MARRIAGE

1. Falcis vs. Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019

Facts: On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to
“declare article 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles
46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”
Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v.
Executive Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
(Associate Justice Brion) in Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion’s separate opinion, he claims
that this Court should follow a “‘fresh’ approach to this Court’s judicial power” and find that his Petition
pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere
passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion, and that the issues he raised were of such transcendental importance as to warrant the
setting aside of procedural niceties.

Issue: Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right
to life and liberty;

Ruling: Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn
state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise:

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to
legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional
right to marry cannot be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the
law. Rather, the law itself must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry
necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal framework. (Emphasis
supplied)

In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all
intimate relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to
marital relationships.
For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of persons to the
rather restrictive nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point is
to constrain the relationships of those persons who did not even take part or join in this Petition to what
our laws may forbiddingly define as the norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving
freely, which petitioner himself consistently raised:
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That
is, that it is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as
romantic. In truth, each commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the
sacrifices it has gone through, and defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties
creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It
is that which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as
possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring. (Emphasis
supplied)

Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community.
Prematurely adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It
may unwittingly diminish the LGBTQI+ community’s capacity to create a strong movement that ensures
lasting recognition, as well as public understanding, of SOGIESC.
The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a static
anthropological fact. The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing roles
undertaken by men and women, especially under the present economic conditions.
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the
sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do
not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile
couples, families formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family
organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.

Facts: On May 18, 2015, Falcis filed a pro se Petition seeking to declare articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code as unconstitutional and nullify related provisions. He argued that the petition should be treated as a
constitutional case and cited the importance of the issues raised.

Issue: Whether the right to marry and choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life and liberty.

Ruling: Yes. However, the task of devising arrangements for same-sex relations is left to Congress. The
right to marry imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish a legal framework. The court
emphasized that not all intimate relationships are the same and that instantly sanctioning same-sex
marriage may constrain relationships and delay more inclusive arrangements. The court also highlighted
the evolving concept of family and the need to move away from heteronormativity in marriage to avoid
perpetuating discrimination and reinforcing gender stereotypes.

2. Zulueta vs. Martin, G. R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent’s clinic without the latter’s knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the Ipresence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs.

The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held: (1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable”
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception
to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

3. Duncan Association vs. Glaxo, G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to
study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship
by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides these conditions; that otherwise, the management and the
employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking
position” or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding
the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and
Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.

Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would resign from
their jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against entering into a
relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was
planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning to avail of the
redundancy package to be offered by Astra.

Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Thereafter, Tecson applied for a transfer in
Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible”
policy.

Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked
Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the transfer order and
continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance
machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer. On
November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision
declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
CA sustained; MR denied.

Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor
companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions
among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right
to marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed

GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or
marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and
does not violate the equal protection clause;

The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its secrets,
procedures and policies; that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy because when
he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy was stipulated therein.

ISSUE: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is
valid

HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims
to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets
and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to
reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.21

EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and
marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest
between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.

Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest
brought about by his relationship with Bettsy.
**FACTS:**

Pedro A. Tecson joined Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. in 1995 and signed a contract agreeing to
company rules, including disclosure of relationships with employees of competing companies. Despite
warnings, Tecson entered a relationship and later married Bettsy, an Astra Pharmaceuticals employee,
Glaxo's competitor.

**DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE:**

Efforts to resolve the conflict through voluntary arbitration failed, leading to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board's decision supporting Glaxo's policy and Tecson's transfer. The Court of Appeals upheld
this decision, denying Tecson's Motion for Reconsideration.

**ISSUE:**

The central question is the validity of Glaxo's policy against employees marrying individuals from
competitor companies.

**HELD:**

The Court found the petition lacking merit, affirming Glaxo's right to protect its trade secrets and
confidential information. The prohibition on employee relationships with competitors is deemed
reasonable to safeguard the company's interests. While laws prioritize social justice, management rights
are acknowledged for fair play.

**EQUAL-PROTECTION:**

Dismissal of the equal-protection argument is grounded in Glaxo's allowance of employee relationships,

aiming solely to prevent conflicts of interest. Tecson was given multiple chances to resolve the conflict,
emphasizing the reasonableness of Glaxo's actions.

4. Star Paper vs. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

FACTS: Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-employee and they eventually had a
relationship and got married. Prior to the marriage, the manager advise the couple that should they
decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy: 1) new applicant will not
be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd degree of consanguinity, already employed by
the company. 2) if the two employees got married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated first. Simbol resigned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company, a
valid exercise of management prerogative.

RULING: No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees
under the constitution. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated , or to actually dismiss, discharge ,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.” The company
policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the requirement of reasonableness. In the case
at bar, there was no reasonable business necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section,
could be detrimental to its business operations. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136
of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only
way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our
jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.

5. Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name to “Mely” and
sex (gender) in his birth certificate be changed to female since he underwent sex reassignment surgery.
The OSG alleges that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the live birth certificate by reason
of sex reassignment surgery.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in
the live birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.

RULING: No. It is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. Presently, there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. A law has to be enacted by the legislative
body laying down the guidelines governing the change of entries in birth certificate due to sex
reassignment in order to enter the same in civil registry.

6. Republic vs. Cagandahan, G. R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Facts: The plaintiff was registered at birth as female, but developed secondary male characteristics over
time. He was diagnosed with congenital adrenal hyperplasia and displayed both male and female
characteristics. At age six the plaintiff was diagnosed with clitoral hypertrophy and small ovaries; at age
thirteen the ovaries had minimised, he had no breasts and no menstrual cycle. He stated that in his
mind, appearance, emotions and interests he was a male person, and therefore asked that his birth
certificate sex be changed to male, and that his name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. A medical expert
testified that the plaintiff was genetically female but that, because the plaintiff’s body secreted male
hormones, his female organs had not developed normally. He further testified that the plaintiff’s condition
was permanent and recommended the change of gender because the plaintiff had adjusted to his
chosen role as male and the gender change would be advantageous to him.

Issue: Whether the court should recognise a new name and gender identity to reflect the chosen gender
of an intersex person who was raised as the opposite gender.

Ruling: The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

Cagandahan thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
According to the Court, for intersex persons gender classification at birth was inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons like Cagandahan, is fixed.

The Court considered that the plaintiff had allowed “nature to take its course” and had not interfered with
what “he was born with”. By not forcing his body to become female, he permitted the male characteristics
of the body to develop. Thus the Court rejected the objections of the solicitor general and held that,
where no law governed the matter,

The Court held that where the individual was biologically or naturally intersex, it was reasonable to allow
that person to determine his or her own gender.

7. Republic vs. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 15, 2013

FACTS: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on filed a
petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways;
that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described
their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein
case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.
RULING: No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”

8. Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129

Facts: Complainant Mayor Navarro files a complaint against respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law. Nature of the Case: Administrative complaint against a judge’s
misconduct. Charges of Mayor Navarro against Judge Domagtoy:

1. He solemnized a wedding despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
2. He performed a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction

Explanation of the judge: (1) He merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of
Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that the groom and his first wife have not seen each other for almost
seven years; (2) He did not violate article 7 and 8 of the Family Code.

Issues and Ruling: Did judge Domagtoy validly solemnized the marriage? No.

The groom’s first wife left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor
been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda’s
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. The Court does
not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: To contract a subsequent marriage…, the [remaining]
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan [groom] did not institute a summary proceeding for his first wife’s
presumptive death. He therefore remains married to Ida Peñaranda. It was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom.

Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, ” The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41.”

Did the respondent judge acted with gross ignorance of Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code? Yes

Respondent judge misunderstood Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code.

For Article 7, “An incumbent member of the judiciary may only solemnize marriage within the court’s
jurisdiction;” Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte.

For Article 8, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario, and not both contracting parties. Article 8, which is a directory provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate
the marriage.

In this case, Complainant Mayor Navarro alleges gross misconduct, inefficiency, and ignorance of the
law against Respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. The charges include
solemnizing a wedding despite knowledge of the groom's separation, performing a marriage outside the
court's jurisdiction, and misunderstanding Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code. The respondent justifies
his actions by relying on an affidavit from another judge and claiming no violation of relevant articles.
However, the court rules against Judge Domagtoy, finding that the groom's first wife had not been
properly declared presumptively dead through a summary proceeding, rendering the subsequent
marriage bigamous and void. Additionally, the court concludes that Judge Domagtoy acted with gross
ignorance of the law by solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and misinterpreting Articles 7
and 8 of the Family Code.

9. OCA vs. Justalero, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2424 (Formerly A.M. No. 15-12-390-RTC). January 18, 2023

Facts: The case involves Judge Justalero, who was designated as the Assisting Judge in the RTC of
Barotac Viejo alongside his duties as the Presiding Judge of Branch 32, RTC of Iloilo City. A regular
judicial audit revealed irregularities in Judge Justalero's handling of nullity of marriage cases, such as
unusually swift decisions, failure to follow proper procedures, and various irregularities in the court
process. This led to a discreet investigation and ultimately resulted in his preventive suspension and a
formal administrative complaint against him.

Judge Justalero defended himself, stating that he aimed to expedite case resolution and argued that his
actions were within the Rules of Procedure. However, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended his dismissal for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, gross misconduct, and
incompetency, citing his failure to provide justifiable reasons for the irregularities and the potential
misuse of his court for favorable decisions in nullity cases.

In summary, the case revolves around allegations of misconduct and irregularities in Judge Justalero's
handling of nullity of marriage cases, leading to a recommendation for his dismissal from the service.

Issue: whether Judge Globert J. Justalero should be held liable for guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and procedure, gross misconduct, and incompetency.
Ruling: In this case, the Court found Judge Globert J. Justalero guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, as well as gross misconduct. The charges against him stem from several violations,
including:

1. Disregarding the rules of procedure when handling cases of nullity and annulment of
marriage.
2. Failing to ascertain the true residence of parties in these cases, which is essential for
determining jurisdiction.
3. Not complying with the requirement to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the
public prosecutor with copies of the petition for the declaration of nullity of void marriages.
4. Various procedural lapses and violations in handling cases.

Due to these serious charges, the Court imposed a penalty of suspending Judge Justalero from office
without pay for one year. Additionally, he received a stern warning that any repetition of similar offenses
would be dealt with more severely.

The violations by Judge Justalero related to his role in solemnizing marriages and notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation, which he performed without proper authority and in contravention of established rules, were
a significant part of the charges.

This ruling serves as a reminder of the importance of judges' adherence to the law and procedural rules,
particularly when dealing with cases involving the sanctity of marriage.

10. Alcantara vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange
a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest.
They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of
their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with
whom he has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA
affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall
and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage
license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara
and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage
license number.

