Krijnen-ed-Recognition - German Idealism As An Ongoing Challenge-Bk2

Recognition—German Idealism
as an Ongoing Challenge
Critical Studies in
German Idealism
Series Editor
Paul G. Cobben
Advisory Board
simon critchley – paul cruysberghs – rózsa erzsébet
garth green – vittorio hösle – francesca menegoni
martin moors – michael quante – ludwig siep
timo slootweg – klaus vieweg
VOLUME 10
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/csgi

Recognition—German Idealism
as an Ongoing Challenge
Edited By
Christian Krijnen
Leiden • boston
2014
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CONTENTS
List of Contributors . ....................................................................................... vii

Foreword ............................................................................................................ xiii
1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1
Christian Krijnen
2. Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—What Is It? . ................................ 11

Heikki Ikäheimo
3. The Paradigm of Recognition and the Free Market ....................... 39

Paul Cobben
4. From Autonomy to Recognition ........................................................... 53

Robert Brandom
5. The Metaphysics of Recognition: On Hegel’s Concept of

Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit . ..................... 67
Arthur Kok
6. R
ecognition—Future Hegelian Challenges for a Contemporary
Philosophical Paradigm ........................................................................... 99
Christian Krijnen
7. The Tragedy of Misrecognition—The Desire for a Catholic

Shakespeare and Hegel’s Hamlet . ........................................................ 129
Simon Critchley
8. R
ecognition and Dissent: Schelling’s Conception
of Recognition and Its Contribution to Contemporary
Political Philosophy .................................................................................. 143
Emiliano Acosta
9. K
antian Version of Recognition: The Bottom–Line of
Axel Honneth’s Project ............................................................................ 165
Donald Loose
vi contents
10. A
nerkennung – Ein Ausweg aus einer Verlegenheit? . ................ 191
Kurt Walter Zeidler
11. R
ecognition of Norms and Recognition of Persons: Practical
Acknowledgment in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit ............... 207
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer
12. F initude, Rational Justification & Mutual Recognition ............... 235

Kenneth R. Westphal
13. I nter-Personality and Wrong ............................................................... 253

Klaus Vieweg
14. The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel’s Lordship

and Bondage ............................................................................................. 267
Sasa Josifovic
15. F rom Love to Recognition: Hegel’s Conception of

Intersubjectivity in a Developmental-Historical Perspective .... 287
Erzsébet Rózsa
16. F riendship in Hegel and Its Interpretation in Theories

of Recognition .......................................................................................... 311
Jean-Christophe Merle
Index of Terms ................................................................................................. 323

Index of Names ................................................................................................ 332
List of Contributors
Emiliano Acosta is a Postdoctoral Researcher (Research Foundation Flan-

ders, FWO) at the Centre for Critical Philosophy of the Ghent University
and Member of the Young Academy of the Royal Flemish Academy of
Sciences and Arts of Belgium. His research focuses on topics of contem-
porary political philosophy such as recognition, liberty of expression and
press, pluralism and cosmopolitanism in the light of the legacy of mod-
ern Philosophy, especially Kantian Philosophy and German Idealism. On
these topics he published numerous articles. He is author of Schiller versus
Fichte, Amsterdam/New York 2011. http://www.criticalphilosophy.ugent.be/
members?member=8
Robert B. Brandom is a Dinstinguished Professor of Philosophy at the

University of Pittsburgh. He works primarily in philosophy of language,
philosophy of mind and philosophical logic. Among his books: Making
It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Harvard
University Press 1994; Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferential-
ism, Harvard University Press 2000; Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical
Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Harvard University Press 2002;
Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2008; Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, Harvard University
Press 2009; Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contempo-
rary, Harvard University Press 2011.
Paul Cobben is Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University (The Nether-

lands). His publications focus on practical philosophy, combining a sys-
tematic and historical approach. Among his books: Das endliche Selbst,
Würzburg 1999; Das Gesetz der multikulturellen Gesellschaft, Würzburg
2002; (ed.) Hegel-Lexikon, Darmstadt 2006; The Nature of the Self. Recog-
nition in the Form of Right and Morality, Berlin/New York 2009; (ed.) Insti-
tutions of Educations: then and today, Leiden/Boston 2010; The Paradigm
of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death, Leiden/Boston
2012.
Simon Critchley is Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy at the New School

for Social Research (New York) and Professor of Philosophy at the Tilburg
viii list of contributors
University. His work concentrates on Continental philosophy; phenom-

enology; philosophy and literature; psychoanalysis; ethical and political
philosophy. Recent publications: Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Polit-
ical Theology, Verso Books 2012; Impossible Objects, Polity Press 2011; The
Book of Dead Philosophers, Granta Books 2009/Vintage Books 2008; (with
R. Schuermann) On Heidegger’s Being and Time, Routledge 2008; Infinitely
Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance, Verso Books
2007.
Heikki Ikäheimo has a PhD from University of Jyväskylä in Finland (2003).

He came to Australia in 2008 and worked as research fellow at Macqua-
rie University until moving to UNSW in 2012. He works on an Australian
Research Council project titled ‘The Social Ontology of Personhood—A
Recognition-Theoretical Account’. He published following books: Nature
in Spirit; Recognition and Social Ontology; Self-consciousness and Intersub-
jectivity. A Study on Hegel’s Encyclopedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit
(1830); Dimensions of Personhood; On the Nature of Social and Institutional
Reality.
Sasa Josifovic (PhD University of Cologne). His main fields of interests

are Classical German Philosophy, Classical Chinese Philosophy, and the
interplay of philosophy and literature. Recent publications: Hegels Theo-
rie des Selbstbewusstseins in der Phänomenologie des Geistes, Würzburg
2008; Selbstbewusstsein, in: Kurt Appel und Thomas Auinger (eds.): Eine
Lektüre von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Teil 1: Von der Sinnlichen
Gewissheit zur gesetzprüfenden Vernunft, Wien/Frankfurt am Main 2009;
Die systematische und inhaltliche Bestimmung der ‘vollkommenen Selb-
stanschauung’ in Schellings Genieästhetik von 1800, in: Philosophisches
Jahrbuch 119, 2012; The Crucial Role of Pure Apperception within the
Framework of Kant’s Theory of Synthesis and Cognition, in: G. van der
Vijver / B. Damarest (eds.), Objectivity after Kant. Its Meaning, its Limita-
tions, its Fateful Omissions, Olms, Hildesheim / Zürich / New York 2013;
(ed. with G. Yi/A. Lätzer-Lasar): Metaphysical Foundations of Knowledge
and Ethics in Chinese and European Philosophy, Wilhelm Fink Verlag,
München 2013.
Arthur Kok, PhD (2012), studied philosophy in Tilburg and Berlin. He is

postdoctoral researcher at Tilburg University. He works in the field of
moral philosophy and the history of modern and contemporary philoso-
phy. Recent publications: Kant, Hegel und die Frage der Metaphysik: Über
list of contributors ix
die Möglichkeit der Philosophie nach der kopernikanischen Wende, München

2013; Sublimity, Freedom and Necessity in the Philosophy of Kant, in:
D. Loose (ed.), The Sublime and Its Teleology, Leiden/Boston 2011.
Christian Krijnen is a professor of Philosophy at the University of Tilburg and

the VU University Amsterdam. His research focuses on Modern Philosophy,
Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of
Culture, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Economics and Management &
Organization. Among his books: Nachmetaphysischer Sinn. Eine problemge-
schichtliche und systematische Studie zu den Prinzipien der Wertphilosophie
Heinrich Rickerts, Würzburg 2001 (Dissertation); Philosophie als System. Prin-
zipientheoretische Untersuchungen zum Systemgedanken bei Hegel, im Neukan-
tianismus und in der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Würzburg 2008 (Habilitation);
(ed. with H. F. Fulda): Systemphilosophie als Selbsterkenntnis? Hegel und der
Neukantianismus, Würzburg 2006; (ed. with M. Heinz): Kant im Neukantian-
ismus. Fortschritt oder Rückschritt?, Würzburg 2007; (ed. with K. W. Zeidler):
Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung. Transzendentalphilosophie im
Anschluss an Werner Flach, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2011; (ed.
with M. de Launay), Der Begriff der Geschichte im Neukantianismus und seine
Aktualität, Würzburg 2013. https://sites.google.com/site/christiankrijnen/
Donald Loose is Thomas More Professor at Erasmus Univerity Rotterdam

and professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University. His main research
deals with fundamental ethics, Kant and Enlightenment, post-modern
French political philosophy and religion in the public domain. Some
recent publications: Marcel Gauchet: politique, religion et christianisme,
in: A. Braeckman, La démocratie à bout de souffle? Une introduction cri-
tique à la philosophie politique de Marcel Gauchet, Louvain (Peeters), 2007,
pp. 95–110; Kant on Contingency in Christian Religion, in: D. M. Grube &
P. Jonkers, Religions Challenged by Contingency. Theological and Philo-
sophical Approaches to the Problem of Contingency, Leiden (Brill) 2008,
pp. 67–88; “Der Augapfel Gottes”. Das Recht als Integrationsfaktor der
interkulturellen Gesellschaft, in: H. Goris & M Heimbach-Steins, Religion
in Recht und politischer Ordnung heute, Würzburg (Ergon) 2008, pp. 69–92;
(ed.) The Sublime and Its Teleology. Kant—German Idealism—Phenome-
nology, Leiden/Boston 2011; The Excess of Reason and the Return of Reli-
gion. Transcendence of Christian Monotheism in Nancy’s Dis-enclosure,
in: A. Alexandrova e.a. (Ed.), Re-treating Religion. Deconstructing Christi-
anity with Jean-Luc Nancy; Fordham University Press 2012.
x list of contributors
Jean-Christophe Merle, professor at the Université de Lorraine, honorary

professor at the Universität des Saarlandes at Saarbrücken. His areas of
specializations are philosophy of law and political philosophy, as well as
Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. He is the author of Justice et Progrès
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1997) and German Idealism and the
Concept of Punishment (Cambridge University Press 2009; German origi-
nal: Strafen aus Respekt vor der Menschenwürde, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
2007); editor of Fichte. Grundlage des Naturrechts (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag 2001), Globale Gerechtigkeit (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 2005),
Die Legitimität von supranationalen Institutionen (Münster: LIT 2012), and
Spheres of Global Justice (Springer: Dortrecht 2013); and co-editor of sev-
eral volumes in political philosophy and philosophy of law, as well as
L’amitié (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2005).
Erzsébet Rózsa (PhD 1984) is a Professor of Philosophy at the University

of Debrecen (Hungary). She is also the head of a German-Hungarian
interdisciplinary bioethical research group and of the Graduate School of
Humanities at the University of Debrecen. Since 2012, she is a fellow at
the University of Münster and its Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics
(Kolleg-Forschergruppe “Normenbegründung in Medizinethik und Bio-
politik”). She has published monographs and articles on Hegel and Ger-
man idealism, including Versöhnung und System (W. Fink, 2005), Hegels
Konzeption praktischer Individualität (Mentis, 2007) and Hegel’s Theory of
Modern Individuality (Brill, 2012). http://www.erozsa.eu/
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Uni-

versity of Leipzig. His research focuses on the philosophy of logic and
language, mind and action. He published among other: Hegels Phänom-
enologie des Geistes. Ein dialogischer Kommentar. 2 Bde. Hamburg: Meiner
2013; Denken. Wege und Abwege in der Philosophie des Geistes. Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck 2012; Philosophie des Selbstbewusstseins. Hegels System als
Formanalyse von Wissen und Autonomie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005; Sinn-
Kriterien. Die logischen Grundlagen kritischer Philosophie von Platon bis
Wittgenstein. Paderborn: Schöningh 1995; Hegels Analytische Philosophie.
Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung. Paderborn:
Schöningh 1992. http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~philos/stekeler/index.php
Klaus Vieweg, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, is Professor for Phi-

losophy. Fields of research: German Idealism (Hegel), scepticism. Major
publications: Das Denken der Freiheit. Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie
list of contributors xi
des Rechts, München 2012; Skepsis und Freiheit, München 2007; Phi-
losophie des Remis. Der junge Hegel und das Gespenst des Skepticismus,
München 1999; Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (ed. with W. Welsch),
Frankfurt/M. 2008; Das Interesse des Denkens. Hegel aus heutiger Sicht (ed.
with W. Welsch), München 2003.
Kenneth R. Westphal is Professorial Fellow, School of Philosophy, Univer-

sity of East Anglia, Norwich (UK). The central focus of his research is ratio-
nal justification in non-formal domains, including both epistemology and
history and philosophy of science, and moral philosophy (ethics, justice).
His recent publications include Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism
(2004), ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’
(Theory & Research in Education 2012), ‘Hume, Empiricism and the Gen-
erality of Thought’ (Dialogue 2013), ‘Natural Law, Social Contract & Moral
Objectivity: Rousseau’s Natural Law Constructivism’ ( Jurisprudence 2013)
and ‘Hegel’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference, Newton’s Meth-
odological Rule Four and Scientific Realism Today’ (Philosophical Inquiries
2013); http://eastanglia.academia.edu/KennethRWestphal
Kurt Walter Zeidler is a Professor for Philosophy at the University of Vienna.

Main fields of research: Idealism, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophy
of Science. Major publications: Grundriß der transzendentalen Logik, Cux-
haven 1992, 21997; Kritische Dialektik und Transzendentalontologie. Der
Ausgang des Neukantianismus und die post-neukantianische Systematik,
Bonn 1995; Prolegomena zur Wissenschaftstheorie, Würzburg 2000, 22006;
(ed. with Ch. Krijnen): Gegenstandsbestimmung und Selbstgestaltung.
Transzendentalphilosophie im Anschluss an Werner Flach, Würzburg 2011.
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/kurt.walter.zeidler/
Foreword
For the philosophers in the tradition of German Idealism, the French

Revolution was an epoch-making historical event. In this revolution the
great ideal of human freedom and equality became the central political
focus point. It was established in the revolution that being human is not
dependant on specific individual qualities, but rather on relationships of
mutuality. Especially those beings are human who are universally recog-
nized as human beings. In our contemporary, globalized world, recogni-
tion has become a central philosophical category which articulates a sense
of freedom that diametrically contrasts with traditionalism, nationalism,
subjectivism or objectivism.
The German idealist philosophers made great efforts to elaborate an
adequate philosophical conception of recognition. However, this collec-
tion makes clear that thinking about recognition is indeed an ‘ongoing
challenge’. Eminent scholars, originating from three different continents
and eight different nationalities, show that the concept of recognition has
a multilayered meaning. Even within the framework of Hegel’s philosoph-
ical development, they give different interpretations and accentuations
of the concept. Moreover, Hegel’s view is compared with the exposi-
tions in Kant, Fichte and Schelling. Combining historical with systematic
approaches, the discussion of the concept sheds new light on such diver-
gent topics as, for example, love, friendship, tragedy, free market, desire,
misrecognition, autonomy, dissent, the wrong, the transcendental I, and
rational justification.
Paul Cobben (Tilburg University), Series Editor.

Chapter One
Introduction
Christian Krijnen
For the past couple decades there has been intensive debate about recog-
nition (Anerkennung) which has commanded ever greater attention. This
debate began with topics in practical philosophy, especially political and
social philosophy. As it developed, however, recognition has achieved the-
matically and historically such broad significance, that a new philosophi-
cal paradigm indeed seems to be in the making: Recognition turns out to
be a fundamental concept, relevant not only for understanding political
issues, but for our human world as a whole. Hence, the concept of recog-
nition now includes such notions as subjectivity, objectivity, rationality,
knowledge, personality, sociality, identity, otherness, nature, logic, etc.
The protagonists in this debate seek to make German idealism fruit-
ful for contemporary problems. Whereas neo-Kantians a century ago also
sought to update German idealism, though focussing on Kant as the phi-
losopher of modern culture, contemporary theorists of recognition intend
to rejuvenate especially Hegel’s philosophy. Both analytical and continen-
tal traditions of philosophy come together in this debate, developing a
deeper and more comprehensive understanding of what is going on in
our modern world.
Against this background, the conference Recognition—German Idealism
As Ongoing Challenge took place at Tilburg University (The Netherlands)
from 5 to 7 September 2012, organized by Paul Cobben and Christian
Krijnen. Its aim was to explore, i.e. to diagnose, analyze and evaluate,
prospects and limits of recognition as a philosophical paradigm. This
exploration was lead by the question of whether the present debate suf-
ficiently incorporates the systematic requirements of the philosophy of
German idealism, which it pretends to inherit and update. Are there rel-
evant fundamental aspects of German idealism which are not or insuffi-
ciently addressed in the contemporary debate on recognition? Recognition
as a ‘new paradigm’ of philosophy does not only depart from highly influ-
ential convictions with regard to the philosophy of German idealism,
its argumentative potential, internal development and limits. As a new
2 christian krijnen
paradigm for philosophy claiming to actualize German idealist philoso-

phy, it provokes questions about the foundation of the principle of rec-
ognition itself and its exact place within, and structural relation to, other
principles of philosophy and its corresponding philosophical disciplines,
as well as questions about which philosophical method provides the best
means for addressing recognition. Put in more historical terms, such
questions concern, for example, the apparent preference in the debate
for Hegel’s earlier works, partly favoring his Phänomenologie des Geistes
(1807), partly his pre-phenomenological investigations in the Jena period,
both differing significantly from each other and from the comprehensive
philosophy Hegel developed later in his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen
Wissenschaften (1830). They of course also concern the concept of recog-
nition in Kant and Fichte, their merits and shortcomings.
This collection of essays is the result of the presentations and discus-
sions during the conferences. It roughly follows the thematic arrangement
leading the program of the conference. The first part of the book, con-
taining contributions of Ikäheimo, Cobben, Kok and Brandom, focuses
on Hegel’s concept of recognition as such. The second part of it, from
Krijnen to Critchley, Acosta, Loose and Zeidler, critically revisits the cur-
rent debate on recognition, especially its dealing with Hegel, but also con-
sidering Kant, Fichte and Schelling. The third part—Stekeler-Weithofer,
Westphal, Vieweg, Josifovic, Rózsa, Merle—treats capita selecta of Hegel’s
ideas on recognition. Let me briefly outline the content of the essays!
Heikki Ikäheimo poses the question Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—

