CRIMINAL LAW II

CASE DIGESTS ON ARTICLE 282 (GRAVE THREATS)

TO ARTICLE 310 (QUALIFIED THEFT) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE

SUBMITTED TO: PROSECUTOR BENEDICT R.

PICHAY, III

DON HONORIO VENTURA STATE UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW

2023
BANTILLO

ART 282 Grave Threats

ROSAURO REYES vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Rosauro Reyes, a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange in Sangley Point,
Cavite City, led a group of 20-30 people in a demonstration against Agustin Hallare and
Frank Nolan for allegedly causing Reyes' dismissal. Col. Patricia Monzon, the Philippine
Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point, was called to meet the demonstrators. They
informed Monzon that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but
against Hallare and Nolan. They asked Monzon to demonstrate in front of Hallare's
residence, but they assured him they did not intend to use violence. Agustin Hallare,
apprehensive about his safety, sought Col. Monzon's protection and escorted him and his
companions out of the station. After a brief stop at Hallare's residence, Reyes shouted
"Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita"
before leaving. Hallare stayed inside the house. Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24
and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation,

Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
convicting him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be
convicted of only one offense.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely:
(1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a
wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject
to a condition. The court ruled that Agustin Hallare's demonstration at the naval station
was deliberate, with placards with threatening statements carried by demonstrators.
Hallare was trailed in a motorcade and repeatedly threatened, leading to his safety
concerns. The court upheld Hallare's conviction for grave threats, stating that the threats
were not merely temporary anger, but were motivated by his dismissal a month prior.
However, the charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words,
"Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often
employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom,
if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a
mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant
against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. Therefore, the
decision was reversed with respect to the charge of grave oral defamation.
BAUTISTA

G.R. No. L-24364 February 22, 1968

BIENVENIDO MEDRANO petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. FILEMON MENDOZA, Judge of the Municipal Court of Ibaan, Batangas
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:
A criminal complaint for grave threats alleged to have been committed
by petitioner-appellant Bienvenido Medrano on September 30, 1963, was lodged by one
Leonardo Argente in the Municipal Court of Ibaan, Batangas, on November 29, 1963.
Appellant Medrano moved to quash on two grounds: (1) the complaint did not conform
substantially to the prescribed form, and (2) more than one offense was charged therein.
The municipal court denied appellant's motion. Subsequently, at the latter's
instance, the court reconsidered its stand and, in the order dated directed the private
prosecutor to amend the complaint within five (5) days from receipt thereof by charging
light threats only.
The private prosecutor received his copy of the above-stated order on March 18,
1964. However, the amended complaint charging light threats was filed only on April 15,
1964, or 28 days from March 18, 1964, to be exact.
On April 23, 1964, appellant filed a written motion to quash the amended complaint on
the ground of prescription, in reiteration of his oral motion of the same tenor made on
April 16, 1964. When the municipal court denied his motion, appellant brought the matter
to the Court of First Instance of Batangas on a petition for prohibition averring that the
refusal of the municipal court to quash the case was "in grave abuse of discretion, in
excess of jurisdiction and in direct violation of the legal provision embodied in Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code. . . ."
The petition was given due course, and the People of the Philippines required to
answer, which it did. On November 2, 1964, the Court of First Instance rendered its
decision dismissing the petition. Appellant's motion to reconsider which followed was also
denied.
Hence, this appeal on the sole legal question of whether prescription had set in or
not.

ISSUE:
Whether the prescription of the crime have lapsed already?
HELD:
No. The submission fails to convinces. Appellant himself caused the stoppage of the
proceedings, if any, because of his motion to quash. By this, he, in effect, asked for the
quashing of one of two offenses included in the complaint. The municipal court in ordering
an amendment of the complaint to charge only light threats, in effect, granted the
quashing of the charge for the other offense, effective upon the filing of the amended
complaint.
The result above reached is actually more favorable to appellant for he no stands charged
only for light threats. On the other hand, if the present charge for light threats is
considered prescribed, he could still be legally charged with grave threats or even
grave coercion, offenses the prescriptive period for which would not yet have lapsed,
even if the same is deemed to have run again.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is, as it is hereby, affirmed
CABORNIDA

Art. 282 – Grave Threats

Caluag v. People, G.R. NO. 171511, March 4, 2009

Facts:
Nestor discovered that two guests, Caluag and Sentillas, were attacked during a drinking
spree. Caluag boxed Nestor without warning, and Julia witnessed the incident. Despite
trying to pacify them, they did not listen. Nestor fled to his house, where Julia and her
son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun,
poking it at her forehead. Despite the fearful encounter, Julia reported the incident to the
barangay authorities. The MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of minor injuries and
grave threats. Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the joint decision
of the MeTC. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue:
Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction of slight physical injuries
and of grave threats?

Ruling:
Petition is denied for utter lack of merit. The Revised Penal Code outlines three types of
threats: grave threats (Article 282), light threats (Article 283), and other light threats
(Article 285). Grave threats involve a person threatening another with the infliction of a
crime on their person, honor, or property. The penalty for grave threats is lower in degree
if the offender demanded money or imposed conditions, even if not unlawful, and the
offender achieved their purpose. If the threat was made in writing or through a
middleman, the penalty is lower by two degrees. If the threat was not subject to a
condition, the penalty is arresto mayor and a fine of not exceeding 500 pesos.
The petitioner's act of pointing a gun at Julia's forehead encapsulates a threat to kill or
inflict serious physical injury on her. The uttered words do not contradict the threat to kill
or inflict serious injury, and the offense falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats)
since killing or shooting someone constitutes a crime and the threat to kill is not subject
to a condition.
LAYSON

FEDERICO BATOLANON AND TEODORO V. NANO, Petitioners-Appellants, v.

HON. ROMAN A. LEORENTE, Justice of the Peace of Tagum, Davao,
Respondent-Appellee.

Teodoro V. Nano for and in his own behalf as Petitioner-Appellant.

Irineo D. Benavides for Respondent-Appellee.

ARTICLE 283. LIGHT THREATS

FACTS:

Chief of Police Bosque filed a complaint charging Federico Batolanon. With the crime of
light threat under article 283 of the RPC . Batolan sent a letter to Attorney Irineo
Benavides that if he will not give 1,000 as damages for the fraud and with bad faith
committed wherein with the flagrant violation of the oath of office as an attorney in that
atty. Benavides has intentionally and deliberately promoted and sued false, groundless
or unlawful suits by filing Civil Case No. 1842, entitled FEDERICO BATOLANON v. LANGGA
SANAMA Et. Al., and prosecuting Criminal Case No. 1092, entitled PEOPLE v. LANGGA
SANAMA Et. Al., in the Court of First Instance of Davao and Justice of the Peace Court of
Tagum, Davao, respectively, knowing all the time that Langga Sanama and his
companions never inflicted physical injuries upon Frederico. He gave Atty Benavides for
the period of 10 days otherwise Batulanon would file disbarment proceedings.

The defendants then filed a motion to quash the complaint. They filed a motion for
reconsideration, that the facts do not constitute an offense of light threat; that the
complaint charges more than one offense:light threat and libel; thirdly that the offense
of light threat charged in the complaint has been prescribed. The court denied the motion
for reconsideration twice. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the facts alleged constitute the crime of light threat?

RULING:

YES. Although The appellants argue that the penalty for extortion should be two degrees
lower than arresto mayor, as the purpose of the crime was not achieved. They also argue
that the statute of limitations prevents prosecution due to the complaint being filed after
two months. However, the argument is unfounded.
The correlation between articles 283 and 282, subdivision 1, of the Revised Penal Code
is confined only to the manner of committing the threat, such as demanding money or
imposing any other condition, without changing or altering the penalties each imposes.
Article 282 refers to threat to commit a wrong amounting to a crime, whereas article 283,
to a wrong not amounting to a crime.

In the case at bar, the offense charged is light threat which is punishable by arresto
mayor under article 283 of the Revised Penal Code and prescribed in five years. The
threat was committed on 13 September 1956 and the complaint was filed in court on 10
December 1956. It was filed well within the period of five years.
MENDOZA

G.R. No. 179243 September 7, 2011

JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, CARMINA A. ABBAS and MA.
ELENA GO FRANCISCO, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE A. BERNAS, ATTY. MARIE LOURDES SIA-BERNAS, FERNANDO AMOR,
EDUARDO AGUILAR, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, Respondents.

Facts:
Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro, the lessee-purchaser of a condominium unit, sub-leased
the property for use as a law office. Due to a defect in the air-conditioning system,
Alejandro suspended rental payments. The lessor, Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI), filed
an ejectment case against Alejandro, leading to legal disputes. Allegedly through its
agents, OPI padlocked the unit twice and cut off essential facilities. In response, Alejandro
filed a criminal complaint for grave coercion, claiming illegal padlocking and undue
prejudice.

Issue:
Whether the respondents are liable for grave coercion based on allegations of illegal
padlocking and cutting off facilities, causing undue prejudice to the petitioner.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the criminal complaint for grave coercion,
stating that the mere presence of security guards did not constitute intimidation. The
court held that intimidation, an essential element of grave coercion, requires a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil, which was not proven in this case.
Instead, the charges for unjust vexation were upheld, as the conduct of the respondents
could be considered annoying or vexing, although not causing physical harm. The court
emphasized that the determination of probable cause is within the discretion of the
prosecutor, and in this case, the evidence did not support the charge of grave coercion.
MIRAL

Roberto Barbasa v. Tuquero, G.R. No. 163898, December 23, 2008

FACTS: The petitioner Roberto Barbasa, the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc.,
leases commercial stalls in Tutuban Center owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc. (TPI). On
June 30, 1999, the company received a notice of disconnection of utilities from TPI's
Credit and Collection Manager, Grace Guarin, for failing to settle outstanding obligations
for Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity, and rentals.
The petitioner settled the charges but failed to pay back rentals. On July 1, 1999, TPI's
officers, including Guarin, Sangalang, and Callueng, disconnected the electricity in the
stalls.
The petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its officers,
claiming that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in his stalls in a violent and
intimidating manner. The respondents presented counter-affidavits defending the
actions, stating that the cutting off was peaceful, lawful, and in accordance with the
covenants between the parties. The petitioner was given demand letter-notices, but only
paid P127,272.18 after receiving the third notice. Private respondents also pointed out
that the petitioner had outstanding accountabilities for "Priority Premium Fees" in the
amount of P5,907,013.10.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents' act of disconnecting the supply of electricity
to petitioner's stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion.
RULING: No. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would
produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in
other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of
any lawful right.
The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon petitioner's employees when the cutting off of petitioner's electricity
was effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner
was sent.
NAVARRO

[G.R. NO. 176291 : December 4, 2009]

JORGE B. NAVARRA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SAMUEL
NAMANAMA, FELIXBERTO LAZARO and DANILO MEDINA, Respondents.

