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EBook Social Theory Continuity and Confrontation A Reader Third Edition 3Rd Edition Ebook PDF PDF Docx Kindle Full Chapter
EBook Social Theory Continuity and Confrontation A Reader Third Edition 3Rd Edition Ebook PDF PDF Docx Kindle Full Chapter
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Skocpol, Contemporary Political Life, and the Weberian Legacy
Reading 4.2.2: Skocpol’s “The Narrowing of Civic Life” (2004)
SUGGESTED READINGS
STUDY GUIDE
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Wilson’s Analysis of Institutional Segregation and Joblessness: When Work Disappears
(1996)
Reading 6.5: Wilson’s When Work Disappears (1996)
SUGGESTED READINGS
STUDY GUIDE
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Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964)
Reading 8.4: Excerpts from Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964)
8.5 Structural Marxist Theory: Louis Althusser (1918–1990)
Althusser and Structural Marxist Theory
Reading 8.5: Excerpts from Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970)
SUGGESTED READINGS
STUDY GUIDE
CHAPTER 10: Power, Bodies, and Subjects: The Social Theory of Michel Foucault
10.1 Michel Foucault (1926–1984)
Foucault’s Analysis of Surveillance and Punishment
Reading 10.1.1: Foucault’s “The Body of the Condemned,” from Discipline and Punish
(1975)
Reading 10.1.2: Foucault’s “Panopticon,” from Discipline and Punish (1975)
Foucault’s Analysis of Power
Reading 10.1.3: Foucault’s “The Subject and Power” (1982)
SUGGESTED READINGS
STUDY GUIDE
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STUDY GUIDE
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Butler and the Structural Conditions of the Performance of Gender: Bodies that Matter
(1993)
Reading 14.2: Excerpts from Butler’s Bodies that Matter (1993)
14.3 Angela Y. Davis (1944–)
Angela Y. Davis: Theory and Praxis
Reading 14.3: Excerpts from Lisa Lowe’s Interview of Angela Y. Davis (July 1, 1995)
14.4 Raewyn (R.W.) Connell (1944–)
R.W. Connell on the Construction of Masculinities
Reading 14.4: Excerpts from Connell’s Masculinities (1995)
14.5 Society and Sexualities: John D’Emilio (1948–)
Sexuality and Capitalism: D’Emilio’s “Capitalism and Gay Identity” (1983)
Reading 14.5: D’Emilio’s “Capitalism and Gay Identity” (1983)
SUGGESTED READINGS
STUDY GUIDE
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What Do (Postmodern) Marxist Ethnographers Do?
Reading 16.3: Excerpts from Willis’s The Ethnographic Imagination (2000)
16.4 Roland Barthes (1915–1980)
Barthes, Myths and Critical Social Theory
Reading 16.4: This material omitted from the web edition
SUGGESTED READINGS
STUDY GUIDE
SOURCES
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Preface
The third edition marks a major departure from the previous editions: there are now two
editors and substantially more theorists.
Here are the changes we have made:
We have added a chapter on race-ethnicity and post-colonial theory and substantially
revised the chapter on gender and sexualities, which now includes a selection by Judith
Butler, Angela Davis’s reflections on intersectionality and praxis, and R.W. Connell’s work
on masculinities.
Philosophical traditions are discussed in order to show how the ideas affected social
theory and the discipline of sociology; the selections by Kant and Nietzsche and the
accompanying introductions as well as the discussion of the work of Hegel, Comte, and
Adam Smith provide context and background to the contending perspectives in sociological
theory.
The selection from Machiavelli was newly translated for this volume and will give readers
a fresh look at this masterpiece.
Because of the powerful impact of Sigmund Freud’s theories on the analysis of gender,
the Frankfurt School, and contemporary cultural studies, we feature in the context of classical
theory a selection from his lectures that delves into dreams, pathways to neurosis, the
unconscious, and primary process thought.
We have included two pieces by Frankfurt School theorists beyond our original Walter
Benjamin selection (one by Adorno and Horkheimer on the culture industry and one by
Marcuse).
We have reorganized the “postwar perspectives” material as an overview of American
hegemony and its critics, giving a stronger edge of contention to this chapter. It now includes
selections from C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite and from Marcuse’s One-Dimensional
Man.
We sharpened the focus on the transition from postwar to contemporary theory with
needed attention to four major theorists (Goffman, Foucault, Bourdieu, and Hall) who had
appeared in earlier editions but were not strongly enough foregrounded there.
We added a number of theorists to the discussion of culture and media, including
Raymond Williams, Dick Hebdige, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, and Néstor Garcia
Canclini.
We enhanced the selection of work by classical theorists, including Marx’s writing on
alienation from the early manuscripts, Durkheim on anomie and the social forces involved in
categorical thought, and Weber on “inconvenient facts” as part of the vocation of science.
