Constitutional Law 2 - Bill of Rights - Due Process To Search & Seizure

SUNDAY A.
VELASCO Bill of Rights (Due Process to Search) Page 1 of 35
TAXATION
11.e. City of Pasig and Cripina versus Salumbre, in her capacity as OIC City Treasurer of Pasig City,
Petitioners v. Manila Electric Company, Respondents, March 7, 2018
Title: City of Pasig vs. Manila Electric Co.

Case: G.R. No. 181710; Ponente: MARTIRES, J; Decision Date: Mar 7, 2018
The City of Pasig is found to have no authority to levy franchise tax on the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) for the period 1996 to 1999, as the ordinance imposing the tax was declared null and void,
and the subsequent conversion of Pasig into a city did not rectify the defect of the ordinance.
Facts:
• The case involves the City of Pasig and Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
• In 1992, the Municipality of Pasig enacted Ordinance No. 25, which imposed a franchise tax on
businesses operating within the municipality.
• However, under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, only provinces and cities have the
authority to levy franchise tax.
• In 1995, the Municipality of Pasig was converted into a city.
• The City of Pasig demanded payment of franchise tax from MERALCO for the period 1996 to 1999,
based on the aforementioned ordinance.
• MERALCO protested the demand, claiming that the ordinance was void and that municipalities are
not empowered to impose franchise tax.
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the City of Pasig, but MERALCO appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA).
Issue:
• Whether the City of Pasig had a valid basis for imposing franchise tax on MERALCO for the period
1996 to 1999.
Ruling:
• The Court ruled in favor of MERALCO and af irmed the decision of the CA.
• The City of Pasig had no authority to levy franchise tax on MERALCO for the said period.
• The ordinance imposing the tax was declared null and void, and the subsequent conversion of
Pasig into a city did not rectify the defect of the ordinance.
Ratio:
• Under the LGC, only provinces and cities have the authority to levy franchise tax.
• Municipalities are prohibited from levying taxes speci ically allocated to provinces.
• The power to impose franchise tax must be exercised through an appropriate ordinance.
• In this case, the ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Pasig in 1992 was void because
municipalities do not have the authority to levy franchise tax.
• The conversion of Pasig into a city did not cure the defect of the ordinance.
• The cityhood law did not give curative effect to the void ordinance.
• The Court cited previous cases to support the ruling that the conversion of a municipality into a
city does not remove the original in irmity of an ordinance.
• Therefore, the City of Pasig had no legal basis to demand payment of franchise tax from MERALCO.
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SUNDAY A. VELASCO Bill of Rights (Due Process to Search) Page 2 of 35
11.f. Mandanas, et. al, v. Executive Secretary et. al, July 3, 2018
Title: Mandanas vs. Ochoa, Jr.

Case: G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488; Ponente: BERSAMIN, J; Decision Date: Jul 3, 2018
The Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr. case involves the allocation of national taxes to local government units (LGUs) in the
Philippines, speci ically questioning the exclusion of certain tax collections from the base amount for computing
the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring that
the excluded tax collections should be included in the computation and ordering the automatic release of the LGUs'
just share in the national taxes.
Facts:
• The case involves the allocation of national taxes to local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines.
• The petitioners, including Congressman Hermilando Mandanas and Mayor Efren Diona, challenged the
computation of the LGUs' just share in the national taxes.
• They questioned the exclusion of certain tax collections from the base amount and argued that these
excluded tax collections should be included in the computation.
• The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring that the excluded tax collections should be
included in the computation and ordering the automatic release of the LGUs' just share in the national
taxes.
Issue:
• The main issue raised in the case is whether the exclusion of certain tax collections from the base amount
for computing the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes is constitutional.
Ruling:
• The Court ruled that the exclusion of certain tax collections from the base amount is unconstitutional.
• They argued that Congress exceeded its constitutional boundary by limiting the base to national internal
revenue taxes (NIRTs) instead of all national taxes.
• The Court emphasized that the 1987 Constitution mandates that the just share of the LGUs should come
from national taxes, not just NIRTs.
• The Court also clari ied that Congress can validly exclude taxes from the base amount for the computation
of the LGUs' just share only if a constitutional provision allows such exclusion.
• They upheld the exclusion of certain taxes, such as the share of the affected LGUs in the proceeds of the sale
and conversion of former military bases, the share of the LGUs in the excise taxes on mineral products, and
the share of the COA in the NIRTs, as these exclusions are justi ied by speci ic constitutional provisions or
laws.
• However, the Court denied the petitioners' request for the payment of arrears of the LGUs' just share, as the
declaration of unconstitutionality is prospective and cannot retroactively affect past allocations.
• The Court invoked the doctrine of operative fact, which recognizes the existence and effects of a law or
executive act prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality.
Ratio:
• The exclusion of certain tax collections from the base amount for computing the just share of the LGUs in
the national taxes is unconstitutional.
• Congress exceeded its constitutional boundary by limiting the base to national internal revenue taxes
(NIRTs) instead of all national taxes.
• The 1987 Constitution mandates that the just share of the LGUs should come from national taxes, not just
NIRTs.
• Congress can validly exclude taxes from the base amount for the computation of the LGUs' just share only if
a constitutional provision allows such exclusion.
• Certain exclusions, such as the share of the affected LGUs in the proceeds of the sale and conversion of
former military bases, the share of the LGUs in the excise taxes on mineral products, and the share of the
COA in the NIRTs, are justi ied by speci ic constitutional provisions or laws.
• The declaration of unconstitutionality is prospective and cannot retroactively affect past allocations.
• The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence and effects of a law or executive act prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality.
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DUE PROCESS
12. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada vs. Of ice of the Ombudsman, et. al., January 21, 2015
Title: Estrada vs. Of ice of the Ombudsman

Case: G.R. Nos. 212140-41; Ponente: CARPIO, J; Decision Date: Jan 21, 2015
Senator Jinggoy Estrada challenges the denial of his request for counter-af idavits in a preliminary
investigation, claiming a violation of his right to due process, but the Supreme Court rules that the denial
did not violate his rights as the accused in a preliminary investigation has limited rights.
Facts:
• Senator Jinggoy Estrada was served with a copy of a complaint iled by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito Baligod, praying for criminal proceedings for Plunder.
• Another complaint was iled by the Field Investigation Of ice (FIO) of the Ombudsman, also
praying for criminal proceedings for Plunder.
• Eighteen of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents iled their counter-af idavits.
• Sen. Estrada iled a request to be furnished with copies of the counter-af idavits of the other
respondents and other ilings.
• The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada's request, stating that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to be furnished with all the ilings of the other parties.
• The Ombudsman issued a joint resolution inding probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-
respondents.
• Sen. Estrada iled a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, claiming a violation of his
right to due process.
Issue:
• Whether the denial of Sen. Estrada's request for counter-af idavits violated his right to due
process.
Ruling:
• The denial of Sen. Estrada's request did not violate his right to due process.
• The accused in a preliminary investigation has limited rights, and the right to be furnished with all
the ilings of the other parties is not one of those rights.
• The provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Procedure of the Of ice of the
Ombudsman support the ruling.
• A preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause and is not a part of the
trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights.
Ratio:
• The accused in a preliminary investigation has limited rights.
• The right to be furnished with all the ilings of the other parties is not one of those rights.
• The provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Procedure of the Of ice of the
Ombudsman support the ruling.
• A preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause and is not a part of the
trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights.
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13. Suyan vs. People of the Philippines, July 2, 2014
Title: Suyan vs. People