ISSUE: Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?
HELD: No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom
the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the
fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license
to impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the city or
municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding
the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took
place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City
Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the
situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.

11. De Castro vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

Facts: Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage license. However, when they went back to the Office
of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to get married as soon as
possible, they executed an Affidavit dated 13 March 1995 to show that they had been living together as
husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the marriage license requirement. They got
married on the same date before a judge. After the ceremony, however, they did not live together as
husband and wife.

In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia. In 1998, Annabelle filed a
petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he had not given support to her and their child.

In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio
since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit. He alleged that they never cohabited with each
other five years before their marriage, hence they were not exempted from the requirement of a marriage
license. He also denied being the father of Tricia.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Annabelle and Reinel is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared Reinel as the natural father of the Tricia,
and thus obliged to give her support. Reinel appealed.

The CA ruled that since the case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the
marriage of Annabelle and Reinel as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of
the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the
parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. It also ruled that
Tricia, having born during the subsistence of a marriage, is the legitimate child of Reinel.

Issues:

1. Has the trial court jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle
even though the case before it is for support? In other words, may the marriage be attacked collaterally?

2. Is the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle valid?

3. Is Reinna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?

Held:

1.) Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Nial v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

2.) No. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties
to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the
instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.

3.) Reianna Tricia is an illegitimate daughter of Reinel, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit
waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child. (De
Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008)
12. De Loria vs. Felix, G. R. No. L-9005, June 20, 1958

FACTS: Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and husband in Pasay City. They
acquired properties but had no children. Matea became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition,
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and convinced her to go for confession. They fetched
Father Bautista, Catholic priest of Pasay and the latter upon hearing the confession of the bed-ridden
Matea and knowing that she is living with Felipe without the benefit of marriage then ratified the union of
the two by solemnizing their marriage in articulo mortis with the consent of Felix. Matea recovered from
her illnes but died subsequently after few months. Arsenio and Ricarda de Loria, granchildren of
Matea’s sister filed a complaint and complete delivery of the property of the deceased contending that
they are the succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the marriage of the latter is not valid because of
lack of marriage contract signed by the contracting parties. Felix resisted the action standing his rights
as the widower. CFI ruled in favor of the complainants but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis is valid.

HELD: YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis, where all the requisites are present
renders its validity. The failure of the solemnizing priest to make and file an affidavit as required under
Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law does not affect the validity nor renders the nullity of said marriage.
Hence, CA’s devision is affirmed.

13. Pugeda vs. Trias, G.R. No. L-16925, March 31, 1962

FACTS: On January 5, 1916, plaintiff and the Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of the
Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them, that accordingly to
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of them was Santiago
Salazar and another Amadeo Prudente, and after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to
sign two copies of a marriage contract and after the witness had signed the some, he delivered one copy
to the contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that
time the keeper of the records of the civil register. It is also stated that after the marriage, Pugeda and
Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for 18 years.

The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a phtostatic copy of the marriages
in the municipality of Rosario Cavite in the month of January 1916 which showed that no records of the
alleged marriage existed therein but the Justice of the Peace explained perhaps the person who kept the
register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer exist.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage existed, in view of the proofs presented which are the testimony of the justice of the
peace who solemnized the marriage and the living together of the parties as husband and wife for 18
years. The failure of the solemnizing officer to send a copy of the marriage certificate as well when the
person who kept the register forgot to make an entry are not a fatal defects.

14. Mariategui vs. CA, G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first
wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo.
Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s
second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married
for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of
the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

15. People vs. Borromeo, G.R. No. 61873, October 31, 1984

Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde
Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told
her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to
Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling
incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they
were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for “homicide” and not “parricide”. He thinks
such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in
his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed
married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the
validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are :
legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as
long as the celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in
the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000
16. Republic vs. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

Doctrine: In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent\ circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In this case, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

FACTS: Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend. Upon its receipt, she
discovered she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune in 2002. However, she denied havi ng
contracted marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. Her signature was also
allegedly forged. Thus, she filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially
the wife portion thereof.

The Office of the Solicitor General argued that in directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife
portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage void ab initio. Thus, the
petition instituted by Merlinda was actually a petition fpmyor declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise
of a Rule 108 proceeding which provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of “ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.

RULING: No. In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry
in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.

In this case, with the testimonies and other evidence presented, the RTC held that Merlinda’s signature
in the marriage certificate was not hers and was forged. Therefore, it was established that no marriage
was celebrated. On the contrary, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented
to show the existence of marriage. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.

17. Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985 (MIXED MARRIAGES)

Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their
residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had
remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held: As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He
was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

18. Garcia vs. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 738-739 (2001)

Facts: In this case, Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, and Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, were
married in the Philippines in 1987. They subsequently lived in Australia and obtained a divorce in 1989 in
an Australian family court. Respondent, also a Filipino, became an Australian citizen in 1992. In 1994, he
married another Filipina, and they lived together. The first wife filed a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage in 1998, alleging bigamy. Respondent argued that he had already informed the
second wife about his previous marriage's dissolution, and he obtained another divorce in Australia in
1998. The trial court ruled that the Australian divorce was valid and recognized in the Philippines,
dissolving the marriage without focusing on the issue of legal capacity to remarry.

Issues:
1. whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
2. whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

Rulings:

1. The first issue addressed the recognition of the divorce between the respondent and Editha
Samson. The petitioner challenged the trial court's recognition of the divorce decree, arguing
that it needed proof of the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and the actual divorce decree.
The court clarified that the divorce obtained by a foreigner may be recognized in the Philippines,
but it requires proof of the divorce decree itself and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
The divorce decree was admitted as evidence in the case but not properly objected to by the
petitioner, making it admissible. The court also noted that the registration requirements of the
Family Code didn't apply to the respondent due to his Australian citizenship.

2. The second issue revolved around the respondent's legal capacity to remarry. The petitioner
contended that the divorce wasn't enough to establish the respondent's legal capacity to remarry
in 1994. The court highlighted that the type of divorce obtained was unclear, and the decree
contained a restriction indicating a provisional judgment. Therefore, it didn't automatically
establish the respondent's capacity to remarry. The court emphasized that the burden of proving
the Australian divorce law and its effects fell on the respondent, and no evidence was presented
to show his legal capacity to marry the petitioner. The court ordered a remand of the case for
further evidence or a declaration of nullity based on bigamy if no evidence was provided.

19. Republic vs. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City. In
1986, Lady Myros left for the United States, bringing one of their children with her. A few years later,
Cirpriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, and sometime in 2000,
he learned that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and was remarried to Innocent Stanley. Because
of this, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to remarry, invoking Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code of the Philippines which states

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the said provision cannot be applicable in this case
since Article 26 talks about mixed marriages, i.e., that of a Filipino to a foreigner. However, this was not
the case in Cipriano and Lady Myros’ marriage since both were Filipinos at the time of the marriage

Issues:
1. Does paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply in this case?
2. Can Cipriano remarry?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court looked at the legal intent of the provision and found out that the Civil Code Revision
Committee’s intent in including Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse is
deemed to remain married to the foreigner when, after obtaining the divorce, the foreigner is no longer
married to the Filipino. The Court then set the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2, Article 26
as follows:
● There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
● A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The Court made it clear that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad. Hence, since Lady Myros was already an American citizen at the time she obtained the
divorce abroad, Article 26 may be applied to the case.

2. Yes. As stated earlier, Lady Myros obtained the divorce in the United States at the time when she was
already an American citizen. This makes her divorce valid and has in fact incapacitated her to remarry.
Cipriano, then, can also remarry as provided in Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

20. Republic vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018 (The Court en banc extended the scope of
Article 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino
spouse)

Facts: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a
case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was
granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil
Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead
of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration.
According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign
spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the
wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained
abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse
or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the
divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation
since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if
Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They
said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination
against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce
decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike,
and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would
give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but
also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse,
cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application
of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the
foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree
is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese
law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

21. Racho vs. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018

Doctrine: Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the
foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes
“validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the
Filipino spouse. The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or
participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be
prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.

FACTS: Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They
lived together for nine years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho alleged that on December
16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate issued
by Consul Kenichiro Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated by
the DFA. She was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return
to the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial
recognition of divorce.

She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused
since there was no court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to
renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper court order. She was also
informed by the National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of
Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to remarry.

She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry before the RTC but
the latter held that failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. Racho filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC but the
latter deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly authenticated acceptance
certificate of the notification of divorce. On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance,
attaching a duly authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in
Japan.

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon
notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two or more witnesses. She contends that the
Divorce Certificate stating “Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of
Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan” is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by
agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce. She avers further that under Japanese
law, the manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of its
acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She insists that she is now legally
capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce.

ISSUE: Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that
a divorce was validly obtained by Tanaka according to his national law.

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be
recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national
law. The second paragraph provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, the court
established the principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate
action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign
judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse
must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts.

To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama.
This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance Certification of Notification of
Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner
submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce has been
accepted.

The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a question of fact that
would not ordinarily be within this Court’s ambit to resolve. The court records, however, are already
sufficient to fully resolve the factual issues.

Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General neither posed any objection to the admission of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce nor argued that the Petition presented questions of
fact. In the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by agreement is not the divorce
contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code. In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who
bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our
Constitution provides that State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean
that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign
spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the
divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow. The question in this case, therefore, is not
who among the spouses initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner and
respondent was valid.

Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the
divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the
legal capacity to remarry.

22. Moraña v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227605, December 5, 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Petitioner and Minoru Takahasi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila but ten years later, the couple got
estranged.The husband refused to give support and even cohabited with another woman. Because of
her persistent demand for financial support, her husband suggested they secure a divorce so the
Japanese government would give financial assistance to their children. Thus, petitioner agreed to
divorce her husband and they jointly applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City.
It was granted and they were issued a corresponding Divorce Report. Petitioner then filed with the
RTC-Manila an action for recognition of the Divorce Report but the trial court dismissed the petition for
failure to present in evidence the Divorce Decree itself. The motion for reconsideration was denied and
the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The Court ruled that records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to
the petitioner and her husband when they applied for divorce. There was no “divorce judgment” to speak
of because the divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the office of
the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce Report was
issued by the office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official body in
Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the “Divorce
Decree” in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former
husband.

However, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese
law on divorce and its English translation. Nevertheless, the Court gave petitioner a chance to prove the
Japanese law by remanding the case back to the trial court.

