National Ideology and IR Theory Three in

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National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the 'Russian idea'

Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov
European Journal of International Relations 2010 16: 663 originally published online 24
February 2010
DOI: 10.1177/1354066109356840
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National ideology and IR 16(4) 663–686
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of the ‘Russian idea’ DOI: 10.1177/1354066109356840
ejt.sagepub.com
Andrei P. Tsygankov
San Francisco State University, USA
Pavel A.Tsygankov
Moscow State University, Russia
Abstract
In an attempt to broaden our perspective on IR theory formation, this article seeks to highlight
the significance of ideology. Consistent with the recently revived sociology of knowledge
tradition in international studies, we view IR scholarship as grounded in certain social and
ideological conditions. Although some scholars have studied the political, ideological, and
epistemological biases of Western, particularly American, civilization, in order to achieve a
better understanding of global patterns of knowledge formation it is important to look at
cases beyond the West. We therefore look at the formation of IR knowledge in Russia, and
we argue that the development of a Russian theory of international relations responds
to the old debate on the ‘Russian idea,’ and three distinct ideological traditions that had
been introduced to the national discourse in the mid-19th century. Focusing on theories
and concepts of the international system, regional order, and foreign policy, as developed
by Russian scholars, we attempt to demonstrate how they are shaped by ideological and
therefore pre-theoretical assumptions about social reality.
Key words
IR theory, national ideology, Russia, ‘Russian idea,’ Self and Other, sociology of knowledge
There are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing
independently of the values and position of the subject. (Mannheim, 1968 [1936]: 79)
Corresponding author:
Andrei P. Tsygankov, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA.
Email: andrei@sfsu.edu

664 European Journal of International Relations 16(4)
Introduction
The recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition1 in international studies has drawn
scholarly attention to the fact that IR scholarship is grounded in certain social conditions and
may reflect ideological and cultural premises. In particular, some scholars (Crawford and
Jarvis, 2001; Hoffmann 1995 [1977]; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004; Jones, 2006; Tsygankov
and Tsygankov, 2007) have come to view International Relations as a branch of research that
often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly
American, culture. Implicit in the argument is the importance of ideology, especially national
ideology, in shaping the foundations of social science. In the case of the United States, an
essentially national ideology claims to have universal status, and the positivist methodology
then serves to shape knowledge in accordance with the standards of the particular local com-
munity — in part, for the purpose of shaping the world politically. As E.H. Carr observed in
1977, the ‘study of international relations in English-speaking countries is simply a study of
the best way to run the world from positions of strength’ (Carr, 2001: xiii).
If we are to move further down the path of analyzing the social and ideological foundations
of knowledge, it is important to look beyond the already explored case of the United States.
If ideology remains an ever-powerful influence on knowledge in the world of states, schol-
ars ought to research the relationship between ideology and IR theory formation outside of
the United States. Continuing with the above-quoted observation, Carr suggests that ‘The
study of international relations in African and Asian universities, if it ever got going, would
be a study of the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger’ (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006:
349). Recently, scholars from across the globe have attempted to understand IR from the
perspective of various peripheries — Asian (Acharya and Buzan, 2007; Callahan, 2004b,
2008; Shani, 2008), East European (Guzzini, 2007), Latin American (Tickner, 2003, 2008),
and Russian (Tsygankov, 2008; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2007) — suggesting emergence
of the new sub-discipline of comparative IR theory (Callahan, 2004a).
In an attempt to further broaden our perspective on IR theory formation and highlight
the significance of ideology, this article takes up the case of Russia. Defining ideology as a
systematic presentation of Self, Other, and their relationships, we argue that the Russian
theory of International Relations is grounded in three main ideological traditions. We refer
to these traditions as Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism; each emphasizes a category
of, respectively, the West, the independent state, and a distinct civilization as the desired
identification of the Russian Self. Although these ideologies have recovered their currency
after the Soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the history of Russia’s relations with
Europe and the 19th-century debates about the ‘Russian idea.’ Those scholars who believe
in the importance of studying local knowledge in order to move away from intellectual
hegemony and ethnocentrism will benefit from analyzing potential ‘non-Western’ roots of
these phenomena. To make our case, we first hypothesize relationships between national
ideology and IR theory. We then describe the nature of Russia’s ideological disagreements
and debates about the ‘Russian idea.’ In the second half of the article we attempt to match
the ideologies of Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism to the new Russian IR focusing
on, arguably, the better developed theories and concepts of the international system,
regional order, and foreign policy. Following Hayward Alker and other scholars (Alker,
1981; Alker and Biersteker, 1984; Alker et al., 1998), we do not make a sharp distinction

A.Tsygankov and P.Tsygankov 665
between IR theory as an academic/social institution and foreign policy discussions —

instead, we adopt a broad definition of International Relations theory, viewing it as a
systematically developed and culturally grounded image of the world. The conclusion
discusses the implications of our argument for International Relations theory.
National ideology and IR theory

The end of the Cold War produced new theoretical expectations of an increasing
economic and political convergence across nations. The concepts of globalization and
democratic peace anticipated that nations would redefine their interests to fit the stand-
ards of the newly emerging and West-defined openness in the world.2 Rooted in the
mainstream tradition of modernization theory, the vision of the worldwide ascendancy of
liberal capitalism is based on assumptions of the West’s moral and institutional superiority.3
The vision assumes the relative homogeneity and uniformity of the West relative to the
rest of the world. It also implies that countries outside the West have no distinct social
and ideological roots and therefore are unable to make their own contribution to world
development; at this post-historical point, all that is left to the non-Western world is to
patiently and passively wait to be absorbed by West-defined globalization.
Many scholars have justifiably criticized such assumptions as vastly unrealistic and
propose to move beyond the existing cannon of theorizing International Relations from
the perspective of the currently dominant Western civilization in general and the United
States in particular. They point to the empirical problems with such theorizing by drawing
scholarly attention to new geographic regionalization (Mansfield and Millner, 1997;
Stalling, 1995), social and economic inequality (Murphy, 2001), and political polariza-
tion, violence, and lawlessness (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). No less importantly, they
also highlight the need to study how, instead of relying on the benefits of Western hege-
mony, to readjust to new international conditions nations often seek refuge by reformu-
lating their interests in a way that is consistent with their historical pasts and local
environments (Crane, 1999; Helleiner and Pickel, 2005; Tsygankov, 2004). Furthermore,
scholars have demonstrated the importance of studying patterns of local knowledge and
its implications for IR theory (Callahan, 2004a, 2004b; Guzzini, 2007; Inayatulla and
Blaney, 2004; Tickner, 2003; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2007; Waever, 1998).
In making sense of this persisting diversity of national policies and patterns of knowl-
edge, it is essential that we treat ‘nation’ and ‘national interest’ as open to various meanings
and interpretations, rather than something determined by the structure of the international
system. Several influential schools of thought suggest themselves as a framework for such
treatment. The sociology of knowledge (see especially Berger and Luckmann, 1966;
Harding, 1998; Mannheim 1968 [1936]) examines the social conditions of the emergence,
development, and decline of national ideas, arguing that such ideas only function meaning-
fully in and respond to particular social circumstances. Aristotelian practical reasoning
(Alker, 1997; Haan et al., 1983) views a theorist or ideas-producer as ethically involved
with, rather than neutral toward, social developments. The Frankfurt School (Habermas,
1973) more forcefully places theory in the center of social and political transformation.
And post-colonial theory (Said, 1993; Chakrabarty, 2000) argues that scholarship may
reflect the desire to culturally dominate the Other, treating it as a dependent subject and

