The Black Sea, Paphlagonia,

Pontus and Phrygia in Antiquity

Aspects of archaeology and ancient history

Edited by

Gocha R. Tsetskhladze

With the assistance of

Erguen Laflı, James Hargrave and William Anderson

BAR International Series 2432

2012
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The Black Sea, Paphlagonia, Pontus and Phrygia in Antiquity: Aspects of archaeology and ancient history

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 PAPHLAGONIAN HORSEMEN IN CUNAXA
(Xenophon Anabasis 1. 8. 5)

Bruno TRIPODI
Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Antichità, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia,
Polo Universitario Annunziata, Università di Messina, 98168 Messina, Italy
bruno.tripodi@unime.it

Abstract: Xenophon’s Anabasis, a unique itinerant observatory of populations and territories, also allows us direct insight into
Paphlagonia and the Paphlagonians in the late 5th and the early 4th century BC. Nevertheless, Xenophon’s evidence, which is
different from what is known through other sources, raises questions which are to remain unanswered.
This paper focuses on the information, provided by Xenophon and preserved also by Diodorus, concerning the presence of a
contingent of 1000 Paphlagonian horsemen among the ranks of Cyrus’ army deployed in the battle of Cunaxa against his brother
Artaxerxes. As opposed to the belief that these horsemen were conscripted as satrapal forces, this paper aims at identifying them as
mistophoroi, coming from a region – such as Paphlagonia at that time – which was not subject to Achaemenid military and tributary
control.

CUNAXA SAVAŞINDA PAPHLAGONIALI ATLILAR

(Xenophon Anabasis 1. 8. 5)
Özet: Halklar ve ülkeler konusunda eşsiz bir gözlem kaynağı olan Xenophon’un Anabasis’i İ.Ö. Geç 5. yy. ve Erken 4. yy.
Paphlagonia’sı ve Pontos’u ile ilgili olarak bazı direk gözlemler yapmamızı sağlar. Bununla beraber bu durum Xenophon’un diğer
kaynaklardaki bilgilerden farklı olup, hala yayımlanmayan bazı soruları da beraberinde getirir.
Bu bildiri Xenophon tarafından öne atılan ve Diodoros’ta yer alan Kyros’un ordusunun kardeşi Artaxerxes’e karşı Cunaxa
savaşında kullandığı 1000 adet Paphlagonialı atlı süvarileri ile ilgili bilgiler üzerinde odaklanacaktır. Bildiride adı geçen atlılar
Pers Satraplığı’na bağlı güçler oldukları bilgisine tezat bir şekilde “mistophoroi” olarak incelenecektir. Bunlar o dönemde
Paphlagonia gibi Akhamenid askeri ve vergi kontrolünde olmayan bir bölgeden gelmişlerdi.

