DAY 6

V. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)

IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY
A. ABUSE OF RIGHT (ARTICLE 19)
B. PRIMARY LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2183-2193, 1723) Velayo v. Shell
Rellosa v. Pellosis
1. Possessors/Users of animals (ARTICLE 2183)
Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque
Vestil v. IAC
Albenson Enterprises Corp. v CA
2. Owners of motor vehicles (ARTICLES 2184 and 2185)
B. CONTRARY TO LAW AND MORALS (ARTICLES 20 AND 21)
Mallari v. CA
Hermosisima v. CA
3. Manufacturers & Processors (ARTICLE 2187) Ponce v. Legaspi
Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA Wassmer v. Velez
Pascual v. Ford Motor Company Garciano v. CA
Martires v. Cokieng
4. Municipal corporations (ARTICLE 2189)
City of Manila v. Teotico D. UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ARTICLES 22 & 23)
Jimenez v. City of Manila Pecson v. CA
Guilatco v. City of Dagupan Security Bank v. CA
Q.C. Gov’t v. Dacara Uy v. PEA
Section 24 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation

5. Building proprietors (ARTICLES 2190-2191, 2193) E. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE (ARTICLE 24)

Deroy v. CA Cruz v. NLRC
Everett Steamship Corp. v. CA
6. Engineers/Architects/Contractors (ARTICLES 2192 & 1723)
Nakpil & Sons v. Ca

C. SOLIDARY LIABILITY (ARTICLE 2194)

Lanuzo v. Ping
Gelisan v. Alday
But see Philippine Rabbit v. IAC
PNCC v. CA, GR 159270
Chan v. Iglesia ni Cristo

D. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS

1. Possessors/Users of animals (ARTICLE 2183)
Vestil v. IAC

2. Manufacturers & Processors (ARTICLE 2187)

3. Head of Family (ARTICLE 2193)

1
 IV. VICARIOUS/PRIMARY/SOLIDARY LIABILITY
B. PRIMARY LIABILITY (ARTICLES 2183-2193, 1723)
Articles 2183-2193, 1723
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a
bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages
to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official.
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
1. By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been
kept in a safe and adequate place;
2. By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
3. By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by
force majeure;
4. By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable to the place.
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any
defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages
may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said
article, within the period therein fixed.
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for
damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a
building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure,
the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due
to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the
edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of
materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the
contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily
liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of
action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building.

Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if
the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such
as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of,
or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

2
Possessors / Users of animals (ARTICLE 2183)
bitten by the dog. The dog remained in the house even after the
death of Vicente and until when the incident in question occurred.
Article 2183
Discussion of Art. 2183
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is ● Art 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal should
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. It
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or does not matter either that the dog was tame and was
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does
not speak of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as
long as they cause injury. The obligation imposed by Art
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Art. 2183 is not based on the negligence or 2183 is not based on negligence or on the presumed lack of
on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who damage. It is based on equity and the principle of social
interest. He who possesses the animal for his utility,
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
pleasure, or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause. animal may cause.

Q: What does the court require for you to be held liable under Article
KW: Dog bit a 3 year old
2183? Possession or who makes use of the animal. The law does not
Culpable Act or Omission: Dog at Vestil’s father bit girl
require you to exercise control or supervision.
Damage: 3 year old girl dies to bronchopneumonia
Causal Relation: Vestil argued that they are not the owners nor is
Cf. Afialda Case: How different is this from the case of Afialda? And
there any evidence that the dog caused bronchopneumonia
why can you not rely on 2183 for purposes of Afialda?
–
● Afialda – one who died was the caretaker of the carabo; thus
Theness Uy, a 3-year old girl, was bitten by a dog while she was
had possession of the carabao or was making use of the
playing with a child of the Spouses Vestil in the house of Vicente.
carabao. if the nature of obligation requires assumption of
Theness was rushed to the hospital where she was treated for
risk, then you assume the risk because you are fully aware
wounds on her forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She
that being a caretaker is an expected risk in the activity that
was discharged but she was re-admitted because of vomiting of
you are entering into. That is the reason why you cannot use
saliva. Eventually, she died and the cause of her death was
2183.
broncho-pneumonia. Then Spouses Uy then filed a case for damages,
● Vestil – Since petitioners were proven to be the possessor of
alleging that the Vestils were liable as the possessor of the dog that
the dog and they will be held liable. One of the defenses in
Vestil v. IAC bit and killed their daughter. The Vestils claim that they did not own
this case was remote control since the petitioners lived far
the dog and it was the owner of the house who owned the dog.
away from the house but the court held that it is not sufficient
to absolve them of liability given the fact that it is stated in
WON the Vestils can be held liable for the death of Theness? YES
the provision that if the animal is lost or escaped, the
possessor will still be liable.
What must be determined is the possession of the dog that was
admittedly staying in the house, regardless of the ownership of the
dog or of the house. Art 2183 provides that it is the possessor of the
animal or whoever may make use of the animal is responsible for the
damage which it may cause. Although it may escape or be lost.
Responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who suffered damage.
The SC also found that it was the spouses who possessed the house
at the time of the incident. Their family regularly went to the house.
Their own daughter was playing in the house when the little girl was

3
Owners of motor vehicles (ARTICLES 2184 and 2185)
Articles 2184-2185
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Atty. Go: For purposes of Art. 2184 and 2185, know the distinction. As a general rule, its Art.
2180 that is applicable to drivers and owners, but you use Art. 2185 if let’s say, the owner is
inside the vehicle. That’s the only time that you check whether you still apply Art. 2180 or use
Art. 2184 or Art. 2185 already.
GBD: For Art 2184 to apply, the owner must be inside the car at the time of the incident.
Otherwise, you apply Art 2180. Comparing this with Art. 2185, Art. 2185 refers to the
presumption of negligence when violating a traffic violation at the time of the mishap. If at the
time of the mishap, the driver is found to be violating traffic rules and regulations, he is
presumed to be negligent.
Culpable Act or Omission: Jeep, driven by Mallari Jr., owned by
Mallari Sr. tried overtaking thereby encroaching on the opposite side
of the road, thinking there was enough time, but collided with van,
driven by Angeles, owned by Bulletin Publishing.
Damage: Impact caused jeep to turn around & fall on its left side
causing death of Reyes.
Causal Relation: Wife filed complaint against drivers & owners of jeep
Mallari v. CA (repeat & delivery van
case) – not do so, then the owner is solidarily liable under Art. 2184.
The jeepney being driven by petitioner Mallari Jr. collided with the
delivery van of respondent Bulletin along the National Highway in
Bataan. The accident happened when the jeep was trying to overtake
a Fiera at a curve when the Bulletin delivery van was coming from the
other lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of Bulletin
coming from the opposite direction. The point of collision was the left
rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the
delivery van of Bulletin. The 2 right wheels of the delivery van were on
the right shoulder of the road. The impact caused the jeepney to turn
around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to passengers. One
of the passengers died. A complaint for damages was filed against the
jeepney driver and owner and Bulletin.
WON the accident was because of the negligence of Mallari Jr? YES
The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr overtook a vehicle
in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. The act of
overtaking was a clear violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code which provides that a driver shall not overtake another vehicle
when approaching the crest of a grade nor upon a curve in the
highway. A driver who abandons his lane for the purpose of
overtaking has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to
proceed if he cannot do so safely. When a vehicle is approaching a
curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the
road. Here, the proximate cause of the accident was clearly the
negligence of the jeepney driver. He already saw the van coming
from the opposite direction yet he still overtook the vehicles in front
of it at a curve in the highway. Under Art 2185 of the Civil Code,
unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners failed to present
evidence to overcome this presumption. The negligence and
recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is also binding
against petitioner Mallari Sr who was the owner of the jeepney
engaged as a common carrier.
Negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeep is binding
against Mallari Sr. (owner). The owner is a common carrier and that
an action based on a contract of carriage, the court DOES NOT NEED
to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier to hold it responsible for the payment of damages.
Notes:
● There is no express mention here of Art. 2184. However had
the owner of the Jeep been present in the vehicle during
mishap, and had the opportunity to prevent the injury but did
● Art 1755: a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard
for all the circumstances.
● Art 1756: death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary
4
 diligence.
● Art 1759: common carrier is liable for the death or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former’s employees.
● Liability of a common carrier does not cease upon proof that
it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection of its employees.

5
Manufacturers & Processors (ARTICLE 2187)
him anymore
–
Article 2187 Geronimo owned a canteen. She bought products from Coca-Cola.
The products had micro-fibers and other particles. The parents
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar complained. Her sales went down. She had to close her canteen. She
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances became jobless and destitute. She filed a complaint based on
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. quasi-delict. Coca-Cola argued that her complaint is barred as it was
grounded on breach of warranty which prescribes in six months from
the date of delivery. The RTC dismissed the case. The CA reversed.
Elements
1. Tortfeasor is a manufacturer and processor (NOT sellers) Has Geronimo’s cause of action prescribed? - NO.
2. Goods involved are foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
Geronimo’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict which prescribes
3. Use of noxious or harmful substances
in 4 years. The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to
4. Death or injury results the warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the
5. Plaintiff is either the: thing sold are not limited to withdrawal from the contract with
a. Consumer damages or demanding a proportionate reduction of the price with
b. User damages. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract
c. Purchaser upon proof of error or fraud. Responsibility arising from fraud is
demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for future
fraud is void.
(GBD) Reqs to Hold Manufacturer/Processor Liable:
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Art 2176
1. Proof that the product was defective and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. The
2. Defect was present at the time of delivery or manufacture of the product existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
3. Product reached user/consumer without substantial change in the condition it was commission of a tort by the one against the other. The act that breaks
sold the contract may also be a tort.