Case: G.R. No. 189644; Ponente: SERENO, C.J; Decision Date: Jul 2, 2014
Neil E. Suyan's probation is revoked after he is found to have violated the conditions of his probation by
committing another offense while on probation, leading to the af irmation of the Court of Appeals'
decision.
Facts:
• Neil E. Suyan was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 on
October 27, 1995.
• Suyan pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted and sentenced to six years of prision
correccional.
• Suyan iled an application for probation, which was granted by the RTC on February 16, 1996.
• While on probation, Suyan was arrested twice for violating the same offense he was convicted of.
• The Chief Probation and Parole Of icer of Dagupan City iled a Motion to Revoke Probation,
alleging that Suyan's commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of
the terms thereof.
• The RTC granted the motion and revoked Suyan's probation.
• Suyan iled a Rule 65 Petition with the Court of Appeals, claiming that he was denied due process
during the revocation of his probation.
• The CA granted the petition and ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
to afford Suyan his right to due process.
• After a hearing, the RTC issued an order revoking Suyan's probation.
• Suyan iled a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
• He then appealed to the CA, alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
• The CA denied his appeal, ruling that he was afforded due process and that there was suf icient
justi ication for the revocation of his probation.
Issue:
• Whether Suyan's probation was validly revoked.
Ruling:
• Suyan's probation was validly revoked.
Ratio:
• Procedural grounds: Suyan was given ample opportunity to refute the allegations against him but
failed to do so.
• Substantive grounds: Suyan's commission of another offense while on probation was a direct
violation of the conditions of his probation, justifying its revocation.
• The Court emphasized that probation is a discretionary grant and that Suyan failed to observe full
obedience to the terms and conditions of his probation, leading to the revocation of this privilege.
Conclusion:
• The Court af irmed the revocation of Suyan's probation, ruling that he violated the conditions of
his probation by committing another offense while on probation.
• The Court held that Suyan was given due process and that there was suf icient justi ication for the
revocation of his probation.
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14. Govt. of the USA vs. Guillermo Purganan, September 24, 2002
Title: Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Case: G.R. No. 148571; Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.; Decision Date: Sep 24, 2002
In the case of "Government of the United States of America v. Purganan," the Supreme Court ruled that prospective
extraditees are generally not entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued, and that
the right to bail does not apply to extradition cases, although exceptions may be made in certain circumstances.
Facts:
• Case: Government of the United States of America v. Purganan
• Petitioner: Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice
• Respondents: Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42,
and Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo
• Decision date: September 24, 2002
• Case number: G.R. No. 148571
• Ponente: Justice Panganiban
• The US government iled a Petition for Certiorari challenging the procedure adopted by the trial court in
irst hearing the potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a warrant for his arrest.
• The Supreme Court allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to
settle the issue of bail in extradition proceedings.
• The Supreme Court held that prospective extraditees are presumed to be light risks and that prior acts of
the respondent demonstrated his aversion to the processes in the requesting state and his predisposition to
avoid them.
• The trial court's decision to set a hearing for the issuance of the warrant of arrest when a prima facie
inding already existed was deemed an abuse of discretion.
• The Supreme Court also held that the right to bail does not apply to extradition cases, but exceptions may
be made in certain circumstances.
Issue:
• Whether prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued.
Ruling:
• Prospective extraditees are generally not entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can
be issued.
• The right to bail does not apply to extradition cases, but exceptions may be made in certain circumstances.
Ratio:
• Extradition proceedings are summary in nature and do not involve determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
• The purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the extradition request complies with the
treaty and whether the person sought is extraditable.
• The potential extraditee is presumed to be a light risk, and prior acts demonstrating aversion to the
processes in the requesting state and predisposition to avoid them support this presumption.
• The trial court's decision to set a hearing for the issuance of the warrant of arrest when a prima facie
inding already existed was an abuse of discretion.
• There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest in
extradition cases.
• The right to bail does not apply to extradition cases, but exceptions may be made in certain circumstances.
• The grant of bail to a potential extraditee is discretionary and depends on whether it will frustrate the ends
of justice.
• The potential extraditee has the burden of proving that he is not a light risk.
• The case should be remanded to the extradition court to ensure proper procedure and standards are
followed in determining the right to bail of the potential extraditee.
• The country has obligations under the Extradition Treaty and must prevent fugitives from escaping justice.
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15. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc. vs. COMELEC, April 29, 2010
Title: Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

Case: G.R. No. 190529 (Resolution); Ponente: BRION, J; Decision Date: Apr 29, 2010
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) petitions to nullify the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolution that delisted them from the roster of registered party-list organizations due to
their failure to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections and their non-
participation in the 2007 elections.
Facts:
• The case involves the Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) petitioning to nullify the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolution that delisted them from the roster of registered
party-list organizations.
• PGBI was delisted due to their failure to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding
elections and their non-participation in the 2007 elections.
Issue:
• Whether there is a legal basis for delisting PGBI.
• Whether PGBI's right to due process was violated.
Ruling:
• The court ruled in favor of PGBI.
Ratio:
• The court stated that the previous ruling in the case of Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association v. Commission on Elections (Minero) was an erroneous application of the law.
• The court clari ied that the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting - failure to
participate in the last two preceding elections or failure to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in
the two preceding elections.
• The court mentioned that the disquali ication for failure to get 2% party-list votes should be
understood in light of the Banat ruling, which invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement.
• The court agreed with the COMELEC that PGBI's right to due process was not violated as they were
given an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the delisting.
• The court granted the petition and annulled the COMELEC resolution, stating that the previous
ruling in Minero was erroneous and should be abandoned.
• The court also clari ied the interpretation of the law regarding the disquali ication for failure to
obtain 2% party-list votes.
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15. a. Emilio Ramon Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections et. al., November 25, 2014
Title: Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections

Case: G.R. No. 212398; Ponente: PERALTA, J; Decision Date: Nov 25, 2014
A candidate for provincial governor in the Philippines is disquali ied for exceeding the allowable election campaign
expenses, leading to a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Facts:
• The case involves a petition for certiorari iled by Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito against the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis.
• Ejercito was disquali ied as a candidate for provincial governor in the Philippines due to exceeding the
allowable election campaign expenses.
• Three days before the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, San Luis iled a petition for
disquali ication against Ejercito before the Of ice of the COMELEC.
• San Luis alleged that Ejercito distributed "Orange Cards" to in luence voters and exceeded the allowable
election campaign expenses.
• Ejercito won the election and obtained 549,310 votes compared to San Luis' 471,209 votes.
• Ejercito iled a Veri ied Answer, arguing that the petition should have been iled as a complaint for election
offenses and that he was not previously convicted or declared guilty by a competent court.
• Ejercito claimed that the "Orange Card" was a priority project of his administration and not intended to
in luence the electorate.
• Ejercito argued that the accusation of exceeding campaign expenses was speculative and unsupported by
evidence.
• The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution on September 26, 2013, granting the petition for
disquali ication and ordering Ejercito's removal from of ice.
• Ejercito iled a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.
Issue:
• Whether the COMELEC violated Ejercito's right to due process by ruling for his disquali ication even though
it was not prayed for in the petition.
• Whether the COMELEC relied on an advertising contract that was not formally offered as evidence.
• Whether Ejercito should be disquali ied for an act done by a third party without his knowledge and
consent.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court upheld the COMELEC's resolution and dismissed Ejercito's petition.
• The Court ruled that the petition iled by San Luis was both a complaint for election offenses and a petition
for disquali ication.
• The conduct of a preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a
disquali ication case.
• The advertising contract was properly considered as evidence, as it was submitted to the COMELEC in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
• Ejercito should be disquali ied for an act done by a third party, as he had the opportunity to explain his side
and rebut the evidence against him.
Ratio:
• The petition iled by San Luis was both a complaint for election offenses and a petition for disquali ication.
• The conduct of a preliminary investigation is not required in the resolution of the electoral aspect of a
disquali ication case.
• The advertising contract was properly considered as evidence, as it was submitted to the COMELEC in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
• Ejercito should be disquali ied for an act done by a third party, as he had the opportunity to explain his side
and rebut the evidence against him.
• Ejercito's disquali ication was based on his violation of the election laws, speci ically Section 68 of the OEC.
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EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

16. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, 289 scra 337
Title: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
Case: G.R. No. 132922; Ponente: MENDOZA, J; Decision Date: Apr 21, 1998
The Supreme Court upholds the validity of a provision requiring radio and television broadcast companies to
provide free air time to the COMELEC, stating that these companies do not own the airwaves and frequencies they
use and that the provision does not violate their rights.
Facts:
• The case involves the constitutionality of Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• The petitioners, Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network,
Inc., argue that this provision violates their rights as it con iscates private property without due process
and just compensation, and denies equal protection of the law to broadcast media.
Issue:
• Whether Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code is constitutional.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court upholds the validity of Section 92.
Ratio:
• Radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and frequencies they use, but are
merely granted the temporary privilege of using them through their franchises.
• The provision for free air time is a reasonable condition for the grant of the franchise, as it is a form of
public service that can be required of the grantees.
• The provision does not violate the equal protection clause, as there are important differences between
broadcast media and print media that justify differential treatment for free speech purposes.
Standing:
• The Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) does not have
standing to bring the case, as its members have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the
operation of Section 92.
• GMA Network, Inc. is allowed to bring the constitutional challenge, as it has standing and has shown that it
will suffer losses if required to provide free air time.
Dissenting Opinion:
• Justice Artemio Panganiban argues that Section 92 is unconstitutional as it con iscates private property
without due process and just compensation, and denies equal protection of the law to broadcast media.
• The State does not own the airwaves and frequencies, but merely regulates their use, and therefore cannot
exact onerous burdens from the franchise holders without compensation.
• The forced donation of air time is a taking of the broadcast companies' investments without just
compensation.
Facts:
• The case involves the constitutionality of Section 92 of the Republic Act No. 9006.
• The petitioners argue that this provision violates their constitutional rights to due process, just
compensation, and equal protection of the law.
Issue:
• Whether Section 92 of the Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.
Ruling:
• Section 92 of the Republic Act No. 9006 is unconstitutional.
Ratio:
• The taking of property for public use must be accompanied by just compensation.
• The government has the power to regulate the use of airwaves, but it does not own them.
• The government cannot con iscate private property without due process and just compensation.
• The distinction between print and broadcast media is not a valid justi ication for treating them differently
in terms of compelled donations.
• Section 92 of the Republic Act No. 9006 violates the petitioners' constitutional rights.
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17. People vs. Jalosjos, 324 scra 689
Title: People vs. Jalosjos

