election Day:
1. Undertake an information campaign on salient features of this Code and help in
the dissemination of the orders, decisions and resolutions of the Commission
relative to the forthcoming election.
2. Wage a registration drive in their respective areas so that all citizens of voting
age, not otherwise disqualified by law may be registered.
3. Help cleanse the list of voters of illegal registrants, conduct house-to-house
canvass if necessary, and take the appropriate legal steps towards this end.
4. Report to the Commission violations of the provisions of this Code on the
conduct of the political campaign, election propaganda and electoral
expenditures.
B. On Election Day:
1. Exhort all registered voters in their respective areas to go to their polling
places and cast their votes.
2. Nominate one watcher for accreditation in each polling place and each place of
canvass who shall have the same duties, functions and rights as the other
watchers of political parties and candidates. Members or units of any citizen
group or organization so designated by the Commission except its lone duly
accredited watcher, shall not be allowed to enter any polling place except to vote,
and shall, if they so desire, stay in an area at least fifty meters away from the
polling place.
3. Report to the peace authorities and other appropriate agencies all instances of
terrorism, intimidation of voters, and other similar attempts to frustrate the free
and orderly casting of votes.
4. Perform such other functions as may be entrusted to such group or
organization by the Commission.
The designation of any group or organization made in accordance herewith may
be revoked by the Commission upon notice and hearing whenever by its
actuations such group or organization has shown partiality to any political party
or candidate, or has performed acts in excess or in contravention of the functions
 and duties herein provided and such others which may be granted by the
Commission.
(l) Conduct hearings on controversies pending before it in the cities or provinces
upon proper motion of any party, taking into consideration the materiality and
number of witnesses to be presented, the situation prevailing in the area and the
fund available for the purpose.
(m) Fix other reasonable periods for certain pre-election requirements in order
that voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage and certain groups of
rights granted them in this Code.
Unless indicated in this Code, the Commission is hereby authorized for fix the
appropriate period for the various prohibited acts enumerated herein, consistent
with the requirements of free, orderly, and honest elections.

TAULE VS SANTOS
GR NO: 90336
Ponente: Justice Emilio Gancayco

Facts:
The Association of Barangay Councils of Catanduanes, composed of 11
members, convened to elect their officers. However, only six attended. Yet, the election
proceeded, prompting the Provincial Treasurer and Election Supervisor to walk out.
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes,
sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local
Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its
nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule
as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent
Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor
for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-
partisan affair.
On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the
election of the officers of the FABC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay
Councils.

Decision:
No. The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan
ng mga barangay at all levels shall be organized:
Sec. 110. Organization. — (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in the
following manner:
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of officers. The
president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned in the next higher level
of organization.
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang pampook,
which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and
the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the katipunang bayan in each province
shall constitute the katipunang panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the
katipunang bayan shall be composed of the punong barangays of cities and
municipalities, respectively.
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local
Government Code empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars
and the rules and regulations to carry out the various administrative actions required for
the initial implementation of this Code in such a manner as will ensure the least
disruption of on-going programs and projects.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on
Elections shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials,
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay
officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the
law, the sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with
the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the
proclamation of the results.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of
the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote. Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution,
may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes which do not characterize
the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would
refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not
the contestant is claiming the office in dispute and in the case of elections of barangay
officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-
proclamation controversies are allowed.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational
set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong
barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests
involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over
the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the
representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level
conducted by their own respective organization.

ANGOBUNG VS COMELEC
GR NO: 126576
Ponente: Justice Regino Hermosisima,Jr.

Facts:
Respondent filed a petition for recall against petitioner mayor. The COMELEC En
Banc granted the petition.
 Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional
and therefore invalid, on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition
for Recall albeit same was signed by just one person in violation of the statutory 25%
minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting any petition for recall;
and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the May
12, 1997 Barangay Elections.

Issue:
Whether or not the scheduled recall elections is valid.

Decision:
Yes, in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v. COMELEC8, the recall election
scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be said to be barred by the
May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. In construing the meaning of the term, "regular local
election" in Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that "no
recall shall take place within one (1) year . . . immediately preceding a regular local
election," we ruled that for the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election
must be one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested
and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time bar is being
invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May
1997, there can be no application of the one year bar, hence no invalidity may be
ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.

ANG LADLAD VS COMELEC

GR NO: 190582
Ponente: Justice Mariano Del Castillo

Facts:
Petitioner Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of members of the LGBTQ
community, applied for registration with the COMELEC. It argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMEELC may deny an organization’s application for
registration based on moral and religious grounds.

Decision:
No. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-
list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the
inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class,
not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as
follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression
of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.