CASE DIGESTS
regulations of a general character in force in
TITLE II: CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE
ARTICLE 124 – Arbitrary Detention
1. US vs. BRAGANZA
G.R. No. L-3971. February 3, 1908.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HILARIO BRAGANZA AND MARTIN SALIBIO,
Defendants-Appellants.
Felipe Buencamino, for Appellants. ; Attorney-
General Araneta, for Appellee.
WILLARD, J. :
FACTS:
The defendant-appellants Hilario Braganza
and Martin Salibio were public
officers/municipal officials of the municipality
of Sagay wherein Braganza was a Councilor,
and Salibio, a lieutenant of the barrio of Vito.
They detained one, Father Feliciano Gomez,
they seized him from within the church and
took him out of it, telling him that he was under
arrest.
ISSUE:
Was the arrest of Father Gomez lawful?
RULING:
No. Father Gomez had committed no crime,
rather on the contrary, he was the victim of
coercion and other outrages. As a priest of the
Roman Catholic Church, and the question
herein referring also to a Roman church which
he is alleged to be in possession of, he went
there to give a mass, but a group of
Aglipayanon women violently prevented him
from carrying out his purpose. No law or
regulation of a general character in force
authorizes the accused to commit the act
(arresting of Father Gomez) which they
committed . . . . .
"Article 200 of the Penal Code reads:
" 'The public official who, unless it be by reason
of a crime, should detain a person without
being authorized to do so by a law, or by
the Philippines, shall incur the penalty of a line
of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas if the detention
should not have exceeded three days; “
2. MILO vs. SALANGA
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA,
SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
 An information for Arbitrary Detention
was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza, and Rodolfo Mangsat in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
 The information alleged that on April 21,
1973, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio
captain, along with other individuals,
maltreated Armando Valdez and
subsequently detained him in the
municipal jail for about eleven (11)
hours without legal grounds.
 All the accused, including Juan Tuvera,
Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty.
 Juan Tuvera, Sr., filed a motion to quash
the information, asserting that he did
not have the authority to make arrests
or detain individuals as a barrio captain.
ISSUE:
Whether a barrio captain, specifically Juan
Tuvera, Sr., can be charged with the crime of
Arbitrary Detention.
RULING:
 The court ruled that a barrio captain
can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention.
 The court rejected the argument made
by Juan Tuvera, Sr., that he did not have
 the authority to arrest or detain
individuals as a barrio captain.
 The court cited previous cases where
barrio lieutenants (later named barrio
captains and now barangay captains)
were recognized as persons in authority
and were convicted of Arbitrary
Detention.
 Under the Revised Barrio Charter, the
powers and duties of a barrio captain
include maintaining public order,
assisting in the performance of duties
within the barrio, enforcing laws and
ordinances, and organizing emergency
groups for peace and order
maintenance.
 The court emphasized that one need
not be a police officer to be charged
with Arbitrary Detention. Other public
officers like judges and mayors, who
abuse their functions, can also be guilty
of this crime.
3. PEOPLE vs. GUNGON
G.R. No. 119574 March 19, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO GUNGON, y SANTIAGO and
VENANCIO ROXAS y ARGUELLES, accused.
ROBERTO GUNGON y SANTIAGO, accused-
appellant.
FACTS:
Roberto Gungon y Santiago was convicted in
a legal case that involved several crimes
including kidnapping, serious illegal detention
with frustrated murder, carnapping, and
robbery. The case revolved around the
abduction of Agnes Guirindola, a university
student, on January 12, 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines.
Roxas falsely informed Agnes that she had
committed a traffic violation by wrongly
traversing a one-way street where an accident
had recently occurred. Agnes surrendered her
driver's license, and Roxas gave her what
appeared to be a ticket. However, it wasn't a
regular traffic ticket. Roxas asked her to sign it,
and she put a checkmark on it. Roxas then
entered her car, instructing her to drive to the
next intersection. After a left turn, Roxas
pointed a gun at her and switched off the car
engine, revealing his intention to take her car.
Roxas unlocked the rear door to allow another
man, later identified as Roberto Gungon, to
enter the car.
During her ordeal, she was threatened,
robbed, and shot but survived. The NBI
identified Gungon as a suspect based on
Agnes's description. He was arrested in Davao,
brought to Manila for trial, and positively
identified by Agnes. Gungon received a death
sentence for kidnapping and attempted
murder, as well as imprisonment for other
offenses.
RELATED DOCTRINE:
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention consists not only in placing a person
in an enclosure but also in detaining that
person or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty.
Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was
evident in the instant case from the moment
Agnes was taken at gunpoint from Panay
Avenue to a remote place in Batangas.
4. ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
 Private offended parties Elpidio Simon,
Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo
Maniscan, Renato Militante, and
Crisanto Pelias, who are members of the
Regional Special Operations Group
(RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources,
were conducting intelligence
operations on possible illegal logging on
the Island of Daram, Western Samar.
 During their operation on September 1,
1997, they encountered petitioner
 Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram,
who owned boats being constructed.
 An altercation took place between the
DENR team and the petitioner.
 The petitioner called for reinforcements,
and armed men arrived at the scene.
 The DENR team was then brought to the
petitioner’s house in Daram, where they
had dinner and drinks before leaving at
2:00 a.m.