A number of new legacy pieces were added, such as George Ritzer’s popular piece on
McDonaldization and Theda Skocpol’s timely, critical essay on the narrowing of civic life.
We added pedagogical materials for both students and instructors: These include study
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guides that provide key terms for each chapter and a number of questions to stimulate review,
class discussion, and observation. The suggested readings were expanded and updated, and
biographies of theorists were added to the introductions to each theorist’s work.
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Acknowledgments
The third edition would not have been possible without Anne Brackenbury at the University
of Toronto Press and Karen Taylor. Anne continued to champion our project even as it
expanded to gigantic dimensions. Karen was really a third editor—her role in the book was
essential and the many tasks she accomplished are astounding, including improving our prose,
checking our facts, adding pertinent information, and turning a huge unwieldy object in
cyberspace into an actual book. Beate Schwirtlich supervised the entire complicated
production process, and Ashley Rayner and Jessie Coffey handled the permissions admirably.
We want to thank our chair, Julie Artis, and our colleagues who make scholarship at
DePaul fun and rewarding as well as our students who enabled us to sharpen our
formulations and test our pedagogical strategies. Valerie Paulson was—as always—a key
person in making our dreams come true, and Joshua Covell deserves a heartfelt thanks for his
willingness to help at all times—and especially during our Christmas 2012 crunch.
We appreciate the support of the contemporary authors who contributed their current
biographies.
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Reading Theory: A General Introduction
In the following pages, we will read the words and ideas of social theorists. We will find
continuity: a number of themes appear repeatedly, and certain questions continue to be asked.
The answers may change with time and circumstances, but the questions persist. Social
theorists also confront and challenge each other’s ideas. Theory grows and develops as a result
of this controversy. Disagreements force theorists to sharpen their thinking, to look for new
empirical evidence, and to discard ideas that don’t work.
This reader is organized around continuity and confrontation among ideas. “Continuity”
involves the revisiting and rethinking of theories and theoretical questions. “Confrontation”
means the growth of theories through disagreement and controversies among theorists.
We will reflect on the relationship between theories and empirical reality, the world of
experience and everyday life. Theories are claims that there are patterns in the empirical
world; theorists invent concepts that help us to see these patterns. The concepts point to key
features of the empirical world. Theorists not only chart the real world, they also try to
explain the patterns they see. As social reality changes, theories have to be revised or
discarded.
Although theorists challenge each other, it is usually difficult to confirm or disprove a
theory. Theories are interpretations of reality; they are not research hypotheses that can be
tested with empirical data.
Theorists not only chart and explain social reality; often, they also question it. Many
theorists take a “negative-critical” view of social institutions. They do not believe that this is
the best of all possible worlds: they point to injustices and inequalities among human beings
and hope that their ideas can contribute to ending this state of affairs. Controversies among
theorists are not only about ways of interpreting reality but also about prospects for changing
it.
Several metaphors are often used to talk about theories. They are said to be constructed or
built: theorists make theoretical frameworks, constructions of concepts that are connected to
each other. A second commonly used metaphor is visual: theories are perspectives or points of
view that focus on some aspect of social reality.
A third metaphor portrays theory as a flowing, changing river, with a mainstream and
more controversial countercurrents. The mainstream is formed by ideas that are widely
accepted among intellectuals at major universities and publishing houses; the countercurrents
are formed by critical and dissenting scholars. Historically, the mainstream has usually been
non-Marxist and the major countercurrent Marxist. There are times when the currents are
sharply separated, as in the 1950s, and other times—such as the end of the twentieth century
—when they swirl together. Even when they were separate, they were fluid currents, not
watertight pipelines. It is a good idea not to think of sociological traditions as completely
rigid, distinct systems of ideas; theories have always influenced each other.
Overall, the entire enterprise of theory results in a complex and ever-changing set of
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overlapping as well as contested ideas. Theorists borrow from each other, recontextualize
other theorists’ concepts in new frameworks, adapt theory to new empirical and political
issues, and challenge each other. A number of questions appear in many theories and form
points of connection.
1. What is the nature of modern society, and to what extent is capitalism its key
characteristic?
2. How are different types of institutions connected to each other in societies? More
specifically, what is the impact of technology, the economy, and culture on each other
and on other institutions?
3. How can we best picture the interplay of micro and macro levels of action? By “micro”
we mean individual actions and small-scale interactions, and by “macro” we mean
institutions at the level of societies, nations, and the global system.
4. What is the mix of agency (purposeful human action) and structure (constraining
limits) in outcomes? To what extent do human beings “make their own history”
individually and collectively, and to what extent is it “made for them” by
circumstances inherited from the past?
5. What is the mix of class (economic position) and status (other bases of identity such as
racial or ethnic group, gender, and religion) in individual and collective outcomes?
How are identities formed? How do identities become the basis of collective action?
