DAY 5 IV.

VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY

IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY

A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2180-2182)
A. VICARIOUS LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2180-2182)
Civil Code - ARTICLES 2180-2182
1. Parents & guardians (ARTICLES 216 to 219, 221, 236, Family Code)
Exconde v. Capuno Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
Cuadra v. Monfort acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Tamargo v. CA,
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Libi v. IAC
2. Owners & managers of enterprises/Employers Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
Pestano v. Sumayang under their authority and live in their company.
Jose v. CA
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
Real v. Belo
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
Castilex Industrial v. Vasquez employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Carticiano v. Nuval
L.G. Foods v. Pagapong-Agraviador Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang
engaged in any business or industry.
Filamer Christian Institute v. CA
Del Carmen v. Bacoy The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
Jayme v. Aposto the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
Note: distinguish from subsidiary Liability under the RPC [Arts. 102 and 103] which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Medical negligence/malpractice
Ramos v. CA (1999) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
Ramos v CA (Resolution, 2002)
custody.
Nogales v. Capitol Medical
Professional Services v. Natividad The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
3. State prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Fontanlla v. Maliaman (1989) (1903a)
Fontanila v. Maliaman (1991)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may
Merritt v. Government of Philippine Islands recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
4. Teachers/heads of establishments (ARTICLES 218 and 219, Family Code)
St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
Salvosa v. IAC minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
Ylarde v. Aquino
Amadora v. CA
Mercado v. CA What is the defense of an employer being held vicariously liable? Due diligence in the
Aquinas School v. Inton selection and supervision of the employee. Both must be present, as the absence of even
one is enough for an employer to be declared as vicariously liable.

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Parents & guardians (ARTICLES 216 to 219, 221, 236, Family Code)
Family Code - ARTICLES 216 to 219, 221, 236
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes
necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other
children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial
proceedings to heads of children’s homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if
it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a)
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person
and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life. (412a)
A key fact in establishing NEGLIGENCE to Parents & Guardians is that there is:
a. Authority over the minor or the ward
b. The minor lives in their company
When the two elements do not concur, then vicarious liability does not apply to
Parents/Guardians with regard to the wards/minor’s acts which cause damage to others.
Culpable Act or Omission: 15 year old Dante was allowed by the
driver to drive (guilty of double homicide through reckless
imprudence) on a jeep resulting to turtle while in a parade with the
instruction of teacher
Damage: Death of Isidoro
Causal Relation: Exconde, mother of Isidiro reserved right to bring
separate civil action. Trial Court and CA found Dante guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Exconde filed an action against Delfin, father and
Dante.
Delfin Capuno was the father of Dante Capuno. Dante Capuno was a
member of the Boy Scouts and a student of Balintawak elementary
school. He attended a parade in honor of Rizal and together with
other students, the boy boarded a jeep and drove the jeep with the
Exconde v. Capuno driver sitting on the left side (part of an extracurricular activity in
school). The jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Ticzon &
Caperina, died as a consequence. Delfin Capuno (father) was not with
his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was
going to attend a parade; he only knew after his son told him about
the accident.
Whether or not Delfin Capuno (father) can be held liable with his
son for the damages resulting from the death of Caperina? – Yes
Plaintiff wanted to hold the defendant Delfin (father) liable because at
the time the negligent act was committed, Dante was a minor and was
living with his father. SC agreed and held that the provision only
applies to teachers or directors of arts and trades and not to any other
academic institution. Neither the head of the school nor the city
school’s supervisor could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante
He was not a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided
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 for by law.
SC explained the rationale for the civil liability imposed upon the
parents for damages caused by their minor children who live with
them. This is a necessary consequence of parental authority they
exercise over them. Parents have the duty to support their children,
keep them in their company, educate them, and instruct them in
proportion to their means, which also gives them the right to correct
and punish the children. ​The only way they can relieve themselves of
this [civil] liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage
Culpable Act or Omission: 13yo Monfort threw a plastic headband
stating it was an earthworm at Cuadra, which hit her on the eye at the
very moment she turned around
Damage: 12yo Cuadra lost sight of her eye
Causal Relation: Whether parents are liable for an act of a minor
child? – No
– Bundoc, a 10-year old minor, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
Cuadra and Monfort were classmates in elementary school. Their
teacher assigned them, together with 3 classmates, to weed the grass
in the school premises. Monfort found a plastic headband and she
joked Cuadra about it, saying that it was an earthworm. At that
moment, Cuadra turned around to face her friend and the object hit
Tamargo v. CA
her right eye. She rubbed the injured part and treated it with powder
Cuadra v. Monfort
but it got swollen. She had to undergo surgery to treat the eye but
despite efforts, she completely lost sight of her right eye.
Whether or not the father can be held liable for the injuries caused
to the girl? – NO
SC used Arts 2176 and 2180 in explaining liability for fault or
negligence. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom
another is responsible, the latter becomes himself liable (e.g. father in
the case of the injury caused by the child).
The basis of the vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or
negligence which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is clearly prima facie and
may be rebutted. By diligence of good father of a family, it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case
to determine whether by the exercise of such diligence the damage
could have been prevented. In this case, the defendant could not
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care. He also
cannot be considered remiss in the exercise of his parental authority.
The child was at school and it was his duty to send her where she
was. As far as the act is concerned, it was an innocent prank that
was usual among children at play at which no parent would have
any reason to anticipate. There was no trait in the child’s character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing.
Culpable Act or Omission: 10y Bundoc shot Tamargo with an air rifle
Damage: Death of Tamargo
Causal Relation: Relatives of Tamargo filed for damages and
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence which was exempted from
liability, minority. - Before shooting, lived with natural parents - After
shooting, got adopted by Sps. Rapisura
–
causing injuries which resulted in her death. The parents of Tamargo
filed a complaint against respondents Bundoc, the natural parents of
the boy. Prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to
adopt Bundoc in a special proceeding. This was granted by the CFI.
Petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto shot and killed
Jennifer. In their Answer, respondent spouses now claim that they
are no longer indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents (Spouses Rapisura).
Petitioners then claim that since Bundoc was actually living with his
parents at the time of the shooting, parental authority was with them.
Whether or not the natural parents are indispensable parties to the
case? – YES
SC explained the doctrine of imputed negligence or vicarious liability
where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but
also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Parental liability is made as a logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents which includes the instructing, controlling,
and disciplining of the child. Civil liability imposed upon parents for
torts of their minor children may be seen to be based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code.
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The law assumes that when the minor commits a tortious act, the
parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. The law presumes that the parents were derelict in the
discharge of their duties. Parental dereliction is only presumed and
the presumption can be overturned under Art 2180 by proof that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family.
In this case, during the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto, parental
authority was still lodged in the Bundoc spouses, the natural parents
of Adelberto Thus, it is the natural parents who are indispensable
parties to the suit for damages. SC also said that parental authority
cannot retroact to the time the shooting happened. Retroactive
effect cannot accrue at a time when the adopting parents had no
actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect
may possibly apply only if such is essential or beneficial to the
adopted child.
Culpable Act or Omission: During the enrollment campaign of the
school, 15y Daniel drove jeep in a reckless manner while Sherwin and
other high school students were riding resulting jeep to turtle
Damage: Sherwin died
Causal Relation: Detachment of steering wheel, not reckless driving
of James
– Causal Relation: Whether Parents Libi liable?
Defendant St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive. During
the drive, Sherwin was part of the campaigning group. Sherwin
St. Mary’s Academy
v. Carpitanos
Carpitanos was riding a jeep on the way to an elementary school. The
jeep was allegedly being driven by James Daniel, a 15-year student
from the same school. Allegedly, James Daniel drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died from the injuries he sustained. The parents of Sherwin
now filed a case for damages against the parents of Daniel, the
vehicle owner, and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC.
Whether or not the petitioner should be liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos? – NO
When the lower court held the academy liable for the death, it pointed
out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in
not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under the Family Code, the school, its administrators, and teachers,
have special parental authority and responsibility over its students.
This responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school or institution. Under Art 219 of the
Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the minor. However, for
petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act/omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused.
(Remember the 3rd element: causal relationship)
Here, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of the
petitioner was the proximate cause of the victim’s death. The
proximate cause was not the negligence of petitioner nor the reckless
driving of the minor. It was the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Hence, the reliance on Art 219 of the Family Code
was unfounded. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide was an event over which
the petitioner academy had no control, petitioner may not be held
liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Culpable Act or Omission: Unknown, no eyewitnesses but its
theorized Wendell shot Julie Ann and committed suicide or both got
shot because Wendell was a narcotics informer
Damage: Julie Ann and Wendell died with a single gunshot wound
inflicted from same firearm, licensed to Libi, on Jan. 14, 1979.
–
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until the time
Libi v. IAC when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell. Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann to get back together but she refused and even
stayed at her friend’s house to avoid Wendell. Then, both Julie Ann
and Wendell died from a gunshot inflicted with the same firearm. The
gun was licensed in the name of petitioner Crescencio Libi. As a
result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages from their
vicarious liability under Art 2180. Petitioners’ defense was that they
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family. The mother of
Wendell claimed that her husband owns a gun which she kept in a
safety box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag. They have never
seen their son taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that
on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.
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 Whether or not petitioners (Wendell’s parents) should be liable for
the damage? – YES