 The petitioner was subsequently
charged and convicted of Arbitrary
Detention by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner's conviction for Arbitrary
Detention should be upheld.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reconsidered the
petitioner's conviction and reversed the
decision of the Sandiganbayan based on the
following grounds:
1. Elements of Arbitrary Detention Not Met:
The elements of Arbitrary Detention
require that the offender is a public
officer or employee, detains a person,
and the detention is without legal
grounds. The key factor in Arbitrary
Detention, in the absence of actual
physical restraint, is the instillation of
fear. The testimonial evidence did not
prove that the petitioner instilled fear in
the minds of the private offended
parties.
2. Lack of Fear Element: The testimonies
indicated that the petitioner merely
extended his hospitality and entertained
the DENR team at his house. There was
no element of fear present, and the
testimonies of police officers who
escorted the team were insufficient to
determine whether fear existed in the
minds of the private offended parties.
3. Reasonable Doubt: The circumstances
presented were capable of two
interpretations: one suggesting hostile
detention and the other indicating the
extension of hospitality due to unsafe
sea travel conditions. When guilt is not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail,
and the accused should be acquitted.
4. Presumption of Innocence: In criminal
prosecutions, the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. The weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution cannot be
compensated for by the weakness of
the defense's evidence. The accused is
entitled to the benefit of the doubt in
such cases.
Outcome:
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention based on the presence of
reasonable doubt. The presumption of
innocence prevailed, and the accused was
acquitted due to insufficient evidence
demonstrating the instillation of fear or illegal
detention. The decision of the Sandiganbayan
was set aside.
5. US vs. GELLADA
G.R. No. L-5151 January 31, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERONIMO GELLADA, defendant-appellant.
V. Franco, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
FACTS:
 On January 24, 1907, a dispute arose
between Sixto Gentugao, a servant,
and Felicidad, the daughter of
Geronimo Gellada.
 The dispute stemmed from the behavior
of a horse Gentugao had ridden to the
field.
 Upon arriving home, Gellada, Felicidad's
father, heard the argument and
attempted to beat Gentugao with a
stick.
  Gentugao fled, but Gellada and Filoteo
Soliman managed to catch and restrain
him.
 Gellada, aided by Soliman, bound and
tied Gentugao with a rope to a house
partition.
 An hour later, Gellada, being a barrio
lieutenant, sent Gentugao to the town's
justice of the peace in the custody of a
barrio official.
 Gentugao remained detained
overnight and was released the next
morning (January 25) by the justice of
the peace.
 Following these events, Gellada was
charged with illegal detention and ill
treatment.
ISSUE:
Whether Geronimo Gellada is guilty of arbitrary
detention.
RULING:
 The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. Gellada is declared guilty of
the crime of arbitrary detention
 The court found that Gellada, acting as
a barrio lieutenant, unlawfully detained
Gentugao and sent him to the justice of
the peace.
 No legitimate reason for Gentugao's
detention was established, as the justice
of the peace released him the next
morning due to lack of justification.
 Gellada's defense, asserting that
Gentugao was drunk and might have
harmed Gellada's household, lacked
supporting evidence.
 Despite a potential misclassification of
the act in the complaint, Gellada's
actions amounted to arbitrary
detention.
6. PEOPLE vs. DONGAIL
G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
V. P/INSP. CLARENCE DONGAIL, SPO4 JIMMY
FORTALEZA, AND SPO2 FREDDIE NATIVIDAD,
RESPONDENTS.
CARANDANG, J.:
FACTS:
 On August 31, 2003, P/Insp. Clarence
Dongail (Dongail), SPO4 Jimmy
Fortaleza (Fortaleza), and SPO2 Freddie
Natividad (Natividad) were involved in
the abduction, detention, and
subsequent murder of Eleuterio Salabas,
Ricardo Suganob, and Maximo Lomoljo.
 Accused-appellants were members of
the Bacolod City Police, and the victims
were suspected of involvement in illegal
drug activities.
 The victims were abducted, hogtied,
gagged, and blindfolded by accused-
appellants, who then subjected them to
physical abuse and took them to
various locations before executing
them.
 The victims were killed in different ways,
including gunshot wounds and injuries
from beatings.
 The bodies of the victims were disposed
of in various places, including bodies of
water.
 The RTC convicted accused-appellants
of Arbitrary Detention and Murder.
 The CA affirmed the conviction and
ruled that accused-appellants were
properly charged and convicted for
separate crimes of Arbitrary Detention
and Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellants are guilty of the
charges of Arbitrary Detention and Murder.
RULING:
 The Court denies the appeal and affirms
the convictions of the accused-
appellants for the separate crimes of
arbitrary detention and murder.
 The Court concludes that the incidents
do not constitute a complex crime
 under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. The acts of the accused-
appellants do not qualify as two or more
grave or less grave felonies. Additionally,
arbitrary detention was not a necessary
means to commit murder.
 The Court finds that the accused-
appellants forcibly abducted the victims
and subjected them to various acts of
violence, eventually leading to their
deaths. These actions constituted both
arbitrary detention and murder.
 The Court applies qualifying
aggravating circumstances in the
killings, such as treachery, abuse of
superior strength, and cruelty, based on
the manner in which the victims were
killed.
 The Court confirms that arbitrary
detention was committed as accused-
appellants, who were police officers,
deprived the victims of their liberty
without legal grounds.
Arbitrary Detention:
1. The accused are public
officers or employees.
2. They detain a person.
3. The detention is without
legal grounds.
Murder:
1. A person was killed.
2. The accused killed the
person.