Recently it has rightly been argued that ‘Xenophon’s
Parabasis is our best surviving source’ on the Greek cities
of the southern coast of the Black Sea between the late
5th and the early 4th century BC.1 The contribution given
by Xenophon’s Anabasis to our knowledge of the ethne
which meet/clash with the Greek mercenaries in the
Katabasis and Parabasis has not however been
sufficiently emphasised.2
This paper focuses on one of these ethne, the
Paphlagonians, and more precisely on a specific yet brief
mention of them in Book 1 of the Anabasis, which may
raise new issues in the analysis of the problematic status
of Paphlagonia within the Achaemenid empire.
The Paphlagonians come into the scene, although
elusively, in Book 5 (Anab. 5. 5. 5-23) and are still
present at the beginning of Book 6 (Anab. 6. 1. 1-14).
They belong to a true ‘catalogue’ of ethne in which, after
Cunaxa and up to Byzantium, they are preceded by
Carduchi, Armenians, Mardians, Chaldaei, Chalybians,
Taochians, Phasians, Scythenians, Macronians,
Colchians, Drilae, Mossynoecians and Tibarenians, and
are followed by Mariandynians and Bithynian Thracians.
1
Lane Fox 2004, 30. See Manfredi 1986, 229-31; Avram et al. 2004,
955 (Heracleia), 958 (Kerasus), 959 (Cotyora), 960 (Sinope), 964
(Trapezus).
2
For an analysis of ethne from a food and linguistic perspective, see
Tripodi 1995; 1997; 1998.
More precisely, it should be said that it is Paphlagonia,
rather than the Paphlagonians, which is given emphasis in
the Anabasis. It is the Paphlagonian chora, which in the
spring of 400 BC becomes an insuperable ‘bastion’ on
the path of the mercenaries, before the Paphlagonians
themselves. Rather than actual military actions, the
Greeks in fact mounted only foraging and plundering
expeditions against the Paphlagonians, receiving in
response raids at the edges of the Greek camp in Cotyora
(Anab. 6. 1. 1).3
Nevertheless, about eight months earlier, Greek
mercenaries had fought side by side with Paphlagonian
horsemen in Cyrus’ army. When describing the
deployment of Cyrus’ troops before the battle of Cunaxa,
Xenophon writes that ‘approximately 1000 Paphlagonian
horsemen of the barbaric contingent were deployed
beside Clearchus on the right wing’ (Anab. 1. 8. 5).
One thousand of the 3000 Oriental horsemen led by
Cyrus were positioned to the left under the command of
3
The contact between mercenaries and the Paphlagonians had positive
results afterwards thanks to the legation sent by Corylas, the
Paphlagonians’ archon, to the Greek camp to reach a non-aggression
agreement (Anab. 6. 1. 1-2). This was achieved and celebrated with an
invitation to a banquet to Paphlagonian presbeis and with war dances by
the Greeks, which won the Paphlagonians’ admiration (Anab. 6. 1. 5-13,
with commentary by Lendle 1995, 360-64). For an interpretation of this
banquet between the Greeks and Paphlagonians, see Tripodi 1995, 51-
52.