consumer of already developed knowledge. Borrowing from these schools, scholars of

International Relations (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Inayatulla and Blaney, 2004; Jones,
2006; Shani, 2008) recently highlighted the West’s intellectual hegemony and inability to
come to terms with the problem of difference or recognition of the Other.
One way to gain a better understanding of the described diversity in national policies
and patterns of knowledge is to study social science as a form of social action shaped by
locally meaningful ideological debates. As presentations of relationships between Self
and Other,4 ideologies may be consciously held or ‘unconscious’ (Weber, 2005: 5). Some
ideologies offer no reciprocal engagement with the Other, merely expecting it to follow
the Self’s lead, while others take the Other more seriously and assume the importance of
engaging it in a dialogue (Inayatulla and Blaney, 2004; Tsygankov, 2004). Ideologies
develop in response to various historical developments and have a built-in capacity to
influence national cohesiveness by connecting across time and space. The time connection
refers to the reproduction of the existing mental constructions by mobilizing inter-
generational memory. The spatial dimension means that ideologies are able to success-
fully disseminate their values across their socially defined space. Due to conducive
institutional arrangements, repetitive historical practices, and the activities of intellectual
entrepreneurs, the ideological meanings become consolidated within a certain discursive
area, thereby confirming their status relative to more particularistic values. As with other
cultural entities, ideologies are not always stable. More stable cultural communities are
characterized by the dominance of some ideologies over others, but no discourse is
homogeneous or entirely hegemonic; instead it is always composed of both hegemonic
and recessive trends (Alker et al., 1989; Wight, 1992). For instance, while some social
forces favor a radical cultural renovation and the borrowing from other societies, others
prefer more gradual change and greater reliance on their own social experience. To the extent
that the choice is controlled by elites, the role played by policy actors and intellectuals in
reshaping their nation’s identity and ideology is critical.5
By offering a developed and coherent picture of how Self fits with its environment,
ideology introduces a series of clearly articulated and hidden assumptions that may then
find their way into social science scholarship. What often matters here are certain con-
cepts, rather than fully developed theories and propositions, that help to define the nature
of social reality on a broader level of abstraction before such a definition becomes
accepted in scholarly work. Examples of such concepts abound, and in the context of
Western scholarship include those of ‘democracy’ and the ‘market economy.’ To illustrate
the point of ideological biases hidden in International Relations theories, let us briefly
consider the ‘democratic peace’ debate in the discipline (the list can certainly be contin-
ued and extended beyond Western International Relations). Advocates of the democratic
peace6 thesis proclaim that it closely resembles a ‘law’ in international relations (Levy,
1994: 452), yet they shy away from discussing social conditions that define notions of
democracy and peace. Critics point out that the democratic peace claim is ahistorical and
reflects American values of what is ‘democratic,’ and that those values themselves have
been shaped by the United States’ perception of external threats (Oren, 1995, 2002).
Critics also argue that social structures, in which democratic orders take root, may vary
considerably. In some cases, such social structures are far from conducive to promoting
peace and stability. For example, in the post-communist context, democratization may be

accompanied by state weakness, thereby becoming a permissive condition allowing for

the re-emergence and rise of a previously dormant militant ethnic nationalism. As a
result, not only do some of the newly established democracies go to war against each
other, but they also may do so in part as a result of their moving away from authoritarianism
(Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). Therefore some principally important assumptions about
reality found their way into the theory of democratic peace without being critically examined.
By insisting on its universal applicability, the theory — as commonly practiced — bears
an excessive imprint of Western culture.
Some efforts have already been made to understand the development of IR theory in
response to nations’ ideological imperatives. Stanley Hoffmann (1995 [1977]) famously
exposed the hegemonic nature of the American theory of International Relations by linking
it to the nation’s universalist ideas, power, and institutions. Since then other scholars have
analyzed International Relations as a discipline that is ethnocentric, reflecting American/
Western ideational and political biases (Alker and Biersteker, 1984; Crawford and Jarvis,
2001; Holsti, 1985; Inayatullah and Blaney, 1996; Jones, 2006). Ole Waever (1998)
includes ‘ideologies’ or traditions of political thought in his survey of the sociology of
International Relations in the United States, Germany, France, and Britain. William
Callahan (2004a, 2004b) discusses how ideas of International Society, Democratic Peace,
and Harmony in British, American, and Chinese international studies, respectively, reflected
these nations’ historical perceptions and ideological agendas in the world. Tsygankov and
Tsygankov (2004, 2006) added to this discussion the case of Russia, arguing that a wide-
ranging pluralization within the new post-Soviet Russian IR is a result of the country’s
transitional ideological uncertainty after the fall of Soviet Marxism’s dominance.
Within nations, an ideology’s impact is different, yet also noticeable. Although national
IR theory is a product of intense competition and contestation, the debates in the field are
often informed by larger ideological assumptions and yield themselves to ideological clas-
sifications. Some well-known and still widely practiced classifications of IR theory in the
West, such as realism, liberalism, and critical theory or constructivism, are shaped by theo-
rists’ ideological preferences (Nau, 2006; Viotti and Kauppi, 1998; Weber, 2005). As they
each emphasize concepts of balance of power, international institutions, and human exploita-
tion/emancipation in their research, these theories reflect broader ideological concerns about
Self–Other relationships. Realists, for example, tend to perceive the rise of alternative com-
munities or the Other as a threat, and recommend that the Self prepare to defend its security.
On the other hand, many Western liberals, while recognizing the increasingly globalized
character of world politics, maintain the image of a progressive assertion of the Self’s values
and overlook the forces of identity and diversity associated with the Other. Some critical
theorists too have a tendency to oversimplify Self–Other relationships (Shani, 2008).
Building on the above-made observations by Hoffmann (1995 [1977]) and others, the
impact of ideology on international relations knowledge can be summarized in the fol-
lowing way. As a state-related institution, national ideology influences knowledge forma-
tion through a proposed interpretation of historical events, institutional arrangements, and
funding. As a systematic presentation of Self–Other relationships, each ideology may get
either strengthened or weakened by local conditions and the contemporary behavior of
the outside world. On the level of social, or pre-theoretical, assumptions, an ideology may
signal to IR theorists which international norms and influences to emphasize — those that

