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constructivism (a) in psychotherapy (b) in consulting
to organizations, and (c) in sports psychology,
particularly with professional tennis players.
Funding: No external funding was received
while writing this manuscript.
Competing interests: The author declares
that there are no competing interests.
Received: 10 July 2022
Revised: 2 October 2022
Revised: 4 October 2022
Accepted:10 October 2022
When Studying the Mind, What
Domain Is Being Investigated?
Urban Kordeš
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
urban.kordes/at/pef.uni-lj.si
> Abstract • I problematize the ambigu-
ity in the use of the terms, “cognition”
and “mind.” Do these terms describe
specific dynamics of physical changes
within the organism (i.e., a third-person
perspective) or subjective experience (a
first-person perspective)? I argue that
the lack of precision in addressing cog-
nitive science’s domain of research cre-
ates a blind spot about the central im-
portance of subjective experience.
« 1 » In his target article, “The Or-
ganization of the Living: Maturana’s Key
Insights,” Fritjof Capra traces the develop-
ment of Humberto Maturana’s (and Fran-
cisco Varela’s) theory of autopoiesis from
Maturana’s early years to the theory’s full
maturation into what the author calls the
“Santiago theory.” Capra offers a thoughtful
overview of Maturana’s opus, which, I be-
lieve, is a fitting homage to a scholar who
has made fundamental contributions to
constructivist approaches.
« 2 » However, one item on the article’s
list of Maturana’s achievements is problem-
atic: Capra concludes with the claim that
the process–structure distinction of the
Santiago theory is nothing less than a solu-
tion of the mind–body problem, and “Mat-
are two major issues with this claim: (a) the
idea is not unique, and (b) the Santiago the-
ory’s structure–process distinction does not
offer a solution to the mind–body problem.
The structure vs. process
distinction is not unique to the
Santiago theory
« 3 » The view that the body (of a living
organism) is a structure enabling a very spe-
cial process (i.e., the mind) is not exclusive
to Maturana’s view. The structure–process
distinction is not at all a new idea and has
been applied in all of science, including ear-
ly cybernetics and cognitive science. Early
cognitive science was based on the prem-
ise of the so-called information-processing
(or computer) metaphor of cognition, i.e.,
the notion that the mind is a certain kind
of processing (or “calculation”), enabled by
the suitable (Turing machine-compatible)
structure of the brain (Bermúdez 2014).
« 4 » This does not imply that the com-
puter metaphor of cognition equals the
Santiago theory, but only that they both
apply the structure–process distinction in
order to understand cognitive processes.
Maturana’s theory was much more sophisti-
cated than the cognitive science at the time.
One of his unique insights was the essential
mutual interdependence of structure and
process. Very early on, he also recognized
the importance of the need to incorporate
the whole organism into the explanation of
how the mind works (something that would
today be filed under the label of embodied
cognition). He clearly saw the dependence
of the organism’s reality construction on the
structure as well as on the organization of
the organism.
« 5 » As Capra (§§41–49) emphasizes,
Maturana’s understanding of the mind is
inextricably interwoven with the answer to
the core question of “What is life?” Those
(and many more) are undisputed contribu-
tions of the Santiago theory that go beyond
the cybernetic thought of the day. What
the Santiago theory did not resolve is the
mind–body problem.
Mind, cognition and experience
« 6 » In §15, Capra claims that Mat-
urana solved René Descartes’ “fundamental
division between two independent and sep-
 Biology of Cognition
arate realms – that of mind, which he called
the ‘thinking thing’ (res cogitans), and that
of matter, the ‘extended thing’ (res extensa)”
(emphasis in original). The epistemic dis-
tinction between both realms is described
in the first two of Descartes’s (2013) Medi-
tations on First Philosophy, written in 1641,
where Descartes’s “meditator” aims to chal-
lenge all beliefs, no matter how obvious and
convincing they sound, in order to attain
knowledge that cannot be doubted.
« 7 » Descartes’s argument, focused on
thinking and the self, was sharpened and
clarified at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury by Edmund Husserl (1982). Husserl
established that the domain that cannot be
doubted is subjective experience (or phe-
nomenal consciousness): that there is an
answer to the question “What is it like to
be you?” that is beyond doubt. To doubt the
existence of experience is merely another
kind of experience.
« 8 » Husserl showed the irreducibility
of subjective experience. One can consider
the physical world (including organisms,
their behavior, their organization, their
structure, and involved autopoietic process-
es) as being constituted within subjective
experience. Such a constitution can even
be empirically examined (Kordeš 2021),
whereas the emergence of subjective experi-
ence within the material world cannot even
be conceived. No matter how precisely one
observes neurons or neural activity, experi-
ence will not be found. The same holds for
behavior, the structure of organisms, the
structure of their building blocks, as well as
for the processes that constitute the living.