Case: G.R. Nos. 132875-76 (Resolution); Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J; Decision Date: Feb 3, 2000
A member of Congress convicted of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is denied the right to fully
discharge his duties as a Congressman while his conviction is pending appeal, as the court rules that
elected of icials can have their privileges restricted by law and being elected to public of ice does not
exempt one from imprisonment.
Facts:
• Accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, is a member of Congress and is currently con ined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal.
• Accused-appellant iled a motion asking to be allowed to fully discharge his duties as a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings, despite his
conviction for a non-bailable offense.
• Accused-appellant argued that his re-election by his constituents gives him the duty to perform his
functions as a Congressman and that his incarceration should not hinder him from ful illing his
mandate.
Issue:
• Whether membership in Congress exempts an accused from statutes and rules that apply to
incarcerated individuals in general.
Ruling:
• The court ruled against the accused-appellant's motion, stating that his re-election does not
exempt him from the legal restraints of being incarcerated.
Ratio:
• Privileges and rights arising from being elected can be restricted by law.
• The duty to legislate does not lift the accused-appellant from the class of prisoners.
• Lawful arrest and con inement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
• The performance of legitimate duties by public of icers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison.
• Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classi ication in criminal law
enforcement.
• The functions and duties of the of ice do not distinguish the accused-appellant from other
prisoners.
• Equal protection under the law and the necessity to regulate for the public welfare are important
considerations.
• Election to public of ice does not give priority to any other right or interest, including the police
power of the State.
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Title: People vs. Jalosjos

Case: G.R. Nos. 132875-76; Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J; Decision Date: Nov 16, 2001
Accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory
rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness against eleven-year-old Rosilyn Delantar. The incidents
occurred in Room No. 1702 of Ritz Towers in Makati City. The Supreme Court af irmed the decision of the
trial court, ruling that the birth and baptismal certi icates of Rosilyn are admissible as evidence to prove
her age, and that the acts committed by the accused constitute statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count of statutory rape and imprisonment for
each count of acts of lasciviousness.
Facts:
This case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos who was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati for two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. The victim,
Rosilyn, was a minor below twelve years old at the time of the incidents. The accused, a member of
Congress, was accused of peddling Rosilyn for commercial sex. The acts of rape were preceded by several
acts of lasciviousness on separate occasions.
Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are whether the birth and baptismal certi icates of Rosilyn are
admissible as evidence to prove her age, and whether the acts committed by the accused constitute
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the birth and baptismal certi icates of Rosilyn are admissible as evidence to prove
her age. Even if they were inadmissible, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord Dressing Book of the
hospital where Rosilyn was born are suf icient evidence to establish her date of birth. These documents
are considered entries in of icial records and are admissible as prima facie evidence of their contents.
The court also ruled that the acts committed by the accused constitute statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The court explained that for rape to be consummated, there must be penetration of the
labia majora, and not just touching of the external genitalia. In this case, there was suf icient proof that
the accused's acts went beyond mere touching and involved penetration of the victim's vagina.
The court further ruled that the accused is liable for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, or
the Child Abuse Law, which prohibits lascivious conduct with a child below 18 years of age. The court
found that the accused's acts of kissing the victim on the lips, fondling her breast, inserting his inger into
her vagina, and placing his penis between her thighs constitute lascivious conduct.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court found the testimonies of the victim, Rosilyn Delantar, to be credible and consistent.
Her detailed account of the incidents, corroborated by other witnesses and documentary evidence,
established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the age of
consent for sexual intercourse is set at 12 years old, and any sexual act with a child below that age is
considered statutory rape. The Court also noted that the acts of accused-appellant, such as kissing,
fondling, and inserting his inger and penis into the victim's vagina, clearly constituted acts of
lasciviousness. The Court rejected accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi, as it found the victim's
testimony to be more credible and supported by other evidence.
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18. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, December 7, 2010
Title: Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

Case: G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036; Ponente: MENDOZA, J; Decision Date: Dec 7, 2010
The Philippine Supreme Court declares Executive Order No. 1, which created the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010, unconstitutional due to its encroachment on the powers of Congress and the Ombudsman, violation of the
equal protection clause, and supplanting of the powers of the Of ice of the Ombudsman and the Department of
Justice.
Case Background and Petitioners

• The case involves the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1), which created the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
• The petitioners in the case are Louis Biraogo, a citizen and taxpayer, and several members of the House of
Representatives.
• Biraogo argues that the executive order violated the legislative power of Congress and usurped the
authority of the legislature to create a public of ice and appropriate funds.
• The legislators argue that the creation of the commission fell within the province of Congress and not the
executive branch.
Genesis of the Case
• The case originated from the campaign promises of then-Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III to combat
graft and corruption.
• Upon assuming the presidency, Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 to establish the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
• The commission was tasked with investigating reports of graft and corruption allegedly committed during
the previous administration.
Nature and Powers of the Truth Commission
• The Supreme Court examined the nature of the Truth Commission and concluded that it was a mere ad hoc
body formed under the Of ice of the President.
• The commission did not have quasi-judicial powers and could not adjudicate or impose penalties.
• Its primary function was to gather, collect, and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations.
Power of the President to Create the Commission
• The Court examined the power of the President to create the commission and found that the creation of a
public of ice fell within the province of Congress.
• The creation of the commission could not be justi ied under the power to reorganize the Of ice of the
President.
• The Court rejected the argument that the President had the inherent authority to create fact- inding bodies,
as this power was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or statutes.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
• The Court found that the creation of the commission violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
• The commission singled out the previous administration for investigation, which was deemed arbitrary and
unfair.
• The equal protection clause requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike.
Conclusion and Importance of the Decision
• The Supreme Court declared Executive Order No. 1 unconstitutional due to its encroachment on the powers
of Congress and the Ombudsman, violation of the equal protection clause, and supplanting of the powers of
the Of ice of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice.
• The decision emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional principles and the need for equal
treatment under the law.
Introduction
• The case involves the constitutionality of Executive Order (EO) No. 1, which created the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
• The main issues are whether EO No. 1 violates the Constitution by usurping the power of Congress,
intruding into the independence of the Of ice of the Ombudsman, and infringing on the equal protection
clause with its limited scope of investigation.
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Majority Opinion on the Powers of the President

• The Truth Commission is considered an ad hoc body formed under the Of ice of the President with
investigative powers under the Administrative Code.
• The President has the authority to create such a body as part of his duty to faithfully execute the laws.
• The power to create the Truth Commission does not come from the President's power of control or the
power to reorganize, but from his inherent authority to conduct investigations.
Majority Opinion on Appropriation of Public Funds
• The Truth Commission does not have the power to appropriate funds itself.
• The funds for the Commission are already appropriated by Congress to the Of ice of the President.
• There is no violation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
Majority Opinion on Independence of the Of ice of the Ombudsman
• The Truth Commission's mandate is separate from that of the Of ice of the Ombudsman.
• There is no transgression of the independence of the Of ice of the Ombudsman.
Majority Opinion on the Equal Protection Clause
• The investigation of the Truth Commission is not limited to the Arroyo administration.
• The President has the power to expand the Commission's mandate to include other administrations.
• The prioritization of the investigation of the Arroyo administration is based on reasonable grounds, such as
prescriptive periods for offenses and availability of witnesses and evidence.
• The investigation of the Arroyo administration does not violate the equal protection clause, as other past
administrations have also been investigated or prosecuted.
Conclusion of the Majority Opinion
• The majority opinion upholds the constitutionality of EO No. 1 and the creation of the Truth Commission.
• It inds that there is no violation of the separation of powers, the power of appropriation, the independence
of the Of ice of the Ombudsman, or the equal protection clause.
Dissenting Opinion on Reasonableness of Classi ication
• The classi ication of investigating the previous administration is reasonable and germane to the purpose of
the law.
• The President has the power to prioritize investigations.
• The exclusion of other past administrations is justi ied by the substantial distinction of the immediate past
administration being the most recent and having the most relevant evidence.
Dissenting Opinion on Political Contract and Equal Protection
• The majority disregards the political contract between the President and the Filipino people.
• The majority imposes an impossible condition on the President's campaign promise to address graft and
corruption.
• The interpretation of the equal protection clause by the majority is lawed.
• The President should be allowed to prioritize investigations based on practicality and available evidence.
Overall Analysis and Criticisms
• The decision is criticized for its lack of logical reasoning and disregard of legal precedents.
• It is seen as violating the principle of equal protection and imposing unreasonable restrictions on the
powers of the President.
• The decision fails to properly evaluate practical limitations and resources available to the Truth
Commission.
• It also overlooks the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of prosecutorial duties.
• The decision is criticized for its disregard of logic and legal precedents, as well as its violation of the
principle of equal protection.
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19. COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et. al., November 20, 2009
Title: Commission on Elections vs. Cruz

Case: G.R. No. 186616; Ponente: BRION, J; Decision Date: Nov 20, 2009
The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of a provision in Republic Act No. 9164 that imposes a
three-term limit for barangay of icials and counts the term limit retroactively from the 1994 barangay
elections, rejecting arguments of retroactivity and equal protection violation.
Facts:
• The case involves a constitutional challenge to a provision in Republic Act No. 9164 that imposes a
three-term limit for barangay of icials and counts the term limit retroactively from the 1994
barangay elections.
• The case was originally iled before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City by incumbent
barangay of icials who argued that the term limit should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively.
• The RTC agreed with the respondents and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally in irm.
• The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) iled a petition seeking a review of the RTC decision.
Issue:
• Whether the challenged proviso in Republic Act No. 9164, which imposes a three-term limit for
barangay of icials and counts the term limit retroactively from the 1994 barangay elections, is
constitutional.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COMELEC and upheld the constitutionality of the
challenged proviso.
Ratio:
• The term limit for barangay of icials has been consistently imposed since the enactment of the
second barangay law in 1988. This shows that there is a clear legislative intent to limit the terms of
barangay of icials.
• The retroactive application of the term limit does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Barangay of icials can be treated differently from other local elective of icials because
they hold a unique position in the government structure and have distinct functions and
responsibilities.
• There is a rational basis for treating barangay of icials differently. The term limit aims to prevent
the concentration of power and promote the infusion of new blood and fresh ideas in barangay
governance.
• The challenged proviso is reasonably related to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.
It does not violate the constitutional one subject-one title rule.
• Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision in Republic Act No.
9164 that imposes a three-term limit for barangay of icials and counts the term limit retroactively
from the 1994 barangay elections. The Court rejected the arguments of retroactivity and equal
protection violation.
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20.a. Jose Miguel Arroyo vs. Department of Justice et. al., September 18, 2012
Title: Arroyo vs. Department of Justice