require autonomy and strength as recognized by realists or those that value cooperation
and democracy as promoted by liberal IR scholars. If and when the state appropriates a
particular ideological vision as a guide in policy-making (national interest), it may further
reinforce the formation of IR knowledge by soliciting and funding scholarly research.
The ‘Russian idea’:Three schools of thinking

about Self and Other
Although Russia’s thinking and policy respond to various international contexts, it has
also displayed a remarkable degree of historical continuity. Across the eras of monarchy,
Communism, and liberalism, Russia’s engagement with the world has followed several
consistent patterns. As a borderland nation in an uncertain, often volatile, external environ-
ment, Russia has had to continuously respond to similar challenges to its security. These
challenges included unrest in neigboring territories, threats of invasion from outside, and
the difficulties of preserving internal state integrity. Over time, the country has developed
three distinct ideologies or schools of thinking about the Self and Other — Westernist,
Statist, and Civilizationist. This classification loosely fits Martin Wight’s (1992) triple
conceptualization, which includes those who emphasize international anarchy and control
(the realists), those who concentrate on international interactions as a civilizing force in
world politics (the rationalists), and those who focus on various transformations of the
international system (the revolutionists). Yet the classification is also distinct, as Westernist,
Statist, and Civilizationist ideologies emerged out of Russia’s historical interaction with
the outside world, and in response to the Russian elites’ perception of this world’s chal-
lenges and opportunities. Having established their images of Self and Other, throughout
the centuries the three ideological traditions have sought to present Russia’s international
choices in ways consistent with their respective worldviews.7 This section briefly describes
the three ideologies and their historical roots, and the rest of the article spells out ways in
which the described ideologies have influenced Russian IR scholarship.
Westernizers saw the Russian idea as an essentially Western idea, and they placed
emphasis on Russia’s similarity with Western nations, viewing the West as the most
viable and progressive civilization in the world. At least since Peter the Great (1672–
1725), the West played an especially prominent role in creating for Russia the system of
meanings in which to defend international choices. The early Westernizers sought to
present Russia as a loyal member in the family of European monarchies. Alexander I
(1777–1825), for instance, championed the so-called legitimist policies and established
the ‘Holy Alliance’ with Germany and Austria in order to suppress revolutionary activities
on the continent. From the mid-19th century Westernizers, such as Alexander II, began
to identify with the West’s constitutional freedoms and political equality. Westernizers
within the Soviet system saw Russia as not standing too far apart from European social-
democratic ideas. For instance, one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s favorite lines of thinking
was that the Soviet Union had to ‘purify’ itself of Stalinist ‘distortions’ and become a demo-
cratic, or ‘human,’ version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). Finally, the post-Soviet
liberal Westernizers argued for the ‘natural’ affinity of their country with the West based
on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. Sharing the prejudices
of many in the West, liberal Westernizers, like Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelstin, were

fearful of the non-Western Other and warned against relations with former Soviet allies.
They insisted that only by building Western liberal institutions and integrating with the
coalition of what was frequently referred to as the community of ‘Western civilized
nations’ would Russia be able to respond to its threats and overcome its economic and
political backwardness.
Statists have equated the Russian idea with that of a strong independent state, emphasizing
the state’s ability to govern and preserve the social and political order. They too have expressed
wariness of the Other, and have introduced the notion of external threat as central to Russia’s
security. Depending on the situation, the threatening Other has been presented as coming
from either an eastern or western direction. Ever since the two-centuries-long conquest by
Mongols, Russians have developed a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to
sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty. For instance, when justifying the need
for rapid industrialization, the leader of the Soviet state Josef Stalin famously framed his
argument in terms of responding to powerful external threats, ‘The history of the old Russia
was the continual beating she suffered because of her backwardness. … We are fifty or a
hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years.
Either we do it, or we shall be crushed’ (Stalin, 1947: 357–8).
The Statists are not inherently anti-Western; they merely seek the West’s recognition
by putting the emphasis on economic and military capabilities. The Statists of the monar-
chical era valued Russia’s autocratic structure of power, partly because such were the
structures of European monarchies as well. The socialist Statists insisted on the impor-
tance of the Communist Party’s firm control over society for the purpose of maintaining
political order and averting external ‘capitalist’ threats. In foreign policy, some Statists
advocated relative accommodation with the West, while others favored balancing strategies.
Maxim Litvinov, for instance, supported a ‘collective security’ system in Europe in order
to prevent the rise of fascism. Nikita Khrushchev, too, wanted to break the taboos of
isolationism and to bring Soviet Russia closer to Europe. On the other hand, Stalin’s pact
with Hitler, as well as Brezhnev’s ‘correlation of forces’ strategy, reflected the will to
respond to perceived threats from the outside world. That dualism survived the Soviet
era. For instance, both Primakov and Putin viewed Russia’s greatness and strength as key
goals of their foreign policies, yet the former was trying to reintegrate the former Soviet
region and contain the United States through a strategic alliance with China and India,
whereas the latter emphasized bilateral relations in Russia’s periphery and aimed to
develop a partnership with America to deter terrorism.
Finally, Civilizationists conceptualize the Self–Other relationship in terms of cultural
oppositions. This ideological tradition positions Russia and its values as principally
different from those of the West. Viewing Russia as a civilization in its own right, many
Civilizationists insisted on its ‘mission’ in the world and on spreading Russian values
abroad (Duncan, 2000). As a policy philosophy, Civilizationism dates back to Ivan the
Terrible’s ‘gathering of Russian lands’ after the Mongol Yoke, and to the dictum ‘Moscow
is the Third Rome,’ adopted under the same ruler. Some representatives of this school
advocate a firm commitment to the values of Orthodox Christianity, while others view
Russia as a synthesis of various religions. In the 19th century, Civilizationists defended
the notion of Slavic unity, and their ideology of Pan-Slavism affected some of the Csar’s
foreign policy decisions. Born out of the agony of autocratic and liberal Europe, Soviet