Notes:
(CTIU) How do you hold the manufacturers/sellers of defective products liable?
● Atty Go: You don’t have to suffer the injury caused by
1. Art. 2176, for Tort
noxious or harmful substances in order for you to have a
2. Art. 365 of the RPC, for Delict/Criminal Negligence cause of action under Art. 2187.
3. Breach of Warranty ● The liabilities of manufacturers or sellers of injury-causing
a. Remedies? See law on sales products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty,
● Accion redhibitoria (action to withdraw) tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
● Accion quanti-minoris (action of proportionate reduction of price) misrepresentation.
● Application of Art. 2187: Coca Cola was initially saying that
4. Art. 33 for Fraud or Deceit
there is no quasi-delict because:
5. Consumer Act (but only for consumer goods such as personal, family, household ○ 1. its covered by implied warranties, and
and agricultural purposes) ○ 2. because there was a contractual relation
between Geronimo and Coca Cola Bottlers,
quasi-delict is an improper cause of action.
Negligence: Manufacturing of Coke and Sprite had microfiber or
● Since it was Coca Cola who manufactured the beverages, it
fiber-like substances
Coca-Cola Bottlers v. is liable for the injury caused based on Art. 2187
CA
Injury: Geronimo sold the bottles in the canteen and he lost income
Proximate Cause: How Coca-Cola manufactured the bottles with
Pascual c. Ford Culpable Act or Omission: Pascual bought a secondhand Ford E150;
microfibers resulted in the customers of Geronimo not buying from Motor Company then right axle broke causing the wheel to be detached.

6
Damage: Injury of Pascual and other passengers
Causal Relation: W/N FMC & FMG liable for defect
–
Petitioner Pascual bought a second-hand Ford vehicle. 2 years later, at
around 1:30 am, Pascual’s driver was driving at the National highway
when the vehicle’s right axle broke causing its wheel to be detached.
Pascual and the other passengers suffered physical injuries and were
rushed to the hospital. Pascual demanded that Ford pay her damages
resulting from the incident and it filed a complaint for quasi-delict
against Ford. Claims that they are strictly liable for the defective
vehicle. Ford assert that Pascual cannot claim the warranty against
hidden defects because: The vehicle was bought second hand; the
warranty had expired 2 years after the vehicle was bought from an
authorized Ford dealer; and it also presented an expert witness who
testified that the rear leaf spring of the vehicle had been altered by a
non-Ford dealer.
W/N Ford is liable to Pascual for quasi-delict? NO
Pascual cannot attribute negligence to the FMCI & FGPI; the vehicle
had undergone alterations which affected its performance, including
the safety to passengers.
Requisites to Hold Manufacturer/Processor Liable:
1. Proof that the product was defective
2. Defect was present at the time of delivery or manufacture of
the product
3. Product reached user/consumer without substantial change
in the condition it was sold
Pascual did not present evidence that the vehicle was defective upon
its manufacture. The alteration in the vehicle’s rear axle after the
vehicle was sold is a substantial change in the vehicle’s condition.
Hence, FMCI as manufacturer cannot be held liable.
The strict liability for torts is not applicable
Pascual cited a US case where it was held that a manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Purpose: insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market. Foreign
decisions are not controlling in this jurisdiction. And the case cited has
different facts. In that case, the purchaser bought a defective power
tool firsthand from a retailer.
TRANS:
Q: Why did the Court not find Ford liable in this case?
● Because not only did Pascual buy the Ford motor vehicle
from a second-hand seller but at the same time it was found,
from an investigation of the motor vehicle, that there was an
alteration of the leaf spring in order to that the motor
vehicle can accommodate more weight than it actually can
based on the representation of Ford. Because of this, Ford,
as the manufacturer of the vehicle, did not actually represent
that it could withstand that, and it was because of that
alteration which is the proximate cause of the accident, and
the alteration was not due to the negligence or fault of Ford.
Q: Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning, let’s try to tweak the
facts. Let’s say that the alteration was not the proximate cause. Do
you think Ford will still be held liable or not?
● ​Yes, if the problem is due to a certain representation that
they made. In this case, the court cited a case wherein it was
held that the manufacturer was liable because it made
certain representations when it was offering that
manufactured product.
Q: What does Art. 2128 provide, with respect to dangerous weapons?
● There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use
thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.
7
Municipal Corporations (ARTICLE 2189)
Notes:
Article 2189 ● Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, roads or streets belong to the province, city, or municipality
or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, from which responsibility is to be exacted. What Article 2189
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. requires is that the province, city, or municipality have either
control or supervision over said street or road.
[EXTRA] Art. 24, LGC. Local government units and their officials are not exempt from
liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property. Jimenez, together with his neighbors, went to the Sta. Ana public
market to buy “bagoong.” The public market was flooded with ankle
deep rain rainwater. After purchasing the bagoong, he turned around
to return home and then he stepped on an uncovered opening
Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
[which could not be seen due to the dirty water] causing a dirty and
Manila, waiting for a jeepney. When a jeepney came along to a stop,
rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening to pierce
he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney but he fell
his left leg. He was confined and hence, was forced to hire someone
inside an uncovered manhole. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of
to manage his business. Jimenez sued the City of Manila and Asiatic
the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana
thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons pulled him out of the
public market has been placed by virtue of the Management and
manhole and one of them brought him to the hospital, where his
Operating Contract. The lower court decided in favor of City of Manila.
injuries were treated. Thereafter, he sued for damages, under Article
On appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for
2189 of the Civil Code, the City of Manila, the mayor, the city
damages but absolved City of Manila.
engineer, the city health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of
police. CFI Manila ruled against him but the CA, on appeal, ruled that
Was the City of Manila liable notwithstanding the fact that they
the City of Manila should pay damages. The City of Manila assailed
have a management contract with Asia Integrated? - YES, the City of
the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states
Manila still exercised control over the public market. Therefore Art.
that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the
2189 applies.
city officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law Jimenez v. City of
and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that Manila
The Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating
City of Manila v. the accident happened in national highway.
Teotico
Contract between City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation
remained under the control of the former. Article 1, Section 4 of
Is the City of Manila liable notwithstanding the fact that the charter
Republic Act No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila) refers
of the City of Manila provides for non-liability for negligent acts of
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object,
its officers? - YES, the exemption only covers negligent acts in
while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective
general. Meanwhile Art. 2189 governs a particular act of negligence.
streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is
therefore decisive on this specific case. Under Art. 2189 of the Civil
The charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability
Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach,
of the City of Manila but there is no particular exemption but merely
that the defective public works belong to the province, city or
a general exemption. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
Code provides a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control
municipalities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
or supervision" over the public building in question.
any person by reason - specifically- of the defective condition of
Here, despite contract between the City of Manila and Asiatic, the
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
market remained under the control of the City of Manila. Fact of
their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 of the
supervision and control of the City over subject public market was
charter of Manila refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
admitted by the Mayor. The City even employed a market master
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability
whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and control of that
due to "defective streets," in particular. Art 2189 should be applied.

8
 particular market, more specifically, to check the safety of the place
for the public.
Contention of City that Jimenez should not have ventured to go to the
market during a stormy weather is untenable. Defense against liability
on the basis of a quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family. It is the duty of the City to exercise
reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for
people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. While it may
be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult
during storms and floods, it must be admitted that ordinary
precautions could have been taken during good weather to minimize
the dangers. Negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause
of the injury suffered, the City is therefore liable for the injury
suffered by the Jimenez.
Q: What is the consequence of having the management contract?
Your action or the third party injured will still have a cause of action
against the city whatever terms are there and the management
contract will only bind the parties. Meaning, if let's say the city is later
on held liable, depending on the terms of the contract the city can
probably seek reimbursement if that is provided for under the terms of
the management contract.
Q: But how do you reconcile now the provisions of that
management contract with 2189? Go back to your oblicon
principles, who are bound by the provisions of a contract?
● Since the petitioner isnt privy to the contract between that
entity and the city then the action of the petitioner is still with
the city who represents to be in control of the market.
● Your action or the third party injured will still have a cause of
action against the city whatever terms are there and the
management contract will only bind the parties. Meaning, if
let's say the city is later on held liable, depending on the
terms of the contract the city can probably seek
reimbursement if that is provided for under the terms of the
management contract.
Guilatco was a Court Interpreter. While she was about to board a
motorized tricycle at the sidewalk of Perez Blvd., she accidentally fell
into a manhole, thus causing her right leg to be fractured. She was
Guilatco v. City of confined in 2 hospitals for a period of more than 16 days. She suffered
QC Govt v. Dacara
Dagupan excruciating pain, incurred hospitalization and medication expenses,
had difficulty in locomotion, has not been able to report for duty as
court interpreter, hence deprived of income. The manhole on the
sidewalk along Perez Blvd was partially covered by a concrete
flower pot and left a wide open hole about 2 ft. long by 1.5 feet
wide. Government official Tangco, who took on the DUAL role of
being (1) City Engineer of Dagupan City (Local govt capacity) and (2)
Ex-officio Highway Engineer of Bureau of Public Works (National govt
capacity), admitted the existence of said manhole. The contention of
the City is that Perez Boulevard is a national road that is not under
the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability
should attach to the city. It is the Ministry of Public Highways that has
control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere
coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the
City Engineer of Dagupan.
Does the City of Dagupan exercise control or supervision over a
national road in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with Article 2189. - YES. The City has supervision over
the sidewalk of the supposed national road where the drainage hole
was located thus they are liable.
The Court ruled in the affirmative saying that Article 2189 of the Civil
Code requires only that either control or supervision is exercised
over the defective road or street. It is not even necessary for the
defective road or street to belong to (or be owned by) the province,
city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or
street. The charter of Dagupan clearly indicates that the city indeed
has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located. The same charter of Dagupan also provides
that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues
and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be
legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates
that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk
where the open drainage hole is located. Liability of the City to
Guilatco under Article 2189 of the Civil Code is clear.
What does Sec. 24 of the LGC provide? That the LGU and their
officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or
to damage to property.
Dacara Jr. met an accident in Matahimik St. Quezon City. It was said
that on February 28, 1988 at 1am, Dacara Jr. rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found therein due to lack of warning devices
around the said area. Because of this, Dacara Sr. represented his
injured son, who is a minor for a complaint for collection of damages
against the QC government and Engr. Tiamzon. RTC and CA ruled that
Dacara Jr. can claim from QC government both moral and exemplary
damages.
9
 Can the QC City Gov’t be held liable for the injuries suffered by
Dacara Jr.? - YES.