FACTS:
On June 24, 2002, petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila. Thereafter,
they moved to live in Japan where they bore two (2) children, namely: Haruna Takahashi (born on
January 5, 2003) and Nanami Takahashi (born on May 8, 2006). Ten (10) years later, the couple got
estranged. Petitioner alleged that her husband failed to perform his marital obligations to her. He refused
to give support to their two (2) children, and worse, started cohabiting with another woman. Because of
her persistent demand for financial support, her husband suggested they secure a divorce so the
Japanese government would give financial assistance to their children and send them to school.
Believing it was for the good of their children, petitioner agreed to divorce her husband. Consequently,
they jointly applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, Japan. On May 22,
2012, the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City granted their application for divorce and issued the
corresponding Divorce Report. On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court-Manila
an action for recognition of the Divorce Report. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to present
in evidence the Divorce Decree itself. The trial court held that the Divorce Report and Certificate of All
Matters cannot take the place of the Divorce Decree itself which is the best evidence here. Besides, the
authenticated Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese government was not even included in
petitioner’s formal offer of evidence aside from the fact that it was a mere photocopy and was not
properly identified nay authenticated in open court. Too, on cross, it appeared that petitioner herself was
the one who secured the Divorce Decree which fact is not allowed under Philippine laws. The trial court
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays that the dispositions of the Court of
Appeals be reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained in Japan may be enforced in the Philippines even if there was no
divorce decree but merely a divorce report – YES

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

Republic v. Manalo emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse who initiated and obtained the
divorce decree, the same may be recognized in the Philippines. Racho v. Tanaka further enunciated that
the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own
nationals. Verily, therefore, even though it was petitioner herself or jointly with her husband who applied
for and obtained the divorce decree in this case, the same may be recognized in our jurisdiction.

Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to petitioner and her
husband when they applied for divorce. There was no “divorce judgment” to speak of because the
divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued by
the office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official body in Japan. By
whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the “Divorce Decree” in Japan,
hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.

However, here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent portions of the
Japanese law on divorce and its English translation. There was no proof at all that these printouts
reflected the existing law on divorce in Japan and its correct English translation. Indeed, our rules require
more than a printout from a website to prove a foreign law. At any rate, considering that the fact of
divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of substantial justice compels that petitioner be
afforded the chance to properly prove the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner may
be eventually freed from a marriage in which she is the only remaining party. Thus, the case was
remanded to the trial court.

23. Galapon vs. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020

FACTS: Cynthia Galapon, a Filipino citizen, and Noh Shik Park, a South Korean national, got married in
Manila, on February 27, 2012, but divorced by mutual agreement in South Korea on July 16, 2012, by
the Cheongju Local Court. Cynthia filed before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, a Petition for the
Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce, which the case was ordered to be heard and its notice was
published in The Daily Tribune once per week for three consecutive weeks. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Notice of Appearance for the Republic of the Philippines with the assistance of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

Abigail Galapon represented her sister Cynthia and claimed that her sister could not personally testify
due to the expiration of her Korean visa. Abigail alleged that Park intended to marry his former girlfriend,
thus he threatened Cynthia’s life and forced her to agree to the divorce. The RTC granted the
Recognition Petition, but the OSG filed a Petition for Reconsideration arguing that (1) the case should
have been filed at the RTC of Manila City and (2) absolute divorce is not applicable in the case.

The Petition for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, thus the OSG
elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA (1) held that courts cannot motu propio
dismiss an action on the ground of improper venue. However, (2) it upheld that absolute divorce cannot
be granted since it was through a mutual agreement and not initiated by the foreign spouse as stated in
Article 26(2) of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of appeals erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Cynthia
and her foreign spouse.

HELD:
Yes. Article 26 of the family code states that “All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38 where a marriage between a Filipino Citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

In the recent case of Manalo the Court extended the scope [of] Article 26 (2) and removed the distinction
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and a Filipino who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated the proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instances, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.

The fact that the couple obtained divorce through a mutual agreement does not assail Article 26(2) of the
Family Code which states that a Filipino spouse can remarry whenever the foreign spouse obtained
divorce capacitating him or her to remarry
Pursuant to the majority in the Manalo case, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce
decree is:

1. obtained by the foreign spouse

2. obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and
3. obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.

Hence, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia’s conformity, falls within the scope
of Article 26 (2) and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.

24. Abel vs. Rule, G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021

Facts: In this case, the important facts revolve around a marriage between a Filipino citizen, Mindy P.
Rule, and a United States citizen, Raemark S. Abel, which took place in California in 2005.
Subsequently, in 2008, both spouses jointly filed for a summary dissolution of their marriage in California,
which was ultimately granted. After their divorce, Abel reacquired his Filipino citizenship, while Rule
became a U.S. citizen. In 2017, Abel sought judicial recognition of the foreign divorce in the Philippines.
However, the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the recognition, arguing that the divorce, which was
jointly obtained, did not meet the requirements of Article 26(2) of the Family Code. The Regional Trial
Court initially dismissed the petition, citing the joint nature of the divorce as a violation of Article 26(2).
Abel appealed the decision, contending that the divorce should be recognized, regardless of which
spouse initiated the proceedings.

Issue: whether a jointly obtained foreign divorce can be recognized in the Philippines

Held: The court's ruling in this case centers on the recognition of a foreign divorce obtained jointly by a
Filipino citizen and an alien spouse. The court, based on previous jurisprudence, emphasized that the
critical factor for recognition is the validity of the divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse, rather than
which spouse initiated the divorce proceedings. Citing Article 26(2) of the Family Code, the court held
that the law does not make a distinction based on the initiator of the divorce, and it applies to mixed
marriages where the divorce decree is obtained by the foreign spouse, jointly by the Filipino and foreign
spouse, or solely by the Filipino spouse. The decision also highlighted the importance of upholding
fundamental equality between women and men before the law, as mandated by the Constitution and the
Magna Carta of Women.

In conclusion, the court's legal basis for the decision primarily relies on Article 26(2) of the Family Code
and is reinforced by the Constitution's commitment to ensuring fundamental equality between genders.
The ruling asserts that a foreign divorce, even if jointly obtained, is capable of being recognized in the
Philippines as long as it was validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse, thereby capacitating both
parties to remarry under Philippine law. This decision aims to eliminate discrimination and uphold the
principle of equal rights in marriage and divorce proceedings.

25. Najera vs. Najera, G.R. No. 164817, July 3, 2009

Facts: On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator
Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are
residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United States of America
(U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner claimed that at the time
of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Order terminating the pre-trial conference after the parties signed
a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal partnership
of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the
chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether
the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the
brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with
borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member
of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner
that respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without
provocation on her part, and that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police
blotter.

Issue:Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriagewarranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence submitted
by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.

26. Dedel vs. CA, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004

Facts: On January 29, 2004, David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married. After leaving the country,
Sharon returned to David, bringing along her two children from a previous marriage on September 28,
1996, and May 20, 1967, in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children together.
David initiated a case for the nullity of their marriage, citing Sharon's psychological incapacity to fulfill
basic marital obligations. He alleged that Sharon had extramarital affairs with various men, including a
dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national.

Despite undergoing treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon continued her illicit relationship with the
Jordanian, whom she eventually married and had two children with. David accepted her back and
acknowledged the Jordanian's children as his own. However, Sharon later abandoned David, taking her
two children with the Jordanian, and would only return to the country on special occasions.

Dr. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David, describing him as
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, and a perfectionist. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that
Sharon suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder, exhibiting infidelity without remorse. Sharon's
actions, including bringing her two children from the Jordanian to live with David, indicated immaturity
and irresponsibility, amounting to psychological incapacity to fulfill marital obligations.

The trial court declared their marriage null and void due to Sharon's psychological incapacity. However,
the Court of Appeals overturned the decision, dismissing the petition. David's motion for reconsideration
was denied, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Sharon's infidelity is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ruling: No, Sharon's infidelity is not equivalent to psychological incapacity. The court clarified that
psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity that renders a party incapable of
understanding and fulfilling basic marital covenants. Sharon's sexual infidelity, perversion, and
abandonment, without evidence of a disordered personality, do not constitute psychological incapacity
under the Family Code. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, even when coupled with sexual
promiscuity, do not meet the threshold for declaring a marriage void. Instead, these circumstances may
be grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. The decision was affirmed, and the
petition was denied.
27. Eng Kiam vs. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006

Facts: Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong, and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13, 1975.
They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton, who are now all of the age of majority.
Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation, and grossly abusive conduct. William would also scold and beat
the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt. Whenever she tried to stop
William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her. On December 9, 1995, William
hit her on the stomach, and when she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head. He then
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house. She went to her sister’s house in Binondo, where
she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents' house in Dagupan. The following day,
she sought treatment for her injuries from her parents' doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano.

William, for his part, denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on
December 9, 1995, at their house in Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium, and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.

Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to the repeated
physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William, on the other hand, maintains that the real
motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging
to the conjugal partnership, which were acquired through his sole efforts. Also, William reiterated that
Lucita cannot file the petition since it was Lucita who abandoned their conjugal dwelling.

Issue: Whether or not the defenses of William are valid.

Ruling: William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for
her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties. The Court finds such reasoning hard to
believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial
interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for
legal separation, a cause so strong that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts.

The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a
wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a
smear on his reputation, then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts
but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of
legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code, which provides that
legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The
abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

28. Bugayong vs. Ginez, L-10033, December 28, 1956

Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc,
Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.

Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought
for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of
Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they returned
to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the third day,
Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed
adultery but, instead of answering his query, she merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted
efforts to locate her.

Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an answer
vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned by her husband.

Issue: Whether or not there was condonation in this case.

Ruling: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A
detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a
condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery"
committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to
adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff.
The act of thelatter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the
opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of decisions of the
various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the
plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the
inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation.

29. De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, February 23, 1960

Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are now
living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying
his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying
marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where
she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out
with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had
finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the
name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation. Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned
her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her after having discovered her
adulterous acts.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.

Ruling: We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the
latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It
will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her
dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was
the obligation to return.

Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's
consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital difference
will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her
husband.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed
decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.

30. Llave vs. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Facts: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate
children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City forthe declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Issue: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

Ruling: Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under
civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and
non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist
at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party isa Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

31. Ado-an Morimoto vs. Morimoto and the Republic, G.R. No. 247576, March 15, 2021

Facts: Sometime before December 2007, Rosario was introduced to Yoshio as one with whom she can
simulate a marriage with for her to acquire a Japanese Visa. On December 5, 2007, they met at the
Manila City Hall and signed a blank marriage certificate. They were assured by the S.O. that such
certificate will never be registered in the Civil Registry.

Eventually, when she was about to secure a Certificate of No Marriage, she found out that a Certificate
of Marriage was registered that she married Yoshio on December 5, 2007, in a ceremony officiated by a
certain Reverend Roberto Espiritu. There was also a marriage license that appeared on record that was
issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of San Juan.