Table 1. Three Russian ideologies
Westernism Statism Civilizationism
Self Part of the West Derzhava, or Independent civilization

independent state
Other Non-Western States threatening Western and non-Western
world Russia’s independence civilizations
Action Integration with Building a normal Resisting Western pressures or
the West great power Promoting inter-civilizational
dialogue
Russia saw itself as superior to the ‘decadent’ and ‘rotten’ Western capitalist civilization.
The early socialist Civilizationists challenged the West in a most direct fashion, defend-
ing at one point the doctrine of world revolution. Other Soviet thinkers, however, advo-
cated peaceful coexistence and limited cooperation with the world of ‘capitalism.’ Yet
another version of Civilizationist thinking is the so-called Eurasianism that saw Russia
as an organic unity distinct from both European and Asian cultures. Eurasianists view the
world in terms of struggle between land-based and sea-based powers and advocate the
notion of geopolitical expansion.8
Not all Civilizationists have viewed Russia as in principle opposed to other cultural
entities. Although moving beyond viewing cultural interaction as something mutually
exclusive has been a challenge to Russian thinkers, some of them have found ways to
conceptualize the interaction of cultural entities as a dialogue within which to learn from
opposing perspectives (Tsygankov, 2008). For example, some of Mikhail Gorbachev’s
supporters may be viewed as advocates of cross-cultural dialogue, in which Russia’s
civilizational distinctiveness, defined in terms of association with socialist values, would
be preserved and respected, rather than eliminated or suppressed.
Table 1 summarizes the content of the three Russian ideologies.
Westernism and Russian liberal IR theory

Russian IR theory largely conforms to the broad ideological visions that have developed
in the country over time. The country’s theoretical diversity after the Soviet break-up
(Lebedeva, 2004a; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2004) may be viewed as a reflection of
profound ideological divisions that go back centuries and have obtained a new signifi-
cance after the end of the USSR. The three IR currents we consider are connected with
the identified ideological visions in terms of the general assumptions they each make
about the world and about appropriate foreign policy actions. Our choice of defining the
Russian theoretical currents as liberal, realist, essentialist, and constructivist is also partly
determined by their connections with Western theoretical concepts and propositions,
which may be found in the Russian authors’ occasional references to Western authors,
such as Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, or Robert Keohane. For the purpose of
illustrating the conformity of Russian new IR with the identified ideologies, we focus on
concepts of the international system, regional order, and foreign policy. These three remain

the most developed in the Russian field of International Relations9 and are therefore
representative of the overall sample of Russian IR theory.
Russian liberal scholarship of these issues is heavily shaped by Western, even American,
approaches, and betrays the Westernist ideological preferences of its advocates. Liberal
concepts of the international system and regional order demonstrate almost a religious
belief in the triumph of the Western Self, fear of the non-Western Other, and a readiness
to act toward the suspicious Other in a hegemonic fashion. Thus many Russian scholars
treat the world’s institutional development as predominantly West-centered. One example
of this is the conceptualization of the emerging world as a ‘democratic unipolarity’
(Kulagin, 2002, 2008). The concept is Western in its origins, because democracy is
understood to be a West-centered universal phenomenon, rather than developing out of
local cultural, historic, and political conditions. The supporters of the concept contend
that ‘[Francis] Fukuyama and [Robert] Heilbronner were basically correct in arguing the
“end of history” thesis which implied the absence of a viable alternative to Western
liberalism’ (Shevtsova, 2001). The argument implies that Russia too would do well to
adopt standards of Western pluralistic democracy if it wants to be peaceful and ‘civilized,’
even if this means to grant the right to use force to the only superpower in the world, the
United States (Kremenyuk, 2004, 2006).
Other scholars envision a world in which non-state actors, movements, and networks are
at least as powerful as states in shaping the contemporary world order (Barabanov, 2002,
45–6, 49–50, 2008; Lebedeva, 2008), which these scholars view as a challenge to the very
nature of the great power-based international system. During 2004–05, Russia’s leading
International Relations journal Mezhdunarodnyye protsessy (International Trends) orga-
nized a discussion which sought to clarify concepts of International Relations and world
politics, the latter being reserved by some participants for capturing the growing diversity
of non-state actors.10 Consistent with the West-centered view of the world, Russian liberals
also argue that non-state ties and interactions are especially developed within the area of
Western economically developed and democratic nations, and weak outside the area of
Western democracies. This is why the region of the most economically developed nations
‘remains the center of the global civil society’ (Baluyev, 2007).
An example of conceptualizing regional order by Russian liberal scholars is the notion
of the end of Eurasia introduced by Deputy Director of Moscow Carnegie Center, Dmitri
Trenin (2001) in one of his books. The concept is a liberal attempt to respond to Russia’s
conservative geopolitical projects of integrating the region around Moscow’s vision, and
it reflects the ‘no security without the West’ thinking associated with politicians like
Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev, who held key government positions during the early
stages of Russia’s post-communist transformation. The concept assumes that the age of
Russia as the center of gravity in the former Soviet region historically associated with the
Tsardom of Muscovy, the empire, and the Soviet Union is over. Trenin maintains that,
because of pervasive external influences, especially those from the Western world and
West-initiated globalization, the region of Russia-centered Eurasia no longer exists.
Russia therefore must choose in favor of gradual geopolitical retreat from the region.11
Liberal foreign policy concepts too clearly reflect the Westernist ideology. To
support this argument, we briefly discuss two foreign policy concepts, Atlanticism and
liberal empire. Introduced by leading liberal figures Andrei Kozyrev and Anatoli Chubais