Indeed QC and Engr. Dacara are liable, but except to moral damages.
It was shown that the QC government was grossly negligent in
ensuring safety of the public roads and thoroughfares and that
failure to comply with said laws governing municipal corporation’s
duty is considered negligence per se.

There was not one lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign

which could have served as an adequate warning to motorists during
the time of the accident. Art 2189 provides for the responsibility of the
city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges
since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure
of the defendant city government to comply with Art 2189 is
negligence per se which renders the city government liable. The
State assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the
roads.

The fact that the car was being driven at a speed above the limit
allowed on streets was belatedly raised. It was not raised during trial.

Notes:
● The Quezon City Government argued that Article 2189 of the
Civil Code shall not apply in cases where the resulting injury
is damage to property. It argued that Article 2189 of the Civil
Code only applies to ”death or injuries suffered by persons.”
In its disposition, the Supreme Court did not say anything to
support or dispute this particular argument. It is notable
however that the trial court and the Court of Appeals still
applied Article 2189 in this case and this application was not
disputed by the Supreme Court in its decision

10
Building proprietors (ARTICLES 2190-2191, 2193)
ARTICLES 2190-2191, 2193
Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs. (1907)
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been
kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by
force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible
for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
Q: How do you relate this with 1723? Meaning, 2190 and 2191 gives you the liability or
presumption of negligence insofar as the building proprietors are concerned. When does
your 1723 with respect to architects and engineers come into play, considering that 2190 and
2191 which tells you that the proprietors should be the ones responsible?
● In case the damage is caused by a defect in the construction, the injured person
can go after the engineer, the architect, or contractor according to Art 1723.
Petitioner/Proprietor - De Roy and Ramos
Respondent/Injured Party - Bernal Family
Culpable Act or Omission: Firewall of a burned-out building collapsed
because the proprietor (De Roy and Ramos) did not clear this out.
Damage: Tailor shop of the Bernal family destroyed; injuries and death
of Marissa Bernal, daughter
Deroy v. CA Causal Relation: Proprietor argues that Bernals had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to
vacate the shop.
Are the proprietors liable? YES
The proprietors are liable under Article 2190, which provides that “the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack
of necessary repairs.” Their prior negligence cannot be disregarded
since the doctrine of “last clear chance,” which has been applied to
vehicle accidents, is inapplicable to the case.
Engineers / Architects / Contractors (ARTICLES 2192 & 1723)
ARTICLES 2192 & 1723
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of
any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering
damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance
with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a
building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure,
the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due
to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the
edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of
materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the
contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily
liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of
action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)
Persons Liable for Collapse of Building
1. Engineer or architect - collapse was due to a defect in the plans and specifications
(e.g. blueprints), or due to the defects in the ground
2. Contractor – collapse was due to defects in the construction itself or the use of
materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of
the contract.
3. If engineer or architect was supervising the contractor = solidarily liable
Note: Engineers, architects and contractors may be held liable for torts under the
circumstances identified in Arts. 2190 and 2191 on the basis of Art. 2192.
Q: Within what time frame? For engineers and architects, within what time period?
11
 ● 15 years, if from the time the construction was completed, it collapsed within that
the proximate causes that rendered the building unable to withstand
period. From the time of the collapse, to give rise to the cause of action, you have the earthquake of 1968. Several buildings in the same area
10 years to file your action. withstood the earthquake to which the building of PBA was
similarly situated.
Culpable Act or Omission: Contractors made substantial deviations MR
from the plans and specifications of the architects; Architects’ plans
were also found to have inadequacies or defects Contractor argued that the building did not disintegrate completely as
Damage: Major damage to the building; it tilted the term “collapse” connotes and that it is the legal duty of PBA to
Causal Relation: While there was a FE, they were not free from any provide full-time and active supervision in the construction of the
previous negligence in the planning. building because:
● After the 1968 earthquake, the building was not totally lost
PBA decided to erect an office building. United Construction and the collapse was only partial (building could be restored)
(contractor) was hired to administer the construction. UCCI engaged
● But after the subsequent earthquake in 1970, further damage
the services of Nakpil & Sons (subcontractor architects) to prepare
was caused to the building resulting in an eventual and
plans and specifications of the project.
unavoidable collapse or demolition
Two years after completion, a strong earthquake hit Manila that
Contractors are still liable. It contradicted its own view that this
severely damaged the building. The front columns of the building
construction involves highly technical matter and beyond the ambit of
buckled and the building tilted forward dangerously.
ordinary understanding. The construction was undertaken on an
administration basis. In ordinary practice, one would avail of the
PBA then filed an action for damages for the partial collapse of the
services of architects and engineers whose training and expertise
building against the contractor, alleging that the collapse of the
make them more qualified to provide effective supervision of the
building was due to defects in construction and that the contractors
construction. Hence, the owner does not have full time supervision of
failed to follow plans and specifications of the terms of the contract.
the construction.
Contractors then filed a 3rd-party complaint against the architects
Nakpil & Sons v. Ca
who prepared the plans and specifications.
Architects were still liable because one who negligently creates a
dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and
Can the contractor and architects be held liable despite FE? YES.
probable consequences thereof although the act of a third person or
God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.
Art. 1723 provides that the engineer or architect who drew up the
plans and specifications shall be liable if the collapse occurred within
NOTE:
15 years by reason of defect in plans and specifications. Art 1174 gives
● The earthquake was indeed a force majeure but if the
the exception that no person shall be responsible for events which
destruction was accompanied with the participation of Nakpil
could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were unavoidable. If
and Sons then they cannot escape liability.
upon the happening of a fortuitous event, there concurs
● The damage done should be completely due to a fortuitous
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay, or violation or
event. It should be completely free from human intervention.
contravention in any manner or tenor of the obligation, the obligor
So if let's say there is delay, even if there is a fortuitous
cannot escape liability. To be exempt from liability, the obligor must
event, you cannot invoke Art. 1174. You will still be held liable.
be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that
loss or damage may have been occasioned.

In this case, there was negligence on the part of the contractors as to

have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications.
They also failed to observe the required workmanship in the
construction. The architects were also found to have inadequacies or
defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. These were

12
C. SOLIDARY LIABILITY (ARTICLE 2194)
ARTICLE 2194
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is
solidary. (n)
When you’re talking about solidary liability or joint tortfeasors, you are looking at it from the
perspective of the 3rd party. It is solidary because you can go after anyone of the
tortfeasors and you can claim the entire amount of damages that you sustained.
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
cooperate in, aid or abet in the commission of a tort.
Driver - Mendoza Owner/Employer - Ping Injured Party - Lanuzo
Culpable Act or Omission: A truck rammed into a house and store
Damage: house and store completely razed (lost means of livelihood)
Causal Relation: Reckless negligence by driver
Mendoza, because of his reckless negligence in driving the truck of
Ping, rammed into the residential house and store of Lanuzo. As a
result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground.
Lanuzo became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood. Lanuzo
filed a complaint for damages against the owner and the driver.
Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another criminal
action was pending between the same parties for the same cause.
Lanuzo opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made an express
reservation to institute separate civil action. Trial proceeded as it was
Lanuzo v. Ping
apparent that Lanuzo had based his present claim on quasi-delict.
Is the owner solidarily liable with the driver for the damages? YES.
For the driver’s own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned
and operated by his employer, the driver is primarily liable under
Article 2176. On the other hand, the liability of his employer is also
primary and direct under Article 2180 of which explicitly provides:
“employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”
For failure of the owner to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is
likewise primary and solidarily responsible for the damages caused
by the negligent act of his employee. But although the employer is
solidarily liable with the employee for damages, the employer may
demand reimbursement from his employee for whatever amount the
employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the claim.
Gelisan - Owner of a freight truck; Lessor
Entered a contract with Gelisan; Lessee - Espiritu
Injured party/trucking operator - Alday
Culpable Act or Omission: Nondelivery of the goods
Damage: Losses and damages because Alday had to pay back Atlas
Gelisa (owner of a freight truck) entered into a contract with Espiritu,
under which Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the
purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer. The truck was taken
by a driver of Espiritu. Alday is a trucking operator who also had a
contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corp. from the Pier
to a warehouse in Mandaluyong. Later, Alday met Espiritu at the pier
and Espiritu offered the use of his truck with the driver for a
consideration. It was accepted. The fertilizer was delivered to the
driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary bill receipts. Espiritu,
however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas warehouse in
Mandaluyong, so he was charged with theft.
Alday was compelled to pay the value of the bags of fertilizer to Atlas,
Gelisan v. Alday so he filed an action for the recovery of damages against Gelisan and
Espiritu. RTC dismissed as to Gelisan but CA reversed. Gelisan now
claims that he had no contractual relations with Alday; that the alleged
nondelivery by Espiritu was entirely beyond his control and
knowledge; and that in his written contract of hire with Espiritu, it was
expressly provided that the latter will bear and pay all loss and
damages attending the carriage of goods to be hauled. Alday sued for
the recovery of damages suffered by him thru the criminal acts
committed.
Are Gelisan and Espiritu solidarily liable?
YES, registered owners of a public service vehicle are responsible for
the damages caused by the vehicle.
The registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for
damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation
or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. The lease
contract had not been approved by the Public Service Commission.
If the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to
another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not
binding upon the public and third persons.
13