On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for Declaration of nullity of Marriage before the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court. She claimed that the marriage did not actually happen and that there was no
application for a marriage license at all. As proof she provided as evidence a certification issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, NSO, stating that “said office mistakenly stated that a marriage was
solemnized between Rosario and Yoshio.” She also provided as evidence a Certificate issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, San Juan City, which states that "no record of Marriage License No.
6120159 was issued to the parties.” The RTC denied her petition and the CA also denied her appeal.
Appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the registered marriage between petitioner Rosario D. Ado-An-Morimoto and
respondent Yoshio Morimoto should be declared null and void.

Ruling: The case involves a petition for the declaration of nullity of a marriage between Rosario D.
Ado-an-Morimoto and Yoshio Morimoto. Rosario claimed that the marriage was simulated and never
actually took place, as it was used as a front for obtaining a Japanese visa. The court found that the
marriage lacked the essential and formal requisites required by the Family Code, specifically the
absence of genuine consent and the lack of a marriage license. The court also considered Rosario's
admission against her own interest as credible evidence. The decision declared the registered marriage
between Rosario and Yoshio null and void, as it was considered a fictitious and non-existent marriage.

In essence, the ruling emphasizes that simulated marriages used for fraudulent purposes, such as
obtaining benefits, are void from the beginning and should not be recognized by the courts. The decision
underscores the importance of upholding the sanctity of marriage while also preventing the abuse of the
institution for illicit gain.

32. Kho vs. Republic and Kho, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

FACTS: Sometime in the afternoon of May 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever
necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent
supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing
the marriage ceremony;

Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony. Petitioner has
never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much
less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;

Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer’s office was told
to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the
forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1,
1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage
solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite and neither was it
performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage license;

Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to
their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

Respondent filed her Answer praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action
because there is no evidence to prove petitioner’s allegation that their marriage was celebrated without
the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally
appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before
their marriage was solemnized.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE
OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT’S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE
RULING: The marriage is void for not having a valid marriage license.

Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article

The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code
spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:

ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact
that the license is the essence of the marriage contract

As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar “has no record nor copy of
any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata
[respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972.”21 Thus, on the basis of such
Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and
it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such
validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.

Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled
with respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show
that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple
defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage license was issued
and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is
null and void

It can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As
cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same
Code. As earlier stated, petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exception

FOR WRITING: In this ruling, the court emphasizes the requirement for a valid marriage license under
Article 53 of the Civil Code for the solemnization of marriages, unless it falls under specific exceptions.
The marriage in question, celebrated on June 1, 1972, is governed by the Civil Code, and the absence of
a marriage license renders it void. The petitioner presented a certification from the Municipal Civil
Registrar stating the non-issuance of a marriage license for the parties involved. The burden then shifted
to the respondent to prove the validity of the marriage, which she failed to do. The court concludes that
the absence of a valid marriage license, as evidenced by the certification and the respondent's failure to
provide contrary evidence, renders the marriage null and void. The court rejects the argument that a
wedding ceremony and a signed marriage contract can cure the absence of a valid marriage license,
emphasizing that Article 80(3) of the Civil Code deems marriages without a license void from the
beginning, with only specific exceptions applying.

33. Jumaquio vs. People, G.R. No. 224742, August 7, 2019

Facts: Petitioner was married to Arlene De Guzman. After sometime, he abandoned his wife and
children. Arlene discovered that petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Jean Basan
which prompted her to file this bigamy case. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. However,
RTC found all the elements of the bigamy present; hence, he was found guilty of the crime charged. In
defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene is void because the copy of their Marriage
Contract, which was secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO), did not bear the solemnizing
officer's signature. In addition, he contracted the second marriage in good faith since NSO issued a
Certificate of No Marriage record. On the other hand, the lower courts claim that petitioner could not
unilaterally declare his marriage void. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, before he can remarry, a
competent court must first issue a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to modify the decision of the CA,
affirming the decision of the RTC, finding petitioner De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Prudencio De Guzman y Jumaquio's guilt
for the crime of bigamy.

Ruling: In Teves v. People, “[T]he Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

Analysis: Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal
impediment for him to remarry based merely on the National Statistics Office's issuance of a Certificate
of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and Arlene's Marriage Certificate, along with the photos of
the wedding ceremony, they were married on April 8, 1994. Thus, the Certificate of No Marriage Record
is not enough for Prudencio to assume that his previous marriage with Arlene has been voided.

Holding: NO. A person cannot unilaterally declare his marriage void. The law provides that a judicial
declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage. The law provides that a judicial
declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage. Petitioner cannot claim to have
been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal impediment for him to remarry based merely on
the National Statistics Office's issuance of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on petitioner and
Arlene's Marriage Certificate, along with the photos of the wedding ceremony, they were married on April
8, 1994.Thus, the Certificate of No Marriage Record is not enough for petitioner to assume that his
previous marriage with Arlene has been voided. Further, petitioner also claimed that the absence of the
solemnizing officer's signature in the Marriage Certificate rendered the marriage void. It is worth noting
that based on the trial court's findings; the discrepancy was merely inadvertent since a copy of the
Marriage Certificate under the Local Civil Registry had been signed. Hence, for failure to failure to
comply with Article 40 of the Family Code before contracting his second marriage, petitioner is guilty of
the crime of bigamy.

34. Camara vs. Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916

FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married
on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a
month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce
from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful
acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

35. Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years. The lost contacts
when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant
communication took place between them. They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the
Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed
with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted
his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

36. Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

FACTS: Tenebro married Ancajas (complainant) on April 10, 1990. On 1991, Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he was previously married to a certain Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous
marriage, Tenebro left Ancajas stating that he wanted to cohabit with Villareyes.

Subsequently, on January 25,1993, Tenebro again contracted another marriage with Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she then filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.

During trial, Tenebro denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he only signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman. He further avers that there was no record of his marriage with Villareyes.

On November 10, 1997, the RTC found Tenebro guilty for the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. In his petition for review to the SC, Tenebro presents a two-tiered
defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the
date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements
of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro may still be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?

HELD: No, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’
penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our
mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void
purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the
permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

37. Republic vs. Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 2021
Facts: Melvin and Janufi's relationship began in 1996, and despite a temporary breakup in 2000, they
reconciled in 2001 after Janufi denied rumors of seeing someone else. They got married in 2004 and
had two children. However, in 2010, doubts about the paternity of their first child arose, leading Melvin to
take a DNA test that revealed a 0.0% probability of him being the father. Janufi later admitted through
text messages in 2011 that Melvin was not the biological father. Consequently, Melvin filed for annulment
in 2011, and the RTC granted it in 2017, citing Janufi's fraudulent concealment of her previous
relationship.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the RTC's decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but
the appeal was dismissed due to the OSG's failure to file the appellate brief within a reasonable period.
Despite the OSG's claim of timely filing supported by evidence, the CA considered the brief filed on May
2, 2019, as late. The OSG then filed a petition, challenging both the CA's dismissal and the RTC's ruling
on the annulment. Melvin, in response, supported the CA's decision, asserting that the OSG's appellate
brief was indeed filed out of time.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the OSG's appeal.

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in their petition, stating that
the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in dismissing the OSG's appeal for failure to file an appellate brief within
a reasonable period. The OSG claimed that it timely filed a motion for an extension of time to file its
appellate brief, supported by evidence such as registered mail receipts and a letter-request for
certification from the post office. The court acknowledged the OSG's arguments and, in the interest of
substantial justice, considered the motion for extension as timely filed. It emphasized that technical rules
of procedure should be used to promote justice, not frustrate it.

Regarding the annulment case, the court rejected the Republic's argument that the Regional Trial
Court's decision annulling the marriage was not in accordance with law and jurisprudence. The court
concluded that Janufi's purported fraud did not fall under the specific circumstances outlined in Article
46(2) of the Family Code, which pertains to the wife being pregnant by another man at the time of
marriage. Even if it did apply, the court found that Melvin failed to prove that Janufi acted with bad faith
and fraudulent intent, emphasizing the absence of evidence showing concealment or dishonesty on her
part. As a result, the court dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage for lack of merit.

38. Tilar vs. Republic, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017

Facts: In 2010, Jerrysus Tillar filed to have his marriage to Elizabeth Tilar be declared null and void by
reason of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations because of a
combination of aggressive personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder, especially since he
said that they had already separated in 2002, and she was now living with someone else.

Elizabeth never bothered to respond to the summons of the court, but an investigation by the Fiscal
revealed no collusion between the two.

The RTC, however, still dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction, due to the public policy of
separation of Church and State, and denied his motion for reconsideration, on the same grounds.

Jerrysus then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC, with the Solicitor-General commenting
in concurrence.

Issue: Was the RTC correct in denying jurisdiction?

Ruling: No, it was not. As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely
subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law.

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities
prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest
and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is
considered a sacrament in the Catholic Church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed
by the Family Code. As was correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage
contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of
nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the
proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding
upon the State as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus,
the principle of separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

1. Republic vs. Catubag, G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018

Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4) requisites under Article 41 of the Family
Code that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper:

1. The absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code.
2. The present spouse wishes to remarry.
3. The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.
4. The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

**FACTS:** On June 26, 2003, the private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in Rizal, Cagayan. The
marriage was solemnized by Honorable Judge Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge,
Rizal, Cagayan. Sometime in April 2006, the private respondent and his family were able to acquire a
housing unit located at Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile Cagayan. Thereafter, the private respondent
returned overseas to continue his work. While abroad, he maintained constant communication with his
family.

On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, the private respondent was informed by his relatives that
Shanaviv left their house and never returned. In the meantime, the private respondent's relatives took
care of the children. Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his children, the
private respondent took an emergency vacation and flew back home. The private respondent looked for
his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts
from their close friends and relatives, but they too could offer no help. The private respondent traveled as
far as Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not locate her.

The private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo Philippines, one of the more
well-known radio networks in the Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance.
Moreover, the private respondent searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in
Bicol, with no avail.

2. Republic vs. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

DOCTRINE: The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort, not a mere passive one.
In the case at bar, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors, and friends. She failed to
conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that
her husband was already dead.

FACTS: The respondent and Jerry were married and lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal
dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime later, the couple had a violent
quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry
would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever
saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his
whereabouts.

More than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a
petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a well-founded
belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her
brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of
finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition
in court.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead. (NO)

RULING: Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a
case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort, not a mere passive one.

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required
by jurisprudence for the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from
the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory
therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her
husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This
 Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is
dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of
the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the
aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who
can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s
bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is
insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified
in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had
a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and
in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts.

In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She
failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.

3. Republic vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015

FACTS:

Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a
mechanic in Valencia, Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan
City. While she was in Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband left
their home without telling them his whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to
go back to the Philippines to look and find his husband. Edna searched and made
inquiries about her husband thru their common friends, and parents-in-law in Iligan and
Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.