3. The killing was attended
by qualifying
circumstances (treachery,
abuse of superior strength,
cruelty).
4. The killing is neither
parricide nor infanticide.
 The Court upholds the discharge of a
state witness, Brillantes, as the requisites
for his discharge were met. The RTC's
decision to discharge him as a state
witness is justified.
The Court affirms the convictions of the
accused-appellants for the separate crimes of
arbitrary detention and murder based on the
presented evidence and the application of
relevant legal principles.
Article 125 – Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to proper judicial authorities
7. SAYO vs. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-2128. May 12, 1948.
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN
MOSTERO, Petitioners,
v.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN
CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
MANILA, Respondents.
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao,
charging the petitioners with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin
Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila,
arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and
presented a complaint against them with the
fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when
the petition for habeas corpus filed with this
Court was heard, the petitioners were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal
had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.
“A writ of habeas corpus shall
extend any person to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any
person is illegally deprived of his liberty";
and "if it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or
by virtue of a judgement or order of a
court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed.”
ISSUES:
1. Are the petitioners illegally restrained of their
liberty? (YES)
2. Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial
authority within the meaning of the provisions
of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code? (NO)
RULING:
1. Yes. Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code states that penalties are imposed
on public officers who detain someone
on legal grounds but fail to hand them
over to the proper judicial authorities
within six hours.
2. No. "Judicial authority" in this context
refers to courts or judges with the power
to temporarily detain individuals
charged with public offenses, such as
the Supreme Court and lower courts
established by law.
The judicial authority must be a judge
empowered by law to issue a warrant of
commitment for temporary detention after
proper investigation; it cannot be city fiscals
or unauthorized officers.
Detaining a person for more than six hours
without a proper warrant of commitment
from a competent court would be illegal
and unconstitutional.
Section 125 of the Revised Penal Code
does not include city fiscals or similar
officers, as they cannot issue arrest warrants
or proper commitment warrants.
Only municipal mayors are authorized to
perform a preliminary investigation and
issue arrest warrants in the absence of local
magistrates.
Treating city fiscals as the judicial authority
under Article 125 would lead to prolonged
detention without proper court oversight.
Peace officers cannot arrest individuals
without a warrant except in specific cases
authorized by law; complaints should be
directed to city fiscals or justice of the
peace courts.
Even if the actions of Policeman Dumlao
were in good faith, the petitioners were still
illegally detained as there was no clear
ruling, and their release is ordered unless
they are detained by a legitimate court
process.
8. SORIA vs. DESIERTO
G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005.
RODOLFO SORIA, et al. vs. HON. ANIANO
DESIERTO, et al.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar
Bista were arrested on May 13, 2001 (a Sunday
and the day before May 14 elections) without
a warrant by respondents for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. One
police identified Bista to have a standing
warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6. From
the time of Soria’s detention up to the time of
his release, 22 hours had already elapsed, and
Bista was detained for 26 days.
The crimes for which Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional
penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with
the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of
his arrest. The crimes for which Bista was
arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could
only be detained for 36 hours without criminal
complaints or information having been filed
with the proper judicial authorities.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-
affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code against herein private
respondents. The office dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners then
filed their motion for reconsideration which was
denied for lack of merit in the second assailed
Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether he was arbitrarily detained (NO)
RULING:
No. November 7 was a Sunday (the time when
he was arrested). November 8 was declared
an official holiday; and November 9 (election
day) was also an official holiday. No release or
delivery to proper judicial on no-office day
(Sunday and holiday are no-office day).
Hence, the petitioner was not arbitrarily
detained.
The reason on there is no release or
delivery on no office day is because it was not
an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk
and stenographer, draft the information and
search for the Judge to have him act thereon,
and get the clerk of court to open the
courthouse, docket the case and have the
order of commitment prepared. And then,
where to locate and the certainty of locating
those officers and employees could very well
compound the fiscal's difficulties.
In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against
the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will
not prosper because the running of the thirty-
six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the
filing of the complaint against him from the
time of his arrest was tolled by one day
(election day). Moreover, he has a standing
warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and
he could only be released if he has no other
pending criminal case requiring his continuous
detention.
9. LINO vs. FUGOSO
G.R. No. L-1159. January 30, 1947.
Cecilio M. Lino V. Valeriano E. Fugoso
MORAN, C.J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be
unlawfully detained by respondents. It is
alleged in respondents’ return that ten of the
petitioners had already been released, no
sufficient evidence having been found to
warrant their prosecution for inciting to
sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual
Montaniel and Facifico Deoduco, are being
held in custody because of charges filed
against them in the municipal court unjust
vexation and disobedience to police orders,
respectively.
On November 11 when this petition for habeas
corpus was filed, these two petitioners were still
under arrest. They were thus held in
confinement for three and four days,
respectively, without warrants and without
charges formally filed in court. The papers of
their cases were not transmitted to the City
Fiscal’s office until late in the afternoon of
November 11.
Upon investigation by that office, no sufficient
evidence was found to warrant the
prosecution of Pascual Montaniel for inciting to
sedition and of Pacifico Deoduco for resisting
arrest, but both remained under custody
because of informations filed with the charges
against them. These informations were filed on
the same day when this case was heard. And
so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of
commitment are shown to have been issued
by the municipal court pursuant to the
informations thus filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not their continued detention after
six hours without delivery to judicial authorities is
legal (NO)
RULING:
No, the detention of Pacifico Deoduco and
Pascual Montaniel is illegal. Even assuming that
they were legally arrested without warrant on
November 7 and 8, 1946, respectively, their
continued detention became illegal upon the
exploration of six hours without their having
been delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities. Their cases were referred to the City
Fiscal late in the afternoon of November 11,
1946, that is, four and three days, respectively,
after they were arrested. The illegality of their
detention was not cured by the filing of
information against them, since no warrants of
arrest or orders of commitment have been
issued by the municipal court to the hearing of
this case before this Court.