during Russia’s respective decline and recovery, they illustrate the ideological connection
we seek to highlight. Kozyrev’s Atlanticism (1992, 1995) assumed a radical reorien-
tation of Russia’s foreign policy toward Europe and the United States, and it included
radical economic reform, the so-called ‘shock therapy,’ gaining a full-scale status in trans-
atlantic economic and security institutions, such as the European Union, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the G-7, and separat-
ing the new Russia from the former Soviet republics economically, politically, and cul-
turally. The Atlanicist vision shaped the new foreign policy concept prepared in late 1992
and signed into law in April 1993. The concept of liberal empire articulated by former-
President Yeltsin’s privatization tsar Anatoli Chubais (2003) also intended Russia’s
pro-Western integration, but mostly by means of free commerce and enterprise. Not
unlike the early prophets of globalization, such as Francis Fukuyama and Thomas
Friedman, Chubais argued for the inevitability of Russia’s successful economic
expansion within the former Soviet region and outside due to its successfully completed
market reform.
In addition to its historical influence, several institutional channels assisted Westernist
ideology in shaping liberal IR scholarship in Russia. Immediately following the Soviet
disintegration, Westernizers found themselves in a position of power and signaled to the
emerging IR community the importance of studying the world as influenced by the West’s
globalization. Just as some prominent policy-makers in the United States (Bush, 2002;
Clinton, 1994) welcomed theories of interdependence and democratic peace, Russia’s
statesmen promoted these theories in their country. Disappointed by their own experience,
they were eager to borrow knowledge from those who were more economically and politi-
cally advanced. Westernizers in power wanted to integrate with the United States and
other Western nations through rapid economic reforms and a pro-Western foreign policy
as recommended by advisors in the International Monetary Fund and the White House. In
this highly politicized context, the domestic intellectual capital was discredited by asso-
ciation with the old Soviet state, and the intellectual vacuum was filled with liberal
American ideas. Many IR concepts in Russia, such as Atlanticism and interdependence,
were first introduced to academia by policy-makers.12 In addition, a number of influential
public servants of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras came to the world of policy-making
from academia and maintained their relationships with the ‘Ivory Tower.’ For example, a
number of known foreign policy advisors, such as Vladimir Lukin, Sergei Karaganov, and
Sergei Stankevich, were formerly associated with the Insitute of the United States and
Canada, the Institute of Europe, and the Institute of General History — all specialized
government branches of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
Finally, it is difficult to understand the influence of Westernist ideology on Russian
scholarship of International Relations without discussing the new financial situation
presented by the Soviet break-up. Under conditions of extremely painful economic reform,
post-Soviet social scientists found themselves lacking even elementary resources at
home. Formerly state-supported, they scraped for funds, while new private foundations
barely existed. Many were forced out of the profession, while others had to work at
several jobs simultaneously. Under these conditions, American liberal agencies funding
social science research, such as Ford, MacArthur, and Soros, have played a prominent
role in shaping Russia’s young International Relations discipline. In attempting to meet

their expectations, Russian scholarship has often reflected American, rather than local,
theoretical agendas (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2007).
Statism, Derzhava, and Russian realist IR

Just as Russian liberal IR is shaped by Westernism, Russian realism conforms to the
main assumptions of Statist ideology. The notion of threat, particularly one from the West
as a potentially hegemonic center of power, is a product of Russia’s centuries-long devel-
opment, and it has continued to shape the nation’s thinking, this time expressed through
academic theories and concepts of International Relations. Consistent with this ideological
vision, realists have developed their theories and concepts largely out of expectations of
external threats to Russia’s Self and the perceived necessity to preserve internal stability.
Although Russian realists borrow many conceptual tools from Western, particularly
American, IR (Konyshev, 2004, 2005), they are driven primarily by Russian concerns
and used these tools creatively.
In research on the international system’s structure and polarity, realists have developed
a variety of concepts differentiating between various types of unipolar, bipolar, and multi-
polar system (Shakleyina, 2003). One example is Aleksei Bogaturov’s (1996, 1998, 2003)
proposal to view the post-Cold War international system as ‘pluralistic unipolarity,’ in
which the unipolar center is a group of responsible states, rather than one state (the United
States). Bogaturov sees Russia as a member of the group and argues for the consolidation
of its position within the global center, as well as for discouraging the formation of one
state-unipolarity in the world. His approach to world order includes, not unlike the English
School tradition, the notions of norms and rules (Bogaturov, 2001). It also complicates the
Self–Other ideological opposition, because Russia’s Self was expected to develop closer
ties with the Other (West), while resisting the tendency of its members (the US) to become
predominant in the system. Realists have also been critical of the liberal notion of univer-
sal democratic ideas questioning the significance of internal characteristics in the interna-
tional struggle for power and security. Many in Russia see attempts to globally promote
Western-style democracy as little more than ideology covering a struggle for the world’s
domination (Gadziyev, 2008; Karaganov, 2008; Volodin, 2006). Rather than recommend-
ing development of this kind of democracy, realists propose that Russia concentrate on
strengthening its international position by consolidating regional ties and pursuing even-
handed relations with Western and non-Western nations.
In studying the regional order, realists too have sought to defend the position of
Russia’s independence and power. One example of this is the concept of the former
Soviet region as a post-imperial space first introduced in a series of reports by the Council
on Foreign and Defense Policy (1992, 1993, 1996), the influential non-governmental
organization that was launched and headed by Sergei Karaganov since the early
1990s. The notion of post-imperial space served the ideological objectives of those
social groups — industrialists, businessmen, intellectuals, and mass opinion leaders —
that saw themselves as defenders of the region’s order and stability based on preservation
of Russia’s influence. Just like the notion of pluralistic unipolarity, post-imperial space
was a hybrid of hard-line and moderate influences because it sought to revive the social,
economic, and political coherence of the former Soviet region, without reviving the empire.