15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under
Article 41 of the Family Code. During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.

RTC grants her petition.

The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the
decision of the RTC on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in
direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v.
Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.

CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a
petition for declaration of presumptive death of her husband.

RULING.
NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was
found out that it was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence
on record. Edna did not present additional witnesses (her children, their common friends,
parents-in-law) but herself alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the
authorities at the time her husband disappeared.

4. Republic vs. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016

Facts:
Respondent Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The
marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B. Pogoy of Cordova,
Cebu. Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was
assigned. The couple had no children.

Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate· him, but her
efforts proved futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to
declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the
lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly
believes that he is already dead.

RTC granted Nilda's petition. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975
and from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite diligent efforts to locate him.
In this light, she believes that he had passed away especially since his last assignment
was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found that the absence of thirty-three (33)
years was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of death. CA affirmed the RTC
Decision.

Issue: Whether Dante has been correctly declared as presumptively dead.

Ruling: No.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by
making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or
proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed
to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
She could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the
members of the AFP who were assigned thereto.

To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her
purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did
not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a "well-founded
belief' of his death.

Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who
could have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These
resource persons were not even named.

Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had been offered
to support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What
appears from the facts as. established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed the
passage of time without actively and diligently searching for her husband, which the Court
cannot accept as constituting a "well-founded belief' that her husband is dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.

5. Republic vs. Quiñonez, G.R. No. 237412, January 6, 2020

Facts: Remar A. Quinonez married Lovelyn in 1997, and after two children, Lovelyn went on
a three-month vacation in 2001. Communication between them ceased, and despite
Remar's diligent efforts to locate her, including visits to different locations, the search
proved futile. In 2013, after almost ten years of trying to find Lovelyn, Remar filed a
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, which the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
granted. The RTC found Remar's efforts sufficient and issued a final and executory
judgment.

The Republic of the Philippines contested the decision, filing a Petition for Certiorari, but the
Court of Appeals (CA) denied it, citing the lack of a prior motion for reconsideration and
asserting that the RTC's decision was supported by evidence. The Republic's subsequent
motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Republic maintains that Remar's efforts
were insufficient, arguing against the declaration of Lovelyn as presumptively dead.

Issue: whether the CA erred when it found sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of
Lovelyn's presumptive death.

Ruling: The court granted the Republic of the Philippines' petition, which sought to annul the
Regional Trial Court's (RTC) judgment declaring Lovelyn Uriarte Quiñonez as
presumptively dead. The Court of Appeals (CA) initially denied the Republic's petition,
citing procedural issues, including the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration and
the assertion that the petition raised questions of fact. The Supreme Court disagreed with
the CA, stating that the petition indeed raised a pure question of law, justifying its direct
resort to the CA without a prior motion for reconsideration. The court then delved into the
substantive issue, examining the requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The court emphasized the stringent standard set by Article 41, requiring a "well-founded
belief" by the present spouse that the absentee is already dead. Citing a previous case
(Cantor), the court clarified that this belief must result from diligent and reasonable efforts
to locate the absent spouse. In Remar's case, the court found his efforts, which included
traveling to different locations and constant communication with Lovelyn's relatives,
insufficient. Remar failed to provide details about the extent of his search and the
information obtained, and he did not seek help from authorities during the ten-year
disappearance of Lovelyn. The court concluded that there was no well-founded belief in
Lovelyn's death, and therefore, the declaration of presumptive death was reversed,
denying Remar's petition for remarriage.

6. Republic vs. Ponce-Pilapil, G.R. No. 219185, November 25, 2020

Facts: Josephine Ponce-Pilapil filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
seeking to declare her husband, Agapito S. Pilapil, Jr., presumptively dead. Josephine
testified that Agapito left their home in November 2000 without providing any information
about his whereabouts. She made efforts to locate him through inquiries with relatives
and friends, but all attempts were unsuccessful. Josephine claimed that Agapito's only
surviving relative, Lydia Bueno Pilapil, also had no knowledge of his whereabouts. After
more than six years of his absence, Josephine filed the petition to declare Agapito
 presumptively dead, allowing her to remarry. The RTC, based on the evidence presented,
granted the petition on February 27, 2007, declaring Agapito as presumptively dead.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contested
the decision, arguing that Josephine failed to prove a well-founded belief in Agapito's
death and did not exert sufficient effort in searching for him. The Court of Appeals (CA)
ruled against the Republic, dismissing its petition for certiorari. The CA found no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC and emphasized that the evaluation of the trial
court's decision was not a proper subject for a certiorari petition. The Republic's
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Republic then filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining its position that
the RTC decision was arbitrary and should be reversed, while Josephine argued that the
CA correctly dismissed the Republic's petition, as the RTC's decision was within its
discretion and not tainted by caprice or arbitrariness.

Issue: whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC and in affirming the RTC Order that granted Josephine's petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Agapito, her husband.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal is meritorious, emphasizing that
petitions for certiorari are confined solely to questions of jurisdiction, such as whether a
tribunal has acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its certiorari petition, sought a
review of the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) findings and conclusions, which was beyond
the scope of certiorari. The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly dismissed the OSG's petition
as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

However, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in declaring Agapito
presumptively dead. The crucial issue was the lack of demonstrated compliance with
Article 41 of the Family Code, which sets out requisites for a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death. The Court emphasized the difficulty in establishing the "well-founded
belief" requirement and highlighted the need for diligent and reasonable efforts to locate
the absent spouse. In this case, Josephine's efforts, consisting mainly of inquiries through
letter-correspondence and unreliable informers, were deemed lackadaisical and
insufficient. The Court concluded that a declaration of presumptive death must be based
on a well-founded fact of death, and Josephine's evidence failed to establish such a fact.
Consequently, Josephine's petition to declare Agapito presumptively dead was
dismissed.

7. Santos vs. Santos, G. R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when
they were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became
sweethearts. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo
was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to
have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and
careers. Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married and had two children.

Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of
everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family’s printing
press to stalk her. Rodolfo’s jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own
15-year old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of
being Maria Teresa’s lover. In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave.
They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day. One day, the couple quarreled
because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their
quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa’s head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2)
 daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gun poking incident.
Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by
herself. Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Teresa and Rodolfo should be nullified based on
psychological incapacity.

RULING:
Yes. The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals was the first case that attempted to lay
down the standards for determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Santos declared that “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” Furthermore, the incapacity “should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Dr. Lopez’s testimony, as corroborated by
petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
Respondent’s paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme
jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

The juridical antecedence of respondent’s psychological incapacity was also sufficiently

proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent’s jealousy even before
their marriage, and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to
anyone or cheat on him. She believed that he would change after they got married;
however, this did not happen. Respondent’s jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and
severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner’s head.

The incurability and severity of respondent’s psychological incapacity were likewise

discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder
would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for
treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent
repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and
suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her
attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr.
Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife “to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.” In this case,
petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner
show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him
as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.

8. SSS v. Vda. De Bailon, 520 Phil 249 (2006)

Facts: In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. Some 15
years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being
an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970. In 1983, Clemente married Teresita
Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then sought to claim
her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain
Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa
Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral
spending for it was actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They
further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa
and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice
subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s
 presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he
could have easily located her in her parents’ place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her
parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having
extra-marital affairs. SSS then directed Jarque to reimburse what had been granted her
and to return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the
benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s
marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to be
presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the
Social Security Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. Jarque appealed to the Court of
Appeals and the latter ruled in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively
dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

HELD: No. There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s
death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated
upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the
recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through an affidavit or a
court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the declaration made by the
RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS
is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the
benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not
include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar,
the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid because no
affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally. Alice reappeared
only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file such an affidavit; in
this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised – the marriage
herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally – it is however
impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the
same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

9. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an action
that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because the petitioner was
not seeking to remarry. A reading of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of
death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage under the said law.

FACTS:
The petitioner and Wilfredo entered into a lawful marriage on January 7, 1968, in Imbo,
Anda, Pangasinan. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up their
conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B, San Miguel, Tarlac City.

Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines, and on September 15, 1979, he set out from
their conjugal home to again serve as a member of the Philippine Constabulary. Wilfredo
never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga, since 1979, and he never made
contact or communicated with the petitioner or his relatives.

According to the service record of Wilfredo issued by the National Police Commission,
Wilfredo was already declared missing since 1979. The petitioner constantly pestered the
then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding her beloved husband Wilfredo, but the
Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they have any news
of him going AWOL; all they knew was he was assigned to a place frequented by the New
People's Army.
Weeks became years and years became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope,
and after more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the times
had been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled with her age; it
is now necessary for her to request the benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to
survive.

One of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for proof of death or at least a
declaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court. This petition is being filed not for
any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.

The RTC issued a Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the petition using Article 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code should be applied in this case. (NO)

RULING:
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner is not an action
that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC. The presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under the said law. Thus:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Here, the petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, the petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed
"not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended."

Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, the petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil
purpose, to wit:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The
absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years, which shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage or an aeroplane that is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
 (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war and has been missing for four
years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances, and his existence
has not been known for four years.

Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive death
of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41
of the FC.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
1. Santos vs. Santos, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
FACTS:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia in Iloilo City. On
September 20 1986, Leouel and Julia exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court and followed by a
church wedding. The newly married couple lived with Julia’s parents. On July 18, 1987, Julia gave birth
to a baby boy named Leouel Santos, Jr. But as the day passed by, the couple went on quarrelling over a
number of things. On May 18, 1988, Julia went to the United States of America to work as a nurse even
if Leouel convinced her not to go. On January 01, 1989, Julia called up Leouel and promised him to
return home upon her contract expire on July 1989. But Julia broke her promise. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the AFP from April to
August 1990, he desperately tried to find the whereabouts of Julia but he failed. Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code. On May 31, 1991, respondent Julia through his counsel, opposed the allegations and claimed that
it was Leoeul who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent. On November 06, 1991, the trial
court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Leouel appealed to the CA, but it affirmed the decision of
the trial court. The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91,
which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit. Leouel argues that the
ommission of Julia to return home and not communicating with him for more than 5 years clearly show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD:
No. Julia’s failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute psychological
incapacity. .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which
(Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Although Leouel was aggrieved, the petition was dismissed because the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented.

2. Republic vs. Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

FACTS:

Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985. A son, Andre Molina was born out
of their marriage in 1986. However, a year after their marriage, Roridel alleged that her husband
Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. Reynaldo, as
claimed was spending more time with his friends, depending on his parents for aid and assistance, and
was dishonest with his wife regarding their finances. He even lost his job and abandon his family. Thus,
due to his immaturity and actions that lead to their frequent quarrels, their relationship was estranged
and resulted to the filing of this case to declare the marriage null and void on ground of psychological
incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of Reynaldo and Roridel shall be declared null and void on ground of
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental nor physical
incapacity. The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The condition must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In this case, there is no clear showing that the defect spoken of is an incapacity, but instead is likely to
appear as 'difficulty', if not outright 'refusal' or 'neglect' in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. Their problem shows no gravity, neither juridical antecedence nor its
incurability.