6. How do human beings construct social reality?
The works selected here illustrate different ways of thinking about these questions. Some
are down to earth and address everyday life while others are very abstract. They come from
both the mainstream of academic sociology and the countercurrents. The reader is divided
into five parts. Each corresponds to a distinct period in the history of social thought. These
differ from each other in terms of the themes and problems addressed by social theory, the
styles of doing theory, the methods of research, and the countries where social theorists
worked. The placement of the selections allows the reader to see how theories confront each
other and how they change historically.
The introductions to each period, type of theory, and individual theorist point out these
connections. Biographies of the individual theorists are touched on briefly; longer accounts
can be found in many other places (see the suggested readings at the end of each chapter). In
any case, a reading of ideas should never be reduced to the reported facts of an individual’s
life. Knowing facts (but which facts?) about a person may help us to understand why certain
intellectual puzzles appeared in her or his imagination, but ideas take on a life of their own
and outlive the individual. Religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, social class, and
psychological states may be factors in the development of these ideas, but they do not explain
them. Yet marginality of one kind or another gives a critical edge to a theorist’s work,
shattering the comfortable taken-for-grantedness in which majorities live their lives; all
theorizing is an attack on taken-for-grantedness, and, in that respect, it comes easier to
minorities.
It is important to keep in mind that individuals change in the course of their lives, so the
writings of a theorist’s youth are often different from those of old age. As the maturing and
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aging process and the historical circumstances change, so do the ideas. Sometimes, hope is
replaced by pessimism, especially when old age coincides with historical disasters, as with
several of our theorists and World War I. Even in the happiest historical conditions, old age
may bring about a sense of limited possibilities, replacing the boundless optimism and
freedom of youth, so it may tilt a theorist’s work more toward structural determination and
away from a focus on autonomy and meaningful action.
Not just writers but readers change, as does what is going on outside the texts being
written and read—the context. The historical conditions change, so the texts and what we
make of them do not remain the same. To read Marx after the collapse of the Berlin Wall is
to encounter a different Marx than when the same passages were read in the 1960s. When we
reread these theorists in the future, we will encounter new perspectives from which to look at
our world.
BIOGRAPHIES
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rare in the earlier period, but they become more common as doors opened to talent after
World War II. Especially in the earlier period, theorists’ fathers (and sometimes their
mothers) were professionals: lawyers, more rarely doctors, and quite frequently clergy. These
backgrounds not only provided them with the money, leisure, and university educations that
enabled them to become intellectuals in an era when few individuals enjoyed these
opportunities but also set the foundation for their reflections on the human condition and—
in the case of the law and the clergy—for the way they saw human beings constructing a
universe of meaning.
Many theorists experienced themselves as outsiders, and ethnicity, sexuality, and region of
identification are among the reasons for this outsider feeling. It was sometimes the tension
between their comfortable, privileged backgrounds and their “outsider” status that enabled
them to question conventional, taken-for-granted views of social arrangements. With few
exceptions (for example, the two men who died under fascism and Nazism—Antonio
Gramsci and Walter Benjamin), theorists usually led tranquil lives and lived into old age.
LEARNING AIDS
Each chapter concludes with a list of key terms, which serves as a quick review guide. This
list is followed by a number of questions and exercises that encourage review, discussion,
reflection, and observation. These learning aids include a large range of different types of
questions and exercises.
Two key skills are emphasized:
1. Summarizing theories and theoretical arguments, which means being able to boil them
down into a few key terms and bullet points. This operation means “cutting away the
fat” and making the theoretical ideas easy to remember—making them portable so
that you do not have to rely on a text to look at but can carry them around in your
own mind.
2. Visualizing examples from history and from contemporary everyday life to illustrate the
theories—turning these often very abstract thoughts into a series of vivid pictures like
illustrations in a book or a video played in the movie theatre of your own head. For
example, when Marx and Engels use the word “proletariat,” you can call up images of
nineteenth-century English factories, with looms or spinning machines tended by
hundreds of workers, many of them children; or you can call up similar images of
apparel factories in Bangladesh today. These pictures help to make a very broad and
abstract term more concrete and enable us to see what the term means about human
experiences. This skill involves being able to “conjure up” concrete everyday life
experiences. Often looking at history books with pictures as well as at photo and video
images of today’s news helps to develop this skill.
Study questions ask you to summarize the material, to express a theoretical argument in a
concise summary of the main ideas using key terms as needed but stating the ideas in your
own original words and sentences. There is a narrow window here between plagiarism (just
copying the theorist’s words) and veering too far away from the theorist’s thoughts in your
own restatement.
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Discussion questions ask you to compare and contrast theorists or to come up with your
own contemporary examples to illustrate theories and concepts.
Reflection questions ask you to think about your own experiences and values, to apply the
theories and concepts to your own ideas and actions.
