31

A Study on the Character of Traditional Political Culture in Iran

Dal Seung Yu
(HUFS)

Abstract

The traditional political culture of Iran determined many aspects of politics and the
political management of the society. In describing the character of Iranian political
culture, I will need to refer to the Iranian worldview, ideology and also some aspects
of the popular culture of Iranians, which have ancient historical sources. The roots of
the Iranian worldview and the Iranian people's attitudes regarding political subjects go
back to Islam, and then Avesta, and at last to the period of mythological beliefs.

Ⅰ. Introduction

The traditional political culture of Iran determined many aspects of politics and the
political management of the society. In describing the character of Iranian political
culture, I will need to refer to the Iranian worldview, ideology and also some aspects
of the popular culture of Iranians, which have ancient historical sources.
The roots of the Iranian worldview and the Iranian people's attitudes regarding
political subjects, as a part of general culture, go back to Islam, and then Avesta, and
at last to the period of mythological beliefs. Therefore, though I will not attempt a
detailed history, I will try to quickly review the past, mostly concentrating on the
attitudes, ideas and beliefs that relate to the important political subjects of authority,
legitimacy and government.
The ancient sources of the Iranian worldview can be found in the Rig-Veda. The Rig-
Veda is a collection of hymns in praise of the gods, which the Iranian shared with the
ancient Indians, along with a common culture, before the two separated.1) Later, these
Iranian peoples developed the Zoroastrian culture, which created some changes in
people's political attitudes.
In the Rig-Veda, the universe was divided into three parts: earth, heaven and
atmosphere. The earth was like a bowl at the bottom of the universe, and the heaven
like an inverted bowl at the top. The heaven and the earth were a couple, the father
and mother of the world.
Some researchers have claimed that the oldest ancient Indo-Iranian god, called Diyaos,
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shares a common lexicographical root with Zeus Pater from Greece

and Jupiter from Rome.1) Diyaos was originally the presiding god. This position
was later given to Varona, who was also called Arte or Arshe, meaning the order of
universe. Arte was used to mean true course of morality , and even right.1)
In ancient Indo-Iranian mythology, Mitra and Varona were symbols of the two
different divine and human aspects of government. Together, they controlled the order
of universe. In the Rig-Veda, the chief god was Asura ( The Great ). After becoming
the greatest god, Varona was also called Asora. Eventually, Ahura, a variant of Asura,
became the title of the greatest god of the Iranians.

Ⅱ. Political Culture of Zoroastrianism

One prominent scholar, Georges Dumezil, claims that the order of the universe in
Indo-Iranian thought was a reflection of the social systems of these peoples. In
Mesopotamian thought as well, the order of the universe resembled the earthly
governmental system.1)
According to his claim, Aryan society was divided into three castes. These castes
consisted of dinyaran (priests), rezemyaran (soldiers) and producers (peasants
and artisans). Mithra was the master of human affairs and Varona was the master of
the divine world. Kingship belonged to dinyaran and had both divine and human
aspects; in other words, the king was both earthly ruler and messenger of the divine.1)
In Iranian epic literature also, the kings had both political and religious power at the
same time. They attributed their power and authority to their connection to the gods:
their role as representatives of the gods was the origin of their legitimacy. The kings
considered themselves the representative of the Ahura Mazda on the earth. The
carvings on Achaemenian tombs show the kings performing the sacrificial ceremony
in front of the holy fire on the altar. A wing-spread falcon atop the king's head
symbolized Ahura Mazda ruling over heaven and protecting the earth and the king
who is his representative on it. Dariush , the second king of the Achaemenian dynasty,
was one of the most famous Iranian kings to expand the theory of the king as
representative of Ahura Mazda.1)
In Zoroastrianism, according to the doctrine which developed in the Sassanid, the
world is the battlefield of the forces of good and evil, a battlefield that will exist until
the final victory of good over evil. The material world is the creation of Ahura Mazda,
who laid it as a trap for Ahriman, the god of evil, who will at the end be defeated in
this battle. In this doctrine, humans are holy creatures because their souls exist prior to
their bodies,1) and their help is essential to Ahura Mazda for his success in his fight
against Ahriman.
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In Iranian mythology, Kayumars was considered to be the first human and the first
king as well.1) In this way, religion and government were connected, with the king,
who was the head of both government and religion, as the symbol of their connection.
In Zoroastrianism, the king enjoyed complete superiority over the social system.
Religion was synonymous with the social system and with justice, which was
interpreted as observation of class function . Class function required that each
class had to fulfill its duty and not intervene in the work of other classes. Today, some
Islamic Republic theorists, as I will show, formulate this same idea as genuineness of
duty.
As Ardasher, the Sassanian king, put it, religion was the basis of kingship, which in
turn was the protector of religion. Whatever is without any basis or foundation will
collapse and whatever is without a guard or protector will disappear. When religion
and kingship are combined in one person, they create a strong foundation that even
Ahriman cannot harm.1)
One of the Sassanid writings states that when Zoroaster takes over the government,
Judgment Day will take place. Resemblance between this thought and Shi'a thought
regarding the twelfth Imam, who will bring the Imamate and government together, is
completely clear. Respecting the relationship between religion and government, there
is an opinion written in one of the religious writings of the Sassanid, called Denkard ,
as follows:

The religion of omniscience (is) like a mighty tree with one trunk, two great branches,
three branches, four off-branches and five roots. And the one trunk is the Mean, the
two great boughs are action and abstention, the three branches are humat, hukht and
huvarsht, that is, good thoughts, good words and good deeds. The four off-branches
are the four religious castes by which the Religion and secular life are (both)
maintained, the priesthood, the warrior caste, the caste of husbandmen, and the caste
of artisans. The five roots are the five (degrees of) government whose names in
Religion are manpat (householder), vispat (village headman), zandpat (tribal chieftain),
dehpat (provincial governor) and the Zarathrushtotom (the highest religious authority
and representative of Zoroaster on earth). (Over and above these) is another, the chief
of all chiefs, that is the King of Kings, the governor of the (whole) world.1)

In spite of all that, the king in the Iranian religious system is different from the king in
other religious systems, such as the kings of Egypt and Mesopotamia. In those two
religious systems, there is no mention of an evil king.1) Apparently, the king could not
be evil. Pharaoh was God and the Mesopotamian kings were representatives of the
gods. But the Iranian king just did God's will and did not have a metaphysical aspect,
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so he could, in fact, be evil. In Pahlavian literature, in fact, a distinction was made

between good and evil kings. Zoroastrian moral dualism was reflected in kingship: as
in the universal system, in which there are both Ahura Mazda and Ahriman, in society,
also a part of the universal system, there are both good and evil kings. The good king
is the supporter of Ahura Mazda and the evil king, the executor of Ahriman. The good
king is the best creation of God and the person closest to Him. His position is that of a
divine. Moreover, he is the protector of the divine system. But the evil king is the
closest associate of Ahriman.2) This concept is different from that of the ideal king, the
innocent Imam, of the Shi'ite. Eventually, however, the Sassanid kings came to declare
themselves the family of God.3)
When the good king rules over the people, the world will flourish and nature and
society will be harmonized. However, if any evil king rules over the people, drought
and famine will take over everywhere. Therefore, in Zoroastrian thought, not all kings
are charismatic. If the king is righteous, he has legitimacy and will help the good force
in the battle of good and evil4), but if he is not righteous, he will help the evil force.
(Note that righteous should not be taken in its current meaning. Justice meant the
very protection of class function, which meant everyone stays in their place.) The
divine light is also not particular to the king. Any man who fulfills class function,
meaning that he does his own job well, in his own place, will possess his own
particular divine light. The king's divine light, meanwhile, is greatest but not eternal: if
a king strays from the correct path, he will lose the divine light. This is demonstrated
in the mythological literature; when Jamshid Jam left the correct path, he lost his
divine light and Zahak conquered him. However, all Iranian kings, divine light or no,
always acted to protect the kingship system, throughout Iran's ancient history.
This idea that if the ruler is good, the country will flourish, and everyone will achieve
happiness, still penetrates the Iranian people's view towards governments and creates
a part of political culture.

Ⅲ. Political Culture of Shiism

1. Roots and Elements of Political Culture in the Islamic Period

The Islamic period seems to be more a continuation of the previous period than an
interruption. The basic subjects of Islamic political thought, compared with the
previous time, have changed a little. The Sunni viewpoint on some important subjects
such as political legitimacy is of course different from pre-Islamic thought in Iran. But
in the Shi'a viewpoint, these differences are minimal.
The combination of religion and government, which is one of the basic manifestations
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of the culture of the Asiatic mode of production, is an important principle in the

Zoroastrian, Shi'a and Sunni viewpoints. But from the standpoint of political authority
and legitimacy, while there are many similarities between the Zoroastrian and Shi'a
viewpoints, these two both differ from the Sunni viewpoint. As I will explain later, in
the Sunni viewpoint, the caliph, as a ruler, does not have any metaphysical connection
with God. He is simply an executor of Islamic law. However, the ideal pre-Islamic
Iranian king and Shi'a Imam, in some ways, have a special relationship with God.
I will now briefly discuss these subjects in the context of Iranian political culture in
the Islamic period, which started when Arab nations conquered Iran in the seventh
century. At first, in lands which previously had been governed by Persian kings, a
caliph was installed, but local princes were left in place. Over time, Shi'ism, an Iranian
version of Islam, developed.
Khaje Nizam al-Mulk, the great Seljuk vizier, tried to revive ancient Iranian kingship
and change the source of his legitimacy.5) But he did not have much success in this
respect. In the sixteenth century, the Safavid dynasty took the throne in Iran and
Shi'ism prevailed with a different culture from the Sunnites. The Safavid kings
declared themselves the descendant of the Shi'a Imams and inaugurated charismatic
rule.
In Sunni thought, the source of a caliph's authority was considered to be the
fulfillment of the orders of God among Umma (Islamic community). The Islamic
Umma was founded by the Prophet of Islam, and his successor, the caliph, supervised
the execution of Islamic law in his nation. Religion (church) and government (state)
were not separated; each was an aspect of a single law.6) The government took
responsibility for the people's morality and happiness. In this respect, there is no
difference between the political thought of the Sunnites and the Shi'ites.
Regarding the subjects of power and legal authority, there is an important difference
between the Islamic and Christian viewpoints. In Islam, there is no difference between
legal authority and power, and Islamic law just recognizes one high position, the
Imam. The concept of the two swords, holy and unholy, which existed in the Western
world of the Middle Ages and has been an important fact in Western political culture,
has never existed in Islamic political culture, where the religious system and the
governmental system are the same. The struggle that has existed between Pope and
king in Europe could not have happened in the Islamic world, where political and
social life are one and inseparable. Religion rules over every aspect of life. In this
respect, because policy has not been separate from religion and morality, politics
could not develop as an independent field.7)
After the decline of the caliph and the sultan's rise to power, there were some changes
in religious theory, creating separate realms for religious and secular power8) and
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providing doctrinal support for the sultan's power. But in Eastern autocratic
government, separation of religion and government seems impossible. Separation of
religion and government, on the rare occasions when it occurred in Iranian history,
always caused some political crisis (for example, the Qajar and the Pahlavi dynasties).
So the relationship between the caliph and the sultanate was ceremonially marked by
the sultan receiving the robe of honor, meaning that he was the appointed sultan,
from the caliph. Eventually, this became purely ceremonial, and it was actually the
sultan who appointed and dismissed the caliph.
Muslim scholars, tending to believe that tyranny was better than anarchy and that the
presence of the sultan was necessary for keeping the Islamic lands, yielded to an
agreement with this theory, and extended it still further. At last, Imam Mohammad
Ghazali, the great philosopher of Islam, said that the caliph is he whom the sultan
appointed.9)
But according to Islamic law, Ijtihad belongs to the Imam, meaning that he possesses
the knowledge to act upon the Quran, the Sunna and the Hadith. This did not describe
the sultan. Ghazali theorized that Muslims should follow the great religious leaders in
religious matters. Eastern autocracy accepted this great degree of independence of
religion from government, but it later caused some difficulties for autocratic rule.
Khaje Nizam al-Mulk, a Sunni Muslim, chose a new theory of government, opposed
to caliphate theory, which could be called the divine law of kings. According to this
theory, the king governed because of God's will. Regarding the source of the king's
authority, he said, The supreme God chose a person among creation in every age, and
gave him the royal and praiseworthy arts. He did not approve of this theory, and just
expressed it as a principle. Instead, he spoke in detail regarding the use of royal
government in society. According to him, the king was the instrument of God's will,
which brings order and safety to society. The ability of the king himself and God's
favor and attention were the sources of the king's power. In Khaje Nizam al-Mulk's
view, this fact was not at all inconsistent with royal succession. Therefore, the source
of the king's power will be God's favor, the ability of the king himself and heritage. He
presented a decree from one of the pre-Islamic kings, who said: know that, I have
this reign given by glorious God and inherited from my father and won my rule by
the sword.10)
Meanwhile, in Khaje Nizam al-Mulk's theory, governmental law still was rooted in
divine law. But the king's power was absolute. As he was selected by God, subjects
should follow him. The people had to obey the king without questioning his
legitimacy. He never said what to do if the king was cruel, whether they still had to
obey him or not.
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2. Basis of the Political Culture of Shi'ism