FACTS: Far East Network of Integrated Circuit Subcontractors Corporation (FENICS)

leased the premises of Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) in Taguig, Metro Manila from 1995 up
to 2002.
It appears that before the expiration of the lease contract or on the night of September
16, 2002, armed elements of the FTI took over the FTI premises in Taguig, Metro Manila
and forced two building custodians to leave following which the gates were welded,
drawing FENICS’ president-herein petitioner Jorge B. Navarra to file before public
respondent, Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint for grave coercion, malicious mischief,
and/or grave threats against herein private respondents Samuel Namanama (Namanama,
head of FTI’s legal department) and Danilo Medina (Medina, FTI’s Senior Manager) along
with Felixberto Lazaro (FTI’s Legal Assistant).
As FTI police officers were about to open and enter into the FENICS’ office, they forced
FENICS employees to leave the premises and threatened that if they did not concede,
bad things will happen to them.
Upon the other hand, private respondents claimed that, among other things, they acted
under the orders of their superiors, and that FTI was merely exercising its right under a
Compromise Agreement forged between FTI and FENICS wherein FENICS undertook to
pay the outstanding obligation of a previous lessee of FTI.
In a resolution. Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer Janet Cabigas-Vejerano found
probable cause to hale private respondents into court for grave coercion under Article
286 of the Revised Penal Code. But upon recommendation, the Ombudsman dismissed
the complaint and said that respondent acted in good faith and without any intention of
doing harm against their adversaries. Hence, this petition arguing that all elements of
Grave Coercion were present.

ISSUE: WON there is grave coercion?

RULING: YES.
It is elementary that in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation
as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has
an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
the competent court if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be established: 1) that a person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is
effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the
will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is
not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
In the case at bar, the affidavits of petitioner and his witnesses prima facie show that the
elements of grave coercion are present. Whether FENICS is indebted to FTI is immaterial.
It is elementary that in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation
as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has
an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
the competent court if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
BANTILLO

MELCHOR G. MADERAZO, SENIFORO PERIDO, and VICTOR MADERAZO, JR. vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Facts: Medaria Verutiao, a lessee of a market stall in the Biliran public market, testified
that she paid a monthly rental of P200.00 and was allowed to finish the construction with
the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer. She spent P24,267.00
on the stall but was not reimbursed by the Municipality. In 1995, the Municipality partially
paid her but not fully reimbursed her. In 1997, Verutiao and her husband were ordered
to vacate the stall due to her failure to pay rent. They claimed they could only be ejected
if the Municipality reimbursed them and the stall was no longer willing to lease.

Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of the light or coercion or unjust vexation.

Ruling: Yes. Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything
belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to
the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.

Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof
taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was
nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party
be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the
private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned
of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted
Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from
the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.
BAUTISTA

Baleros v. People
(483 SCRA 10, February 22, 2006)

FACTS:

Petitio Renato "CHITO" Baleros, Jr. seeks for the reversal of the Court of Appeals affirming
his conviction of attempted rape before the Manila RTC in 1991. Petitioner was a medical
student in UST at that time when he was accused of attempting to rape Malou Albano,
also a medical student in UST by covering the victim's face with a piece of cloth covered
with a chemical inducing dizziness and unconsciousness and lying on top of Albano,
pinning down its body. The victim was able to escape such perpetrator when she had the
chance to hold its sex organ, squeezed it and thereafter ran away and sought help from
its classmates who stavs at room 310 of the same floor and building where the victim
lives. Due to panic and the immediacy of her instinct to call for help, the only identification
Albano was able to recall from the perpetrator was that it was wearing a white cotton
shirt and a dark short with a smooth texture similar to that of satin. The following day, a
white shirt and an addidas short with a handkerchief- all garments covered with blue
stain were retrieved from the bag owned by herein petitioner. Several days before such
incident, Chito confessed his feelings towards the victim but was rejected by the latter.
The security guard of the building, as well as the friends of Albano attested for the
prosecution

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming RTC Manila's conviction of Baleros
with attempted rape amid the lack of proof its guilt without reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes. Although the Court does not identify the petitioner to be innocent of the acts
imputed to him, such acts were not substantial enough to convict him of attempted rape.
For one, Baleros was not identified through direct evidence but only from circumstantial
identification (that is, from the congruence of Albano's identification of what the
perpetrator wore and the witnesses' testimonies as to what Baleros wore that night).
Article 335 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states the circumstances that
shows overt acts ot a perpetrator in committing the crime ot rape. Moreover, the Court
has ruled in Perez v. CA that in order for a crime of rape to have been committed in an
attempted stage, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating the woman's
vagina with his sex organ but was not able to completely do so due to some reason or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Even with the acts of kissing the
victim and mashing her breasts, the offense would not have constituted attempted rape
absent the accused's commencement of penetrating the victim's vagina with his sex
organ. In the present case, the perpetrator was even fully dressed when it attacked
Albano.
The Court reversed and set aside the decision affirmed by the CA and adjudges Baleros
guilty of unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under article 287 of the RPC.

CARBONIDA
Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA 4200)
a. Punishable acts (Secs. 1-2)

Edgardo Gaanan vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986

Facts:

Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon discussed the terms for withdrawing a
complaint for direct assault against Leonardo Laconic. Laconico called the appellant to
advise him on the settlement. The appellant secretly listened to the conversation and
heard the complainant enumerate conditions for the settlement, including withdrawing
the complaint, increasing the insurance to P8,000.00, and not disclosing the truth about
the settlement to the mass media. The complainant agreed to the terms and instructed
Laconico to deliver the money. When he received the money, the complainant was
arrested by Philippine Constabulary agents. The appellant executed an affidavit stating
that he heard the complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault.

Issue:

The case concerns whether an extension telephone is a prohibited device for unlawful
interception of communications, and whether both the caller and their lawyer should face
prison sentences for listening to an alleged extortion attempt.

Ruling:

The petitioner argued that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor
and accused Atty. Laconico was private, as the words were made between one person
and another. The petitioner was granted the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's
message using an extension telephone line. However, the court ruled that affirming the
criminal conviction would mean that a caller can force the listener to secrecy, regardless
of the call's content.

The court also noted that technical problems caused by electronic equipment and heavy
loads of telephone cables can lead to "crossed lines." The court argued that the law was
never intended for such mischievous results and that an extension telephone cannot be
placed in the same category as dictaphones or dictagraphs, as their use is not considered
as tapping the main line of a telephone. The court argued that the bill intended to prohibit
the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations,
and that the mere act of listening must strictly be with the use of devices in RA No. 4200
or others of similar nature.
LAYSON

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

ANTI-WIRETAPPING ACT (RA 4200)

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

FACTS:

Soccoro Ramirez filed a civil case against Ester Garcia alleging that Garcia allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her. To support her claim, Ramirez produced a verbatim transcript
of their conversation culled from a tape recording. As a result of Ramirez’s recording,
Garcia filed a
criminal complaint against Ramirez for violation of RA 4200 “An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire-tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes."

Ramirez filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense and that the violation punished under RA 4200. She argues that RA 4200
penalizes the taping of a private communication and not a private conversation, therefore
her act of taping her “conversation” with Garcia was not illegal.

ISSUE:

WON RA 4200 applies to the tapping of a private conversation by one of the parties to
the conversation
RULING:

YES. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.

On her first contention that the provision merely refers to a party other than those
involved in communication, The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought
to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute intends to penalize all persons
unauthorized to male such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
“any ''. As correctly concluded by CA, “Even a person privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will
qualify as a violator”.

The petitioner's argument that "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 doesn't
include "private conversations" is absurd. The word "communication" comes from the
Latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." It encompasses verbal, non-
verbal, written, and expressive communications, including the emotionally charged
exchange between petitioner and private respondent in 1988. Senator Tañada used the
terms interchangeably in his Explanatory Note to the bill. Where the law makes no
distinction, one does not distinguish.
MENDOZA

People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 128286, July 20, 1999

Art. 294 – Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons

G.R. No. 128286 July 20, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
GILBERT BASAO y MACA and PEPE ILIGAN y SALAHAY, accused, PEPE ILIGAN y SALAHAY,
accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Accused Gilbert Basao and appellant Pepe Iligan faced charges for robbery and two
counts of murder in Cantilan, Surigao del Sur. The victims, P/Insp. Joerlick Faburada and
Dra. Arlyn Faburada, were allegedly shot on April 14, 1994.

In Criminal Case No. C-14, Basao and Iligan were charged with robbing the victims of
valuables, including a .45 caliber pistol, an ICOM handset radio, and a PNPA gold ring.
Iligan faced murder charges in C-15 and C-16 for allegedly shooting Dra. Arlyn and
P/Insp. Joerlick Faburada, respectively.

Gilbert Basao was initially arrested but later acquitted due to insufficient evidence. Iligan's
defense included denial and alibi. The prosecution's key witnesses were Basao, Reynaldo
Angeles, and law enforcement officers.

Basao testified that Iligan, a CAFGU member, asked him to accompany him to Carrascal.
However, Iligan allegedly shot the victims while Basao waited for a motorcycle. Iligan
reportedly took valuables from P/Insp. Joerlick Faburada's body.

Reynaldo Angeles, related to Iligan by marriage, claimed that Iligan admitted to shooting
the victims due to Lt. Faburada's strict enforcement of laws against illegal logging.

The defense asserted Iligan's innocence, citing alibi and lack of motive. Alfredo Yagao, a
defense witness, testified that Iligan was in Gacub during the alleged incident.

The trial court found Iligan guilty of robbery and two counts of murder, rejecting the
defense's alibi and denial. The court considered Iligan's motive, witness testimonies, and
dismissed the alibi as unreliable.

Iligan was sentenced to imprisonment for robbery and death for the murder charges. The
case records were forwarded for automatic review by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish Iligan's involvement in the crimes and,
if so, whether the prosecution has proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

RULING:
The ruling related to robbery in this case is that the appeal made by the accused-appellant
is considered unmeritorious. The trial court, after examining the evidence, concluded that
the accused-appellant shot the Faburada spouses with an armalite rifle, causing the death
of Lt. Joerlick Faburada and injuring his pregnant wife, Dra. Arlyn Faburada. The accused-
appellant then took away Lt. Faburada's gold ring, .45 caliber pistol, and radio handset.

The court emphasized the credibility of the witness, Gilbert Basao, whose testimony
positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The court highlighted that
the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great weight unless tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight. The accused-appellant attempted to challenge Basao's
testimony by alleging inconsistencies, but the court found no cogent justification to depart
from established jurisprudence.