This case introduced the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code: (Molina Doctrine-as it is called today)

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

a. Medically or clinically identified;

b. Alleged in the complaint;

c. Sufficiently proven by experts; and

d. Clearly explained in the decision.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage.

4. The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically incurable.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our Courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State.

***

End Notes:

This case of Republic vs. CA and Molina is a jurisprudence setting the guidelines mentioned above for
the first time. Psychological incapacity as it is provided in the Civil Code under Art. 36 is a way to declare
the marriage null and void.

The application of Art. 36 is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorder and must be
determined in case to case basis.

Examples of Psychological Incapacity are the following:

1. In the case of Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA, where the senseless and protracted refusal of one party to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage is considered psychological incapacity.

2. Pathological liar as determined in the case of Antonio vs. Reyes, where the Church annulled the
marriage.

3. In the case of Te vs. Te, where both spouses manifest grave, severe and incurable personality
disorder amounting to psychological incapacity.

3. Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006

Facts:

Antonio and Reyes was married on 6 December 1990, bore child on 1993 but only died 5mos. On 8
March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. respondent’s
persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS), dr. Reyes, (respondent) Dr. Lopez, psychologist, psychiatrist, Dr.Abcede

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent

persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things. In support of this claim, he presented doctors. In opposing the petition,
respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her
husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and
invented personalities.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity
to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among
others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.

The appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.

Issue:

Whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Yes, the case sufficiently meet the Molina Guidelines. Molina established the guidelines presently
recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently
applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules.
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case.
Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that “[t]he evidence
[to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto.”

Article 36 of the Family Code states that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

Therefore, marriage between petitioner and respondent is NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

4. Marcos vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000

FACTS:
Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. They got married twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 and
blessed with five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not succeeded. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children. In 1992, they were already living separately. On
October 16, 1994, when Brenda saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him.
Wilson then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid.
On October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s house. On
October 19, 1994, she submitted herself to medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center.
Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage in the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family Code. The
court ruled the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. But the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological
incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker were not
enough to sustain a finding that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Although Supreme Court is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family
and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

5. Kalaw vs. Fernandez, G.R. 166357, January 14, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973,
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four children.
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who
gave birth to a son.

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started
living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children
from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.

The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in
accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.

Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the
Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the
two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to
her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.

Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration
of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity
and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr.
Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).

The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code.

The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff
must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at
the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts
heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that
respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts
would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

6. Tan-Andal vs. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

FACTS:

Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) were married on 16 December
1995. On 27 July 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of the
parties. The family lived in a duplex in Paranaque City, with Rosanna’s parents living in
the other half of the duplex.

According to Rosanna, even before their marriage, Mario would be extremely irritable and
moody. She also had observed, at the beginning of their marriage, that Mario is
emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Mario
would also leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his
whereabouts, and whenever he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would
sleep for days. When Rosanna confronted Mario about his erratic behavior, she learned
that Mario was using drugs. Mario promised to stop using it, but he did not keep his
promise.

When Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, Mario allegedly did not assist her, leaving her
in the hospital even though he knows that she could not move until the effects of the
anesthesia had worn off. Mario would only return to the hospital later that evening to
sleep. Moreover, when Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital,
Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. Further, during the times when Ma. Samantha was
sick, Mario would instead ignore her.

Rosanna had to eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to financial losses.
Mario’s access to the company funds for his drug use allegedly used up the funds.

Rosanna then petitioned the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to voluntarily commit Mario for
drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation
Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation (Seagulls). Mario escaped from
Seagulls on 14 February 200, but he was recommitted again and remained confined
there until 24 December 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without
completing his rehabilitation program.

Since Mario’s premature release from the rehabilitation center, Rosanna and Mario had
separated and had not lived together. Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and
Ma. Samantha.

These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario’s psychological incapacity to comply

with his essential marital obligations to her.

To prove Mario’s psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso
Garcia (Dr. Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness. Dr. Garcia diagnosed him
with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with
psychotic features. Mario’s narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia
found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to Rosanna.
Dr. Garcia testified that Mario’s personality disorder was grave and “deeply rooted” in his
character.
The Regional Trial Court voided the marriage between Rosanna and Mario as it ruled that
Rosanna discharged the burden of proving Mario’s psychological incapacity. The Court of
Appeals however reversed the trial court’s decision and found that Dr. Garcia’s
psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be “unscientific and unreliable” since she diagnosed
Mario without interviewing him. The Court of Appeals ruled that Dr. Garcia “was working
on pure suppositions and second-hand information fed to her by one side.”

Rosanna contends, before the Supreme Court, that psychological incapacity need not be
grounded on a particular psychological illness psychological incapacity need not be
grounded on a particular psychological illness. Rosanna adds that psychological
incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For her,
incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by the
psychologically incapacitated spouse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not psychological incapacity needs to be medically or clinically identified.

RULING:

No. It was in Molina where this Court laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying
Article 36. Under the second guideline in Molina, the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. In Santos vs.
Court of Appeals (“Santos”) the term psychological incapacity” was first defined as a
“mental (not physical) incapacity” to comply with the essential marital obligations.
“Psychological incapacity” must refer to “the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.” In the past, the Court was inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in
psychological incapacity cases. Not all cases promulgated after Marcos required the
totality of evidence rule.

In light of the foregoing, the Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline.
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that
must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests
itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s
personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more
important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of
personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in
the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that
they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.

As to the juridical antecedence requirement, the Court held that the psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical sense, but in the legal
sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner and
contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to
nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of Mario’s psychological
incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on Mario’s personality structure and how it was
formed primarily through his childhood and adult experiences, well before he married
 Rosanna. In addition to Rosanna’s testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario developed
traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of
empathy, and sense of entitlement-behaviors manifesting his inherent psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.

7. De Silva vs. De Silva, G.R. No. 247985, October 13, 2021

Facts: The case involves the dissolution of the marriage between Donald De Silva and
Raphy Valdez De Silva based on the petitioner's claim of the respondent's psychological
incapacity. The petitioner alleges that the respondent exhibited financial irresponsibility,
gambling, extramarital affairs, physical and verbal abuse, and threats, leading to the filing
of a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy L. Tayag conducted an assessment, concluding that the
respondent suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder, while the petitioner exhibited a
relative psychological disturbance. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage
void ab initio, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision, citing insufficient
evidence of the respondent's severe psychological incapacity.

In response, the petitioner argues that evidence, including Dr. Tayag's assessment and the
testimony of Rosalina (the petitioner's mother), supports the claim of the respondent's
psychological incapacity. The respondent disputes the sufficiency of the evidence,
questioning the credibility of witnesses and the validity of Dr. Tayag's Report. The core
issue revolves around whether the marriage should be declared void ab initio due to the
respondent's psychological incapacity, with the petitioner contending that the evidence
establishes the incapacity, while the respondent disputes its severity and clinical basis.

Issue: Whether the marriage should be declared void ab initio due to the respondent's
psychological incapacity.

Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting the petition for the nullity of
marriage. The decision delves into the development of Article 36 of the Family Code,
emphasizing the gravity and incurability of psychological incapacity as grounds for
declaring a marriage void. It highlights the need for clear and convincing evidence in
proving psychological incapacity and rejects the notion that it should be equated solely
with personality disorders. The ruling clarifies that expert opinion is not the exclusive
means of proving psychological incapacity and allows ordinary witnesses who have
observed the incapacitated spouse's behavior before marriage to testify. The decision
refines the Molina guidelines, emphasizing the legal incurability of psychological
incapacity and the importance of proving the specific aspects of the spouse's personality
that make compliance with marital obligations impossible. The court underscores the
totality of evidence rule, cautioning against rigid reliance on psychiatric assessments and
urging a comprehensive evaluation of each case.

In applying these principles to the case at hand (Tan-Andal v. Andal), the court found that the
petitioner successfully proved the psychological incapacity of the respondent through
clear and convincing evidence. The court rejected the dismissal of the expert opinion by
the Court of Appeals, asserting that the totality of evidence, including the psychiatrist's
report, supported the petitioner's claim. The ruling emphasizes the importance of
considering all relevant circumstances and not disregarding expert opinions outright,
provided they contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the case. Ultimately, the
court reinstates the Regional Trial Court's decision declaring the marriage void ab initio.

8. Tani-De La Fuente vs. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017)

Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in
Mandaluyong City after being in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert
and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life.
His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a gun to his 15 year old cousin and
he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and
molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria
Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria
Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their
children by herself.

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As
support to her petitions, clinical psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an
expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading. The trial court
eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.

Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office
of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to submit its certification. The Office
of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's orders; thus, the
case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of
the Solicitor General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision
granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required
certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also
unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was
handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that
the trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the
Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of
Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on
insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still,
Rodolfo did not file any responsive pleading.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25,
2009, CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo
filed a Comment 70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e
firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as
married."

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.
Held:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance
with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was
able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological
incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving
undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct
a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or
psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two
persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage
is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case,
petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner
show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him
as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise

discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder
would

refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment.
This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused
treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples
counseling to respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking
professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated

to perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He
recommends that the marriage be annulled.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and

isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical
violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and
partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner
should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage
and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in
their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his
marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.

9. Garlet vs. Garlet, G. R. No. 193544, August 2, 2017

Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal concept. It is a personal condition that
prevents a spouse to perform marital obligations in relation to a specific person that may
 exist at the time of marriage but may have revealed through behavior subsequent to
ceremonies. It need not be a mental or personality disorder. It need not be a permanent
and incurable condition. The testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist is not mandatory
in all cases. The totality of evidence must show clear and convincing evidence to cause
the declaration of nullity of marriage.