The two petitioners are charged with light
offenses and as a general rule, when the
offense charged is light the accused should
not be arrested, except in particular instances
when the court expressly so orders in the
experience of its discretion. In this case, the
municipal court has not yet acted on the
informations nor exercised its discretion the
arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore,
they are still detained not because of the
informations filed against them but as a
continuance of their illegal detention by the
police officers.
Article 127 – Explusion
10. VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill
repute (prostitutes), which had been permitted
for a number of years in the city of Manila,
closed. On October 25, the police, acting
pursuant to orders from the chief of police, the
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to
collect their belongings, consult their family
and friends and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no
knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. They had not been asked if they
wished to depart from that region and had
neither directly nor indirectly given their
consent to the deportation.
The attorney for the relatives and friends
of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to
a member of the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Is the detention valid? (NO)
RULING:
NO. Law defines power. Centuries ago
Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of
his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either justice or right.
The supreme court said that the mayor's
acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating
vice was commendable, but there was no law
saying that he could force Filipino women to
change their domicile from manila to another
place. The women, said the court, although in
a sense "lepers of society" were still Filipino
citizens and such they were entitled to the
constitutional enjoyed by all other Filipino
citizens. The right to freedom of domicile
was such a fundamental right that
its suppression could considered tantamount to
slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of
Filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the
Liberty of abode. “Ours is a government of
laws and not of men."
Article 128 – Violation of Domicile
11. PEOPLE vs. LUIS SANE
G.R. No. L-8995 November 6, 1913
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHUA LUI, defendant-appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
DOCTRINE: To constitute a violation of domicile,
the entrance by the public officer or employee
must be against the will of the owner of the
dwelling, which presupposes opposition or
prohibition by said owner, whether express or
implied. If the entrance by the public officer or
employee is only without the consent of the
owner of the dwelling, the crime is not
committed. Neither is the crime committed if
the owner of the dwelling consented to such
entrance.
FACTS:
  Chua Lui and Koh Kieng Sien were
convicted of illegal possession of opium
by the Court of First Instance in Manila.
 Chua Lui had leased a house in
Caloocan, just outside the city limits of
Manila, and had moved in with two
other individuals, Chua Tong and Chua
Bee Cho.
 A group of American officers, led by
George W. Marshall, along with a
Filipino officer, went to the house. Koh
Kieng Sien, one of the occupants,
attempted to flee but was
apprehended.
 The officers claimed that Koh Kieng Sien
had opium paraphernalia and opium in
his possession and had thrown them
away during the chase.
 All occupants, except Koh Kieng Sien,
denied having possession of opium or
any knowledge of it in the house.
 There was a dispute among the officers
about the presence of an opium odor
and a warm opium pipe in the house
when they entered.
 Koh Kieng Sien was a temporary visitor,
under sentence for a prior opium
violation, and had come to borrow
money from Chua Lui to pay his fine.
ISSUE:
Whether the other occupants of the house can
be convicted of illegal possession of opium
based solely on the fact that Koh Kieng Sien, a
temporary visitor, had opium in his possession
during the police raid. (NO)
RULING:
No. The court reversed the judgment of
conviction and acquitted Chua Lui. The ruling
cited several reasons for the acquittal:
The mere presence of a temporary visitor with
opium and his refusal to allow officers to enter
the house were not sufficient to charge Chua
Lui with knowledge of the opium's presence.
The court emphasized the need for animus
possidendi, the intent to possess, to establish
illegal possession, which was subject to
contradiction and could be rebutted by
evidence.
There was no evidence that the house was an
"opium joint" or had been modified for illicit
purposes.
Chua Lui's lack of acquaintance with opium
smugglers or any prior convictions did not
establish guilt.
The court concluded that guilt had not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, leading
to the reversal of the conviction and the
acquittal of Chua Lui.
12. US vs. VALLEJO
G.R. No. 4367 September 3, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR VALLEJO, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
TRACEY, J.:
FACTS:
 On May 17, 1907, a complaint of a
public disturbance was made to the
police authorities of Polangui, Albay, by
Januario Duran.
 In response, two municipal policemen,
Tranquilino Saravillo and Dalmacio
Sabio, were dispatched to the house of
Salvador Vallejo, where the disturbance
was reported.
 Upon arriving at Vallejo's house, they
heard him shouting obscenities from a
window. Many people had gathered
nearby to observe.
 The policemen approached Vallejo's
house, identified themselves as
municipal police, and informed Vallejo
that they had no warrant but needed to
arrest him. Vallejo responded with more
obscenities and physically attacked the
officers.
 Blas Ausina, another individual, also got
involved and physically intervened to
help Vallejo escape the arrest.
 Both policemen were in uniform at the
time.