Case: G.R. Nos. 199082, 199085 & 199118; Ponente: PERALTA, J; Decision Date: Sep 18, 2012
The case of Arroyo v. Department of Justice involves the validity of the creation of a Joint Committee by
the Commission on Elections and the Department of Justice to investigate alleged election offenses, with
the Supreme Court ultimately upholding the constitutionality of the Joint Committee and emphasizing the
importance of allowing direct invocation of its jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of
government actions.
Facts:
• The case involves the validity of the creation of a Joint Committee by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate alleged election offenses.
• The petitioners, including Jose Miguel T. Arroyo, Benjamin S. Abalos Sr., and Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, iled a case against the Department of Justice, Comelec, and other government of icials
involved in the creation and proceedings of the Joint Committee.
• The petitioners argued that the creation of the Joint Committee violated their constitutional rights,
including the equal protection clause, due process, and the principle of separation of powers.
Issue:
• The main issues raised in the case were:
1. the constitutionality of the creation of the Joint Committee,
2. the validity of the proceedings undertaken by the Joint Committee, and
3. the violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court ruled that the creation of the Joint Committee by the Comelec and the DOJ was
constitutional.
• The Court held that the Comelec and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute election offenses, and the creation of the Joint Committee was a valid exercise of their
powers.
• The Court also found no violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights, including the equal
protection clause and due process.
• The Court emphasized that the Joint Committee's proceedings were conducted in accordance with
the law and that there was no evidence of bias or prejudice against the petitioners.
Ratio:
• The creation of the Joint Committee by the Comelec and the DOJ was constitutional because they
have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses.
• The creation of the Joint Committee was a valid exercise of their powers and did not violate the
petitioners' constitutional rights.
• The Joint Committee's proceedings were conducted in accordance with the law and there was no
evidence of bias or prejudice against the petitioners.
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20.b. Republic vs. Daisy Yahon, June 16, 2014
Title: Republic vs. Yahon

Case: G.R. No. 201043; Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J; Decision Date: Jun 16, 2014
The Supreme Court upholds the validity of a protection order and the directive to deduct a portion of
retirement bene its as spousal support, ruling that the military institution can be ordered to comply with
the court order under the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act.
Facts:
• Petition for review on certiorari iled by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), against Daisy R. Yahon.
• Daisy R. Yahon iled a petition for the issuance of a protection order under the provisions of the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act.
• The RTC granted a temporary protection order (TPO) which directed S/SGT. Charles A. Yahon,
Daisy's husband, to refrain from committing acts of physical abuse and violence against her.
• The TPO also ordered him to stay away from Daisy, provide inancial spousal support, and
withhold a portion of his retirement bene its for Daisy's support.
• S/SGT. Yahon appeared during the pre-trial but did not hire a counsel or ile an opposition to the
petition.
• The RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of a permanent
protection order (PPO).
• The RTC granted the PPO, inding that S/SGT. Yahon had repeatedly in licted physical, verbal,
emotional, and economic abuse on Daisy.
• The AFPFC, represented by the Of ice of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), iled a motion to lift
the TPO against the AFP, arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the military institution and
that the AFPFC cannot be bound by the court order.
• The RTC denied the motion, and its denial was af irmed by the CA.
Issue:
• Whether the military institution can be ordered to automatically deduct a portion of retirement
bene its as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC.
Ruling:
• The military institution can be ordered to comply with the court order under the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act.
Ratio:
• Section 8(g) of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act allows for the withholding
of an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be remitted directly to
the woman entitled to support.
• The directive to withhold a portion of retirement bene its as spousal support is not illegal and falls
within the exemptions provided by law.
• The Act is a support enforcement legislation, and the military institution can be ordered to comply
with the court order.
Conclusion:
• The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the protection order and the directive to deduct a
portion of retirement bene its as spousal support.
• The military institution can be ordered to comply with the court order under the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE

20.b. Raul H. Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals, March 26, 2014
Title: Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals

Case: G.R. No. 160689; Ponente: BERSAMIN, J; Decision Date: Mar 26, 2014
This case involves a claim for damages based on abuse of rights, where the petitioner accused a violation
of contract inspection team of conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises, but the
court dismissed the claim due to lack of evidence and credibility of witnesses.
Facts:
• Petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by
the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) of conducting an unreasonable search in his residential
premises.
• Sesbreño alleged that the VOC team entered his house without permission, turned his electric
meter upside down, took photographs, replaced the meter, and searched his house without a
search warrant.
• Sesbreño also claimed that some of his personal effects were missing after the search.
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed his claim due to lack of evidence and credibility of
witnesses.
• The Court of Appeals (CA) af irmed the dismissal.
Issue:
• Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
Ruling:
• The appeal has no merit.
• The Court held that the VOC team had the authority to enter Sesbreño's premises to inspect the
electric meter based on the metered service contract between VECO and its customers.
• The inspection of the garage where the meter was installed was justi ied and did not require a
search warrant.
• The entry into the main premises of the house was a continuation of the authorized entry and was
necessary to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by Sesbreño's household.
• The Court found no evidence of malice or bad faith on the part of the VOC team.
• Therefore, Sesbreño failed to establish his claim for damages based on abuse of rights.
• The Court emphasized that the exercise of rights must be done with justice, giving everyone their
due, and observing honesty and good faith.
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20.c. Lim vs. Felix, 194 scra 292
Title: Lim, Sr. vs. Felix

Case: G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 94266-69; Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J; Decision Date: Feb 19, 1991
In the case of Lim, Sr. v. Felix, the court ruled that a judge cannot issue a warrant of arrest solely based on the
certi ication of a prosecutor, emphasizing the judge's responsibility to personally determine the existence of
probable cause.
Facts:
• Multiple petitioners were accused of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with an
assassination plot.
• After conducting a preliminary investigation, the court issued an order stating that a probable cause has
been established and ordered the arrest of the petitioners.
• The case was transferred to a different court.
• The petitioners iled motions and manifestations requesting the transmittal of the records of the
preliminary investigation and the opportunity to ile a motion for preliminary investigation.
• The court denied these motions and issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
Issue:
• Whether a judge may issue a warrant of arrest solely based on the certi ication of a prosecutor that a
probable cause exists.
Ruling:
• The judge cannot rely solely on the prosecutor's certi ication and must personally determine the existence
of probable cause.
• The judge should not simply follow what the prosecutor presents.
• The judge should examine the report, af idavits, and other supporting documents to aid in the
determination of probable cause.
• The judge has the discretion to determine the extent of the examination.
• The judge cannot issue a warrant of arrest without any evidence before him or her.
• The order of the respondent judge is null and void and set aside.
• The temporary restraining orders and preliminary mandatory injunction issued in the case were made
permanent.
Ratio:
• The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and the judge should not solely rely on the
prosecutor's certi ication.
• The judge should personally examine the report, af idavits, and other supporting documents to aid in the
determination of probable cause.
• The judge has the discretion to determine the extent of the examination depending on the circumstances of
each case.
• The judge cannot issue a warrant of arrest without any evidence before him or her.
• In this case, the respondent judge committed a grave error by relying solely on the prosecutor's
certi ication and issuing the warrant of arrest without any other basis for his personal determination of
probable cause.
• The court emphasizes the importance of the judge's personal determination of probable cause and the need
for the judge to examine the evidence before issuing a warrant of arrest.20.d. People vs. Edano, July 7, 2014
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20.e. Marcelo Saluday v. People of the Philippines, April 3, 2018
Title: Saluday vs. People