The court also considered the corroborating testimony of Reynaldo Angeles, who pawned
Lt. Faburada's ring at the request of the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant
contested the authenticity of the signature on the pawn ticket, but the court found
Angeles' explanation satisfactory and upheld his positive identification of the accused-
appellant.

The defense of denial and alibi put forth by the accused-appellant was deemed
insufficient by the court. The court noted that the accused-appellant failed to prove the
physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene, and his alibi lacked
corroboration.

The court rejected the appeal, affirmed the trial court's decision, and upheld the
conviction of the accused-appellant for robbery with homicide.
MIRAL

People vs. Donato Del Rosario, 359 SCRA 166 (2001)

FACTS: Emelita Paragua and Delia Aquino left their house in Balic-Balic, Sta. Rita,
Olongapo City to go to a formers stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year-
old niece of Paragua, was left behind and found dead when her aunt discovered her. The
burned properties were worth around P30,000.00. Emelita Paragua also found six pieces
of her jewelry missing. SPO1 Ramon Fernandez investigated the fire and found Raquel's
body in the kitchen. Ramon Ilagan, who was seen near the house, was interrogated but
denied the crime. He was released as no evidence could be found linking him to the
crime. Three days later, police received information that Donato Del Rosario, who had
disappeared before the crime, was suspected of the crime. On October 2, 1992, Del
Rosario surrendered to police officer Fernando Morales, who was willing to help recover
the stolen items wedding band, diamond ring, bracelet and a 7-day ring. Accused-
appellant Donato del Rosario contends that it is essential to prove the intent to rob and
that the intent to rob must come first before the killing transpired.
ISSUE: Whether or not the all essential elements of Robbery with Homicide is present.
RULING: Yes. In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as
one against property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the
following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of
the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic
sense, was committed.
Animus lucrandi, or intent to gain, is an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when
the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the
usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator. In this case, it was apparent that the reason why accused-appellant stole
the jewelry of Emelita Paragua was because he intended to gain by them.
NAVARRO

G.R. No. 135682. March 26, 2003. *

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO REYES y BATAC,
accused-appellant.

FACTS: PO1 Eduardo C. Molato testified that while he was on his way home, he saw the
victim Donaldo Salmorin, Jr. being held up by two persons. The one in front of the victim
forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the back. He fired one
warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu Avenue. He
chased them but to no avail. The incident happened swiftly but PO1 Molato had a good
look at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was about 8 to 10 meters away
from them. The victim died due to serious physical injuries.
Accused Danilo Reyes was convicted of Robbery with Homicide. Hence, this appeal.
Reyes argued that the vital element of animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established
as the taking of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the real intent of
the malefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim. Moreover, there was no evidence
of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may have belonged to the two persons who attacked
the victim. Lastly, there was no evidence of conspiracy.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime charged?

RULING: YES.
A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the
taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force
upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with
animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if
the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robber
Accused-appellant’s contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established
by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act
which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive
for the crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to
gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property
pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part
of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.
In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim’s wristwatch by one of the accused
Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise
to the presumption.
Furthermore, the detailed narration of how the victim was forcibly divested of the
wristwatch by accused Cergontes and stabbed at the back by accused-appellant cannot
be taken lightly on the argument that the attackers owned the wristwatch and they
attacked the victim solely on their desire to retrieve it. Clearly, this contention is a mere
conjecture and has no basis on record. In any event, in robbery by the taking of
property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person
unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. Article 293
of the Revised Penal Code employs the phrase “belonging to another” and this has been
interpreted to merely require that the property taken does not belong to the offender.
Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact,
it has been held that robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person
who himself has stolen it. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property
from another against the latter’s will through violence or intimidation, with animo de
lucro, robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. If the victim is killed on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the offense is converted into the composite crime
of robbery with homicide.
Notes. —The accused cannot be held guilty of the complex crimes of attempted robbery
with homicide where they were not properly charged with such offense in any of three
informations filed, one for attempted robbery, the other for multiple frustrated murder,
and the third for qualified illegal possession of firearms used in multiple murder. (People
vs. Manalili, 294 SCRA 220 [1998])
BANTILLO

Art 294

FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: Lucia Valdez married Agustin Valdez in 1973, but their relationship turned sour
after the death of Agustin's first wife, Presentacion. After the July 16, 1990 earthquake,
Lucia and her children moved to Paringao, Bauang, La Union. Agustin learned that Lucia
was selling their personal properties, and he asked his son Ramon Valdez to retrieve
them. Ramon demolished Lucia's kitchen and sought help from neighbors, including
Marlon Gatchalian, Elpidio Picazo, and petitioner Francisco de Guzman. Agustin
Mendegoria, the common-law husband of one of Lucia's daughters, witnessed the
retrieval incident and discovered her properties were brought to Ramon's house, except
for a wooden bench which was found in the house of De Guzman. Lucia took pictures of
her belongings and reported the matter to the police.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime robbery with force upon things.

Ruling: No. To constitute robbery, the following elements must be established: (1) the
subject is personal property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that
property; (3) the taking is with the intent to gain; and (4) there is violence against or
intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.
We are not convinced with moral certainty that petitioner had acted with intent to gain.
Contrary to the findings of the trial and appellate courts, the records bear out that it was
Ramon, under a claim of ownership, who had wanted the properties taken out from
Lucia’s house. And he had asked his neighbors, petitioner among them, to assist him in
recovering these properties. To be sure, petitioner, like the others who helped Ramon,
was an innocent person who merely acceded to a neighbor’s request. To stress, petitioner
should not be held answerable for the act charged absent a felonious intent. Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.
BAUTISTA

People vs Richard Dilatan

FACTS:

Private complainants, Henry and Violeta with son Henry were on their way home riding a
motorcycle when herein accused-appellants Dilatan and Garcia grabbed Violeta's beltbag
containing Php70, 000 and in the process killed son Homer and wounded spouses Henry
and Violeta. RTC and CA convicted herein appellants. The latter, however, questioned
their positive identification by claiming that there was inadequate lIghting at the scene
of the crime.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the accused-appellants can still question the factual findings of the lower
courts. 2. Whether conspiracy exists.

RULING:

1. No. Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect
on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.
It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material
and relevant matters, that the Court will evaluate the factual findings of the court below.
More importantly, it is an established principle ·in appellate review that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect and that these findings
and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA. Guided by the
foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC's factual findings,
as affirmed by the CA.

2. YES. The lower courts, also, correctly ruled that accused-appellants acted in conspiracy
with one another. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.30 Conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint purpose, concert of action
and community of interest.31 For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an
agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the
time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were
united in its execution.32 In the present case, the coordinated acts and movements of
accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime point to no other
conclusion than that they have acted in conspiracy with each other. Moreover, it is settled
that when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
CARBONIDA

Art. 294 – Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons

e. Robbery with Homicide
People vs. Ardo Bacero y Casabon, 797 SCRA 673 (2016)

Facts:

On March 27, 2003, an Information for the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide was filed against the accused-appellant and several men whose true identities
were unknown at the time of filing. Juliet Dumdum-Bimot and her boyfriend, Virgilio "Jun"
San Juan Jr., Jr., y Molina, were attacked by six men while having a picnic at the
Monteverde Royal Subdivision in Taytay, Rizal. One of the men, later identified as the
accused-appellant, forcibly grabbed Jun's cellphone after stabbing him on the face with
a knife. Juliet was restrained by one of the men, and her face was covered with a towel
and her hands were tied with another towel. When Juliet freed herself, she immediately
looked for Jun but he was nowhere to be found. She sought assistance from the
Monteverde Royale Subdivision security guards, who roamed around the subdivision and
saw Jim's lifeless body in a grassy area.

The trial and appellate courts committed no error in convicting the accused-appellant of
Robbery with Homicide, as the prosecution must prove the confluence of elements: taking
of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person, property
taken belongs to another, taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi,
and on occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide is used in a
generic sense.

Issue:

The Court upholds the previous court's findings, stating that the accused-appellant's
claims of mistaken identity, torture, and denial are unfounded.

Ruling:

The accused-appellant was convicted of Robbery with Homicide, as per the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution must prove the confluence of elements: taking personal property
with violence or intimidation against a person, taking property belonging to another,
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and the crime of homicide being
committed on the occasion of the robbery. The evidence of Juliet and her positive
identification of the accused-appellant as one of the assailants supports the charge of the
component offense of Robbery. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength was also considered, as the felonious acts of the accused-appellant and other
malefactors were executed with abuse of superior strength, leaving the victim
defenseless. The case at bar serves to aggravate the crime, as the qualifying
circumstances attendant to the killing would be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances.
LAYSON

G.R. No. 198020 July 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-Appellant.

ARTICLE 294. ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS.

FACTS:

An information was filed against Appellant Joseph Barra charging him of special complex
crime of robbery with homicide committed against the victim Elmer Lagdaan. On October
9, 2003 at around 9:00 p.m., one witness stated that he was on his way home when in
the light of a bright moon, he saw Barra enter the house of Lagdaan (victim), which was
lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money.
When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, the appellant shot him.
The victim died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound. In his defense,
Barra (appellant) denied the charges against him arguing that the elements for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide were not proven particularly the element of
taking of personal property. Appellant also claimed that he was in Batangas City, with his
brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur.

Crime charged: special complex crime of robbery with homicide (Art. 294, RPC)

RTC: convicted as charged

CA: only found appellant guilty of attempted robbery with homicide (Art. 297, RPC);
attempted because no evidence was presented to establish that the accused-appellant
took away the victim’s money or any property, for that matter. The killing was an offshoot
of the accused appellant’s intent to rob the victim. Accused-appellant was bent on
resorting to violent means to attain his end. Due to the victim’s failure to give his money,
the crime of robbery was, however, not consummated.

ISSUE:

WON Barra is guilty of robbery with homicide?

RULING:

NO. Barra is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. Requisites to be proven by the
prosecution for appellant to be convicted of robbery with homicide under Art. 294, are,
to wit: 1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking is characterized
by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion
thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.

Appellant’s intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the victim’s refusal
to give up his personal property – his money – to appellant, the victim was shot in the
head, causing his death. The element of taking was not complete, making the crime one
of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed to the crime appellant was convicted in
the RTC.

The elements of attempted and frustrated robbery with homicide as defined in Art. 297
of the Revised Penal Code are: 1) there is an attempted or frustrated robbery 2) a
homicide is committed In the present case, the crime of robbery remained
unconsummated because the victim refused to give his money to appellant and no
personal property was shown to have been taken.

It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Since the RTC and the Court of Appeals
found appellant’s crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.
MENDOZA

People vs. Amba, G.R. No. 140898, September 20, 2001

Stages of robbery

G.R. No. 140898 September 20, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE ISHIKAWA AMBA, accused-appellant.