Likewise, Gelisan's contention that his liability is only subsidiary is
wrong. The Court has consistently considered the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle to be jointly and severally
liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third
persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of
said vehicles.
However, Gelisan, the registered owner, is not without recourse. He
has a right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount that he may be
required to pay as damages for the injury caused, since the lease
contract in question (although not effective against the public for not
having been approved by the PSC), is valid and binding between the
contracting parties.
Culpable Act or Omission: Jeepney collided with a Philippine Rabbit
bus because the right rear tire got detached.
Damage: Jeepney passengers were killed and injured
A group of passengers were on their way to Pangasinan from
Pampanga, for Christmas. The buses were full so they decided to
board a jeepney, driven by Manalo (owned by Spouses Mangune).
The jeepney driver was driving recklessly and the passengers even
tried to caution the driver to slow down. The right rear tire of the
jeepney got detached and the driver made a sudden u-turn. This led
to the collision of the jeepney with a Philippine Rabbit Bus. A number
of jeepney passengers were killed and some got injured.
The heirs of the passengers filed a civil case against the owners and
the jeep driver Manalo for breach of the contract of carriage, while
But see: Philippine
Rabbit v. IAC
Philippine Rabbit was impleaded for quasi-delict. The RTC found the
owner and driver solidarily liable for the breach of contract of carriage.
Should the Jeepney owners be held solidarily liable with their
driver? - NO, since a contract of carriage is only between the carrier
and the passenger.
The SC ruled in the negative and stated that the owners alone should
be liable for its breach of the contract of carriage. The contract of
carriage is between the carrier and the passenger and in the event of
contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible, even if
breach due to negligence of the driver. Carrier cannot shift liability to
the driver nor share it with him. If one makes driver jointly and
severally liable with carrier, that would make the carrier’s liability
personal instead of vicarious and consequently entitled to recover
only the share which corresponds to the driver, contradictory to 2181,
which provides that whoever pays for the damage caused by the
employee may recover it from the employee.
NOTES:
● What’s the difference between Gelisan AND Phil. Rabbit? -
● The difference is the cause of action and the relationship of
the parties. The contract in the case of PRBL is a contract of
carriage. In such contracts, the driver-employee cannot be
made solidarily liable with the employer as he is not a party
to the contract of carriage between the common carrier and
the passenger. Hence, common carrier is solely liable for
the damages caused even if it is through the fault or
negligence of the employee and even though the breach
was due to the driver's negligence.
● In Gelisan the parties relationship was one of lessor-lessee.
The court held that despite the fact that the truck was merely
leased by Espiritu, since Gelisan was the registered owner
of a public service vehicle he is primarily liable for damages
incurred by third persons due to the operation of the vehicle.
The cause of action there is reimbursement NOT TORT.
PASUDECO transports sugarcane in Pampanga. When the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption damaged national bridges in Pampanga,
PASUDECO asked the Toll Regulatory Board for its trucks to enter
through NLEX. The TRB furnished the PNCC a copy of the request.
TRB and PASUDECO then entered into an agreement where the
latter was allowed to pass through NLEX under certain conditions:
(1) PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy; (2) A vehicle with
blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy; (3)
Accidents/damages shall be the responsibility of any activity related to
the approval.
One day, PNCC employees found a pile of sugarcane in the middle of
PNCC v. CA the road and they placed diesel oil and lane dividers to warn motorists
of the obstruction. Upon request, PASUDECO removed the
sugarcane but they left a few flattened sugarcane at the side of the
road. Eventually, Arnaiz’s car ran over the scattered sugarcane, and
it flew out of control and turned turtle. The passengers filed a
complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC, alleging that
through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain NLEX safe,
and as to PASUDECO, they claim that it negligently spilled sugarcanes
on NLEX.
Who is liable for the mishap? With PASUDECO and PNCC’s
successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Art 2194.
14

As to PNCC, it failed to exercise diligence in maintaining NLEX safe for
motorists. PNCC removed the emergency warning devices and
declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of
sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane
stalks left flattened by motorists. The highway was still wet from the
juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. As to PASUDECO, they
were negligent in transporting sugarcanes without proper
harness/straps. PNCC cannot escape liability thru the MOA between
PASUDECO and TRB since the passengers were not a party thereto.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is
an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened,
the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes. And
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons. It
is no defense that the injury would not have occurred from his
negligence alone without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasors. There is no contribution between joint
tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for
the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omissions of 2 or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a 3rd person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury. They become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Art 2194.
NOTE:
● From a practical standpoint, when you are talking about
solidary liability, you are talking from a perspective of an
injured party in a situation where the court cannot
determine who between A or B committed the act which
resulted to the injury, what the court will do is to make them
both liable to C, being your injured party.
● On the other hand, in a situation where your court can
actually apportion, then they will apportion between A & B, it
won't be 50/50. The 50/50 will apply if let’s say if B will pay
the entire amount to C, B can claim 50% from A. But in the
situation where the court can actually determine that both
their acts can be considered to be the proximate cause but
A’s negligence is 30% and B’s negligence is 70%, in so far as
C is concerned they’re still both liable 100% but between the
two, that’s the time we use comparative negligence. Then
the court will compare their negligence vis a vis the
tortfeasors so far they can claim reimbursement from each
other. But with respect to C, the claimant, they would still be
held liable for the 100%.
Chan owns a gas station which was beside a chapel of INC. Chan
procured the services of Yoro to install additional sewerage and septic
tanks for Chan’s gas station. They entered into a MOA wherein they
stipulated that damage incurred during the digging will be borne by
Yoro, and division of valuable objects which may be found pursuant to
the digging. Diggings commenced and the foundation of INC’s
church was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it, to INC’s
damage and prejudice. INC filed a complaint against Chan and Oller
(Chan’s engineer), which was later amended to include Yoro. CA: Chan
and Yoro to be solidarily liable to INC for the damage. Chan alleges
that because of their MOA, Yoro should be solely liable to INC. INC
claims that the MOA should not absolve Chan from any liability
because the intention of the parties was to search for hidden treasure.
Did the memorandum of agreement entered into by Chan and Yoro
have the effect of making Yoro solely responsible for damages to
INC? NO, because the responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
All the requisites of quasi-delict are present in the case:
● The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage
to INC – it was done surreptitiously within the premises and
Chan v. Iglesia ni may have affected the foundation of the chapel
Cristo ● The excavation on INC’s premises was caused by fault
● There was no pre-existing contractual relation between
Chan & Yoro and INC on the other
SC upheld the CA’s finding that the basis of their solidary liability
(Chan & Yoro’s) is not the MOA but the fact that they have become
joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity. As a general rule: Joint tortfeasors are all the
persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
cooperate in, aid or abet in the commission of a tort. Here, Chan and
Yoro cooperated in committing the tort.
Moreover, it is evident from their MOA that the installation of
sewerage and septic tanks was the reason they used to cover up their
true intent—to find hidden treasure. For the damage caused to INC,
Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors.
NOTE:
● When we are talking about strict liability torts, the culpable
act or negligence element of QD is missing. The injured party
does not need to prove the first element.
● In strict liability torts, you only need to prove the damage or
15