Case: G.R. No. 215305; Ponente: CARPIO, Acting C.J; Decision Date: Apr 3, 2018
Saluday v. People is a case involving the illegal possession of a high-powered irearm, ammunition, and
explosive, discovered during a routine bus inspection, leading to the conviction of Marcelo G. Saluday.
Facts:
• Case of Saluday v. People involves illegal possession of high-powered irearm, ammunition, and
explosive.
• On May 5, 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was lagged down by Task Force Davao at a
checkpoint near Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City.
• SCAA Junbert M. Buco, a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark while
allowing female passengers to remain inside.
• SCAA Buco boarded the bus to check for contraband, illegal irearms or explosives, and suspicious
individuals.
• SCAA Buco noticed a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus that caught his
attention.
• SCAA Buco noticed petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday peeping through the window towards the bag.
• The bus conductor con irmed that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back.
• SCAA Buco asked petitioner to open the bag, and it revealed a high-powered irearm, ammunition,
explosive, and a hunting knife.
• Petitioner was arrested and charged with illegal possession of a high-powered irearm, ammunition,
and explosive.
Issue:
• Whether the search conducted by Task Force Davao was legal.
• Whether the seized items can be admitted as evidence.
Ruling:
• The court ruled in favor of the People of the Philippines and af irmed the conviction of Marcelo G.
Saluday for illegal possession of a high-powered irearm, ammunition, and explosive.
• The court held that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was a reasonable search and did not
violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The court found that petitioner consented to the search when he allowed SCAA Buco to open the bag.
• Therefore, the seized items were admissible as evidence.
Ratio:
• The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to reasonable
searches.
• The search conducted by Task Force Davao during a routine bus inspection was considered a
reasonable search.
• The consent given by petitioner to open the bag was voluntary and unequivocal, making the seized
items admissible as evidence.
• The court laid down guidelines for bus searches, stating that routine inspections at bus terminals and
searches of buses in transit are valid as long as they are the least intrusive, do not result from
discriminatory motives, are con ined to ensuring public safety, and have precautionary measures in
place to prevent evidence planting.
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20.f. In the Matter of Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corppus, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Legal Aid v. Department of Justice, July 25, 2027
Title: Integrated Bar of the Philippines Pangasinan Legal Aid vs. Department of Justice
Case: G.R. No. 232413; Ponente: MENDOZA, J; Decision Date: Jul 25, 2017
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) iles a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that several detention prisoners have been languishing in jail for years without a case being iled
in court and without de inite indings of probable cause, due to Department of Justice (DOJ) issuances;
the IBP seeks the release of these prisoners and the declaration of the DOJ issuances as unconstitutional.
Facts:
• The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) iled a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
• The petition claims that several detention prisoners have been languishing in jail for years without
a case being iled in court and without de inite indings of probable cause, due to Department of
Justice (DOJ) issuances.
• The IBP seeks the release of these prisoners and the declaration of the DOJ issuances as
unconstitutional.
• The petition speci ically represents the case of Jay-Ar Senin, who has been detained for at least
eight months without any inding of probable cause or a case being iled in court.
Issue:
• Whether the detention of the prisoners without a case being iled in court and without de inite
indings of probable cause is a violation of their constitutional rights.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
• The Court declared that all detainees whose cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the
conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or
preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation, or automatic
review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right
to liberty and their constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some
other lawful cause.
Ratio:
• The Court held that the detainees' constitutional rights to liberty and against unreasonable
seizures were being violated by the prolonged detention without a case being iled in court and
without de inite indings of probable cause.
• The Court emphasized that the waiver of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which allows for
the continued detention of a person pending the conduct of preliminary investigation, cannot be
used to detain a person inde initely.
• The Court also noted that the constant changes in DOJ circulars regarding the automatic review of
dismissed cases create a possibility of repetition, thus necessitating the Court's intervention to lay
down controlling principles.
• The Court further emphasized that the security of the public and the interest of the State cannot
justify trampling upon the constitutional rights of detainees.
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21. Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 scra 400
Title: Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

Case: G.R. No. 113447; Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J; Decision Date: Oct 9, 1997
Manalili v. Court of Appeals is a Philippine jurisprudence case where the Supreme Court af irmed the
conviction of Alain Manalili for illegal possession of marijuana residue, ruling that the search conducted by the
arresting of icers was valid and that Manalili had voluntarily waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Facts:
• Date: April 11, 1988
• Place: Kalookan City Cemetery
• Respondent: Alain Manalili
• Police of icers from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting
surveillance in front of the cemetery.
• Of icers observed Manalili, who appeared to be high on drugs, with red eyes and walking in a swaying
manner.
• Of icers approached Manalili and asked what he was holding in his hands.
• Manalili resisted but eventually allowed them to examine his wallet.
• Inside the wallet, of icers found crushed marijuana residue.
• Manalili was brought to the police headquarters and turned over to another of icer for investigation.
• Marijuana residue was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis, con irming it was
marijuana.
• Manalili was charged with illegal possession of marijuana residue and convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City.
• Manalili appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals af irmed the conviction.
• Manalili iled a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search conducted by the arresting of icers was valid.
Ruling: The search conducted by the arresting of icers was valid.
Ratio: The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. The of icers had reasonable suspicion to stop
Manalili based on his suspicious behavior and the information they had received about drug addicts in the
area. The search was justi ied under the stop-and-frisk exception to the general rule against warrantless
searches.
Issue: Whether Manalili voluntarily waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ruling: Manalili voluntarily waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Ratio: A valid waiver requires the concurrence of three requirements: the right to be waived existed, the
person waiving it had knowledge of the right, and the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Manalili waived his right by failing to raise its violation before the trial court. Issues not raised below cannot
be pleaded for the irst time on appeal.
Issue: Whether Manalili is guilty of illegal possession of marijuana residue.

Ruling: Manalili is guilty of illegal possession of marijuana residue.
Ratio: Based on the evidence presented, including the testimony of the arresting of icers and the forensic
chemist, the Court found that Manalili was in possession of marijuana residue. Such possession was not
authorized by law. Manalili freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Penalty: The Court modi ied the decision of the lower court. The proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years, and a ine of six thousand pesos.
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21.a. People of the Philippines vs. Nazareno Villareal, March 18, 2013
Title: People vs. Villareal y Lualhati

Case: G.R. No. 201363; Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J; Decision Date: Mar 18, 2013
A man accused of illegal possession of drugs is acquitted by the Supreme Court due to an unlawful arrest,
highlighting the importance of credible evidence and a lawful warrantless arrest in criminal cases.
Facts:
• Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicting him of violation of Section 11, Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
• The appellant was arrested on December 25, 2006, by PO3 Renato de Leon, a member of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City.
• PO3 de Leon claimed to have seen the appellant holding and scrutinizing a plastic sachet of shabu
while driving his motorcycle.
• The appellant was apprehended and a plastic sachet of shabu was con iscated from him.
• The seized substance was later tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
• The appellant denied the allegations and claimed that he was framed by the arresting of icer.
Issue:
• Whether the Court of Appeals erred in af irming the RTC's decision convicting the appellant of the
offense charged.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and acquitted the appellant.
• The Court held that there was no lawful warrantless arrest in this case.
• The arresting of icer's claim of seeing the appellant holding and scrutinizing a plastic sachet of
shabu from a distance of 8 to 10 meters while driving his motorcycle was deemed inconceivable
and insuf icient to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest.
• Personal knowledge of the arresting of icer that a crime had in fact just been committed is
required for a lawful warrantless arrest.
• Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and cannot be solely relied upon to justify an arrest.
• The seized shabu was deemed inadmissible as evidence.
• The appellant was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Ratio:
• For a warrantless arrest to be lawful, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting of icer.
• Personal knowledge of the arresting of icer that a crime had in fact just been committed is
required for a lawful warrantless arrest.
• Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and cannot be solely relied upon to justify an arrest.
• The arresting of icer's claim of seeing the appellant holding and scrutinizing a plastic sachet of
shabu from a distance while driving his motorcycle was deemed insuf icient to establish probable
cause for a warrantless arrest.
• The seized shabu was deemed inadmissible as evidence.
• The appellant was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
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22. People of the Philippines vs. Edison Sucro, March 18, 1991
Title: People vs. Sucro

Case: G.R. No. 93239; Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J; Decision Date: Mar 18, 1991
In the Philippine Jurisprudence case of People v. Sucro, accused-appellant Edison Sucro is convicted of
selling prohibited drugs based on a lawful arrest and positive identi ication by the buyer, despite his
argument that the arrest violated his constitutional rights.
Facts:
• Accused-appellant Edison Sucro was convicted of selling prohibited drugs based on a lawful arrest
and positive identi ication by the buyer.
• The case was decided by the Third Division of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on March 18,
1991, with Justice Gutierrez, Jr. as the ponente.
• On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed to
monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, who was suspected of selling marijuana.
• Fulgencio witnessed Sucro entering a chapel, taking something from a cart inside, and then
returning to the street to exchange items with buyers. This happened three times during the
surveillance.
• Fulgencio reported that a third buyer, Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. The police
team intercepted Macabante and found him in possession of a tea bag of marijuana, which he
admitted to buying from Sucro.
• The police then arrested Sucro and recovered 19 sticks and 4 tea bags of marijuana from the
chapel and another tea bag from Macabante.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest of Sucro without a warrant was lawful and if the evidence obtained from
the arrest is admissible.
Ruling: The court ruled that the arrest was lawful and the evidence obtained from it was admissible.
Ratio: The court based its ruling on Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which allows for
warrantless arrests when an offense has just been committed and the arresting of icer has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
• In this case, the police of icers witnessed Sucro selling marijuana during their surveillance and had
personal knowledge of his illegal activities.
• Therefore, the arrest was deemed lawful and the evidence obtained from it was admissible.
Additional Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Macabante, the buyer, was credible.
Additional Ruling: The court found Macabante's testimony to be credible, as it was corroborated by the
testimonies of the police of icers who witnessed the transaction.
• The court also noted that the police of icers had no motive to falsely testify against Sucro and that
their actions were in line with their duty to apprehend drug pushers.
Conclusion: The court af irmed the decision of the trial court, inding Sucro guilty of selling prohibited
drugs.
• The court held that the arrest of Sucro was lawful and that the evidence obtained from the arrest
was admissible.
• The court also found the testimony of Macabante to be credible, as it was supported by the
testimonies of the police of icers.
• Therefore, Sucro's defense of alibi was deemed unavailing, and he was convicted of the offense
charged.
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23. People vs. Abe Valdes, September 5, 2000
Title: People vs. Valdez