229
THE BLACK SEA, PAPHLAGONIA, PONTUS AND PHRYGIA IN ANTIQUITY: ASPECTS OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND ANCIENT HISTORY
Ariaeus,4 between 600 and 1000 were deployed in the
centre with Cyrus,5 and finally 1000 Paphlagonians were
positioned to cover the right flank, composed of Greeks
and therefore only infantry troops (hoplites and peltasts).6
Furthermore, given that among the whole of Cyrus’
cavalry forces the Paphlagonian contingent is the only
one which has been identified ethnically and as a
homogenous group, we cannot rule out the possibility
that its commander was a Paphlagonian officer, whose
name has not reached us for this very reason.7
The mention of these horsemen, which, as seen,
represented one third of Cyrus’ cavalry, and of whose
fate we know nothing after the battle of Cunaxa, should
be related to what Xenophon writes later, in Book 5,
about the excellence of their art of warfare in general, and
their cavalry in particular, as fundamental qualities of the
Paphlagonian ethnos.8
In the late spring of 400 BC, when the mercenaries
arrived in Cotyora, one of Sinope’s colonies, where they
stopped for 45 days (Anab. 5. 5. 3-5), they did not receive
xenia (cereals and wine) from the Cotyorites, nor were
they given the opportunity of access to the market. For
this reason they were forced to forage for food in the
Cotyorites’ fields and in the neighbouring Paphlagonian
chora. It was because of these raids that a legation was
sent to the mercenaries’ camp by the Sinopeans,
concerned for the destiny of their colony (Anab. 5. 5. 6).
Hecatonymus, head of the delegation, defended the
Cotyorites and threatened the Greeks that he would enter
into an alliance with Corylas and the Paphlagonians
against them (Anab. 5. 5. 7-12).
It is Xenophon who replies on behalf of the Greeks. After
justifying the raids, he argues that the Greeks are ready to
fight against the joint forces of the Sinopeans and the
4
This information is provided by Diodorus (14. 22. 5).
5 they continue their journey by ship ‘keeping Paphlagonia
The two different figures are given by Xenophon (Anab. 1. 8. 6) and
Diodorus (14. 22. 6) respectively.
6
This number is also confirmed by Diodorus (14. 22. 5). For the
positioning of Cyrus and Artaxerxes’ troops in Cunaxa, see Lendle
1995, 64-66 and fig. 12.
7
According to Diodorus (14. 19. 9), all the officers of Cyrus’ ‘barbaric’
troops were Persian. Diodorus argues elsewhere (17. 19. 4) that, during
the battle of Granicus, the Persian army deployed against Alexander the
Great also included a contingent of Paphlagonian cavalry led by the
Persian Arsites, satrap of the Hellespontine Phrygia. It is not certain,
however, that the conditions in 401 BC were the same as in 334 BC.
8
The Paphlagonians’ excellence in the art of warfare was not only
related to cavalry but also to infantry equipment or, at least, to one of its
items: the helmet. This is what we can presume from two brief and
indirect references, by Xenophon in Book 5 of the Anabasis,
complementing one another. When describing the weaponry of two
more ethne, Drilae and Mossynoecians, for the first Xenophon refers to
their ‘Paphlagonian helmets’ (Anab. 5. 2. 22: krane paphlagonika) and,
similarly but with more details, in relation to the Mossynoecians, he
writes: ‘leather helmets similar to the Paphlagonian ones, with a knob in
the centre, very similar to a tiara in shape’ (Anab. 5. 4. 13). The
description according to which the helmets of the Drilae and the
Mossynoecians were similar to those by the Paphlagonians, both in
terms of shape and material, indicates that the latter represented a
benchmark of form and quality for the weapons of the region’s ethne.
For a comment on these sections, see Dintsis 1986, I, 52-53; Lendle
1995, 306-07, 325. Even Herodotus (7. 72-73) describes the weaponry
of some ethne enlisted in Xerxes’ army by making references to that of
the Paphlagonians.
230
Paphlagonians (Anab. 5. 5. 22), but are also ready to
become allies of the Paphlagonians and support them
against the Sinopeans, given that the mercenaries are
aware that the Paphlagonians ‘have set their eyes on
[their] city and fortresses along the coast’ (Anab. 5. 5.
23). The Sinopeans are persuaded to take a more
moderate stand by Xenophon and, after promising
hospitality to the mercenaries in Sinope, are invited to a
banquet (Anab. 5. 5. 24-25).9
During the negotiations, Hecatonymus gives a well-
argued speech aimed at advising the mercenaries against
crossing Paphlagonia overland (Anab. 5. 6. 4-10). To this
end, he traces a concise but convincing picture of the
peculiarities of the region and of its inhabitants, given
that he is very familiar with the Paphlagonians’ territory
and their military power. He tells the Greeks that ‘the
region has beautiful plains and incredibly high