that the tort occurred (with defendant actually the proximate
cause). You don’t need to prove negligence because the
presumption of negligence is already provided for by the law.
D. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
Strict liability tort can be committed even if reasonable care was exercised and regardless of
the state of mind of the actor at that time. These kinds of Torts create liability EVEN when
there may NOT HAVE BEEN FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE. The mere happening of the event
provided by law creates liability.
● **N.B. It then stands to reason that there need be no allegation of negligence in the
complaint for this.
Similar to damnum absque injuria, the element of culpable act or omission is dispensed
with in situations of Strict Liability Torts.
You cannot say that a tort is a strict liability tort in the absence of a statutory provision that
clearly states that such tort is a strict liability tort for the reason that the general rule is that
fault or negligence must be proved on the part of the defendant.
Possessors / Users of animals (ARTICLE 2183)
ARTICLE 2183
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
First Bite Rule Not Applicable in the PH
It is a common law principle which says that it is only after the first bite (i.e. when the animal
attacks someone else for the first time) that the owner/possessor of the animal realizes that
his animal is a vicious animal. It is only upon the second and subsequent bites that the
owner/possessor may be held liable for the injuries caused by the animal because it is only
after the first bite that the owner realizes that the animal is vicious. The first bite is a “free
pass”. The only time that the owner/possessor of an animal will be held liable for the injury
that the animal caused is if the owner/possessor fails to take the necessary precautions to
prevent the animal from hurting someone. It applies to vicious animals only. Therefore,
negligence is an element. This rule is not applicable in the Philippines because Article 2183
(1) does not distinguish between vicious and domesticated animals, (2) it does not distinguish
between the first and subsequent bites, and (3) it is not predicated upon negligence but
based on natural equity.
Culpable Act or Omission: Dog at Vestil’s father bit girl
Vestil v. IAC Damage: 3 year old girl dies due to bronchopneumonia
Causal Relation: Vestils argued they are not the owners of the dog
16
and there was no evidence dog caused bronchopneumonia
Theness, 3 yrs. old, was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the Vestils in the house of Vicente (wife’s father). Theness was
rushed to the hospital where she was treated for multiple lacerated
wounds on the forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She
was readmitted 1 week later due to vomiting of saliva. Eventually, she
died. 7 months later, the Uys (her parents) sued for damages, alleging
that the Vestils were liable to them, as possessors of the dog that bit
and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge,
insisting that the dog was tame and belonged to Vicente and that no
one witnessed it bite Theness.
Whether or not the Vestils can be held liable for the death? - YES,
Art. 2183 does not even require that the animal be possessed or
under supervision of the owner or possessor at the time it caused
injury.
SC held that what must be determined is the possession of the dog
that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house. Art. 2183 of the Civil Code
states that the possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of
the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although
it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage. This was affirmed in the case of
Afialda vs. Hisole.
Furthermore, while it is true they were not really the owner of the
house, there is no doubt that the Uys were its possessors at the time
of the incident even if they lived far. The Vestils offered to assist the
Uys with their hospitalization expenses. According to Manresa, the
obligation imposed by Art. 2183 is not based on the negligence or on
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle
of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal
may cause.
In Afialda, the injured party is a caretaker of the animal that
caused the injury. Included in the job of the caretaker is the
assumption of risk of being injured by the animal he/she is
tasked of taking care of. In Vestil, the victim is a mere child
who did not assume the same risk.
● You cannot rely on 2183 for the purposes of Afialda because
here, the one who died was the caretaker of the carabao.
Meaning he had possession of the carabao or was making
use of the carabao. It is expressly provided for under Art
2183 that if the cause of damage or injury is the fault of
person who suffered the injury, then the possessor will not
be held liable. However in Vestil, since the petitioners were
proven to be the possessor of the dog, they will be held
liable. One of the defenses in this case was remote control
since the petitioners lived far away from the house but the
court held that it is not sufficient to absolve them of liability
given the fact that it is stated in the provision that if the
animal is lost or escaped, the possessor will still be liable.
Manufacturers & Processors (ARTICLE 2187)
ARTICLE 2187
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
Head of Family (ARTICLE 2193)
ARTICLE 2193
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible
for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)

NOTE:
● What does the court require for you to be held liable under
Article 2183? Possession or who makes use of the animal
The law does not require you to exercise control or
supervision.
● Why is the ruling of the Court in Vestil different from the
ruling in Afialda v. Hisole? The character of the injured party.

17
 V. SPECIAL TORTS (HUMAN RELATIONS)
A. ABUSE OF RIGHT (ARTICLE 19)
ARTICLE 19
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
JURISPRUDENCE - The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due, and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards
these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
actor can be held accountable.
Note - Normally exercise of rights are not “culpable acts” within the definition of a tort. It is
the abuse of the exercise of rights or performance of duties that makes it tort under Art. 19 of
the Civil Code.
Elements of Abuse of Rights (Art. 19):
1. The existence of a legal right or duty;
2. Which is exercised in bad faith; and
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
But overall - determination of whether the right/duty was abused is still dependent on the
facts.
● “There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. Whether or not the principle
of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.”
● Do note however when there’s no abuse of an exercise of a right or duty, but still
damage and injury was suffered by the plaintiff, then the act/omission falls under the
principle of damnum absque injuria.
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k to Shell
Velayo v. Shell Company. CALI offered its C-54 plane (in California) as payment to
Shell; but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient
money to pay its debt.
Culpable Act or Omission: However, in 1948, CALI was going
bankrupt so it called an informal meeting with its creditors. The
creditors determined the order of preference as to how each creditor
should be paid. Meanwhile, Shell USA, which was assigned the credit
of Shell PH, learned that CALI had a C-54 plane in California, so it
petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of
a writ of attachment. This was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment
of credit made by Shell PH to Shell USA and they went on to approve
the sale of CALI’s plane to the Philippine Airlines.
- Claire’s note so u can get it: the creditors wanted to sell the
Plane to PAL so that the money can be used to pay for CALI’s
debts to them; but now they cant bcos Shell took the plane
Damage: [Prejudicial to other creditors]. The other creditors learned of
the assignment made by Shell. Hence, the other creditors filed their
own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for
insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from
being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was
approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding
- Hence, the creditors filed to attach the other properties of
CALI nalang cos wala na the plane - which CALI doesnt want
Causal Relation: In order for Velayo to recover the C-54 plane in
California, he filed for a writ of injunction against Shell PH to restrain
Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative,
that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the
amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell
Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing
in the law, which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being
a common practice.
Whether Shell is liable for damages considering it did not violate
the law? Yes.
The Court ruled that the acts of Shell in immediately assigning the
credits of Shell to its sister company in the USA and attaching the
plane in a suit in the USA led to the detriment of CALI’s creditors,
whether preferred or not. The assignment of the credit violated Art.
19 in relation to Art. 21 of the Civil Code because Shell knew that
CALI was going through insolvency proceedings, yet selfishly
attached the asset (plane) of CALI in order to recover almost the
entire amount of its credit from CALI. This led to the deprivation of
18
 CALI to exercise control over its assets, thus was unable to sell the
plane to PAL, and pay its creditors according to the preferences made
during the informal meeting between the creditors and CALI.
Art. 19 is a mere declaration of principles but Art. 21 is applicable
where any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, shall
compensate the other. In this case,
- Shell made a telegraphic transfer without the knowledge of
the other creditors, despite participating in the meeting.
- although Shell claimed other creditors was committing fraud,
this is no justification for Shell to commit this misdeed
NOTE
● The right that was abused is the assignment of credit, and
the attachment of the C-54.
● It was abused because of one material fact, the agreement
between the creditors as to the order of preference between
of the credits in the insolvency/restructuring of credit.
Reyes informed Pellosis et al. that for leasing the land for more than
20 years, they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land.
However, Reyes sold it to Ortega. Pellosis et al. filed for the
declaration of nullity of the sale. Meanwhile, Ortega filed a
condemnation case, and so the Office of the Building Official ordered
the demolition of the houses;
Culpable Act or Omission: Ortega began to demolish the house, but
this was stopped by the police as the demolition order is not yet final
and executory. However, Ortega continued with the demolition.
Damage: Pellosis et al. house was demolished
Rellosa v. Pellosis
Causal Relation: Pellosis et al. filed a case, praying that petitioners be
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fee, for the untimely demolition of the houses. RTC and CA granted
damages because the demolition was premature, given that the Order
was not final and executory yet. Ortega appealed;
W/N Ortega is liable for damages to Pellosis et. al? YES
Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy
and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof,
but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations.
Art. 19 is a limitation to the exercise of rights such as right to enjoy and
right to exclude other people being owners of the land. Art. 19 is not
just a declaration of principles but it can be a valid source of cause of
action or defense.
In this case, the demolition was done despite the fact that the order of
demolition was not yet final and executory (15-day appeal period with
the Office of the Building Official). The fact it was later affirmed by
DPWH is of no moment. The demolition of the house left
respondents with no recourse .Implementing the order unmindful of
the right of respondents to contest the ruling was utterly
indefensible.
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI) is a corporation operating as a
non-profit and non-stock private membership club. ​San Miguel Co.
designated respondent Elizagaque as a special company
non-proprietary member of CCCI
Culpable Act or Omission: Later, Elizaque applied and paid for
proprietary membership with CCCI. His application kept getting
deferred, until it was disapproved due to the requirement of
unanimous vote.
Damage: Elizagaque tried to ask CCCI to reconsider many times, but
CCCI kept silent. (deliverzoned and ignored)
Causal Relation: Elizagaque filed a case for damages.
W/N disapproval of Elizaque’s application makes CCCI liable and
Cebu Country Club, whether liability is joint and severally? Yes, Art. 19 in relation to 21.
Inc. v. Elizagaque
In rejecting Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership, we
find that CCCI violated the rules governing human relations, the
basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of social order.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in
accordance with the proper norm. When the right is exercised
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
Elizagaque was left in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the
Board was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an
inquiry about his application, CCCI ignored him. Certainly, he did not
deserve this kind of treatment.
19