What is it? He aims to provide some illumination on what ‘recognition’
in Hegel means by analysing the chapter ‘Self-consciousness’ of Hegel’s
Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. He shows that even in this
relatively short and concise text what exactly ‘recognition’ means, is a
rather complicated matter, or, in other words, that in using the term in
this text, Hegel had in mind several issues which, though they are related,
are by no means reducible to just one thing. Ikäheimo sorts out some of
the different issues at stake, as this might be useful both for figuring out
what is going on in Hegel’s text and for speaking in a more differentiated
manner about the plurality of phenomena that may be at issue when we
talk about ‘recognition’ today. He underlines that it is only with adequate
consciousness of the variety of phenomena at stake, that we can work
towards a conceptual unification of recognition-theory as a paradigm.
In his The Paradigm of Recognition and the Free Market, Paul Cobben
argues that the separation between the philosophy of consciousness and
introduction 3
recognition clashes with the basic intention of Hegel’s project. For Hegel,
as Cobben interprets him, recognition has to be understood as the subla-
tion of the fear of death. Philosophy of consciousness does not oppose rec-
ognition, but rather is an essential moment of recognition. According to
Cobben, the recognition relation is an attempt to conceptualize an inter-
nal unity between the relation to nature and the relation to the other. As
long as this is not understood properly, an adequate insight into the mod-
ern market remains impossible. Cobben aims to substantiate this claim by
discussing the ideas of Honneth and Schmidt am Busch. Both relate the
modern market to the so-called second form of social recognition. In this
relation, the individuals are related as persons and respect one-another
as persons. Since Hegel, in his Philosophy of Right, discusses the rela-
tion between persons at the level of ‘Abstract Right’, it is not surprising
that they link the second form of recognition with ‘Abstract Right’. As a
result, they make being-a-person a contingent quality of concrete individ-
uals. For Cobben, this could be a consequence of their anti-metaphysical
Hegel-reading. Cobben shows, however, that this point of departure implies
a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel’s concept of recognition.
Robert Brandom sketches a route From Autonomy to Recognition. For
him, Kant’s deepest and most original idea, the axis around all of his
thought revolves, is that what distinguishes judging and intentional doing
from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some
special sort of mental processes, but that they, as knowers and agents,
are responsible for their beliefs and actions in a distinctive way. Kant’s
normative conception of intentionality moves to the center of the philo-
sophical stage the question of how we should think about the force or
bindingness of normative statuses such as commitments, authority and
responsibility. Kant’s response is to develop and extend the Enlighten-
ment commitment to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses in
the form of his autonomy model, which serves also as a criterion demar-
cating the realm of the normative from that of the natural. According to
Brandom, Hegel sees that the very distinction of force and content that
called forth Kant’s new normative conception of judging and intending
demands a relative independence of those two aspects that cannot be
accommodated on the autonomy model, so long as that model is construed
as applying to individual normative subjects conceived in isolation from
one another—that is, apart from their normative attitudes towards one
another. For Brandom, Hegel notices that the requisite dependence and
independence claims can be reconciled if they are construed in terms of
individually necessary conditions, rather than individually sufficient ones.
4 christian krijnen
And understanding the sort of normative dependence and independence

in question as ways of talking about relations of responsibility and author-
ity, Hegel offers a social model of normative statuses as instituted by
reciprocal recognition, according to which each recognitive relation (rec-
ognizing and being recognized) combines aspects of authority over and
responsibility to those who are recognized or who recognize.
In The Metaphysics of Recognition: On Hegel’s Concept of Self-
Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Arthur Kok argues that
Hegel’s ‘Self-consciousness’ chapter in his Phenomenology of Spirit intends
to offer an alternative to Kant’s idea of the transcendental ‘I’. Although
Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness has epistemological and socio-theo-
retical implications, Kok focuses on Hegel’s metaphysical position which
justifies these implications. Different from Kant, Hegel not only points out
the fundamental distinction between self-consciousness and nature, but
also their oneness. According to Kok, the difference between them exists
within the subject itself. This position is not alien to Kant, but belongs to
his practical philosophy. Hegel takes Kant’s practical view on the unity of
reason, autonomous freedom, to be the intrinsic unity of the transcenden-
tal subject and the thing-in-itself which remain irreconcilable in Kant’s
theoretical philosophy. This is expressed in Hegel’s formula ‘Substance
= Subject’. Hegel does not deny, however, that the thing-in-itself has no
otherness for the subject. For Hegel too, philosophical or metaphysical
knowledge exists only in a fundamental relation to otherness. His concept
of self-consciousness as a relation between self and other Hegel calls rec-
ognition; it replaces Kant’s idea of the transcendental ‘I’, integrating the
most important element of the transcendental subject, namely to think
the unity of reason.
Christian Krijnen discusses Recognition—Future Hegelian Challenges
for a Contemporary Philosophical Paradigm. He is of the opinion that the
present attempt to return to Hegel exhibits a remarkable turning away
from Hegel’s mature system, as outlined in his Enzyklopädie der philoso-
phischen Wissenschaften of 1830. Hegel’s philosophical project of develop-
ing self-knowledge of the idea in the form of a system through the three
elements of pure thought, nature and spirit appears to his critics as uncon-
vincing. By contrast, Krijnen argues that Hegel as a systematic philosopher
confronts the contemporary paradigm of recognition with difficult and
far-reaching questions concerning its own foundation, both methodologi-
cally and thematically. This general thesis is specified and corroborated
by three considerations, resulting in three challenges to the contempo-
rary paradigm of recognition: First, Krijnen shows that Hegel’s concept
introduction 5
of philosophy as a science of the absolute idea and its non-metaphysical

character should be taken much more into account. With this result, he,
then, is able to make clear how and why Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit is
not practical philosophy, but philosophy of the (absolute) idea. Against
the background of the these two considerations, Krijnen, finally, points to
some problems arising from a general system philosophical perspective in
the attempt to elevate recognition to a philosophical paradigm, and high-
lights some significant features of embedding the paradigm of recognition
within Hegel’s philosophy of the idea.
In his essay on The Tragedy of Misrecognition—The Desire for a Catho-
lic Shakespeare and Hegel’s Hamlet, Simon Critchley draws the attention
to the theme of misrecognition. He starts with the fact that the philo-
sophical task after Kant was how to achieve a reconciliation of the dual-
isms of nature and freedom or pure and practical reason. The view that
is adumbrated in Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment and announced in
Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man and incipient romantic
and idealist trends in the Germanophone 1790s, is that the artwork is the
vehicle for such reconciliation. Critchley, then, elaborates on Schelling’s
concept of art, especially on the highest exemplar of art, drama, and its
highest manifestation, tragedy, and on the equilibrium between freedom
and nature, theoretical and practical reason, it offers. He then discusses
Schelling’s and Hegel’s views on tragedy, especially on Hamlet, finally
offering an analysis of Hamlet’s multiple misrecognitions. For Critchley,
as a quintessentially modern tragedy, Hamlet enacts the tragedy of moder-
nity, allowing us no relief, release or satisfaction of desire: Hamlet as a
mournful, melancholic and melodramatic farce—just like our world.
Emiliano Acosta explores Recognition and Dissent: Schelling’s Concep-
tion of Recognition and its Contribution to Contemporary Political Philoso-
phy. He wants to offer an alternative notion of recognition, which consists
of conceiving recognition in terms of fundamental and foundational dis-
sent. The thesis of his article is that such a concept of recognition makes
visible problems in the common understanding of recognition in contem-
porary debates on ethics, politics and right, such as the one about the
conditions for a fair dialogue between cultures and/or religions. In doing
so, Acosta’s alternative to the widespread concept of recognition opens up
the possibility for reconsidering the way in which the theoretic framework
of contemporary debates usually is built up. Acosta bases his alternative
comprehension of recognition on Schelling’s New Deduction of Natural
Right (1795/96). In order to identify critical points of the common under-
standing of recognition, he analyzes two cases of the modern struggle for
6 christian krijnen
recognition and connects them with Kant’s and Fichte’s accounts of recog-
nition. Finally, he reconstructs Schelling’s concept of recognition in order
to show to what extent this account of recognition offers a solution.
Donald Loose turns to the Kantian Version of Recognition: The Bottom-
Line of Axel Honneth’s Project. Loose points to the Kantian moral foun-
dation as a precondition for a correct understanding of the Hegelian
analysis of recognition Honneth refers to. From a Kantian perspective,
Loose firstly emphasizes the absolute priority of the objective constitu-
tive rational ground of morality for a coherent understanding of personal
integrity, juridical respect and social esteem, considered by Honneth as
being equally valid claims of recognition. Secondly, by introducing the
notions of morally qualified means and ends, Loose responds to the criti-
cisms of the Kantian paradigm: its so-called moral indeterminacy and
juridical externalism. Finally, Loose adds a critical horizon to factual ethi-
cal life and the belief that social spheres and practices are bearers of right.
According to him, only the individual judging person from the position
of the real conditions of the human—including evil—can be considered
as the ultimate metaphysical principle of a metaphysics of morals (Meta-
physik der Sitten).
Kurt Walter Zeidler addresses the question Anerkennung—Ein Ausweg
aus einer Verlegenheit? According to Zeidler, in the last decades recog-
nition has developed into a new paradigm of philosophy because key
concepts of modern philosophy like reason, humanity, history, culture,
science, etc., turned out to become more and more questionable. A theory
of recognition seems to offer a theoretical reimbursement for the men-
tioned key concepts and therefore promises a way out of the confusion of
post-modern thought. Unfortunately, however, there is no such a ‘theory’
in sight, though in some respect Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit could be
read as a ‘theory of recognition’. For Zeidler, the Phenomenology is a ‘the-
ory of recognition’ only insofar as the ‘movement of recognition’ (Bewe-
gung des Anerkennens) paves the way for logic by anticipating, rather than
explaining, Hegel’s understanding of the ‘concept’ (Begriff ) as ‘mediation’
(Vermittlung).
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer elaborates on Recognition of Norms and Rec-
ognition of Persons: Practical Acknowledgment in Hegel’s Phenomenology
of Spirit. According to him, one of Hegel’s leading questions in the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit is this: What is the difference between the performa-
tive side of the actual “I” in speaking and acting right now and the logically
much more complex notion of the “self ”? What is the difference between
just being a speaker or actor and referring to oneself by use of a phrase
introduction 7
like “I myself?” This leads to the following questions: What is the unity
of the self? How do I determine my own future self by my actions? What
self lies behind our everyday talk about personal identity? In Stekeler-
Weithofer’s view, these are Hegel’s central questions for understanding
the unity of the subject’s self-consciousness. In his analysis, he presents
Hegel’s surprising answer to the first question: The unity of the self is
desire altogether. Hegel thereby reminds us of the conceptual contrasts,
and connections, between desire and life, between animal appetite and
its satisfaction, between wishes and intentions. For Stekeler-Weithofer,
any serious philosophy of action and knowledge has to explicate how the
trans-subjective notion of objective fulfilment (of correctness or truth
conditions) depends on, and stands in contrast to, the merely subjective
notion of satisfaction (of desires).
Kenneth Westphal, in Finitude, Rational Justification & Mutual Rec-
ognition, holds that individual rational judgment, of the kind required
for rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains (empirical
knowledge and morals), is in a fundamental way socially and historically
based. For him, this is consistent with realism about objects of empiri-
cal knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles. To
judge fully rationally that one judges—in ways which provide rational jus-
tification of one’s judgment about any substantive matter—requires rec-
ognizing one’s inherent fallibility and consequently also recognizing our
mutual interdependence for assessing our own and each others’ judgments
and their justification. According to Westphal, this is the most fundamen-
tal significance and role of Hegel’s account of mutual recognition in ratio-
nal justification. Westphal argues that very minimal premises regarding
our cognitive finitude suffice to justify Hegel’s two key theses transcen-
dentally. He argues that infallibilism is only suited to formal domains,
whereas all non-formal domains require fallibilism about rational justifi-
cation. He then aims to show that our own fallibility, limited knowledge
and finite skills and abilities, together with the complexities inherent in
forming informed, well-reasoned judgments, require us to seek out and
seriously consider the critical assessment of any and all competent others.
Hence, for Westphal, in non-formal, substantive domains rational justi-
fication is socially based. He reinforces these points by criticizing con-
temporary Cartesianism and shows that in non-formal domains rational
justification is also in part a historical phenomenon.
In his Inter-Personality and Wrong, Klaus Vieweg discusses Hegel’s
theory of personality. According to Vieweg, this theory testifies to the
continuing and enduring modernity of Hegel’s conception of ‘Objective
8 christian krijnen
Spirit’ as a philosophy of the practical, as a theory of action. For Vieweg,

the cornerstone of the entire building of Hegel’s philosophy of freedom
is erected here. The problems treated range from the concept of the per-
son, personality and inter-personality, fundamental rights (Grundrechte),
property, the formation of the natural as self-formation and formation
of external nature, sustainability, appropriation, intellectual property to
contract, wrong (Unrecht), ‘second coercion’ (zweiter Zwang) and pun-
ishment. Vieweg, then, concentrates his elaboration on the problem of
wrong and Hegel’s concept of ‘second coercion’. According to him, Hegel’s
recognition based philosophical theory of wrong (Unrecht) can be seen
as a radically new theory, still highly relevant for us today. It derives its
intellectual power and fascination from its logical grounding—for Vieweg
the essential reason for its topicality.
Sasa Josifovic discusses The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel’s
Lordship and Bondage. He holds that, among other interesting and rel-
evant aspects, Hegel’s Chapter on ‘Self-consciousness’ in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit including ‘Lordship and Bondage’ represents an exposition
and dialectic of two most elementary normative attitudes that determine
the practice of self-cognition and self-constitution: independence and
dependence. Josifovic shows that as a result of recognition, these two
normative attitudes become part of the experience and “education of the
natural consciousness to the standpoint of science”.
In her article From Love to Recognition: Hegel’s Conception of Inter
subjectivity in a Developmental-Historical Perspective, Erzsébet Rózsa aims
to explicate the development through which Hegel’s theory of inter
subjectivity achieves its systematically mature forms in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, Encyclopedia, and Philosophy of Right. She makes clear, that
in this process the concept of love plays a role of great significance. Love
and recognition are forms of interpersonal and social relationship through
which Hegel elaborates models of intersubjectivity. These models, how-
ever, demonstrate differences which express conceptual changes in Hegel’s
philosophy. According to Rózsa, the basic shapes of intersubjectivity are
not regarded as forms of self-consciousness in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit,
as they are in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but as forms of morality and
ethical life. She is of the opinion that in Jena love is interpreted very simi-
larly to the way it is later in the encyclopedic Philosophy of Spirit and Phi-
losophy of Right: as ethical love. This conception of love turns out to be the
immediate basis for the implementation of recognition as the basic shape
of ethical and social life.
introduction 9
Jean-Christophe Merle explores the notion of Friendship in Hegel and

its Interpretation in Theories of Recognition. According to Merle, Hegel
is a major source for the thesis of the intersubjective formation of self-
consciousness considered as recognition. However, the theories of rec-
ognition that rely on Hegel seem to claim much more than this thesis.
According to them, recognition should apply not only to the universal dig-
nity of self-conscious human beings, but also to their particular character,
i.e. to their differences. Using the example of love—and particularly the
example of friendship—as it is treated by Hegel, Merle attempts to show
that there are two different, and radically heterogeneous, processes of rec-
ognition, of which Hegel investigates only the first one: the interpersonal
formation of self-consciousness or the constitution of the self. Merle, then,
stresses that this process of recognition does not include the recognition
of particular or individual differences, but even expressly excludes it.
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to a number of people and

institutions: To my co-organizer Prof. Dr. Paul Cobben for his congenial
efforts during the whole process of bringing both the conference and
the publication of its results to light. To the Department of Philosophy
of the Tilburg University and the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts
and Sciences (Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen), as
they provided the necessary financial means for having a conference in a
convenient setting. To the secretary Annette van Gemerden for her help
before and during the conference. To the publishing house Brill, especially
Julia Berick and Judy Pereira, for the pleasant cooperation.
Chapter Two
Hegel’s concept of recognition—what is it?
Heikki Ikäheimo
Much has been written during the last 20 years or so about “recognition”,
and some of the best minds in contemporary philosophy have made it
a central term in their own theoretical projects. But is it justified to talk
of a “new paradigm” centred around the idea of recognition, in social
and political philosophy, or perhaps even more broadly? This of course
depends on what one expects from a paradigm. If one expects a family
of shared basic intuitions and approaches to an overlapping or intercon-
nected set of themes and problems, then probably yes. If one expects con-
ceptual unity, or at least an organized and well-documented debate about
and contestation of the basic concepts of the suggested paradigm, a fair
amount of work still remains to be done.
Part of the problem with the latter issues maybe the consoling sense of
unity that a common reference point in Hegel gives: in referring to Hegel
one easily creates the rhetorical effect that one is talking about more
or less the same thing as others referring to Hegel are. Yet, Hegel never
defined ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) and as any teacher of a course on
the topic knows it is not particularly easy to come up with a concise
answer to what exactly Hegel meant by it.1
In what follows, I will try to provide some illumination on this question
by means of an analysis of one important text by Hegel in which whatever
it is that Hegel means by ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) plays a central role.
I will show that even in this relatively short and concise text what ‘recogni-
tion’ means is a rather complicated matter, or in other words that in using
the term in this text Hegel had in mind several issues which, though they
are related, are by no means reducible to just one thing. Eventually, what
I hope to achieve in this article is to sort out at least some of the different
1 Robert Williams (1997, 1) suggests that recognition is not a “thematic” concept in

Hegel which he would explicate anywhere, but rather an “operative” concept by means
of which Hegel explicates other concepts. But even this may be too optimistic, as it still
makes it sound as if there is one concept that the term ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) refers
to in Hegel. Whether there is, is something I wish to clarify in this article.
12 heikki ikäheimo
issues at stake, with the hope that this will turn out useful both for figuring
out what really is going on in Hegel’s text and for trying to speak in a more
consciously differentiated manner about the plurality of phenomena that
may be at issue when we talk about ‘recognition’ today. It is only with
adequate consciousness of the variety of phenomena at stake that we can
inquire into their connections and thus work our way towards a concep-
tual unification of recognition-theory as a paradigm.
1. Recognition in Philosophy of Subjective Spirit
The text that I have in mind is the chapter ‘Self-consciousness’ in Hegel’s

Berlin Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Why choose this text
rather than the much more famous Self-consciousness chapter in the 1807
Phenomenology of Spirit? If one is to choose between these two texts in
particular for the purpose of reconstructing what recognition in Hegel’s
view does and what it is, there are several reasons to favour the Encyclo-
paedia version.
First of all, the Encyclopaedia is free from a certain complication that
very easily leads astray readings of the Phenomenology. This is the fact
that in the Phenomenology of Spirit it is often difficult to determine
whether something that Hegel writes is meant as a neutral description of
the relevant phenomena themselves, or rather serves the very particular
goal and the very particular method of the book as an introduction to his
philosophical system. In contrast, such complications are absent in the
Encyclopaedia which is not an introduction to the system, but simply
the system itself.
Another significant difference is that whereas the paragraphs explicitly
discussing recognition in Phenomenology of Spirit end with a description
of the unequal relationship of the master and the bondsman—a fact that
has lead numerous readers and authors thinking that Hegel’s concept of
recognition is somehow essentially about domination—the Encyclopae-
dia-version also describes (albeit very briefly) a state of reciprocal recog-
nition in which domination by one party has been overcome. For sure,
it is nowadays widely acknowledged that the story of recognition in Phe-
nomenology of Spirit continues far beyond the chapter explicitly dedicated
to it.2 But the fact still remains that if one is to focus just on the chapter on
2 See, for example, Canivez 2011.