While a departure from Kozyrev’s isolationism, the notion of post-imperial space, as seen
by its advocates, could not be likened to restoration of the empire or revival of aggressive
imperial nationalism. For instance, the 1996 report by the Council on Foreign and Defense
Policy referred to the idea of the Soviet restoration as a ‘reactionary utopia.’ At the same
time, the report argued that a reasonable alternative to post-Soviet integration was not
available and that Russia should assume the role of a leader of such integration.
Consistent with their defense of Russia as a relatively independent power center,
realists have pursued the notion of multi-vector foreign policy. A former senior academic,
and the second Foreign Minister of Russia, Yevgeni Primakov (1996, 1998) argued that if
Russia was to remain a sovereign state with the capacity to organize and secure the post-
Soviet space and resist hegemonic ambitions anywhere in the world, there was no alterna-
tive to acting in all geopolitical directions. Primakov and his supporters warned against
Russia unequivocally siding with Europe or the United States at the expense of relation-
ships with other key international participants, such as China, India, and the Islamic
world. Realists have argued for flexible alliances in all geopolitical directions (Gadziyev
2007), which too resonates with the official discourse. The country’s National Security
Concept of 1997 identified Russia as an ‘influential European and Asian power,’ and it
recommended that Russia maintain equal distance in relations to the ‘global European and
Asian economic and political actors’ and presented a positive program for the integration
of the CIS efforts in the security area (Shakleyina, 2002: 51–90). The government’s official
Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 referred to the Russian Federation as ‘a great power …
[with a] responsibility for maintaining security in the world both on a global and on a
regional level’ and warned of a new threat of ‘a unipolar structure of the world under the
economic and military domination of the United States’ (Shakleyina, 2002: 110–11).
The influence of Statist ideology in the post-Soviet era too has been assisted by Russia’s
institutional arrangements. As was the case with Westernizers, a number of prominent Statist
policy-makers have maintained close relations with academia. Examples include academ-
ics-turned-policy-makers, such as presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich and Foreign
Minister and subsequently Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov. Whereas liberal IR gained
strength in the context of the nation’s departure from the old Soviet thinking, Russian real-
ists drew their support from traditionally strong geopolitical theories that emphasized values
of order and security over those of freedom and democracy. These theories revived their
prominence due to growing disorder, corruption, and poverty that had resulted from the
Soviet disintegration and Yeltsin’s Westernist reforms. Accompanied by new conflicts in the
Russian periphery and the West’s decision to expand NATO eastward by excluding Russia
from the process, these changes stimulated the rise of IR theories with emphasis on geopoli-
tics and security balancing. The language of these theories soon filled academic and semi-
academic conferences, as well as the national media. For example, at the 1992 conference
‘The Transformed Russia in the New World,’ presidential advisor and former academic
Sergei Stankevich (1992) took issue with the then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and
promoted the vision of Russia as a great power and cultural bridge between Europe and
Asia. Being well connected, Statists soon found ways to exploit state resources and re-
established opportunities for funding realist IR scholarship. Multiple research institutes and
think tanks, such as the Institute of Defense Studies and the Institute of Strategic Studies,
devote themselves to studying Russia’s national interests and security challenges.

Civilizationism and the choice between culturally essentialist

and constructivist IR
Finally, Russian culturally essentialist and constructivist IR theories have been supported
by varieties of the Civilizationist ideological vision. The two schools are radically different
in conceptualizing local cultures. Whereas cultural essentialists have been inspired by
visions of a self-sufficient and autarchic Eurasian or Orthodox empire, constructivist
scholars place the emphasis on cultural syntheses and cross-civilizational dialogue.
While essentialists tend to view culture as homogeneous and relatively closed to outside
influences, to constructivists cultures are subject to change and interaction with other
entities. Broadly defined, the constructivist movement includes theorists that are both
conventional and critical in their assumptions about world politics and the appropriate
tools to research it (Hopf, 1998). While Russian constructivists are different in their
intellectual priorities and research tools, they share with their Western counterparts the
notion of culture as a socially constructed phenomenon. This section considers Russian
constructivists and essentialists together because the two schools share an interest in
studying the role of culture in international relations and proceed from the assumption of
Russia’s cultural or civilizational distinctiveness. It is important to stress, however, that
beyond this general interest the two do not have much in common, just as Samuel
Hungtington (1996) and some of his Western critics (Said, 2001) agree on the significance
of studying the role played by civilizations in world politics, but radically differ in the
methodological and ontological assumptions they make in their research.
Essentialists view the international system in terms of the irreconcilable struggle of
cultures, or a conflict of civilizations, not unlike the one described by Samuel Huntington
(1996). Some, similarly to Huntington, identify a multipolar civilizational struggle
(Nartov, 1999; Zyuganov, 1999, 2002), while others see an essentially bipolar geocultural
conflict. Alexander Dugin’s (2002) concept of a great war of continents is of the latter
kind. The bipolarity Dugin perceives is the result of a struggle for values and power
between the two competing rivals — the land-based Eurasianists and the sea-oriented
Athlanticists. The Eurasianist orientation is expressed most distinctly by Russia,
Germany, Iran, and, to a lesser extent, Japan, while the Athlanticist posture is well
expressed by the United States and Britain. Similarly, a recent popular volume (Proyekt
Rossiya, 2008: 42–5) identifies two cultural poles — the material profit-driven America,
and a Russia that is viewed as the last stronghold of Christianity.
From the constructivist perspective, the fact that the world is culturally pluralist does
not mean that cultures are doomed to conflict. Instead, they should strive to establish a
‘unity in diversity’ regime, under which Self and Other are able to maintain an intense
dialogue and cooperation by observing certain globally acknowledged rules, yet still fol-
low their own internally developed sets of norms. In order to sustain the culturally plural-
ist system, new ideas are necessary to challenge the dominance of US-centered economic
and political globalization (Alekseyeva, 2007; Batalov, 2005; Voytolovski, 2007). Some
constructivists have proposed the strengthening of the United Nations as a prototype for
future world government, with the General Assembly as parliament, the Security Council
as executive body, and the Secretary General as president of the world state. For exam-
ple, former Gorbachev advisor Georgi Shakhnazarov (2000) argued that such a structure