mountains’ (Anab. 5. 6. 6). The mountains make access to
the area extremely difficult, while the plains facilitate a
cavalry force, which ‘the barbarians regard as superior to
the whole of the king’s cavalry’ (Anab. 5. 6. 7-8). The
Paphlagonians’ army numbered more than 120,000 men
between horsemen and infantrymen. Furthermore, the
mercenaries would have had to cross four rivers to march
across Paphlagonian territory (Anab. 5. 6. 9),10 making the
mercenaries’ passage through Paphlagonia ‘rather than
difficult, absolutely impossible’ (Anab. 5. 6. 10).
What Hecatonymus tells the Greeks about Paphlagonia
and the Paphlagonians seems exaggerated to the point
that the Sinopean is suspected to have spoken in those
terms ‘because of his friendship for Corylas, who is a
proxenos of his’ (Anab. 5. 6. 11). Despite their
suspicions, the Greeks take the information about the
Paphlagonians’ territory and their war skills seriously and
decide to follow Hecatonymus’ advice.11 They do not
attempt to walk across Paphlagonia, and from Cotyora
on the left’, stopping at Sinope and Heracleia (Anab. 6. 1.
14-15; 6. 2. 1-3).
What is relevant for the purpose of this analysis is that the
Paphlagonians and Paphlagonia in the Anabasis, even
9
It is worth noticing that these speeches are aimed at making the
arguments of the mercenaries and Xenophon himself prevail, as when
the latter manages to reverse Hecatonymus’ threat to form an alliance
with the Paphlagonians at the cost of a hardly credible motivation. If we
are to believe Xenophon, the Paphlagonians would have been ready to
compromise their long time good relations with the Sinopeans, testified
to also by the relationship of proxenia between Hecatonymus and
Corylas, in favour of an army of mercenaries in transit (Anab. 5. 6. 11).
In relation to another Greek, Timesitheus the Trapezuntian, proxenos of
another ethnos, the Mossynoecians, who was an interpreter between the
latter and the mercenaries, see Anab. 5. 4. 2-3; cf. Tripodi 1998, 103. On
the ethnically mixed nature of the colonial societies of Pontus Euxinus
‘right from the start’, see Tsetskhladze 1998; 2004.
10
From east to west: Thermodon, Iris, Halys, Parthenius. Xenophon
provides the respective width of these rivers. On the hydrography of
Paphlagonia, see Robert 1980, 165-90; Lendle 1995, 342-43. On rivers
in general in the Anabasis, see Baslez 1995.
11
Without hesitating, Hecatonymus defines himself as empeiros both of
the country and the military power of the Paphlagonians (Anab. 5. 6. 6),
and Xenophon had already specified, in the same terms, that the
Sinopeans ‘knew Paphlagonia very well’ (Anab. 5. 6. 1).
 B. TRIPODI: PAPHLAGONIAN HORSEMAN IN CUNAXA (XENOPHON ANABASIS 1. 8. 5)
though in brief and elusive terms, appear as being closely
linked with warfare. The country is ideal for the practice
of war and at the same time is hostile to any potential
enemy. The ethnos does its best when fighting on horse-
back but its infantry is equally well equipped. And much
more importantly, Xenophon, through Hecatonymus
(Anab. 5. 6. 7-8), attributes to the Paphlagonians the
awareness that their cavalry is superior to that of the
king,12 adding that ‘even recently (kai nyn) they have
failed to present themselves when the king summoned
them’ (Anab. 5. 6. 8). More precisely, this last point, as
will be shown later, might become particularly relevant if
we relate it to the undoubtedly non-secondary presence of
Paphlagonian horsemen in Cyrus’ army and on the
battlefield of Cunaxa.
Their presence can be interpreted as a duty by an ethnos
subject to a high representative of imperial power, that is
to say Cyrus in his double role as satrap of Lydia, Great
Phrygia and Cappadocia, as well as ‘Karanos of the
troops gathered in Castolus’.13 Elsewhere, in fact,
Xenophon shows Cyrus, in 407 BC, gathering troops
among the peoples of Asia Minor with an official letter
signed by the king.14
Nevertheless, this fact, apparently taken for granted,
becomes problematic if we look at it in relation to the
previously mentioned passage in the Anabasis (5. 6. 8),
where it is specified that the Paphlagonians have recently
refused to provide the king with their cavalry. It is
important to notice the unusual situation of subjects who
deny their services to the king but offer them to a
subordinate; a situation which is even more
incomprehensible if we suppose that kai nyn might refer
to the previous year (spring 401 BC) and to the gathering
of troops for the royal army which would have to fight
against Cyrus.15
We should here bear in mind that the expression kai nyn
in the Anabasis is always present in direct speeches and
indicates the historic present or an extremely recent time
in relation to the historic present itself.16 Therefore the