Exercises ask you to do something to produce empirical examples, such as interview
friends, look at behaviours in various settings, or analyze media products. They ask for a
systematic recording of what you observe.
Readings
Berger, Peter, and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday, 1966.
Best, Steven, and Douglas Kellner. Postmodern Theory. New York: Guilford Press, 1991.
Collins, Randall. Four Sociological Traditions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Farganis, James. Readings in Social Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996.
Feyerabend, Paul. Against Method. London: New Left Books, 1975.
Hancock, Black Hawk, and Roberta Garner. Changing Theories: New Directions in Sociology. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2009.
Jameson, Fredric. Valences of the Dialectic. London and New York: Verso, 2009.
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Ritzer, George, and Douglas Goodman. Sociological Theory. 6th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.
Wallace, Ruth, and Alison Wolf. Contemporary Sociological Theory. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999.
Zeitlin, Irving. Ideology and the Development of Social Theory. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
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Part I
Beginnings
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Introduction
In Part I, we will discover how social theory emerged as a coherent, continuous enterprise in
modern Europe. Prior to this period, there had been many astute observers of human
societies, such as the Greek historian Herodotus and the North African writer Ibn Khaldun.
These writers not only observed cultures and societies but tried to explain the differences they
saw; for example, they tried to relate customs to religious beliefs and culture to political
systems, and they made use of explanatory factors such as climate and the history of
institutions. These accounts and reflections were not, as yet, part of an ongoing enterprise of
social theory in which scholars systematically addressed each other’s ideas. Before modern
times in Europe, continuity and confrontation were missing from social observation; the
observations remained unconnected to each other, and writers about human societies did not
yet have the sense of participating in an ongoing tradition. By the nineteenth century, this
tradition had taken shape, and social theory had become increasingly an enterprise carried out
by a self-conscious community of scholars and theorists.
From the beginning, social theory was closely connected to ideology; the analysis of
society was always connected to different points of view about the nature of the good society
and the causes of social problems. Sociology was born as a modern intellectual enterprise at
the same time that ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and nationalism
emerged, more or less at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the
nineteenth; the ideas of sociology as the pursuit of knowledge are often close to the ideas of
these contending political forces.
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1
Inventing the Lens
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we look at the origins of social theory as a systematic pursuit of knowledge
about society.
The story begins in Renaissance Italy, when Niccolò Machiavelli wrote about the exercise
of power as it really was, not as it should be. The writers of the European Enlightenment
continued to look at society as it was, but with a critical eye, in hopes of understanding how
human beings could be liberated from cruelty, irrationality, and superstition. They called for
freeing thought and speech from the tutelage of authorities, a central theme in the selection
from Immanuel Kant. Their critical approach brought forth an opposition, a new breed of
conservative prepared to defend existing institutions with the same tools of observation and
analysis that the Enlightenment used to attack them. Confrontation was born as a mode of
discourse in social theory; the process of debate forced each side to clarify concepts, make its
thinking coherent and systematic, and assemble empirical evidence.
The chapter includes a provocative selection from Friedrich Nietzsche, a philosopher who
challenged Western values and offered a perspective on the human condition that influenced
not only Sigmund Freud and the generation of classical social theorists at the end of the
nineteenth century but today’s postmodernists as well.
The inclusion of Kant and Nietzsche in this chapter draws attention to the concepts of
reason and science, both as guiding principles of social thought and as values in society.
Kant’s philosophical project is focused on the sovereignty of reason, the human ability to
conceive ideas, make judgments, formulate inferences, propose arguments, and follow
through from premises to conclusions. The central claim in Kant’s philosophy is that reason
must be the supreme authority, and his project is to establish reason as the goal of human
thought and insist on commitment to it. Reason must be superior to all other contenders for
authority, such as political, social, traditional, and religious claimants, and it must be the
governing structure over our lives. All people share the capacity for reason, and, therefore, we
must seek to work out our understandings and arguments by justifying them in this ultimate
court of appeal. We do so through systems of thought and the systematic organization of
knowledge, always guided by the fundamental principle of reason.
For Nietzsche, when reason is extended to all areas of society, it becomes another form of
ideology. Reason is critical and will tear everything down, demolishing all meaning and
understanding. The critical character of reason, so celebrated by the Enlightenment, is a
baleful force for Nietzsche. He sees reason, in the form of science, as destroying the myths
that sustain us and emptying the world of purpose and will. For Nietzsche, reason provides
no answer to the question of meaning and the question “why?” Reason leads to the constant
interrogation of social life and ends in disappointment. The supremacy of reason leads to
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nihilism—to the view that all values, and all moral, religious, and metaphysical convictions
are baseless—leaving us with only this question: How do we live in a world of nihilism?