was necessary in order to address urgent global problems, such as growing militarism,
the depletion of world resources, overpopulation, and environmental degradation, and to
mitigate the selfish impulses of local civilizations. In his view, the Huntington-proposed
restructuring of the Security Council in accordance with the civilizational representation
would mean throwing away all the positive potential of the United Nations and returning
to the times of isolation and the rule of crude force in world politics. Instead, and for the
purpose of preserving and developing the central governing structure of the world, he
proposed a piecemeal development of the United Nations by gradually incorporating into
the Security Council those states that have acquired indisputable world influence, includ-
ing Germany, Japan, and possibly even India, Brazil, and other states.
A similar divide between essentialists and constructivists concerns analysis of the
regional order. Eurasianists, like Dugin, view such order as a Russia-centered empire
free of any Atlanticist influences. Similarly, Russian religious nationalists have advanced
the notion of a Russian Orthodox empire. For instance, the recent influential volume
(Russkaya doktrina, 2007) set out a regional order capable of resisting the West and
becoming self-sufficient. Projecting the United States’ retreat from the region between
2010 and 2015, nationalists call for ‘a full-fledged political, economic and — ideally
— military union in the manner of a Warsaw Pact’ with China, India, Iran, and other non-
Western nations (Russkaya doktrina, 2007: 297, 313).
In their turn, more constructivist-oriented thinkers suggest concepts that transcend the
known dichotomy of the region as either pro-Western or Eurasian. Unlike pro-Western liber-
als, who commonly see Russia as in need of a ‘return’ to Europe, some scholars have assumed
that Russia already is in Europe/the West. By their historical accounts, Russia has been
Western longer than some other nations, including the United States. Therefore the challenge
for Russia is not to be included, but to develop a deeper awareness of itself as a legitimate
member of Europe and of its special ties with the world. Put differently, Russia has to intel-
lectually absorb the world/West, rather than let itself be absorbed by it. An example of such
thinking is Gleb Pavlovski’s (2004) concept of Euro-East, which conceptualizes the region as
a part of Europe and distinct in its own right. The Euro-East shares with Europe values of the
market economy and a growing middle class, yet being mainly preoccupied with economic
and social modernization, the region is in special need of maintaining political stability.
Foreign policy too is viewed by cultural essentialists and constructivists in a
principally different light. Both Eurasianists and Russian Orthodox nationalists
insist on the toughest possible policy response as the means of restoring Russia’s
geopolitical status as the Eurasian Heartland (Bassin and Aksenov, 2006) and of
imperial self-sufficiency, as well as offering a new attractive idea for the world
(Kholmogorov, 2006; Маtveychev, 2007; Russkaya doktrina, 2007: 11). Constructivists
see foreign policy differently. More socialist-oriented thinkers (Tolstykh, 2003)
argue for cultural dialogue as a key humanistic principle that may set the world
on the path of solving the above-identified global problems of militarism, poverty,
and environmental degradation. More conservative thinkers inspired by Orthodox
Christian values (Panarin, 2002) advocate a cross-religious synthesis of Western reason
and Eastern myth. They see Russia as a natural place for such a synthesis and, therefore,
as a model for the world.
Similar to Westernism and Statism, Civilizationist ideology has been historically
influential and promoted by various political and social forces. Many of the above-cited

works would not have appeared without support from these forces. For example, Mikhail
Gorbachev and his Gorbachev Foundation organized a number of wide-ranging discus-
sions on international relations and funded important constructivist research promoting
the idea of inter-cultural dialogue (Gorbachev, 2003). Russia’s officials also sympathized
with the idea. For example, in March 2008 President Putin sent a message to the
Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Senegal in which he said that ‘deeper
relations of friendship and cooperation with the Islamic world are Russia’s strategic
course,’ and that ‘we share concerns about the danger of the world splitting along religious
and civilizational lines’ (RFE/RL, 14 March 2008). On the other hand, concepts
developed by essentialists are not infrequently supported by the Russian Orthodox
Church and nationalist political organizations, such as the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation. Thus, a number of Orthodox priests, such as Metropolit Kirill,
endorsed Russkaya doktrina. The Communist Party leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, has regu-
larly written on issues of geopolitics and national interests. Yet another Eurasianist and
prolific geopolitical writer, Alexander Dugin, has been politically and ideologically
involved, having founded the International Eurasian Movement.13
Table 2 offers a summary of the above-discussed concepts and their relations to IR
theories and ideologies of the Russian idea.
Table 2. Ideologies, theories and concepts in Russian IR: Some examples
Ideologies Theories Concepts
International Regional Order Foreign Policy

System Objective
Westernism Liberalism Democratic End of Eurasia Atlanticism and

unipolarity (Trenin) integration with
(Kulagin) the West (Kozyrev)
Liberal empire
(Chubais)
Statism Realism Pluralistic Post-imperial space A multi-vector
unipolarity (Karaganov) orientation
(Bogaturov) (Primakov)
Civilizationism Cultural Great war of New Eurasia Heartland of
Essentialism continents (Dugin) Eurasia (Dugin)
(Dugin) Orthodox empire Self-sufficiency
(Russkaya doktrina) (Russkaya doktrina)
Constructivism Pluralism of Euro-East Humanistic
civilizations (Pavlovski) globalism and
(Shakhnazarov) cultural dialogue
(Gorbachev)
Orthodox
synthesis of
Western reason
and Eastern myth
(Panarin)

Conclusion
Contrary to some old theories, ideology is neither a false consciousness (Mannheim,
1968 [1936]; Marx and Engels, 1964 [1846]), nor a truly scientific (Lenin, 1969 [1902])
representation of reality. Rather, it is a system of assumptions about reality. Formed by a
nation’s historical experience, these assumptions precede theory formation and therefore
are pre-theoretical. Being a social science, IR theory can only meaningfully function
within a certain nationally confined ideological context, and that dictates the importance
of carefully scrutinizing ideological assumptions. Ever since Stanley Hoffmann (1995
[1977]: 213) wrote about ‘the rude intrusion of grand ideology’ into the realm of social
science, the situation has not fundamentally changed.
Russian IR theory after the Soviet break-up is only new in the sense that it represents
a new form of framing reality, yet behind the new concepts, such as democratic unipolarity
or multi-vector foreign policy, one can recognize the same old debate about the Russian
idea that had been introduced by the Westernizer/Slavophile polemics in the mid-19th
century. The Russian idea has not disappeared from public discussion; rather, it has been
reincarnated in the post-Soviet context, thanks to a considerable extent to the debates
among scholars of International Relations. As our analysis indicates, Russia’s distinct
ideologies of Westernism, Statism, and Civilizationism have gained new life by informing
and inspiring IR concepts of the international system, regional order, and foreign policy.
Not only in the United States, but also (and perhaps especially) in Russia, national ideology
has not been evicted from the social sciences by the rational spirit of modernity. In some
respects, theorists in Russia are closer to and less ashamed of ideology, and it is more
common among them to be explicit about their ideological assumptions. For example,
claiming the scientific status of their theories does not preclude thinkers such as Nikolai
Nartov (1999: 305) and Gennadi Zyuganov (1999: 2, 9–10) from openly stating their
ideological beliefs — that Russia is Eurasia’s Heartland; that the United States is a
hostile alien; and that a self-sufficient empire is the natural state of the Russian political
order. Pre-theoretical, these beliefs are essential for the functioning of a theory, for in
their absence a theory loses its meaning.
We have also argued that a society is never ideologically homogeneous. At a given
time, not one, but several ideological traditions exist, overlap, and compete for national
influence, informing and inspiring developments within the discipline of International
Relations. These ideologies influence knowledge formation by offering a coherent inter-
pretation of historical events and utilizing available institutional channels. Importantly,
IR theories and concepts in Russia — of liberal, realist, constructivist, and essentialist
orientation — have their ideological and political supporters outside academia. Just as
liberal scholars of International Relations benefited from the decline of Soviet institutions,
realists became strengthened in the context of the new consolidation of the Russian state.
Constructivists and essentialists too had to learn to exploit existing social institutions and
sources of support.
Because the social sciences respond to human needs and desires, it is important to
study the ideological foundations of IR theory. Although not in the literal sense, theory
follows politics, and when political changes bring a new form of ideological competition,
social science research agendas also get modified, with old concepts and theories