hegel’s concept of recognition—what is it? 13
Self-consciousness—which at least for pedagogical purposes often makes

good sense—the Encyclopaedia-version presents the whole story, whereas
the Phenomenology of Spirit-version does not.3
A third advantage of the Encyclopaedia-version is that it is situated in
Hegel’s mature philosophical system which presents his thinking in its
most elaborated and worked through form, and includes important ele-
ments that are completely missing in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit,
yet are important for understanding the full significance of recognition
for Hegel. Most importantly, these include the Philosophy of Nature
with its concluding discussion of the animal life-form, and the section
on Anthropology in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (both of which in
the Encyclopaedia precede the discussion on recognition), as well as the
whole of Philosophy of Objective Spirit which is thematically closely con-
nected to Subjective Spirit.
But didn’t recognition lose much or most of its earlier importance for
Hegel in the Encyclopaedia, and isn’t it therefore pointless to focus on
any part of that text in discussing “Hegel’s concept of recognition”? As
widely spread as this view once was, as far as I can see it was never based
on very convincing scholarship, and it has been largely refuted by now.4
What I will say in this paper will hopefully also contribute a little more
to its refutation.
All in all, there are several good reasons to focus on the Self-consciousness-
chapter of the Encyclopaedia in particular as a first point of contact with
“Hegel’s concept of recognition”.
2. Spirit, Freedom and Recognition
To get started with the theme of recognition in the Encyclopaedia Phi-

losophy of Subjective Spirit (or in the Philosophy of Spirit in general) one
needs to grasp its connections to the concepts or themes of spirit and
freedom. In the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel famously characterizes
3 Another nowadays well-known fact about the chapter in Phenomenology of Spirit in

question is that Hegel does in fact first presents in it the structure of mutual recognition,
though on a very abstract conceptual level (Hegel 1975, §§ 179–184), after which he then
goes on to illustrate the dialectic of recognition with the story of the lord and bondsman
which is an account of one-sided and thus not yet fully unfolded recognition. Hence on a
certain abstract level also the chapter in Phenomenology of Spirit does of course also pres-
ent “the whole story”.
4 See Williams 1997, Ikäheimo 2004, Honneth 2010.
14 heikki ikäheimo
‘spirit’ as the “I that is we, and the we that is I”, or as “the unity of opposite
self-consciousnesses”.5 The unity of opposite self-consciousnesses is basi-
cally the state or structure of mutual recognition, and thus we can say
that in the Phenomenology of Spirit, or at least at this point in the book,
Hegel presents the structure of mutual recognition as the basic structure
of spirit—whatever that means more exactly. Is something like this true of
recognition and spirit in the Berlin Encyclopaedia as well? Yes and no.
“No” in the sense that in the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit recogni-
tion is a subordinated principle, or a concrete instantiation of more gen-
eral principles, and thus saying that the structure of mutual recognition
is the basic structure of spirit in the Encyclopaedia would be somewhat
misleading. But “yes” in the sense that recognition, at least in some of its
modifications, is in the Encyclopaedia a necessary constitutive element
of “spirit”, or in other words of a life-form that is not merely natural or
animal, but a form of life of rational beings or persons. And “yes” also in
the sense that mutual recognition is something whereby the more general
principles are or can be realized to the maximum degree. Which prin-
ciples do I mean? Let us take a brief look at how Hegel characterizes the
concept of spirit in the Encyclopaedia.
In the published version of the Encyclopaedia, at the beginning of Phi-
losophy of Spirit (the final 1830 edition) Hegel discusses the “concept
of spirit” and says that the “essence of spirit is [. . .] freedom [. . .] [or]
absolute negativity”.6 In the 1827/8-lectures on Philosophy of (Subjective)
Spirit Hegel explains this at some length: “the human being is natural,
[yet] [. . .] not [. . .] merely natural, but also [. . .] spiritual”.7 Further, “[we]
ourselves” “are spirit”, meaning that though we humans are both natural
and spiritual (or both animals and persons), spirituality (or personhood) is
our essence. Since our essence is spirit and spirit’s essence is freedom, our
essence is thus to be free and this is also our “vocation (Bestimmung)”.8
By calling freedom our vocation Hegel is saying that it is something that
we both have an inbuilt tendency or drive (Trieb)9 to realize and that it is
our task to realize.10
5 Hegel 1975, § 177.

6 E3, § 382.
7 EW, 3.
8 EW, 6–7.
9 ‘Drive’ (Trieb) is Hegel’s general term for the teleological urge of the human life-form.
He talks of the drive of spirit to cognize objectivity (HPSS, § 416 Addition), the drive of self-
consciousness to actualise what it is implicitly (ibid., § 425), the drive to knowledge (ibid.,
§ 443 Add.), the drive to the good and the true (Hegel, 1991, § 225), and so on.
10 EW, 4–5.
As in the published version, also in the lectures Hegel identifies free-

dom, as the essence of spirit and thus as our essence, with “absolute nega-
tivity” or “negation of negation”.11 He explains that freedom in the sense in
question is not abstract or formal freedom which is the (impossibility of )
freedom from determination by otherness, but rather what he calls “con-
crete freedom”,12 or in other words being “at home with oneself ” in “what
limits one”.13 Concrete freedom has the structure of absolute negation
or negation of negation, or as Hegel also says “double negation”,14 where
being limited or determined by some otherness is the first negation, and
overcoming the externality, alienness or hostility of that by which one is
limited or determined is the second negation completing absolute nega-
tion, and thus bringing about concrete freedom with regard to the other-
ness in question.
The first one of the principles that I mentioned is exactly this principle
of absolute negation or of concrete freedom, or, which is the same, the prin-
ciple of being with oneself in otherness. This principle appears prominently
in Hegel’s Logic, especially at the beginning of the Logic of Concept, as
well as in his Philosophy of nature in which the more a natural phenom-
enon instantiates the principle the ‘free’er’ it is. Animal life, as the highest
point of nature, exhibits internal “concrete freedom” in that an animal’s
every organ affects or determines its every other organ (the first negation),
yet in such a way that they all contribute to making possible each other’s
existence and functioning (the second negation). An animal also exhibits
some, though very minimal, degree of concrete freedom with regard to
the external world, in that it can treat parts of it as its own environment
(Umwelt) whereby it maintains its life.15
However, whereas nature can realize the principle of absolute negation
or concrete freedom only to a very limited degree, the realm of spirit or
the human realm realizes it maximally. The reason for this is that humans
are conscious beings, equipped with Bewusstsein. In humans as conscious
beings the principle of absolute negation or “being with oneself in other-
ness” takes the more concrete form of “conscious-being [bewusst-Sein]
11 EW, 140.
12 EW, 14.
13 “Concrete freedom means that in whatever determines, limits or negates me, I nev-
ertheless remain at home with myself, and annihilate the other[ness].—Freedom consti-
tutes the essential determination of spirit, and we can say that freedom is the concept of
spirit.” (EW, 14)
14 Hegel 2010, 531.
15 E2, §§ 350–366.
16 heikki ikäheimo
with oneself in otherness” or “consciousness of oneself in otherness”. Con-

scious-being with, or consciousness of, oneself in otherness is the second one
of the principles that I mentioned. It is by being conscious of themselves
in otherness that humans are spiritual beings and thus concretely free to
a much larger extent than any merely natural beings are. (It should be
added that since humans are animals too, the more limited ways in which
animals instantiate concrete freedom partly also apply to humans.)
The principle of “conscious-being with, or consciousness of, oneself in
otherness” has various ways of realization. On the most general revel, there
are theoretical (or epistemic) and practical ways or aspects of its realization.
All epistemic activities involve, first, conceiving something as an external
object and thus being determined, as a subject, by it. This is the first nega-
tion. Secondly, they involve, when successful, gaining knowledge or under-
standing of what is posited as object, and thus overcoming its foreignness.
This is the second negation. In cognizing or understanding structures of
reality (whether natural or spiritual) by means of concepts with which we
can also operate in thought, we are able to “find ourselves”—or in other
words our own thoughts or structures of thinking—in reality, be thereby
concretely free in relation to reality, and thus feel at home in the world.
Practical activities can similarly be ways of domesticating the world,
by being ways of externalizing ourselves, our interests and thoughts in
reality, and thereby making the world whereby we are necessarily deter-
mined a home that reflects ourselves or enables us to be “conscious of or
ourselves” in it. It is by means of such practical activities that we leave
external nature or a merely animal environment (partly) behind, and
start (partly) dwelling in a world of ‘objective spirit’ of our own making.
(I say “partly” because humans are also animals and thus can never leave
nature completely behind.) Almost needless to say, the epistemic and
practical dimensions of spirit’s, i.e. humanity’s coming to know itself in
reality, or making it a place in which humans can be or feel “at home” are
in Hegel’s thinking in many ways interrelated.
Among all the ways in which humans can be conscious of or “find”
themselves in otherness and thus be concretely free with what determines
them, on Hegel’s account there is something very special about the way
in which they can find themselves in one another. Importantly, this par-
ticular instantiation of the second principle is closely connected to how
humans leave their internal nature or merely animal subjectivity (again
partly) behind by developing embodied psychological structures that
make them beings with “subjective spirit”. In contemporary philosophical
language we can say that on Hegel’s account finding ourselves in each

other is closely connected to how we become and are psychological per-
sons. What I am talking about now is the structure or principle of (mutual)
recognition, which is the third and last one of the principles I mentioned.
But what exactly is recognition according to the passage dedicated to the
theme in the Encyclopaedia—the Self-consciousness chapter?
3. Recognition—Preliminary Distinctions
To start clarifying things, let me first thematize six distinctions that are
necessary for any attempt to answer the question just posed in a detailed
way.16 These distinctions (except the sixth one) apply to discourses on
recognition in general, but in this paper I will only apply them to a closer
analysis of what is going on in the Self-consciousness chapter.
(1) First, there is the distinction between vertical and horizontal forms
of recognition, familiar already from Ludwig Siep’s Anerkennung als Prin-
zip der praktischen Philosophie.17 ‘Horizontal recognition’ refers to recog-
nition between individuals (and in principle groups) and it is what the
expression ‘mutual recognition’ primarily refers to. ‘Vertical recognition’,
on the other hand, at least as it applies to the text in question, refers to
recognition between individuals on the one hand and social institutions
or an authority upholding them on the other hand (whether this author-
ity is a tyrant, a separate ruling class, or the community of individuals as
a whole).
(2) Secondly, ‘horizontal’ recognition comes in two importantly differ-
ent variants which I will call purely intersubjective recognition and insti-
tutionally mediated (horizontal) recognition respectively. Institutionally
mediated recognition is recognition of a subject as a bearer of institutional
roles made up of rights and duties (or ‘deontic powers’). In contrast, purely
intersubjective recognition is recognition of a subject which abstracts
from or bares no internal or conceptual relation to his or her institutional
roles, relating to the recognizee simply as a bearer of a certain kind of
16 A word of caution: distinguishing these various issues does not mean that they are
unrelated or merely externally related. One is only able to understand how they are related
by first distinguishing them. There is no proper synthesis without a proper analysis (and
the other way around).
17 Siep 1979.
18 heikki ikäheimo
psychological constitution. To keep these two phenomena that are easily

confused with each other distinct, I will mark the institutionally mediated
form of horizontal recognition with an asterisk (‘recognition*’).
(3) Thirdly, and closely related to the previous two distinctions, we
need to distinguish between, on the one hand, social norms and norm-
systems that are not institutionalized, and, on the other hand, institutional-
ized norm-systems or institutions proper. Whereas one can at least imagine
non-institutional norms and systems of norms emerging in the interaction
of an intersubjective dyad and upheld and administered by its members
alone, institutions proper are norms-systems that are relatively indepen-
dent of any single subject or intersubjective pair of subjects. In other
words, institutions proper form a relatively independent ‘third instance’
authorized and administered not only (and in the extreme case only very
minimally) by this or that particular individual or intersubjective dyad
whose life they govern, but also (and in the extreme case almost exclu-
sively) by some third person or persons.18
The concept of vertical recognition mentioned above applies only (or
at least paradigmatically) when there is a ‘third’ relatively independent
instance of social institutions and an authority upholding them. Similarly,
the concept of institutionally mediated horizontal recognition of individ-
uals as bearers of institutional roles applies only (or at least paradigmati-
cally) when institutions and thus institutional roles are at place.
(4.) Fourthly, what I have just called recognition in the purely intersub-
jective sense has two dimensions: a deontological and an axiological one. In
short, whereas the deontological dimension of purely intersubjective rec-
ognition concerns issues such as norms, authority, obedience and respect,
the axiological dimension concerns issues such as values, concern, care
and love.
(5.) Fifthly, both the purely intersubjective and the institutionally medi-
ated forms of horizontal recognition have, on the one hand, modes that
are in a certain sense not genuinely interpersonal or personifying, and,
on the other hand, modes that are interpersonal or personifying. The not-
interpersonal mode of institutionally mediated horizontal recognition is
recognizing someone as a bearer of an institutional role or status that
is not that of a person (but, say, of a slave), whereas the interpersonal
18 For example Robert Brandom’s talk in Brandom 2009, p. 70 of “reciprocal recogni-

tion” “instituting” “normative statuses” seems ambivalent between the purely intersubjec-
tive and the genuinely institutional norms.
mode of recognition in this sense is recognizing someone as a bearer of

the ‘institutional status of a person’, or of ‘person-making’ deontic powers
such as the right to life or ownership of oneself.
The not-personifying or not genuinely interpersonal mode of purely
intersubjective horizontal recognition is recognizing someone in a way
that does not quite attribute her the intersubjective significance of a per-
son in the recognizer’s eyes (but, say, that of someone useful for one’s own
purposes), whereas intersubjective recognition in the genuinely interper-
sonal or personifying sense involves precisely seeing the other in light of
what we can call ‘person-making intersubjective significance’.19
(6.) There is one more distinction to make, a distinction that does not
directly concern the meaning of the term ‘recognition’, but rather the very
special architectonics or thematic structure of the text in question. Namely,
the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (and broadly speaking the Realphiloso-
phien as a whole) can, in principle, be read from two complementary per-
spectives or “directions”. From what we can call the bottom-up-perspective,
the consecutive sub-chapters of the text describe consecutive stages in a
developmental process so that real living entities can realize or instan-
tiate a particular stage without realizing or instantiating the later more
developed ones. In contrast, from the top-down-perspective the consecu-
tive sub-chapters each describe internally connected moments of the fully
developed or cultivated whole which is the fully ‘spiritual’ or free human
person. Hegel himself seems to have had had both directions or perspec-
tives in mind in writing the text. This has consequences not only but also
for attempts to reconstruct the theme of recognition in it.
4. The Self-consciousness Chapter—A Brief Introduction
Before analyzing the Self-consciousness chapter with the help of these dis-
tinctions, let me first briefly and with broad stokes outline the structure
and main events of the chapter. I will do this only from the bottom-up-
perspective, understanding each sub-chapter discussing a distinct devel-
opmental stage or sequence. This ‘direction’ of reading fits the illustrative
19 Though they are in many ways (partly internally) related, being a person in insti-
tutional status, being a person in intersubjective significance, and being a psychological
person are three different issues. For some of the details, Ikäheimo 2007.
20 heikki ikäheimo
story of the master and slave or bondsman better and allows hence a more
text-immanent reading of the text as it stands.20
4.1 The Primitive Subject of ‘Desire’

The chapter consists of a short introduction (§§ 424–425), and three
sub-chapters: ‘Desire’ (Die Begierde) (§§ 426–429), ‘Recognitive self-
consciousness’ (Das anerkennende Selbstbewusstsein) (§§ 430–435), and
‘General self-consciousness’ (Das Allgemeine Selbstbewusstsein). In the first
sub-chapter ‘Desire’ Hegel describes a primitive mode of practical inten-
tionality or object-relation solely determined by the subject’s immediately
given and felt physiological needs and by the desire for whatever objects
its instincts point out as promising immediate satisfaction. Objects thus
appear for the desiring subject solely in light of significances determined
by its immediate needs and instincts (i.e. as something like ‘desirable’,
‘avoidable’ and so forth).21 Although the subject experiences the objects of
its desire as distinct from its own body, their significance for the subject
is in this sense thoroughly determined by the its own nature—something
that Hegel expresses by saying that as independent objects they are deter-
mined as “a nullity” (ein Nichtiges).22 In terms of the principle of con-
sciousness of oneself in otherness, desire hence instantiates consciousness
of oneself in the object (the second negation or moment of “unity”), yet it
does not instantiate a fully unfolded sense of otherness of the object (the
first negation or moment of “difference”).23 One could say, to caricature a
bit, that the subject is hence conscious only of itself in the object.
4.2 Cultivation Through a “Process of Recognition”