The chapter closes with a discussion of Auguste Comte’s early attempt at synthesis, one
based on the claim that it is possible to preserve social order and hasten progress, both at the
same time. He insisted that the structure of society, above and beyond the action of the
individual, is a level of reality that requires its own form of inquiry. This idea marks the birth
of sociology as a systematic pursuit of knowledge.
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1.1 NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI (1469–1527)
Niccolò Machiavelli was born in 1469, a decisive period in European and world history.1 In
1453, the Turks had conquered the Christian Byzantine city of Constantinople, sealing their
rule over the eastern end of the Mediterranean and thereby forcing Europeans at the western
end to turn their attention to the world beyond the straits of Gibraltar. At mid-century,
Johann Gutenberg used movable type to print a Bible, beginning the long march to mass
literacy and modern media. Intellectuals and artists returned to pagan ancient Greek and
Roman literature, philosophy, art, and scholarship in the movement called the Renaissance
(“rebirth”). They did not reject Christianity, but expanded their understanding of nature and
human beings beyond the confines of the worldview of the medieval church. In their cosmo-
vision, science and superstitions such as astrology were not yet clearly separated, and they
frequently wondered what acts of boldness might enable them to master “fickle Fortune”—or,
as we would say today, how to impose our agency on we what now call “contingency,”
“circumstance,” and “random events.”
Machiavelli was born in Florence, in the heart of Tuscany in central Italy. Florentines
were supremely self-confident, lively, contentious, creative, sharp-witted, and no strangers to
violence. “Italy” did not exist as a modern nation-state; it was a collection of warring city-
states, and many regions had been or were being conquered by larger powers such as France
and Spain. Like many Florentines, Machiavelli hoped to see a strong, unified state emerge on
the peninsula—ruled from Florence, of course—that would be similar to the absolutist
monarchies that were successfully consolidating large states elsewhere in Europe.
Machiavelli’s father was a lawyer (a not uncommon pattern for many of our theorists) and
a citizen of Florence. Niccolò spent his early years during the brilliant reign of Lorenzo de
Medici, a patron of the arts and a philosopher in his own right. After the Medici rulers were
supplanted by a republic, Machiavelli was appointed as a secretary and second chancellor, a
civil service position with diplomatic responsibilities. He held this post until 1512—though
he frequently grumbled about the poor pay. He went on diplomatic missions that exposed
him to many different types of states, styles of ruling, and ways of maintaining power.
Experience in diplomacy and the observation of other states confirmed Machiavelli’s belief
that it was important for Florence to have its own militia, rather than relying on mercenaries
or “supportive” foreign powers. Along with historical examples, these experiences and
observations contributed a number of the case studies that formed the bulk of his evidence for
his conclusions about how a ruler establishes and maintains power.
In 1501, he married Marietta Corsini, a woman with whom he had six children. By his
account, he was something of a womanizer, but this claim has not been substantiated. His
attitude towards women is perhaps captured by this remark from The Prince:
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Of course, this statement is only a metaphor playing on the image inherited from Greek and
Roman times that “Fortune” is a woman.
By 1512, Florence had reverted to Medici rule. Machiavelli not only fell out of favour and
lost his appointment but also was accused of conspiring against the Medici, arrested, and
tortured by being strung up with a rope to dislocate the shoulders. After his exoneration and
release, he retired to the family estate near Florence (at San Casciano) and devoted himself to
writing of all kinds—poetry, songs, and plays as well as political writing. In 1513, he
completed The Prince, his most famous book, and initially dedicated it to Giuliano de Medici,
perhaps in the futile hope of being reappointed to a major office. He continued to present his
ideas to literary gatherings and was even asked to develop plans to fortify the walls of
Florence.
His portrait shows a man with a strong, alert face, eyes sceptically turned away from the
viewer and a slight smile on his lips. Indeed, his biographer Villari remarks “he could not rid
himself of the sarcastic expression continually playing around his mouth and flashing from his
eyes.”3
In addition to his sarcasm, cynicism, and irony (widely shared dispositions in Tuscan
culture), he possessed a marvellous imagination, which was the driving force of his political
writing. In 1513, he describes his daily routine in a letter. He rises at sunset, supervises
woodcutters on the estate, muses on his romantic affairs, reads classic works of literature,
squabbles with tradesmen, eats the midday meal with the kids, plays cards and dice in the
local inn, and then finally returns home to put on splendid clothes, and in his imagination
talks with the great individuals of the past about history and politics. Documenting his
feelings about these passionate conversations, he writes, “for four hours I am conscious of no
boredom, I forget all my troubles, I cease to fear poverty, I have no terror of death. I give
myself up entirely to them.”4
Machiavelli died in 1527, after suffering from severe stomach pains, and left little
property to his children.
Notes
1. Information about the renaissance is taken from Jacob Burckhardt, Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 2 vols. (New
York: Harper, 1958). Return to text.
2. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Anthony Bull (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 81. Return to text.