Facts:

On February 10, 1998, an incident occurred where Stephanie Sy, a 21-year-old student, was attacked
while walking with her friend, Jennifer Llamas, in Marikina City. A man, identified as Jose Ishikawa
Amba (the accused-appellant), attempted to rob Stephanie, leading to a struggle. Eventually, Amba
stabbed Stephanie, resulting in her death.

The trial court charged Amba and his co-accused, Pastor Oro Zamora, with the complex crime of
robbery with homicide. The prosecution presented witnesses, including Llamas, Carlos Sian III, and
Nelson Almuete, along with documentary evidence and a police investigator. The trial court, in its
August 19, 1999 decision, found Amba guilty of attempted robbery with homicide but acquitted
Zamora due to insufficient evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused-appellant should be convicted of the complex crime of attempted robbery with
homicide.

RULING:

The court emphasized the positive identification of Amba by eyewitnesses, sustaining the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence. However, the court modified the trial court's ruling by stating that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present in the commission of the crime. The court upheld
that the accused was found guilty of attempted robbery with homicide. This classification was based
on the fact that the prosecution could not establish with certainty what particular item Amba intended
to steal from the victim, Stephanie Sy, and whether he was successful in completing the robbery. The
court noted that while there was uncertainty regarding the specific personal item targeted by Amba,
his overt acts clearly demonstrated the intent to commit robbery.

Despite the lack of certainty regarding the consummation of the robbery, the court held that Amba's
actions, including grabbing and pulling something from Stephanie before she resisted, constituted a
clear manifestation of his intention to carry out the robbery. Stephanie's resistance prevented the
completion of the crime, leading the court to classify the offense as attempted robbery with homicide.
MIRAL

People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020

FACTS: On October 11, 2012, Ciara Kristle V. Abella was riding a jeepney to Montalban
when three passengers boarded and declared a hold-up. One of the hold-uppers was
holding a knife and took Abella's belongings, including her phone, wallet, and ATM card,
worth P5,000. The other passengers surrendered their belongings to the hold-uppers. At
around 6:20 a.m., PO2 Ramilo P. De Pedro and PO2 Michael Albania noticed the
commotion and approached the hold-uppers. PO2 De Pedro introduced himself as a police
officer and frisked one of the hold-uppers. The other hold-upper took a pistol from his
backpack, prompting PO2 De Pedro to let go of the M16 rifle he was carrying and wrestle
for the possession of the pistol. PO2 De Pedro was able to fire twice, killing the hold-
upper in the chest. The other hold-upper then threw away the knife he was holding and
was handcuffed by PO2 De Pedro. PO2 Albania returned with the third hold-upper and
recovered the items taken from the passengers. The passengers were taken to the
precinct for interrogation, while PO2 De Pedro guarded the hold-uppers, who were later
identified as appellants.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellants commit the complex crime of robbery with homicide
under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Yes. The elements of robbery with homicide are (a) the taking of personal
property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus
taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.

Here, the elements of the complex crime of robbery with homicide are all present: First.
Appellants, through force and intimidation, threatening physical violence and death with
the use of a gun and knives, took the personal properties of the passengers of the
jeepney. Second. The properties found in the person of appellants did not belong to
them but to the passengers of the jeepney. Third. The intent to gain or animus lucrandi
is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing
subject of asportation. Appellants were caught in the possession of various small items
that belonged to the passengers of the jeepney. Fourth. A person died, i.e., Arizala, on
the occasion of the robbery.

In robbery with homicide, it is essential that there be a direct relation and intimate
connection between the robbery and the killing. It does not matter whether both crimes
were committed at the same time. Further, it is irrelevant if the victim of homicide
is one of the robbers. In such scenario, the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Verily, once a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the felony committed is robbery with homicide.
NAVARRO

G.R. No. 174660. May 30, 2011.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICKY LADIANA y DAVAO,

(at-large), accused.

ANTONIO MANUEL UY, accused-appellant.

FACTS: On or about the 27th day of June 2001, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Antonio
Manuel Uy y Suangan and John Doe, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away 191 pieces of jewelry
amounting to P304,140 and 2 imported bags worth P23,250, with a total value of
P327,390 all belonging to JEEPNEY SHOPPING CENTER, and an ARMSCOR .38 caliber
revolver with SERIAL No. 64517 amounting to ₱9,000.00.

On the occasion thereof, accused stabbed Gilbert V. Esmaquilan and hit on the head with
a 2x2 wood Felix Arañez y Gida and Delfin Biniahan y Cahtong, Security Guard, Janitor
and maintenance of Jeepney Shopping Center(,) respectively, thereby causing their
death; and accused to facilitate their escape thereafter take, steal and drive away a (sic)
one (1) Black Honda Civic with Plate No. WFD-891 registered in the name of OLIVER
GATCHALIAN.

The Information was subsequently amended to identify appellant's co- accused as Ricky
Ladiana y Davao (Ricky), the brother of appellant’s girlfriend Richlie, without changing
the allegations of the original information. However, accused Ricky remained at-large.

Appellant was convicted of Robbery with Homicide. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the court erred in the conviction of special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide?

RULING: NO.

Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on

occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to
another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent
to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery.

Here, evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently established that such crime was
indeed committed. The destruction of the properties of the shopping center to gain
entrance; intent to steal was likewise proven from accused’s statement to Eduardo dela
Cruz to the effect that if they were able to open the vault, their families would have lived
a good life even if they die in the process. No special circumstance was present to belie
the presumption of the intent to gain of the accused-appellant. The existence of the
fourth element is incontestable – Homicide preceded robbery but committed on
the occasion thereof, the purpose is to eliminate an obstacle to the commission
of robbery. Essential in robbery with homicide is that there is a nexus, an intimate
connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent
to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time. Appellant’s grudge
against his former co-workers is not sufficient to overcome the presumption and evidence
of intent to gain, it is clear that the victims were killed on the occasion of robbery and to
commit robbery.
BANTILLO

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL DANIELA alias MANUEL DE LA CRUZ

@ TAGALOG and JOSE BAYLOSIS y BAISAC,

Facts: Ronito Enero and his wife Maria Fe Balo lived in Sawang, Calero, Pasil, Cebu City,
where they operated a fish vending business. They employed Leo Quilongquilong and
Julifer Barrera as helpers and househelps. Manuel and Jose Baylosis arrived in Cebu City
and borrowed money from the couple. On March 31, 1996, Manuel entered their house
and stabbed Maria Fe, Leo, and Julifer. They threatened to kill Maria Fe and her family if
she refused to surrender her money. Maria Fe gave the money to Manuel and Jose, and
they stayed in the house until 4:00 a.m. They told Maria Fe they were acting on orders
from Rolando Pedrejas, Joel Colejara, Grace Pabulacion, and Juliet Capuno.

Issue: Whether the accused are guilty of robbery with homicide.

Ruling: Yes. ART. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

The elements of the crime are as follows:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo
lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is
committed.

A robbery with homicide conviction requires the main purpose of the malefactor being
robbery, and the killing incidental to it. If the original design does not include robbery,
the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, homicide or murder and robbery, not the
complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from
the victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person
the malefactor intended to rob. For the conviction of the special complex crime, the
robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other element of the crime.
BAUTISTA

PEOPLE VS DIU G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013 695 SCRA 229

FACTS:

On 3 October 2003, Perlie Salvador and Nely Salvador (sisters) were on their way home
from work, walking along Colorado Street, when they saw accused-appellants, Welvin
Diu, Dennis Dayaon and Cornelio Dela Cruz, urinating facing the wall. As soon as the
sisters passed by them, Diu embraced Perlie while Dayaon and Dela Cruz held on to Nely
and took their bag. Perlie was able to escape Diu and seek for help, when she tried to go
near Nely, she saw Dela Cruz stabbed her sister. Nely was declared dead on arrival due
to multiple stab wounds Accused-appellants Welvin Diu and Dennis Dayaon were brought
to the police station a few days after the incident, when they were identited by Perlie,
while Dela Cruz was not found. The Regional Trial Court found the accused-appellants
guilty of robbery with homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's
decision with modification. Accused-appellants contend that it is impossible for Perlie to
identify them because it was very dark and that robbery took place, since the investigation
was focused on the homicide incident.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complex crime of robbery with homicide is correct?

HELD:

Yes, the complex crime of robbery with homicide is correct. In People v. De Jesus, 429
SCRA 384 (2004), the Court explained extensively the nature of the complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide: For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution
is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the
robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. In robbery with homicide, the
original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede
the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be
taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

The Supreme Court rendered the decision, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03785 is AFFIRMED.
CARBONIDA

People vs. Daguman, G.R. No. 219116, August 26, 2020

Facts:

Raymark Daguman was charged with robbery with homicide in Las Piñas, Philippines, on
August 16, 2010. He was armed with an unlicensed firearm and a bladed weapon,
conspiring with Denise Sigua, John Doe, and Peter Doe to steal Php46,415.00 from
Starbucks Coffee. A police shootout followed, resulting in Sigua's death. Daguman
pleaded not guilty, but the trial court summarized the prosecution's version of the facts.
The defense argued that Daguman was attacked by Sigua and Gharry Oquindo, but
Daguman denied knowledge of the plan or being caught in possession of the weapon.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Daguman, based on evidence from store manager
Alexander Angeles and security guard Gharry Oquindo. The court found Sigua killed by
reason or on occasion of the robbery but did not consider the aggravating circumstances
of robbery by a band and use of an unlicensed firearm. Daguman appealed to the Court
of Appeals, claiming the trial court erred in convicting him, but the Court of Appeals ruled
that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove Daguman's guilt. Daguman
was arrested and found with the knife and money taken from a cafe but could not explain
why he was inside.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant Raymark Daguman is guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide

Ruling:

The crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294(1) of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of robbery with homicide include taking personal property with
violence or intimidation, taking property belonging to another, taking it with animo
lucrandi, and committing homicide on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
accused-appellant was cited as the person who restrained and blindfolded him during the
robbery. The felony committed is robbery with homicide, and all felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one. Homicide is
considered committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it was committed to
facilitate the robbery or escape, preserve the possession of the loot, prevent discovery of
the commission of the robbery, or eliminate witnesses in the crime. The court reasoned
that the victim of the robbery did not need to be the victim of the homicide.
The evidence presented in this case does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the element
of homicide as defined in Article 294(l) of the Revised Penal Code. The only witness who
testified on the alleged shootout was PO2 Palisoc, who only testified that he heard
gunshots after the robbery. Other witnesses, such as Angeles and Oquindo, only testified
to two perpetrators: Sigua and the accused-appellant. The perceived threat to the police
officers was unsubstantiated, and the alleged third and fourth robbers who fled the crime
scene with Sigua and the accused-appellant could not be corroborated. The "intimate
connection" essential for a robbery with homicide was ill-established, and the homicide
on the occasion of this robbery was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The accused-
appellant may only be convicted of simple robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised
Penal Code, with its corresponding penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period.

WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the Court of Appeals' August
26, 2014 Decision in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 05643. Accused-appellant Raymark Daguman y
Asierto @ "Mark" is found GUILTY of the crime of robbery under Article 294(5) of the
Revised Penal Code
LAYSON

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ATILANO AGATON Y

OBICO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

ARTICLE 294. ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS.

SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME.

FACTS:

The undersigned city prosecutor of the city of Tacloban accuses EDGAR FALLO, JOSEPH
EVANGILIO, ATILANO AGATON Y OBICO AND NOEL GARCIA OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY
WITH RAPE.

In Tacloban, Philippines, the above-named accused conspired to steal personal property

from a house owned by [BBB] and [CCC], armed with a handgun and deadly weapons.
The accused, Edgar, had carnal knowledge of [AAA], a 17-year-old minor, against her
will and consent.

The prosecution presented AAA as its first witness and moved to adopt her earlier
testimony during the trial of Joseph. The trial court ordered that Edgar's former plea of
guilty be considered withdrawn and a plea of not guilty be reinstated. The prosecution
version of the case states that AAA was cooking when two persons, armed with a firearm
and a knife, entered through the kitchen door. They held AAA and brought her to the
living room, where she was left unconscious.

The defense presented Edgar and appellant as witnesses, who interposed the defenses
of alibi and denial. During the hearing the trial court was convinced that they freely and
voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to Robbery only.

The trial court received a letter from the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Tacloban City, informing it that Edgar had died that day. Accordingly, the trial court
dismissed the case against him on the ground that death of an accused extinguishes his
criminal liability.

THERFORE, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty AGATON beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Rape and sentenced him
to a penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9346. He is ordered to return the stolen jewelry and valuables, pay the spouses Aya-
ay the value of the stolen items, and increase the award of civil indemnity, moral, and
exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each.
In his brief that his plea of guilty merely involved his intention to rob the house of spouses
BBB and CCC, but did not extend to successfully taking the properties therein.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant for the special complex crime
of of Robbery with Rape.

RULING:

YES. He is only guilty of the crime of Robbery. To be able to be convicted on the the
special complex crime of Robbery with Rape requires that the accused be aware of the
sexual act in order for him to have the opportunity to attempt to prevent the same,
without which he cannot be faulted for his inaction.

The court found in this case, Agaton was not aware of the act. The fact that he was
upstairs while the rape was occuring lends even more credence o+to the absence of
awareness.

Therefore for the lack of positive proof that he was aware of the rape, AGATO shall only
be liable for robbery under paragraph 5 Article 294 of the Revised penal code which is
Simple Robbery. The prosecution proved that all accused, including appellant, took
spouses' jewelry and valuables through violence and intimidation. They entered the
victims' homes, tied their hands, and demanded their location. BBB was tied and struck
in the head, resulting in blood oozing from his left eyebrow. The appellant is liable for the
robbery.
MENDOZA

Art. 299 – Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship

G.R. No. 181138 December 3, 2012

RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, ROY BERNARDO, and JOMER MAGALONG,

Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Prosecution’s Version:
Marlon Mallari, a co-conspirator, testified that on April 6, 2002, at around 2:30 a.m.,
petitioners, along with accused Ryan Benzon, planned to rob a Rice-in-a-Box store in
Caloocan City. Marquez suggested the robbery, and Magalong and Bernardo used a lead
pipe to destroy the padlock of the store. Mallari acted as the lookout while petitioners
and Benzon entered the store and stole various items. The stolen items were taken to
Benzon's uncle's house. Mallari later confessed his involvement to Valderosa, the store
owner.

Petitioners’ Version:
Petitioners denied the accusations, claiming they were not at the scene of the crime. They
asserted that on the night of April 5, 2002, until the early morning of April 6, 2002, they
were enjoying a videoke session and then went to eat lugaw. They argued that Mallari's
testimony lacked credibility and that there was no proof of conspiracy.

RTC Decision:
The trial court ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding Mallari's identification of
petitioners credible and establishing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court
rejected the defense of denial and alibi, emphasizing that it was not physically impossible
for petitioners to be at the scene of the crime.

CA Decision:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, stating that Mallari's testimony, even if
uncorroborated, was sufficient. The CA considered Mallari a credible witness, and the
details in his testimony indicated honesty and truth. The court upheld the finding of
conspiracy among the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of robbery (YES) and whether Art 299 application is correct
(NO).

RULING:
The court discusses the elements of robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Revised Penal
Code, which involves taking personal property belonging to another by using force upon
anything. The court further discusses the specific circumstances under Article 302 that
pertain to robbery in an uninhabited place or private building.

In this case, the court notes that the store allegedly robbed by the petitioners is not an
inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship, as defined in
Article 301. Therefore, the applicable provision is Article 302, not Article 299, as
erroneously applied by the Court of Appeals (CA). The court emphasizes that the store
was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling. The
court highlights that the store allegedly robbed by the petitioners does not fall under the
definition of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious
worship, as specified in Article 301 of the RPC.

Article 299 of the RPC pertains to robbery in an inhabited house or public building or
edifice devoted to worship. Meanwhile, Article 302 deals with robbery in an uninhabited
place or in a private building.
MIRAL

People vs. Saldua, G.R. No. L-40008, December 8, 1978

FACTS: A testimony against the accused Jaime, Angel, Loreta, all were surnamed Saldua
was presented. Quijano and Singson, a laborer in the bodega of Federal Marketing, heard
a sound caused by the crashing on the floor of a box of canned goods. The witnesses
saw Jaime ad Loreta Saldua and a rope tied up in a beam of the ceiling near a rectangular
opening in the roof. The intruders sensed that they have been discovered so they rushed
to climb the rope and exited. Singson summoned the security guards and later went out
of the bodega where he saw a total of four person who jumped to the ground. They were
Jaime, Loreta, Angel, and Gaudioso. Later, the witness allegedly heard sounds of struggle
as if persons are trying to strike each other and he heard somebody groaning but he did
no see those persons. Singson subsequently discovered that Jabel was already dead and
Gaudioso mortally wounded. Jaime testified against his Father that it is him who stabbed
Jabel and Gaudioso. Angel and his son Jaime Saldua was convicted of Robbery with
double homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct in convicting the accused of the crime of
Robbery with Double Homicide.

RULING: No. Angel and Jaime, father and son, cannot be held responsible for the deaths
of Jabel and Gaudioso Saldua. The prosecution has no evidence as to how Jabel and
Gaudioso were killed. The responsibility for the killings is not a matter of conjecture. It
was shown that there are loose ends in the case which the prosecution has not expressed.
The rule is that theft or robbery is consummated after the accused had taken material
possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making
use of the thing was frustrated. The robbery herein falls under article 302(1) of the
Revised Penal Code as robbery committed in an uninhabited place where entrance was
effected through an opening not intended for the purpose.
NAVARRO

G.R. No. 11952 September 25, 1917,

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS MACAMAY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: At about 10 o'clock at night of May 5, 1915, in the house of Juan Mar, in the
municipality of Catarman, Province of Misamis, armed men entered the house of Juan
Mar, and with threats and menaces ordered the inmates to give up their money. In the
bedroom a trunk or receptacle was discovered which, upon being opened with a key,
likewise obtained from Aquilina Mar, as found to contain P2,500 in money, which was
taken by the robber. They also carried away a few articles of personal property, worth
about P5.

The main evidence connecting the defendant Nicolas Macamay with the crime consist in
the testimony of Nicolas Ranollo and Benigno Madria, each of whom admitted his own
capacity in the crime. About two days before the perpetration of the robbery Simeon
Ventusal and Lorenzo Tinampay induced Benigno Madria and Francisco Bacleon to join
them on the pretense that they were going over into a neighboring barrio to gamble. The
party then proceeded to the home of Nicolas Macamay, the defendant, where they arrived
at about 10 o'clock on the night of May 4 where they were entertained until the next
night. After supper, the party of seven left the house of Macamay and had proceeded but
a short way then they were halted and told by Simeon Ventusal that the real purpose of
the expedition was to rob the house of Juan Mar, who lived some 2 kilometers away.
When this revelation was made Madria and Ranollo desired to abandon the party, so they
claim but were forced by threats to stay with the band. Nicolas Macamay, who had come
along in the rear of the party, then produced arms which were distributed among the
seven. The band then proceeded to the house of Juan Mar wherein Nicolas Macamay and
Basilio had been posted downstairs as a guard, the other five went upstairs with the
results already stated. Thereafter, the money was divided among all the members of the
band.

In his defense, Macamay denied participation in the robbery and interposed an alibi. The
six were brought to trial in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis and
were convicted; but in the present case only four were tried together, the other two
having been granted a separate trial. From a judgment of conviction rendered in this case
the defendant Macamay has appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant Nicolas Macamay was a participant in a robbery?

RULING: YES. The Court concluded that Macamay's complicity is shown with all the
certainty which the law requires; and we think that the trial court committed no error in
finding him guilty.

In the Court’s opinion, the statements made by the witnesses as to the connection of
Nicolas Macamay with this robbery are credible and reasonable and must be accepted as
true, even without any weighty corroborative proof. However, we think that the admitted
fact that this party was entertained at Macamay's house just before the robbery occurred
is an important circumstance against him; and the statements of the witnesses mentioned
relative to what occurred in the house of Juan Mar are fully corroborated by the testimony
of the inmates of the house.

Here, four men were tried together. Three successively took the stand and, admitting
their own guilt, testified that the fourth was a member of the band. The proof clearly
shows that the band was composed of seven men, of whom three, namely, Ventusal,
Tinampay, and Macamay, and the other three as witnesses. They were evidently drawn
into the robbery by the influence which was exerted over them by the others, and were
discriminated against in the division of the spoils.

The crime committed in the present case is that of robbery en cuadrilla, with violence or
intimidation against the person, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the injured person.

Macamay was convicted.

**ROBBERY "EN CUADRILLA." — Where only two or even three of a party of four
committing a robbery are armed the party does not constitute a cuadrilla. (US v.
Mendigoren, 1903)
BANTILLO

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

Facts: On May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van no. MVD 02 was driven by Nerito Miranda
and two couriers. They collected mail matters from Manila International Airport and the
Central Post Office. On their return trip, they encountered a Mercedes Benz sedan with
five passengers. The passengers, including Reynaldo Frias, were identified as Mendoza,
Liwanag, Saguindel, and Frias. The car moved in circles, and the captured men were
eventually found in Kalookan City. The Bureau of Posts recovered the van, revealing
several mail matters, checks, warrants, and the van's battery, tools, and fuel.