ISSUE:
 1. Whether a violation of domicile has
been committed? (NO)
2. Whether the municipal policemen had
the authority to arrest without a warrant
for a breach of the peace committed in
their presence. (YES)
RULING:
1. No. Even Vallejo was inside his own
house, his behavior did constitute more
than private misconduct; it amounted
to a public annoyance and a breach of
the peace in the neighborhood. While a
person has the right to privacy within
their own house, they cannot use it as a
citadel for aggressive or disorderly
behavior that affects the peace and
order of the community.
2. Yes. The municipal policemen, in this
case, had the authority to arrest without
a warrant for a breach of the peace
committed in their presence. Although
the law did not explicitly define the
powers of municipal police officers, they
were assumed to possess those powers
necessary for the convenient exercise of
their duties. This included the power to
make arrests without a warrant for
offenses committed in their presence.
Vallejo's conviction falls under the second
paragraph of Article 249 of the Penal Code, as
it involved resistance to public officers while
executing their duty. He was a public official, a
sanitary officer, and therefore subject to an
increased punishment according to Article
250. However, his intoxication, without being
an habitual drunkard, was considered as one
extenuating circumstance. He was sentenced
to prision mayor for two years, four months,
and one day, with a fine of P100.
Blas Ausina, not meeting any of the
circumstances specified in Article 250, was
sentenced to prision correccional for one year,
eight months, and twenty-one days, with a fine
of P100.
13. US vs. DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 6800. November 16, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
VALERIANO DE LOS REYES and GABRIELA
ESGUERRA, Defendants-Appellants.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS
 Appellant Gabriela Esguerra came to
visit Valeriano de los Reyes and his wife
at their home in Manila.
 On 5 November, while Gabriela was still
at de los Reyes’ house, revenue officials
went to the house of the accused de los
Reyes to search for opium.
 De los Reyes refused to let the officials in
his house on the ground that, without
search warrant, they were not
authorized to search the premises.
 After a few moments' conversation, and
upon their assertion that they were
officers of the law, while not consenting,
he offered no physical resistance to their
entry.
 While some of the officers were in the
house searching for drugs, others were
on the outside watching to see that no
one left the house.
 During the progress of the search in the
front part of the house, one of the
officers outside saw the accused
Gabriela throw a package from the
window of the kitchen into the grass
behind the house. Upon recovering the
package it was found to contained a
considerable quantity of morphine.
 Although there is no direct evidence of
any kind showing that the accused de
los Reyes had any knowledge of the
fact that the Gabriela had possession of
the drug, the trial court convicted
Gabriella Esguerra and Valeriano de los
Reyes.
 In its opinion, the court admitted that
the only evidence relative to delos
Reyes’ knowledge that the opium was in
his house is derived from the fact that he
refused permission to the officials to
search his premises, the inference being
drawn from such refusal that the
accused had knowledge of the fact
that the contraband drug was located
in his house, otherwise he would have
offered no objection to the search.
ISSUE:
Whether an accused's refusal to let the officials
without search warrant to search his house
may be a basis of his conviction.
RULING:
No. Every man’s house is his castle.
The fact that Valeriano refused the officers
permission to search his house for opium
cannot be taken against him. No public official
or other person, in any country where that
portion of the Constitution of the United States
against searches and seizures, or other similar
provision, is in force, has the right to enter the
premises of another without his consent, for the
purpose of search or seizure, without first being
provided with a proper search warrant for the
purpose, obtained in the manner provided by
law.
The mere fact that a visitor at the home of
another is suspected of having unlawful
possession of opium, is no excuse for entry into
the home by any person for the purpose of
search, against the will of the occupant and
without the proper search warrant, nor can
lawful resistance to such entry on the part of
the occupant be taken against him as
evidence of complicity.
The only evidence against the defendant
Valeriano being an inference drawn from the
exercise of a legal right, THE COURT declare
the evidence insufficient to support the
conviction. The Court reverse the judgment
and acquit him of the charge embraced in the
information.
ARTICLE 129 Search warrants maliciously
obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained
14. US vs. ADDISON
G.R. No. 9951. December 3, 1914.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A. A.
ADDISON, Defendant-Appellant.
TRENT, J. :
FACTS:
 Addison was condemned to pay a fine
of P100, indemnify the injured party
(John McStay) in the sum of P500, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs for a
violation of the provisions of section 106
of General Orders No. 58.
 Addison had subscribed and sworn to
an affidavit on December 23, 1912,
stating that he saw bottles containing
opium compounds in an aparador in
John McStay's house in Lucena,
Tayabas.
 Based on Addison's affidavit, a search
warrant was issued on the same day to
search McStay's house for opium, but
nothing of a contraband nature was
found.
 John McStay filed a complaint alleging
that Addison had procured the search
warrant maliciously and without
probable cause.
 Addison was charged with the "crime of
malicious prosecution."
ISSUE:
Whether Addison procured the search warrant
maliciously and without probable cause, as
required by Section 106 of General Orders No.
58 (Now Art 129 of RPC)
RULING:
No. Section 106 of General Orders No. 58
requires both malice and the absence of
probable cause to exist concurrently to justify a
conviction for procuring a search warrant
maliciously and without probable cause.
Malice cannot be inferred merely from the fact
that no contraband (opium) was found during
the search.
Probable cause for obtaining a search warrant
is defined as "such reasons, supported by facts
and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious
man in the belief that his action and the
means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper."
In this case, the court found that Addison's act
in making the affidavit was not malicious, and
there was probable cause for his actions.
Addison had reasonable cause to believe that
he would be rewarded as an informer
according to certain provisions of the Opium
Law.