3. Quoted in George Bull, “Introduction,” in The Prince, by Niccolò Machiavelli (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961),
17. Return to text.
4. Quoted in Federico Chabod, Machiavelli and the Renaissance (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), 127. Return to text.
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Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532)
The story of sociology begins with Niccolò Machiavelli and The Prince, a book he completed
in 1513, at the height of the Italian Renaissance, although it was not published until after his
death in 1532. Europe was caught up in a period of dramatic change. In one lifetime—say
from 1450 to 1525—a rush of events set the course of modern history for the next 500 years.
• In 1453, the Turks captured Constantinople (now Istanbul) from the Greeks and
demonstrated the effective use of cannons and gunpowder; the eastern Mediterranean
became part of the Islamic world; and European rulers, merchants, and adventurers
felt pressure to expand their sphere westward and southward beyond the Straits of
Gibraltar.
• In 1458, Johann Gutenberg printed a version of the Bible with movable type; the
modern book and the mass dissemination of the printed word were born.
• In 1492, the sovereigns of Christian Spain completed their reconquest of the Iberian
Peninsula from Islamic rule and expelled the remaining Moors and Jews. In 1492,
Columbus “discovered” the “New” World, the key event of Europe’s explosive
movement into the rest of the globe.
• In the years from 1497 to 1503, Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama led the first
European expedition to reach India by sea and established Portuguese power along
the coasts of Africa; the African slave trade began to expand.
• In 1517, Martin Luther posted his challenge to Roman Catholicism, and the
Reformation split the unity of Western Christendom.
• In 1519, Ferdinand Magellan’s fleet set sail to circumnavigate the globe, returning in
1522.
• In 1521, Hernán Cortés and a handful of men brought down Montezuma’s kingdom,
beginning a swift and terrible destruction of the indigenous civilizations of the
Western Hemisphere.
The cultural background of all these momentous and generally violent events was the
Renaissance, the glorious rediscovery—more accurately, reimagining—of the world of the
pagan Greeks and Romans: its art, philosophy, and joyous affirmation of human creativity
and the human spirit.
In Western intellectual history, The Prince was as explosive as gunpowder. For the first
time in centuries, someone dared to put in writing a realistic view of human actions. Of
course, cynical and brutal advice circulated by word of mouth throughout European society in
the Middle Ages: the practical knowledge of how to rule and control people was shared by
kings and queens, knights and sheriffs, slave owners and overseers. However, books were
filled with morality and pious platitudes; they dwelled on the exemplary Christian life and the
noble character of Christian rulers. (In other literate cultures, the written word fulfilled the
same prescriptive function, for example, in the Confucian analects.) In short, until the
Renaissance, most books were tiresomely normative, not empirical; they prescribed good
behaviour rather than observing, describing, and analyzing what human beings really did. The
Prince broke with the normative tradition of writing: Machiavelli put into his book all the
29
cruel, violent, cunning, coercive, and occasionally even compassionate acts that the ruler must
carry out to stay in power. The Prince was based on reality, on observations of real people, and
not on moral precepts. For this reason, it shocked its readers and was widely censored and
banned. Its publication marks the beginning of modern social science—to write about society
as it really is, not only as we would like it be; to write about the “is,” and not only the “ought
to be.”
As you will see in the selection, on the surface, The Prince appears to be a collection of
cynical tips on how to take and hold onto power. Machiavelli used the term “prince” not only
for hereditary monarchs but also for soldiers of fortune who came to rule territories, elected
politicians, and any person who was intent on establishing and maintaining power. Indeed,
executives today still read and learn from the tips.
Machiavelli’s goals in writing The Prince went beyond currying favour by offering useful
tips to the Medici princes of Florence (to whom it is dedicated). He was writing as an Italian
patriot dismayed at Italian rulers’ inability to form the large, powerful, centralized states that
were beginning to appear in France, England, and Spain. He hoped that his advice to rulers
would be taken up by an Italian prince intent on creating a stronger state; he was concerned
that a weak, disunited Italy would be invaded and divided by stronger, more cohesive states—
and indeed it was.
We can even engage in a leftist reading of The Prince, seeing its author as the prototype of
a radical democrat revealing the secrets of power to the masses. After all, princes have known
the tricks of rule since time immemorial; the lore of power has circulated by word of mouth
through royal families and among counsellors and generals since the Bronze Age. To put this
lore in writing was a radical leap, a secular parallel to the dissemination of God’s word in the
form of the printed Bible. Just as people could now freely and directly read God’s word,
without the intercession of priests, they could now read and understand the workings of
earthly powers. The secret oral lore of those in power was made available and transparent to
the masses through the medium of writing. Thus, The Prince is one of the first steps toward
the emergence of the democratic and revolutionary ideals that characterize modern times.
This left or radical reading of The Prince is a bit controversial, but intriguing.