The transition to the next sub-chapter ‘Recognitive self-consciousness’
takes place by the introduction of a new object, namely another sub
ject that resists its reduction to the significances in light of which the
20 One should keep in mind that the master and slave or bondsman are only illustra-
tion, yet they are so central to the text that completely abstracting from them is not pos-
sible for an interpretation that tries to make sense what Hegel actually writes in the text.
21 Robert Brandom (2011) calls these “erotic significances”, Robert Pippin (2011) “orec-
tic significances”.
22 E3, § 426.
23 In Hegel’s highly unconventional terminology one can also say that desire instanti-
ates too much self-consciousness and not enough consciousness. One textual question
that I cannot discuss here is the connection of Hegel’s description of ‘desire’ in the Self-
consciousness-chapter to his description of the animal world-relation in his Philosophy of
Nature. See Ikäheimo 2011.
primitive desiring subject sees the world. Hegel writes that whereas the
object of desire is “without a self ” and therefore “can offer no resistance”24
to its reduction in the subject’s perspective to significances determined
by immediate needs, the other subject is a “free object”25 that does resist
such reduction. Hegel is hence suggesting that the other subject is, in a
way, the paradigmatic object that first reveals the world for the first sub-
ject as genuinely independent of it.
It is in this sub-chapter that we meet the famous figures of the ‘mas-
ter’ and ‘bondsman’ or ‘slave’ (Hegel uses both terms). For both subjects
the other subject is a problem exactly because of its resistance to being
seen and related to in light of significances determined by one’s imme-
diate needs. Whereas the intentional relation to objects of desire were
characterized by unity without enough difference (or the second negation
without the first), the encounter with the other subject is characterized
by difference without enough unity (the first negation without the sec-
ond). Neither subject can be conscious of itself in the other. The develop-
ment or “process of recognition” described in this sub-chapter is basically
a progress in the ways in and the extent to which subjects are able to
relate to each other so that they are both genuinely independent with
regard to each other and also conscious of themselves in the other in the
more exact sense of affirmed by the other’s intentionality. The telos of this
development is mutual consciousness of oneself in a free other, and thus
a “concretely free” relationship.
The first and most primitive attempt to realize freedom with regard to
the other subjects is however still very far from this telos: it is a mutual
attempt to completely eliminate the otherness or unyieldingness of the
other, and thus a “struggle” or “fight”.26 To the extent that both really are
unyielding, it is a struggle about “life and death” (ibidem). And yet, if a
social relation is to ensue at all both subjects have to stay alive. The sim-
plest solution to the problem in which both subjects stay alive and form
a social relation is one subject yielding to the perspective or will of the
other. The one who yields becomes thereby the slave or bondsman, mak-
ing the unyielding other a master. The master is now conscious of itself
affirmed by the obeying slave in that he is “recognized by the acquiescent
slave”.27 The slave, on the other hand, is at first not recognized by the
24 E3, § 427.
25 E3, § 429.
26 E3, § 432.
27 E3, § 433.
22 heikki ikäheimo
master and thus cannot be conscious of himself affirmed by the latter. As

to the cultivation of subjectivities, the slave has left behind a mere desire-
determined practical orientation already by preferring “preservation of its
life” over immediate satisfaction of desire, whereas the master apparently
won precisely because he was less worried about his life.
However, the master-slave-relationship cultivates also the subjectivity
of the master, forcing him too to leave behind immediate desire-orienta-
tion. As Hegel puts it, “the means of mastery, the bondsman, has [. . .] to
be kept alive”, and this creates a “community of need and concern for its
satisfaction”. By having to care for the life of another subject, namely the
bondsman, even the master cannot hold on to its/his immediate desire-
orientation characterized by “crude destruction of the immediate object”.
Instead, what now arises is, as Hegel puts it, “acquisition, conservation and
formation” of objects, a “provision [Vorsorge] that takes the future into
account and secures it”.28 In only a few dense sentences Hegel describes
the coming about of a wholly new practical orientation concerned not
only for immediate satisfaction, but for life in general and thus future
well-being; and not only of one’s own life, but also that of another. Clearly
it is the slave who “acquires, conserves and forms”29 objects, or in other
words labours to concretely provide for the future of both his master and
himself. Yet, also the master is concerned for the future well-being of both
and thus develops a psychological constitution radically different from
that of a primitive solipsistic desiring subject. As for the slave, labouring
for the master has further cultivating effects on his subjectivity or psycho-
logical structure: the slave “works off the singularity of his will in the ser-
vice of the master [. . .] and sublates the inner immediacy of desire”.30 This
is best understood as a description of the bondsman’s new future-oriented
concern, one that sacrifices immediate satisfaction for future well-being,
becoming habitualized as his “second nature”.31
28 “Since the means of mastery, the servant, has also to be kept alive, one aspect of
this relationship consists of need and concern for its satisfaction. Crude destruction of the
immediate object is therefore replaced by the acquisition, conservation and formation
of it, and the object is treated as the mediating factor within which the two extremes of
independence and dependence unite themselves. The form of universality in the satisfy-
ing of need is a perpetuating means, a provision which takes the future into account and
secures it.” (§ 434)
29 Ibidem.
30 E3, § 435.
31 Hegel discusses habitualization as an important moment of subjective spirit, or psy-
chological personhood, towards the end of Anthropology (E3, §§ 409–410).
All in all, whereas the story of the master and bondsman begins with
a mutual attempt to completely annihilate the challenge of the other, it
gradually develops into a situation in which both relate to the other as
distinct from oneself, yet can be conscious of oneself in the other, or in
other words affirmed by the other’s consciousness or intentionality. The
master can see the slave “recognizing” him or affirming his will in that
the slave obeys him, and the slave can see the master, to some extent at
least, “recognizing” him by affirming his interest for self-preservation and
well-being by being concerned about it. (As we shall see below, there is in
fact more to say about recognition between the master and bondsman.)
Generally speaking this sub-chapter is hence simultaneously an illustra-
tion of development of concrete freedom in intersubjective relations, and
of the cultivation of subjects from primitive animality to psychological
personhood.
4.3 The Concretely Free Relationship of Mutual Recognition

Hegel names the state that is the end of the “process or recognition”
“general self-consciousness”. In the third and final sub-chapter of ‘Self-
consciousness’ with this term as its title, Hegel briefly describes the state
in question in terms of the concept of concrete freedom as knowing of
oneself in an independent other, and presents, very briefly, some thoughts
about its concrete realizations. He writes:
General self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of one’s self in the
other self. Each self has absolute independence [. . .], but on account of
the negation of its immediacy or desire does not differentiate itself from the
other. Each [. . .] knows itself to be recognized by its free counterpart, and
knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free.32
Both (or all) subjects thus now “know” or are conscious of themselves in
the other in the sense of being affirmed by the other’s recognition. Both
are for each other “absolutely independent”, neither trying to subsume the
other under one’s egocentric perspective (the first negation or moment of
difference); yet, somehow neither of them “differentiates” herself from the
other (the second negation or moment of unity). Hegel says that this is
so due to the “negation” or overcoming of “desire”, but the “negation” in
question must be understood not merely as the absence of the primitive
orientation by immediate desire, but more positively as including the new
32 E3, § 436.
24 heikki ikäheimo
form of subjective orientation in which recognition of the other has a cen-

tral role. The unity that Hegel talks about comes about precisely through
recognition, which involves on the one hand adopting the other’s con-
cern for his own well-being as one’s own concern (which is what Hegel
explained the master doing), and on the other hand taking the other’s
will as authoritative on one (which is what Hegel explained the bonds-
man doing). It is through these ‘recognitive’ ways of relating to the other
that the recognizer’s perspective adopts and thus affirms elements of the
recognizee’s perspective, and when the recognizee is conscious of this, she
“knows” herself “affirmatively” in the recognizer.
Hegel goes on to say that “general self-consciousness” as mutual know-
ing of oneself in a free other is the “substance” of what makes modes
of social life such as “the family, the fatherland, the state” as well “vir-
tues, love, friendship, valour, honor, fame” truly “spiritual”.33 This seems
like a rather motley list of phenomena, and Hegel is clearly only making
a very general statement according to which all of these are instantia-
tions of “spirit” and thus concrete freedom in the sense of mutual knowing
of oneself recognized by free others.34 But why is it that one can only
know oneself recognized by a free other “insofar as one recognizes the
other”? The answer lies in the word “free”: recognizing the other (my rec-
ognizer) is what makes her concretely free since it is what allows her be
conscious of herself in me. Thus only a recognizer who is recognized by
me is concretely free in her relationship to me.
5. What is ‘Recognition’ in the Self-consciousness Chapter?
How do the distinctions that I made in section 3 apply to the Self-

consciousness chapter, and what do they tell us about the concept or
concepts of recognition operative in this text?
1) Starting with the distinction between the vertical and horizontal
senses of recognition, Hegel himself does not articulate this distinction at
all, and there is in fact an amount of ambivalence in the text as to whether
33 Ibidem.
34 In lecture notes from 1825 Hegel says “[t]he forms, which are those of feeling, incli-
nation, benevolence, love, friendship do not concern us” (GK, 347). Hegel clearly speaks
here in a rather high level of conceptual abstraction, focusing only on the structure of
concrete freedom as knowing oneself in a free other which he considers as the “substance”
of all these more concrete phenomena.
the illustrative figures of the master and the slave or bondsman are to be
read as being ‘horizontally’ or ‘vertically’ related. On the one hand, most of
the text gives the impression that the master-bondsman-relationship is an
illustration of a horizontal relationship between two individuals forming
an intersubjective dyad. It is the primitive dyad of two desiring subjects
encountering each other, and at the next step a struggle between two sub-
jects on a more or less equal ‘horizontal’ footing, that at the beginning of
the story leads to the relationship of a master and a slave or bondsman.
Also, as I just indicated, Hegel conceives of the end of the development in
the sub-chapter ‘General self-consciousness’ in what appears to be hori-
zontal terms.
Yet, on the other hand, in § 433 as well as in the lectures Hegel in
fact talks about the empirical beginning of states though domination
and clearly interprets the figure of the master as a ruler, king or tyrant
ruling and thus ‘standing above’ a plurality of other people. In the lec-
tures he talks of the tyrant Pisistratus, who imposed the laws of Solon
on the Athenians, and clearly associates the figure of the ‘master’ with
Pisistratus and that of the ‘slave’ or ‘bondsman’ with the plurality of
the Athenians.35 What Hegel does not do at this point is to thematize the
horizontal relations between individuals—or as he writes “the shared life
of men” (Zusammenleben der Menschen, E3, § 433)—subjected to the law
or authority, but the individuals are clearly to be thought of as vertically
related to the “master” or tyrant, who is an external authority ruling but
not ruled by them.36 Put in another way, whereas Hegel mostly seems to
be thinking of the master-bondsman-relation as a dyadic relationship not
involving any ‘third’ element, in § 433 and here and there in the lectures
he in fact operates with a triadic model that involves both horizontal rela-
tions between individuals and vertical relations between them on the one
hand and a ruler or “master” on the other. Hegel simply leaves the details
of the triadic model for the reader to think through.
It seems at first quite surprising that Hegel conceives of universal
self-consciousness in horizontal terms only, leaving out any reference to
vertical recognition even in mentioning “the state”. What about vertical
35 See E3, § 435Z.; EW, 173; GK, 345.

36 E3, § 433: “It is through the appearance of this struggle for recognition and submis-
sion to a master that states have been initiated out of the social life of men.” E3, § 435Z.:
“After Solon had given the Athenians democratically free laws for example, Pisistratus
necessarily assumed power by which he forced the Athenians to obey them. It was only
when this obedience had taken root that the rule of the Pisistratids became superfluous.”
26 heikki ikäheimo
recognition between the state and its citizens? This does not have to
signal oversight on his part however for reasons that I will return to in
discussing the next distinction.
2) Hegel’s text is also ambiguous between purely intersubjective and the
institutionally mediated senses of horizontal recognition. To understand
the relationship described in ‘Recognitive self-consciousness’ as a purely
intersubjective one is to understand the ‘master’ and the ‘bondsman’
as intersubjective roles determined solely by the way in which the individ-
uals in question regard each other: I regard you as my master and myself
as your bondsman, you regard me as your bondsman and yourself as my
master, and this alone is what makes you the master and me the bonds-
man. Recognition or lack of it in the purely intersubjective sense is here the
essential element in the ways in which we regard each other, and thereby
constitutive of mastery or bondage as relational or intersubjective roles.
In contrast, to understand the master-bondsman-relationship as an
institutionally mediated (or ‘institutional’) relationship means that one
understands the ‘master’ and the ‘bondsman’ as roles, positions or sta-
tuses in an institutional system and thereby as relatively independent of
the individuals in those positions and how they regard each other. For
sure, they need to recognize* each other as bearers of their institutional
or institutionally mediated statuses or positions, or as bearers of the deon-
tic powers to go with them. Without such recognition* the institution of
mastery and slavery would not be in power in their relationship. Yet, their
recognition* alone is not enough for the institution to exist and thus for
them to occupy the institutional roles in question.
Since much of what Hegel says in the Self-consciousness chapter implies
a strictly horizontal or dyadic model that makes no reference to a ‘third’
institutional instance, it seems to a large extent right to reconstruct the
text in the purely intersubjective register. What this means, however, is
that one must understand the expressions ‘master’ and ‘slave’ or ‘bonds-
man’ fairly metaphorically, since what we usually mean by them is not
an isolated intersubjective dyad but individuals who occupy positions
determined by the overall normative or institutional structure of their
society. Slavery in a non-metaphorical sense in the real world is a social
institution.
This ambivalence between the purely intersubjective and the institu-
tional senses of horizontal recognition also applies to Hegel’s short depic-
tion of ‘General self-consciousness’ or the state of mutual recognition. One
wonders what exactly Hegel had in mind with his rather haphazard list of
phenomena for which “general self-consciousness” forms the “substance”
of what makes them “spiritual” and thus instantiations of concrete free-

dom. These were, to repeat, “the family, the native country, the state, but
also [. . .] all virtues, [. . .] love, friendship, valour, honour, [and] fame”. It
seems largely right to say that the roles or positions of at least friends or
people who love each other are essentially intersubjective ones and that
the relevant sense of recognition in these relationships is the intersubjec-
tive one.37 In contrast, the roles and relationships that constitute the state
of course also include institutional roles and relationships. Thus, if Hegel’s
point is, as it seems to be, to say that horizontal recognition is the sub-
stance of what makes the state a ‘spiritual’ or in other words concretely
free community, it is difficult to believe that he would not also be think-
ing of institutionally mediated horizontal recognition, or in other words
recognition between citizens as occupiers of the various social positions
comprising of the ideal society or state articulated in his Philosophy of
Objective Spirit.
There is however at least one candidate reason for why Hegel might
want to emphasize purely intersubjective horizontal recognition espe-
cially. Namely, it is recognition in this sense that realizes the principle of
self-consciousness in other subjects to the maximum degree in that it, as
Hegel puts it, “unites humans internally” (E3, § 431Z). This is so because in
purely intersubjective recognition the intentionality or subjective perspec-
tive of the recognizer adopts elements of the recognizee’s intentionality
or subjective perspective into itself and thus makes the recognizer partly
see the world from the recognizer’s perspective. This is not so with insti-
tutionally mediated recognition* where the recognizer* merely responds
to the recognizee’s* institutional status without necessarily responding in
any particular way to how the recognizee* sees the world as an individual.
I will return to this theme shortly, in discussing how the fifth distinction
between the non-personifying and personifying modes of intersubjective
and institutionally mediated horizontal recognition applies to the text. It
is more exactly the personifying mode of purely intersubjective horizontal
recognition that to the maximum degree unites humans internally (with-
out thereby compromising their freedom).
All these considerations aside, it seems nevertheless unreasonable to
assume that Hegel would not also have had in mind horizontal institutionally
37 Though ‘lovers’ and ‘friends’ can also stand in institutional relations with each other,
this is not what constitutes them as each other’s lovers and friends. Rather it is their (rel-
evant kind of ) intersubjective recognition of each other that does.
28 heikki ikäheimo
mediated recognition* in thinking of “the state”. Even if purely intersub-

jective recognition might be the ideal instantiation of concrete freedom,
rights and therefore mutual recognition* between citizens as rights-bearers
are indeed an essential element of the state. Thinking of universal self-
consciousness in terms of recognition* also provides an explanation for
why Hegel can forfeit in this context an explicit mention of vertical rec-
ognition, even if vertical recognition between the citizens and the state
clearly is essential to social life in a state. Namely, the citizens’ verti-
cal ‘upwards’ recognition of the state hardly is anything else than their
acknowledgement or acceptance of its laws and norms, and the institu-
tions that these constitute, as valid or legitimate. And their acknowledge-
ment or acceptance of these laws, norms and institutions commits them
to recognizing* each other as bearers of the rights and duties that the laws
and institutions of the state attribute to them (or in other words that they
have due to the state’s vertical ‘downwards’ recognition of them). Thus, in
talking explicitly about horizontal recognition* between citizens as bear-
ers or rights and duties one is in fact implicitly also talking about vertical
recognition of and by the state. This vertical recognition is present in the
paragraph in ‘universal self-consciousness’ by implication.
(3) As to the third distinction between non-institutional norms and insti-
tutionalized norms or institutions proper, the problem with the text is that
Hegel’s only explicit reference to norms anywhere in the Self-consciousness-
chapter, as well as in the lectures, is in the context of the discussion of
Solon, Pisistratus and the Athenians and thus refers to institutionalized
norms or “laws” (Gesetz). Yet such norms do not fit the dyadic or purely
intersubjective model (also) at work in Hegel’s text, as it simply does not
and cannot involve any reference to an institutional ‘third’ instance. On
the dyadic model one can only think of norms arising and administered
by the subjects themselves forming the intersubjective dyad.
If one wants to reconstruct Hegel’s account of recognition in the lord-
bondsman-story (solely or mainly) in the deontological register of norms,
authority, and of recognition as either (purely intersubjective) attribution
of authority on norms, or as (institutionally mediated) response to deon-
tic statuses, it is important to be aware of this difference between the
dyadic and triadic models and thus between an intersubjective and an
institutional concept of social norms.
4) This brings us to the fourth distinction between what I have called
the axiological and the deontological dimension of horizontal intersub-
jective recognition. On a rational reconstruction which is both sensi-
tive to Hegel’s text and conceptually adequate for grasping the overall
phenomenon discussed in it, recognition seems to have two dimensions:

on the one hand some sort of concern for the life or well-being of the
other, and on the other hand taking the other as having or sharing author-
ity with oneself on the norms whereby interaction and life in common is
organized and regulated.
In ‘Recognitive self-consciousness’ Hegel first talks of the axiological
dimension, emphasizing the master’s need to “keep the bondsman alive”,
implying that the master has to develop a concern for the bondsman’s
well-being.38 He talks of the deontological dimension in discussing the
bondsman’s service for and thus obedience of the master.39 The impres-
sion that the text gives is hence that only the master has to develop rec-
ognition for the bondsman in the axiological register of concern for his
well-being, whereas only the bondsman has to develop recognition for the
master in the deontological register of acknowledgement of his authority.
But in fact it is clear on reflection, on the one hand, that the bondsman
too has to develop a concern for the master’s well-being. After all, the
bondsman’s life and well-being largely depend on how well he is able to
care for the master, satisfy the master’s needs and secure his well-being.
On the other hand, it is easy to show that the master too has to develop
recognition for the bondsman as having some authority in the relation-
ship. How come? Because any norm or rule he that the master imposes
on the bondsman requires that the bondsman applies it in concrete cases.
Since no rule or norm can fully determine every possible concrete applica-
tion and thus every case of following it, the bondsman has to use his own
judgment in determining how to apply the given norm in concrete cases.
If a norm says, for example, “prepare adequate food-stores for winter”,
what this requires and thus means in concreto depends on various circum-
stances and has to be determined skilfully as they arise.
There may even be instances where the slave must criticize the mas-
ter. Hegel points to this in his lectures by emphasizing that commanding
effectively requires that one commands reasonably, abstracting from any-
thing preposterous and absurd.40 In a case where the master’s commands
or rules are inconsistent or unrealizable, the slave is forced to make this
38 E3, § 434.
39 E3, § 435.
40 GK, 343: “Whoever wants to command must do so reasonably, for only he who com-
mands reasonably will be obeyed.”
30 heikki ikäheimo
explicit on pain of not being able to execute them.41 Not making explicit
the master’s failure to command rationally and in this sense not criticiz-
ing him would not only make the slave vulnerable to punishment, but
also leave the master’s commands or rules without realization. Similarly,
since the slave is better acquainted with what exactly promotes or cor-
rodes his own well-being, if the master fails to have adequate concern
for the slave, he is in principle criticisable by the slave by appeal to the
master’s own self-concern. All in all, if the master is to serve well his own
self-interest as a master, he must in practice regard and treat the bonds-
man as having some (as it were technical) authority in the relationship.
On a rational reconstruction of Hegel’s idealized developmental account
one can thus say that both the master and the bondsman develop in it
some kind of recognition for the other both in the axiological sense of con-
cern for the other’s well-being, and in the deontological sense of regard
for his authority.
Many contemporary readings tend to see recognition in Hegel pre-
dominantly, and sometimes exclusively, in deontological terms of norms,
authority and respect, and underrate or simply leave out the axiological
dimension of values, concern, care and love.42 As important as the deon-
tological dimension is and as valuable as insights about it are, focusing on
it alone is both a one-sided reading of Hegel’s text and a one-sided view
of recognition in general.
5) There is however still something important missing from a full com-
prehension of Hegel’s treatment of the theme of recognition in the text.
We can articulate this missing element in terms of the distinction between
what I called the non-interpersonal or non-personifying and the genuinely
interpersonal or personifying modes of horizontal—both intersubjective
and institutionally mediated—recognition. More in line with Hegel’s own
terminology, we can formulate it as a distinction between not fully spiri-
tual modes of horizontal recognition on the one hand, and fully spiritual
modes on the other hand. Again, Hegel does not make this distinction
explicit, nor is it commonly made in interpretations of him.
The standard way to look at the development taking place in the master-
bondsman-relationship is to see it as a development from a one-sided or
41 Robert Brandom’s idea of inferential commitments is very useful for thinking through
in more detail what is involved here.
42 See for example Brandom 2009, chapters 1 and 2; Pinkard 2002, chapter 11. This is
by no means to deny the great service that the Kant-inspired deontological readings by
Brandom, Pinkard and others have done to the understanding of Hegel.
extremely unequal or asymmetric relation of recognition to a fully equal