SC said that there are serious doubts as to whether the petitioners

had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by
safely locking the gun. Wendell could not have gotten the gun unless
one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying
around or he had free access to his mother’s bag.

The diligence of a good father of a family consists of the instruction

and supervision of the child. Here, petitioners were remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son
despite his minority and immaturity. It was only at the time of
Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that the son was a
drug agent and that the gun was missing from the safety deposit box.

SC also said that the civil liability of parents is primary and not
subsidiary. Hence, the responsibility shall cease when they prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. The liability
of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is
likewise primary and not subsidiary. Thus, in both quasi-delicts and
crimes, the parents primarily respond for the damages.

5
Owners & managers of enterprises/Employers
Article 2180 par. 4 & 5
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
What are the requisites to hold employers liable under Paragraph 4 of Article 2180?
1. Existence of employer-employee relationship between the culpable employee and
the employer to be held vicariously liable;
2. The employee committed a culpable act or omission;
3. The culpable act is either in the occasion of the employee’s functions or committed
in the service of the branches where he/she is employed; and
4. The employer did not exercise due diligence in the selection AND supervision of
the culpable employee.
Quiz: What are the requisites to make employers vicariously liable under Paragraph 5 of
Article 2180?
1. Existence of a quasi-delict (refer to the elements under Article 2176);
2. Existence of an employer-employee relationship between the culpable employee
and the employer to be made vicariously liable (refer to the four-fold test in Labor);
and
3. The culpable act was committed within the scope of their assigned duty.
NOTE: In the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the
supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
It is important to make a delineation between Par 5 & 6 of Art. 2180; difference:
Par. 4 of 2180 Par. 5 of 2180
Owners and managers of an Employers in general WHETHER
Applies to
establishment/enterprise engaged in any business/industry
Covers acts of negligence of
Covers ALL acts of negligence
employees in the service of the
Covers employees acting in the scope of
branch/establishment or in the
their assigned tasks.
occasion of their functions.
What is the distinction then?
● Atty. Go says that the distinction lies in the character of the negligent act. Thus if the
employee does an act or omission in connection of his/her duties in the service of
the establishment or his/her official functions, and injury results by reason of fault or
negligence then Par. 4 applies.
● Otherwise stated: In Paragraph 4, the employer of the negligent employee must be
engaged in a particular trade or industry. In Paragraph 5, this requirement is absent.
Paragraph 5 includes non-industrialized and non-specialized employer-employee
relationships such as kasambahays, casual drivers, etc.
At 2PM on Aug. 9, ’86, Ananias Sumayang and Manuel Romagos were
riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Tabagon Cebu. As
they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the
road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger bus driven by
Gregorio Pestaño and owned by Metro Cebu Autobus Corporation,
which had tried to overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its
passengers hurtling upon the pavement. The RTC ruled in favor of
Sps. Sumayang, alleging that Pestaño was negligent in driving the
bus. Pestaño negligently attempted to overtake the motorcycle at a
dangerous speed as they were coming upon a junction in the road,
and as the motorcycle was about to turn left towards Tabagon. Metro
Cebu was also held directly and primarily liable along with Pestaño,
as the latter’s employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. The RTC
Pestano v. held that Metro Cebu did not observe the diligence of a good father of
Sumayang a family to prevent the damage, nor in the supervision of its
employees, and maintenance of its vehicles.
Was MCAC vicariously liable for the negligent act of Pestaño? - YES,
it has not proven that it exercised the diligence of a good father in
supervising its employees as evidenced by the broken speedometer.
Both of them should be liable due to their negligence. As a
professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have
anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and
should thus have exercised extreme caution. The CA said that
allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer
showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its
business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence
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 alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which
directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestaño was able to use a
bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss
in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its
vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence
required by law.
Key Take-Away:
● Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of CC, owners and managers
are responsible for damages caused by their employees.
● When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that
employee. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
Culpable Act or Omission: Bus (on the correct lane), driven by Jose,
operated by MCL and owned by Metro Manila Transit collided with a
Ford Escort driven by Macarubo
Damage: Hood of Ford severely damaged, death of Macrubo and
removal of left eye, fracture and lacerations of passenger, Abraham
Causal Relation: Parents Macarubo and Abraham filed a case for
damages.
–
A bus operated by petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines, driven by Jose
collided with a Ford Escort driven by Abraham and Macarubo. Ford
Jose v. CA
Escort just came from a party and the driver had no sleep. The car
encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as the
cross-joint was detached. As a result of the collision, the left side of
the Ford Escort’s hood was damaged. The driver of the Ford was
seriously injured. The passenger was rushed to the hospital but
despite surgery, he died. A case for damages was filed against the
Real v. Belo
petitioners Jose and MCL.
Whether or not petitioners should be held liable for damages? – NO
SC found that based on the position of the two vehicles, the bus was
on its proper lane and it was the Ford Escort which usurped a
portion of the opposite lane. The Ford was positioned diagonally on
the highway, with its 2 front wheels occupying the Bus’ lane. It was
highly likely that it was the defective cross joint which caused the
driver of the Ford Escort to lose control of the vehicle.
As to Proof of Due Diligence in Selection & Supervision
SC held that proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees is not required. The responsibility of employers is
premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees. It is
the negligence of the employee which gives rise to the presumption
of negligence on the part of the employer. Before the presumption of
the employer’s negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must be first
established. While the allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation are enough to
make out a case of quasi-delict, the failure to prove the employee’s
negligence during trial is fatal to proving the employer’s vicarious
liability. In this case, respondents failed to prove their allegation of
negligence against the driver. In fact, the driver was acquitted in the
case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident.
On Liability of the Owner of the Car
Art 2180 makes the persons specified therein responsible for the
quasi-delicts of others. Burden is upon MCL to prove that Macarubo is
one of the specified persons who are vicariously liable for the
negligence of the deceased. It was not alleged in the case that
Macarubo was the son, ward, employee, or pupil of the respondent as
to make Macarubo liable for the negligence of the Ford driver. The
allegation that Macarubo was the authorized driver is not equivalent
to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo.
Culpable Act or Omission: A fire broke out at Wasabe Fastfood Stall
(owned by Real) that spread out to BS Masters Fastfood stall (owned
by Belo).
Damage: Damage to Belo’s stall by fire
Causal Relation: Investigation revealed that the fire broke out
because of the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove and tank
installed at REAL’s stall.
Belo filed for damages against Real for failing to exercise due
diligence in maintaining the equipment in good condition, in the
selection and supervision of employees, and that such negligence is
the proximate cause of the fire. Real argued it was a fortuitous event
and he exercised due diligence in selection/supervision.
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 Is the owner liable? Yes, she is vicariously liable. She failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father in supervising her employee
and stall.
Fire is not a fortuitous event because for Art. 1174 to apply, there
should be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of
injury or loss. Evidence showed it came from the leaking fumes and
that the employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading.
Thus, whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury
to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer
failed to exercise due diligence by virtue of Art. 2180. Real was
unable to submit proof that the equipment or LPG stove was