Case Title: Yolanda E. Garlet vs. Vencidor T. Garlet, GR. No. 193544; August 2, 2017

Facts:
Yolanda Garlet (petitioner) and Vencidor Garlet (respondent) became intimately involved
upon partying and drinking liquor which resulted to the latter getting pregnant. Vencidor
doubted if he fathered the child, refused to provide support, and even urged Yolanda to
have an abortion. Disagreeing with the proposed abortion, she gave birth to (Michael) out
of wedlock and worked in Japan as a cultural dancer to support their son. Sometime in
1992, Yolanda instructed Vencidor to scout for a real property for investment to which a
210-square meter lot was bought in Morong, Rizal. The title, however, was registered
under
Vencidor’s name. He also sold a 69-square meter portion of the same property to his in-laws
without consent and mortgaged the property, forcing Yolanda to redeem it for 50,000 php.
Despite these, the two still got married on March 4, 1994, ending up with a second child
(Michelle). During the marriage, however, the family relied on Yolanda as the
breadwinner, forcing her to go back to Japan to work upon the exhaustion of her savings.
She also found out that Vencidor squandered her hard-earned money, pawned her
jewelry, incurred debts in her name, and even allowed a male friend to sleep in the
master’s bedroom upon returning to the Philippines. Issues of gambling, drinking, and
womanizing were also raised. Such prompted Yolanda to file a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Vencidor's psychological incapacity to fulfill his
essential marital obligations to Yolanda and their children, which Ms. De Guzman
assessed to have stemmed from Vencidor’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder in her
Psychological Report.
The RTC declared the marriage of Yolanda and Vencidor null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity of respondent in accordance with Art. 36 of the Family Code.
o The property relation between the petitioner and respondent under Article 147 of the
Family Code was dissolved Custody of the children, Michael and Michelle, awarded to the
petitioner subject to visitorial right of the respondent once a week at the most convenient
time of the said children.
o Support of 3, 000 php a month and at least one-half of the cost of their education were
also directed
o The petitioner also shall revert to the use of her maiden name.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC judgment, finding that the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the incapacity itself
were not sufficiently explained.
o Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied for being filed out of
time. Hence, the filing of instant petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:
WON Vencidor Garlet’s (Respondent) negative character traits and vices (alleged drinking,
gambling, womanizing, and refusal to find a job) constitute psychological capacity and
hence be a valid ground for the nullity of his marriage with Yolanda Garlet (Petitioner)?

Held:
In this ruling, the court concurs with the Court of Appeals, rejecting the petitioner's claim of
psychological incapacity against the respondent, Vencidor. The evidence presented by
Yolanda is deemed insufficient and marred by inconsistencies, with negative character
 traits attributed to Vencidor not meeting the criteria for psychological incapacity as defined
in the Family Code. Specific points highlighted include Vencidor's multiple jobs (which
does not indicate psychological incapacity), alleged vices based on hearsay evidence
(lacking probative value), and the absence of factual basis for claims of sexual infidelity.

The court also scrutinizes a verbal exchange between the parties, revealing that Vencidor's
actions, such as hiding money and jewelry, were portrayed as desperate attempts to
salvage the marriage, while Yolanda was adamant about ending the relationship, even
offering financial incentives for Vencidor to leave.

Moreover, the court dismisses the credibility of Ms. De Guzman, an expert witness relied
upon by the petitioner, stating that her sources and methodology lack the necessary
depth and comprehensiveness. Ms. De Guzman's characterization of Vencidor as a
spoiled child, while acknowledging his self-centered and self-indulgent behavior, falls
short of establishing the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability required to declare
Vencidor's psychological incapacity and render the marriage void ab initio.

In conclusion, the court denies the Petition for Review on Certiorari, affirming the Court of
Appeals' decision and resolution. The ruling is delivered by Justice Leonardo – De
Castro.

10. Pugoy-Solidum vs. Republic, G.R. No. 213954, April 20, 2022
In this case, the petitioner, Hannamer, sought the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Grant based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The factual
antecedents reveal that after a seemingly promising start to their relationship, the
marriage faced challenges when Hannamer had to stop working due to pregnancy, and
Grant failed to contribute financially. The situation worsened when Hannamer's mother
moved in, leading to discord and Hannamer leaving their home. The petitioner alleged
that Grant exhibited narcissistic personality disorder with anti-social and dependent traits,
rendering him incapable of fulfilling essential marital obligations.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Hannamer's petition, declaring the marriage void on
the grounds of Grant's psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals (CA), however,
reversed this decision, contending that Hannamer failed to establish the incurable
psychological illness existing at the time of marriage. The CA criticized the reliance on
hearsay evidence and the lack of a personal examination of Grant by the psychologist.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supported the CA's decision, arguing that the
evidence presented did not sufficiently prove the juridical antecedence, gravity, and
permanence of Grant's psychological incapacity. The OSG asserted that the case
portrayed marital discord rather than psychological incapacity. Hannamer, on the other
hand, maintained that the RTC applied the appropriate guidelines and that a personal
psychological examination of the incapacitated spouse was not mandatory.

Issue: whether Grant's actions and behavior, as described by Hannamer and supported by a
psychologist's report, meet the legal standards for psychological incapacity as grounds
for declaring the marriage void.

Ruling: The court ruled that the petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage lacked
merit. To declare a marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code, psychological
incapacity must meet the criteria of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. While
expert testimony is important, a personal examination of the alleged incapacitated spouse
is not always mandatory if the totality of evidence is sufficient. The court emphasized
recent guidelines in Tan-Andal, recognizing that psychological incapacity is not strictly a
mental disorder and can be proven by ordinary witnesses. In this case, the court found
 that Hannamer failed to sufficiently prove Grant's psychological incapacity, as her
testimony and the psychologist's report lacked clear evidence of the enduring aspects of
Grant's personality and the required juridical antecedence. The totality of evidence did not
support a finding of psychological incapacity, leading to the affirmation of the Court of
Appeals' decision sustaining the validity of the marriage.

11. Datu vs. Datu, G.R. No. 209278, September 15, 2021

Facts: The case involves a petition to void the marriage between Irene Constantino Datu
and Alfredo Fabian Datu on the grounds of Alfredo's psychological incapacity. The couple
married in 1980 and had two children. Alfredo, a former U.S. Navy employee discharged
for schizophrenia, claimed psychological incapacity and sought nullity. Testimonies,
including those from a clinical psychologist, supported Alfredo's claim, citing symptoms of
schizophrenia and his belief in being an emissary of God. Irene countered, admitting their
religious differences and financial disputes. The Regional Trial Court granted the nullity,
emphasizing Alfredo's long-standing schizophrenia. Irene's appeal was denied by the
Court of Appeals, upholding Alfredo's psychological incapacity. Irene contends the trial
lacked proper evidence and was tainted by collusion, fraud, and conflict of interest, while
Alfredo argues the issues are factual and not within the Supreme Court's purview.

Issues:

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not respondent Alfredo Fabian Datu indeed suffered from schizophrenia;

Second, whether or not all the elements of psychological incapacity have been proven by respondent
Alfredo Fabian Datu; and

Finally, whether or not the proceedings before the trial court were tainted by fraud, warranting a reversal
of the assailed Decision.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.

Rulings:
In addressing the first issue of whether Alfredo Fabian Datu indeed suffered from
schizophrenia, the court emphasizes its limited role in reviewing factual findings and
recognizes exceptions only in specific circumstances. Irene's request for a review of
Alfredo's alleged discharge from the U.S. Navy and the authenticity of documents is
rejected, with the court asserting that sufficient evidence, particularly from expert
testimony, supports Alfredo's schizophrenia.

Regarding the second issue of whether all elements of psychological incapacity have been
proven by Alfredo, the court clarifies that psychological incapacity is a legal, not a medical
concept. It distinguishes psychological incapacity from a specific mental illness and
highlights the enduring aspect of a person's personality structure that hinders the
fulfillment of essential marital obligations. Alfredo's belief in being the son of God, refusal
to live with Irene based on divine orders, and disregard for marital vows are cited as clear
acts of dysfunctionality, supporting the finding of psychological incapacity.

Finally, on the third issue of whether the proceedings were tainted by fraud, the court
dismisses Irene's claims, asserting that fraud in the context of a new trial involves
preventing the unsuccessful party from fully presenting their case. The court finds no
evidence of fraud committed by Alfredo and refutes Irene's allegations of a conflict of
interest involving Alfredo's counsel.
 In conclusion, the court denies Irene's Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirms the Court
of Appeals' decisions upholding the nullity of Irene and Alfredo's marriage.

12. Mallillin vs. Jamesolamin, G.R. 192718,

FACTS

Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6, 1972 and begot three children. The
petitioner filed a complaint for nullity of marriage on the grounds that the respondent allegedly suffered
from psychological and mental incapacity at the time of the marriage celebration, unpreparedness to
enter into such marital life, and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.

He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and married an American. While they were
still together though, Robert disclosed that respondent did not perform responsibilities of being a
housewife like keeping the house in order, preparing meals, washing clothes and taking care of the
children. He also stated that she dated several men and contracted loans without his knowledge.

In turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity.

On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the
essential marital obligations but the Court of Appeals, in its November 20, 2009 Decision, reversed the
RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING

DENIED.

The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
Other than his self-serving testimony, no other witness corroborated his allegations on her behavior. As
the Court has repeatedly stressed, psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was
subjected to a psychological examination.

On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, yes, they are given
great respect by our courts, but they are neither controlling nor decisive.

Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
 13. Marable vs. Marable, G.R. No. 178741

Legal Issue:
Is psychological evaluation a necessity for the establishment of psychological incapacity of a spouse for
declaration of nullity of marriage?

Legal Facts:
In 1967 petitioner Rosalino Marable and respondent Myrna Marable were students in
Arellano University who became lovers after they met in a bus. They got married on
December 19, 1970, in civil rites of Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra, and
that following day is a church wedding at the Chapel of Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison.
Somehow they were blessed with 5 children but several years after the marriage their
relationship got soured with frequent quarrels as a consequence, their daughter rebelled
and unexpectedly she got pregnant at her young age. Eventually, the petitioner had
incessant marital conflicts leading to withdrawal of marital obligations. Rosalino Marable
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his own
psychological incapacity. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag, a clinical psychologist, who reported that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial
Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse which
rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. The RTC granted the
petition; on the other hand the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC thus judgment of the Court denied the appeal.

Holding and Reasoning:

In this case yes but the examination still doesn’t corroborate the contention of psychological incapacity.
The Court said that the petitioner was able to prove infidelity on his part and the existence
of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities apparently, it doesn’t
constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it
is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The CA did
not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent as valid and subsisting. The
totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioner’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.

Policing:
Psychological examination by means of getting the emotional quotient through test must be properly
observed in every couple prior to marriage. Greater advantage if sets of personality and
psychological examination after attending marriage seminars should be one of the
additional requisites prior to the solemnization and in order to prevent any future
relationship hostilities before entering marriage life.

Synthesis:
In Marable v. Marable, 639 SCRA 557, 567, The Supreme Court ruled that conflicting
personalities do not constitute psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the provision in
Article 36 does not stress either of its characteristic as to the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability, indicating such guidelines that the burden of proof belongs
to the plaintiff to which its medical or psychological examination clearly explains or bring
about such totality of evidence in establishing psychological incapacity.