In 1982, Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez requested the Special Operations Group
(SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary to investigate a hijacking incident. The SOG
organized two investigative teams, led by Capt. Rosendo Ferrer and 1st Lt. Samuel
Pagdilao. They gathered intelligence and posed as buyers of stolen checks. They met
with Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara, who revealed that the bulk of the checks were in the
possession of their companions in Obrero, Tondo, Manila. They subsequently arrested
Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza, who were later identified as the masterminds of the
hijacking. Filoteo, Jr., was arrested and admitted to involvement in the crime. He was
later sworn in as a confederate by three other soldiers.

Issue: Whether or not accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974.

Ruling: No. "Highway Robbery/Brigandage" has been defined as the "the seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of property
of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things
or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway."

In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there
are at least four armed participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not
have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there
being no indication to the contrary.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses
BAUTISTA

Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Facts:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he
saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent
and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then
returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent.
Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As
the taxi was about to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the
merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently
apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the
crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing
that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose
of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for
Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the
following elements should be present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon
things. The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal
property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or
unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts
of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts.
Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or
consummated.
CARBONIDA

Rose Aoas vs. People, 547 SCRA 311 (2008)

Facts:

Petitioner Rose Aoas was charged forthe crime of theft of eighteen (18) sacks of red and
white beans, all valued at P24,720.00 belonging to NATY MADON-EP. During the trial,
prosecution presented two witnesses, the private complainant and barangay tanod
Gregorio Garcia. In summary, private complainant testified that she was engaged in the
business of selling assorted beans, and adjacent of her stall in the market was that of
accused appellant. She reported the matter to the authorities that 18 sacks of red and
white beans were missing. Upon inquiry from the persons in the city market she was
informed by a certain Gregorio Garcia that the accused-appellant was the culprit. The
defense proffered an explanation which, unfortunately, was not given credence. Defense
witness Imelda Bautista testified that she was also engaged in the buying and selling of
beans. Her goods were also kept at the second floor/mezzanine of petitioner's stall.
Petitioner testified that she brought out sacks of beans from her stall because one Ronda
Sabado bought them from Imelda Bautista. The trial court held petitioner guilty of the
crime of theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

Issue:

Is petitioner guilty of the crime of theft?

Ruling:

No, The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of a crime.
Circumstantial evidence is based on experience, observations, and coincidences, and
must be consistent with the accused's guilt and innocence. The court found that the
circumstantial evidence did not pass the moral certainty test, as it did not exclude the
possibility that someone else could have committed the crime. The complainant testified
that 18 sacks of beans were missing from her stall, and she discovered the loss in the
morning when she saw red and white beans scattered on the floor in front of her stall
and that of the petitioner. The prosecution failed to show that the circumstances invoked
completely discounted the possibility that persons other than the petitioner could have
committed the crime. Thus, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and
is not sufficient to convict the accused. The court found that the circumstantial evidence
did not meet the test of moral certainty and was not sufficient to convict the petitioner.
LAYSON

HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Article 308. WHO ARE LIABLE FOR THEFT

SUBJECT FOR THEFT.

FACTS:

The RTC and CA convicted the accused for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in
relation to Art. 309 par. 1 of the RPC.

The case stems from the fact that Henry Lim sought service to Hermano Medina, a
mechanic and maintenance repair shop because his Korando Jeep was damaged due to
an accident. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running
condition and serviceable because the under chassis was not affected and the motor
engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.

A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning,
Purita Lim, Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (another mechanic) to retrieve the jeep
from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in his own
auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator, starter,
battery, and two tires with rims worth P5,000, P5,000, P2,500, and P10,000, respectively,
could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and installed them on
Lim’s other vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran
went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep, but without
the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing
the jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and
put back in good running condition.

Purita filed a criminal complaint for simple theft against Medina, and the court found him
guilty.

ISSUE:

WON he is liable under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
YES. In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep's
alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that
they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim. With such admission, the burden of
evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken.

Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that
Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony
of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting
documentary evidence or corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner
of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the same items that were
placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto
parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from, the jeep and their
placement to the pick-up. Neither did Medina adduce any justifying19 or exempting
circumstance to avoid criminal liability

Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.13 As defined and penalized, the elements of the crime are:

(1) there was taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the
taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner;
and (5) the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against, or intimidation
of persons or force, upon things.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Although proof as to motive
for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to
gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property
appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part
of the perpetrator.

THEREFORE MEDINA IS LIABLE. THE PROPER PENALTY IS UNDER ARTICLE 309 PAR. 1.
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
MENDOZA

G.R. No. 155076 February 27, 2006

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES& PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

FACTS:
The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) holds a legislative franchise to
provide local and international telecommunication services. One of the fraudulent
practices that violate PLDT's network integrity is International Simple Resale (ISR), which
involves routing international long distance calls through International Private Leased
Lines (IPL) to bypass the International Gateway Facility (IGF) and avoid paying access
and termination charges. Baynet Co., Ltd. offers an ISR service called "Bay Super Orient
Card," which allows customers to call the Philippines at a lower rate by using a local line
provided by an IPL connected to PLDT's telephone lines and equipment. PLDT alleges
that Baynet conducts its ISR activities by making it appear as if calls originate from Metro
Manila to evade regulatory requirements and compete unfairly with legitimate operators
like PLDT.

PLDT filed a complaint against Baynet, accusing the latter of engaging in network fraud.
PLDT discovered that Baynet was using PLDT's equipment, including telephone lines and
modems, for its ISR activities. Baynet also subscribed to 123 PLDT telephone lines. PLDT
incurred an estimated monthly loss of P10,185,325.96 due to calls passing through
Baynet's ISR network, bypassing the IGF toll center. Baynet was not authorized to provide
international or domestic long distance telephone services. The National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) agents searched Baynet's office and seized numerous equipment and
devices used in its ISR activities. Four individuals were arrested, including Luis Marcos P.
Laurel, a Filipino board member and corporate secretary of Baynet. The State Prosecutor
found probable cause for theft against Laurel and the other respondents.

State Prosecutor Calo charged Matsuura, Miyake, Lacson, and Villegas with theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The Amended Information added Laurel and the
other members of the board of directors of Baynet as accused for theft under Article 308
of the Revised Penal Code. The accused were charged with the theft of international long-
distance calls from Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR). Laurel filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer
Arraignment)" on the grounds that ISR operations are not prohibited by the Revised Penal
Code or any other special penal law and that no personal property was stolen from PLDT
in which it was denied by the trial court. The prosecution argued that the movant
unlawfully took personal property belonging to it, such as intangible telephone services
and revenues derived from such services and the use of such facilities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDT’s business
of providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code;

RULING:
NO. The court has ruled that international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient
Card holders and the telecommunication services provided by PLDT are not considered
personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The court emphasizes
that penal laws should be construed strictly and that it is the prerogative of Congress to
define crimes and their punishments. The court should not broaden the interpretation of
penal laws beyond their fair meaning and should resolve ambiguities in favor of leniency.
Additionally, the court should not base an expansive reading of criminal statutes on
subjective and variable understanding.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence, against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
The Supreme Court in the Philippines ruled that telecommunications services cannot be
considered personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The court
rejected the claim that stealing international long-distance calls, which are transmitted
through electronic impulses, was equivalent to stealing personal property. The court also
clarified that the defendant was not charged with stealing a specific amount of money,
but with stealing the international long-distance calls belonging to the
telecommunications company. The court found that the definition of "business" could not
be applied to theft charges and concluded that the defendant could not be charged with
theft of services.

Thus, the court has granted the petition and reversed the orders of the Regional Trial
Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Regional Trial Court is directed to
issue an order granting the petitioner's motion to quash the Amended Information.
MIRAL

People vs. Rodrigo, G.R. No. L-18507, March 31, 1966

FACTS: An information was filed against the accused Romualdo Rodrigo but was
dismissed by the reason that “intent to gain” was not alleged in the information which
states that:
“That on or about March 8, 1960, and months previous at Tubod, Pio V.
Corpus, Masbate, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused deliberately did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and criminally kept in his possession one male horse which is
specifically described under Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle No.
4685981, legally belonging to FELIX MUERTIGUE, said accused knowing
as he does that the aforementioned horse was stolen from the ranch of
said Felix Muertigue at Casabangan, Pio V. Corpuz, Masbate, and
deliberately failed as he did fail to deliver the same to the authorities or to
its owner. The value of the aforecited horse is no less than ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P150.00), all to the damage and prejudice of said owner of
the aforementioned amount."

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing complaint is defective because the

element of "intent to gain" is not alleged for the crime of theft.

RULING: No. Under the first paragraph of Article 308 the essential elements of theft are
(1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation
against person or force upon things (U.S. v. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). But under paragraph
2, subparagraph (1), the elements are (1) the finding of lost property; and (2) the failure
of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner. In this kind of
theft intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to deliver the lost property to
the proper person, the finder knowing that the property does not belong to him. The
court further affirmed to find that the complaint filed against defendant- appellee satisfies
the requirements of Rule 110, and in charging the offense of theft of large cattle defined
in Article 310, in relation to Article 308, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code.
NAVARRO

G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: On April 12, 1986, Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco and Rodita Hablero
were robbed in Iloilo, Philippines. Mary Choco suffered serious physical injuries,
Bienvenido Salvilla and Reynaldo Canasares also suffered physical injuries. The accused
also illegally detained Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, and Rodita Hablero at
the New Iloilo Lumber Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, and asked for ransom money
of P50,000.00. The amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money, two Men's wrist watches,
two lady's wrist watches, one.38 caliber revolver and one live grenade were recovered
from the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo Lumber Company..

The accused-appellants were convicted of Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and
Serious Illegal Detention; hence, Bienvenido Salvilla solely appealed to SC. The defense
contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an
attempt requires asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking, In other words,
the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and
3) the carrying away or asportation And without asportation the crime committed is only
attempted"

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime?

RULING: YES.
Robbery is a crime that requires the taking of personal property belonging to another.
The element of asportation is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner
without his consent and without the animus revertendi. Appellant insists that the "giving"
has been proven, but the "taking" has not. Evidence suggests that the money demanded
and the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and
his co-accused and completed the taking.