maintained and checked for defects. There was no evidence of
exercising diligence in selection and supervision of employees.
After some snacks and chat with friends at 2AM, Abad while driving
Castilex’ company pickup, collided with Vasquez’ motorcycle, resulting
in the death of Vasquez in Cebu Doctors 8 days later. Sps Vasquez
filed an action for damages, while the hospital intervened to collect
unpaid balance. Trial Court ordered Abad and Castilex to pay jointly
and solidarily. CA affirmed but made Castilex only vicariously liable.
Caltex argued it is not vicariously liable because Art. 2180 par. 5
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged
in business/industry. Since it is engaged in manufacturing and selling,
it is covered not under par. 5 but par. 4.
Whether par. 5 requires the person not to be engaged in
business/industry? No.
Castilex Industrial v.
It just means it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
Vasquez (repeat
case) business or industry. Both paragraphs could apply in this case
because par. 5 is only an expansion. Par. 4 is applicable when the
employee is performing functions which are beyond their office, title
or designation but which are still within the call of duty.
Whether Castilex is vicariously liable for the death resulting from
the negligent operations by its managerial employee under Article
2180 par. 5 providing that employers are liable for its employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task, not engaged in any
business or industry? No.
Abad was going from work AFTER he tended to his own personal
business. Such is not within the service of the branch or the
occasion of his functions. It is important to establish the
employer-employee relationship and that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the tort was committed.
Use in Going to/from meals
● GR: Not within the scope of employment
● XPN: When there’s evidence of special benefit to the
employer (such as when by using the vehicle, the
employee’s time off is reduced and he’s able to devote more
time to perform his duty
Use in Going to/from work
● GR: Not part of service to employer
● XPN: If employer derives some special benefit from having
the employee drive home (having employee at work earlier),
special errand or roving commission rule (ex. Employee is
required to circulate in an area with no fixed hours of work or
to go to and from his house to various outside places of work
● X2X: Employee is not deemed to be acting within the scope
of employment (ex. Personal errand
Use outside regular working hours/Employer-loaned vehicle for
employee’s personal use
● Employer is not liable even when there’s incidental benefit to
employee
In this case, Abad was carrying out a personal purpose not in line
with his duties. It was beyond normal work hours (2AM).
Requisites to hold employer liable under CC
1. Employer-employee relationship
2. Plaintiff acting within the scope of assigned task
3. Defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees not duly proven
Under RPC
1. Employer is engaged in any kind of industry
2. Commits felony while in the discharge of duties
3. Insolvent and has not satisfied civil liability
NOTE: In order for liability to attach to persons mentioned in par. 4 & 5
of Article 2180, the employees must have committed the act causing
damage in either two situations:
1. In the course of service of the establishment or enterprise
OR acts within their function
2. When the employee is doing acts within the scope of official
duty.
3. Employers
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Atty Go says that the difference between the two is:
● Par. 5 applies when an employee is acting in the scope of
their assigned task given to them by the employer.
○ In the former, the character of the act is in the
service of the establishment or their functions. In
the latter, the character of the act is done within the
assigned task given by the employer.
● Par. 5 is merely an expansion of Par. 4 in that, even if the
employee was not acting in the service of any establishment
and is not doing acts which part of his/her official functions;
as long as the employee is acting within the direction of the
employer, the employer is still held liable.
Culpable Act or Omission: The jeep, driven by Darwin (owned by
Nuval) collided with the car of Zacarias when Darwin swerved into the
lane of Zacarias one night.
Damage: Zacarias suffered injuries and leg was operated on, resulting
in his limp.
– ●
Carticiano v. Nuval Carticiano was on his way home to Cavite, with Zacarias driving his
father’s Ford Laser car. At the same time, Nuval’s jeep driven by
Darwin was travelling the opposite direction. When the two cars were
about to pass one another, Darwin veered the vehicle and occupied
Zacarias’ lane. As a result, the 2 vehicles collided. As a result, Zacarias
suffered physical injuries and he eventually filed this case for
damages. Zacarias alleged that the proximate cause of the accident
is Darwin’s recklessness in driving Nuval’s jeep. He also alleged that
Nuval did not exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Nuval claims that he cannot be held
liable for the acts of Darwin. That Darwin was not an employee at the
time of the accident. He was only hired as a casual and has worked
with Nuval only for 5 days. That Darwin was not authorized to drive
Nuva;’s vehicle.
W/N Nuval, as the employer, is liable? Yes.
(WON Nuval as employer can be held liable for the tort committed by
Darwin? YES)
Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law
presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the
latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a
defense. Darwin’s job was to drive Nuval’s children to and from the
school and had easy access to the keys. Nuval cannot claim he
exercised diligence as his main defense, and that Darwin was no
longer his employee (he presented a payroll showing this but no proof
of termination). There was also no evidence of contributory
negligence as there is insufficient proof to show Zacarias could have
evaded the vehicle.
RECAP:
It was not sufficiently proven that the employment of Darwin with
Nuval had already been terminated. It was also not proven that Darwin
stole the car from Nuval. SC was convinced that Darwin was Nuval’s
driver at the time of the accident. In this case, Darwin was acting
within the scope of authority given to him when the collision
occurred. Darwin had easy access to the keys of the vehicle. True,
Darwin was hired to take Nuval’s children to school, but no proof was
presented to show that it was his only task. His authority was to drive
Nuval’s car. Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the
law presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes the
burden of proving proper selection of employee as defense.
NOTE:
This case was a prime-example of Art. 2180 (5), Nuval was
held vicariously liable because of the negligent acts of his
driver Darwin. Darwin was Nuval’s personal driver, and was
acting in the scope of his assigned task which is DRIVING
Nuval’s owner type jeep. It didn’t matter that Darwin was not
driving Nuval’s kids at the time.
Culpable Act or Omission: Son of Sps. Vallejera was hit by a van
L.G. Foods v. driven by Yeneza (owned by LG Foods)
Pagapong-
Agraviador Damage: Death of child of Sps. Vallejera
9
Causal Relation: A criminal case was filed but was dismissed as driver
committed suicide. Thereafter, Sps. filed a civil case against LG Foods
as the employer of the deceased driver, alleging that it failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee.
– The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil
Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Vallereja, was hit by
a Ford Fiera van owned by the LG Foods and driven at the time by
their employee Yeneza. Charles died as a result of the accident. Then,
an information for reckless imprudence was filed against the driver but
before trial could be concluded, the accused committed suicide and
the case was dismissed. Spouses Vallereja then filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners as employers of the deceased driver.
Alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
LG Food argued the complaint is a claim for subsidiary liability (Article
103 of the RPC) and since the driver died, no judgment of conviction
can be done, which is a requirement to hold the employer liable.
Whether the cause of action of the civil case is found on Art. 103 of
RPC or Art. 2180 of the CC? It is QD under Art. 2180. The criminal
action has ceased and the only recourse of the petitioners was to file
a claim of damages under Art. 2180. The CIVIL CASE is a negligence
suit brought under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code to recover damages
primarily from LG Foods as EMPLOYERS responsible for their
negligent driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Huang
Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver,
precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the
criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue
the employer for their direct and primary liability based on
quasi-delict.
There are two separate civil liability: civil liability ex delicto and
independent civil liabilities.
● Independent civil liabilities: Contractual, Quasi-delict, act or
omission complained as a felony, obligations from law, right
to file an action independent and distinct from criminal
action.
Under Art. 2180, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It
is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
The complaint sufficiently alleged the death of the son was caused by
a negligent act of the employer’s driver and the employer is civilly
liable for negligence for failing to exercise diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee.
action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of
no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed
without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, it is
as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place.
Culpable Act or Omission: 6-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario
(owned by Mercury) swerved to its left hitting a red toyota sedan
driven by Huang (owned by his parents)
Damage: Car total wreck valued at P300k (the collision hurled the car
over the island where it hit a lamppost, the truck also hit a lamppost).
Huang paralyzed for life, chest down.
Huang fault driver for committing gross negligence while driving and
Mercury Drug in failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection & supervision of its driver.
Whether the driver was negligent? Yes.
Dr. Daza, an expert in Physics, concluded the general direction of the
car after impact would be to the left of the truck. Damage was at the
right side of the truck. Also, after the impact, he lost control of the
truck and failed to apply his brakes.
Whether Mercury Rug is liable? Yes.
In the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required
to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.
With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In this case,
● Drivers are required to take theoretical and actual driving
tests and psychological examination. However, it was taken
10
 by Del Rosario as a delivery man, not truck man.
● Del Rosario did not use a truck in the driving tests
● No tests were taken on motor skills development, perceptual
speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness
● No NBI and police clearance
● Attended only 3 driving seminar (last one 12 years ago)
● No back-up driver for long trips – not a company policy
● Has driven for 13 hours without alternates
● No driving license
● Holding a traffic violation receipt for reckless driving (no
suspension or reprimand, no disciplinary action)
● Failed to step on the breaks upon impact to reduce damage
Filamer - School
Funtencha - student
Agustin Masa - director and president of school
Allan Masa - authorized driver
Culpable Act or Omission: Kapunan Sr., an 82-year old teacher, was
walking along Roxas Avenue when he was struck by a jeep driven by
Funtencha (owned by Filamer Christian Institute).
Damage: Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries, hospitalized for 20
days
At the time of the accident, only one headlight of the jeep was
functioning. It was also Funtecha, who only had a student driver’s
permit, who was driving. He persuaded the authorized driver to turn
Filamer Christian over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident.
Institute v. CA
Kapunan Sr. filed a criminal case and reserved to file an independent
civil action. Funtecha was found guilty of serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Kapunan Sr. filed a civil case against
Filamer and Funtecha and Agustin Masa (the director and president
of Filamer) for allowing Funtecha to drive despite not having the
necessary license, and Allan Masa (passenger).
Del Carmen v. Bacoy
Whether Filamer is vicariously liable? No (1990).
The Labor Code provides that there is no employer-employee
relationship between students and schools where students work in
exchange for the privilege to study. Under this provision, petitioner
cannot be considered as Funtencha’s employer. He belongs to that
special category of students who render service to the school in
exchange for free tuition. He was not even included in the company
payroll.
Even if he were an employee, Funtecha was not acting within the
scope of his employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages
for 2 hours, not driving.
Whether Filamer is vicariously liable? Yes (1992 – MR).
Under the circumstances, the school president had knowledge that
the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
In this case, Funtecha requested the authorized driver, Masa, to allow
him to take over the vehicle as he has a student permit. Driving to and
from the house of the school president where both Masa and
Funtecha reside is an act of furtherance of interest of the school.
Masa’s job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can
fetch the students in the morning.
The clause “within the scope of their assigned tasks” includes any act
done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer.
The Labor Code and Omnibus Rules are not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student
There were no rules and guidelines to prohibit employees from taking
over the vehicles if not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and
son to authorize another employee. It also failed to prove it imposed
sanctions or warned employees against the use.
Culpable Act or Omission: A Fuso passenger jeep driven by Allan
(registered in the name of Sps. Del Carmen) ran over Sps. Monsalud
and their daughter Glenda when they were on their way home from a
party
Damage: Death of the 3
A criminal case was filed against the jeepney driver and during the
pendency of the case, Bacoy filed a civil case for damages against
Allan and the Spouses Del Carmen. Defendants refused civil liability
averring that they do not own the jeep and that they were never the
employers of Allan. Rather, they were employers of Rodrigo, their
driver and the brother of Allan. They claim that Allan stole the jeep
while it was parked beside Rodrigo’s house to take it for a joyride (the
jeep can easily be started by merely pushing the ignition key).
Whether Sps. Del Carmen are primarily liable for the negligence
11
 caused by Allan? Yes.
The operator of a vehicle is primarily responsible to 3rd persons for
deaths/injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the
employee drove the vehicle in connection with his employment.
In the case of registered motor vehicles, the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while
the vehicle was being driven on the highways.
● Main aim of vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, responsibility can be fixed on a
definite individual.
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the vehicle
was stolen, Oscar cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting
from the jeep’s use. The defense that Allan drove in a private capacity
still makes him liable because there is a settled doctrine that the
registered owner even if not used for public service would be
responsible to the public or third persons for injuries while being
driven in the highways or streets.
Res Ipsa Loquitur present in this case:
1. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; - not normal for a person to be
sideswept and run over unless the one in charge of the
vehicle was negligent.
2. The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person in charge and – car exclusive control of Oscar,
has the power to supervise and control driver; As he is
aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also
has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to
instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution.
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. – no evidence death was due to voluntary action or
contribution
Culpable Act or Omission: A pickup, driven by Lonzano for Mayor
Miguel, registered under Apostol, borrowed from Simbulan
Damage: Death of a minor, Jayme
Jayme v. Apostol
Causal Relation: Sps. Jayme sued everyone.
● Simbulan and Apostol had nothing to do with Lozano driving
around
● Mayor not in the pickup
–
The mayor of Koronadal (Miguel) was on board an Isuzu pick-up truck
driven by Lozano, an employee of the municipality of Koronadal. The
truck was registered under the name of Apostol, but it was in the
possession of Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the truck to bring the
mayor to the Airport to catch his flight to Manila. However, the truck
hit a minor who was crossing the National Highway. The collision
sent the child 50 meters away from point of impact. Lozano was
driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. The child died
despite medical treatment. The parents filed a complaint for damages
against respondents. All respondents denied liability for Marvin’s
death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
truck without their consent. Miguel pointed out that the boy’s sudden
sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident.
Miguel also denied being on board the vehicle. The parents contend
that vicarious liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. He was not a mere
passenger, but one who had direct control and supervision over
Lozano at the time of the accident. The element of direct control is not
negated by the fact that Lozano’s employer was the Municipality of
Koronadal.
Lower court found Lozano, Apostol, and Mayor solidarily liable,
prompting the mayor to appeal.
Whether Mayor Miguel can be held liable on the basis of Vicarious
Liability? No.
(WON the doctrine of vicarious liability applies? NO)
Elements of Vicarious Liability
1. Employee chosen by the employer or another
2. Service rendered with authority of employer
3. Illicit act done by reason of function
Four fold test
1. Power of selection
2. Payment of wages
3. Control
4. Dismissal
In this case, Mayor is not the employer. It is the LGU. Mere giving of
directions does not make him liable.
To make the employee liable under pars 5 and 6 of Art 2180, it must
12
 be established that the injurious act was committed at the time the
employee was performing his functions. The employer-employee
relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove the relationship. It is imperative to determine the
employer-employee relationship using the four-fold test. Under the 4
elements, it was not the mayor but the MUNICIPALITY which was
the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. The
spouses also argued that the Mayor had supervision and control over
Lozano and how the latter drove the pick-up truck at the time of the
accident. But SC held that assuming he had authority to give
instructions, he still cannot be held liable. Mere giving of instructions