The attitudes, beliefs, values and political viewpoint of Iranians are rooted mainly in
the two traditions of ancient kingship and Shi'ism. These two share some
characteristics, but there are differences between them as well. These points will be
clarified through a brief description of a few aspects of Shi'ism that relate to
government. Meanwhile, in order to consider the positions which Shi'ism has taken on
recent political questions, it seems necessary to survey its theories regarding
governments and the changes it has undergone.
At first a political group, Shi'ism believed that leadership of the people was the right
of Ali, the fourth caliph, and his descendants. This group eventually became a
religious movement. Later, many disaffected social movements turned to Shi'ism as an
ideological weapon against their rulers. Shi'ites divided into three sects: The Zayd sect,
the Ismail sect and the Twelfth Imam sect. Here I discuss the last, which is the
dominant religion in Iran.
The Shi'a theory of government has its origins in a few major sources. One of these
sources is mysticism, which, in some part, is rooted in ancient thought. According to
this thought, after human creation, a divine light (also called the light of Mohammad)
penetrates someone who has been selected from each generation, and also is passed
from Ali to his descendants. Therefore, they possess Imamate knowledge. Imamate
means that one has the right to rule the Muslims. It is a continuation of the
prophethood of Mohammad. This conception of the Imam, connecting God and
humans, also has similarities with Iranian ideal kingship.
The second source of Shi'a governmental theory forms the basis of the political theory
of Shi'ism: the justice doctrine, which has been propounded in scholastic theories
since the first Islamic philosophers. According to this doctrine, justice is an inherent
attribute of God, which means that God never refuses his permanent guidance to the
people. He always sends someone to guide them towards the right path. The Imamate
is the continuation of the institution of prophesy.
When a legal government is formed, the Imamate and Velayat (rule) will be united.
But while the twelfth Shi'ite Imam is absent on some affairs, the jurists or religious
scholars control and arrange Muslims' affairs as deputies (or successors). The
business of governmental force and compulsion is in the hands of tyrant-governors. As
I will explain later, this part of Shi'a thought sparked change and prepared the way for
a new movement, which led to Islamic government and the Velayat-e Faqih (rule of
the jurist).
The formation of the Safavid dynasty, the first Shi'a government in Iran in 1501, was
one of the important turning points of Shi'a governmental thought. The Al-Buyeh
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kings (945-1055), who ruled long before the Safavid, were, though Shi'ites, officially
subordinate to the caliph (although they themselves appointed and dismissed the
caliph). But the Safavid government, which actually began as a religious and sectarian
movement, was Shi'a in all respects. When the Safavid dynasty took power in Iran,
Shi'a jurists faced many difficulties.11) As already explained, Shi'a jurists believed that
Imamate and Velayat (rule) were reserved for the innocent Imam who, by having the
Imamate knowledge through God, deserved such a position. But now Shi'a scholars
had to adapt themselves and their theories to political realities. Till then, they had been
in opposition to the government and could develop theories freely, but with the
formation of the Shi'a government, they had to conform their theories to the existing
realities.
At last, a new theory was founded among Shi'a ulama. Under this new theory, the
basis of government would be the innocent Imam.12) But during the time of the Imam's
absence, jurists, as public deputies of the innocent Imam, should manage the general
affairs of Shi'a society. (It is worthwhile to mention that the twelfth Imam had four
special deputies.) The relationship between jurists and the people was called Velayat
( rule ). Thus, the Shi'a jurists, theoretically (not practically), granted themselves the
right to manage the people's general affairs, independently from government. This
principle gave them the position of deputies of Imam and the right of Velayat-e
Faqih (rule of the jurist). These concepts still exist among Shi'a jurists and have
become a basic principle of the Islamic Republic system. They are expressed as
followed by one of the greatest Shi'a ulama during the Safavid dynasty, Seyyed
Mohammad ben Ghoreiysh Hosseini Sabzdari, who wrote in his book, Zein al-
Arefin: And at this time that the Twelfth Imam is covered and hidden from sight the
possessors of this glorious position are the divine ulama who are the same as jurists
and Mujtahdiin (s, Mujtahid) responsible for other people, who cannot attain such a
position and are to follow them.13)
The establishment of the first Shi'a dynasty in Iran and the changes that followed had
important consequences for the political culture of Iran. After the establishment of the
Shi'a dynasty, Iran went through extensive social, political and religious changes.
Before 1501, when the dynasty began, Shi'ites were an opposition religion and
ideologically rejected any state that was not led by Imam Mahdi, who was the Hidden
Imam. So there had to be a new theory to justify and legitimize a Shi'a state. Hence
there appeared the theory of Niabat (vice-gerency) according to which the Safavid
Shahs would rule the Shi'ite country with Islamic justice until the appearance of the
Hidden Imam.
The Safavid dynasty laid the foundation for a new identity: the Iranian Shi'a identity.
The first Shah of the Safavid dynasty, Ismail I (1501-1524), announced the Shi'ite
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Twelve Imami to be the official religion of Iran. The radical followers of this
charismatic leader made the Sunni ulama leave Iran for the Ottoman Empire, while
Shi'a ulama from all over the Ottoman Empire, while settled in the new Shi'a country.
The Safavid Shahs needed religious leaders to legitimize their political power, and the
Shi'a ulama, who accepted Ismail as the vice-gerent of the Hidden Imam, gradually
gained considerable authority, social power and prestige. They gained the right to act
as religious jurists and to collect religious taxes. This gave them an economic
independence which was very important in itself. Sunni ulama were deprived of such
independence.
Some of the most important Shi'a institutions, practices and rituals appeared at the
time of the establishment of the Safavid dynasty. One of these was Marja-e Taqlid
(sources of emulation), an important position in Shi'ism that represented clerical
hierarchy and power.14) From that time until the Islamic Revolution, Iranian history
was an arena of dual authority divided between the state and the Shi'a clerics, who
developed important social ties with the whole community and, especially, established
functional and even personal connections with the bazaaris, which were to play an
important part in succeeding Iranian historical events.
The bazaar was traditionally the major center of socio-economic life in the cities of
Iran. During the reign of the Safavid dynasty, many clerical centers, mosques and
religious schools were constructed within bazaars. Bazaaris paid their religious taxes
to the ulama. This economic support helped the ulama to grow in number and power.
Rich bazaaris even built mosques as the combined power of the bazaaris and ulama
increased while the religious, social and economic connections between the state and
the bazaaris decreased.
The political order in pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran was an axial order, outside of the
society. The social order was legitimized as divine order. The notion of the Shah as a
shadow of God on earth and the notion of the vice-gerency of the Hidden Imam were
adopted by all political leaders. The Safavid dynasty combined these two sources of
legitimacy, but the Qajar dynasty mainly adopted only the notion of the shadow of
God as its legitimizing source of power.15) This externality of the political order to
society meant that the Iranian ruling dynasty was dependent on religion, and on
religious authority, which had a monopoly over religious matters in the Muslim
community. The clergy had extensive social, educational and judicial responsibility.
The state and the clergy needed each other while, at the same time, competing with
each other. The Shi'a ideas of state resulted in a weakening of state power:16) one can
say that the state was not a full sovereign organ. According to the most accepted
theory of society, the state was only legitimized as the defender of Umma against the
threat of non-Muslims. Most important twentieth-century movements in Iran bear the
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marks of this alliance between the state and the Shi'a clergy. The traditional bazaar of
Iran was an important economic, as well as social, center. It was a commercial hub,
and a center for workshops, guilds, banks, educational and religious institutions. The
bazaaris also had links with peasants and tribal groups.
Contrary to Max Weber's claim17), there is no duality of centers of distinct authority in
Islam. There is no theological legitimization for such dualism, as there is in the
European Catholic Church. In Islam, there is no such thing as two realms of power,
one belonging to the state as the realm of secular affairs and the other belonging to the
church as the realm of power of God on earth. Meanwhile, the Shi'a theory of state
denies the divine legitimacy of political power. The Safavid dynasty, which was
surrounded by Sunni Ottomans, who did not recognize any political power in the
Muslim community other than the sultanate, established the powerful body of Shi'a
clerics. Paradoxically, while, the Safavid dynasty tried through an office namde sadr to
incorporate the Shi'a clerics into the state machinery, as a result of their economic
independence the power of the clergy increased considerably, so that soon the power
of some major ulama surpassed that of governors and even of the Shah.18) The main
source of the Shi'a ulama's theoretical power was the doctrine of gheybat (absence),
which was incompatible with the existence of any sovereign political power other than
the reign of the Hidden Imam. Even the claim of the Safavid dynasty to be the vice-
gerent of the Hidden Imam did not give the dynasty full sovereignty over the Umma.
According to Shi'a theology, the Shi'a Muslim community was supposed to await its
Hidden Imam, who would establish the just reign of the Imam.
After the fall of the Safavid dynasty, the Shi'a ulama attempted to create regular
education centers and a well-defined hierarchical discipline for the ranking of the
Shi'a ulama. The so-called Marja-e Taqlid and Ijtihad were examples of this attempt.
However, the ulama did not construct an independent institution of power.19) Instead
of this, they pursued the alliance with the bazaaris, which gained them prominent
sources of influence.
As already mentioned, the interconnection between the clergy and the bazaaris had far
reaching consequences for the later development of Iranian history. Shi'a ulama
compensated for their lack of a central organization by reinforcing their position in the
civil sphere of society. The ulama connection to the bazaaris was institutionalized
through several systems, such as the collecting of religious taxes, and the holding of
several religious rites and ceremonies. Bazaaris in their turn enjoyed ulama support in
relation to the state.
The state needed a clerical state-wide networks as a means of control over the whole
country because of several social and political considerations. One of these was the
tribal base of the Iranian state before the Pahlavi dynasty. Jihad (holy war) was
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another factor: ulama had the power to declare holy war against an enemy and
mobilize the country.