No matter how hard one looks, no traces
of experience will be found in the natural
world.
« 9 » When debating the primacy of
experience, it is important to stress that
the “primacy” in question is epistemologi-
cal and not ontological. When noticing that
experience is primary, what is recognized
is that knowing (the world, ourselves,… all
of it) is nothing but a way of experiencing;
moreover, both the knower and her know-
ing regardless of the kind of her knowing
– are experience. This simple observation
does not imply any ontological position,
i.e., it does not make any claims about what
might or might not exist independently of
experience.
What Domain Is Being Investigated? Urban Kordeš
« 10 » As the information-processing
era of cognitive science matured around the
early 1980s, it became clear to many scien-
tists and philosophers that it is impossible
to fully understand the mind if its essential
constituent – subjective experience – is be-
ing ignored. Studying the physical mani-
festations of cognizing organisms does not
tackle the core mystery: what is the nature
of subjective experience?1
« 11 » Capra writes that “[f]ollowing
Descartes, scientists and philosophers con-
tinued to think of the mind as some intan-
gible entity and were unable to imagine
how this ‘thinking thing’ was related to the
body” (§15). The soundness of this claim
depends on what the author means by the
term “mind.”2
« 12 » If “mind” stands for certain
types of behavior and physical activities
(as the term was mainly understood in the
early days of cognitive science), then the
statement does not hold, as such a “mind”
is tangible and has nothing to do with
Descartes’s puzzle. If, on the other hand,
“mind” stands for (or includes) experi-
ence, then the puzzle in question is called
the hard problem of consciousness (Chalm-
ers 1995), and the statement holds. How-
ever, Capra’s assertion that the Santiago
theory solved the puzzle is way off the
mark. Neither organization nor its con-
stitutive processes offers a clue about the
emergence of subjective experience. They
can be observed and described in terms of
their constitutive parts, their relations, or
dynamics of physical changes within (i.e.,
processes). In other words, they lie within
the naturalistic realm where – as we estab-
lished above – no subjective experience
can be found.
« 13 » Since the question of subjective
experience became a valid and important
part of cognitive science, a number of so-
called “theories of consciousness” have
1 | Some good introductions to the puzzle
of subjective experience and its importance for
cognitive science are provided by Thomas Na-
gel (1974), Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor
Rosch (1991: Chapter 2), David Chalmers (1995),
and Susan Blackmore (2017).
2 | The same could be asked about the term
“cognition,” which Capra seems to use almost in-
terchangeably with “mind.”
been developed in an effort to find the neu-
ral correlates of consciousness (most prom-
inently, “integrated information theory”;
Tononi et al. 2016). However, even their au-
thors are clear about the reach of such theo-
ries: they hope to find physical substrates
of experience, not experience itself. These
third-person “theories of consciousness”
do not explain the emergence of subjective
experience, i.e., they do not solve the hard
problem.
« 14 » In the early 1990s, Varela moved
the focus of his work to the consciousness-
shaped blind spot in cognitive science (in-
cluding his previous work), and it may not
be an exaggeration to say that the rest of his
life’s work was dedicated to understanding
the curious mismatch between the first-per-
son and third-person perspectives. In his
works from 1990 onward, he was struggling
to find a way to reconcile the two seemingly
mutually exclusive positions: the primacy of
human experience (subjective experience
being the only epistemologically undeni-
able thing) and the unavoidability of the
third-person (or naturalistic) perspective
(Varela 1996; Depraz, Varela & Vermersch
2003).
« 15 » Instead of further dwelling on the
history of cognitive science, I would like to
challenge Capra’s claim with a question that
should be simple to answer, provided that
the Santiago theory solved the hard prob-
lem. Consider an oak tree, an amoeba, and
a human being in a vegetative state. Can it
be claimed that those organisms are con-
scious? 19
« 16 » Capra mentions Maturana’s
“characterization of the circular organiza-
tion and continual regeneration of living
networks as cognitive processes” as a “key”
idea and “the one with the most radical
philosophical implications” (§14). Capra
continues: “This implies nothing less than
a new conception of the nature of mind,
which overcomes the Cartesian division be-
tween mind and matter […]”
Conclusion
« 17 » Let me summarize my arguments:
A Capra equates cognitive processes with
mind.
B Capra claims that Maturana’s “new
conception of mind” solves (or “over-
comes”) the Cartesian division.
https://constructivist.info/18/1/005.capra
 C Since the division in question is the
separation between subjective experi-
ence and the (supposedly underlying)
physical structure, it follows that Capra
equates mind with the subjective experi-
ence.