to the driver does not establish that the passenger had control over
the vehicle. No negligence may be imputed against a fellow
employee although the person may have the right to control the
manner of the vehicle’s operation. In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship, the driver’s negligence should not
be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an
occupant of the vehicle.
Whether Mayor can be held liable for his own negligence in not
warning the driver?
● No, failure of a passenger to assist the driver by providing
warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the
passenger liable.
Whether the LGU can be held liable?
● No, it must be shown that the action is done in its proprietary
capacity
Note: distinguish from subsidiary Liability under the RPC [Articles 102 and 103]
● Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an
employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law
does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
Nonetheless, before the employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must
exist establishing that:
1. they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees;
2. they are engaged in some kind of industry;
3. the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and
4. the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.
The determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the
judgment.
Revised Penal Code – Articles 102-103
ARTICLE 102. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Innkeepers, Tavernkeepers and Proprietors of
Establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,
and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may
have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper’s employees.
ARTICLE 103. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
13
Medical negligence/malpractice
Three important doctrines arose from this section:
1. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Negligence Cases:
The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur did not change in Ramos v. CA. Two important points
however arose in the case. First, one element of the doctrine was clarified in the context of
Medical Negligence. Second, the application of the doctrine.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked by the plaintiff when the following
requisites concur: KNOWS-BEST- NO ACCESS
1. Defendant, having in charge of the instrumentality, either knows the cause of the
accident or is in the best opportunity of ascertaining it
2. Plaintiff has no knowledge and has no access to evidence.
For PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE arising from the invocation of res ipsa loquitur several
factors must concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent.
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of person charged negligence
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.
Once the plaintiff has proven the requisites, the burden is shifted to defendant/alleged
tortfeasor to prove that he/she/it has acted with diligence with evidence to overthrow the
presumption.
However, it is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the
presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant to prove that it exercised
due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established
HOW IS THE DOCTRINE APPLIED IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASES?
● The rule for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa is - Whether or not in the
process of the operation, any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of
the routine performance occurred, which is beyond the regular scope of customary
professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves
reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the
untoward consequence.
2. Application of Art. 2180 vs. Doctrine of Apparent Authority:
The rules for determining vicarious liability under par. 4 & 5 of Art. 2180 still applies in the
medical malpractice cases.
They only apply however if the hospital is the employer of the resident doctor AND NOT
MERELY a contractor. In order to determine this apply the four-fold test to determine whether
there is an employer-employee relationship.
Q: What if there’s no Employer-Employee relationship between the Doctor and the
Hospital?
● A: Then go to the next level of inquiry.
○ Did the Hospital “hold-out” the services of the Doctor in the hospital in a
manner as to show that the particular doctor is an employee of the
hospital, AND BECAUSE of this representation did the plaintiff RELIED on
such representation to engage the services of the doctor?
■ If the answer is YES, then apply the requisites for the doctrine of
apparent authority.
Elements of the doctrine of apparent authority in hospitals:
1. The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or
agent of the hospital.
2. Where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must
also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them.
3. The plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
If all the elements concur then the hospital is solidarily liable for the damage caused.
The critical element is the reliance of the plaintiff upon the representation of the hospital.
Thus, it stands to reason that the plaintiff HAD NO WAY of knowing that the doctor “held-out”
to be in an employee or agent of the Hospital, was NOT an employee or agent of the latter.
3. Corporate Negligence:
A close reading of the cases of PSI and Nogales cases will show that the Corporate
Negligence does not stem from Art. 2180, but rather Art. 2176.
14
Corporate Negligence of Hospitals arise from their failure to exercise the following
standard of care: W/N Dr. Gutierrez is liable? YES
1. The use of reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and
equipment; Dr. Gutierrez is liable. Dr. Gutierrez failed to conduct a pre-operative
2. The selection and retention of competent physicians; evaluation of the patient prior to the administration of anesthesia. This
3. The overseeing or supervision of all persons who practice medicine within its walls; procedure is universally observed to lessen the possibility of
and anesthetic accidents. Seeing her patient for the first time only an
hour before the scheduled operation was an act of exceptional
4. The formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that
negligence and professional irresponsibility. This led to the failure of
ensure quality care for its patients. the intubation which was the proximate cause of the patient's current
condition.
Culpable Act or Omission: Wrong intubation by Dr. Gutierrez
Is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applicable? - YES.
Damage: Comatose condition of Erlinda
Causal Relation: Doctor witness: endotracheal tube entered
Res Ipsa Loquitur – need for expert medical testimony dispensed
esophagus causing delay in oxygen. Second intubation was not
1) The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
successful because bluish discoloration was observed. Assuming
unless someone is negligent; - brain damage does not
successful, Erlinda brain dead.
usually occur in a gall bladder operation and does not
happen in the absence of negligence in the administration of
–
anesthesia and the use of endotracheal tube
2) The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
Because of occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains which
the person in charge – the instruments used in the
she thinks are being caused by gall bladder stones, Erlina Ramos, an
administration of anesthesia were all under the exclusive
otherwise a robust woman, with her husband, met with Dr. Hosaka, for
control of the respondent doctors
a cholecystectomy. She was admitted into Delos Santos Medical
3) The injury suffered must not have been due to any
Center. On the day of the operation, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3-hours late.
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
When he arrived, they abruptly Started.
injured - Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence because she was unconscious.
Dean Herminda, Erlina’s sister-in-law, was present in the operation
Ramos v. CA (1999) room for support. She observed that while Dr. Gutierrez, the
*Dr. Gutierrez argued the difficulty to insert the tube because of being
anesthesiologist, was intubating the patient, the patient’s nailbred
obese, short neck and protruding teeth. A preoperative evaluation
became bluish, signaling decrease of bloody supply in the brain. Dr.
could have been done to lessen anesthetic accidents. IN this case, no
Gutierrez remarked that something is wrong with the intubation and
preoperative evaluation
that the patient’s stomach is growing. Dr. Hosaka had to call another
anesthesiologist. Still with bluish nail beds, the patient was placed in a
Whether Dr. Hosaka is liable? Yes.
trendelenburg position. At 3PM that day, the patient was admitted to
the ICU. She stayed there for a month, and then was discharged
Captain of the ship doctrine – As the so-called captain of the ship, it
from the hospital after 4 months. However, since that day, the
is the surgeon’s responsibility to see to it that those under him
patient Erlinada, has been in comatose. She cannot move, see, hear
perform their task in the proper manner.
and is living on mechanical means. She was diagnosed to be suffering
from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage.
IN this case, no evidence Dr. Hosaka verified if properly intubated. He
was also 3 hours late. (2002)
The Ramos family filed a civil case for damages against the hospital,
- Dr. Hosaka recommended Dr. Gutierrez
Dr. Hosaka, and Dr. Gutierrez. As a defense, they presented the
- Dr. Hosaka’s delay could have caused continued starvation,
testimony of Dr. Jamora who said the cause of brain damage was
risk of acidosis and increased anxiety
Erlinda’s allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent. RTC held them all
liable, but the CA reversed.