3. The Qajar Dynasty and the Clergy

The Qajar dynasty in its turn attempted to create a religiously legitimized state. Agha
Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty, began to use Shi'a symbols
abundantly, though he resisted ulama intervention in state affairs. His successor, Fath
Ali Shah (1797-1863), developed a closer relation with the ulama.
He ordered the building of new religious places, mosques and madrasah, and he
repaired shrines. He exempted inhabitants of the holy city of Qom from taxation. He
encouraged major ulama to settle in Tehran, the capital of the Qajar dynasty. In his
reign, the auqaf (endowments) property of the ulama increased drastically. The ulama
reciprocated by recognizing the legitimacy of the temporal rule of the Qajar Shahs.
Mirza Abul-Qasim Qomi, the chief Mujtahid of the time, announced, as a new
theological legitimization of the Shah's power, that God had made the Shah his
lieutenant on the earth for the preservation of order and the clergy for the protection of
religion. Later, other prominent theologians such as Kashif al-Ghita created a division
between the political and religious leadership of the Hidden Imam, so that political
leadership should belong to the Shah and religious leadership to the ulama. The ulama
reached such a prominent place that their fatvas (verdicts) were more important than
the Shah's decrees, and in conflicts between ulama and local governors, the Shah took
the side of the ulama.20) In many cases, ulama supporting oppressed people succeeded
in deposing local governors. The ulama used their privileges to reinforce their position
in the social, educational and political life of Iran.
One of the theological developments that reinforced the ulama's power was the victory
of the Usulis over the Akhbaris. The Akhbaris did not believe in the interpretation of
religious sources. Instead of this, they believed in Hadith and Khabar. However, the
task of interpretation of religious sources reinforced the mujtahids' position and the
institutionalization of ijtihad.
The growth of foreign influences was another factor that in its turn increased the
social prestige of the clergy as the defenders of native values. The Qajar concessions
to foreign companies created an opposition to the government in the people and the
ulama, and set the stage for political unrest and several movements. One of the most
typical examples of the ulama's reaction to concession was the tobacco movement. In
this movement, the clergy, working through an organized network for the first time,
gained leadership of the resistance against an English company which had a monopoly
over the sale and trade of tobacco in Iran. Major ulama used fatva as an important
 42

means of mobilizing people against the company and the government. Finally, Mirza
Hasan Shirazi, the most important Mujtahid, declared a fatva forbidding people from
using tobacco, which was obeyed by everyone, everywhere in Iran. Even Naser al-Din
Shah's wives observed this religious verdict. This movement showed the great
influence of the ulama in Iran. Playing their part as guardians of religion most
skillfully, they constructed a political network and institutionalized their political
leadership. The clergy led a victorious movement and showed that they were the civil
counterparts of the state.
The twentieth century held many challenges for the Shi'a clergy in Iran. Various
movements and extensive programs of modernization called for clerical reaction and
response. The Constitutional Movement was one crucial event that deeply involved
the ulama. The Qajar dynasty's connections with foreign powers had caused the Qajars
to lose credibility as the protectors of the Islamic community. The ulama were at first
unacquainted with constitutionalism, but as they were against the absolute power of
the state, and they were leaders of the community, they were pushed into participation
in the movement and soon became the leaders of the Constitutional Revolution.21)
Gradually, they developed significant theological and theoretical justification for the
Constitutional Movement, in spite of crucial opposition from one of the main
Mujtahids of Tehran, named Sheikh Fazl Allah Nuri, who believed that
Constitutionalism was opposed to Islam. Nuri and some of the other ulama believed in
shariat (law of God) as the fundamental law, that the Quran is the fundamental law for
Muslims. The Constitutionalist ulama argued against them that whereas the Quran is
the foundation of religion, fundamental law determines the principles of the state, the
limits of the government and the rights of a nation.
Mirza Mohammad Hussein Naini was one of the major pro-Constitutionalism
Mujtahids. In a famous book, he provided the most prominent arguments in defense of
Constitutionalism. Using Quranic verses and the sayings of the Prophet and of Shi'ite
Imams to condemn tyranny, he argued that the best way to avoid tyranny in a time of
gheibat (the absence of the Imam) is a Constitutional form of government. Naini
considered tyrannical power to be sherk (a usurpation of God); his Constitutionalism
was not intended to justify a separation between the political and the religious powers
of the ulama, but the core of his theory was rather the necessity to limit government.
Nuri, on the other hand, opposing the idea of parliament, argued that dealing with the
affairs of people is the responsibility only of qualified Mujtahids, not of any grocer or
shopkeeper.

4. The Growth of the Influence of Shi'a Clerics in Iranian Society

 43

I hope to have made clear that the explosion of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979
did not happen without any premise or background. It was the climax of a political
movement within Shi'a doctrine which had had a long evolution. The events and
concepts I have discussed so far are related to the important historical transformations,
and especially doctrinal changes, through which Shi'ism passed before arriving at this
point.
Shi'ism, in its beginnings, seemed opposed to government, though not actively so. At
the time of the Abbasid dynasty, Shi'ites believed that a just government would be
established when the hidden Imam appeared on Judgement Day, which was a
justification for withdrawal from public life in the meantime. Shi'ites even had a
principle of dissimulation , which justified hiding their religion and pretending
approval of the official religion and government. In the sixteenth century, a group of
extremist Shi'ites managed to take over the government through a factional movement
and founded the Safavid dynasty. The Safavid kings, who claimed divinity and
charisma, considered themselves sons of the Seventh Imam, and when they ascended
the throne, suppressed all other factions of Shi'ism, appointing religious leaders at will.
But, at that time, Shi'a clerics possessed economic independence. They could establish
a basis for separation from government through religious taxes.23)
The shape of Shi'a authority, unlike authority in the Catholic Church and among
Sunnites, was scattered. In the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt, the religious authority
was located in the capital and under the control of the political ruler. But in later
periods, after the Safavid dynasty, Shi'a authority became both scattered and free from
the direct supervision of government. Dispersion of government after the decline of
the Safavid also had an important role in this process.
In the Qajar period, after almost two decades of political dispersion, political
centralization was again strengthened in Iran. But the Qajar kings did not resume
ancient custom and did not make religion subordinate to government. They took the
neutral position and did not create any impediment to clerical independence. They did
not even try to subject the religious authority to royal authority. Then competition
between the two basic schools of Shi'ism at that time the Akhbari and the Usuli, ended
in the victory of the second school, which was important to doctrinal change in
Shi'ism because the system of Velayat-e Faqih, which had been discussed in recent
decades, actually would be expressed within the framework of the Usuli school.
Whereas the Akhbari school believed that believers could make decisions as to
religious affairs, themselves, by interpreting the Quran and the Traditions of the
Prophet and the Imams correctly, the Usuli school was opposed to this opinion and
believed that all pious men had to follow a Mujtahid. In the mid-Qajar dynasty, the
Usuli opinion prevailed over the Akhbari school. Later, another institution developed,
 44

the Marja-e Taqlid, which was followed by everyone, in case of general consensus.
But this kind of consensus has less often been realized in practice. Although there was
no obligation to have a Marja-e Taqlid, it was considered ideal. This kind of tradition
has given a great deal of power to clerics.
At the end of the Qajar period and the beginning of the Pahlavi period, some new
elements emerged, some of which challenged clerical influence and some of which
strengthened it. Among these new elements were colonialism, Westernism and reform,
which threatened the foundation of the clergy, although, but on the other hand, the
influence of colonialism and the beginnings of a fight against it led people towards the
clergy. In 1891, Shi'a clerics joined the anti-tobacco monopoly movement,
strengthening their connection with the people and the bazaaris. But in the
Constitutional Revolution, as has already been explained, clerics agreed to the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy, while standing against Reza Shah creating
a republic, because that seemed akin to secularization. Reza Shah's reforms of the
judicial and educational systems, which had traditionally been in the hands of clerics,
seriously injured the economic and cultural basis of the clergy. Relations between the
regime of Mohammad Reza Shah, the last king of Iran, and the United States also
ended in the domination by foreigners and unbelievers of Muslims, which was
intolerable for clerics. All of these led Shi'a clerics to a new doctrine, Velayat-e Faqih.
The theory of Velayat-e Faqih, although considered an innovation in Shi'ism, has roots
in ancient culture. Political and social changes and the change in Shi'a doctrines
prepared the way for this new theory, which laid the foundation for the Islamic
Revolution and the new Islamic government. Despite its long development and its
inspiration in ancient thought, the new theory as formulated by Ayatollah Khomeini
and formed by the religious movements of the previous three to four decades was an
innovation. As already said, the great Shi'a clerics traditionally refrained from
intruding in governmental affairs. This custom continued until the period of Ayatollah
Boroujerdi, who was the Marja-e Taqlid after the Constitutional Revolution, and who
only pronounced upon and interfered in governmental affairs when regulations
contrary to Islamic law were approved (before him, Ayatollah Kazem Yazdi and Haeri
had done the same). In 1949, when various political forces became very active in Iran,
Ayatollah Boroudjerdi held a meeting in order to discuss the urgent affairs of the time.
In that meeting, in which participated the great ulama, it was decided that clerics
should not interfere in politics. When Ayatollah Kashani was elected member of
parliament and then speaker of the Majles (parliament), Boroudjerdi tried to distance
himself from him. The madrasa (theological school), at that time, was not interested in
interfering in political affairs. The Islamic radical groups, such as Fedaiyan-e Eslam
(the Devotees of Islam), could not exercise influence even in Qom. Ayatollah
 45

Boroudjerdi went so far as to express opposition to politicizing the Palestine question.

Notwithstanding this preference for non-interference in politics, the clerics did oppose
some governmental moves towards reform. They proclaimed the new educational
system a depraved institution and even prohibited listening to the radio. The Madrasa
isolated itself from the new generation who were trained in new schools.
After Ayatollah Boroudjerdi, Ayatollah Shariatmadari became the Marja-e Taqlid,
continuing on Boroudjerdi's path. At the same time, Ayatollah Khomeini, who had
been an unknown cleric, rose to fame. Ayatollah Khomeini, who preached in a small
mosque, gradually found many followers among reformists and the youth. Those
opposed to the outmoded madrasa gathered around him.
In 1963, a referendum put forward by the Shah to approve the Revolution of the
Shah and People prompted the great clerics to enter politics united for the first time.
They arranged a statement in opposition to the referendum and sent it to the Shah via
telegram. The Shah got angry, calling them black reactionaries. The bazaaris
supported the clergy and the Tehran and Qom bazaars were closed for three days.
After this move, Ayatollah Shariatmadari returned to non-interference. But Ayatollah
Khomeini continued his opposition and found some followers among lower-ranking
clerics, such as Rabbani Shirazi, Mohammad Gilani, Hashemi Rafsanjani and
Khameni. This group, who had radical beliefs, gradually increased their influence in
Qom. From then on, all religious ceremonies, such as Ashura and mourning
processions, became politicized. In the provinces also, the radical clerical influence
increased. At that time, capitulation (as it was called by the Iranians) was signed
between the Shah's regime and the United States. Under this agreement, the
Americans won extraterritoriality in Iran, to which Ayatollah Khomeini intensely
objected, causing him to be sent into exile in Iraq, which increased the opposition of
the clergy to the Shah's regime.
Before 1969, Ayatollah Khomeini believed in the constitutional government, and his
objection to the Shah's regime was due to its violations of constitutional law.86 But
gradually he came to believe that the colonial influence had so increased in Iran that it
was impossible to stem it by defending constitutional law. The Velayat-e Faqih may
have been derived in part from these considerations. Meanwhile, national affairs were
one of the most important issues in the contemporaneous clerical opposition to the
government.
Velayat (rule) is a controversial and deeply rooted subject in Shi'a jurisprudence. This
concept has been given different expressions within historical discussions. As I have
already explained, Shi'a jurists expressed the doctrine that Velayat or government of
the people belonged exclusively to the innocent Imams. Respecting government
during the Imam's absence, and even Shi'a duties, many changes have been made in
 46

Shi'a jurisprudence throughout history. Until the Safavid dynasty, Sunni kings were
the rulers. Of course, the al-Buyeh kings (945-1055) were themselves Shi'ite, but they
accepted the caliphate and left the Shi'ites free as to proselytization and religious
customs. Therefore, before the Safavid, Shi'ites considered all governments usurpers,
but believing in the twelfth Imam, and according to the concept of taqiya
(dissimulation of belief in the time of danger), they did not get involved with
government and tried to hide their opposition.
In the Safavid period (starting in 1501), the Shi'ites' circumstances changed. The
Safavid government was Shi'a and this presented the Shi'a ulama with a great dilemma.
On one hand, the clerics could not consider the government tyrannical (because it was
Shi'ite); on the other hand, they, the clerics, did not themselves rule. Some resolved
this dilemma by saying that the kings ruled on behalf of the jurists, who were the
deputies of the hidden Imam. Meanwhile, some religious affairs, such as reclaiming
the Imam's property, Auqaf and charitable affairs , were managed directly by the
ulama.
For a long time after the decline of the Safavid dynasty, Iran experienced riots and
disunity. During this period, government remained oblivious of religion and the clerics,
which meanwhile obtained economic independence, increasing their power and
influence. The Qajar kings did not have any religious authority. Nor did they have
anything to do with religion as an institution. During their time, therefore, the scope of
clerical influence was broadened. Government no longer interfered in determining the
Friday prayer leaders and chief of the clergy. The clergy in other Islamic countries did
not have such independence. On the other hand, clerics remained aloof from
governmental affairs. However, some clerics believed that Velayat meant management
of all of Muslims' affairs. Moreover, they believed that the authority of the qualified
jurist, during the time of the Imam's absence, was equal to the absent Imam's authority.
This theory was described in Tahrir al-Vasile , another book written by Ayatollah
Khomeini.
Ayatollah Khomeini asked why, if the Imam's property and charitable affairs are under
the authority of the Imam's deputies, should not other common affairs of Muslims be
under the authority of the Imam's deputies as well? Ayatollah Khomeini explained that
during the Imam's absence it was necessary for the Imam's deputies to take on the
Velayat of Muslims. This necessity meant that any qualified jurist was obliged to take
on the Velayat of Muslims, and further, that this obligation would be taken away from
others, and thereafter, Muslims should obey only the Imam's deputies.
According to this view, the Velayat was divided into two types: Velayat-e Takvini
(genealogical rule) and Velayat-e Tashriei (canonical rule). Velayat-e Takvini belongs
to the Imams and Velayat-e Tashriei, the spiritual one, belongs to the Imam's deputies,
 47

who are jurists. Deputies also have general authority over all of Muslims' affairs. In
Ayatollah Khomeini's opinion, there is no reason to consider some affairs of Muslims
as belonging to the deputies, and some others, not.