Offender's unlawful taking is complete when they gain possession of the thing, even if
they had no opportunity to dispose of it.
BANTILLO

ANITA L. MIRANDA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Facts: The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, an accounting clerk and bookkeeper
for sister companies Video City Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc.,
unauthorizedly transferred funds from a joint-venture bank account with VCCI. The
petitioner deposited checks from other franchisees' accounts into the bank account and
withdrew funds using pre-signed checks. An audit was conducted after the petitioner's
maternity leave and resignation in May 2002, revealing unauthorized withdrawals and
fund transfers totaling ₱4,877,759.60.5. The prosecution presented witness Jose
Laureola, the assistant manager/acting cashier of BPI Family Bank, Sta. Mesa Branch,
who presented a microfilm of the checks, encashed checks, and deposit slips, as well as
the bank statement of VCCI.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty for the crime of qualified theft.

Ruling: Yes. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article
310 is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is
committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken
from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond
or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

The prosecution proved that the amount taken by the petitioner, ₱797,187.85, belongs
to VCCI and was taken without consent and with grave abuse of confidence. The court
affirmed the trial court's findings, which are conclusive without grave abuse of discretion.
The court also ruled that the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another,
and the factual findings are supported by evidence on record.
BAUTISTA

PEOPLE vs. JULKIPLI ASAMUDDIN Y SALAPUDIN

G.R. No. 213913 September 02, 2015

FACTS: Sometime in 2006, Emelina Gloria hired appellant Asamuddin as a messenger in

Gloria Money Changer located at Mandaluyong City, and assigned him a blue Honda XRM
motorcycle for be used for work purposes. On July 11, 2007, at 12:30pm, Emelina handed
to appellant the cash amount of P800,000.00 and various foreign denominations with a
peso value of P277, 995.00 and instructed him to bring them to her friend Rina Rosalial,
also a money changer, in Mabini, Manila. Thereafter, appellant left aboard his service
motorcycle. Said instruction and handing of the currencies was seen by Imee, a domestic
helper of Emelina, who was then inside the E. Gloria Money Changer After an hour,
Rosalial called Emelina and told her that appellant has yet to arrive in her shop. Emelina
called appellant and his wife through their cellular phones, but to no avail. This prompted
Emelina to file a complaint against appellant at the PNP-CIDG, Camp Crame A month
later, appellant's service motorcycle was found abandoned in Silang, Cavite, and was
returned to Emelina On January 16, 2008, an Information was filed charging Asamuddin
of violation of RA 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 and the crime of Qualified
Theft. The cases were temporarily archived, but were revived when appellant was
arrested in Zamboanga City in 2009. Asamuddin pleaded not guilty to both charges and
denied the accusation, saying that he resigned from his job on July 10, 2007 and that the
amount handed to him by Emelina was his last salary On October 15, 2012, the RTC of
Madaluyong City, Branch 212 found Regaspi guilty of the crune of Carnapping and
Qualified Theft. On appeal, the CA aflirmed the lower court's decision. Hence, this present
petition.

ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not there was no consent of Emelina when appellant took the
subject service motorcycle, in order to convict him of the crime of Carnapping.

2. Whether or not appellant's employment as messenger created a fiduciary relationship

between him and Emelina, that will qualify him for the crime of Qualified Theft

HELD:

1. Yes - Although it is true that Emelina herself tasked the appellant to proceed to Mabini,
Manila and permitted him to use the service motorcycle, it cannot be denied that
appellant's failure to return the motorcycle to Emelina after his working hours constitutes
"unlawful taking." If indeed appellant's taking of the service motorcycle was consented
by Emelina, she should not have filed a complaint against the appellant for the loss of
the subject personal property. This just proves that appellant's possession of the subject
property after his work hours was not authorized nor consented by Emelina.

2.) Yes. One of the elements of the crime of Qualified Theft is that the crime must be
done with grave abuse of confidence. In the present case, there exists a fiduciary
relationship between appellant and Emelina, as his function of delivering amounts of
money to the clients or other money changers involves a total trust and high degree of
confidence from his employer, Emelina. Emelina routinely entrusts to appellant, on a daily
basis, various amounts of money from P50,000.00 to P500,000.00 without even requiring
the latter to acknowledge receipt thereof. Emelina even testified that she does not have
proof that she handed to appellant P800,000.00 and various foreign currency on July 11,
2007 because she has total trust and high degree of confidence on appellant. "Tiwalaan
lang po." This exhibits the trust and confidence of Emelina to the appellant which he
exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of the former. Therefore, the
present appeal is dismissed, affirming the conviction of Asamuddin of the crime of
Carnapping and Qualified Theft.
CARBONIDA

Gaviola vss. People, G.R. No. 163927, January 27, 2006

Facts:

With the land dispute issue between the parties, the court clearly identified the
demarcation of the properties involve therein. Having known of the said court decision,
the accused still gathered 1500 of coconuts from the land of Cleto Eusebio and was
convicted of qualified theft. On appeal, he invoked his honest belief that he owned the
land which negates intent to steal, an essential element of the felony of theft.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of taking the coconuts from another’s plantation constitutes
qualified theft.

Ruling:

Yes, in all cases where one in good faith takes another’s property underclaim of title in
himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim
may in fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed
to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, it will not protect
the taker. Gaviola cannot feign ignorance or even unfamiliarity with the location, identity
and the metes and bounds of the properties involved as it is categorically stated clearly
that the three parcels of land are distinct and separate from each other. Hence, Gaviola’s
claim of good faith in taking the coconuts is a mere pretense to escape criminal liability
and was guilty not only of simple theft but of qualified theft but under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified if coconuts are taken from the premises of a
plantation.
MENDOZA

G. R. No. 148233 June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.

Facts:
Luisito D. Bustinera, the appellant, was employed as a taxi driver for ESC Transport. On
December 25, 1996, he failed to return the Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi he was driving,
violating the agreement to return it daily. Edwin Cipriano, the manager of ESC Transport,
reported the taxi as missing on December 26, 1996. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife
informed Cipriano that the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon
City. Cipriano retrieved the taxi.

The appellant appealed his conviction for qualified theft, questioning the court's
conclusion that he had the intent to gain when he failed to return the taxi. He argued
that his failure to return the taxi was due to his inability to remit the boundary fee, not
an intent to permanently take the vehicle.

ISSUE:
Whether the element of intent to gain is present?

Ruling:
The trial court did not err in concluding that there was intent to gain when the appellant
failed to return the taxi. The use of the vehicle, even temporarily, without the owner's
consent constitutes gain, and the intent to gain is presumed from the unlawful taking.

The trial court erred in convicting the appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping.
The court reversed the trial court's decision, finding the appellant guilty of carnapping
under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended. The court determined that the anti-carnapping
law applied to the case, as it involved the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
MIRAL

Viray v. People, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013

FACTS:. Dog-keeper Viray was charged with qualified theft. His employer said that she
closed her home and left Viray to care for her pets. The employer returned home to find
her jewels, game boy, mobile phones, CD players, and front door destroyed. She also
spotted a plastic bag with Viray's t-shirt and shorts near her bedroom. Viray was left with
the dogs, the employer's personal belongings were missing, the front door was destroyed,
and a plastic bag containing Viray's t-shirt and shorts was found near the bedroom. Ryan
Viray was charged of the crime of Qualified Theft.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is correct in convicting Ryan Viray of Qualified
Theft.

RULING: No. The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified by grave abuse of
confidence. In this mode of qualified theft, this Court has stated that the following
elements must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted of the crime charged:
(1.) Taking of personal property; (2) That the said property belongs to another; (3)That
the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) That it be done without the owner’s
consent; (5) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
The prosecution had proved the existence of the first four elements enumerated above
beyond reasonable doubt. The law provides that qualified theft is theft with a qualifying
circumstance such as breach of trust. In this case, while it is true that the employer
trusted Viray in taking care of the dog and leaving him outside her house, the employer
did not entrust the room where Viray robbed the things. It was actually locked. There
was no breach of trust nor force upon things. Therefore, the crime is only simple theft
only.
NAVARRO

G.R. No. 176298 January 25, 2012

ANITA L. MIRANDA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with qualified theft. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded
not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

Video City Commercial, Inc. (VCCI) and Viva Video City, Inc. (Viva) were sister companies
which managed a chain of stores known as Video City. These stores, some company-
owned while others were operated in joint ventures with franchisees, were engaged in
the sale and rental of video-related merchandises. During the period of April 28, 1998 to
May 2, 2002, petitioner was the accounting clerk and bookkeeper of VCCI and Viva. One
of her duties was to disburse checks for the accounts she handled. She was assigned to
handle twelve (12) Video City store franchise accounts, including those of Tommy Uy,
Wilma Cheng, Jefferson Tan and Sharon Cuneta. As regards the franchisee Jefferson Tan,
who was out of the country most of the time, Tan pre-signed checks to cover the store’s
disbursements and entrusted them to petitioner. The pre-signed checks by Jefferson Tan
were from a current account maintained jointly by VCCI and Jefferson Tan at BPI Family
Bank, Sta. Mesa. There was also an existing agreement with the bank that any
disbursement not exceeding ₱20,000.00 would require only Tan’s signature. 4

Taking advantage of Tan’s constant absence from the country, petitioner was able to use
Tan’s joint-venture bank account with VCCI as a clearing house for her unauthorized
transfer of funds. Petitioner deposited VCCI checks coming from other franchisees’
accounts into the said bank account, and withdrew the funds by writing checks to her
name using the checks pre-signed by Tan. It was only after petitioner went on maternity
leave and her subsequent resignation from the company in May 2002 that an audit was
conducted since she refused to turn over all the financial records in her possession. The
audit was made on all the accounts handled by petitioner and it was discovered that she
made unauthorized withdrawals and fund transfers amounting to ₱4,877,759.60. 5

In the face of the prosecution’s evidence, petitioner chose not to present any evidence
during trial. Petitioner was convicted of qualified theft; hence, this instant petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime?

RULING: YES.

The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
9

Code are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft
10

becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 310 is present:
11

(1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave
abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the
property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.12

Here, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of
₱797,187.85 taken does not belong to petitioner but to VCCI and that petitioner took it
without VCCI’s consent and with grave abuse of confidence by taking advantage of her
position as accountant and bookkeeper. The prosecution’s evidence proved that petitioner
was entrusted with checks payable to VCCI or Viva by virtue of her position as accountant
and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account maintained by VCCI
and Jefferson Tan, then withdrew a total of ₱797,187.85 from said joint account using
the pre-signed checks, with her as the payee. In other words, the bank account was
merely the instrument through which petitioner stole from her employer VCCI.

Moreover, we agree with the CA when it gave short shrift to petitioner’s argument that
full ownership of the thing stolen needed to be established first before she could be
convicted of qualified theft. As correctly held by the CA, the subject of the crime of theft
is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken does
not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said
offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property. In 16

any event, as stated above, the factual findings of the courts a quo as to the ownership
of the amount petitioner stole is conclusive upon this Court, the finding being adequately
supported by the evidence on record.
BANTILLO

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some
pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino
and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold,
to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of qualified theft.