As you read this selection, note its method as well as its key ideas. Machiavelli often first
states his observations as general rules and then supports them with examples from classical
antiquity or from contemporary Italy. This evidence may strike the modern reader as
scattershot or anecdotal, but it represents the beginning of a case-study method, still popular
in our day as a way of educating public administrators, policy planners, lawyers, and
executives.
These examples of how to apply general rules in specific contexts allowed Machiavelli to
develop his paired concepts of fortuna and virtù. Fortuna refers to the external circumstances
in which one must act, the situation that fortune (or fate) doles out to each individual. Virtù
refers to the qualities of the individual that allow him or her to act effectively within those
circumstances. To some extent, virtù is inborn in the individual, in boldness, strength of will,
courage, and intelligence; but it can be enhanced, and that enhancement is the purpose of The
Prince.
In this selection, Machiavelli develops another important contrast, the one between the
30
lion who rules through coercion and the fox who rules through cunning.
Keep both of these paired concepts (fortuna/virtù and lion/fox) in mind, as we will
encounter them in other writers in updated forms. The juxtaposition of virtù and fortuna will
reappear in Karl Marx’s view that “human beings make history but not in circumstances of
their own choosing” and in the contemporary distinction between agency (meaningful action)
and structure (external social circumstances). The lion and fox will reappear in theories that
address the central question of how power is exercised in different types of societies, whether
by coercion or consent.
31
Reading 1.1: Excerpts from The Prince (1532)
[Source: Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, translated for this text by Larry Garner.]
Chapter XVII
32
Nonetheless, a ruler should make himself feared in such a way that, even though he is not
loved, he is not hated; for it is perfectly possible to be feared but not hated. And he will
always succeed in doing so if he lays no hand on the property of his citizens and subjects and
stays away from their women. But if he must shed blood, then he should do so when there is
sufficient justification and clear culpability—and, above all, he must refrain from taking the
property of others; for men will erase from their memory more readily the death of a father
than the loss of their estate. Furthermore, pretexts for seizing the property of others are never
in short supply—and a ruler who begins by plundering some of his subjects, soon enough
moves on to others. But reasons for shedding blood are few, and they are quickly dispensed
with.
But when a ruler is at the head of an army and has to give commands to masses of
soldiers, he should not be concerned at all about having a reputation for cruelty; for without
this reputation he will never be able to hold his army together nor get his men to go into
combat. Among the extraordinary deeds of Hannibal (247–182 BCE) was that, even though
he had an exceedingly large army made up of all kinds of men from different races who
fought in distant lands, there was never any breakdown in discipline—neither amongst
themselves nor directed against the leader, neither when circumstances (fortuna) were
favourable nor when they were unfavourable. And this was a consequence of his inhuman
cruelty, which, together with his countless other qualities (virtù), made him revered and
feared by his soldiers; without that cruelty, all of his other qualities would have been
insufficient to produce that effect.
There are those rather thoughtless writers who, on the one hand, admire Hannibal’s
achievements, but, on the other hand, condemn the very means which made the
achievements possible. And for evidence that Hannibal could not have relied solely on his
other qualities to achieve success, we need look no further than the case of Scipio (236–183
BCE). The latter was a man of exceptional virtues, not only in his own time but also in the
memory of all time. And yet his armies revolted against him in Spain—his excessive leniency
had given rise to a laxness in their ranks incompatible with military discipline. Fabius
Maximus upbraided him for this leniency in the Senate, calling it a corrupting force among
Roman troops. Indeed, when one of Scipio′s officers massacred and pillaged the Locrians,
Scipio failed to redress the outrage and to punish the misdeeds of his officer—once again a
consequence of his forgiving character. Indeed, when someone in the Senate sought to justify
Scipio’s conduct, he said that Scipio was one of those many men who found it easier to avoid
making mistakes himself than to take measures to correct them in others. Over the course of
time, Scipio’s leniency would have lost him his claim to fame and glory had he continued as a
military commander. But since he lived in the shadow of the Senate, this shortcoming of his
not only remained hidden but even brought him glory.
Returning, then, to the question of being feared or loved: Since men love at their own
choosing but live in fear at the choosing of the ruler, a wise ruler will count on what he
controls and not on what others control. He must only guard against being hated….
Ch. XVIII
33
WHETHER A RULER SHOULD KEEP HIS WORD Everyone knows that it would be
altogether well and good if a ruler always kept his word, living his life in an upright fashion
and avoiding duplicity. Nonetheless, experience shows that, in our times, rulers who have
achieved great things have paid little attention to keeping their word; rather, they have
excelled in their use of cunning to manipulate the minds of others—and, in the end, they
have eclipsed those who relied on being faithful to their word.
You should bear in mind that there are two ways of having one’s way in this world: the
first is by enforcing laws and codes of right conduct and the other is by means of violence.
The former is peculiar to human beings; the latter is the way of beasts. But because codes of
right conduct are often inadequate to the task at hand, recourse to violence may be called for.