Conclusion

In surveying religion and government in Iran, I tried to introduce subjects such as

political legitimacy, political authority and the principles of the political management
of society. The universal system, as presented in this religion, is the reflection of the
political system in Iran. The quality of government authoritarianism, the class system
and the king's place in the centralized government are exactly reflected in the
universal system. In the religious beliefs of ancient Iranians, the king was the one who
coordinated the system of the society with the system of the universe. The king was
the divine executor on earth.
Religion also stresses justice and class function. Justice meant maintaining the system
of the society in accordance with the system of Iranian imperialism. Society was
divided into three major classes, and class function meant that any class or trade had
to pay attention to its specific job. The king's class function was sovereignty and the
class function of the peasants and tradesmen, who made up 99% of society, was
working. The king had the divine light which did not belong to the others.
In Islam, among the Sunnites, the caliph is the watchman of religion and divine law.
But he did not have a divinely determined position. Among the Shi'ites, however, the
Imam has a divine position. In this respect, Shi'a thought is close to ancient Iranian
thought. Khaje Nizam al-Mulk, the great vizier of Seljuk, although he was a Sunnite,
tried to revive the imperial thought of Iran in his book
called Siyasatname, propounding the divine right of the king instead of the caliph
theory, and trying to follow the ancient Iranian style in state management.
According to Shi'ite theory, the Imamate is the continuation of prophethood and divine
guidance. The divine judgment never leaves the people without guidance, and always
appoints some Imams in order to direct them. The government belongs to those who
have divine light. The twelfth Imam, the epochal Imam whose name is Mahdi and
who one day will appear to spread justice all over the society, is currently absent, but
in his absence, the jurists are entrusted with the management of Muslim affairs.
When the Safavid dynasty took power in the fifteenth century, they named themselves
the seventh Imam. The Shi'a jurists, who until then had considered any government to
be a usurper in the absence of the twelfth Imam, made some changes in their doctrine,
introducing the Safavid kings as representatives of the qualified jurists of the time. But
reality was exactly the opposite, and it was the king who appointed the clergy
 48

positions.
Under the Qajars, Shi'a clerics received political independence in addition to the
economic independence they had attained under the Safavids. Furthermore, in reaction
to imperial power, people turned to the clerics, causing the clergy in turn to gain too
much power. The independence of religion and government made the clergy powerful
and the government weak. After repeated governmental crises, the clergy finally
pushed the secular government aside and took over the government itself.
Political culture is undoubtedly not a stable and everlasting fact, and it is undergoes
transformations

References
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1983. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Adamiyyat, Fereydun. 1944. Amir Kabir va Iran. Tehran: Kharazmi.
Afghani, Ali Mohammad. 1985. Doktor Baktash. Tehran: Entesharat-e Negah.
Algar, Hamid. 1970. Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906: Clergy-State Relations in Qajar
Period. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Arjomand, Said A. 1988. The Turban for the Crown. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bashiriyeh, Hossein. 1984. State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982. New York: St. Martin's
Press.
Binder, Leonard. 1962. Iran: Political Development in a changing Society. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Curzon, Lord. 1892. Persia and The Persian Question. London: Longman, Green and Co.
Entner, Marvin. 1965. Russo-Persian Commercial Relation 1914-1928. Gainsville: University
of Florida Press.
Farsoun, Samih and Mashayekhi, Mehdad, eds. 1992. Political Culture in the Islamic
Republic. London: Routledge.
Frankfort, Henri. 1969. Kingship and the God. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Frye, Richard. 1962. The Heritage of Persia. London: Wieden Feld and Nicolson.
Keddie, Nikki. 1995. Iran and The Muslim World. London: Macmillan.
Lambton, Ann. 1981. State and Government in Medieval Islam. London: Oxford University
Press.
Milani, Mohsen M. 1994. The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution. Colorado: Westview
Press.
Rosenthal, Erwin. 1958. Political Thought in Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zonis, Marvin. 1971. The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 49

Analysis of Korean Drama Series with an emphasis on the notions

of tradition and modesty, as their main themes, from a religious
point of view

Jafar Morvarid
(Almustafa- International University of Mashhad)

In this paper, I first mention a statistical survey runs with the Korean TV
series’ audience in Tehran. After that, I study the concepts of “tradition”,
“moderation”, and “justice”, as the main themes of Korean TV series, from
the Islamic and Quranic point of view. I finally make some practical
proposals as to how to model Korean cinema.

Introduction

The article develops as follows: I first mention a statistical population in Tehran

which indicates that Korean TV series have been well received by the Iranian youth
and women. And I mention some reasons of the popularity of Korean TV series. I also
examine the result of the survey.
Korean series exhibit a lifestyle which is based on moderation and tradition. Heroes
of the stories have lives which are mangled with genuine and deep-rooted traditions.
In Korean culture, traditions are sources of aspiration for morality and social order,
and the elderly in well-born families protect these traditions and transmit them to later
generations. Respect toward the elderly and care for educating one’s children are
among the cornerstones of such traditions, and the task of establishing the traditions in
society are regarded to bear on the shoulder of the transmitters (i.e. the elderly).
Moderation is the fruit of such genuine and undying traditions. Such traditions exhibit
a moderate harmony between material, spiritual, and aesthetical aspects of life.
Commitment to such tradition brings about inner peace, material happiness and
welfare, and moderation and justice.
Furthermore, praise of chivalrousness (braveness) is a main theme of Korean series.
Heroes of the stories are social models who pursue the ideal of justice. It is
noteworthy that justice and moderation are closely interrelated; they supplement one
another. One can establish justice in society only if he has attained moderation in his
inner world.
 50

Thus, tradition, moderation, and justice constitute the three main themes and
messages of Korean series. Korean series are well received among Iranians for these
themes. These three are Iranians’ ideals. This is why Iranians feel affinity toward
Korean culture through their series.
Moderation and justice are Iranians’ ideals, and it is through tradition and religion that
they can attain this ideal.
The popularity of Korean serials among Iranian people stems from the roots of in their
culture. Iranian culture, like that of Korean, is influenced by an ancient and deep
tradition, and so I will first discuss the analysis and definition of tradition and
traditionalism.
Moderation and justice are two ideals that Iranian culture has from a long time ago
pursued. The religion of Islam and the noble Quran have always enjoined, and, invited
to them, too. Islam and Quran have also bolstered and extended Iranians’ view of
these two ideals. Hence, I will analyze the Islamic concepts of moderation and justice.
I will especially discuss about one important constituent of these concepts, namely
rationality. In so doing, I will define reasoning and rationality, study the application of
reasoning in ethics and sociology, and point to the Islamic idea that there is a close
interrelatedness between theory (or theoretical intellect/reasoning) and practice (or
practical intellect/reasoning). This idea contrasts modern philosophers’ idea to the
effect that there is a sharp distinction between theory and practice.
Then, I will examine Quran’s view on moderation with respect to ontology,
anthropology and society.
After the conceptual study, I will come back to our first topic and taking the statistical
results, mentioned at the first part of the article, into consideration, I will make some
practical suggestions as to how to promote the Iranian cinema by modeling the Korean
series.

Statistical survey runs with the Korean TV series’ audience in Tehran

In this study, according to the nature of the case, research objectives, questions and
the extent of its operating, has been used descriptive and survey methods. The
statistical population of the present study includes the 15 to 19 year youth that living
in district 4 of Tehran municipality, which is prepared by social-cultural assistant of
municipality of district 4, based on statistic of year 2009 (1388). This statistic
includes 275465 persons. In this study has been used multistage cluster sampling
method and random sampling. Thus, in population of the present study includes the 15
to 19 year youth, that living in district 4 of Tehran municipality, which is prepared by
social-cultural assistant of municipality of district the first stage randomly 4 areas
 51

were sampled among the 9 areas of district 4of Tehran municipality. (Majidi
Ghahrevardi, Nasim and Hoshmand, Zohre, 2010)
And in the second stage 2 neighborhoods of each area were chosen randomly. Then
the questionaries were distributed among the 15 to 19 year youths randomly. The sex
ratio of respondents is equal; 50 percent are males and 50 percent are females.

Methods in estimating the size of sample

As a statistical sample 384 persons from 15 to 19 year youth who residing in district 4
of Tehran municipality have been touché upon in the present study, and this number
computed based on the Cochran formula.

Research findings
The features of sample population

The number of studied sample was 384 persons; 192 persons were male and 192
female. So, 50 percent is male and 50 percent female. From age distribution aspect,
the largest number of studied sample belongs to 15 to 18 years age group which
appropriate 27/1 percent of sample. In contrast with, 13 percent of them belong to 27
to 30 year age group. And also, in terms of marital status, 69/3 percent of studied
sample was single and 30/7 percent married. In terms of education, 30/5 percent of
respondents had bachelor’s degree, which includes the majority of the respondents.
And 25/8 percent had diploma degree, 20/8 percent pre-diploma and 14/3 percent
associate of art, and just 8/4 percent had Master of Science and doctorate degree.
Finally, about the distribution of sample population would say, 25/8 percent was
employed, 21/9 percent was the students of primary and high school, 19/5 percent was
unemployed, 17/7 percent was students of university and 15/1 percent was
housekeeper.

Analytical findings and hypotheses testing

First hypothesis: it seems that, there is a significant relationship between sex and the
rate of Korean series addressee. For examining this hypothesis, drawing two-
dimensional table for checking the relationship among variables, chi-square non-
parametric tests have been used as well. Frequency distribution of two-dimensional
variables of above hypothesis and the results of chi-square test have shown in the
below table:
 52

Sex/ rate of Korean series Very little much Very total

addressee little much
Mal frequency 42 61 57 32 192
Male Percent 21,9% 31,8% 29,7% 16,7% 100,0%
female frequency 35 37 86 34 192
female percent 18,2% 19,3% 44,8% 17,7% 100,0%
total frequency 77 98 143 66 384
total percent 20,1% 25,5% 37,2% 17,2% 100,0%

The table above shows that the females have watched Korean series more than males,
so that, 44/8 percent of females have watched much the Korean series, in contract to
just 29/7 percent of male have watched them much.

test Value Degree of Level of Cramer’s

freedom significance correlation
coefficient
Chi-square 12,456 3 0,006 180,0

The chi-square statistic rate is equal to 12,456, the degree of freedom is equal to 3,
and level of significance is equal to 0,006. Because the level of significance rate is
less than 0,01, therefore the first hypothesis is confirmed by 99 percent confidence
and 1 percent error. So there is a significant relationship between the sex and the rate
of people who watching Korean series.
And also the rate of Cramer’s correlation coefficient of these two variables is equal to
0.180. This rate of correlation coefficient shows the weak relationship between two
variable of sex and rate of people who watching the Korean series. According to the
above table, females have watched the Korean series more than males.
Second hypothesis: it seems that, there is a significant relationship between
education and the rate of people who watching the Korean series.
For examining this hypothesis, drawing two-dimensional table for checking the
relationship among variables, chi-square non-parametric tests have been used as well.
Frequency distribution of two-dimensional variables of above hypothesis and the
results of chi-square test are shown in the below table:
 53

Education/ the rate of Korean Very Rarely much A Great Total

series addressee Rarely Deal
Pre-diploma frequency 12 11 35 22 80
Pre-diploma percent 15,0% 13,8% 43,8% 27,5% 100,0%
Associate of arts frequency 32 41 58 23 154
Associate of arts Percent 20,8% 26,6% 37,7% 14,9% 100,0%
BA,MA,.. Frequency 33 46 50 21 150
BA,MA,.. percent 22,0% 30,7% 33,3% 14,0% 100,0%
Total frequency 77 98 143 66 384
Total Percent 20,1% 25,5% 37,2% 17,2% 100,0%

Above table indicates that lower educated persons have watched the Korean series
more that the higher educated persons. So that, 27/5 percent of pre-diploma persons
have watched Korean series “very much”. In contrast to, 9/4 percent of bachelor’s
degree persons have watched the Korean series “much”.

test Value Degree of Level of Cramer’s

freedom significance correlation
coefficient
Chi-square 53,747 12 0,000 0,216

The statistic rate of chi-square is equal to 53,747, degree of freedom is equal to 12

and level of significance is equal 0,000. Because level of significance rate is less than
0,01, therefore the second hypothesis is confirmed by 99 percent confidence and 1
percent error. So, there is a significant relationship between the education and the rate
of people who watching the Korean series. And also the rate of Cramer’s correlation
coefficient of these two variables is equal to 0,216. This rate of correlation coefficient
shows the weak relationship between two variable of education and rate of people
who watching the Korean series.