or symmetric one. But this, as it were merely structural way of conceiving
the development ignores something of fundamental importance.
Let us reconsider what exactly recognition between the master and
bondsman is as described so far, focusing first on recognition in the purely
intersubjective sense. What exactly does it mean for the subservient slave
or bondsman to recognize the master in the intersubjective sense, tak-
ing into account the two dimensions of horizontal recognition? On the
deontological dimension, what seems to be at issue is the slave obeying
the master’s commands and thus the master as an authority of the rules
or norms of the relationship out of fear for the master (which is basically
fear for his own life).43 The slave’s deontological attitude of recognition
towards the master is hence something like fearful obedience. On the
axiological dimension, what is at issue is the slave being concerned for
the master’s life and well-being instrumentally, motivated by the slave’s
(non-instrumental) concern for his own life and well-being, dependent as
these are on those of the master. The slave’s axiological attitude of recog-
nition towards the master is hence one of instrumental concern for his life
or well-being. It is by virtue of the slave’s recognition of the master in the
senses of fearful obedience of him and instrumental concern for his well-
being that the master can be conscious of himself, or in other words of his
authority and well-being affirmed by the slave. And as we saw, the master
must also develop an instrumental concern for the slave’s well-being, as
well as regard for the slave as having at least some (technical) authority
in the relationship. It is by virtue of these attitudes by the master that also
the slave can, to some minimal extent at least, be conscious of himself
affirmed by the master.
In the text Hegel makes a transition to ‘general self-consciousness’
right after discussing the bondsman’s fearful obedience of the master (in
§ 435).44 This inevitably raises the question whether Hegel really thinks
43 E3, § 435.
44 In the 1825 lectures Hegel fills in a little more detail, making the transition seem
less abrupt, and thus doing more justice to the processuality or gradual change that he
clearly is after: “The instrument [i.e. the slave or servant] also serves the master willingly
however, being implicitly free self-consciousness, and the servant’s will therefore has to
be made favourably inclined toward the master, who has to care for him as a living being,
take care of him as an implicitly free will. By this means, the servant is brought into the
community of providing, so that he also has a purpose, counts, is to be honoured, is a
member of the family.” (GK, 343) Though these are only student notes from Hegel’s lecture
and not always completely reliable, one can discern two important moments in a gradual
development in this passage:
32 heikki ikäheimo
that the mutual intersubjective recognition between free beings that he

discusses in the final chapter ‘General self-consciousness’ which should
fully realize concrete freedom as consciousness of oneself in otherness
(more exactly in the other subject) is simply mutual instrumental concern
for and mutual reluctant attribution of some authority to the other, both
motivated either out of fear or practical necessity. If all that happens in
the “process of recognition” is that recognition becomes mutual or sym-
metric, then this seems to be the implication. It does look rather cyni-
cal or disappointing as a picture of a community of mutual recognition
between free beings. On a closer look Hegel makes it however clear that
this is not a correct construal of what mutual recognition that fully real-
izes concrete freedom actually is.
In § 436 of ‘General self-consciousness’ he says that in fact the “master
who confronted the bondsman was not yet fully free, for he was not fully
conscious of himself in the other”. This relates to a sentence in § 431Z:
“freedom of one within the other unites humans inwardly, whereas need
and necessity only brings them together externally”. I suggested above that
what distinguishes purely intersubjective recognition from institutionally
mediated horizontal recognition* is that only the former “unites humans
inwardly”. However, this is in fact not yet fully true of the not genuinely
personifying recognition between the master and the slave.
Hegel himself does not explain what exactly he means by saying that
the master is or was not yet fully conscious of himself in the slave, but the
point can be put as follows: when A cares about B’s life and well-being
merely instrumentally or conditionally—out of “need and necessity” to
borrow Hegel—she does not care about it in the way in which B him-
self cares about it if B is a psychological person, namely intrinsically.
Persons, in contrast to mere animals, are concerned for their well-being
(1) The slave’s fearful obedience of the master turns into a less fearful prudential motiva-
tion to serve him, as the master turns from someone who motivates through immediate
death-threats to someone who motivates, at least also, by positive incentives (the master
promises to “take care of ” the bondsman if he works for him). This is a transition from a
“slave” (Sklav) to a “bondsman” or “servant” (Knecht).
(2) A relation of mutual instrumentalization turns into a relation involving also mutual
non-instrumental concern, as well as honouring (Ehre). This is a transition of the “servant”
into a “member of the family”. What comes to fore here is not only non-instrumental
concern (or love), but also honour and mutual gratitude for contributions to the family as
a “community of providing (Gemeinschaft der Vorsorge)”. (Thus also something like recog-
nition or esteem for contributions, important in Axel Honneth’s work on recognition, is
present in this passage.)
or lives in general, and importantly they are not concerned for it (at least
only) instrumentally or for the sake of something else, but (at least also)
intrinsically or ‘for their own sake’. This means that if A cares about B’s
well-being only instrumentally, she is thereby not affirming it in a way
that fully reflects its importance for B himself. Or to put this in another
way, axiological recognition in the mode of instrumental concern for well-
being does not attribute the recognizee or her life and well-being the same
significance in light of which the recognizee himself relates to himself as a
psychological person. Instrumental concern is not a fully personifying, or
fully interpersonal mode of intersubjective recognition, as it does not fully
respond to, or fully affirm, an essential element of the kind of practical
self-relation constitutive of psychological personhood.
Something roughly analogical seems true on the deontological dimen-
sion: when A obeys B’s will merely conditionally, out of fear or some
other purely prudential reason (“need and necessity”) his attitude towards
B does not fully respond to, reflect, or affirm the way in which persons
themselves grasp their own authoritativeness among other persons. When
A obeys or recognizes B as having authority merely conditionally—in the
sense that when the condition such as a threat of and fear for death ceases
to be in place, B’s authority in A’s eyes simply vanishes, or in the sense of
A taking B as having authority only for applying rules prescribed by A but
not for questioning or changing those rules—she is thereby not respond-
ing to B fully seriously as someone with authority. To the extent that
having authority on the norms or terms of interaction with others is also
an essential element of what it is to be a person, recognition as obedience
out of need, necessity or fear—or any other merely conditional forms of
attribution of authority—is not a fully personifying or fully interpersonal
mode of intersubjective recognition. It too does not fully respond to, or
fully affirm, an essential element of the kind of practical self-conception
constitutive of psychological personhood. Neither one of these not fully
personifying modes of recognition allows the recognizee to be fully con-
scious of himself affirmed by the recognizer. Subjects hence remain in
an important sense estranged from each other, or not genuinely or fully
“inwardly” united.
What is it then to recognize someone in the horizontal and intersubjec-
tive sense in a fully ‘personifying’ or fully ‘spiritual’ mode which enables
the recognizee to be fully conscious of herself in, or affirmed by, the recog-
nizer? In short, on the axiological dimension it is to care about the other
in the same way in which she cares about herself, namely intrinsically
34 heikki ikäheimo
or unconditionally—or “for her own sake”. Caring for the other in this
sense is usually called love. Analogically, on the deontological dimension
fully personifying intersubjective recognition is taking the other as having
‘unconditional’ authority on the norms or terms of one’s co-existence with
her, and thus on oneself. Though Hegel does not use the term in this con-
text, this phenomenon is usually called respect.45 What is at issue is not
merely attributing the other technical authority in the interpretation and
execution of ends set by oneself, but taking her as someone who has an
independent viewpoint on ends and commands authority on the norms
and principles of co-existence independently of my view-point.
Unlike instrumental concern and conditional forms of attributing
authority, love and respect do “unite humans internally”: in loving some-
one her well-being or perspective of hopes and fears partly determines
what has positive or negative value for me independently of what value
(if any) the same things or states of affairs would have for me would I
not love the person in question. Analogically, in respecting someone her
judgments of right and wrong have subjective or felt bindingness on me
that does not derive from my own judgments on the same issues nor from
my own prudential considerations or calculations. Her view on right and
wrong partly determines what from my point of view actually seems or
feels right or wrong.
This is not to say that in loving another my evaluative perspective is
completely determined by what is good or bad for the one I love, or that in
respecting another my own independent judgments have no force at all.
Rather, it is to say that the other’s axiological and deontological perspec-
tive becomes part of my own perspective and thereby partly decenters it.46
The loved or respected person can therefore be conscious of her perspec-
tive being genuinely affirmed by my recognition of her, and at the same
45 A lithmus-test of genuine respect in this sense is whether one could genuinely feel
ashamed in front of the other, or in other words respond to her negative judgment of
oneself with shame.
46 Speaking of “parts” sounds like conceiving the phenomenon in terms of external
relations and this is at least partly right: my independent judgements and the judgements
of those I respect can be in harmony, but they can also be in conflict and this is a con-
flict within me. Such conflict is central in what drives moral learning, the calibration of
moral judgment and cultivation of moral imagination, but it can also lead to an (at least
temporally) irreconcilable internal division or conflict within the subject. To put this in
another way: integration is the ideal, but it is integration of partly independent elements
or parts that can also remain unintegrated. For Hegel lack of inner integration is defining
of psychological pathologies—some of which he discusses in the Anthropology-section of
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.
time also be conscious that my own perspective remains irreducibly inde-

pendent of hers.47 Hence, intersubjective recognition in the personifying
mode realizes both moments of concrete freedom as absolute negation.
It unites persons “internally”, and allows them to be “fully” conscious of
themselves in each other without thereby compromising their indepen-
dence. To be free in this purely intersubjective sense is to live among and
thus to be limited or determined by other persons who have love and
respect for one.
As to institutionally mediated horizontal recognition*, it now seems
to have a somewhat more marginal role in comparison to purely inter-
subjective recognition, since it is not capable of uniting humans to the
same extent internally, and therefore does not enable them to be as fully
conscious of themselves in each other. It simply does not involve the same
psychological intimacy to recognize* someone as a bearer of rights or
other deontic powers, since it does not mediate one’s perspective through
that of the other in the same intimate or “internal” way. Nevertheless, the
distinction between non-personifying and personifying modes does apply
also to institutionally mediated recognition*.
This difference between, on the one hand, recognizing someone as a
bearer of deontic powers that does not make her a person in institutional
status, and, on the other hand, recognizing someone as a bearer of deon-
tic powers that does make her so is clear in the master-slave-story: it is a
difference between someone who can be owned but not own (a slave who is
not a person in the institutional sense) and someone who can own but not
be owned (a master who is a person in the institutional sense). The distinc-
tion becomes centrally important if one wants to reconstruct the “process
of recognition” in the Self-consciousness chapter in the institutional regis-
ter, as an account of development of social institutions. Read in this way,
‘general self-consciousness’ consists of mutual recognition* or respect*
between individuals as bearers of rights and other deontic powers that
they have as persons in institutional status.48
47 This does not mean that subjects only remain independent insofar as the actual con-
tents of their concerns and judgments remain separate. It rather means that the identity of
these contents is never automatic since each subject is still formally a distinct “centre”
of concerns and judgments. The “decentring” involved in recognition does not completely
do away with the distinctness of subjects, or to the extent it does the relationship does
not adequately instantiate the moment of difference which is as important an element of
concrete freedom as the moment of unity is.
48 See the end of my discussion of the second distinction.
36 heikki ikäheimo
6) As to the final distinction between bottom-up and top-down read-

ings of Hegel’s text, I have discussed the text only from the bottom-up-
perspective from which it reads as a highly stylized developmental story
of the coming about and cultivation of social and psychological structures
that make humans full-fledged persons in each other’s eyes and in them-
selves. The complementary top-down-reading in contrast understands
‘desire’, unequal and conditional recognition, and full-fledged personi-
fying recognition all as elements or moments of the fully developed or
ideal concrete whole that is the full “spirituality” of humanity, or in other
words the life-form of human persons fully realizing its essence which is
concrete freedom. The important point that a top-down-reading makes
visible is that the less than fully cultivated structures of intentionality,
psychological profiles, interpersonal relations and institutional structures
will always have some presence even in the ideal society. This is not only
so because they will present themselves in every newborn and every new
generation, but also because phenomena such as urges for immediate sat-
isfaction or egoistic motivations with regard to other persons are a normal
part of the life of full-fledged adults as well.
What does happen however is that in cultivated adult persons the lay-
ers that are ‘earlier’ in the idealized developmental account are infused
with phenomena belonging to the ‘later’ or more developed layers: the
immediate desires of a cultivated adult are not those of an animal or
a human infant, and the unequal or strategic relations of recognition
between cultivated adults rarely take quite the brutal form of mastery
and slavery. Still, the virtue of a top-down reading is to emphasize that
both nature in the form of physiological need and desire, and the ‘half-
spiritual’, instrumentalizing or strategic relations and attitudes are never
totally overcome or eliminated, but play various roles also in forms of
well-organized and cultivated social life that realizes concrete freedom
maximally. Hegel’s theory of the state, presented in the Philosophy of
Objective Spirit is centrally about the ideal institutional framework in
which each of these layers of human being (the natural, the ‘half-spiritual’,
and the fully spiritual) co-exist in such a way that they constitute social
life that is life that is—all things considered—maximally free in the con-
crete sense of freedom.
Conclusion
To think of ‘recognition’ as a center point of a new paradigm in social

and political philosophy, or perhaps even more broadly, requires think-
ing of it as a collective philosophical and scientific endeavor. This, in its
turn, requires efforts to think through the distinguishing and unifying
features in the various currently existing approaches and perspectives to the
theme and the implicit or explicit understandings of the central concepts
they involve. It also requires a clear awareness of the plurality of issues at
work in the writings on the theme by the central common reference, Hegel.
In this article I have drawn attention to the plurality of meanings that
‘recognition’ has in one central text by Hegel, and briefly outlined some
of the connections between them. These are among the many distinctions
and connections that a more synthetic work on the theme—both Hegel-
scholarship and systematic thought—should in my view be cognizant of
if it wants to advance recognition-theory as a paradigm.
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—— (2009): Reason in Philosophy. Cambridge/Mass.
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851–887.
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Allen and Unwin, 1970.
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—— (EW): Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 1827–8 (Based on transcripts by Erdmann
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Chapter Three
The Paradigm of Recognition and the Free Market
Paul Cobben
Introduction
Is the Paradigm of Recognition an adequate conceptual framework to

understand the contemporary (neo-liberal) society? Fraser and Zurn,
for example, argue that this paradigm does not offer the opportunity to
understand capitalism as a system.1 Therefore, the paradigm would be
a backsliding into a position before Marx. However, Schmidt am Busch
rightly maintains that a Marx-revival cannot be justified: his ideal society
refers to family relations for which love is central.2 This is incompatible
with the modern market.
The modern market must be conceived of as an institution in a way that
does justice to modern subjective freedom. This not only means that (in
accordance with Marx) the market cannot be conceptualized as a system
which is principally independent, but also (versus Marx) that the criticism
of the market as an alienated system may not be based on a philosophical
position which opposes market relations in general. Therefore, Schmidt
am Busch thinks that Jürgen Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action
is not an acceptable alternative to Marx.3 Although Habermas opposes
1 N. Fraser (2003), C. F. Zurn (2005).