Testimony from witnesses also indicated that
opium had been seen in McStay's premises
before Addison's affidavit, suggesting probable
cause.
The court reversed the previous judgment,
acquitted Addison of the charges.
15. Corro vs. Lising
G.R. No. L-69899 July 15, 1985
ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ESTEBAN LISING, et al., respondents,
RELOVA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Corro is publisher and editor
of the Philippine Times. Respondent Judge
Esteban Lising, upon application filed by Lt.
Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service,
issued a search warrant authorizing the search
and seizure of articles allegedly used by
petitioner in committing the crime of sedition.
Seized were printed copies of the Philippine
Times, manuscripts or drafts of articles for
publication in the Philippine Times, newspaper
dummies of the Philippine Times, subversive
documents, articles printed matters, handbills,
leaflets, banners, typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing machines and
tape recorders, video machines and tapes.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall
warrant and to return documents or personal
properties alleging among others that the
properties seized are typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and
tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or
mute things as they are, connected with the
offense of inciting to sedition.
Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion.
Hence, this petition praying that the search
warrant issued by respondent Judge Esteban
M. Lising be declared null and void that the
padlocked office premises of the Philippine
Times be reopened. Respondents would have
this Court dismiss the petition stating that
probable cause exists justifying the issuance of
a search warrant, the articles seized were
adequately described in the search warrant, a
search was conducted in an orderly manner
and the padlocking of the searched premises
was with the consent of petitioner’s wife.
ISSUE:
Whether the seizure was illegal and was
without probable cause. (yes)
RULING:
YES. There was no sufficient probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant. Probable
cause as defined in Burton vs. St. Paul, M&M.
Ry. Co., is constituted by “such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances, as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it,
are legally just and proper. Thus, an
application for search warrant must state with
particularly the alleged subversive materials
published or intended to be published by the
petitioner publisher and editor of the Philippine
Times. Mere generalization will not suffice. The
statements of private respondents Col. Castillo
and Lt. Ignacio in their affidavits are mere
conclusions of law and will not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. The language
used is all embracing as to include all
conceivable words and equipment of
petitioner regardless of whether they are legal
or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is objectionable.
Prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
properties seized thereunder are ordered
RELEASED to petitioner. Respondent officers are
ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office
premises.
16. Alvarez vs. CFI
G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and
THE ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
Facts:
A search and seizure warrant was issued to get
Alvarez’s documents in accordance with the
Anti-Usury law, with the chief of the Anti-Usury
Board as applicant. The chief’s oath says that
he has reports saying that Alvarez houses
documents that were pertinent to the case
they are formulating. Alvarez argues that the
search and seizure was illegal and was done
without probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrant was issued without
probable cause
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Courts decision reads: “That
the search and seizure made are
illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because
the warrant was based solely upon the
affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal
knowledge of the facts of probable cause,
and (b) because the warrant was issued for
the sole purpose of seizing evidence which
would later be used in the criminal
proceedings that might be instituted against
the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury
Law; That as the warrant had been issued
unreasonably, and as it does not appear
positively in the affidavit that the articles were
in the possession of the petitioner and in the
place indicated, neither could the search and
seizure be made at night.
Mere reports do not amount to personal
knowledge or that of his witness, making the
arrest bereft of probable cause.
17. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, et al., respondents.
Facts:
Several AFP Officials acquired search warrants
for subversive and guilty of conspiracy
materials located in the office of WE FORUM,
represented by Burgos. The warrants were not
specific as to what materials will be
commandeered as well as it was founded on
the report of the subordinates of said officials.
Legality of warrants were not questioned by
the lower courts, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure was
done without probable cause
RULING:
YES. The broad statement of the officials as to
the materials to be seized were insufficient to
amount to probable cause in the issuance of
said warrant. The alleged subversive acts were
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of a probable cause.
Furthermore, the reports by the unit surveilling
and investigating to the AFP personnel do not
meet the requirement in issuance of such
warrant as provided by law that the oath of
the warrant’s applicant shall refer to the truth
of facts known personally or by his witness. This
was not met by the AFP officials, which in turn
does not amount to probable or just cause.
ARTICLE 130 Searching domicile without
witnesses
18. Papa vs. Mago
G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, et al., petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO,
as Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Facts:
Following upon an informed tip that a certain
shipment were allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued. The authorities from the Customs
Commission and the Ports of Manila searched
the suspected truck and seized said items.
Mago contends that such seizure was illegal as
it was headed towards his home and that in
such, a warrant is needed to be procured.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless seizure is illegal
RULING:
NO. The authorities acted within the confines of
the law.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require
said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority
under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to enter, pass through or search any
land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building,
not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope
or any person on board, or to stop and search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in
said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling
house, the Code provides that said "dwelling
house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of
the peace”
ARTICLE 131 Prohibition, interruption, and
dissolution of peaceful meetings
19. Ignacio vs. Ela
G.R. No. L-6858 May 31, 1956
FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA CRUZ,
Petitioners and Appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA, Mayor of Sta.
Cruz, Zambales, Respondent and Appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO J.:
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the Watch Tower
Bible and Tract Society, commonly known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Desiring to hold a
meeting in furtherance of its objectives,
Petitioners asked Respondent to give them
permission to use the public plaza together
with the kiosk, but instead of granting the
permission, Respondent allowed them to hold
their meeting on the northwestern part corner
of the plaza. He adopted as a policy not to
allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by
any religious denomination as it is his belief that
said Kiosk should only be used “for legal
purposes.” And when their request for
reconsideration was denied, Petitioners
instituted the present action for mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Mayor should
be held liable for his refusal to grant the
petitioners a permit to hold a public meeting
at the public plaza.