Dependent variable Have large audience

Independent variables Spearman Level of
correlation significance
coefficient
Cultural similarities between Iran and 0/378 0/000
Korea
Hero raising in Korean series 0/420 0/000
 54

using clothes with joyful and various 0/422 0/000

colors in Korean series
suspension, doubt and hope that 0/435 0/000
occurred in the Korean series stories
expressing the moral message in 0/363 0/000
themes of Korean series stories
presenting the stories with exciting 0/456 0/000
events in Korean series
Well ending in Korean series 0/449 0/000

According to the above two-dimensional table the lower educated people have
watched the Korean series more. Considering to table 5, the rate of significance level
is less than 0/01 in all cases. And correlation relationship between the dependent
variables and independent variables are on average. So the cultural similarities
between Iran and Korea have effect in watching Korean series much more by Iranian
audiences. The others effective factors that could attract the attention of Iranian
audience are hero raising, using clothes with joyful and various colors, suspension,
doubt and hope that occurred in the story, expressing the moral message in themes,
presenting the stories with exciting events and well ending in the Korean series.

Conclusion of the statistical survey

The separation of using of the media and its specific content based on the sex, has an
ancient history. And also in this study the sex variable have been touché upon in the
rate of people who watching the Korean series. The researches that have done before
in genre of radio and television family dramas in America show that women are the
addressee of such series contents more than men. And, this special attractiveness is not
just because of broadcasting in proper time, but due to their contents that are
combination of advice, morality, imagination and symbolic supporting of the role of
women in the house. The results of the present study with confirmation the previous
study, indicate that there is a significant relationship between sex and the rate of
people who watching and watching the Korean series, and women have watched
Korean series more than men. And also, there is a significant relationship between
education and the rate of people who watching and watching the Korean series.
Researches show that lower educated persons have watched Korean series more than
others.
Cultural congruity between text and its audience culture is very important. The
 55

audience will leave the series because the series is not understandable for him or her
when the story and narrative is far from him or her culture. This is important for this
factor (this make sense), when a film or series have been made in a country and
broadcasting in another country. So the connection between these two countries due to
cultural and lingual dependent will be very effective. When there is no cultural
coordination between two countries, the audience will not accepted the imported
products and make effective connection with them. This phenomenon called by Hiskin
and Mirus (1988) as “cultural discount”. It means that, whatever the media products
have had a large cultural distance between their audiences, the demand for those
products will be little. So, cultural similarities between Iran and Korea are another
variable that has been studied. Based on researches, cultural similarities between Iran
and Korea have been effective in having Korean series large audiences.
According to the achieved results, another effective factor that could attracted the
attention of Iranian audience is hero raising, using clothes with joyful and various
colors, suspension, doubt and hope that occurred in the story, expressing the moral
message in themes, presenting the stories with exciting events and well ending in the
Korean series. When we pay attention to east series, we notice that, they are not so
complicated structurally. And the subject of these works is very general and
stereotyped. But this factor is attractiveness, newness and believable for audience.
And also, audiences pay attention to actions, make-up and the high coloring clothes of
such series. The popularity of a series is dependent on different factors such as:
addressing to characters, accepting the facts or not, and the overall atmosphere of the
series that includes the designing the clothes, make-up and scene.
It is obvious that, the Korean screenwriter could addressing to and training more than
one hundred character, so that each of these character are involved in flow cases. In
these series, has been addressed to the main character of the story that usually has a
heroic features such as grandee, idealism and financial independence. And this process
has been effective in story attractiveness, and the audiences watch them.
The other reason we could mention that people welcoming the Korean series is the
rhythms and process of the story, the unpredictable events, and because viewer could
not predict what will be happened in the continuation. Sometimes the viewer enjoys
for predicting the next sections and its events, and likes to see his or her correct
predictions. Sometimes his or her prediction is not correct, and this surprising is
attractive for him or her.
Another reason that Korean series have large audiences is confliction between good
and evil. In Legend Jumong, as an example, Jumong is a very gentle with spiritual
traits, and he is the agent of the good and Tzu in the other side is the agent of the evil.
Jumong always remain loyal to his soldiers and he has sense of patriotism. Generally,
 56

this issues have used in religious war and this is attractive for Iranian audience.
Putting much emphasis on respecting parents and elders and expressing moral
messages is the other reason for these series attractiveness. Denis McQuail in his book
“Audience analysis” says “audiences expect media to conform to certain norms of
good taste and morality, and sometimes also to other values, such as those of the local
community, patriotism and democracy” (Denis McQuai, 1997 (1385): 156). It is
obvious that, respect has a special place from Iranian point of view, and this issue
caused the attention of Iranian audiences.
One of the other factors that caused the attention of Iranian audiences to Korean
series is the clothes and colors designing. Despite the traditional form of clothes, they
are very beautiful with various colors. And this is very appropriate for audience
relaxation. The clothes designer would have known the color effect in making
connection within series and viewer, especially in historical works. Using of blue,
green and pink colors in women clothes, and red and white in men shows the strong
feeling of these series, conveniently.
Beside the mentioned cases, bringing up the issues such as kindness, love, anger,
power, fighting and martial arts have a significant effect on inspiriting the interests
sense, attractiveness and watching the series. And also we should mention about good
and accurate dubbed that present for audiences and this factor has effect on these
Korean series attractiveness among the Iranian audiences.
Now, I start to study the concepts of “tradition”, “moderation”, and “justice”, as the
main themes of Korean TV series, from the Islamic and Quranic point of view.

Tradition from the religious point of view

One contemporary epistemological movement is traditionalism. The battle between

tradition and modernity in the globalization age is one whose result would determine
the fate of the world. Without understanding tradition, it is impossible to understand
modernity. The roots of western modernity are to be sought in the Cartesian “I”.
Descartes’ aim was to lay a new foundation for knowledge, which is certain. To
achieve this, he casted methodic doubt on anything that was traditionally taken as
certain. Thus he could throw everything doubtful out. But there was something he
could not doubt, i.e. the fact that “I exist”. The very act of casting doubt on doubtable
things implies the existence of a doubter; there can be no doubt unless there is a
doubter. Hence the famous remark: “cogito ergo sum.” Thus, he found his own
existence as the first certain fact, on which other certain facts could be built. This way,
western “I” became the center of knowledge, and it later became the center of value
and beauty, too. Man became subject, and the rest of the world became his object.
 57

In today’s world, there are various traditions; today’s world is characterized by such a
plurality. Many of these traditions move in opposite directions, and sometimes they
even clash one another. Under such circumstances, the questions come to mind: “how
one can rely on a particular tradition?”, “in such traditions, what threads are linked
together in such a way that a coherent web is made?”, “in today’s changing world,
how is the role of time explained?”, “how does present and future speak in the past
tradition?”
To answer these questions, a definition for tradition must be provided and the history
of its development must be taken into consideration. Traditionalism appeared as a
result of the works of such people as Guénon, Coomaraswamy, Schuon, Lings
Burckhardt, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. This intellectual movement was developed in
the 1910s and 1920s through such traditionalists’ efforts and now includes about 50
traditionalists of different levels. Seyyed Hssein Nasr is among those who
enthusiastically try to propagate and defend the traditionalist worldview. In his view,
tradition is a divine gift. In Nasr’s project, tradition is perennial, permanent, and
conscious, and it is in continuity with God’s tradition which is referred in Quran as
“sunnat al-awalin (tradition of the old), the tradition “which hath taken course
aforetime. Thou wilt not find for the law of Allah aught of power to change.” (Surah
Al-fath, verse 23) It is the very tradition which no alteration could be made into it, and
its arena never ends, and it is live and present in all ages.
Tradition has a divine origin and was revealed to human kind through figures known
as messengers, prophets, Logos, or other transmitter agents. (Nasr, 155-5)
Tradition is at the same time both truth and presence. Nasr holds that tradition is a
science that is too real. (Nasr, 156) Traditionalism is an ideal different from living a
traditional life. Traditionalism has social functions and forms people’s collective
behavior.
Human widespread traditions are manifestations of perennial wisdom. Perennial
wisdom, or Prennialism as is often referred to, is a traditional worldview which
resides in the heart of religion, and being of a mystical nature, it is regarded as the
uppermost mode of truth discovery in human life. In traditionalists’ intellectual system,
perennial wisdom is a metaphysical philosophy conjoint with mythology, religion, and
mysticism. Traditionalists aim at the revival of divine wisdom, a revival which is
undying and perennial, and hence they call their project as “perennial wisdom”. This
wisdom did not emerge in the modern world; rather, its thoughts were present in the
ancient past.
To elucidate the concept of tradition, Nasr examines its relation to religion. In his
view, the concept of tradition includes religion as one of its constituents. Any religion
has two dimensions: apparent dimension (Shari’ah) and esoterical dimension
 58

(mysticism). Whereas the apparent dimension of different religions varies across times
and locations, the voice of God can be heard from inside all religions. (Surah Fatir:
24; Surah Yunus: 47)
Another concept which Nasr tries to elucidate is that of the Sacred. In his view, the
Sacred is the starting point of tradition, and what is traditional is insuperable from the
Sacred. Whoever has no idea of the Sacred cannot comprehend the traditional view.
(Nasr: 168-169)
The question arises “who or what guarantees the persistence of tradition? In Nasr’s
view, some traditions have authority and some have a sacred community, which
guarantees the continuation of the message.

Moderation and justice in Islamic thought

According to Islamic thought, moderation results from the close interrelation that
exists between the theoretical and practical intellects. One grasps the close
interrelatedness of the theoretical and practical intellects if one considers the lexical
root of the Arabic term “aql” (i.e. intellect or reasoning). It comes from the term
“oqol” or “iqal”, which are used to refer to the rope Arabs use to fasten the legs of
camels. (Reza Mahyar, Arabic-Persian dictionary, p. 617)
The Quranic concept of aql has a similar content. Derivatives of “aql” used in Quran
do not refer to pure theoretical intellect that has no connection to practice. In Islamic
thought, “aql” is a bond which, like a camel’s bridle, bounds the theoretical intellect
and prevents from disobeying God. Aql is a phenomenon with which God is
worshiped and with which paradise is attained (ma obeda bi hi al-Rahman wa
oktosiba bi hi al-Jinan)"‫" ﻣﺎﻋﺒﺪ ﺑﮫ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ و اﮐﺘﺴﺐ ﺑﮫ اﻟﺠﻨﺎن‬. Under
the Quranic verse " َ ‫ُﻮن‬‫ِﻠ‬‫ْﻘ‬
‫ﯾﻌ‬َ ‫ٌ ﻻ‬ ‫ْم‬
‫ْ َﻗﻮ‬‫ﮭﻢ‬ُ‫ﻧ‬‫َﱠ‬
‫ِﺄ‬‫“ " ﺑ‬that is because they are a folk who
know not” it is said that:

The meaning of the infinitive form of aql is to thoroughly comprehend. Whereas

its noun form refers to the faculty that distinguishes good from bad and right and
wrong. However, the original meaning of aql is prevention, binding, or
maintenance. This is why the comprehension to which one binds oneself and the
faculty with which one comprehends things are called aql. In addition, the faculty
which is said to be one of humans’ and with which humans tells good from evil
and rightness form wrongness is called aql, and its antonyms are jonoon (insanity),
sefh (foolishness), humq(stupidity), and jahl (ignorance). Iqal is a rope which is
used to fasten a camel’s legs. In the same vein, aql is a faculty which prevents one
from wrong doing. (Abu al-Fazl Davapanah, Anvar al-Quran fi Tafsir al-Quran,
 59

vol. 10, p. 464)