The amendment in CCCI’s bylaws requiring unanimous vote was not
printed on the application form; it was the old rule written on the form,
even though the new unanimous rule had been up for 20 yrs already.
CCCI also tried to argue damnum absque injuria. However, the
principle of damage without injury is not applicable in abuse of rights.
ERDS:
● Art. 19 and Damnum Absque Injuria - they both talk about the
exercise of legal rights. Art. 19, one of its elements, is the
exercise of legal rights. Damnum Absque Injuria also tells
you that you are exercising a legal right but it resulted in
damages
● Remember if you're talking about Art. 19 - you are exercising
a legal right but you do so in bad faith with the clear intent of
injuring another. In Damnum Absque Injuria, you are talking
about the context of quasi-delict. What element is missing - is
it the negligent act, proximate relation or the damage? The
negligent act. So that's the difference between Art. 19 and
Damnum Absque Injuria.
Albenson Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries mild steel
plates. The latter paid using a check against the account of E.L.
Woodworks. It was dishonored. Albenson, from the records of the SEC
and Ministry of Trade and Industry, discovered that the president of
Guaranteed was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Drawee bank also said the
check was from a “Eugenio Baltao.” Albenson demanded Baltao to
replace the check. Baltao denied that he issued the check.
Culpable Act or Omission: Albenson filed a complaint against
Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of BP22.
Albenson Enterprises Damage: However, there are two other Baltao’s; One of them is his
Corp. v CA son Baltao III, who manages a business called E. L. Woodworks in the
same business address of Guaranteed. BUT, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo
Sumaway still filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao.
Causal Relation: After an investigation, Baltao was exonerated by the
fiscal. Baltao filed a complaint for damages for the unjust filing of a
criminal case against Albenson and its owner, Jesse Yap.
W/N Albenson is liable for damages based on abuse of right? NO
Elements of an abuse of right
1. Legal right or duty
2. Exercised in bad faith
3. Sole intent for prejudicing the other
Albenson did not violate the principle of abuse of right. What
prompted them to file the case was an honest belief that the bounced
check was issued to them by Baltao. They conducted inquiries about
the check and discovered from SEC, Ministry of TI, and drawee bank
that it was from a "Eugenio S. Baltao." When Albenson sent a demand
letter to Baltao, the latter should have mentioned that there are 2
other people with his same name.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.
Requisites of Malicious prosecution (allowed in 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33,
35, 2219(8))
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact the
defendant was himself the prosecutor and the action was
finally terminated with an acquittal
2. That in bringing the action, prosecutor acted without
probable cause
● there was probable cause because upon
investigation with SEC and Ministry of Trade and
Industry, Woodworks was registered with Baltao
3. Prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
● no sinister design, mistaken identity
In this case, the last 2 elements of malicious prosecution are not
present. The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal
consequence, the absence of malice. While Albenson may have been
negligent to some extent, its not tantamount to bad faith which would
warrant an award of damages.
TRANS
What’s the difference between Article 19, 20, 21? When can you apply them?
● Article 19 can be applied when a person with a legal right or duty to perform an
obligation must exercise it with justice, giving everyone his due and observing
honesty and good faith.
○ Note: Article 19 does not give you a cause of action, it only sets the
standard on how you will conduct yourself. It is merely a declaration of
20
 principles, applied in relation to other articles. It’s only Article 20 and 21
which gives you a cause of action.
● Article 20 applies when someone causes damage willfully or negligently to
another must indemnify another for the damage done.
● Article 21 applies when person exercises a duty which willfully causes loss to
another person, could be a cause of action.

Case of Albenson: There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the
act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done
either "willfully", or "negligently".

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B. CONTRARY TO LAW AND MORALS (ARTICLES 20 AND 21)
but denied having made such promise. CFI ruled in favor of Soledad
and ordered Francisco to pay moral damages. CA affirmed the
ARTICLES 20 AND 21 decision but increased the moral damages.

W/N moral damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry?

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Nature of Liability under Art. 20
● Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for their own sanction.
● Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right
or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered
thereby.
Elements of Acts Contra Bonus Mores (Art. 21):
1. There is an act which is legal;
2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and
3. It is done with intent to injure.
HENCE, under any of these three (3) provisions of law [19, 20, 21], an act which causes injury
to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.
No. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable.
The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced, upon the
faith of such promise. Deliberations in Congress show that this was
removed because the action could allow abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. Hence, the award of moral damages made by
the lower court is untenable.
The CA based its award of damages based on Art. 2219 of the New
Civil Code, which states that moral damages can be recovered in case
of seduction. This seduction pertains to the seduction punished under
the RPC. However, there is no seduction in this case.
It cannot be said that Francisco is morally guilty of seduction:
- He is 10 years younger than Soledad
- Soledad is a highly enlightened former high school teacher
and life insurance agent while
- Francisco is an apprentice pilot
- The CFI found that Soledad "surrendered herself" to
Francisco because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" him "by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy."

NOTE - The reader might recall Gashem Shookat v. CA. However a

There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.
careful reading of the facts and ratio in Gashem creates the necessary
However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or distinction between the two cases:
"negligently".

Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA Hermosisima v. CA

Legal Act: Francisco married Perez
Contrary: Prior to marriage, promised to marry Soledad The defendant used the promised to marry The parties
Intent to Injure: Soledad filed a complaint for acknowledgement of to “seduce” the plaintiff into have intercourse involved consented
child, support of child and moral damages for alleged breach of to having
promise There was evident malice on the part of the intercourse with
– defendant use promise of marriage. each other.
Hermosisima v. CA
Soledad and Francisco, who was almost 10 years younger than her,
were in a relationship and they had one child. Francisco promised to The circumstance of the person was clincher, Plaintiff had
marry Soledad. However, Francisco married another person. Soledad he merely inveigled the woman to have sex ascendancy over
then filed a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child as the with her under false pretense of marriage. the defendant.
natural child of Francisco as well as for support and moral damages
for the alleged breach of promise. Francisco acknowledged the child

22
 The Gashem case’s basis for damage is NOT the breach of promise to
marry. That is settled to be not actionable , RATHER it is the act of the
defendant in Gashem which falls under Art. 21 of the Civil Code.
Ponce and her husband Manuel owned 43% of the stockholdings of
L'NOR Marine Services. Meanwhile, 48% of the stocks were owned by
Spouses Porter. Porter and other officers of L’NOR were allegedly
guilty of conducting fraudulent schemes because they, with the aid of
Atty. Legaspi (the legal counsel of L’NOR), incorporated the Yrasport
Drydocks, Inc., a company whose line of business is in direct
competition with L’NOR. On account of these illicit schemes, Ponce
asked Atty. Legaspi to protect L’NOR thru legal means. Atty. Legaspi,
however, refused without excuse. Instead, he appeared as counsel for
Spouses Porter and others in the estafa case filed against them.
Legal Act: Ponce filed a disbarment case against Atty. Legaspi for
appearing as counsel for Sps. Porter, despite being the legal counsel
of L’NOR which is the prejudiced party in the estafa case. [conflicting
interests]
Contrary: Atty. Legaspi argued there was malicious prosecution and
that Ponce disseminated information regarding the disbarment case to
Legaspi’s clients. The disbarment case was dismissed.
Intent to Injure:
Ponce v. Legaspi
Atty. Legaspi filed a complaint for damages against Ponce. Ponce
argued that this was retaliatory in character because of Atty Legaspi’s
feeling of wounded pride.
CFI ruled that Ponce is liable for damages. Ponce appealed claiming
that the action for damages was retaliatory in character because of
Atty. Legaspi’s feeling of wounded pride. She argues that her act of
filing a disbarment case does not constitute malicious prosecution
because the disbarment case is not a criminal action.
Whether Ponce is liable for damages? No. Two elements which
establish malicious prosecution are missing : Lack of probable
cause in filing the complaint and legal malice.
Generally, Malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions
in an original proceeding, which is judicial in character. In this case, it
is a disbarment proceeding, which is judicial in character. It does not
have to be criminal.
Malicious prosecution is anchored on Art. 21 and moral damages.
Elements of Malicious Prosecution
1. Fact of the prosecution and further fact that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal
2. Prosecutor acted without probable cause
● Ponce had probable cause to file the disbarment
suit against Legaspi
● Ponce saw a conflict of interest because Legaspi
appeared as counsel for Porter who had allegedly
swindled L’NOR and had an honest perception that
Yrasport was actually organized to appropriate for
itself L’NOR’s business.
● Whether or not her perception of these facts and
circumstance is actually correct is irrelevant to our
inquiry.
3. Prosecutor impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or
sinister motive
One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage resulted from
the exercise of legal rights, loss without injury occurs (damnum
absque injuria).
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the
disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not
per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make
payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided to get married and set
a date. 2 days before the wedding,
Legal Act: Velez sent Wassmer a telegram stating that the wedding
will be postponed as his mother opposed the wedding. The next day,
he assured her again that it will push through, but on the wedding day
itself, he did not appear.
Contrary: Velez was never heard from again.
Wassmer v. Velez
Intent to Injure:
Wassmer filed a complaint for damages. Velez argued that the RTC
judgment holding him liable for damages is contrary to law since no
provision in the Civil Code authorizes an action for breach of promise
to marry citing Estopa v. Biansay
Whether Velez can be held liable for breaching his promise to
marry? Yes, not a mere breach of promise but conduct in violation
of Article 21.
23