15
 Dr. Hosaka is liable. His negligence can be found in his failure to
exercise the proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in
not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. Dr. Hosaka failed to verify if respondent Dra. Gutierrez
properly intubated the patient. Because of Dr. Hosaka’s tardiness, he
had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding
the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his
professional duties towards his patient.
Whether the hospital is liable? YES
For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
Hospital in this case failed to adduce evidence that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in hiring and supervising
physicians. Solidarily liable with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the formers responsibility under a relationship of
patria potestas
(NOTE - in the MR, hospital was found NOT liable. Check MR)
Same facts as above. DLSMC, Dr. Hosaka, and Dr. Gutierrez moved for
a motion for reconsideration.
Dr. Gutierrez - alleged that Erlinda’s allergic reaction to pentothal
might have been a reason to her comatose condition.
● SHE IS NEGLIGENT. The faulty intubation was the proximate
cause of Erlinda’s comatose condition.
● SC: found no evidence on the matter. The Court found that
Gutierrez was remiss of her duties by not following the
Ramos v CA standards of care as an anesthesiologist. She omitted to
(Resolution, 2002) perform a thorough preoperative evaluation on Erlinda. The
cyanosis and enlargement of Erlinda’s stomach indicate that
the tube was improperly inserted into the esophagus instead
of the trachea. Consequently, oxygen was delivered not to
the lungs but to the gastrointestinal tract. The injury incurred
by Erlinda does not normally happen absent any
negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the
use of an endotracheal tube.
Dr. Hosaka - contends that the Court erred in finding him negligent as
a surgeon by applying the Captain-of-the- Ship doctrine.
● HE IS NEGLIGENT because of the Captain of the Ship
doctrine and his negligence in not arriving on time.
● SC: That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do
away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean
that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka worked as a team in the operating room. Dr.
Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very least,
supervision over the procedure then being performed on
Erlinda.
Whether the hospital is liable? NO (MR 2002)
● There is no employer-employee relationship between the
hospital and the doctors in applying four fold test
● 1st - Hospital does not hire consultants but accredits and
grants them the privilege to maintain and admit patients if
they have the necessary qualifications [SELECTION]
● 2nd - it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the
consultants fee [WAGES]
● 3rd - a hospital does not dismiss a consultant; instead, the
latter may lose his or her accreditation or privileges granted
by the hospital. [POWER OF DISMISSAL]
● 4th - Does not exercise control; when a doctor refers a
patient for admission in a hospital, it is the doctor who
prescribes the treatment to be given to said patient. The
hospital’s obligations are limited to room accommodation,
providing the diet and meds recommended by the Dr.,,
equipment, facilities, services of staff [CONTROL]
● Hence, not solidarily liable for Erlineda
Culpable Act or Omission: Upon transfer to the delivery room,
Corazon experienced convulsions prompting delivery of the baby
which led to the tearing of the cervical tissue leading to profuse
bleeding. A hysterectomy was done but Corazon died.
Damage: Death of Corazon
Nogales v. Capitol Causal Relation: RTC held that the cause is the pre-eclamptic
Medical condition of the patient and misapplying the forceps causing a
cervical tear. Dr. Estrada is liable. Nogales wants to hold CMC liable.
CMC argued Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor.
Corazon Nogales was having her 4th pregnancy. She was under the
exclusive care of Dr. Estrada, who was regularly visiting her at home.
When Corazon started to experience mild labor pains, Dr. Estrada
advised her immediate admission to Capitol Medical Center (CMC).
16
There, Rogelio Nogales, was made to sign consent and waiver
forms bearing the CMC letterhead. After a series of operations, and
after being handled by a number of physician-employees of CMC
(under the direction of Dr. Estrada), Corazon died due to a torn
cervical tissue, and the baby was extracted, but in a weak and injured
condition.
Rogelio, on behalf of the children, filed a complaint for damages,
based on negligence (ie., quasi-delict) against CMC (vicariously) and
each and every phyisician and the nurse of CMC.
CMC argues that it is not liable since Dr. Estrada was not an employee,
but a mere independent contractor, and that the physician-employees
and the nurse of CMC were not negligent, and that they were under
the direct supervision of Dr. Estrada, who should solely be liable.
Whether Dr. Estrada is an employee? NO
Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC since the latter did not control
the former’s methods and manners, but merely supplied Dr. Estrada
with staff and facility privileges in CMC, considering that the situation
was an emergency.
Whether CMC is liable? Yes, due to its implied act of clothing Dr.
Estrada with apparent authority [Doctrine of Apparent Authority]
GR: The hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician
EXC: Doctrine of Apparent Authority
The doctrine of apparent authority focuses on two factors: (1) the
hospital’s manifestations and (2) the patient’s reliance.
For the hospital’s manifestations, it need not make express
representations to the patient that the treating physician is an
employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and
implied; the doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine
of estoppel.
Elements:
1. Hospital or its agent acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude the individual was an
employer or agent
a. CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms and waivers
printed on CMC letterhead – contained a provision
“That the Physician, personally or by and through
the CMC and/or its staff, may use, adapt, or employ
such means, forms or methods of cure, treatment...”
b. Such form made it appear that Dr. Estrada was
authorized by CMC, and contained no express
recital of the contrary.
2. Acts of the agent create the appearance of authority
(plaintiff must prove the hospital had knowledge and
acquiesced)
a. Dr. Estrada’s referral of Nogales to CMC gave the
impression that Dr. Estrada is a member of CMC’s
medical staff, which impression was further
reinforced when Dr. Estrada was collaborating with
other CMC-employed specialists in treating
Corazon.
3. Plaintiff relied upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence
a. patient relied on the hospital to provide complete
emergency room care, choosing of Dr. Estrada due
to connection with CMC, brought to hospital due to
fear of complications
The consent forms and waivers cannot relieve CMC from liability
because it did not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation.
- This was a CONTRACT OF ADHESION which is construed
strictly against hospital
- Blanket release contrary to public policy
No liability on the part of the other physicians and the nurse:
1. Dr. Villaflor – act of reducing MgSO4 were orders of Dr.
Estrada
2. Dr. Uy – did not participate in delivery, merely resident
physician
3. Dr. Enriquez – anesthesiologist, not expected to correct Dr.
Estrada (no evidence of knowledge of error)
4. Dr. Lacson – no unreasonable delay in the delivery of blood
(45-60mins)
5. Dr. Espinola – not negligent by giving order through phone,
hysterectomy did not push through as it is too late
6. Nurse Dumlao – no evidence of the nurse’s alleged failure to
follow Dr. Estrada’s specific instructions. No showing that
side-drip administration of hemacel proximately caused
Corazon’s death.
Professional Services Culpable Act or Omission: Dr. Fuentes, who performed the
v. Natividad hysterectomy and Dr. Ampil who closed the incision, ended the
17
operation despite 2 missing gauze. Despite the report of 2 missing
gauze after operation, PSI did not initiate an investigation.
Damage: Gauze caused a recto-vaginal fistula cuasing stool to
excrete out of the vagina prompting the need for another surgery
Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy on
respondent Natividad Agana. Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the
operation appeared to be flawed. In the Record of Operation, the
attending nurses entered these remarks, “sponge count lacking 2,
announced to surgeon searched done (sic) but to no avail continue for
closure.” Despite the report of 2 missing gauzes after the operation
PSI did not initiate an investigation. Natividad still felt pains and it
turns out she was suffering due to 2 gauges left inside her vagina
so she and her husband sued PSI. {MY GOD…]
1. The use of reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and
adequate facilities and equipment;
2. The selection and retention of competent physicians;
3. The overseeing or supervision of all persons who practice
medicine within its walls; and
4. The formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate
rules and policies that ensure quality care for its patients.
In this case, PSI as owner, operator and manager of Medical City
Hospital did not perform the necessary supervision nor exercise
diligent effort in the supervision of the staff. PSI's liability is traceable
to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the
nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSI's part in the
dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
Directly liable