Ruling:
No. The power exercised by Respondent
cannot be considered as capricious or
arbitrary considering the peculiar
circumstances of this case. It appears that the
public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at
a short distance from the Roman Catholic
Church. The proximity of said church to the
kiosk has caused some concern on the part of
the authorities that to avoid disturbance of
peace and order, or the happening of
untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary
to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious
denomination as a place of meeting of its
members. It cannot therefore be said that
Petitioners were denied their constitutional right
to assemble for, as was said, such right is
subject to regulation to maintain public order
and public safety.
20. People vs. Evangelista
G.R. No. L-36277 October 26, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
CRISANTO EVANGELISTA and ABELARDO
RAMOS, defendants-appellants.
OSTRAND, J.:
Facts:
When a parade was about to be held,
Crisanto Evangelista spoke before the people,
raising his fist and accusing the big ones of
persecuting and oppressing them. Then shouts
were heard from the audience saying: “Let us
fight them.” Then Ramos shouted, “Let us fight
them until death.” Evangelista and Ramos
were arrested. The Constabulary aksi dispersed
the people by using water pump.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of the Constabulary
violated Article 131 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
No. Under the circumstances of the case, the
statements made by the accused on the
occasion above related are clearly seditious.
The act of the Constabulary was proper, the
meeting not being peaceful.
21. PEOPLE V. CALERA AND CANTELA
FACTS:
 Juan CALINDONG was the municipal
mayor of Catarman, Samar.
 He issued a call to all the municipal
officials and employees of the
municipality for a conference/meeting.
 The purpose of the meeting was to
“readjust” the assignment of official
duties of the employees to assist or
harmonize with the newly established
Commonwealth government at that
time.
 So the meeting was held at the
municipal hall around 4pm on
November 17, 1945.
 Among those who attended the
meeting were municipal councilors, the
mayor, vice mayor, treasurer the chief
of police of the town and his assistants.
 The meeting was called to order by
Mayor Calindong who explained the
purpose of the conference and the
importance of maintaining the law and
public order.
 He then called on municipal councilor
CAMPOSANO to speak before the
audience.
 Councilor Camposano asked the mayor
whether he would take responsibility for
what he was about to say to the
audience. Then, the chief of police (and
accused appellant) CALERA stood up,
quite agitated, telling Camposano that
the mayor cannot be responsible for
whatever he was going to say.
 Basically, Councilor Camposano was
supposed to speak about a certain
municipal ordinance and Calera was
disrupting him from speaking because
he won’t sit down even if ordered to by
the mayor.
 Calera was agitated because he feels
that Camposano was going to criticize
and speak against the police force. As
a result, there were exchange of words,
shouting between the mayor, the
councilor and the chief of police.
 Due to the confusion, there was disorder
in the municipal hall and the audience
rushed out of the hall and the meeting
was DISSOLVED.
 The justice of peace present in the
meeting tried to break up the fight
between the 3 but failed. SO the
meeting was never finished.
  Now, the Calera faces charges of
violation of Art 131 of the RPC
(prohibition interruption, and dissolution
of peaceful meetings).
ISSUE:
Whether Calera is guilty of dissolving or
interrupting a meeting under Art 113. NO!
RULING:
The provision in Art 131 of the RPC is intended
to penalize the act of a public official who shall
prohibit, stop or otherwise interrupt the holding
and/or dissolve a peaceful meeting. But in
order to be liable under this provision, it is
necessary that the accused be a STRANGER,
not a participant, of the meeting that has
been interrupted and eventually dissolved.
In this case, the said conference was called by
the mayor and one of the officials invited to
attend the same was the appellant Calera
(chief of police). So he is not a stranger to the
meeting. He was not only present in the
meeting but he also took direct part in the said
proceeding. It’s specific purpose is to penalize
the prohibition, interruption and dissolution of
peaceful meetings by a stranger. This is NOT
that kind of situation.
Side issues: SC held that Calera cannot he held
criminally liable under Art 144 (disturbance of
proceedings) either. This is because the
conference in question is not a meeting of the
municipal council. It was in fact convened by
the mayor. (the proceedings contemplated in
this article ata are legislative and quasi-
legislative meetings). However, the SC found
Calera guilty of LIGHT COERCIONS (art 287)
instead. Evidence shows that he was guilty of
unjust vexation in causing the commotion.
22. Primicias vs Fugoso
G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign
Manager of Coalesced Minority Parties,
petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of
Manila, respondent.
FERIA, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties filed a n action
for mandamus against Valeraino Fugoso, as
Mayor of the City of Manila, on the ground
that the latter refused to grant and issue a
permit for the holding of a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon,
November 16, 1947.
The reason alleged by the Mayor Fugoso in his
defense for refusing the permit is that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, especially on the part of the losing
groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the
people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order.
Issue:
Whether or not the fear of serious injury can
justify suppression of speech and assembly.