In this case, a wedding was formally set and prepared and advertised
but Velez walked out.
- Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to marry
- Invitations were printed and distributed
- Dresses and a matrimonial bed were purchased
- Bridal showers were given and gifts received
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated,
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Civil Code provides any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter.
Note: When we’re talking about breach of promise to marry, the actual
breach of promise to marry is not actionable. What will give rise to
your cause of action for damages is if you actually incurred wedding
preparations.
Legal Act: Garciano, a teacher of Immaculate Concepcion Institute
went to Austria after approval of her application for indefinite leave.
The application was recommended for approval by the school
principal, Emerito Labajo, and approved by the President of the
school's Board of Directors
Contrary: The principal, Labajo, sent a letter to Garciano thru her
husband, informing her that she was being terminated because of
- Her refusal to sign a written contract of employment
- Difficulty of getting a substitute on a temporary basis as no
Garciano v. CA one would accept without a written contract
Upon her return from Austria, Garciano received the letter, and when
she inquired the school about the matter, the members of the Board of
Directors reinstated her; Later however, the Pres, VP, Sec, and 3 other
members of the board of directors resigned because the faculty Fr.
Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, reacted “acidly” to Garciano’s
reinstatement, questioning the integrity of the Board's decision.
Intent to Injure:
Garciano filed a complaint for damages against the school’s founder,
principal and members of the faculty for discrimination and unjust and
illegal dismissal
Whether Labajo et al. can be held liable for damages? No.
Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to
law, or morals, good customs or public policy.
In this case, there was no unlawful, willful or negligent acts contrary to
law, morals, good customs or public policy.
- Board of Directors did not dismiss Garciano and even
directed her to report for work
- The letter of termination sent to her through her husband
had no legal effect; Labajo et al. had no authority to dismiss
her and Garciano knows this
- The fact Labajo et al. acidly received the action repudiating
their decision to terminate Garciano is not proof of effectively
and physical preventing Garciano from resuming her post -
This is nothing more than a reaction by Labajo et al. to their
collective prestige.
The CA was correct in finding that Garciano’s discontinuance from
teaching was her own choice. While the BOD admittedly wanted her
service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post.
That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's
decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to
resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for
damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or
their right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were not
contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Consequently,
whatever loss of earnings she may have incurred was self-inflicted.
Volenti non fit injuria.
As to her claim for moral damages, the right to recover them under
Art. 21 is based on equity, and he who comes to court to demand
equity, must come with clean hands. Here, she is not without fault.
- Firstly, she went on an indefinite leave of absence and failed
to report back in time for the regular opening of classes.
- Secondly, for reasons known to herself alone, she refused to
sign a written contract of employment.
- Lastly, she ignored the BOD' order for her to report for duty
TRANS: What was the act being complained of and was this
24
 considered by the Court to be violative of Articles 20 and 21?
● The act being complained of was the act of the other
teachers and even the principal of resigning if the board
chose to retain Garciano.
● The Court held that this act was not violative of Art. 20 & 21
because the declaration of the teachers and the principal
was merely an exercise of their right to free speech and it
was not contrary to law or morals.
Lehner Martires and Ricardo Cokieng were classmates in Xavier and
in DLSU. Cokieng owned Phil-Air Conditioning Center jointly with his
brother and co-respondent Regino. Phil-Air was engaged in the
distribution and sale of Carrier air-conditioners and refrigeration units.
Martires later joined Phil-Air as its agent who received commission
and a fixed salary. This arrangement was informal and they had no
contact. As a result of an argument, Martires resigned from Phil-Air.
Legal Act: Regino then filed an estafa case against Martires, but
recoiled from pursuing it; and his brother, Ricardo filed a crime of
unjust vexation against Martires. Allegedly, Martires received Ricardo's
bank statement of account without the latter's authorization.
Additionally, Ricardo said that he had previously requested Martires
"to render an accounting of his business activities during the
existence of the partnership as he suspected that he was doing
something foolish, but instead Martires never reported to the office
anymore. METC ruled that taking of the bank statement is not an
unlawful act hence acquitted Martires.
Martires v. Cokieng
Contrary: Martires claimed bad faith and malice in the filing of the two
suits against him by the Cokiengs, because it had no legal and factual
basis and with the purpose of harassing and inconveniencing him.
PNPCIC only stated it be filed in an appropriate
case in court, not that there was no ground
● The appropriate action should have been for
account and damages, not a criminal case for unjust
vexation but the Court ruled being ill-advised by the
counsel should not be taken against them
● In layman’s point of view, the prosecutor’s act of
filing an information of unjust vexation bolstered
belief that he had a strong case
3. that the said defendant acted with malice – no factual
allegations supporting a finding of malice and bad faith
a. Desistance is an earmark of good faith
4. the damages he has suffered
Want of probable cause and malice must simultaneously exist
otherwise the presence of probable cause signifies the absence of
malice. There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by an
intention to vex and humiliate a person
SC found that the act of filing the information for unjust vexation was
based on respondent’s fear that petitioner took the statement so he
could hold onto something which he could use against Cokieng. He
was motivated by this honest belief. Therefore, malicious prosecution
does not apply

Intent to Injure: Martires filed a complaint for damages.

Whether there is malicious prosecution? No.

There is malicious prosecution when a person directly insinuates or

imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime and the
accused is compelled to defend himself in court. To award damages in
a case of malicious prosecution, the aggrieved must prove:
1. that he has been denounced or charged falsely of an offense
by the defendant
2. that the latter knows that the charge was false or lacks
probable cause
● Regino’s withdrawal of the estafa case cannot be
construed as outright acquiescence since the

25
D. UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ARTICLES 22 & 23)
4. that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Articles 22 & 23
Pecson owns a commercial lot in Kamias, QC. Pecson built a four-unit
ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other apartment but failed to pay taxes. Lot was then sold at public auction
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter where Mamerto won. Mamerto then sold it for 103k to Sps. Naguid.
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Pecson challenged the auction sale claiming the apartment is not part
the auction sale. Court ruled in this case that the apartment building is
ARTICLE 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not not part of the auction sale. Sps. Naguid then filed a motion for
due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if delivery of possession of the lot and apartment building.
through the act or event he was benefited.
The Trial Court issued an order wherein Spouses Nuguid were
ordered to reimburse Pecson for the construction cost of the building
Nemo ex alterius incommode debet locupletari – No man ought to made rich out of worth P53,000 and when such reimbursement has been made,
another’s injury Spouses Nuguid are entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of
possession over the Lot and improvements thereon.
Despite being discussed under Torts and Damages, Quasi- Contracts as embodied in Art. 22
Sps. Nuguid contend that the value of the reimbursement should be
and 23, Quasi-Contracts ARE NOT within the species of torts. Torts, at its core, is an the construction cost of the building in 1965. Pecson contends that it
infringement of a right against another caused through wrongful acts or omissions whether should be the current market value.
intentional or through negligence
W/N the basis of the indemnity should be the current market value
Therefore it’s more akin to an obligation rather than a tort. Nevertheless, in a quasi-contract or the construction cost of the building in 1965? - MV
situation both the plaintiff suffers some damage while the other defendant acquires
The current market value because it would unjustly enrich Spouses
something
Nuguid who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount. The
Elements for Liability under Unjust Enrichment otherwise known as ACCION IN REM objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice
VERSO: between the parties involved.
1. The defendant has been enriched
2. The plaintiff has suffered a loss The said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the
owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer
3. The enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground
complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the
4. The plaintiff has NO other action based on a contract, quasi-contract, crime,
other may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him.
quasi-delict, or any other provision of law.
JJ
Pecson (original owner of a commercial lot)
1. that the defendant has been enriched – SBTC derived
Mamerto Nepomuceno (public auction winner / seller)
benefits when the construction was complete, even at an
Sps. Naguid (buyer)
increased cost
Security Bank v. CA 2. that the plaintiff has suffered a loss – Ferrer incurred
1. that the defendant has been enriched – Nuguid obtained
Pecson v. CA additional expenses
property for a measly amount
3. that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
2. that the plaintiff has suffered a loss – Pecson lost the
ground, and – The contract allows price adjustments
apartment for a low amount
4. that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
3. that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
ground, and