giving way to those that are more attuned to a new ideological agenda. As scholars of
International Relations develop a better awareness of the cultural and ideological
assumptions behind their research, it is important to study the various roles played by
these assumptions, as well as ways in which one can move beyond the Self–Other
dichotomy in empirical research and policy recommendations. If we are to develop a
truly global understanding of IR theory formation, the examination of non-American
and non-Western ideological assumptions is just as important as those of America and
the West.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was delivered at the 49th Annual International Studies Association
Convention, San Francisco, USA, 27 March 2008. The authors are grateful to the editors of the
European Journal of International Relations and the anonymous reviewers of the article for criti-
cal comments and encouragement. The usual disclaimers apply.
Notes
1 Historically the tradition is rooted in work by Karl Mannheim (1968 [1936]) and Max Weber,
among others. For contemporary scholarship focusing on social foundations of knowledge, see
especially, Hoffmann (1995 [1977]), Waever (1998), and Crawford and Jarvis (2001).
2 For work emphasizing global spread of Western political and economic institutions, see Friedman
(1999) and Mandelbaum (2002). For earlier works of a similar ideological spin, see espe-
cially Fukuyama (1989).
3 The theory was known precisely for projecting Western views and values across the globe
and for offering ethnocentric, context-insensitive policy advice to non-Western societies. For
some critiques of modernization theory as ethnocentric, see Wiarda (1981), Badie (2000),
and Oren (2000).
4 See Gerring (1997) and Freeden (2006) for a recent theoretical discussion of ideology.
5 The literature on ideas and intellectual influences in shaping cultural identities is large. See, for
instance, Mannheim (1968 [1936]), Habermas (1973), Wolfe (1989), Said (1993), Neumann
(1996), Suny and Kennedy (2001), English (2000), Oren (2002), and Tsygankov (2004).
6 For a summary of the debate, see, for example, Brown et al. (1996), Ray (2003), and
Chernoff (2004).
7 This section relies on discussion in Tsygankov (2006: Ch. 1), which provides a more detailed
description of the three ideological traditions. For other discussions, see Neumann (1996),
Prizel (1998), Ringmar (2002), and Hopf (2002).
8 On Eurasianism and its influence in the contemporary Russia, see Solovyev (2004), Bassin and
Aksenov (2006), and Shlapentokh (2007).
9 For other overviews of the Russian discipline of international studies, see Sergounin (2000),
Bogaturov et al. (2002), Shakleyina (2002), Lebedeva (2003, 2004a), Kokoshin and Bogaturov
(2005), Torkunov (2004), and Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2004, 2006).
10 Such was the position of Marina Lebedeva (2004b), who initiated the discussion. Lebedeva
was then engaged by several other participants, whose presentations have been published by
the journal. The substance of the discussion can be found at: http://www.intertrends.ru
11 In another book, Dmitri Trenin (2006), while granting Russia a right to pursue a distinct path,
assumes that the country needs to ‘become’ a part of Europe and the ‘new’ West. Russia, he

says, has been historically European, yet it often ‘fell out of’ Europe (2006: 63, 167) as a result
of failed reform efforts. If this is the case, then what Russia really needs is to ‘return’ to Europe,
rather than preserve its identity and distinctiveness.
12 Such practice was not exclusive to the post-Soviet era. For instance, before coming to power
Mikhail Gorbachev and his team, including Alexander Yakovlev, had been influenced —
through their advisors — by Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane’s (1971) theories of trasna-
tionalism and interdependence. Interestingly enough, after Gorbachev came to power, Nye was
one of the first non-Marxist International Relations theorists to publish several of his articles in
the leading Russian journal MEiMO (Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyiye Otnosheniya).
13 For detailed analyses of Dugin’s writing and political activities, see Umland (2003), and
Laruelle (2006).
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Pavel A. Tsygankov is Professor of International Relations at Moscow State University, Russia.

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National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the 'Russian idea'

The online version of this article can be found at:

Standing Group on International Relations of the ECPR

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between IR theory as an academic/social institution and foreign policy discussions —

National ideology and IR theory

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consumer of already developed knowledge. Borrowing from these schools, scholars of

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accompanied by state weakness, thereby becoming a permissive condition allowing for

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The ‘Russian idea’:Three schools of thinking

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Table 1. Three Russian ideologies

Westernism Statism Civilizationism

Self Part of the West Derzhava, or Independent civilization

Westernism and Russian liberal IR theory

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Statism, Derzhava, and Russian realist IR

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Civilizationism and the choice between culturally essentialist

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Table 2. Ideologies, theories and concepts in Russian IR: Some examples

Ideologies Theories Concepts

International Regional Order Foreign Policy

Westernism Liberalism Democratic End of Eurasia Atlanticism and

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Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at Shanghai Jiaotong University on May 7, 2011

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Inayatullah N, Blaney DL (1996) Knowing encounters: Beyond paroichialism in International

Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at Shanghai Jiaotong University on May 7, 2011

Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at Shanghai Jiaotong University on May 7, 2011

Sergounin AA (2000) Russian post-communist foreign policy thinking at the cross-roads.

Downloaded from ejt.sagepub.com at Shanghai Jiaotong University on May 7, 2011

Tsygankov AP, Tsygankov PA (2007) A sociology of dependence in International Relations theory:

Pavel A. Tsygankov is Professor of International Relations at Moscow State University, Russia.

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