‫َﺎ‬‫ِﻨ‬‫ْﺤَﺎﺑ‬
‫َﺻ‬‫ﺾ أ‬
ِْ
‫ﺑﻌ‬َ ْ‫َﻦ‬
‫ِ ﻋ‬ ‫ْﺠَﺒّﺎر‬
‫ْﺪِ اﻟ‬ ‫َﺒ‬‫ﻦِ ﻋ‬
‫ﺑ‬
ْ ‫ﺪ‬ ِ‫ﻤ‬َّ‫ُﺤ‬
‫ْ ﻣ‬‫َﻦ‬
‫ِﯾﺲَ ﻋ‬‫ْر‬‫ِد‬
‫ُ إ‬‫ﺑﻦ‬
ْ ‫ﺪ‬ُ‫ﻤ‬ ‫" أ‬
َْ‫َﺣ‬
ِ
‫ِﮫ‬‫ﺪ ﺑ‬َِ‫ُﺒ‬
‫َﺎ ﻋ‬‫َ ﻣ‬‫ُ َﻗﺎل‬
‫ْﻞ‬‫َﻘ‬‫ﻟﻌ‬
ْ‫َﺎ ا‬ ‫ُ ﻣ‬‫ﻟﮫ‬
َ ُ‫ْﺖ‬
‫َ ُﻗﻠ‬ ‫ ع َﻗﺎل‬ِّ ِ‫ْﺪ‬
‫َﺒ‬‫ِﻲ ﻋ‬‫َﺑ‬
‫َﻰ أ‬‫ِﻟ‬‫ُ إ‬‫َﮫ‬‫َﻌ‬
‫َﻓ‬‫ر‬
َ
‫ﯾﺔ‬َِ‫َﺎو‬‫ﻣﻌ‬
ُ ‫ِﻲ‬‫َ ﻓ‬‫َﺎن‬‫ّﺬِي ﻛ‬ ‫َﺎﻟ‬‫ُ ﻓ‬‫ْﺖ‬
‫َُﻗﻠ‬‫ُ َﻗﺎل‬ ‫َﺎن‬ ‫ْﺠِﻨ‬
‫ِ اﻟ‬‫ِﮫ‬‫َ ﺑ‬‫ِﺐ‬
‫ُﺴ‬‫ْﺘ‬
‫َ اﻛ‬‫ُ و‬‫ﻤﻦ‬َْ‫ّﺣ‬
‫اﻟﺮ‬
ْ
‫َﯿْﺴَﺖ‬
‫َ ﻟ‬‫ِ و‬‫ْﻞ‬
‫َﻘ‬‫ﻟﻌ‬
ْ‫ِﺎ‬‫َﺔٌ ﺑ‬ ‫ِﻲَ ﺷَﺒِﯿﮭ‬
‫َ ھ‬‫ُ و‬‫َﺔ‬‫ْﻚَاﻟﺸّﯿْﻄَﻨ‬‫ِﻠ‬
‫ء ﺗ‬ ُ‫َا‬
‫ّﻜْﺮ‬
‫ْﻚَ اﻟﻨ‬‫ِﻠ‬
‫َ ﺗ‬ ‫َﺎل‬‫َﻘ‬
‫ﻓ‬
" ِ
‫ْﻞ‬‫َﻘ‬‫ﻟﻌ‬
ْ‫ِﺎ‬‫ﺑ‬

The traditions narrated in the chapter, entitled “Reason and Ignorance”, of Kitab al-
Kafi, indicates the existence of a close interrelation between theory and knowledge on
the one hand and practice and faith on the other. According to these traditions, aql is
not comprehension unconnected from practice, and a comprehension is sound only if
it leads to religious practice and not to Satanic wrongdoing:
Ahmad the son of Idris narrated from Muhammad the son of Abd al-Jabbar, and
the latter narrated from some companions that “I asked Abi Abdi al-Allah what
aql is. He answered it is what through which God is worshiped and through which
paradise is attained. I asked him what the thing that Mu’aviah possessed was then.
He answered it was artifice and shenanigan; it looked like aql, but it was not
really aql. (al-Kafi, vol. 1, p. 10, tradition 3)

In Islamic thought, aql is sometimes referred to as “hikmat” (wisdom), and it is said

that whoever has a share of hikmat has been given great benefit.
ِ‫َﺣْﺴَﻦ‬
‫ِﺄ‬‫ْ ﺑ‬ ‫ھﻢ‬
ُ‫َﻼ‬
ّ‫َ ﺣ‬ ‫ِ و‬ ‫ْﺮ‬
‫ّﻛ‬‫َﺣْﺴَﻦِ اﻟﺬ‬‫ِﺄ‬
‫ْﺒَﺎبِ ﺑ‬ ‫اﻷَﻟ‬
ْ ‫ِﻲ‬ ‫ُوﻟ‬ ‫َ أ‬‫َﺮ‬‫َﻛ‬
‫ّ ذ‬‫ُﻢ‬
‫ُ ﺛ‬ ‫ِﺸَﺎم‬‫َﺎ ھ‬ ‫"ﯾ‬
َ‫ِﻲ‬‫ُوﺗ‬‫ﺪ أ‬َْ‫َﻘ‬‫َ ﻓ‬‫ﻤﺔ‬َْ‫ْﺤِﻜ‬
‫َ اﻟ‬‫ْت‬‫ﯾﺆ‬ُ ْ
‫ﻣﻦ‬َ َ‫ء و‬ ُ‫َﺸﺎ‬
‫ْ ﯾ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ‬َ َ‫ﻤﺔ‬
َْ‫ْﺤِﻜ‬
‫ِﻲ اﻟ‬ ‫ْﺗ‬
‫ﯾﺆ‬ُ َ
‫َﺎل‬‫َﻘ‬
‫ِ ﻓ‬‫ْﯿَﺔ‬‫ْﺤِﻠ‬
‫اﻟ‬
"ِ‫ْﺒﺎب‬‫اﻷَﻟ‬
ْ ‫ُﻮا‬ ‫ُوﻟ‬‫ِﻻ أ‬
ّ‫ُ إ‬ ‫ّﺮ‬
‫ّﻛ‬‫ﯾﺬ‬
َ ‫َ ﻣﺎ‬‫ً و‬‫ِﯿﺮا‬‫َﺜ‬‫ً ﻛ‬‫ﺧَﯿْﺮا‬
It is narrated, in al-Kafi, from Hisham the son of Hakam that: “Imam abu al-Hasan
Musa the son of Jafar told ‘Oh Hisham! God has talked high of those who has
reasoning and has dressed them the best ornament and has said that He giveth wisdom
unto whom He will, and he unto whom wisdom is given, he truly hath received
abundant good But none remember except men of understanding. (al-Kafi, vol. 1, p.
12, tradition 12)
In Islamic thought, the reasoning or intellect which has been Godly qualified, and the
knowledge which is interwoven with piety and probity is the central core. The Islamic
concept of moderation must be understood in this paradigm or framework:

Oh Hisham! God told the story of a pious community who said “Our Lord!
Cause not our hearts to stray after Thou hast guided us, and bestow upon us mercy
from Thy Presence. Lo! Thou, only Thou art the Bestower.” This community had
 60

realized that hearts could go astray, lose their innate light and gets blind and
wicked. Oh Hisham! One does not fear God unless his heart has been bridled by
God and his reasoning (or intellect) has become Godly. And one’s heart would not
obtain and preserve any knowledge and one would not comprehend the reality of
what he knows unless he is sincere.
ْ‫ِغ‬
‫ﺗﺰ‬ُ ‫ّﻨﺎ ﻻ‬ ‫َﺑ‬‫ُﻮا ر‬ ‫ْ َﻗﺎﻟ‬ ‫ﮭﻢ‬ُ‫ﻧ‬َّ
‫َ أ‬ ‫ِﺤِﯿﻦ‬‫َﺎﻟ‬ ‫ٍ ﺻ‬‫ْم‬‫ْ َﻗﻮ‬‫َﻦ‬‫ ﺣَﻜَﻰ ﻋ‬َّّ ‫ِن‬
‫ُ إ‬ ‫ِﺸَﺎم‬
‫َﺎ ھ‬ ‫" ﯾ‬
ُ‫ّﺎب‬‫َھ‬
‫ﻟﻮ‬ْ‫َ ا‬ ‫ﻧﺖ‬َْ‫ّﻚَ أ‬‫ِﻧ‬
‫ً إ‬‫ﻤﺔ‬َْ‫َﺣ‬
‫ْﻚَ ر‬‫ﺪﻧ‬ُ‫ﻟ‬َ ْ‫ِﻦ‬‫َﻨﺎ ﻣ‬ ‫ْ ﻟ‬ ‫ھﺐ‬
َ َ ‫َﻨﺎ و‬ ‫ﯾﺘ‬ْ‫ﺪ‬ََ‫ْ ھ‬ ‫ِذ‬‫ﺪ إ‬َْ‫ﺑﻌ‬
َ ‫َﻨﺎ‬ ‫ُﻮﺑ‬‫ُﻗﻠ‬
ْ‫ﻟﻢ‬
َ ُ ‫ﻧﮫ‬
ِّ‫َﺎ إ‬ ‫َاھ‬‫َد‬‫َ ر‬‫َﺎ و‬ ‫َﺎھ‬‫َﻤ‬‫َﻰ ﻋ‬ ‫ِﻟ‬
‫ُ إ‬ ‫ُﻮد‬‫ﺗﻌ‬َ َ‫ُ و‬ ‫ِﯾﻎ‬‫ﺗﺰ‬َ َ‫ُﻮب‬ ‫ُﻠ‬
‫ﻟﻘ‬ ْ‫ّ ا‬‫َن‬‫ُﻮا أ‬ ‫ِﻤ‬
‫َﻠ‬‫َ ﻋ‬‫ﺣِﯿﻦ‬
‫َﻰ‬
‫َﻠ‬‫ُ ﻋ‬‫ْﺒَﮫ‬‫ﺪ َﻗﻠ‬ ِْ
‫ْﻘ‬‫ﯾﻌ‬
َ ْ‫ﻟﻢ‬
َ ِِّ ‫َﻦ‬
‫ْ ﻋ‬ ‫ِﻞ‬
‫ْﻘ‬‫ﯾﻌ‬َ ْ‫ﻟﻢ‬َ ْ‫ﻣﻦ‬َ َ‫ و‬ِِّ ‫َﻦ‬‫ْ ﻋ‬ ‫ِﻞ‬‫ْﻘ‬
‫ﯾﻌ‬َ ْ‫ﻟﻢ‬َ ْ‫ﻣﻦ‬
َ ِّ َ
‫َﺨَﻒ‬
‫ﯾ‬
َ‫ِﻚ‬
‫َﻟ‬‫َﺬ‬
‫ﺪ ﻛ‬ ٌَ‫َﺣ‬
‫ُ أ‬ ‫َﻜُﻮن‬‫َ َﻻ ﯾ‬
‫ِ و‬ ‫ْﺒِﮫ‬
‫ِﻲ َﻗﻠ‬ ‫َﺎ ﻓ‬ ‫َﮭ‬‫َﺘ‬
‫ِﯿﻘ‬‫ﺪ ﺣَﻘ‬ُِ‫َﺠ‬
‫َ ﯾ‬‫َﺎ و‬ ‫ُھ‬‫ِﺮ‬
‫ُﺒْﺼ‬
‫ٍ ﯾ‬ ‫َﺔ‬
‫ِﺘ‬‫َﺎﺑ‬
‫ٍ ﺛ‬‫َﺔ‬
‫ِﻓ‬‫ْﺮ‬‫ﻣﻌ‬
َ
َ‫َك‬
‫َﺒَﺎر‬‫ ﺗ‬ّّ ‫ن‬
ََ‫ً ِﻷ‬
‫ِﻘﺎ‬‫َاﻓ‬‫ﻣﻮ‬ُِ ‫ِﮫ‬
‫ِﯿَﺘ‬‫َﻼﻧ‬
َ‫ﻟﻌ‬ِ ‫ه‬ُّ‫ِﺮ‬
‫َ ﺳ‬‫ً و‬‫ّﻗﺎ‬ ‫َﺪ‬‫ﻣﺼ‬
ُ ِ‫ِﮫ‬‫ْﻠ‬‫ِﻌ‬
‫ﻟﻔ‬ِ ُ ‫ﻟﮫ‬
ُْ‫َ َﻗﻮ‬
‫َﺎن‬‫ْ ﻛ‬‫ﻣﻦ‬
َ ‫ِﻻ‬ّ‫إ‬
ٍ‫ِﻖ‬
‫َﺎﻃ‬‫َ ﻧ‬ ‫ُ و‬‫ْﮫ‬‫ِﻨ‬ ‫ٍ ﻣ‬‫ِﺮ‬
‫ِﻈَﺎھ‬
‫ِﻻ ﺑ‬ّ‫ِ إ‬ ‫ْﻞ‬‫َﻘ‬
‫ﻟﻌ‬ْ‫َ ا‬ ‫ِﻦ‬‫ِﻲّ ﻣ‬
‫ْﺨَﻔ‬‫ِﻦِ اﻟ‬‫ْﺒَﺎﻃ‬‫َﻰ اﻟ‬ ‫َﻠ‬‫ّ ﻋ‬‫ﺪل‬ُ‫ﯾ‬
َ ْ‫ﻟﻢ‬َ ُ
‫ﻤﮫ‬ُْ‫اﺳ‬
"ُ‫ْﮫ‬‫َﻨ‬
‫ﻋ‬