Ruling:
No. The request for a permit to hold a peaceful
public meeting cannot be denied because
there is no doubt it was intended as a lawful
assembly. Fear of serious injury alone cannot
justify suppressing free speech and assembly;
there must be a reasonable belief that
imminent and serious harm will result from these
activities. Even if there is imminent danger, it
cannot justify prohibition unless the harm is
relatively serious. The fact that speech may
lead to some violence or property damage is
insufficient to warrant suppression. The power
to regulate citizens' fundamental rights in
public places cannot be delegated without
clear rules to prevent abuse. The ordinance
does not grant the Mayor the power to refuse
a permit but only discretion in specifying the
location of the event. Consequently, the
petition for mandamus is granted, and the
Mayor is ordered to issue the requested permit
for the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo.
23. People vs. Mejica
C.A-G.R. No.12980-R, December 29, 1955
Facts:
In a barrio chapel, a priestwas ready to
conduct a mass and a number of barrio folks
were there to hear the mass. The barrio
lieutenant made an actual threat on the life of
the priest should the latter persist in his intention
to start the mass. As a result, the mass was not
celebrated and the people dispersed.
Issue:
Whether or not the barrio captain is guilty of
violating Article 132 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
Yes.
The elements for Interruption of religious
worship, pursuant to Art. 132 of the RPC are as
follows:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee
2. That religious ceremonies or
manifestation of any religion are about to take
place.
3. That the offender prevents or disturbs
the same.
In the instant case the accused was a barrio
lieutenant who was a public officer. The mass
was also about to be conducted which is a
religious ceremony. Lastly, it was due to the
actions of the accused which prevented the
religious ceremony. Clearly, all elements of the
said provision are attendant. Hence, Mejica is
guilty.
24. People vs. Migallos
“Acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful”
Wherein the accused was convicted by the
Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals of
the offense defined under Art. 133 of the
Revised Penal Code, the facts show that
Minister Tagoylo of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect was
stoned by the accused while the former was
preaching or spreading his belief on a public
road before a crowd of around 500 persons.
Throwing stone at the minister of the Iglesia ni
Cristo who was preaching or spreading his
beliefs before a crowd notoriously offended
the religious feelings of the minister and of the
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo who witnessed
the incident.
25. People vs. Baes
G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts:
Jose Baes, the parish priest of the Roman
Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged
and accused with an offense against religion
for causing the funeral of a member of the
“Church of Christ” to pass through the
churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic
Church, belonging to said church and
devoted to the religious worship therof. The
parish priest opposed this, but through force
and threats of physical violence by the
accused, was compelled to allow the funeral
to pass through the said churchyard.
Issue:
Whether or not Baes is guilty of offending the
religious feelings of the Catholics punished
under Art. 133 of the RPC.
Ruling:
Yes. The motion raises a question of law, not
one of fact. Whether or of the act complained
of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholics and not those of other faithful ones,
for it is possible that certain acts may offend
the feelings of those who profess a certain
religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith.
26. Celdran vs. People
CARLOS CELDRAN Y PAMINTUAN
V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 220127, March 21, 2018
FACTS:
In celebration of the second anniversary of the
May They Be One Campaign (MTBC) and the
launching of the Hand Written Bible which
coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a
throng of people composed mainly of catholic
dignitaries intermixed with those different
religions such as members of the military,
police, media, non-catholics, students,
representatives of various religious
organizations gathered around the Manila
Cathedral in the afternoon of September 30,
2010.
While Brother Edgar J. Tria was a reading a
passage from the Bible around 3:00PM,
petitioner entered the Manila Cathedral clad
in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the
center of the aisle, in front of the altar and
suddenly brought out a placard emblazoned
with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion ensued
when petitioner started shouting while inside
the church saying “Bishops, stop involving
yourself in politics,” disrupting and showing
disrespect to an otherwise solemn celebration.
The defense, on the other hand, alleged that
the incident did not happen during the
celebration of the holy mass and nothing
happened that disturbed the proceedings.
CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner
Celdran for the crime of Offending the
Religious Feeling as provided under Art. 133 of
the RPC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is guilty of the crime
of Offending Religious Feelings under Art. 133
of the RPC
RULING:
Yes. SC Affirmed.
The elements of Offending the Religious Feeling
as provided under Art. 133 of the RPC are
present in the case at bar.
The first element is present considering that the
incident was committed by the petitioner
Celdran during the celebration of a religious
ceremony inside the Manila Cathedral, a
place devoted to religious worship, the second
anniversary of the May They Be One Bible
Campaign, and the launching of the Hand
Written Bible which coincided with the feast
day of Saint Gerome where many people from
various religions attended.
The second element is also present. “Acts” as
applied in Art. 133 may come in the form of
words, overt behavior, deeds or anything
which is knowingly performed by a person,
symbolic or otherwise, and that it is not
confined to merely be limited to voluntary
body movement guided to obtain a
determined end. The petitioner is said to have
dressed in black suit and hat, walked through
the middle aisle in the front of the altar of the
Manila Cathedral, and that he displayed the
placard with the word “DAMASO” in front of
the entire assembly, and that after being
escorted outside, he blurted out “Don’t
meddle in politics”
“Notoriously offensive” as provided in Art. 133,
is meant to mean those which causes
someone to feel resentful, upset or annoyed,
and the offense is judged from the point of
view of the complainant and not the offender.
The prosecution presented witnesses who
testified that they were indeed offended and
insulted by the actions of the petitioner, and
such testimonies were given full faith and credit
by the MeTC and RTC.
“Feelings of the faithful” as provided in Art. 133
is meant to refer to the religious feelings of the
faithful or those inside the place devoted to
religious worship or those engaged in religious
worship at the time of the commission of the
act.