Paphlagonians’ denial to the king should be interpreted as
referring to a past which is very close to the time of the
mercenaries’ stay in Cotyora. In that period of time, as
Xenophon argues (Anab. 6. 1. 2), the Paphlagonians’
archon was Corylas.
The image of Paphlagonia given by Xenophon is
certainly that of one undivided entity according to
12
It goes without saying that the superiority here refers to military
performance (military skills and offensive efficiency), not in terms of
numbers, with regard to which it should be specified that the overall
amount of 120,000 men attributed to Paphlagonian forces appears very
high (see also below n. 17).
13
Xenophon (Anab. 1. 9. 7; Hellenica 1. 4. 3) (see Briant 1996, 352,
639, 718-19; Tuplin 2004, 162, 77).
14
Xenophon (Hellenica 1. 4. 3-4). In relation to Cyrus’ Oriental infantry
only, Diodorus (14. 22. 5) specifies that it was formed by troops from
Phrygia and Lydia (see Briant 1996, 617).
15
According to Briant (1996, 648), Artaxerxes’ army was composed
exclusively of soldiers from Babylonia, Susiana, Media and Persis.
There are no references to Paphlagonian troops among the king’s ranks.
16
See, for example, Xenophon (Anab. 2. 4. 3; 5. 5. 14; 6. 1. 32).
231
physical and ethnic geography (both in the Anabasis and
in the Hellenica),17 but at the same time it cannot be ruled
out that the Paphlagonians who responded to Cyrus and
those who denied their services to the king occupied two
different areas of the country and were led by two
different rulers, perhaps even in conflict.18 The setup of
Paphlagonia in those years, as it is documented by
Xenophon, is rather difficult to pin down, particularly in
terms of the definition and interrelation of the
geographical, ethnic and political entities in themselves
and in relation to Achaemenid imperial power.19 And in
such an overall context Xenophon’s evidence, although
providing precise information, raises questions which
remain unanswered.20 This is even more so if we take into
account that at specific periods in time and under certain
rulers, whether local rulers or rulers of the entire ethnos,21
the Paphlagonians refused to satisfy the king’s requests –
a fact that can hardly be denied – and much more
importantly, they acted independently, creating military
alliances with partners of their own choice.
Corylas was the first, if it was him, as previously shown,
the archon of the horsemen who denied their services to
the king, according to the well-informed Hecatonymus.22
Another one is Otys23 who, in 396/95 BC, ‘refuses the
King’s invitation to go to him and prefers to reach
Agesilaus, with whom he signs an alliance treaty’, and as
a consequence of which he provides the Spartan king
with ‘1000 horsemen and 2000 peltasts’.24 And Thuys,
dynastes Paphlagoniae, who approximately a decade
later, is defeated and caught by the satrap Datames
for not obeying the king, is probably the same
17
Such an image, apart from the high figures involved, is reinforced by
the high number of men who, according to Hecatonymus, form the
Paphlagonian army (Anab. 5. 6. 9; see above n. 12). It is interesting to
note the correspondence between the references to the Paphlagonian
chora and dynamis, in both cases presented as an inseparable pair, in
both the Anabasis (5. 6. 6) and the Hellenica (4. 1. 4).
18
According to Xenophon, the Mossynoecians were in a similar
condition, since they were divided in two groups fighting for the
metropolis (Anab. 5. 4. 3-15). On the possibility that Paphlagonia was
divided into separate rival groups and that, due to the considerable
extension of its territory, had more than one local ruler and,
exceptionally, only one national ruler, see Briant 1996, 661;
Tuplin 2004, 177-78; see also below n. 21. Strabo (12. 3. 9)
distinguishes two different geographical areas in Paphlagonia, mesogaia
and paralia, but in this case the distinction is based on physical
geography.
19
See Briant 1996, 402 and 514; Debord 1999, 110-15; Tuplin 2004,
164-65 and n. 34, 177-78.
20
Among other things, the territory of Paphlagonia, as indicated in the
Anabasis, is extended eastwards to the River Thermodon, and this
information is not found in any other source, either prior or subsequent
to Xenophon. On the Paphlagonian borders, see Ruge and Bittel 1949,
cols. 2489-92; Lendle 1995, 334-36.
21
According to Tuplin (2004, 178), these were ‘regional, not national,
rulers’. However, it is important to note that when Theopompus, quoted
by Strabo (12. 3. 4), defined Paphlagonia as being ‘governed by several
rulers’, he was referring to a mythistoric age, and Plutarch’s reference to
‘kings and dynasts’ (Pericles 20. 1-2) was not limited to Paphlagonia,
but also referred to all ethne living near the Pontus.
22
See above n. 11. Cf. also Debord 1999, 112.
23