« 18 » The amoeba’s organization is cir-
cular and maintains continual regeneration,
as is the case for the oak tree and the vege-
tative-state person. These are the processes
that (according to Capra, §14) Maturana
identifies as cognitive. As Capra equates
cognitive processes with mind (see A) and
INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPTS IN Biology of Cognition
also uses the term “mind” to indicate subjec-
tive experience (see C), then it should follow
that all aforementioned organisms have sub-
jective experience.
« 19 » I hope I have managed to show
that such a belief is unfounded. It originates
in the naturalistic blind spot for conscious-
ness, and is maintained by placeholder
terms like “mind” or “cognition” that en-
courage the ambiguity as to which domain
they are describing.
References
Bermúdez J. L. (2014) Cognitive science: An
introduction to the science of the mind.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Blackmore S. (2017) Consciousness: A very
short introduction. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Chalmers D. (1995) Facing up to the problem
of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 2(3): 200–219.
20 Depraz N. E., Varela F. J. & Vermersch P. E.
(2003) On becoming aware: A pragmatics of
experiencing. John Benjamins, Amsterdam.
Descartes R. (2013) Meditations on first phi-
losophy. Broadview Press, Ontario. Latin
originally published in 1641.
Husserl E. (1982) Ideas pertaining to a pure
phenomenology and to a phenomenological
philosophy: First book, general introduction
to a pure phenomenology. Translated by F.
Kersten. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Bos-
ton. German original published in 1913.
Kordeš U. (2021) Bracketing the meta-
physical attitude. Constructiv-
ist Foundations 16(2): 156–159.
▶︎ https://constructivist.info/16/2/156
Nagel T. (1974) What is it like to be a bat?
Philosophical Review 83(4): 435–450.
▶︎ https://cepa.info/2399
Tononi G., Boly M., Massimini M. & Koch C.
(2016) Integrated information theory: From
consciousness to its physical substrate. Na-
ture Reviews Neuroscience 17(7): 450–461.
Varela F. J., Thompson E. & Rosch E. (1991) The
embodied mind: Cognitive science and hu-
man experience. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Varela F. J. (1996) Neurophenomenology: A
methodological remedy to the hard problem.
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4):
330–349. ▶︎ https://cepa.info/1893
Urban Kordeš is professor of cognitive science and
first-person research at the University of Ljubljana,
where he is currently heading the Center for Cognitive
Science and the graduate cognitive science program.
His research interests include in-depth empirical
phenomenological research, neurophenomenology,
second-order cybernetics, and collaborative knowledge
creation, as well as epistemic and methodological
issues in the research of non-trivial systems. Urban
believes that training in the skill of reflection and
subsequent first-person reporting should become
one of the essential cognitive-science research
techniques. His current research involves such training
in the participatory setting of the “Observatory”
research group, http://observatory.pef.uni-lj.si/
Funding: No funding was received for
the work on this commentary.
Competing interests: The author declares
that he has no competing interests.
Received: 10 July 2022
Revised: 13 July 2022
Revised: 17 August 2022
Accepted: 22 August 2022
Reflections on Autopoiesis,
the Signature of Life
Pier Luigi Luisi
ETH Zurich, Switzerland
luisi/at/mat.ethz.ch
> Abstract • I agree with Capra that au-
topoiesis is the signature of life and that
Maturana did well to reject Cartesian
dualism. Contrary to how mainstream
biology defines life, I point out that re-
production is a consequence of life, not
its origin. Furthermore, I address the
questions of whether both autopoiesis
and cognition together are necessary
for life and whether autopoiesis can be
extended beyond the molecular domain.
I also have words of criticism for Mat-
urana, who called for “objectivity” to be
put in parentheses, and conclude with
a reminder that it was Varela who was
instrumental in making autopoiesis a
household term.
Autopoiesis and life
« 1 » Fritjof Capra’s target article is much
more than a review. It is the integration of
Humberto Maturana’s view with most of the
main concepts that characterize the contem-
porary conception of science (including no-
tions such as network, patterns and process-
es), and the systems view, namely the mutual
relations among the parts that constitute a
living or a non-living complex structure.
Capra focusses on the two most commonly
known notions of what he calls the Santiago
theory, autopoiesis and cognition, claiming
that autopoiesis is the best answer ever pro-
vided by science to the question, what is life?
And since life on this planet is cellular, and
only cellular, Maturana and Francisco Va-
rela, in their analysis, as Capra (§§50ff) indi-
cates, in order to answer such a fundamental
question, focus on how a cell works. Their
analysis led to a discovery that autopoiesis
characterizes not only a single living cell, but
any higher form of life. Increasing the com-
plexity of organisms changes the structure,
but not the basic organization, an organiza-
tion that recursively regenerates itself and its
boundary. Autopoiesis is the signature of life.
« 2 » If autopoiesis is the best answer to
that question of what life is, then why is it not