Case: G.R. No. 129296; Ponente: QUISUMBING, J; Decision Date: Sep 25, 2000
In the case of People v. Valdez, the Supreme Court of the Philippines acquits Abe Valdez due to an illegal
search and seizure of marijuana plants and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession,
highlighting the importance of upholding constitutional rights in criminal investigations.
Facts:
• The case involved Abe Valdez, who was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972
for planting and cultivating seven marijuana plants weighing 2.194 kilos in Nueva Vizcaya.
• Valdez pleaded not guilty to the charge and a trial on the merits ensued.
• The trial court found Valdez guilty and sentenced him to death.
• The case was then forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Issue:
• Whether the search and seizure of the marijuana plants were illegal.
• Whether Valdez's confession during the investigation was admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court found the appeal meritorious and reversed the decision of the trial court.
• The Court ruled that the search and seizure of the marijuana plants were illegal because there was
no valid warrant and the plants were not immediately apparent or in plain view.
• The Court also found that Valdez's confession was inadmissible because it was verbal,
uncounselled, and violated his right to counsel during criminal investigations.
• Based on these indings, the Court held that the seized marijuana plants and Valdez's confession
could not be used as evidence against him.
• Therefore, the Court acquitted Valdez and ordered his immediate release from con inement.
Ratio:
• The search and seizure of the marijuana plants were illegal because there was no valid warrant
and the plants were not immediately apparent or in plain view.
• The plain view doctrine did not apply in this case.
• Valdez's confession was inadmissible because it was verbal, uncounselled, and violated his right to
counsel during criminal investigations.
• The protection against illegal search and seizure applies to both innocent and guilty individuals.
• The Bill of Rights belongs to every person, regardless of their location or circumstances.
• Confessions made without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible in evidence, regardless of
their voluntariness.
Conclusion
• The Supreme Court acquitted Abe Valdez due to an illegal search and seizure of marijuana plants
and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession.
• The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights in criminal
investigations.
• Evidence obtained through illegal means or in violation of constitutional rights cannot be used
against the accused.
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24. People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 scra 432
Title: People vs. Chua Ho San

Case: G.R. No. 128222; Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., C.J; Decision Date: Jun 17, 1999
In a landmark ruling, the Philippine Supreme Court acquits Chua Ho San of drug charges due to an illegal search
and seizure, inconsistencies in witness testimonies, and an error in appreciating conspiracy, highlighting the
importance of constitutional rights and the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings.
Facts:
• Chua Ho San was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
• The charge was later amended to illegal transport of a regulated drug.
• The RTC found that the search was incidental to a valid in lagrante delicto arrest and allowed the
admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as evidence.
• The RTC noted the language barrier and the irregularity in informing Chua Ho San of his constitutional
rights under custodial investigation.
Issue:
• Whether the search and seizure conducted on Chua Ho San were legal.
• Whether there were inconsistencies in the witness testimonies.
• Whether there was an error in appreciating conspiracy.
Ruling:
• The Supreme Court held that the search made was not incidental to an arrest as there was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions allowed by the Constitution.
• The Court emphasized that probable cause must exist for a warrantless arrest, and in this case, there were
no facts reasonably suggestive of Chua Ho San's participation in a criminal enterprise.
• The Court also found that there was no valid consent to the search as Chua Ho San did not exhibit
knowledge of his right against unreasonable searches or intentionally concede the same.
• The Court further ruled that evidence obtained during an illegal search, even if con irming initial suspicion
of criminal activity, is inadmissible.
• The Court addressed the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
considering them trivial and not affecting the outcome of the case.
• The Court noted the erroneous appreciation of conspiracy by the trial court, as conspiracy was not included
in the indictment or raised in the proceedings.
• The Court emphasized that conspiracy must be proven independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
• As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the RTC and acquitted Chua Ho San of the crime
charged, as the evidence was not suf icient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ratio:
• The search and seizure conducted on Chua Ho San were deemed illegal because there was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions allowed by the Constitution.
• Probable cause must exist for a warrantless arrest, and in this case, there were no facts reasonably
suggestive of Chua Ho San's participation in a criminal enterprise.
• There was no valid consent to the search as Chua Ho San did not exhibit knowledge of his right against
unreasonable searches or intentionally concede the same.
• Evidence obtained during an illegal search, even if con irming initial suspicion of criminal activity, is
inadmissible.
• Inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were considered trivial and not affecting
the outcome of the case.
• The trial court's appreciation of conspiracy was erroneous as conspiracy was not included in the indictment
or raised in the proceedings.
• Conspiracy must be proven independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
• The evidence was not suf icient to establish Chua Ho San's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, leading to his
acquittal.
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25. People vs. Tangliben, 184 scra 220
People Vs. Tangliben [184 Scra 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory
Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who
acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The
accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben
guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.
Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace of icer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a
person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be
therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency
on the part of the arresting police of icers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling
the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police of icers had to act quickly and there
was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
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26. People vs. Leila Johnson, December 18, 2000
Title: People vs. Johnson

Case: G.R. No. 138881; Ponente: MENDOZA, J; Decision Date: Dec 18, 2000
Leila Johnson, a naturalized American citizen, is convicted of possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride

(shabu) after it was found hidden in her abdominal area during a routine frisk at the airport, but the court rules
that the search and seizure were legal and orders the return of her con iscated personal belongings.
Facts:
• Leila Johnson, a naturalized American citizen, was charged and convicted of possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) after it was found hidden in her abdominal area during a routine
frisk at the airport.
• She appealed the conviction, arguing that her search and arrest without a warrant were illegal, and that the
prosecution failed to prove that she did not have a license to possess shabu.
• The trial court found her guilty and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua and a ine of P500,000.00.
Issue:
1. Whether the search and seizure of the shabu were legal.
2. Whether the subsequent arrest of Leila Johnson was justi ied.
3. Whether the prosecution was required to prove that Leila Johnson did not have a license to possess shabu.
Ruling:
1. The search and seizure of the shabu were legal.
2. The subsequent arrest of Leila Johnson was justi ied.
3. The prosecution was not required to prove that Leila Johnson did not have a license to possess shabu.
Ratio:
1. The search and seizure of the shabu were legal because they were conducted pursuant to airport security
procedures, which are considered reasonable given the minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
• Notices, signs, and public address systems in public transportation facilities informing travelers that they
are subject to search are reasonable.
• Searches made pursuant to these procedures do not violate the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from Leila Johnson during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately, and therefore admissible as evidence against her.
2. The subsequent arrest of Leila Johnson was justi ied since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery
of shabu in her person in lagrante delicto.
• Although the arrest was made without a warrant, it was justi ied because it was made upon the discovery
and recovery of shabu in her person in lagrante delicto.
3. The prosecution was not required to prove that Leila Johnson did not have a license to possess shabu.
• There is nothing in the law that requires the prosecution to prove the negative allegation that the accused
does not have a license or permit to possess regulated drugs.
• The burden of proof is upon the accused to show that she has a license or permit under the law to possess
the prohibited drug.
Additional Ruling:
• The trial court erred in con iscating Leila Johnson's passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal
effects.
• These items should be returned to her as they are not subject to seizure under the law.
• The ine imposed by the trial court is also reduced to P50,000.00, considering the quantity of shabu
con iscated from Leila Johnson.
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27. People vs. Malmstedt, 198 scra 401
Title: People vs. Malmstedt

Case: G.R. No. 91107; Ponente: PADILLA, J; Decision Date: Jun 19, 1991
A Swedish national named Mikael Malmstedt is convicted of drug possession after NARCOM of icers conduct a
search of his personal effects without a warrant, leading to the discovery of hashish in a pouch bag and teddy bears,
with Malmstedt claiming the drugs were planted by the of icers.
Facts:
• Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines as a tourist for the third time in December
1988.
• On May 7, 1989, Malmstedt went to Baguio City and stayed there for two days.
• On May 11, 1989, Malmstedt took a bus from Sagada to Baguio City.
• NARCOM of icers set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, to check
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
• The of icers received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession.
• Malmstedt's bus was stopped at the checkpoint and the of icers conducted an inspection.
• A bulge was found on Malmstedt's waist, which turned out to be a pouch bag containing hashish.
• Malmstedt was asked to bring out the bulging object and it was discovered to be a pouch bag containing
hashish.
• Malmstedt was then invited outside the bus, where two traveling bags with teddy bears were found. The
bears were found to contain hashish as well.
• During the trial, Malmstedt claimed that the drugs were planted by the NARCOM of icers and that the
traveling bags were not owned by him but were entrusted to him by an Australian couple he met in Sagada.
• Malmstedt also alleged that he handed his pouch bag, which contained his passport and other papers, to
one of the of icers when asked for his identi ication, and the of icer brought it outside the bus. Malmstedt
claimed that the of icer charged him with having hashish in the bag when he returned.
• Malmstedt was found guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act by the trial court
and appealed the decision.
Issue: Whether the search of Malmstedt's personal effects without a warrant was legal.
Ruling: The search of Malmstedt's personal effects without a warrant was legal.
Ratio:
• A warrantless search is allowed when there is probable cause and when the search is made incident to a
lawful arrest.
• In this case, the NARCOM of icers had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession.
• Malmstedt's suspicious behavior, such as refusing to present his passport, gave rise to probable cause.
• Therefore, the search of Malmstedt's personal effects was justi ied as it was made incident to a lawful
arrest.
• The search was not extensive at irst and was only prompted by Malmstedt's attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport.
• The information received by the NARCOM of icers, combined with Malmstedt's suspicious behavior, created
a probable cause that justi ied the warrantless search.
Conclusion:
• The court af irmed the trial court's decision, inding Malmstedt guilty of drug possession.
• The search of Malmstedt's personal effects without a warrant was legal under the circumstances, as there
was probable cause and the search was made incident to a lawful arrest.
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28. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 scra 211
Title: Valmonte vs. De Villa