2 H. Schmidt am Busch (2011): “Marx’ Beschreibung des Verständnisses, das A und B
von sich selbst und den Anderen haben, ist ein starkes Indiz für die Richtigkeit meiner
These, dass seine Konzeption des menschlichen Wesens nach dem Vorbild von Liebes- und
Familienbeziehungen konstruiert worden ist” (p. 110). “Folglich stützt sich Marx’ Kritik an
Hegels Konzeption personaler Freiheit auf eine Theorie des Menschen (als Gemeinwesen),
die von den Bürgern moderner westlicher Gesellschaften nicht geteilt wird” (p. 127). “Auch
ohne eine eingehende Analyse der hier zitierten Texte lässt sich angeben, inwiefern die
Marx’sche Theorie der Bejahung als Gemeinwesen und als konsumptiv-bedürftiges Indivi-
duum als eine Verallgemeinerung und ‘Essentialisierung’ einiger Kernelemente von Hegels
Theorie der Liebe und Ehe zu verstehen ist” (p. 146).
3 H. Schmidt am Busch (2011): “Wie ich im Folgenden zeigen werde, ist Habermas’
Theorie der Ökonomie nicht befriedigend” (p. 31). “Wie auch Jürgen Habermas ist auch
Fraser der Auffassung, dass kapitalistische Märkte nur systemtheoretisch angemessen ana-
lysiert werden können” (p. 62).
40 paul cobben
the market as an alienating system (by criticizing the colonization of the

lifeworld by the system) without generally rejecting market relations, he
nevertheless remains tied, according to Schmidt am Busch, to a system-
theoretical analysis of the market and consequently cannot give a suffi-
cient answer to its potentially alienating status.4 As with Axel Honneth,5
Schmidt am Busch6 argues that an adequate version of the paradigm of
recognition has to return to Hegel’s analysis in the Philosophy of Right.
Although I share Honneth’s and Schmidt am Busch’s opinion that
Hegel’s version of the paradigm of recognition enables to understand the
modern market from a critical philosophical framework, I think they have
basically misunderstood the meaning which Hegel assigns to the free mar-
ket. Moreover, I think that this misunderstanding is rooted in a ground
position they share with Habermas. In his Theory of Communicative Action
in which the subject/subject-relation is central, Habermas opposes the
philosophy of consciousness in which the relation subject/nature is cen-
tral. According to Habermas, the market system remains tied to the power
of nature and ultimately has to manifest itself as a system of alienation
as long as it is conceived of in terms of the philosophy of consciousness.
Only if the market can be understood as a particular case of communica-
tion-theoretical relations, namely as a subject/subject relation which is
mediated through “entsprachlichte Steuerungsmedien”, its independence
principally can be restricted. More extremely than Habermas, Honneth
and Schmidt am Busch resist the philosophy of consciousness: even as an
“entsprachlichte Steuerungsmedien”, it must not return.
I will argue that the separation between the philosophy of conscious-
ness and recognition clashes with the basic intention of Hegel’s project:
for Hegel recognition has to be understood as the sublation of the fear
of death. Philosophy of consciousness does not oppose recognition, but
rather is an essential moment of recognition. The recognition relation
is an attempt to conceptualize an internal unity between the relation to
4 In Cobben (2012), however, I have elaborated that Habermas’ analysis of money as

an “entsprachlichtes Steuerungsmedium” is completely in line with Hegel’s conception
of money (pp. 158–161). The problem is that he is not able to understand the economic
system as a moment of the recognition relation. Therefore, he does not understand the
central meaning Hegel attributes to Bildung within the labor process.
5 Honneth (2011): “Ich wollte dem Vorbild der Hegelschen ‘Rechtsphilosophie’ in der
Idee folgen, die Prinzipen sozialer Gerechtigkeit direkt in der Form einer Gesellschafts-
analyse zu entwickeln” (p. 9).
6 Schmidt am Busch (2011): “In der Tat stellen die GPhR mit dem Begriff des personalen
Respeks eine Ressource zur Verfügung, mit der Märkte als Institrutionalisierungen einer
spezifischen Anerkennungsform ausgewiesen und legitimiert werden können” (p. 155).
the paradigm of recognition and the free market 41
nature and the relation to the other. As long as this is not understood, an
adequate insight into the modern market remains impossible.
Honneth and Schmidt am Busch relate the modern market to the so-
called second form of social recognition. In this relation, the individuals
are related as persons and respect one-another as persons. Since Hegel, in
his Philosophy of Right, discusses the relation between persons at the level
of abstract Right, it may not surprise us that they link the second form of
recognition with abstract Right. As a result, they make being-a-person a
contingent quality of concrete individuals.7 This is possibly a consequence
of their anti-metaphysical Hegel-reading. I will show, however, that this
point of departure implies a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel’s
concept of recognition.
1. Being-person at the Level of Abstract Right
“Sei eine Person und respektiere die anderen als Personen”8 is the demand
which underlies abstract Right. Is this “being-a-person” a contingent qual-
ity of real individuals as Honneth and Schmidt am Busch state? No, if
it would concern a contingent property of the individual, it would be
senseless to deduce a demand from it. Being-a-person (die Persönlichkeit)
expresses the concept of right in its most abstract form: it is the abstract
concept of the free will in and for itself. The person expresses the most
abstract form of autonomy. The autonomy of the free person implies that
7 It is true that Schmidt am Busch remarks “Deshalb ist eine rechtliche und wirtschaft-
liche Ordnung als eine adäquate Institutionalisierung von personalem Respekt anzusehen.
Wenn jene Individuen aber Menschen sind, ist eine freie Marktwirtschaft problematisch.
[. . .] Folglich kann die “Vollständige Entwicklung” und rechtliche “Anerkennung der per-
sonalen Einzelheit unter Menschen nicht die soziale Gestalt eines freien Marktes haben”
(p. 203). Rightly, he distinguishes between the person and the concrete individual. How-
ever, in the Philosophy of Right, it makes no sense to speak about the adequate realization
of the person distinguished from the real individual. The realization of the person is only
adequate if the realization is in and for itself, i.e. the adequate realization cannot abstract
from the real individual. All moments in the Philosophy of Right are necessary moments
of the realization of the free and equal persons. Therefore, Schmidt am Busch is wrong
when he states: “Menschen, die Personen sein wollen und einander als Personen respek-
tieren, unterhalten nicht notwendigerweise wirtschaftliche Beziehungen zueinander. Es
ist nämlich denkbar, dass jeder von ihnen die von ihm konsumierte Güter in Eigenarbeit
herstellt” (p. 193). A person of the roman right can be conceived in this way. The person
of the Philosophy of Right, however, presupposes all moments which are developed in the
Philosophy of Right. Therefore, also the moment of the Contract is already presupposed
all the time.
8 PhofR, § 36.
42 paul cobben
it must be conceived of as substance. Only under this condition can it

be understood how abstract Right results in a demand. Autonomy, the
substantiality of the person can only be conceived in such a way that
the otherness to which the person is related is also a person. Without the
demand to recognize the other as a person, the person would contradict
itself.9 However, the demand to recognize the other as a person is still
insufficient. As long as the person/person relation is understood as an
internal, formal relation, it opposes as a subjective (i.e. intersubjective)
relation an independent nature and would lose as yet its substantiality.10
Therefore, the demand also implies that the person has to exist, i.e. it has
to realize itself as a person in the natural world.
The realization of the person/person relation in the natural world
seems to be accomplished at the level of the Contract. In the thing as
property nature already appears as an expression of freedom. And pre-
cisely because it becomes clear in the Contract that being-a-proprietor is
mediated by another person, it is explicitly expressed that the person has
a free relation to the thing. In its relation to the thing the person is related
to the other person, and therefore, to itself. For the person, the thing does
not have a strange independence. Insofar as the thing has its own quality,
this is irrelevant in the Contract. The quality of thing is all the same in
the Contract: the thing can be exchanged for a thing with another quality.
However, it is only important that the thing expresses the being-a-person
of the parties to the contract, i.e. their freedom. The exchange of qualita-
tively different things makes it clear that for the person the quality of the
thing is not important.
2. Morality as the Thinking through of Being-a-person
However, in the Contract the freedom of the person is not adequately

realized. In the contract the realization of freedom is possible, but not
yet necessary. That is to say, whether properties are really exchanged is
9 This point is made in Hegel (PhofS), in the Self-Consciousness chapter: “Self-

consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” (p. 110).
10 In Cobben (2012), I present a critical analysis of Honneth’s reading of the Self-
Conscious chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (pp. 91–104) Honneth thinks that in this
chapter the symmetrical relation between self-consciousnesses is developed. He overlooks,
however, the fact that the central problem is how to reconcile the pure self-consciousness
with nature. A symmetrical relation between real individuals is discussed for the first time
at the level of Spirit, namely as the relation between the Greek citizens.
not independent of their quality. Moreover, only if a thing is exchanged

with a thing of a different quality is it explicitly expressed that the prop-
erty is mediated by another person. Since, for the person, the quality of
the property is accidental,11 the adequate realization of the free person
cannot adequately be expressed at the level of abstract Right. Whoever
attempts to maintain this realization of freedom at the level of abstract
Right unjustly presupposes that the quality of the thing can be deter-
mined in the relation between person and thing. At the level of Wrong,
Hegel elaborates that it can neither be determined that the person owns a
specific thing, nor that the person has an adequate insight into the quality
of the thing, nor that the person has the insight into the will of another
person to exchange his property to a property with a different quality.
Therefore, the exchange of properties which is actually performed, does
not exclude Wrong. The possibility of Wrong can only be overcome when
the person is determined more precisely and the contingency of the thing
to which he is related has been sublated. Hegel discusses this more precise
determination as the moral subject.
The moral subject is the person who has become aware that he can
only realize himself when he is able to exclude the Wrong, i.e. when he
has overcome the accidentalness of the qualitative determination of the
thing. In the first place this means that the moral subject has a positive
relation to the quality of the thing. The subject no longer is only the
exchangeable universal person, but realizes himself as also situated, i.e. is
related to a particular thing. Only as subject, the person is aware that he
has a unique body which incorporates his situatedness.12 The relation to
a particular thing, however, can only then be harmonized with being-a-
person, if Wrong is excluded. Therefore, the being-situated of the subject
is not a factual observation (in this case: the acknowledgment of one’s
own corporeality), but rather has the form of a moral demand. The deter-
minedness of the thing’s content has to appear for the subject in a way
that Wrong is excluded. The subject cannot be satisfied with a content
which is externally given, but has to make this content accord with the
11 Hegel (PhofR), § 104 Anmerkung: “At the moral standpoint, the abstract determinacy
of the will in the sphere of right has been so far overcome that this contingency itself is,
as reflected in upon itself and self-identical, the inward infinite contingency of the will,
i.e. its subjectivity.”
12 Of course, in some sense, the body is already thematized at the level of abstract
Right: “But from the point of view of others, I am in essence a free entity in my body while
my possession of it is still immediate” (PhofR, § 48). However, all persons are in immediate
possession of their body and are, in this respect, exchangeable.
44 paul cobben
freedom of the person through his actions. His actions have to exclude
Wrong and guarantee the realization of freedom. Therefore, moral action
is tied to three normative conditions. It must (i) guarantee that reality
expresses freedom, i.e. has no strange independence, so that the (non-
malicious) Wrong is excluded; (ii) guarantee that the content of reality
corresponds to the realization of the person’s freedom; (iii) guarantee that
the interactions with others serve the good life (i.e. the others are not
submitted to violence).
Therefore, at the level of Morality the formal demand of abstract Right
is concretized. The realization of the person presupposes that the person
as subject underlies the demand to realize the good life. The question is,
however, whether this demand does justice to reality at all. The demand
only makes sense if natural reality is principally in harmony with freedom.
But why would this harmony exist? Is freedom not hindered by the corpo-
real individual precisely because it is tied to the structure of his desires?
3. The Lord/Bondsman Relation as the Basic Model for the Harmony

between Freedom and Nature
In the Self-Consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel

develops how the harmony between freedom and nature can be concep-
tualized in principle.13 He argues that the essence of the problem is not
how to think the harmony between the pure freedom and the corporeal
individual, but rather how this harmony has to be understood such that
pure freedom already presupposes the corporeal individual all the time. Pure
freedom has to be conceived of as a sublated fear of death. For the organ-
ism, the fear of death is an experience of absolute negativity. Death is the
absolute lord14 who lets us experience the absolute futility of all corporeal
determinedness. However, insofar as this futility is experienced as such
by the self-conscious organism, the experience of the fear of death is at
the same time the transcendence of death. It is the experience of finitude
which has been conceived as such. In this experience, self-consciousness
internalizes the absolute lord: in its awareness of finitude as such it is
itself the absolute negation of its corporeality. Then, the absolute lord
is no longer the external power of nature, but rather is self-consciousness’
13 Cobben (2009), p. 37 ff.

14 Hegel states: “for it [i.e., the self-conscious organism, the bondsman, P.C.) has experi-
enced the fear of death, the absolute Lord” (PhofS, p. 117).
representation of its absolute essence: the representation of its freedom,

namely the freedom to conceive nature in itself. In this manner, the prin-
cipal unity of freedom and nature is explicated.
Self-consciousness represents its absolute essence as lord, i.e. as god.
Initially, self-consciousness only practically expresses that this god is the
image of its pure freedom, namely by serving its lord as bondsman. By
serving the lord, self-consciousness expresses its actions in such a way that
they are no longer determined through nature (the laws of the instinct),
but through a self-made, free law: a cultural law. This means that the har-
mony between freedom and nature is also objectively expressed. The law
of culture is the institutional form of the fear of death which has been
overcome.
Hegel’s considerations in the Self-Consciousness chapter allow for the
conclusion that the demand to which the moral subject is subjected only
makes sense under the assumption that the moral subject already partici-
pates in a cultural community throughout, namely in a social organism
in which its actions are not determined through the law of nature but
through the law of culture. In the Philosophy of Right, this social organism
is discussed as the family.
The cultural law in which the family organism is realized manifests itself
in the traditional norms and values of the family. However, also the family
organism cannot be understood as an adequate realization of the free per-
son. It is true that, considered from an external perspective, the actions
of the family members presuppose the pure freedom of the person (after
all, participation in a cultural law is only possible when the fear of death
is endured and overcome),15 but considered from the internal perspective,
this has not yet been explicated: the cultural law of the family appears as a
given tradition to which the newly born children must subject themselves.
Therefore, the social organism of the family presupposes a second insti-
tutional domain which guarantees that, also considered from an internal
perspective, this awareness is developed in such a way that the fear of
death is endured and overcome. This second domain, in which the mod-
ern free market is also situated, Hegel discusses as Civil Society.
15 Therefore, Hegel stipulates in PhofR § 162: “But its (the marriage, P.C.) objective
source lies in the free consent of the persons, especially in their consent to make them-
selves one person [. . .]”.
46 paul cobben
4. Civil Society as the Domain in which the Overcoming of the Fear

of Death becomes Self-Conscious
Civil Society is the domain of the manifold of families and is characterized

by what Hegel calls the “Verlust der Sittlichkeit”.16 Precisely in relation to
other families, it becomes clear that the norms and values which are real-
ized in one’s own family only have a contingent status, and consequently,
cannot guarantee the realization of the person’s freedom. The “Verlust
der Sittlichkeit” implies that the shared norms and values in this relation
get lost. Therefore, Civil Society is characterized by the pure freedom of
the relation of person to person. Although the persons try to realize their
freedom through the exchange of properties, they are nevertheless distin-
guished from the person of the abstract Right. After all, the persons are
now generated by the families, and therefore, have developed themselves
as persons who appear as corporeal individuals.
The corporeal persons relate to one another in what Hegel calls the
“System der Bedürfnisse”. In this system, the persons can only realize their
pure freedom if this realization is combined and in harmony with the
satisfaction of the corporeal needs of persons. The exchange of property
must also serve the satisfaction of needs. However, there is no guarantee
that this demand is met. After all, the needs of persons are contingent.
Therefore, the actual performance of the property exchange remains
incidental. It is true that in the System of Needs the power of nature has
acquired a social form, but this does not mean that it is in harmony with
freedom. Nature’s interplay of forces, the external causality of nature, is
transformed into an interplay of forces of the market. The laws of nature
are continued in the laws of the market. For the realization of freedom,
the result is catastrophic: whoever loses the competition of the market
will also get lost. Under this condition the freedom of the market is pure
ideology. It makes little difference whether the fear of death is generated
through external nature or through a social system.
However, in contrast to Marx, Hegel does not draw the conclusion that
a social system is incompatible with the realization of freedom and must
for that reason be abolished. The individual must have experienced the
fear of death to manifest himself as a person, only then can he liberate
himself from his natural drives. However, at the same time the experience
of the fear of death has to result in the overcoming of the fear of death.
16 PhofR § 181.
Hegel thinks that this victory gets shape in the theoretical and practical
Bildung, the education of the labor process.17
The competition of the market not only enforces a supply which cor-
responds to a social demand, but the product must also be offered for a
competitive price. This results in the ongoing rationalization of the labor
process. The theoretical and practical Bildung of the workers belongs to
this process of rationalization. Their work must become more and more
efficient, i.e. it must correspond better and better to general technological
rules. The Bildung of the workers can be understood as the institutional
form in which the overcoming of the fear of death takes shape.
The Bildung of the worker is a process of rationalization in which
the worker step by step and again and again sacrifices his particularity. The
process makes the “alles Fixe” continuously “bebt”.18 In this sense the fear
of death is institutionalized. This sacrifice, however, results in an objecti-
fication of the world of labor in which all strangeness is sublated. In this
sense, the worker returns from the process of objectification to himself,
thereby sublating the fear of death. Through their Bildung in the labor
process the persons acquire the insight that their pure freedom is the
essence of reality.19 For them, the labor system appears as the finite real-
ity which they continuously transcend in the process of Bildung. In its
reality, the labor system throughout has a particular content. However, for
the persons this content is accidental. Therefore, the labor system cannot
be understood as the adequate realization of the general good, i.e. as the
realization of the moral subject.
5. The Labor System and the General Good
The general good cannot be determined at the level of civil society. After
all, the corporeal person is related to the particular good (der besondere
Inhalt des Wohls)20 and is not able to determine the general good. Hegel
states that the general good can only be determined at the level of the
17 PhofR § 197.
18 PhofS, p. 117: “and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations
(und alles Fixe hat in ihm gebebt)”.
19 PhofR § 208: “As the private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this
system of needs contains absolute universality, the universality of freedom, only abstractly
and therefore as the right of property. At this point, however, this right is no longer merely
implicit but has attained its recognized actuality as the protection of property through the
administration of justice.”
20 PhofR, § 125.
48 paul cobben
state. This means that he repeats the line of reasoning which was already
under discussion in the lord/bondsman relation: the subjective certitude
of the free person to be the “lord” of reality gets objective shape in serving
the law of society which is already given in tradition throughout.
The problem which Hegel has to solve is how to understand the tran-
sition from civil society into the state. That is, how the subjective self-
realization of the corporeal person can be reconciled with the law of
society, which is already given all the time and which expresses the good
life? After having explicated—at the level of the System of Needs and its
sublation into the Administration of Justice—that the social organism of
the family implicitly contains the realization of the person/person rela-
tion, now the awareness has to be developed that the family organism
implicitly also contains the realization of the moral subject.
It is not problematic for Hegel that the market presupposes a value
community (in this case: the state). This community of value is not a
compensation for the shortcomings of the market (as Honneth thinks),
but a necessary presupposition to conceive the existence of the market
at all. The problem is rather how a traditionally given determination of
the good life can have legitimacy for corporeal persons, i.e. for individuals
who have developed subjective freedom.
Hegel solves this problem by the introduction of the Corporation, the
labor community in which the individuals participate in a mediated form
of subjective freedom. The transition to the good life is made because
the labor system is conceived of as a manifold of corporations which are
brought to a unity at the state level.
Honneth rightly states that the corporation does not correspond to the
institutions we know in contemporary society.21 However, he is less right
if he argues that we can learn from Hegel that “the directions and the
design of corrective institutions” must be derived from “the normative
principles of the very economic system” that we seek to correct.22 The
community of value not only is not a “corrective institution”, but can also
not be deduced from the principles of the economic system. It is true in
some manner that Hegel tries to deduce the corporation from the prin-
ciples of the economic system, but this very attempt has to be criticized.
Hegel reduces subjective freedom to the free choice that mediates the
21 Honneth (2010), p. 231.