This figure is also found, with variants, in Xenophon’s Hellenica and
Agesilaus (Cotys), and in the Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus (Gyes).
24
Xenophon (Hellenica 4. 1. 3); (Agesilaus 3. 4); Hell. Oxy. = FGH 66,
F 1. It should be noted, for what it is worth, that the figure of 1000
horsemen provided first by Corylas and then by Otys, respectively, to
Cyrus and to Agesilaus, is exactly the same.
THE BLACK SEA, PAPHLAGONIA, PONTUS AND PHRYGIA IN ANTIQUITY: ASPECTS OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND ANCIENT HISTORY
person.25 In light of these indications – on the basis of
which we should presume that Paphlagonian dynasts
were free to move and to act outside Persian control26 –
one might be lead to believe that the dynasts’ acts of
‘insubordination’ towards the king might not have been
occasional.27 On the contrary, the Paphlagonians, at least
those who occupied inland areas, share the same
conditions as those ethne of central Asia Minor who were
nominally part of Achaemenid empire, but in actual fact
were not subject to military and tributary control.28
This is confirmed by the Persians’ strategic choice to let
the Greek mercenaries, after the battle of Cunaxa, go
further north towards the hinterland. Such choice was
supported by the awareness that the territories where the
Greeks were going were, as seen by the central power, an
insurmountable and dangerous land controlled by
indigenous ethne.29
If this was the case for the Paphlagonians – and we have
reasons to believe that it was so given that their territory
was off-limits for the Greek mercenaries – then we need
to further question the abovementioned unusual situation,
whereby an ethnos (or at least part of it) denies its
services to the king but offers them to one of his
subalterns, and we should presume that the reason for the
presence of the Paphlagonian cavalry among the ranks of
Cyrus’ army was other than a conscription in the satrapal
forces.
A possible trace is provided by some references in the
Anabasis to misthophoroi, who are not Greeks, but
belonged to Asian ethne, and therefore to subjected
populations. According to Xenophon, Armenian, Mardian
and Chaldaean misthophoroi were also at the service of
25
Nepos (Dat. 2): is regi dicto audiens non erat. See also Theopompus
(FGH 115, F 179) apud Athenaeus (4. 144f; 10. 415d); Aelian (VH 1.
27), with the variant of the name Thys.
26
See Lane Fox 2004, 30-31. According to Debord (1999, 113),
between 400 and 380 BC, Paphlagonia was ‘en état de sécession de
fait’. On the contrary, according to Briant (1996, 751), the entire
Paphlagonian territory was not beyond satrapal surveillance. Tuplin
(2004, 177) argues that Paphlagonia in those years was ‘technically
subject to Persian authority’. Diodorus (14. 11. 3) wrongly writes about
a ‘satrap of Paphlagonia’.
27
Without making the ‘généralisation abusive’, typical of Greek authors
of the 4th century, of considering the region always independent from
the Persians (see Briant 1996, 719). The Persian archaeological
evidence found in Paphlagonia is considered to be convincing proof of
Achaemenid control (bibliography in Tuplin 2004, 174, n. 75).
28
In relation to the alliance between Agesilaus and Cotys, Xenophon
(Agesilaus 3. 4) specifies that the latter ‘did not give in to the king who
was holding out his right hand’, being afraid, among other things, ‘that
he had to pay a high sum’. This information might well refer to Cotys’
rebellion, also against phoros, and therefore to the payment of
substantial overdue sums of it.
29
See Xenophon (Anab. 3. 5. 16) on the territory of the Carduchi who
did not obey the king and who once had destroyed a royal army
precisely thanks to the territory’s inaccessible nature. Tuplin (2004,
176) emphasises that ‘the Carduchi never appear in Persian service,
even as mercenaries’. Diodorus is the only one who argues that, after
Cunaxa, the Ten Thousand decided to go back ‘marching towards
Paphlagonia’ (14. 25. 7 and 27. 2). In any case, it should be noted that
the last two Persians whom the mercenaries dealt with are Tiribazus,
governor of Armenia (Anab. 4. 4. 4-18), and Asidates, rich owner from
Mysia (Anab. 7. 8. 9-22). In the middle, along the march of the Ten
Thousand, there are only ethne and poleis, a world without Persians.
232
Orontes, satrap of Armenia (Anab. 4. 3. 4), whereas
Tiribazus, hyparchos of Western Armenia, besides ‘his
own army’, also had troops of Chalybian and Taochian
misthophoroi (Anab. 4. 4. 18). Finally, Itamenes, in
Mysia, also had, in addition to his own troops, Assyrian
hoplites from Comania and 80 Hyrcanian horsemen,
called ‘mercenaries in the service of the King’ (Anab. 7.
8. 15: basileos misthophoroi). These data, together with
other factors, have been analysed in relation to the