Case: G.R. No. 83988; Ponente: PADILLA, J; Decision Date: Sep 29, 1989
A petition is iled to declare checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila as unconstitutional and to protect
the rights of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the petition is dismissed by the
court.
Facts:
• Petition iled by Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights
(ULAP)
• Checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila are being challenged as unconstitutional
• Checkpoints causing fear and harassment among residents
• Cars and vehicles subjected to regular searches without a search warrant or court order
• Checkpoints give military blanket authority to make searches and seizures without legal basis
Issue:
• Whether the checkpoints in Valenzuela are constitutional
• Whether the checkpoints violate the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
Ruling:
• The petition is dismissed
• The constitutionality of the checkpoints is upheld
Ratio:
• Checkpoints are a security measure implemented by the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) to maintain peace and order and protect the public
• Checkpoints are necessary during abnormal times, such as when there is an insurgency movement
in urban centers
• Right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that can only be invoked by
those whose rights have been infringed
• Petitioners have not provided suf icient evidence to prove that their rights have been violated by
the checkpoints
• Checkpoints are a necessary measure to protect public security
• Occasional inconvenience and discomfort to individuals are a small price to pay for an orderly
society
• Absence of a search warrant does not automatically make checkpoint searches unreasonable
• Reasonableness of a search is determined on a case-by-case basis
• Checkpoints in Valenzuela are constitutional and serve a legitimate purpose in maintaining peace
and order.
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Title: Valmonte vs. De Villa

Case: G.R. No. 83988; Ponente: PADILLA, J; Decision Date: May 24, 1990
Valmonte v. De Villa is a Philippine Jurisprudence case that ruled checkpoints are not illegal per se but can be
allowed under exceptional circumstances for the government's security measures, emphasizing the need for
accountability and adherence to the law.
Facts:
• The case of Valmonte v. De Villa was decided on May 24, 1990, by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
• The petitioners in this case were Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
Rights (ULAP).
• They iled a petition for prohibition seeking the declaration of checkpoints as unconstitutional and their
dismantling or banning.
• The respondents in the case were General Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command.
• The Court's decision dated September 29, 1989, dismissed the petitioners' petition.
• The petitioners iled a motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the decision.
• The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, iled a comment, to which the petitioners iled a reply.
Issue: Is the establishment of checkpoints constitutional?
Ruling:
• The Court clari ied that its previous decision did not legalize all checkpoints at all times and under all
circumstances.
• Checkpoints are not illegal per se but can be allowed under exceptional circumstances.
• Checkpoints should only be installed by the government in exceptional circumstances and should be
dismantled once the situation clears and the grave perils are removed.
• Routine checkpoint stops do intrude on a motorist's right to free passage without interruption to a certain
extent.
• However, as long as the vehicle is not searched, the occupants are not subjected to a body search, and the
inspection is limited to a visual search, routine checks cannot be considered a violation of an individual's
right against unreasonable search.
• Warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints are similar to searches and seizures accompanying
warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime or immediately thereafter.
• Warrantless searches of incoming and outgoing passengers at international airports are not
constitutionally objectionable because they are founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.
• Soldiers who abuse their authority at checkpoints act beyond the scope of their authority and are criminally
and civilly liable for their abusive acts.
Ratio:
• Checkpoints are not illegal per se but can be allowed under exceptional circumstances, such as when the
survival of organized government is at stake or when the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril.
• Checkpoints should only be installed by the government in these exceptional circumstances and should be
dismantled once the situation clears and the grave perils are removed.
• Routine checkpoint stops do intrude on a motorist's right to free passage without interruption to a certain
extent.
• However, as long as the vehicle is not searched, the occupants are not subjected to a body search, and the
inspection is limited to a visual search, routine checks cannot be considered a violation of an individual's
right against unreasonable search.
• Warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints are similar to searches and seizures accompanying
warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime or immediately thereafter.
• Warrantless searches of incoming and outgoing passengers at international airports are not
constitutionally objectionable because they are founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.
• Soldiers who abuse their authority at checkpoints act beyond the scope of their authority and are criminally
and civilly liable for their abusive acts.
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29. People vs. De Gracia, 233 scra 716
Title: People vs. De Gracia

Case: G.R. Nos. 102009-10; Ponente: REGALADO, J; Decision Date: Jul 6, 1994
During a coup d'etat in the Philippines, Rolando de Gracia is charged with illegal possession of irearms
and explosives, claiming he was guarding them for his employer, leading to a conviction for possession in
furtherance of rebellion.
Facts:
• Rolando de Gracia was charged with illegal possession of irearms and explosives during a coup
d'etat in the Philippines in December 1989.
• De Gracia claimed that he was guarding the irearms and explosives for his employer.
• He was charged with two separate offenses: illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and attempted homicide.
• The case was tried by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Issue:
• Can De Gracia be held guilty of illegal possession of irearms and explosives, considering his claim
that he was guarding them for his employer?
Ruling:
• De Gracia was found guilty of illegal possession of irearms in furtherance of rebellion.
• He was acquitted of attempted homicide.
• The court held that intent to possess is not an essential element of the offense of illegal possession
of irearms. It is suf icient that the accused had physical or constructive possession of the irearms.
• The court also ruled that there was a valid warrantless search and seizure in this case, considering
the urgency and exigency of the situation during the coup d'etat.
• Finally, the court found that De Gracia's possession of the irearms and explosives was for the
purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
Ratio:
1. Intent to possess is not an essential element of the offense of illegal possession of irearms. It is
suf icient that the accused had physical or constructive possession of the irearms.
2. A valid warrantless search and seizure can be conducted in urgent and exigent circumstances, such
as during a coup d'etat, when there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime is being
committed.
3. Possession of irearms and explosives in furtherance of rebellion can give rise to separate
prosecutions for violations of different provisions of the law with variant elements.
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29.a. Jorge Dabon v. People of the Philippines, January 22, 2018
Title: Dabon vs. People

Case: G.R. No. 208775; Ponente: TIJAM, J; Decision Date: Jan 22, 2018
In the case of Dabon v. People, the Supreme Court ruled that the evidence obtained against Jorge Dabon
was inadmissible due to an invalid search warrant, leading to his acquittal for violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts:
• The case involves Jorge Dabon who was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
• Law enforcement agents conducted surveillance and test-buy operations that con irmed Dabon's
involvement in illegal drug activity.
• The agents applied for a search warrant, which was granted and authorized the search of Dabon's
residence.
• On July 26, 2003, the agents conducted the search in Dabon's residence and found drug
paraphernalia and suspected shabu.
• The seized items were turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for
examination, which con irmed the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
• Dabon was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and sentenced to imprisonment and a
ine.
• Dabon iled a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
• Dabon appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the evidence obtained against him was
inadmissible.
• The CA af irmed his conviction, stating that his right to question his arrest was deemed waived
because he failed to raise the issue before arraignment.
Issue: Whether the evidence obtained against Dabon was admissible.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and acquitted Dabon of the
charges.
Ratio:
• The Court emphasized that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is inviolable.
• Section 8 of Rule 126 requires that a search of a house or premises must be made in the presence
of the lawful occupant or any member of his family, or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
suf icient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
• In this case, it was established that Dabon and his wife were present in their residence during the
search, but only one witness was present, in violation of the mandatory requirement.
• The Court ruled that the evidence obtained in violation of this requirement is inadmissible, and
the exclusionary rule applies.
• Dabon's failure to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence does not waive his right to
question its admissibility.
• Therefore, the Supreme Court acquitted Dabon of the charges and ordered his immediate release
from custody, unless he is lawfully held for another cause.
• The seized drugs and paraphernalia were forfeited in favor of the State.
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30. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, et. al., November 3, 2008
Title: Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