22 Ibidem.
subjective position in the labor system23 which is in service of the given

content of the good life. However, free subjectivity cannot be reduced
to free labor and the good life cannot be deduced from a given produc-
tion system, even if this system is continuously revolutionized through
the competition of the market. The community of value must rather be
conceived as a “comprehensive doctrine” in the sense of John Rawls (be it
that the reasonable discourse between communities of values must not
be excluded). To free subjectivity also belong the dimensions which tran-
scend the domain of labor, such as, religion, art, science and politics.
Hegel’s reduction of subjective freedom to the economic domain must
rather be understood as a narrowing which might be typical for the nine-
teenth century.
Honneth rightly qualifies “the emptying of the work of all qualitative
content” as a development of contemporary capitalistic labor which should
be criticized. However, this criticism must not be understood as a posi-
tion which can be deduced from the capitalistic labor system. Norms that
labor may not be soul-killing or that everybody has the right to earn an
income which enables a life worthy of a human being can be formulated
in a community of value. They can get shape in the political framework
within which the labor system functions. But in no way do these norms
originate from the labor system itself. The only norm of the labor system
is the constraint of rationalization which follows from the competition
of the free market. This requirement to rationalize leads to an ongoing
reorganization which calls for an ongoing Bildung of labor forces. This
process almost certainly results in labor which, from a specific evaluative
perspective, can be called soul-killing precisely because the rationalizing
of labor again and again makes that parts of the labor are replaceable by
machines.24 This mechanical labor is pre-eminently soul-killing and not
worthy of a human being. Nevertheless this is not a reason to criticize
this labor or the rationalization processes coupled with it or to try to make
labor itself moral. Here, we have to deal with processes in which the over-
coming of the fear of death is institutionalized. The attempt to make labor
immediately moral is nothing less than the repression of the fear of death.
23 PhofR, § 207, “In this class-system, the ethical frame of mind therefore is rectitude
and esprit de corps, i.e. the disposition to make oneself a member of one of the moments
of civil society by one’s own act, through one’s energy, industry, and skill [. . .]”.
24 PhofR, § 198, “Further, the abstraction of one man’s production from another’s
makes work more and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install
machines in his place.”
50 paul cobben
The endurance of the fear of death is the fundamental presupposition

of the development of freedom, and consequently, for the development of
communities of value which flatly oppose labor that is not worthy of a
human being.
Conclusion
Appealing to the Paradigm of Recognition, Schmidt am Busch criticizes

Jürgen Habermas’ system-theoretical analysis of the free market. In line
with Hegel and Axel Honneth, he pretends to develop an alternative anal-
ysis based on the mutual recognition of persons.
I argue that this Hegel reception is false. Not only because Habermas’
conception of money as “entsprachlichtes Steuerungsmedium” is com-
pletely compatible with Hegel’s conception of money, but also because
Hegel neither analyzes the market as a social order “die (fast) ausschliess-
lich durch das abstrakte Recht strukturiert [ist]”,25 nor wants to introduce
institutions which compensate for the market. For Hegel, the market nec-
essarily presupposes a “community of value”.
The criticism of neo-liberalism based on a Hegelian approach can-
not concern a criticism of the market relations themselves, because they
institutionalize the “fear of death”. It must rather concern the nature
of the community of value in which the market relations are necessar-
ily sublated. The community of value must neither be conceived of as a
compensation of the market, nor as a corporation in the Hegelian sense.
The community of value cannot be deduced from labor relations, but has
already transcended labor relations throughout. The crucial problem that
remains is how to develop a positive determination of the community
of value.26
Literature
Cobben, Paul (2009): The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the Form of Right and Morality.
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
—— (2012): The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death.
Leiden/Boston: Brill.
25 Schmidt am Busch (2011), p. 264.

26 Cobben (2009, 2011).
Fraser, Nancy (1993): “Anerkennung bis zur Unkenntlichkeit verzerrt. Eine Erwiderung
auf Axel Honneth”. In: N. Fraser, A. Honneth: Umverteilung oder Anerkennung? Eine
politisch-philosophische Kontroverse. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 225–270.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (PhofS): Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V.
Miller. Oxford University Press, 1977.
—— (PhofR): Philosophy of Right. Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford University Press,
1967.
Honneth, Axel (2010): “Work and Recognition: A Redefinition”. In: H. Schmidt am Busch,
Ch. Zurn (eds.): The Philosophy of Recognition. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 223–241.
—— (2011): Das Recht der Freiheit. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Schmidt am Busch, Hans-Christoph (2011): “Anerkennung” als Prinzip der kritischen Theo-
rie. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
Zurn, Christopher (2005): “Anerkennung, Umverteilung und Demokratie. Dilemmata in
Honneths Kritischer Theorie der Gesellschaft”. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
52/3, 435–460.
Chapter Four
From Autonomy to Recognition
Robert Brandom
Kant’s deepest and most original idea, the axis around which I see all of
his thought as revolving, is that what distinguishes judging and inten-
tional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they
involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things
knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and
acting involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of author-
ity. Responsibility, commitment, endorsement, authority—these are all nor-
mative notions. Judgments and actions make knowers and agents liable
to characteristic kinds of normative assessment. Kant’s most basic idea is
that minded creatures are to be distinguished from un-minded ones not
by a matter-of-fact ontological distinction (the presence of mind-stuff ),
but by a normative deontological one. This is his normative characteriza-
tion of the mental.
II
One of the permanent intellectual achievements, and great philosophi-

cal legacies of the Enlightenment—and perhaps the greatest contribu-
tion modern philosophers have ever made to the wider culture—is the
development of secular conceptions of legal, political, and moral norma-
tivity. In the place of traditional appeals to authority derived ultimately
from divine commands (thought of as ontologically based upon the status
of the heavenly lord as creator of those he commands) Enlightenment
philosophers conceived of kinds of responsibility and authority (commit-
ment and entitlement) that derived from the practical attitudes of human
beings. So for instance in social contract theories of political obligation,
normative statuses are thought of as instituted by the intent of individuals
to bind themselves, on the model of promising or entering into a contract.
54 robert brandom
Political authority is understood as ultimately derived from its (perhaps

only implicit) acknowledgment by those over whom it is exercised.
This movement of thought is animated by a revolutionary new concep-
tion of the relations between normative statuses and the attitudes of the
human beings who are the subjects of such statuses, the ones who commit
themselves, undertake responsibilities, and exercise authority, and who
attribute or take themselves and others to exhibit those statuses. This is
the idea that normative statuses are attitude-dependent. It is the idea that
authority, responsibility, and commitment were not features of the non-
or pre-human world. They did not exist until human beings started tak-
ing or treating each other as authoritative, responsible, committed, and
so on—that is, until they started adopting normative attitudes towards
one another. Those attitudes, and the social practices that made adopting
them possible, institute the normative statuses, in a distinctive sense that
it is a principal task of philosophy to investigate and elucidate. This view
of the global attitude-dependence of norms contrasts with the traditional
objectivist one, according to which the norms that determine what is “fit-
ting” in the way of human conduct are to be read off of features of the
non-human world that are independent of the attitudes of those subject
to the norms. The job of human normative subjects on this picture is to
conform their attitudes (what they take to be correct or appropriate con-
duct) to those attitude-independent norms—to discover and acknowl-
edge the objective normative facts, on the practical side, just as they are
obliged to discover and acknowledge objective non-normative facts on
the theoretical side.
Kant identifies himself with this tradition in that he embraces the
Enlightenment commitment to the attitude-dependence of basic norma-
tive statuses. This is a thought that can be developed in a number of ways.
One of Kant’s big ideas is that it can be exploited to provide a criterion of
demarcation for the normative. To be entitled to a normative conception
of positive human freedom as discursive spontaneity, Kant must be able to
distinguish the normative constraint characteristic of knowing and acting
subjects from the causal constraint characteristic of the objects they know
about and act on. In his terms, he must be able to distinguish constraint
by conceptions1 of laws from constraint by laws. What is the difference
between adopting a normative status and coming to be in a natural state?
1 Or representations: “Vorstellungen”.
from autonomy to recognition 55
What is the difference between how norms and causes “bind” those sub-
ject to them?
Following his hero Rousseau, Kant radicalizes (what he and his follow-
ers thought of as) the Enlightenment discovery of the attitude-dependence
of normative statuses into an account of what is distinctive of normative
bindingness according to a model of autonomy. This model, and the cri-
terion for demarcating normative statuses from natural properties that
it embodies, is intended as a successor-conception to the traditional
model of obedience of a subordinate to the commands of a superior. On
that traditional conception, one’s normative statuses are determined by
one’s place in the great feudal chain of normative subordination—which
may itself be thought of either as an objective feature of the natural (and
supernatural) world, or as itself determined normatively by some notion
of the deserts of those ranked according to their asymmetric authority
over and responsibility to one another. The contrasting autonomy idea
that we (as subjects) are genuinely normatively constrained only by rules
we constrain ourselves by, those that we adopt and acknowledge as bind-
ing on us. Merely natural creatures (as objects) are bound only by rules
in the form of laws whose bindingness is not at all conditioned by their
acknowledgment of those rules as binding on them. The difference between
non-normative compulsion and normative authority is that we are genu-
inely normatively responsible only to what we acknowledge as authorita-
tive. In this sense, only we can bind ourselves, in the sense that we are only
normatively bound by the results of exercises of our freedom: self-bindings,
commitments we have undertaken by acknowledging them.2 This is to say
that the positive freedom to adopt normative statuses, to be responsible or
committed, is the same as the positive freedom to make ourselves respon-
sible, by our attitudes. So Kant’s normative conception of positive freedom
is of freedom as a kind of authority. Specifically, it consists in our author-
ity to make ourselves rationally responsible. The capacity to be bound by
norms and the capacity to bind ourselves by norms are one and the same.
That they are one and the same is what it is for it to be norms that we are
bound by—in virtue of binding ourselves by them. Here authority and
2 The acknowledgement of authority may be merely implicit, as when Kant argues that
in acknowledging others as concept users we are implicitly also acknowledging a commit-
ment not to treat their concept-using activities as mere means to our own ends. That is,
there can be background commitments that are part of the implicit structure of rationality
and normativity as such. But even in these cases, the source of our normative statuses is
understood to lie in our normative attitudes.
56 robert brandom
responsibility are symmetric and reciprocal, constitutive features of the

normative subject who is at once authoritative and responsible.
This whole constellation of ideas about normativity, reason, and free-
dom, initiated by Kant, and developed by his successors, is, I think, what
Heidegger means when he talks about “the dignity and spiritual greatness
of German Idealism.”
III
The Kant-Rousseau autonomy criterion of demarcation of the normative

tells us something about normative force—about the nature of the bind-
ingness or validity of the discursive commitments undertaken in judging
or acting intentionally. That force, it tells us, is attitude-dependent. It is
important to realize that such an approach can only work if it is paired
with an account of the contents that normative force is invested in that
construes those contents as attitude-independent. The autonomy crite-
rion says that it is in a certain sense up to us (it depends on our activi-
ties and attitudes) whether we are bound by (responsible to) a particular
conceptual norm (though acknowledging any conceptual commitments
may involve further implicit rationality- and intentionality-structural
commitments). If not only the normative force, but also the contents of
those commitments—what we are responsible for—were also up to us,
then, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, “whatever seems right to us would be
right.” In that case, talk of what is right or wrong could get no intelligible
grip: no norm would have been brought to bear, no genuine commitment
undertaken. Put another way, autonomy, binding oneself by a norm, rule,
or law, has two components, corresponding to ‘autos’ and ‘nomos’. One
must bind oneself, but one must also bind oneself. If not only that one is
bound by a certain norm, but also what that norm involves—what is cor-
rect or incorrect according to it—is up to the one endorsing it, the notion
that one is bound, that a distinction has been put in place between what
is correct and incorrect according to that norm goes missing. The atti-
tude-dependence of normative force, which is what the autonomy thesis
asserts, is intelligible only in a context in which the boundaries of the
content—what I acknowledge as constraining me and by that acknowl-
edgment make into a normative constraint on me in the sense of open-
ing myself up to normative assessments according to it—are not in the
same way attitude-dependent. That is a condition of making the notion
of normative constraint intelligible. We may call it the requirement of the
relative independence of normative force and content.
Kant secures this necessary division of labor by appeal to concepts, as

rules that determine what is a reason for what, and so what falls under the
concepts so articulated. (If being malleable is a conclusive consequence
of being gold, then only malleable particulars can fall under the concept
gold.) His picture of empirical activity as consisting in the application
of concepts—of judging and acting as consisting in the endorsement of
propositions and maxims—strictly separates the contents endorsed from
the acts of endorsing them. The latter is our responsibility, the former is
not.3 The judging or acting empirical consciousness always already has
available a stable of completely determinate concepts. Its function is
to choose among them, picking which ones to invest its authority in by
applying to objects, hence which conceptually articulated responsibility to
assume, which discursive commitments to undertake. Judging that what
I see ahead is a dog—applying that concept in perceptual judgment—
may initially be successfully integratable into my transcendental unity of
apperception, in that it is not incompatible with any of my other com-
mitments. But subsequent empirical experience may normatively require
me to withdraw that characterization, and apply instead the concept fox.
That is my activity and my responsibility. But what other judgments are
compatible with somethings being a dog or a fox is not at that point up to
me. It is settled by the contents of those concepts, by the particular rules
I can choose to apply.
In taking this line, Kant is adopting a characteristic rationalist order of
explanation. It starts with the idea that empirical experience presupposes
the availability of determinate concepts. For apperception—awareness
in the sense required for sapience, awareness that can have cognitive
significance—is judgment: the application of concepts. Even classification
of something particular as of some general kind counts as awareness only
if the general kind one applies is a concept: something whose application
can both serve as and stand in need of reasons constituted by the applica-
tion of other concepts. When an iron pipe rusts in the rain, it is in some
sense classifying its environment as being of a certain general kind, but is
in no interesting sense aware of it. So one must already have concepts in
order to be aware of anything at all.
3 This does not require that the constitution of conceptual contents be wholly inde-
pendent of our activity. Kant in fact sees “judgments of reflection” as playing a crucial
role in it. It requires only that each empirical (“determinate”) judgment be made in a
context in which already determinately contentful concepts are available as candidates
for application.
58 robert brandom
Of course, this is just the point at which the pre-Kantian rationalists

notoriously faced the problem of where determinate concepts come from.
If they are presupposed by experiential awareness, then it seems that
they cannot be thought of as derived from it, for instance by abstraction.
Once the normative apperceptive enterprise is up-and-running, further
concepts may be produced or refined by various kinds of judgments (for
instance, reflective ones), but concepts must always already be available
for judgment, and hence apperception, to take place at all. Empirical
activity, paradigmatically apperception in the form of judgment, presup-
poses transcendental activity, which is the rational criticism and rectifi-
cation of ones commitments, making them into a normatively coherent,
unified system. Defining that normative unity requires the availability of
concepts with already determinate contents (roles in reasoning). Leibniz’s
appeal to innateness is not an attractive response to the resulting explana-
tory demand. And it would not be much improvement to punt the central
issue of the institution of conceptual norms from the realm of empirical
into the realm of noumenal activity. It is a nice question just how Kant’s
account deals with this issue.
IV
As I read him, Hegel criticizes Kant on just this point. He sees Kant as
having been uncharacteristically and culpably uncritical about the ori-
gin and nature of the determinate contentfulness of empirical concepts.
Hegel’s principal innovation is his idea that in order to follow through
on Kant’s fundamental insight into the essentially normative character
of mind, meaning, and rationality, we need to recognize that normative
statuses such as authority and responsibility are at base social statuses.
One of the problems this theory responds to, I want to claim, is set by the
tension between the autonomy model of normative bindingness, which
is a way of working out and filling in the Enlightenment commitment
to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, on the one hand, and
the requirement that the contents by which autonomous subjects bind
themselves be attitude-independent, in the sense that while according to
the autonomy thesis the subject has the authority over the judging, in the
sense of which concepts are applied, which judgeable content is endorsed
(responsibility is taken for), what one then becomes responsible for must
be independent of one’s taking responsibility for it, on the other. This is
to say that the content itself must have an authority that is independent
of the responsibility that the judger takes for it. And the problem is to rec-
oncile that requirement with the autonomy model of the bindingness of
normative statuses such as authority. Whose attitudes is the authority
of conceptual contents dependent on? The autonomy model says it must
be dependent on the attitudes of those responsible to that authority,
namely the subjects who are judging and acting, so undertaking com-
mitments with those contents and thereby subjecting themselves to that
authority. But the requirement of relative independence of normative
force and content forbids exactly that sort of attitude-dependence.
To resolve this tension, we must disambiguate the basic idea of the
attitude-dependence of normative statuses along two axes. First, we can
ask: whose attitudes? The autonomy model takes a clear stand here: it
is the attitudes of those who are responsible, that is, those over whom
authority is exercised. This is not the only possible answer. For instance,
the traditional subordination model of normative bindingness as obedi-
ence, by contrast to which the autonomy view defines itself, can be under-
stood not only in objectivist terms, as rejecting the attitude-dependence
of normative statuses, but also in terms compatible with that insight. So
understood it acknowledges the attitude-dependence of normative sta-
tuses, but insists that it is the attitudes of those exercising authority, the
superiors, rather than the attitudes of those over whom it is exercised,
the subordinates, that are the source of its bindingness. (It is in this form
that Enlightenment thinkers fully committed to attitude-dependence,
such as Pufendorf, could continue to subscribe to the obedience model.)
Hegel wants to respect both these thoughts. The trouble with them, he
thinks, is that each of them construes the reciprocal notions of authority
and responsibility, in a one-sided [einseitig] way, as having an asymmetric
structure that is unmotivated and ultimately unsustainable. If X has
authority over Y, then Y is responsible to X. The obedience view sees only
the attitudes of X as relevant to the bindingness of the normative relation
between them, while the autonomy view sees only the attitudes of Y as
mattering. Hegel’s claim is that they both do. The problem is to under-
stand how the authority to undertake a determinate responsibility that
for Kant is required for an exercise of freedom is actually supplied with a
determinate responsibility, so that one is intelligible as genuinely commit-
ting oneself to something, constraining oneself. This co-ordinate structure
of authority and responsibility (‘independence’ and ‘dependence’ in the
normative sense Hegel gives to these terms) is what Hegel’s social model
of reciprocal recognition is supposed to make sense of. He thinks (and this
60 robert brandom
is an Enlightenment thought, of a piece with that which motivates the