Whether Dr. Ampil is liable for negligence? YES. His negligence is *Also vicariously liable as it failed to adduce evidence showing it
the proximate cause of Natividad's injury. exercise diligence of a good father

Elements of Medical Negligence

1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate cause

A patient must only prove that healthcare provider either failed to do

something which is reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done.

Negligence - Act of closing incision despite the information given of

two gauze still missing. The extraction of the gauze from the vagina
established the causal link. What further aggravated such injury was
his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge
of Natividad and her family.

Whether Dr. Fuentes is absolved?

Yes, because of the Captain of the Ship rule.
The operating surgeon is the person in complete control of the
surgery. His duty is to obey the orders of Dr. Ampil. The control and
management of the thing is in the hands of Dr. Ampil

Whether PSI is solidarily liable? Yes.

Doctrine of Corporate Negligence or Corporate Responsibility

Hospital’s duties include:

18
State

ARTICLE 2180 STATE LIABILITY TORTFEASOR FUNCTION

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own State NOT liable, only the
Governmental functions
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. [xx] public officer is liable under
INHERENT in office
Art. 2176
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when Public Officer
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in State may be held liable, as Governmental functions
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. [xx] acting through as Special FOREIGN to the usual
Agent (Art. 2180, [6]) functions of the office
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. State may be held liable, as Governmental functions
acting through as Special Private Individual specifically commissioned
Agent (Art. 2180, [6]) by the State
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in State may be held liable as
Proprietary functions on
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. an Ordinary Employer (Art. Private Individual
behalf of the state
2180, [4,5])
There are two situations wherein the state can be held liable for the acts of its officials or
agents: State may be held liable as
an Ordinary Employer (Art. Public Officer Proprietary functions
1. Through the negligent acts of its special agent
2180, [4,5])
2. Through the acts of officials in the course of proprietary functions.

What is meant by Special Agent? - A special agent is a private person deputized or

commissioned by the State to perform a special governmental task.
Proprietary Function vs. Governmental Function - It is important to distinguish what act the
State is engaged in in order to determine if liability may attach. If such is Governmental
Function then no liability attaches to the Government by way of Vicarious liability. Negligence
will be attached to the officer causing damage through fault or negligence under Art. 2176.
Culpable Act or Omission: A pick-up owned by National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) driven by Garcia (employee of agency) bumped a
bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and
Restituto Deligo
Damage: Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured.
Fontanilla later died.

However, if the state is exercising Proprietary Functions, then it allows itself to be sued under
Art. 2180 as a regular employer
Maliaman (1989)
What’s the difference then?
● Governmental/Public functions are functions that pertain exclusively to the
government.
○ Generally, the state cannot be held liable for acts of its employees/agents
unless it acts through a special agent, in which case it may be held
vicariously liable
● Proprietary functions are actions of the government which is also available to a
private person or entity.
○ State may be held vicariously liable as an ordinary employer
Causal Relation:
Fontanlla v. Sps. Fontanilla filed for damages against NIA. NIA argued that it
cannot be liable as it is an agent and doing governmental functions
and driver is not a special agent
*Garcia was then a regular driver of the respondent agency who at the
time of the accident was a licensed professional driver. Qualified for
employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed
written and oral exams on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles
Whether NIA liable for torts? Yes.

19

The liability of the State has 2 aspects:
● Its public or governmental aspects – where it is liable for the
tortious acts of special agents only
● Its private or business aspects [proprietary] – where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer
Art. 2180(6) provides that the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done by special agent (if public official must not only be
commission to specially do a particular task but task must be foreign
to usual functions)
If the State’s agent is not a public official and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental function, state assumes the role of an
ordinary employer and will be held liable as such.
IN this case, NIA is an agency exercising proprietary function: collect
fees for irrigations. NIA assumes liability of an ordinary employer.
Negligence of driver
- Francisco thrown 50 meters away due to the speeding
vehicle (caused damage to radiator guard, hood, fender, and
radiator)
No diligence in supervision
- Failure of the supervisor, Ely Salonga to caution and make
the driver observe the proper speed limit
- Even if employer can prove diligence in the selection and
supervision, Salonga ratified the wrongful acts (by allowing
the speed limit)
NIA claims that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions
● As such, it is not liable for the tortious act of its driver who
was not its special agent
Whether NIA performs proprietary functions which can make them
Fontanila v.
Maliaman (1991)
liable for damage? Yes
The functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are
regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the
service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is
for the general interest of society.
Although the community benefited from the service, it is only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation
of lands.
NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the
Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects.
The NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the
Corporation Law.
Therefore, it may be liable for the damages caused by the negligent
act of its driver
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS
Involves exercise of sovereignty Connotes merely the exercise
and considered as compulsory of proprietary functions and
considered as optional
Culpable Act or Omission: Ambulance turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into
the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or
horn. It then hit a motorcycle driven by Merritt, in violation of the
prescribed ordinance and Motor Vehicle Act.
Damage: Severe injury of Merritt, lost agility, energy and ability to
work as a contractor. Merritt also had to dissolve the partnership he
had formed with an engineer because he was incapacitated from
making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his
leg and of his mental faculties.
Merritt v.
Government of
Philippine Islands Causal Relation: Merritt sued the government. Trial court found the
driver negligent. Act 2457 was enacted authorizing Merritt to file the
case against the government to fix the responsibility for collision and
determine damages.
Whether the Government is liable? No.
State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents
whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative
enactment. The rule is: by consenting to be sued, a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. In this case, Act 2457 does not operate
to extend liability of government but it gives a remedy to enforce pre
20
existing liability.

Civil Code provides the State is only liable for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents.

Special agent = one who receives a definite and fixed order or

commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official

The concept of special agent DOES NOT apply to an executive agent

who is an employee of the active administration and who in his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office

In this case, the driver is not a special agent. Thus, the Government is
not liable.