In the religious view, practical intellect, which is usually called “aql” in Arabic,
comes from light; or rather it is light itself. In this light, good and evil are recognized.
Like a lamp, practical intellect guides one the way. On the other hand, theoretical
intellect, which is usually called “ilm” in Arabic, has been defined as a light through
which good and bad actions are recognized. This indicates the close interrelatedness
of practical and theoretical intellects in the religious ontology:

The holy prophet was asked “out of what did God make aql?” He responded
“when the curtain is lifted a light is cast upon one’s heart, and in this light
religious duties and virtuous acts are recognized and good is distinguished from
bad. Beware that aql in one’s heart is as lamp in one’s house. (Bihar al-Anwar,
vol. 1, p. 99)

The interrelatedness of practical and theoretical intellects is emphasized in numerous

traditions, and the nature aql is defined in a web of concepts including ilm. To be more
precise, in Islamic thought, aql and ilm are defined in an interwoven net of concepts
including aql, ilm, soul, asceticism, power, light, and providence. Aql which
illuminates one’s soul has fruits such as sagacity, understanding, and insight. The
substance of aql is ilm, the spirit of it is understanding, and the fruit of it is asceticism.
Aql is created out of ilm, power, and providence:

Mūsá ibn Ja'far al-Kādhim told Hisham “the illumination of soul is aql” (tohaf al-
Oqul, p. 396)
 61

Amīr al-Mu'minīn quoted the holy prophet “God created aql from a light which
was hidden in His eternal knowledge. Then, He set Ilm as its substance, understanding
as its spirit, and asceticism as its fruit. (khisal, p. 427)

Imam Sadiq told “aql is one’s credit. Sagacity, understanding, remembrance, and ilm
are from aql. So if light is behind one’s aql, one has sagacity, understanding,
remembrance, and ilm. Then, one will attain perfection, and aql will be one’s guide,
and aql will give him insight and key to all problems. (Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 1, p. 90)

And it is also narrated that “God created aql out of four things: ilm, power, light, and
providence. (Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 1, p. 98)

The idea that there is a close interrelation between theory and practice is grounded in
the view that there is a graded unity between God, mankind, and nature. In contrast,
the idea that theory is sharply distinct from practice is rooted in the view that there is a
sharp distinction or dichotomy between human as the subject and nature as the object.

The religious view that there is a close interrelation between theory and practice
becomes clear if we contrast it to the modern subjectivist view, which is based on the
sharp distinction between subject and object. The subjectivist view began, in the
modern world, with Descartes and was established in Kant and culminated in Hegel.
Descartes casted his methodic doubt on any doubtable fact. Then, he set clarity and
distinctness as the only criterion of truth. Thus he doubted the truth of anything except
the truth of the very fact that he doubted. So, his doubting was the only fact that he
took as certain. Doubting is a form of thinking. There can be no thinking unless there
is a thinker. The underlying foundation of knowledge thus was set. The thinking “I”
was set as the underlying foundation of knowledge and ontology. In the pre-modern
philosophy, substance was the independent underlying subject upon which other
things, including the thinking “I” depended. In the modern subjectivism, the relation is
conversed: the thinking “I” becomes the underlying subject, and substance becomes
its object of knowledge. This shift was the starting point of modern subjectivism, and
it was then that God and nature, which were in the pre-modern worldview the
ontological and epistemological foundation, were epistemologically significant only
as far as they were the object of the thinking “I”’s knowledge. For Descartes, the
thinking “I” was the foundation upon which the knowledge of God and nature was
based. Whereas, in the religious thought this is God which is the foundation for
knowing other facts. In Descartes’ thought, God has a secondary importance: He is
important only because He guarantees the correctness of clear and distinct beliefs of
 62

the thinking “I”. In this view, man is sharply distinct from nature and God, and his
existence is the foundation of knowledge. In this view, nature and God are significant
only because they are objects of man’s knowledge. For Kant, a prior forms of time
and space constitutes nature, and God merely has a regulative role. God and nature
which, in the religious worldview, are in a graded unity relationship to mankind is, in
the modern subjectivist worldview, relegated to mere objects of man’s knowledge.
And in Hegel’s thought, the absolute idea produces, in its historical unfolding, all
ontological phenomenon, and its historical determinism substitutes the free
compassionate God.

In Plato’s view, there are two concepts of truth: the concept of truth which is at play
in his cave metaphor, and the concept of truth as aletheia (a Greek term meaning
unhiddenness or non-concealment). In the cave metaphor, the active role of man in
discovering truth and attaining Ideas is emphasized. In this metaphor, truth is hidden
from man, and this is man who passing the stages of perception (pestis), imagination
(eikasia), and reasoning (noumena), reveals truth. Whereas, according to the latter
concept, truth is non-concealment itself. In this sense, truth is not hidden from man.
Rather this is man who is hidden from truth. Man drank of the River Lethe (River of
Forgetfulness), and the way to reach truth is to hearken Logos.

Moderation and justice in Quran

One should take the Quranic view on moderation and justice as the standard of
religious form of life. The holy Quran is a source of aspiration for human
philosophical and theological theorizing. Quranic statements are themselves the best
manifestations of moderation. They describe an ontology, an anthropology, and a
sociology, in which moderation is best manifested.

The holy Quran describes an ontology in which the natural world rests on a firm
order, and everything is put, in the appropriate amount, in its proper place. This is the
moderation in ontology. In regard to anthropology, the holy Quran swears by the
moderation of the human soul, and it describes the religious form of life in terms of
the rich concept of “middle nation”. (Surah al-Baqarah, verse, 143) And with respect
to sociology, the holy Quran introduces justice and equity as the cornerstone of
religion and as the main purpose of sending messengers and revealing Scriptures. To
establish equity and justice, people need to reform themselves by moderating their
inner faculties. The outer manifestation of moderation is social reformation.
 63

(I) Quran’s view on moderation with respect to ontology

The holy Quran states that everything was created in a specific pre-determined
proper proportion, and that the world rests on a prior moderation:

“Allah hath set a measure for all things.” (Surah al-Talaq, verse 3)

" ‫ ﻟﮑﻞ ﺷﯿﺊ ﻗﺪرا‬ ‫" ﻗﺪ ﺟﻌﻞ‬

“And everything with Him is measured.” (Surah al-Ra’d, verse 8)

"‫" ﮐﻞ ﺷﺊ ﻋﻨﺪه ﺑﻤﻘﺪار‬

(II) Quran’s view on moderation with respect to anthropology

According to Quran’s anthropological view, the moderation of the world is manifested

in the moderation of the human soul. And the holy Quran swears by the moderation of
human soul:

“And a soul and Him who perfected it” (Surah al-Shams,verse 7)

" ‫" و ﻧﻔﺲ و ﻣﺎﺳﻮاھﺎ‬

The noble Quran refers to the Muslim community as the middle nation. (Suarh al-
Baqarah, verse 143) Thus, a society which is guided by Quran avoids extremes and
maintains the golden mean. The holy Quran always guides to the middle way. And as
Shahid Mutahhari pointed out, keeping moderation needs ijtihad (“ijtihad” means
endeavor of a Muslim scholar to derive a rule of divine law from the Quran and
Hadith without relying on the views of other scholars):

Apparently the path moderation is always as a narrow line such that a bit of
carelessness would lead to slipping off the line. What is meant by the remark,
mentioned in religious texts, that “Sirat (i.e. the right path) is more capillary
than hair” is the very point that observing moderation in any deed is so difficult.
Needless to say, human kind always faces new problems, and new problems
calls for new solutions. The term “al-hawadith al-waqi’ah), (i.e. occurring
events), whose solutions are said, in some traditions, to be upon the bearers of
Islamic knowledge, refers to these novel problems. This is why there must be in
any age some mujtahid (i.e. someone who performs ijtihad), and this is why
people should always refer to some living mujtahid. (Shahid Mutahhari’s corpus,
 64

vol. 21, p.61)

“Thus We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses against
mankind. and that the messenger may be a witness against you. And We appointed the
qiblah which ye formerly observed only that We might know him who followeth the
messenger, from him who turneth on his heels. In truth it was a hard (test) save for
those whom Allah guided. But it was not Allah's purpose that your faith should be in
vain, for Allah is full of pity, Merciful toward mankind.” (Surah al-Bawarah, verse 43)
َ
‫َﻜُﻮن‬‫َ ﯾ‬‫ﱠﺎسِ و‬ ‫َﻰ اﻟﻨ‬ ‫َﻠ‬‫ء ﻋ‬ َ‫َﺪا‬ ‫ُﻮا ﺷُﮭ‬ ‫َﻜُﻮﻧ‬‫ﻟﺘ‬ِ ً ‫َﺳَﻄﺎ‬
‫ً و‬‫ﻣﺔ‬
‫ُﱠ‬
‫ْ أ‬ ‫ُﻢ‬‫ْﻨﺎﻛ‬‫َﻠ‬‫ِﻚَ ﺟَﻌ‬
‫َﺬﻟ‬‫َ ﻛ‬‫" و‬
‫ِﻻﱠ‬‫َﯿْﮭﺎ إ‬ ‫َﻠ‬
‫َ ﻋ‬ ‫ْﺖ‬‫ُﻨ‬‫ِﻲ ﻛ‬ ‫ﻟﺘ‬‫َ اﱠ‬ ‫َﺔ‬
‫ِﺒْﻠ‬‫ﻟﻘ‬
ْ‫َﺎ ا‬ ‫ْﻨ‬
‫َﻠ‬ ‫َ ﻣﺎ ﺟَﻌ‬ ‫ً و‬‫ِﯿﺪا‬ ‫ْ ﺷَﮭ‬‫َﯿْﻜُﻢ‬
‫َﻠ‬‫ُ ﻋ‬‫ﱠﺳُﻮل‬
‫اﻟﺮ‬
‫ة‬
ًَ‫َﻜَﺒِﯿﺮ‬
‫ْ ﻟ‬‫ﻧﺖ‬َ‫ْ ﻛﺎ‬ ‫ِن‬‫َ إ‬‫ِ و‬ ‫ِﺒَﯿْﮫ‬
‫َﻘ‬‫َﻠﻰ ﻋ‬ ‫ُ ﻋ‬‫ِﺐ‬‫َﻠ‬‫ْﻘ‬‫ﯾﻨ‬َ ْ‫ﻤﻦ‬
‫ِﱠ‬
‫َ ﻣ‬‫ﱠﺳُﻮل‬
‫ُ اﻟﺮ‬ ‫ﱠﺒِﻊ‬
‫ﯾﺘ‬َ ْ‫ﻣﻦ‬
َ َ‫َﻢ‬‫ْﻠ‬
‫َﻌ‬‫ﻟﻨ‬
ِ
ِ‫ﱠﺎس‬‫ِﺎﻟﻨ‬ ‫ ﺑ‬‫َﱠ‬ ‫ﱠ‬
‫ِن‬‫ْ إ‬ ‫َﻜُﻢ‬
‫ِﯾﻤﺎﻧ‬ ‫َ إ‬ ‫ِﯿﻊ‬‫ِﯿُﻀ‬
‫ ﻟ‬ ‫ُﱠ‬ َ
‫َ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن‬ ‫ و‬‫َىُﱠ‬ ‫ھﺪ‬َ َ‫ﱠﺬِﯾﻦ‬ ‫َﻰ اﻟ‬
‫َﻠ‬‫ِﻻﱠ ﻋ‬
‫إ‬
"(143 ‫آﯾﮫ‬،‫َﺣِﯿﻢ )ﺑﻘﺮه‬ ‫ٌ ر‬‫ُف‬
‫َؤ‬‫ﻟﺮ‬
َ

The above-mentioned verse explicitly states that the prophet’s ummah (i.e. nation) is a
nation of moderation,
"ً‫َﺳَﻄﺎ‬‫ً و‬
‫ﻣﺔ‬‫ُﱠ‬
‫ْ أ‬ ‫ُﻢ‬
‫ْﻨﺎﻛ‬ ‫َﻠ‬
‫ِﻚَ ﺟَﻌ‬
‫َﺬﻟ‬ ‫َ ﻛ‬‫" و‬
and it also mentions some reasons of changing the qiblah in the early years of Islam.