Case: G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 &161658; Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J; Decision Date: Nov 3, 2008
The Philippine Supreme Court declares certain provisions of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
unconstitutional, while upholding the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing for candidates for
public of ice, students, and of icers and employees of public and private of ices.
Facts:
• The case involves the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act, particularly Section 36.
• The petitioners are Social Justice Society (SJS), Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., and Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr.
• The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 36, which mandates drug testing for
candidates for public of ice, students, and of icers and employees of public and private of ices.
• The petitioners argued that the mandatory drug testing violated their constitutional rights,
particularly the right to privacy and the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue:
• Whether Section 36 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is constitutional.
• Whether the mandatory drug testing violates the right to privacy and the right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
• Whether the drug testing requirements are narrowly drawn and meet the standards of
reasonableness.
Ruling:
• Section 36 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is partially unconstitutional.
• The mandatory drug testing for candidates for public of ice, students, and of icers and employees
of public and private of ices is constitutional.
• The mandatory drug testing for persons charged with a criminal offense is unconstitutional.
Ratio:
• The mandatory drug testing for candidates for public of ice, students, and of icers and employees
of public and private of ices is constitutional because it serves a legitimate government interest in
promoting the safety and well-being of the public.
• The drug testing requirements are reasonable and narrowly drawn, and they do not violate the
right to privacy or the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
• The mandatory drug testing for persons charged with a criminal offense is unconstitutional
because it is not random or suspicionless.
• The mandatory drug testing of accused individuals is a violation of their right to privacy and their
right against self-incrimination.
• The drug testing of accused individuals is not necessary for the prosecution of criminal offenses.
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31. Pollo vs. Constantino-David, et. al., October 18, 2011
Title: Pollo vs. Constantino-David

Case: G.R. No. 181881; Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J; Decision Date: Oct 18, 2011
A government employee's dismissal from service is upheld by the Supreme Court after his personal iles
on his of ice computer are used as evidence against him, ruling that the search and copying of his iles
were reasonable and did not violate his constitutional right to privacy.
Facts:
• Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo, a government employee, was dismissed from service after his personal
iles on his of ice computer were used as evidence against him.
• The search and copying of his iles were conducted by the government employer, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), without his knowledge or consent.
• Pollo iled a petition for review on certiorari to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which dismissed his petition for certiorari to nullify the proceedings conducted by the CSC.
• Pollo was a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Of ice No. IV and the
Of icer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
• An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David,
alleging that Pollo was "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC.
• Chairperson David formed a team to investigate the allegations and ordered the back-up of all iles
in the computers of the PALD and Legal divisions.
• The team informed Pollo and the head of the LSD about the ongoing copying of computer iles.
• The iles were examined and found to be draft pleadings or letters related to administrative cases
in the CSC and other tribunals.
• Based on this inding, Pollo was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and violation of the CSC Computer Use Policy.
Issue: Whether the search and copying of Pollo's personal iles on his of ice computer violated his
constitutional right to privacy.
Ruling: The search and copying of Pollo's personal iles were reasonable and did not violate his
constitutional right to privacy.
Ratio:
• The court cited relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, particularly the cases of
O'Connor v. Ortega and United States v. Mark L. Simons, which held that government employers
can conduct warrantless searches in the workplace without meeting the "probable cause" or
warrant requirement for search and seizure.
• The court also considered the CSC Computer Use Policy, which explicitly stated that employees
have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer
system.
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31.a. Calleja, et. al. vs. Executive Secretary, December 7, 2021
Title: Calleja vs. Executive Secretary

Case: G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733,
252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904,
252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420
Ponente: CARANDANG, J: Decision Date: Dec 7, 2021
The Supreme Court af irms the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, balancing national security
concerns with civil liberties and human rights protection.
Case Background and Petitioners

• The case involves 37 separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.
• The petitioners include lawyers, lawmakers, human rights advocates, labor unions, journalists, religious
groups, and various organizations.
Supreme Court Decision and Balancing of Interests
• The Supreme Court, in its decision penned by Justice Carandang, af irmed the constitutionality of the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2020.
• The Court balanced national security concerns with the protection of civil liberties and human rights.
• It recognized the need for an effective legal framework to combat terrorism, which poses a signi icant
threat to the security and stability of the country.
History of Terrorism in the Philippines
• The Court discussed the history of terrorism and its impact on the Philippines.
• It highlighted various terrorist incidents that have occurred in the country.
• The Court emphasized the need for a comprehensive and coordinated response to terrorism, both
domestically and internationally.
Addressing Concerns Raised by Petitioners
• The Court addressed the concerns raised by the petitioners regarding the potential abuse of the law and the
infringement of civil liberties.
• It emphasized that the Anti-Terrorism Act contains suf icient safeguards to prevent abuse, such as the
requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the provision for judicial review
of detention orders.
• The Court recognized the importance of protecting freedom of speech, expression, and the press, as well as
the right to privacy.
• It clari ied that the Anti-Terrorism Act does not curtail these rights but rather aims to prevent and punish
acts of terrorism.
Conclusion and Guidance from the Supreme Court
• The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020.
• The decision recognizes the need for a comprehensive legal framework to combat terrorism while ensuring
the protection of civil liberties and human rights.
• The decision provides guidance on the interpretation and implementation of the law, emphasizing the
importance of striking a balance between national security and individual rights.
Challenge to the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020
• Petitioners argue that provisions are vague, overbroad, and infringe upon rights to freedom of speech,
expression, and association.
• Court examines provisions and analyzes their compatibility with the Constitution.
Provision De ining Terrorism and the "Not Intended Clause"
• Petitioners argue that the clause is void for vagueness as it creates confusion about whether exercise of civil
and political rights may be interpreted as acts of terrorism.
• Court agrees with petitioners, stating that without suf icient parameters, people are not guided as to
whether their impassioned propositions or intense government criticism are intended to cause harm or
create a risk to public safety.
• Court notes that these types of speech are essential for the exercise of civil liberties in a democracy.
• Court strikes down the "Not Intended Clause" as unconstitutional.
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Provision Penalizing Threats to Commit Terrorism

• Petitioners argue that provision is vague and overbroad as it deviates from understanding of "threats" in
Philippine case law.
• Court disagrees with petitioners, stating that de inition of threats in provision is consistent with previous
judicial interpretations.
• Court inds that provision is not impermissibly vague or overbroad.
Provision Penalizing Planning, Training, Preparing, and Facilitating Terrorism
• Petitioners argue that provision is vague and overbroad as it does not de ine the term "instruction."
• Court disagrees with petitioners, stating that de inition of training in provision is clear and includes
requirement that training is intentionally designed to impart a skill in relation to terrorism.
Provision Penalizing Proposal to Commit Terrorism
• Petitioners argue that provision is inconsistent with another provision in the law and is vague and
overbroad.
• Court disagrees with petitioners, stating that provision is clear and only penalizes proposals to commit
terrorism as de ined in Section 4 of the law.
Provision Penalizing Inciting Others to Commit Terrorism
• Petitioners argue that provision does not distinguish between legitimate dissent and terrorism.
• Court disagrees with petitioners, stating that provision is necessary to prevent terrorist acts that may result
from incitement.
• Court inds that provision is a permissible restriction on freedom of speech and expression.
Provision Penalizing Recruitment to and Membership in a Terrorist Organization
• Petitioners argue that provision is vague and overbroad.
• Court disagrees with petitioners, stating that provision only penalizes voluntary and knowing membership
in a proscribed or designated organization.
Conclusion
• Court strikes down the "Not Intended Clause" in the provision de ining terrorism as unconstitutional.
• Court upholds other provisions challenged in the case as constitutional.
• Court emphasizes importance of protecting freedom of speech, expression, and association, while
recognizing the need to prevent terrorist acts.
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Constitutional Law 2 - Bill of Rights - Due Process To Search & Seizure

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SUNDAY A.

VELASCO Bill of Rights (Due Process to Search) Page 1 of 35

Title: City of Pasig vs. Manila Electric Co.

Title: Mandanas vs. Ochoa, Jr.

Title: Estrada vs. Of ice of the Ombudsman

13. Suyan vs. People of the Philippines, July 2, 2014

Title: Suyan vs. People

Title: Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan

Title: Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

Title: Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

17. People vs. Jalosjos, 324 scra 689

Title: People vs. Jalosjos

Title: People vs. Jalosjos

Title: Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

Case Background and Petitioners

Majority Opinion on the Powers of the President

Title: Commission on Elections vs. Cruz

Title: Arroyo vs. Department of Justice

20.b. Republic vs. Daisy Yahon, June 16, 2014

Title: Republic vs. Yahon

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Title: Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals

20.c. Lim vs. Felix, 194 scra 292

Title: Lim, Sr. vs. Felix

20.e. Marcelo Saluday v. People of the Philippines, April 3, 2018

Title: Saluday vs. People

21. Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, 280 scra 400

Title: Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether Manalili is guilty of illegal possession of marijuana residue.

Title: People vs. Villareal y Lualhati

Title: People vs. Sucro

23. People vs. Abe Valdes, September 5, 2000

Title: People vs. Valdez

24. People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 scra 432

Title: People vs. Chua Ho San

25. People vs. Tangliben, 184 scra 220

26. People vs. Leila Johnson, December 18, 2000

Title: People vs. Johnson

Leila Johnson, a naturalized American citizen, is convicted of possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride

27. People vs. Malmstedt, 198 scra 401

Title: People vs. Malmstedt

28. Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 scra 211

Title: Valmonte vs. De Villa

Title: Valmonte vs. De Villa

Issue: Is the establishment of checkpoints constitutional?

29. People vs. De Gracia, 233 scra 716

Title: People vs. De Gracia

29.a. Jorge Dabon v. People of the Philippines, January 22, 2018

Title: Dabon vs. People

Issue: Whether the evidence obtained against Dabon was admissible.

Title: Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board

31. Pollo vs. Constantino-David, et. al., October 18, 2011

Title: Pollo vs. Constantino-David

31.a. Calleja, et. al. vs. Executive Secretary, December 7, 2021

Title: Calleja vs. Executive Secretary

Case Background and Petitioners