21
Teachers/heads of establishments (ARTICLES 218 and 219, Family Code)
Family Code - ARTICLES 218 and 219
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if
it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades – liable for pupils and students or
apprentice as long as in custody (2180)
School, administrators, teachers or individual, entity or institution engaged in child care –
special parental authority over minor (218, FC)
● Applies to all authorized activities outside or inside the school
● Principally and solidarily liable for damage caused by unemancipated minor (219,
FC)
○ Parents, guardians, and other persons with substitute parental authority –
subsidiary
○ Shall not apply if proven proper diligence (219, FC)
Culpable Act or Omission: Tabugo (teacher) left her Grade 6 science
class while it was doing an experiment. Jayson, the assistant leader of
one of the class groups, 12 years old, checked the test tube for results,
St. Joseph’s College but one of the groupmates moved it closer to his eye. The compound
v. Miranda in the test tube then spurted out and several particles hit Jayson's eye.
JIC: science experiment = fusion of sulfur and iron fillings
Damage: As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had
to spend for his medication. Vision of Jason was not impaired but to
avoid additional charges, his parents requested SJC to pay for the
medical expenses.
Causal Relation: St. Joseph College (SJC) argued that Jayson and
classmates were given strict instructions to follow written procedure
and not to look into the test tube until the compound cooled off.
● SJC: proximate cause of Jayson's injury was his own
negligence in disregarding Tabugo’s instructions and
peeking into the tube. He was of sufficient age & discretion
● Parents sued SJC for damages as it did not agree to pay.
W/N SJC can be held liable for the accident? - YES; Petitioners were
"negligent since they all failed to exercise the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to
the students."
Petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a
higher degree of care, caution, and foresight.
SC also said that it was wrong for petitioners to allocate all the
responsibility for the accident on a 12-year old student
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, caution, and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators, and teachers
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by pupils, students and apprentices so long as
they remain in the custody.
● SJC did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury
to its students although it knew the dangerous nature of the
experiments
● SJC did not install safety measure to protect the children
● SJC did not provide protective gears and devices
● Tabugo was not in the classroom, the whole time of the
experiment
● 50 students is difficult to monitor
How different from the case of St. Mary’s?
● Here, the cause of the accident was the mechanical defect
and not the recklessness of the minor
● The mishap was foreseeable by the school, its officials, and
teachers.
22
 Within the premises of the Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an
ROTC Unit, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The ROTC unit has an armory in the basement of BCF. The
ROTC Unit had Jimmy Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer
of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not
an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP.
Culpable Act or Omission: At night, while in BCF, Abon took and used
an unlicensed firearm from the armorer by the AFP as he was the duly
appointed armorer.
Then, in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a
student of the University with an unlicensed firearm
Damage: Napoleon was shot; died.
Causal Relation: Abon convicted of Homicide; Heirs then sued for
damages, impleading not just Abon but also BCF and Benjamin
Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF).
Whether BCF is solidarily liable? No.
Under Art. 2180, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
Salvosa v. IAC
trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." Likewise, "the
phrase used in [Art. 2180] — 'so long as (the students) remain in their
custody' means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time.
Hence, Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in
the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Abon was neither at attendance in class nor in recess at the time of
the shooting. He was already dismissed at 8PM.
● Supported on record that under the instruction of ROTC unit
commandant, Ugos told Abon not to leave the armory and
guard it. This shows that Abon was supposed to working in
the armory when he shot Castro
“Recess”
● temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor; and
● is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
within which the school activity is conducted.
● Does not include dismissal
Culpable Act or Omission: Aquino, the teacher asked his students to
help dig to bury concrete blocks, remnants from the old school shop
destroyed in world war II. Aquino left the children to borrow a rope but
when he left the children. They jumped on top of the concrete block
causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Damage: Ylarde was pinned to the wall, sustained injuries and
eventually died.
Causal Relation: Ylarde’s parents filed a suit for damages against
Aquino and Soriano
In this case, there was a school littered with several concrete blocks
which were remnants of the old school destroyed in WWII
● One of the teachers started to bury the remnants as they
realized that the stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren
● Respondent Aquino then gathered 18 of his pupils after class
dismissal to order them to dig beside a concrete block to
make a hole where the stone can be buried
● After they finished digging, Aquino went to borrow out a
rope and he told the children not to touch the stone
● But a few minutes after he left, the children jumped into the
Ylarde v. Aquino
pit and when a student jumped on top of the concrete block,
it slid down towards the opening
○ One of the children inside the pit got stuck and was
pinned to the wall in standing position
○ As a result, Ylarde sustained injuries and eventually
died
○ Ylarde’s parents filed a suit for damages against
Aquino and Soriano
Whether Aquino and Soriano are liable? Aquino (Yes), Soriano, the
principal (No) Soriano not liable because academic school not art
and trades.
Aquino acted negligent because
● Failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers
and instead utilized pupils to make an excavation near a one
tone stone (hazardous)
● Required the children to remain inside the pit, even after
finishing digging knowing the block was lying nearby
● Ordered them to level the soil knowing the stone is at the
brink of falling
● Went to a place where he is not able to check children’s
23
 safety
● Left children close to excavation, an obviously attractive
nuisance
The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous
site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde.
SC also said that the digging cannot be part of work education
● The excavation required strong and mature laborers and not
grade four pupils
Aquino can also not be said to have exercised the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person
● A teacher stands in loco parentis to his pupils. He should
have made sure that the children are protected from all harm
in his company
Culpable Act or Omission: Daffon, while in the auditorium fired a gun
that mortally hit Amadora a graduating student (17 y.o.)
Damage: Death of Amadora
Causal Relation:
Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence
Parents of Amadora filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos.
P: their son was in the school to finish his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to graduation
R: Amadora was no longer under the custody of the school because
Amadora v. CA the semester already ended
Whether teachers and heads of establishment are liable for the
death of the student? No
Mercado v. CA
SC discussed previous cases which discussed that Art 2180 does not
apply to academic institutions of learning, but only schools of arts and
trades
SC now held that the Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well
as non-academic
A student is in custody of the school authorities as long as he is under
control and influence of the school and within its premises. As long as
it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues. Its not required that the teacher is present.
● He was in the custody of the authorities of school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended
● It was immaterial if he was in the auditorium to finish a
physics
● Important is a legitimate purpose
● Assuming that Dicon was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon
Damon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance.
His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be
considered against him because he was not supposed or
required to report to school on that day
Rector, principal and dean of boys not liable because none of them
was a teacher-in-charge exercising only general authority
- Dean should be negligent as he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun and returned it without disciplinary action
- No proof of link with this gun
Culpable Act or Omission: Mercado and Quisumbing (classmates)
quarreled over a pitogo (empty nutshell used as piggy bank),
belonging to Mercado
Damage: Quisumbing got wounded on the right cheek with a razor.
Causal Relation:
The Parents of Quisumbing filed a complaint against the school under
Art 2180, the school where his son was studying should be made
liable
Whether Lourdes Catholic School is liable as it happened during
recess? No.
It would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents.
In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and
actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the
teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
24
 This situation is not present in this case
● The pupils were going home in this case
● Therefore, it is the father or mother who is responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children
● The proximate cause of the injury was also Quisimbing’s own
fault
● He interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo
from another boy

While Sister Yamyamin, a religion teacher was writing on the

blackboard, Inton left his seat and went to a classmate to play a joke,
surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat
but he kept doing it. Yamyamin kicked his legs, pulled and shove his
head and told him to stay.

Parents of Inton filed an action for damages and violation of RA 7610.

Whether Aquinas is solidarily liable with Yamyamin? No

Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin as she was a religion
Aquinas School v.
Inton
teacher sent by the sisters. Aquinas still had the responsibility to
ensure only qualified catechists are allowed
● Records, certs and diplomas show she was qualified
● She came from a legitimate religious congregation and given
her Christian training so theres reason she would behave
● School gave a copy of the administrative faculty staff manual
● School pre-approved content of the catechesis
● Subject to classroom evaluation (Aquinas did not have
sufficient opportunity to observe as she just started

In addition, Aquinas also acted promptly to relieve her of her

assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident .

25