In the above-mentioned verse, the purpose of making them a middle nation was to set
the prophet’s ummah an example for, and so witnesses against, other people.
"ً
‫ِﯿﺪا‬ ‫ْ ﺷَﮭ‬
‫َﯿْﻜُﻢ‬
‫َﻠ‬‫ُ ﻋ‬
‫ﱠﺳُﻮل‬
‫َ اﻟﺮ‬ ‫َﻜُﻮن‬
‫َ ﯾ‬‫ﱠﺎسِ و‬‫َﻰ اﻟﻨ‬ ‫َﻠ‬
‫ء ﻋ‬َ‫َﺪا‬ ‫ُﻮا ﺷُﮭ‬‫َﻜُﻮﻧ‬
‫ﻟﺘ‬ِ "
The clause “that ye may be witnesses against mankind. and that the messenger may be
a witness against you” might be meant to point to the fact that the prephet’s ummah is
to be an example for other people, and that the prophet himself was an example for his
ummah. After all, witnesses are selected from among those who are exemplars. That is,
the prophet’s ummah with their deeds witnesses that a human being can be both a man
of religion and a man of this terrestrial world, and that a human being can live up to
his religious and moral values while socializing with other people in his everyday life.
The prophet’s ummah witnesses that not only religion and this worldly life are not
incompatible, but also they can serve and promote one another.

Some Quran interpreters have commented that the term “wasat” (i.e. middle) refers to
something which is not part of either extremes but rather is between them. Muslim
community is in the same position with regard to followers of past Abrahamic
religions and pagans: pagans are totally on the side of materialism; they merely try to
accumulate their wealth and to maximize their material pleasures. They neither
believe in the hereafter and nor in any kind of resurrection. They have no care for
 65

moral and spiritual values.

God made the Muslim community the middle nation. That is to say, He gave them a
religion which leads its followers to the middle way, a way which avoids both extreme
sides. In the middle way, both the means and the goal are considered important. Man
has two dimensions: body and spirit. Therefore, to have a happy life, he must cultivate
both. (Almizan Quran Interpretation, vol. 1, pp. 482-3)

(III) Quran’s view on moderation with respect to society

According to Quran, the purpose of sending messengers and revealing Scriptures was
to establish justice. It also takes the establishment of justice as the result of faith. Thus
in Surah al-Imran, God says:

“Allah (Himself) is witness that there is no God save Him. And the angels and the
men of learning (too are witness). Maintaining His creation in justice, there is no God
save Him, the Almighty, the Wise.”
‫ اﻧﮫ ﻻ اﻟﮫ اﻻ ھﻮ و اﻟﻤﻼﺋﮑﮫ و اوﻟﻮا اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ‬ ‫" ﺷﮭﺪ‬
"‫ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻂ‬

And in Surah al-Nisaa, He says:

“O ye who believe! Be ye staunch in justice, witnesses for Allah”

".‫" ﯾﺎ اﯾﮭﺎ اﻟﺬﯾﻦ آﻣﻨﻮا ﮐﻮﻧﻮ ﻗﻮاﻣﯿﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻂ ﺷﮭﺪائ ﷲ‬

A similar remark is made in Surah al-Maidah:

“O ye who believe! Be steadfast witnesses for Allah in equity”

".‫" ﯾﺎ اﯾﮭﺎ اﻟﺬﯾﻦ آﻣﻨﻮا ﮐﻮﻧﻮ ﻗﻮاﻣﯿﻦ ﷲ ﺷﮭﺪائ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻂ‬
In Surah al-Hadid, God says:

“We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the
Scripture and the Balance, that mankind may observe right measure”
‫" ارﺳﻠﻨﺎ رﺳﻠﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﯿﻨﺎت و اﻧﺰﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻌﮭﻢ اﻟﮑﺘﺎب و اﻟﻤﯿﺰان‬
".‫ﻟﯿﻘﻮم اﻟﻨﺎس ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻂ‬

In this verse, three things are mentioned as prologues to the establishment of justice:
“bayyinat” (i.e. clear proofs), “Kitab” (i.e. Scripture), and “mizan” (i.e. Balance).
“bayyinat” means clear proofs, intellectual perceptions, common sense, and miracles.
 66

“Kitab” refers to revealed Scriptures, in which religious convictions, divine laws, and
morality are discussed. “Mizan” means a set of rules which serve as a criterion for
recognizing good and evil, right and wrong, true and false. Equipped with these three,
prophets could raise people for establishing justice. Interestingly, the holy Quran does
not ascribe the establishment of justice to prophets themselves. Rather, the
establishment of justice is assigned to their followers. In Quran’s view, people should
be educated, such that they rise to establish justice by themselves. The significant
point is that the rise should be spontaneous and not premeditated or forced by external
causes. (Javadi Amuli, Thematic Interpretation of Quran, vol. 3, p. 174)

There is a close relation between individual moderation and establishment of justice.

One must attain moderation in his individual life before he can establish justice in
society. Moderation consists in the harmony between soul’s and body’s faculties.
Justice or equity is the outer manifestation of this inner moderation. To attain inner
moderation, like the outer justice, one needs a criterion for recognizing rightness and
wrongness and a model to follow. Bayyinat, kitab, and mizan provide one with them.

Here, prophets merely play the role of guides; they do not deprive their followers of
their volition and free will. Prophets were sent to guide people and to waken what
already existed in their intellect but was not awake, so that people rise to establish
justice by themselves. As the holy Quran says “Say: O People of the Scripture. Come
to an agreement between us and you: that we shall worship none but Allah, and that
we shall ascribe no partners unto Him, and that none of us shall take others for lords
beside Allah” (Surah al-Imran, verse 64)
‫َ ﻻ‬ ‫ و‬‫ِﻻَﱠ‬ ‫ﺪ إﱠ‬َُ‫ْﺒ‬
‫ﻧﻌ‬َ ‫َﻻ‬‫ْ أﱠ‬ ‫َﻜُﻢ‬
‫َﯿْﻨ‬
‫َ ﺑ‬‫َﻨﺎ و‬ ‫َﯿْﻨ‬
‫ء ﺑ‬ ٍ‫ٍ ﺳَﻮا‬‫ﻤﺔ‬َِ
‫َﻠ‬‫ِﻟﻰ ﻛ‬ ‫ْا إ‬‫ﻟﻮ‬َ‫" ﺗﻌﺎا‬
ِ‫ُون‬‫ْ د‬ ‫ِﻦ‬‫ً ﻣ‬ ‫ْﺑﺎﺑﺎ‬ ‫َر‬‫ً أ‬ ‫ْﻀﺎ‬‫ﺑﻌ‬َ ‫ُﻨﺎ‬ ‫ْﻀ‬
‫ﺑﻌ‬َ َ ‫ﱠﺨِﺬ‬
‫ﯾﺘ‬َ ‫َ ﻻ‬ ‫ً و‬ ‫ِ ﺷَﯿْﺌﺎ‬ ‫ِﮫ‬
‫ِكَ ﺑ‬‫ُﺸْﺮ‬
‫ﻧ‬
"64 ‫آﯾﮫ‬،‫آلﻋﻤﺮان‬. ‫ِﱠ‬
and “Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that
which is in their hearts.” (Surah al-Ra’d, verse 11)
"11 ‫ آﯾﮫ‬،‫ِﻢ رﻋﺪ‬ ‫ِﮭ‬‫ُﺴ‬‫ﻧﻔ‬
َْ‫ِﺄ‬
‫ُوا ﻣﺎ ﺑ‬ ‫َﯿﱢﺮ‬‫ﯾﻐ‬ُ ‫ﱠﻰ‬‫ٍ ﺣَﺘ‬
‫ْم‬‫َﻮ‬
‫ِﻘ‬‫ُ ﻣﺎ ﺑ‬‫َﯿﱢﺮ‬‫ﯾﻐ‬
ُ ‫ ﻻ‬‫ﱠﱠ‬‫ن‬‫" إ‬
َِ

Finally, it is worth noting that one of the most important social impacts of observing
moderation is that moral deficiencies of society are corrected. God’s tradition is to
enjoin people to maintain moderation, and appealing to the moderate system of
shari’ah is the key to reform the immoral traditions. God enjoin people to maintain
moderation, and thus sets a criterion for distinguishing what really belongs to religion
from what is a tradition of the old and is wrongly ascribed to religion. The following
verses show the critical attitude of shar’ah toward immoral traditions and costumes of
 67

the old, and, as Shahid Mutahhari points out, mentions the criterion for cleansing
religion of what is wrongly ascribed to religion:

“And when they do some lewdness they say: We found our fathers doing it and Allah
hath enjoined it on us. Say: Allah, verily, enjoineth not lewdness. Tell ye concerning
Allah that which ye know not? Say: My Lord enjoineth justice.” (Surah al-A’raf,
verses 28-29)
‫ِﮭﺎ‬‫َﻧﺎ ﺑ‬ ‫ﻣﺮ‬
ََ‫ أ‬‫َﱠ‬ ‫و‬
ُ ‫َﻧﺎ‬ ‫َﯿْﮭﺎ آﺑﺎء‬ ‫َﻠ‬
‫ْﻧﺎ ﻋ‬ ‫َﺟَﺪ‬
‫ُﻮا و‬ ‫ً ﻗﺎﻟ‬ ‫ُﻮا ﻓﺎﺣِﺸَﺔ‬ ‫َﻠ‬
‫َﻌ‬‫ِذا ﻓ‬ ‫" و‬
‫َ إ‬
ْ
‫ ُﻗﻞ‬.َ‫ُﻮن‬‫َﻤ‬‫ْﻠ‬
‫ﺗﻌ‬َ ‫ ﻣﺎ ﻻ‬‫َﻰِﱠ‬ ‫َﻠ‬‫َ ﻋ‬‫ُﻮن‬‫ُﻮﻟ‬ ‫ﺗﻘ‬َ َ‫ء أ‬ ِ‫َﺤْﺸﺎ‬
‫ﻟﻔ‬ْ‫ِﺎ‬‫ُ ﺑ‬ ‫ﻣﺮ‬
ُْ
‫ﯾﺄ‬َ ‫ ﻻ‬‫ﱠَﱠ‬ ‫ِن‬
‫ْ إ‬‫ُﻗﻞ‬
" ِ
‫ِﺴْﻂ‬
‫ﻟﻘ‬ْ‫ِﺎ‬‫ﱢﻲ ﺑ‬‫َﺑ‬
‫َ ر‬‫ﻣﺮ‬ََ
‫أ‬
(Shahid Mutahhari’s corpus, vol. 4, p. 814)

After this conceptual study, I come back to our first topic and I make some practical
suggestions as to how to promote the Iranian cinema by modeling the Korean series.

Some practical proposals

1- In researches, one of the reasons for interesting of people in Korean series that
declared by audiences is using the clothes with varies and happy colors. It is
suggests that financiers involved in Iranian films get the idea of such series and
used them in their film, so that Iranian series will be attractive for audiences
because of color, designing the scene and clothes.
2- In Korean series such as “Jewel in the Palace “, “Emperor of the Sea “and
Legend Jumong “we observe the explanation of Korea history, literature and
traditions. Korea is a country that by making family series with adding martial
actions could find supporters for their series in Asia, Europe and even in
America. And this is a cultural, economical and national prosperity for a
country such Korea. Consequently, it is suggested for IRIB officials that
making big historical series ( such as Rustam and Sohrab tragedy and stories,
Bijan and manijeh lovers, or death of Siavash and the events that happened in
Iran history) by planning and researching: believable and non-exaggeration
series, so that we also could show the greatness of history, culture and
traditions of Iranian people.
 68

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