26

SBTC contracted Ferrer to construct its building in Davao City. He
incurred additional expenses, and promptly informed SBTC of the
unforeseen increase in cost of P 300,000. (the contract was entered
into in Feb, and he informed them of the cost increase in March, and
the building was finished sometime in August). Ferrer made timely
demands for the payment, supported by the proper documents like
receipts and the like. SBTC consulted with its AVP and an architectural
firm, and they made a recommendation to pay Ysmael P 200,000.
Instead of paying Ysmael, SBTC denied ever authorizing payment of
any amount beyond the original contract price, and denied liability
for the additional cost based on the building contract (see fact 3).
This prompted Ysmael to file an action for breach of contract and
damages, and the RTC ruled in favor of Ysmael, ordering SBTC to pay
him. This was affirmed by the CA.
W/N Security Bank is liable to pay for the increase in materials. -
YES ​SBTC BENEFITTED FROM THE INCREASED COST SINCE THE
BUILDING WAS TRANSFERRED TO THEM; IT IS ONLY RIGHT THAT
THEY REIMBURSE FERRER.
The SC ruled that if SBTC is not ordered to pay, that would result to
unjust enrichment on its part. It cannot be denied that SBTC derived
benefits when Ysmael completed the construction even at an
increased cost. Hence, to allow SBTC to acquire the constructed
building at a price far below its actual construction cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the
prejudice of Ysmael. Such unjust enrichment, as previously discussed,
is not allowed by law.
Uy v. PEA
It is not denied that Ysmael incurred additional expenses in
constructing SBTC’s building due to a drastic and unexpected
increase in construction cost. In fact, SBTC admitted liability for
increased cost when a recommendation was made to settle private
respondent's claim for P200,000. Private respondent's claim for the
increased amount was adequately proven during the trial by receipts,
invoices and other supporting documents.
NOTES:
How different is the case of UY v. PAEA with the case of Security
Bank v. CA with regard to unjust enrichment and additional costs?
In the case of Security Bank v. CA there was additional costs when the
building was completed due to the rise of construction costs, Security
Bank refused to pay for such additional costs. In this case, Security
Bank was made liable under Article 22 because to allow Security
Bank to acquire the building at a cost below the actual construction
costs would result in unjust enrichment on the part of Security Bank to
the prejudice of Ferrer.
What makes this different from the case of UY? Remember in the
case of Uy there was also increase in the costs, but what the Court
was saying in the case of Uy was that you cannot claim because you
failed to comply with the stipulation in the contract which provides that
there should be written authority to incur additional costs. Is there a
similar contractual stipulation with Security Bank? NO. There is no
similar stipulation in the Case Security Bank, because in that case they
were actually informed of the additional costs to be incurred on top of
the original construction costs.
Uy - owner of Edison Development Construction
Public Estates Authority (PEA) contracted Edison for the landscaping
of Heritage Park. There was a delay in the delivery of the property by
PEA to Edison due to squatters and an existing public cemetery
causing additional costs to Edison.
● Rental costs for equipment - increased rentals
● Labor costs - idle men
● Caused topsoil at the original supplier to be depleted
prompting Edison to obtain from farther Source
● Mobilization of water tracks
● Nursery shade for young plants and trees
Uy (Edison Development Construction) sued PEA for damages.
Whether PEA is liable?
YES - rental cost of equipment + labor, NO - topsoil
RENTAL + LABOR
Uy had mobilized manpower and equipment sufficient to do the
landscaping works for the entire 105 hectares. The unilateral
reduction in scope of work made by PEA thus laid idle the men and
equipment of Uy in direct proportion to said reduction.
In effect, therefore, Uy had on hand manpower and equipment
amounting to 42.85% in excess of that necessary to perform the
landscaping works for the reduced scope of work. Uy thus suffered
costs in terms of excess manpower and equipment in proportion to
the reduced scope of work.
TOPSOIL
The principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invoked, if
through the act or omission the person took the risk of being denied
27
 payment by not giving prior notice and/or securing consent as
required by contract or law.
Elements of Unjust enrichment
1. that the defendant has been enriched
2. that the plaintiff has suffered a loss – owner-caused delay
was 546 days causing costs in the equipment rental
3. that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and
4. that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Art. 1724 provides that the contractor who undertakes a work for a
stipulated price in conformity with plans and specifications agreed
upon, cannot increase the price on account of higher cost of labor or
materials, save where there has been a change in plans and
specifications, provided that:
1. Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in
writing; and
2. The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been
determined in writing by both parties.
In this case, there was no written consent obtained for the topsoil
and water trucks as required by 1724. Thus, PEA is not liable.
Sps. Lopez - Lessor of Car Cool / Seller of the Property
Car Cool - Lessee of Sps. Lopez
USHIO - Buyer of the Property
Sps. Lopez leased their property to Car Cool through a Verbal Lease
Agreement. They informed Car Cool of plans to sell it but it was
ignored.
Sps. Lopez terminated the Verbal Lease Agreement and gave notice
Car Cool Philippines, to Car Cool. It was then sold to USHIO. USHIO demanded Car Cool to
Inc. v. Ushio Realty
and Development
vacate but it did not.
Corporation
USHIO filed an ejectment case while Car Cool filed robbery with force,
malicious mischief and grave coercion against USHIO.
Car Cool also filed specific performance and damages because they
paid advance payments in checks for monthly rentals.
Whether there was unjust enrichment due to the rentals and
attorney’s fee? No (attorney’s fee removed bec no basis).
The alleged payment by the petitioner as rentals were given to the
former owner (Lopez) and not to the private respondent who was not
privy to the transaction.
It never benefited financially from the alleged transaction. Aside
from that, the postdated checks the "private respondent" admitted to
have received, as rental payments were never encashed. On the
contrary, USHIO even offered to return the same to the petitioner, but
was refused. Thus, it did not amount to payment.
​USHIO Realty, as the new owner of the property, has a right to
physical possession of the property. Since CAR COOL deprived
USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty
rentals as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property.
There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has
a valid claim to such benefit. Under Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, USHIO Realty has the legal right to receive some
amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOL's occupation of
the property.
Elements of Unjust enrichment
1. that the defendant has been enriched – advance payments
never encashed, but was returned
2. that the plaintiff has suffered a loss –
3. that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal
ground, and – Rules of Civil Procedure provide that USHIO
has the legal right to receive amount as reasonable
compensation for CAR COOL’s occupation, arising from the
loss of the use and occupation of the property and not
damages
4. that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Two conditions
1. that a person is benefited without a valid basis or
justification, and,
2. that such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.
The requisites for unjust enrichment are not present on the part of the
respondent because it has a valid claim to such benefit.
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E. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE (ARTICLE24)
ART. 24
ARTICLE 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Does Art. 24 need to be invoked in order to be applied?
● It seems not. The Court may step in, as long as they identify that one of the
contracting parties or other party in the relationship is at a disadvantage.
● However it is important to note that this is one few times that the court can interfere
with contractual relations of the parties.
Cruz - Employee
EMS Manpower - Employer
Cruz went to Kuwait to work as a domestic helper. After completing
her contract, she went back to the Philippines and sued EMS
Manpower and its foreign principal for underpayment and
non-payment of vacation leave, for being charged a different
placement fee, for physical injuries inflicted upon her by her employer.
EMS Manpower raised the principal defense of settlement as
evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cruz. However,
Cruz contends that she was inveigled into signing the affidavit
because she signed it without the assistance of counsel, because
the “lawyer” who assisted her was not really a lawyer, but just a
helper at the OWWA.
Cruz v. NLRC
Does the affidavit exculpate EMS from all liability? - NO. Cruz was at
clear disadvantage and the court stepped in to protect her rights.
The SC held in the negative. She was not assisted by counsel and
even assuming that she was assisted by one, there is still the question
of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross disparity
between the amount of the settlement and Cruz’s original claim.
Contrary to the contention of EMS Manpower that it has no privity of
contract with Cruz, we have held in a long line of cases that the local
recruiter is solidarily liable with the foreign principal for all damages
sustained by the overseas worker in connection with his contract of
employment.
This decision demonstrates once against the tenderness of the Court
toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and
impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is
especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks
they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land.
That is why we must carefully listen to her when she is finally able to
complain against those who would rob her of her just rewards and
even of her dignity as a human being.
● the attorney who counseled her was not even a lawyer
● gross disparity between claim and settlement (P88,840 to
P2,400)
● waiver null and void, contrary to public policy
● susceptible to abuse because she works by herself
Thus, EMS solidarily liable with foreign principal.
Maruman - Shipper
Everette - owner of Ship
Hernandez - Consignee
Maruman shipped 3 crates of bus spare parts to Hernandez from
Nagoya, Japan to Manila through the Adelfaeverette, owned by
Everette. Upon arrival, it was discovered one of the crates was
missing.
In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties
is at disadvantage on account of
1. moral dependence
2. ignorance
3. indigence
4. mental weakness
Everett Steamship
Corp v. CA
5. tender age
6. other handicap
Courts must be vigilant for his protection. Hernandez wanted to claim
the full value at 1,522,500 yen but Everett claimed that the bill of
lading limits its liability for lost cargo to 100,000 yen. Hernandez,
consignee, instituted a civil suit of collection against Everett.
Trial Court ruled that the fact the conditions were printed so small that
they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that
Hernandez was aware of these conditions such that he had fairly and
freely agreed to it.
● The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage
to or in any connection with, goods in an amount exceeding
Y100,000.00 or its equivalent in any other currency per
package or customary freight unit (whichever is least) unless
29
 the value of the goods higher than this amount is declared
in writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the
carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is
paid as required.

Whether Hernandez fairly and freely agreed to the limited liability

clause in the bill of lading because said conditions were printed in
small letters? Yes.

The Court applied the Articles 1749 & 1750,

Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to

the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the
owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

Further, the Court ruled that the stipulation limiting the liability of the
carrier to 100,000 yen is reasonable and just because the shipper had
the option to declare a higher valuation for the goods. In this case, the
shipper failed to declare a higher valuation for the goods.

According to jurisprudence, a contract of adhesion is a contract

wherein the party imposes a ready-made contract to the other. It is not
prohibited because the other party can freely reject it.
In this case,
● Maruman has been extensively engaged in the trading
business is not ignorant of the business transactions and
should be knowledge of of the stipulations of the bill of land
and should have declared a higher valuation of the goods
● Maruman has not been heard to complain that it has been
deceived or rushed into agreeing to ship the cargo in Everett

30