14. Meneses vs. Meneses, G.R. No. 200182, March 13, 2019

Facts: Anacleto and Linda met during college in the USA, got married in 1981, and had a
daughter in 1983. They initially lived with Anacleto's family in Texas but later moved to
 Korea for business, which eventually failed. The couple then returned to the Philippines.
Throughout their marriage, they faced financial issues, leading to constant fights and
accusations.

In 2005, after almost 21 years of marriage, Linda left Anacleto, residing in Korea and later
the USA with their daughter. Anacleto filed a petition for the nullity of their marriage in
2006, citing Linda's alleged psychological incapacity. Anacleto presented Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez's testimony, a clinical psychiatrist, who diagnosed Linda with narcissistic
personality disorder and borderline personality disorder, attributing it to her dysfunctional
familial background.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in 2009 that Anacleto failed to prove Linda's
psychological incapacity, emphasizing the lack of evidence for the gravity and juridical
antecedence of Linda's personality disorder. Anacleto's motion for reconsideration was
denied in 2010.

Anacleto appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2010, arguing that the RTC disregarded
Dr. Lopez's findings. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in 2011, citing the strict standards
set by precedent cases and the principle favoring the validity of marriages.

Anacleto filed a Rule 45 Petition with the Supreme Court in 2012, which was initially denied
in 2012. However, a motion for reconsideration was later granted in 2012, reinstating the
petition. Anacleto, in 2013, disclosed that he lost communication with Linda since 2005
and didn't know her current address.

The case revolves around Anacleto's attempt to prove Linda's psychological incapacity as
grounds for nullity, with the lower courts ruling against him due to insufficient evidence.
The Supreme Court granted reconsideration and reinstated the case for further
consideration.

Issue: whether the lower courts erred in dismissing Anacleto's petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of insufficient evidence.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Anacleto's petition for the nullification of his
marriage to Linda lacks merit. They emphasized the stringent criteria for psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, requiring gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability. Anacleto argued that Linda's psychological incapacity was evidenced by
Dr. Lopez's findings of narcissistic and borderline personality disorders, rooted in her
allegedly unhealthy childhood. However, the Court disagreed, noting that Dr. Lopez's
conclusions were based on interviews with individuals who did not know Linda during her
childhood. The Court upheld the lower courts' uniform findings, asserting that it is not their
role to reevaluate factual determinations unless compelling reasons exist, which were
absent in this case. While expressing sympathy for Anacleto's situation, the Court
underscored its obligation to decide based on law and evidence rather than personal
emotions, ultimately denying the petition for lack of sufficient grounds to nullify the
marriage.

15. Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi, G.R. No. 119190, 266 S.C.R.A.
324 (January 16, 1997) (Phil.)

Facts:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral
Intramuros Manila. After the celebration thereof and wedding reception, the newlyweds
proceeded to the house of husband-defendant’s mother. Contrary to her expectations,
 instead of consummating their marriage, husband-defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side, then turned his back and went to sleep. The newlyweds failed to consummate
their marriage even on the succeeding nights. The couple slept together in the same
room and on the same bed for almost ten (10) months but there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. She claims that she did not even see her husband’s private
parts nor did he see hers.

On January 20, 1989, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufamio Macalalag, urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of said
physical examination showed that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband’s examination was kept confidential. Medications were only prescribed for her
husband but the same was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her, but for
her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he failed to do so.

Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in order
to annul their marriage.

Husband-defendant does not want his marriage annulled since he loves her wife
very much, he has no defect on his part, and there is still chance of reconciliation.
However, husband-defendant claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. The husband-defendant admitted that
since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was
no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did
not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. In another
physical examination by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., which was submitted in a Medical Report,
results showed that there is no evidence of impotency of husband-defendant

The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed such decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Whether or not there is a necessity to determine who between the couple are
psychologically incapacitated.
Held:

Yes, the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity. The Court provides that one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In this case, the Court ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The Court further quoted, “If a spouse, although physically capable but simply
refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
 incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.”

No, there is no necessity to determine who between the couple are psychologically
incapacitated. In this case, neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with
the other, however, the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them. The
Court held that since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party,
i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.

Herein Petitioner alleged that it was his wife who refused to have coitus with him,
that the same may not be psychological but merely a physical disorder. The Court found
such defenses unmeritorious. The Court held that there was nothing in the record to show
that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor’s Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection. Since it is petitioner’s claim that the reason is
not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

As stated by the respondent court:

“…if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband’s inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her
marital status.”

Hence, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.

NOTE:
On 24 January 2023, the Supreme Court enbanc issued a Resolution approving the (1) amended
guidelines to validate compliance with the jurisdictional requirements in petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage, and legal separation, and (2)
amendments to Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Section 2(c) of A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, or
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and the Rule on Legal Separation, respectively.
Amended Guidelines to Validate Compliance with Jurisdictional Requirements in Petitions
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage, Annulment of Marriage, and Legal
Separation

SEE ALSO:
a. Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021
FACTS:
Pulido and Arcon were married on September 5, 1983, in a civil wedding at the
Municipal Hall of Rosario Cavite. In 2007, Pulido stopped going home to their
conjugal dwelling. Upon confrontation, Arcon found out that Pulido has an affair
with Baleda and they were married on July 31, 1995.

In December 2007, Arcon filed a bigamy case against Pulido and Baleda.

Pulido defended that both of his marriage was void ab initio. His marriage with Arcon
is void due to lack of a marriage license, and his marriage to Baleda is also void
due to lack of a marriage ceremony.

Baleda on the other hand claimed that she only knew Pulido's prior marriage
sometime in April 2007 and that she filed a Petition to Annul their marriage before
the filing of the bigamy case. The court even declared their marriage null and void
for being bigamous on October 25, 2007.

The trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda.

Appeals and motions of Pulido were likewise denied. The court ruled in reliance with
the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code.

Meanwhile, in 2015, the court in a civil case declared Arcon and Pulido's marriage null
and void. A decree of absolute nullity of their marriage was issued in 2016.

ISSUE:

Whether a Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is necessary to establish the

invalidity of a void ab initio marriage in a bigamy case.

RULING:

No. The court in this case abandons its earlier rulings and holds that a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and
subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in
the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which
they are secured.

The court based the foregoing conclusion and justification on the following:

Retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage in criminal prosecutions for bigamy.

The court stressed that the nullity of a void ab initio marriage, being inexistent under
the eyes of the law can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the spouses.
A void marriage is ipso facto void without the need for any judicial declaration of
nullity. This requirement is necessary under Art. 40, where the law treated a void ab
initio marriage as valid for purposes of remarriage.

Thus, being inexistent from the beginning, the void first marriage does not qualify nor
satisfy one of the essential elements of bigamy which requires the existence of a
prior valid marriage. Logically, there is no first marriage to begin with. As for the
retroactive effect of a void ab initio marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve
 as the judicial declaration of nullity merely confirms the inexistence of such
marriage. This also explains why the second element of bigamy which requires that
the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled is wanting in the
case of void ab initio prior marriage. The RPC provision regarding bigamy pertains
to contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage is still
subsisting.

In the same vein, when the accused contracted a subsequent void ab initio marriage,
which is void other than it being bigamous, it has the effect of not having entered
into a subsequent marriage at all because the same is inexistent from the
beginning. Thus, negates the existence of one of the elements of bigamy which
requires that the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage. A
subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the second marriage merely
confirms its inexistence.

In both instances, the accused may validly raise the defense of a void ab initio
marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.

Article 40 of the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of absolute nullity for
purposes of remarriage but not as a defense in bigamy.

The Court clarifies that the requirement under Art. 40 (Final judgment requiring the
previous marriage void) need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. The
word "solely" under Art. 40 qualifies the "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" and not "for purposes of remarriage".

In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in other instances
for purposes other than remarriage. Nonetheless, other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, may also prove the absolute nullity of the previous marriage in the
said instances. Hence, such previous void marriage need not be proved solely by
an earlier judgment of the court declaring it void. For purposes of remarriage, the
only evidence to prove a void marriage is the final judgment declaring its absolute
nullity. In other cases, the absolute nullity of a marriage may be proved by evidence
other than such judicial declaration.

b. Obergefell vs. Hodges, June 26, 2015(discussion on same sex marriage)

Facts: Obergefell, the named appellant, traveled to Maryland to marry his ailing
partner who was suffering from ALS. His partner died in Ohio, the couple’s home
state, shortly after they were married; but, because the laws of Ohio did not allow
for same-sex marriage, Obergefell could not be listed as his partner’s surviving
spouse on Obergefell’s death certificate. Obergefell sued with the co-plaintiffs to
have his Maryland marriage recognized in Ohio so that his name could appear on
his dead husband’s death certificate. Other co-plaintiffs sued for adoption rights as
well as for the right not to have their “marriage stripped from them whenever” they
moved between states.

Issue:whether same-sex marriage should be decided at the state or federal level and
whether it should be legalized or banned.

Ruling: The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to recognize
the validity of same-sex marriages performed in other states. The Court concluded
that the Constitution protects personal choices as to marriage, noting the fact that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberties which
include “intimate choices”. In that way, the Court asserted that the Due Process
 Clause protects liberties associated with “choices about marriage” and that the
constitution protects the “right to marry”. It characterized marriage as a liberty
through the way in which it provides a couple with a means of finding “other
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality”. It also noted that that
aspect of marriage is “true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation”.
The Court also held that the “right to marry” protects an “intimate association”—a freedom that courts
such as the court in Lawrence have recognized should not be subject to criminal liability. The Court
defined “intimate association” as a means of defining oneself “through commitment to” another person. It
asserted that same-sex couples are just as entitled as opposite-sex couples to an “association” that
“responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there”. In so doing,
the Court suggested that denying the freedom of “intimate association” to same-sex couples denies them
equal enjoyment of a freedom which addresses basic and universal human needs (or, within the legal
framework, needs of citizens or “the people of the United States”).

The Court then described the benefits of marriage to society and to individual citizens. It described the
good that marriage does for society, including and the way in which it “safeguards children and families”
within a stable family structure and protects children from the potential stigma of being in a
non-traditional family not solidified by a marriage. Finally, the Court outlined the benefits afforded to
those who are allowed to marry—namely, “dignity”, “expression, intimacy, and spirituality”—as well as
financial (e.g., tax) benefits, suggesting that those who are not offered those benefits are being denied
equal protection. It noted that, because marriage is considered to be a “keystone of the…social order,”
the law offers a range of other exclusive benefits to married couples. It went on to describe how “locking”
same-sex couples out of such a key societal institution would be not only unfair and unequal but also
“demeaning” to them. The Court cited Zablocki and Loving to highlight how, in this case, there was,
likewise, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause through the burdening of “a right of ‘fundamental
importance’”—the “right to marry”—and through the “un-equal treatment of…[gay and heterosexual]
couples”. Based on this reasoning, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
valid, out-of-state same-sex marriages must be recognized as valid by all states.