Thus, a ruler has to know when it is necessary to act like a human being and when like a
beast. In ancient times, writers taught this lesson to rulers through mythology. They wrote,
for example, how Achilles and many other princes from ancient times were nurtured by
Chiron, the centaur, and that they were brought up under a discipline imposed by the
centaur. The meaning of the myth is clear: the ruler has as a mentor a creature that is half
man and half beast because he must learn to use both sides of the centaur′s nature—if the
ruler possesses one side but not the other, his power will not last.
But if a ruler must know how to use the beast within himself, he must also know how to
play both the lion and the fox—for the lion is not very good at defending himself from traps,
while the fox does poorly against wolves. Consequently, a ruler must learn to be a fox
whenever traps are to be avoided, and to be a lion whenever wolves have to be frightened
away. Those who would play only the part of the lion will fail the test. Thus, a prudent ruler
cannot and should not keep his word if, by so doing, he undermines his own position and
when the original reasons to keep his word no longer abide. If human beings were all good,
then this axiom would not be true. But since they are a wretched lot who do not keep their
word to you, you likewise have no obligation to keep yours to them. Furthermore, a ruler will
never lack legitimate reasons for his breach of good faith. One could give endless examples of
this in modern times; countless peace treaties and agreements have been broken and annulled
by rulers—and those who have known how to use the tricks of the fox have fared the best.
Still, one must know how to disguise effectively this disposition by mastering the art of
deception and prevarication. And human beings are such simpletons and so preoccupied with
just their immediate needs that rulers who undertake to deceive will always find those who let
themselves be deceived.
There is one example from our own times which should not be overlooked. Pope
Alexander VI (1492–1503) never did or ever considered doing anything that did not involve
deceiving others—and he could always find occasions to deploy his deception. And there
never was a man who was more adept at swearing an oath to observe his word and then
disregarding that same oath. And yet he always managed to carry out his acts of deceptions
with success because he knew very well how that part of the world worked.
Thus, one can say that it is not necessary for a ruler to possess all of the above-mentioned
qualities, but it is essential he be able to appear to possess them. I would even go so far as to
say that virtuous qualities are harmful to a ruler if he possesses them and always acts in
accordance with them; on the other hand, those qualities are most useful insofar as the ruler
34
simply appears to possess them. It is a good thing to appear to be compassionate, faithful to
one’s word, humane, upright, and religious—and even to be such in reality. But a ruler must
be adroit enough to know how to act in just the opposite way if circumstances require it. So
the lesson above all is this: A ruler, and especially a new ruler, cannot live by all of those good
qualities by virtue of which humans are regarded to be good human beings—and this is
because a ruler, in order to maintain order and hold on to his power, is often forced to act
against the principle of being faithful to his word, against charity, against his humane
feelings, and against religion. In short, he must possess a personality which enables him to
shift from one modus operandi to another according to the direction of the winds and the
prevailing circumstances (fortuna)—doing what is right and good when he can, but capable of
doing evil if he is forced to do so.
Consequently, a ruler must always be on guard against ever letting slip out of his mouth
any words which might suggest that he does not fully possess the five qualities mentioned
above. To others who see or hear him, he must always appear to be the very embodiment of
compassion, trustworthiness, integrity, kindness, and piety. And it is necessary, above all, for
the ruler to possess this last quality: i.e., to appear to be a man of religion. For humans
everywhere judge others more with their eyes than with their hands—since we can readily see
things but not so readily touch them. And this means that everyone sees what you appear to
be, but few have close enough contact to know who you really are—and those few are little
inclined to stand up against the opinion of the many, which is backed up by the magisterial
aura of the State. For in appraising the actions of all men, and especially in the actions taken
by rulers—for which there is no court of appeal—the eye focuses on the end result to be
achieved. If, then, a ruler is able to win victories and maintain law and order within his State,
the means employed will always be deemed honourable and praised by all. Average people are
taken in by appearances and impressed by final results—and the world is made up of average
people. And the few will be able to hold sway over the many as long as the many feel secure.
A present-day ruler, who best goes unnamed,3 never ceases to preach the virtues of peace and
mutual trust, and yet he is the worst possible enemy of both; and if he had ever really lived by
those virtues, he would have lost his reputation and his State many times over.
Notes
1. Cesare Borgia (1475–1507) an Italian nobleman and cardinal, was recognized by Pope Alexander VI as his son and
personally known to Machiavelli who hailed his boldness. Return to text.
2. Queen Dido, the first queen of the North African city of Carthage, is a character in Roman mythology and in Virgil’s epic
poem, the Aeneid. Return to text.
3. Ferdinand II of Aragon, 1452–1516. Return to text.
35
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DANCE ON STILTS AT THE GIRLS’ UNYAGO, NIUCHI
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.