Ruling: No, with respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the
imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition
of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the
crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon
her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the
employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive
as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such
wrongful acts. The accused is found guilty for Estafa.
BAUTISTA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELEN MEJARES Y VALENCIA

G.R. No. 225735, 10 January 2018

FACTS:

At around 1:00 p.m. on May 22, 2012, Mejares, a household helper, got a call from a
certain Nancy who told her that Jacqueline Suzanne Gavin, her employer, met an
accident. Nancy instructed her to get something from a drawer in the masters' bedroom.
Since it was locked, Meiares was supposedly told to destroy it. Mejares left with a green
bag containing a black wallet and envelopes. Pedro Garcia, the condominium security
guard, did not allow her to leave in the absence of a gate pass signed by her employer.
Despite his insistence that Mejares call her employer, she did not. After a few moments,
her cellphone rang. Instead of answering Garcia's query on the caller's identity Mejares
rushed to the elevator. He attempted to stop her by warning her that they could be
victims of dugodugo gang. Mejares went to Greenhills Shopping Mall, allegedly on Jackie's
orders. He complied, then return to the condominium. From there, Mejares took a cab
going to Baclaran Church, where she met an unknown woman and hand over the bag to
the unidentified lady. When Mejares returned at about 3:00 p.m, she asked Raquel
Torres, another household helper, if there had been an incoming landline call while she
was gone. Torres answered in the negative and Mejares stated that she had purposely
hung it. At 4:00 p.m., Torres started to receive calls from Jackie, who sounded "loud,
normal and animated," making Torres wonder if Jackie had really encountered an
accident. Meanwhile, Jackie, while at work, tried calling but could not access her
household so she decided to call Torres' cellular phone to have her instruct the driver to
pick her up from the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board's Office After
the phone call was cut, she then received a call from Mejares, informing her about what
happened. Jackie clarified in her account that she had neither a personal secretary nor
an aide named Nancy and that she did not figure in any accident. The Regional Trial
Court found Mejares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft of
assets amounting to PI,056,308.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court Decision in toto. Mejares contended that there could be no theft on
her part because there was no intent to gain. She insists that she only took instructions
from the secretary of Jackie and later on, from Jackie herself. She claims that she is as
much a victim of the dugo-dugo gang as was her employer.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the contention of Mejares is valid 2. Whether the adjustments on penalty

made by Republic Act No. 10951 would apply

RULING: 1. No. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from
the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Thus, actual gain
is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. In this case, it is clear
from the established facts that it was Mejares who opened the drawer in the masters'
bedroom and took away the cash and valuables it contained. Therefore, the burden is on
the defense to prove that intent to gain was absent despite Mejares' actual taking of her
employer's valuables, which the defense failed to discharge.

2. Yes. The Court modifies the penalty to be imposed upon Mejares, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 10951, that sought, to help indigent prisoners and individuals accused of
committing petty crimes. It also increased the fines for treason and the publication of
false news and likewise increased the baseline amounts and values of property and
damage to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the offenses committed
in relation to them. The adjustments made by Republic Act No. 10951 is imperative to
maintain an effective and progressive penal system in consideration of exigencies borne
by the passage of time. In his dissenting opinion in Corpuz v. People, Justice Roberto
Abad stated that "Qualified theft is a grievous offense since its penalty is automatically
raised two degrees higher than that usually imposed on simple theft.
CARBONIDA

Art. 310 – Qualified Theft

People vs. Sabado, 830 SCRA 238 (2017)

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Luher P. Sabado, and two other individuals were charged with
stealing an assortment of jewelry and cellular phones worth ₱500,000.00 from Diamond
Pawnshop in Dasmariñas, Cavite, Philippines, on September 13, 2006. The accused
pleaded not guilty, while his co-accused remained at large. Witnesses testified that they
saw Sabado and two unidentified men entering the pawnshop, and Sabado was tied up
and covered with tape. The pawnshop was robbed, and the stolen items were found to
be worth Php. 582,200.00. Police Chief Inspector Dominador Arevalo and PO1 Efren
Recare arrested the accused-appellant and his co-accused. The stolen items were
identified by the auditor and appraiser of Diamond Pawnshop. Sabado claimed that he
was held at gunpoint and threatened to kill him. He was instructed to conduct an
inventory of the contents and make a cartographic sketch of the robbers. After trial, the
RTC found Sabado guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilt of accused appellant for the crime charged has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

The appeal against the conviction of Luther Sabado, a former employee of Diamond
Pawnshop, is deemed unworthy. The court ruled that theft is a crime involving the taking
of personal property without consent, violence, or intimidation. The theft was committed
with grave abuse of confidence due to the relationship between the accused-appellant
and the offended party. The accused-appellant's plea of acquittal is unmeritorious as it
lacks direct evidence linking him to the robbery.

The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly appreciated the conspiracy between the accused-
appellant and the other accused, as it was established that conspiracy exists when two
or more persons agree on committing a felony. The court does not disturb the findings
of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, as they are supported by the evidence on
record. The court gives deference to the RTC's appreciation of facts and witnesses'
credibility without showing that substantial facts and circumstances would change the
case's outcome.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

LAYSON

G.R. No. 199208, July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.

ARTICLE 310. QUALIFIED THEFT.

FACTS: Trinidad Cahilig worked as a cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings

and Loan Association. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing
the funds. It was discovered that she made withdrawals for her personal benefit. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier.

Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal
WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a
withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.

Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the 30 cases of qualified theft. She was
then charged with 30 cases of Qualified theft.

ISSUE:

WON the conviction of 30 counts of Qualified theft is correct?

RULING:

YES. All of the elements of Qualified Theft is present in this case, it is committed with
grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property; when accused-appellant took the proceeds of the

WPESLAI checks issued in her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to
be deposited to another account of WPESLAI.

2. That the said property belongs to another; since the funds indisputably belong to
WPESLAI.

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain; as accused-appellant for her personal
benefit, took the funds by means of moduse operandi that made it appear through the
entries in the ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course
of business and with the approval of WPESLAI.
4. That it be done without the owner's consent; in the presented case which is obvious
because the appellant created a ruse showing that the funds were credited to another
account but were actually withdrawn from her own personal account.

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,

nor of force upon things;

6. And it was done with grave abuse of confidence

MENDOZA

Taking Money in his Posession by Receiving Bank Teller: Roque vs. People, 444
SCRA 98 (2004)

G.R. No. 138954 November 25, 2004

ASUNCION GALANG ROQUE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioner was charged with qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court of Guagua
Pampanga.
Petitioner ASUNCION GALANG ROQUE was being then employed as teller of the Basa Air
Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA). Salazar is a member/depositor of the
BABSLA.

lazar disclosed that around July 1990 he heard that the funds of other depositors were
missing inside the BABSLA and were supposedly clandestinely circulating around the base.
Prodded by this news, and considering that the balance in his passbook was P46,000, he
went to the BABSLA to withdraw P40,000, but was informed that his balance at the
BABSLA was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. He was not allowed to withdraw.
Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager, informed him that several withdrawals were
made on his account amounting to P30,500, as evidenced by three (3) withdrawal slips.
Included among these withdrawal slips is one with the amount of P10,000, dated
November 16, 1989. Salazar claimed that the signature appearing on said withdrawal slip
was not his signature. He does not personally know who made the withdrawal of P10,000.
Salazar assumed that the one in control of the funds made the withdrawal.

Reynaldo Manlulu, who is both the treasurer and a member of the board of directors of
the BABSLA testified that petitioner reported for work on the 17th of that month. He
intimated that on that date petitioner got a beginning cash from him amounting to
P355,984.53, including all the the transactions that occurred after 3:00 p.m. of the
preceding day. This beginning cash can be seen in the Teller's Daily Report. The signature
above the typewritten name "agroque" is petitioner's because she signed it in his
presence. Apart from the beginning cash, he also turned over to petitioner the
transactions that took place after 3:00 p.m. of the preceding day, particularly the
withdrawal slip of MSgt. Salazar. At the end of the business day of November 17, 1989,
she prepared an abstract of payment and in this abstract the initial over the typewritten
name "agroque" is the initial of the petitioner because she signed it in his presence.
Petitioner paid the withdrawal of P16,300 evidenced by the withdrawal slips attached to
the abstract of payment. After she prepared the abstract of payment, petitioner turned
over to him the cash and all the transactions that were taken after 3:00 p.m. A Cash
Count shows the total cash that petitioner turned over to him. The initial over the
typewritten name "agroque" is petitioner's because it was signed in his presence

The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the
lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony?
2. Whether or not the elements of qualified theft were proven

RULING:

1.Yes. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the elements of the
crime of theft:
1. Intent to gain;
2. Unlawful taking;
3. Personal property belonging to another;
4. Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.

The foregoing requirements presume that the personal property is in the possession of
another, unlike estafa, where the possession of the thing is already in the hands of the
offender.

The court has carefully considered the classification of the crime committed by the
defendant and found it to be correctly classified by the trial court as qualified theft. The
money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the
possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with
a grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use
without the consent of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in
the definition of the crime of theft.

In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity of a bank
teller. The Court considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only
in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to
money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the purpose of
servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical possession remains with
the bank. If the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed
is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the
bank places money in the teller's possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller,
the felony of qualified theft would be committed and the bank places money in the teller's
possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would
be committed.
2. No. The specific qualifying circumstance in Article 310 of the RPC which the information
indicated was that the felony was committed with grave abuse of confidence.

Hence, to warrant a conviction, the prosecution should have proven the following
elements:
1. Taking of personal property.
2. That the said property belongs to another.
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain.
4. That it be done without the owner's consent.
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things.
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

Regarding the first element, the taking of personal property, the prosecution was not able
to present direct evidence that petitioner took the P10,000 on November 16, 1989.

A careful inspection of all the withdrawal slips, shows that the date and the initial of
petitioner were written across the stamped word "paid." This indicates that petitioner's
initial was placed in her capacity as a teller which, therefore, only proves that this
transaction passed through her hands in such capacity. It does not in any manner show
that petitioner prepared the withdrawal slip or that the proceeds of the withdrawal
increased her patrimony.

The Court has always applied this presumption to a situation where property has been
stolen and the stolen property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases
the possession of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the taker
of the stolen property. In the presumption availed of by the lower courts the property
found in the possession of the accused, which is the withdrawal slip, is not stolen
property. Furthermore, the presumption the lower court made was not that the petitioner
stole anything, but rather that the petitioner was the maker of the withdrawal slip.
Consequently, there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared by
the petitioner.

The prosecution was, therefore, unsuccessful in proving beyond reasonable doubt that
the petitioner committed the crime of qualified theft.