composition of imperial armies at various levels. The
latter included troops defined by Greek sources as
misthophoroi, from various peoples of the empire, but
clearly different from the others forming the army,
precisely because of the way they are named, showing
them to be mercenaries. Scholars agree that these
mercenaries should not be identified according to the
Greek meaning of the term mistophoroi, but rather in the
‘Achaemenid sense’, given that they provided neither
voluntary nor paid services. They were in fact subject to
conscription and their misthos consisted only of receiving
trophe.30
If this were so, however, the difference between
mercenaries and regular troops would be too small to
justify the distinction made by Greek authors and their
use of a strongly distinctive term in Greek. Another
element which leads us to question the compulsory nature
of these misthophoroi’s services is given by the fact that
all Orientals defined as such belong to ‘minor’ ethne, also
known as ‘rebels’, non-subjects, ready to refuse tributary
and military requests of the king.31 The persistence of
sources’ references to these ethne in those terms is so
strong that it cannot be reduced to a topos, rather it
should be considered as related to a real context. The
contribution of these ethne to imperial armies included
both their precious knowledge of territories otherwise
impossible to cross, as well as different weapons and
fighting techniques. The enlisting of mercenaries, both
Greek and Oriental, should be therefore considered as a
further way to control and use the various populations of
the empire by the central power.32
Therefore if, within the empire, there could be ethne (or
part of them) whose territories were not accessible to
royal armies, and that as a consequence did not pay
phoros and were prepared to provide military services to
30
See Tuplin 1987, 195, 222-23. Briant 1966, 814-15 (but see also 786-
87 and 1062-63) defines ‘tout à fait caractéristique’ Xenophon’s
expression basileos misthophoroi and derives from it a sort of
institutional category of soldiers who, despite being defined as
‘mercenaries’, would not be such according to the Greek meaning of the
term but ‘au sens achéménide’. However, in the Anabasis, Xenophon
defines in similar terms the entire royal army. See basilikon strateuma
(Anab. 2. 2. 16), basilike stratia (Anab. 3. 5. 16), but also basileos
stratia (Anab. 1. 7. 12), basileos dynamis (Anab. 2. 1. 14) and basileos
hippeias (Anab. 5. 6. 8). This means that the expression used for the
mercenaries loses its peculiarity.
31
See, in the Anabasis (5. 5. 17), Carduchi, Taochians and Chaldaeans.
Xenophon, in the Cyropaedia (3. 2. 7), argues that the latter fight for
those who need them ‘because they are polemikotatoi and penetes’.
Tuplin (2004, 176) defines Chalybians and Taochians ‘certainly non-
subject’. About Carduchi, see above n. 29.
32
Briant (1996, 815 and passim) rightly insists on these different forms
of control without, however, believing in Oriental mercenaries. (see
above n. 30).
 B. TRIPODI: PAPHLAGONIAN HORSEMAN IN CUNAXA (XENOPHON ANABASIS 1. 8. 5)
the king only if paid, we should take into account the
possibility that those 1000 Paphlagonian horsemen at
Cunaxa were not conscripted by Cyrus, but rather
deployed by him as mercenaries, independently of the
territorial extension of Cyrus’ arche.
It cannot be denied that such a hypothesis contrasts with
the description, provided by literary sources, of Cyrus’
army as clearly divided into two ethnic groups. Accor-
ding to Xenophon (Anab. 1. 7. 14, 1. 8. 5), Diodorus (14.
19. 6)33 and Plutarch (Artaxerxes 6. 5), on the one hand
there were the barbarians, who are not further identified,
and therefore subject to conscription, and on the other the
Greeks, the only ones identified as misthophoroi.34
The undifferentiated image of Cyrus’ strateuma
barbarikon is nevertheless the result of the Hellenocentric
approach of the sources, mainly interested in focusing on
the Greek troops. This does not allow us to know if
Cyrus, like Tiribazus, had been forced to integrate his
satrapal forces with contingents of mercenaries, recruited
in the territories of the empire among the subjects who
were such only by name.
In any case, the previously mentioned military excellence
of the Paphlagonian cavalry, which was against carrying
out orders on behalf of a third party and submitting to
obligations, was a relevant contribution for any Oriental
army. And perhaps it is no coincidence that Cyrus had
placed the two ethnic groups, the Paphlagonian and the
Hellenic, side by side on the battlefield of Cunaxa, since
they represented excellence in the art of warfare, cavalry
and infantry respectively, and which he could deploy only
by paying misthos.
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