autonomy criterion of demarcation of the normative) that all authority
and responsibility are ultimately social phenomena. They are the prod-
ucts of the attitudes of those who, on the one hand, undertake responsi-
bility and exercise authority, and on the other, of those who hold others
responsible, and acknowledge their authority. In spite of the formal parity
of the models as asymmetric, the modern autonomy model represents for
Hegel a clear advance on the traditional obedience model in that it does
aspire to endorse symmetry of authority and responsibility. But it does so
by insisting that these relations of authority and responsibility obtain only
when X and Y are identical: when the authoritative one and the respon-
sible one coincide. That immediate collapse of roles achieves symmetry,
but only at the cost of making it impossible to satisfy the demand of rela-
tive independence of normative force and content.
The next clarificatory question that must be asked about the basic idea
of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses is: what sort of depen-
dence? In particular, are the attitudes in question sufficient to institute
the normative statuses? Or are they merely necessary? The stronger,
sufficiency, claim seems to be required to sustain the tension between
the autonomy model and the requirement of relative independence of
force from content. When I introduced the attitude-dependence idea,
I characterized it in two different ways. On the one hand, I said it was
the idea that
Authority, responsibility, and commitment were not features of the non- or
pre-human world. They did not exist until human beings started taking
or treating each other as authoritative, responsible, committed, and so on—
that is, until they started adopting normative attitudes towards one another.
This asserts only the necessity of normative attitudes for normative sta-
tuses. But I also put it as the idea that
Those attitudes, and the social practices that made adopting them possible,
institute the normative statuses.
Here the suggestion is of the sufficiency of attitudes to bring normative
statuses—genuine obligations and rights—into existence. A moderate
version of the normative attitude-dependence thesis rejects objectiv-
ism by insisting that the notions of responsibility and authority essen-
tially involve (in the sense of being unintelligible apart from) the notion
of acknowledging responsibility and authority. One can say that political
legitimacy is not possible without the consent of the governed without
thereby being committed to the possibility of reducing legitimacy without

remainder to such consent. And a moderate autonomy thesis might treat
subjects as responsible only to what they acknowledge as authoritative
without dissolving the authority wholly into that acknowledgement. The
one-sided obedience view took the attitudes of the superior to be sufficient
to institute a normative status of authority and corresponding responsibil-
ity on the part of the subordinate. And the one-sided autonomy view took
the acknowledgement of responsibility by the one bound to be sufficient
to institute the authority by which he is bound. What Hegel sees as wrong
about the obedience view is accordingly not that it makes each subject’s
normative statuses dependent on the attitudes of others, but that it sees
those attitudes as sufficient to institute those statuses all by themselves,
independently of the attitudes of the one whose statuses they are.
Taking someone to be responsible or authoritative, attributing a nor-
mative deontic status to someone, is an attitude that Hegel (picking up a
term of Fichte’s) calls ‘recognition’ [Anerkennung]. Hegel’s view is what
you get if you take the attitudes of both recognizer and recognized, both
those who are authoritative and those who are responsible, to be essen-
tial necessary conditions of the institution of genuine normative statuses,
and require in addition that those attitudes be symmetric or reciprocal
[gegenseitig]. In a certain sense, Hegel also takes it that those individu-
ally necessary normative attitudes are jointly sufficient to institute norma-
tive statuses. What institutes normative statuses is reciprocal recognition.
Someone becomes responsible only when others hold him responsible,
and exercises authority only when others acknowledge that authority.
One can petition others for recognition, in an attempt to become respon-
sible or authoritative. To do that, one must recognize them as able to
hold one responsible or acknowledge one’s authority. This is according
them a certain kind of authority. But to achieve such statuses, one must
be recognized by them in turn. That is to make oneself in a certain sense
responsible to them. The process that synthesizes an apperceiving norma-
tive subject, one who can commit himself in judgment and action, become
responsible cognitively and practically, is a social process of reciprocal rec-
ognition that at the same time synthesizes a normative recognitive com-
munity of those recognized by and who recognize that normative subject:
a community bound together by reciprocal relations of authority over and
responsibility to each other.
Here is a mundane example. Achieving the status of being a good chess-
player is not something I can do simply be coming subjectively to adopt
62 robert brandom
a certain attitude toward myself. It is, in a certain sense, up to me whom

I regard as good chess-players: whether I count any woodpusher who can
play a legal game, only formidable club players, Masters, or Grand Mas-
ters. That is, it is up to me whom I recognize as good chess-players, in the
sense in which I aspire to be one. But it is not then in the same sense up
to me whether I qualify as one of them. To earn their recognition in turn,
I must be able to play up to their standards. To be, say, a formidable club
player, I must be recognized as such by those I recognize as such. My rec-
ognitive attitudes can define a virtual community, but only the reciprocal
recognition by those I recognize can make me actually a member of it,
accord me the status for which I have implicitly petitioned by recognizing
them. My attitudes exercise recognitive authority in determining whose
recognitive attitudes I am responsible to for my actual normative status.
As in the Kantian autonomy model of normative bindingness, we bind
ourselves, collectively, and individually. No-one has authority over me
except that which I grant by my recognitive attitudes. They are accord-
ingly a necessary condition of my having the status I do. But as on the
traditional obedience model, others do exercise genuine authority over
my normative statuses—in the cases we care about, what I am commit-
ted to, responsible for, and authoritative about. Their attitudes are also a
necessary condition of my having the status I do. The two aspects of nor-
mative dependence, authority and responsibility, are entirely reciprocal
and symmetrical. And together, the attitudes of myself and my fellows in
the recognitive community, of those I recognize and who recognize me,
are sufficient to institute normative statuses that are not subjective in the
same way in which the normative attitudes that institute them are.
Hegel diagnoses the incompatibility of commitment to the attitude-
dependence of normative statuses according to the Kantian autonomy
model and the relative independence of normative content from norma-
tive force as resulting from the autonomy model’s asymmetric insistence
on the sufficiency of the attitudes of the committed one to institute the
normative status in question, without acknowledging also any norma-
tive dependence, in the sense of a necessary condition, on the attitudes
of others (due to an insufficiently nuanced appreciation of the dimen-
sions along which the autonomy model of normative force or binding-
ness represents an advance over the obedience model). The reciprocal
recognition model he recommends to resolve this incompatibility bal-
ances moments of normative independence or authority of attitudes over
statuses, on the part of both recognizer and recognized, with correspond-
ing moments of normative dependence or responsibility to the attitudes
of others, by reading both of these aspects as individually only necessary,

and only jointly sufficient to institute normative statuses in the sense of
giving them binding force.
For Hegel, social substance is synthesized by reciprocal recognition. It is

articulated into individual recognizing and recognized selves, which are sub-
jects of normative statuses of commitment, authority, and responsibility—
statuses instituted collectively by those recognitive attitudes. He sees
these social recognitive practices as providing the context and background
required to make sense of the Kantian process of integrating conceptual
commitments so as to synthesize a rational unity of apperception. Hegel’s
term for the whole normatively articulated realm of discursive activity
(Kant’s “realm of freedom”) is ‘Geist’: spirit. At its core is language: “Lan-
guage is the Dasein of Geist,” Hegel says.4 That is where concepts (which
for Hegel, as for Kant, is to say, norms) have their actual, public existence.
(To look ahead: we might here think of Sellars’s principle that “Grasp of a
concept is mastery of the use of a word.”)
Here is how I think the social division of conceptual labor understood
according to the recognitive model of reciprocal authority and responsi-
bility works in the paradigmatic linguistic case, so as to resolve the ten-
sion with which we have been concerned. It is up to me which counter in
the game I play, which move I make, which word I use. But it is not then
in the same sense up to me what the significance of that counter is—what
other moves it precludes or makes necessary, what I have said or claimed
by using that word, what the constraints are on successful rational inte-
gration of the commitment I have thereby undertaken with the rest of
those I acknowledge. It is up to me what concept I apply in a particular
judgment—whether I claim that the coin is made of copper or silver, for
instance. But if I claim that it is copper, it is not then up to me what move
I have made, what else I have committed myself to by using that term.
So, for instance, I have thereby committed myself to the coin melting at
1084° C, but not at 1083° C—in the sense that if those claims are not true
then neither is the one I made. And I have made a claim that is incompat-
ible with saying that the coin is an electrical insulator. I can bind myself
4 In the Phenomenology of Spirit, [A. W. Miller, (trans.), Oxford University Press] para-
graph 652.
64 robert brandom
by these determinate conceptual norms because they are always already

there in the always already up-and-running communal linguistic practices
into which I enter as a young one. An essential part of what maintains
them is the attitudes of others—in this case, of the metallurgical experts
who would hold me responsible for those commitments on the basis of
my performance, if the issue arose. My authority to commit myself using
public words is the authority at once to make myself responsible for and
authorize others to hold me responsible for determinate conceptual con-
tents about which I am not authoritative. It is a petition for determinate
recognition (attribution of specific commitments) by those I implicitly
recognize as having, and thereby grant the authority so to recognize me.
That is granting them the authority to assess the correctness or success of
my rational integrative performances.
The point with which I want to close is that Hegel’s social, linguistic
development of Kant’s fundamental insight into the essentially normative
character of our mindedness provides a model of positive freedom that,
while building on his notion of autonomy, develops it substantially. One of
the central issues of classical political philosophy is how to reconcile indi-
vidual freedom with constraint by social, communal, or political norms.
Kant’s vision of us as rational creatures opens up space for an understand-
ing of a kind of freedom that consists in being able constrain ourselves
by norms—indeed, by norms that are rational, in the sense that they
are conceptual norms: norms articulating what is a reason for what. The
normative conception of positive freedom then makes possible a distinc-
tive kind of answer to the question of how the loss of individual negative
freedom—freedom from constraint—inevitably involved in being subject
to institutional norms could be rationally justified to the individual. In the
Kantian context, such a justification could in principle consist in the cor-
responding increase in positive freedom.
The positive expressive freedom, the freedom to do something, that is
obtainable only by constraining oneself by the conceptual norms implicit
in discursive social practices, speaking a public language, is a central case
where such a justification evidently is available. Speaking a particular lan-
guage requires complying with a daunting variety of norms, rules, and
standards. The result of failure to comply with enough of them is unintel-
ligibility. This fact can fade so far into the background as to be well-nigh
invisible for our home languages, but it is an obtrusive, unpleasant, and
unavoidable feature of working in a language in which one is not at home.
The same phenomenon is manifest in texts that intentionally violate even
a relatively small number of central grammatical and semantic norms,
such as Gertrude Stein’s prose. But the kind of positive freedom one gets
in return for constraining oneself in these multifarious ways is distinc-
tive and remarkable. The astonishing empirical observation with which
Chomsky inaugurated contemporary linguistic theory is that almost every
sentence uttered by an adult native speaker is radically novel. That is, not
only has that speaker never heard or uttered just that sequence of words
before, but neither has anyone else—ever. “Have a nice day,” may get a
lot of play in the States, and “Noch eins,” in Germany, but any tolerably
complex sentence is almost bound to be new.
Quotation aside, it is for instance exceptionally unlikely that anyone
else has ever used a sentence chosen at random from the story I have
been telling. And this is not a special property of professor-speak. Sur-
veys of large corpora of actual utterances (collected and collated by inde-
fatigable graduate students) have repeatedly confirmed this empirically.
And it can be demonstrated on more fundamental grounds by looking
at the number of sentences of, say, thirty words or less that a relatively
simple grammar can construct using the extremely minimal 5000-word
vocabulary of Basic English. There hasn’t been time in human history for
us to have used a substantial proportion of those sentences, even if every
human there had ever been always spoke English and did nothing but
chatter incessantly. Yet I have no trouble producing, and you have no
trouble understanding, a sentence that (in spite of its ordinariness) it is
quite unlikely anyone has happened to use before, such as:
We shouldn’t leave for the picnic until we’re sure that we’ve packed
my old wool blanket, the thermos, and all the sandwiches we made this
morning.
This capacity for radical semantic novelty fundamentally distinguishes
sapient creatures from those who do not engage in linguistic practices.
Because of it we can (and do, all the time) make claims, formulate desires,
and entertain goals that no-one in the history of the world has ever before
so much as considered. This massive positive expressive freedom trans-
forms the lives of sentient creatures who become sapient by constraining
themselves by linguistic—which is at base to say conceptual—norms.
So in the conceptual normativity implicit in linguistic practice we have
a model of a kind of constraint—loss of negative freedom—that is repaid
many times over in a bonanza of positive freedom. Anyone who was in
a position to consider the trade-off rationally would consider it a once-
in-a-lifetime bargain. Of course, one need not be a creature like us. As
Sellars says, one always could simply not speak—but only at the price of
having nothing to say. And non-sapient sentients are hardly in a position
66 robert brandom
to weigh the pros and cons involved. But the fact remains that there is
an argument that shows that at least this sort of normative constraint
is rational from the point of view of the individual—that it pays off by
opening up a dimension of positive expressive freedom that is a pearl
without price, available in no other way. Hegel’s idea is that this case pro-
vides the model that every other social or political institution that proposes
to constrain our negative freedom should be compared to and measured
against. The question always is: what new kind of positive expressive free-
dom, what new kinds of life-possibilities, what new kinds of commitment,
responsibility, and authority are made possible by the institution?
VI
Kant’s normative conception of intentionality moves to the center of the

philosophical stage the question of how we should think about the force
or bindingness (his ‘Gültigkeit’ or ‘Verbindlichkeit’) of normative statuses
such as commitment, authority, and responsibility. Kant’s response is
to develop and extend the Enlightenment commitment to the attitude-
dependence of normative statuses in the form of his autonomy model,
which serves also as a criterion demarcating the realm of the normative
from that of the natural. Hegel sees that the very distinction of force and
content that called forth Kant’s new normative conception of judging
and intending demands a relative independence of those two aspects that
cannot be accommodated on the autonomy model, so long as that model
is construed as applying to individual normative subjects conceived in
isolation from one another—that is, apart from their normative attitudes
towards one another. He notices to begin with that the requisite depen-
dence and independence claims can be reconciled if they are construed
in terms of individually necessary conditions, rather than individually suf-
ficient ones. And understanding the sort of normative dependence and
independence in question as ways of talking about relations of respon-
sibility and authority, he offers a social model of normative statuses as
instituted by reciprocal recognition, according to which each recognitive
relation (recognizing and being recognized) combines aspects of authority
over and responsibility to those who are recognized or who recognize.
Chapter Five
The Metaphysics of Recognition

On Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness
in the Phenomenology of Spirit
Arthur Kok
Introduction
This contribution proposes to understand Hegel’s self-consciousness chap-

ter in his Phenomenology of Spirit (PhoS) as his alternative to Kant’s idea
of the transcendental ‘I’. Kant’s project: Thinking the possibility of meta-
physics is comparable to Hegel’s project in the PhoS. Of course, Hegel’s
theory of self-consciousness has epistemological and socio-theoretical
implications, but in this paper I will focus on Hegel’s metaphysical posi-
tion that justifies these implications. It is not original to draw attention to
making the comparison between the transcendental ‘I’ and the Hegelian
self-consciousness. Well-known scholars have already emphasized that
Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness aims to improve the Kantian notion
of it.1 In my opinion, however, they fail to identify the precise difference
because they overlook an important similarity.
In this paper, I will present the view that Hegel further develops the
Kantian idea that we cannot perceive unity, but only think it. Yet, this is
not the only similarity to Kant. Like Kant, Hegel holds on to the view that
although we are unable to perceive nature’s unity, and that we ourselves
are the unity of nature, it still exists relatively independently from us. In
opposition to ‘standard’ idealism, such as Berkeley’s, in which nature only
exists insofar as it is perceived, Hegel does not reduce nature to being just
an idea of reason. Different from Kant, however, Hegel not only points out
the fundamental distinction between self-consciousness and nature, but
also their oneness. The difference between them exists within the sub-
ject itself. This position is not alien to Kant, but belongs to his practical
1 E.g., the recent wave of Anglo-Saxon Hegel-scholars, including most notably, Pippin,
Pinkard and Houlgate, all emphazise that Hegel takes the Kantian project as his starting
point.
68 arthur kok
philosophy. The practical standpoint of reason implies a position in which

the subject is both natural and intellectual. So, Hegel’s actual program
in the self-consciousness chapter then is to think the unity of practical
and theoretical reason.
Thus, the core problem that Hegel tries to tackle is the problem of
the unity of reason. I claim that Hegel takes Kant’s practical view on the
unity of reason, autonomous freedom, to be the intrinsic unity of the tran-
scendental subject and the thing-in-itself which remain irreconcilable in
Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Hegel does not regard the relation between
the transcendental subject and the autonomous subject as ‘precise
concordance’,2 as does Kant, but shows that freedom—not in the sense
of spontaneity, but as autonomy—is the essence of the transcendental ‘I’.
In Hegel’s view, the autonomous subject is identical to the thing-in-itself,
because the thing-in-itself as such has the structure of a subject. Hegel
does not deny, however, that the thing-in-itself has no otherness for the
subject, but this otherness is not alien to it, as Kant maintains. Philo-
sophical or metaphysical knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the thing-in-itself,
is self-knowledge, yet the self or subject that is known exists essentially in
a relation to otherness. In the end, the essence of our being, autonomy,
must be understood as the unity of independency and dependency of the
subject. This is made explicit in the lord/bondsman relation in the self-
consciousness chapter of the PhoS. Hegel calls this relation of indepen-
dency and dependency recognition. His concept of recognition replaces
Kant’s idea of the transcendental ‘I’ as an adequate concept for self-
consciousness, without failing to integrate the most important element of
the transcendental subject, namely to be the condition for metaphysics.
To make my thesis about the metaphysical importance of the self-
consciousness chapter in the PhoS more feasible, I will first draw some
relations between this book and the Science of Logic (SoL). In the introduc-
tion to The Science of Subjective Logic, Hegel discusses directly with Kant
about the nature of subjectivity. This discussion is helpful to understand
how we can relate the self-consciousness chapter in the PhoS to Kant’s
transcendental project of the possibility of metaphysics. The main body of
my contribution will consist in a reading of the self-consciousness chap-
ter of the PhoS. I will systematically evaluate the dialectical structure of
this chapter, drawing special attention to Hegel’s famous introduction
of life in the first part of the self-consciousness chapter.
2 I borrow this phrase from Martin Moors (1990), p. 20.

the metaphysics of recognition 69
1. Hegel’s Criticism of Kant’s Theoretical Reason
In the end, Kant is only able to think a merely formal correspondence

between pure self-consciousness and moral agency. In Hegel’s eyes, this is
a provisional result; one which he wants to develop further into a relation
of pure adequacy, i.e., as a unity of form and content. To do this, Hegel
must question Kant’s idea of transcendental freedom. Transcendental free-
dom is the possibility to be the cause of an action—i.e., the possibility of
a subject to possess free will—as opposed to merely sensible, affective
determination which is impure or pathological. Transcendental freedom
is the result of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPuR), a purely theoretical
construction of the free will. Kant’s conclusion is that transcendental free-
dom is not adequate to the entire concept of freedom, but is only compat-
ible with it in the sense that we can comprehend the logical possibility
of it, i.e., it enables us to think freedom re-affirmatively. Nonetheless, the
entire concept of freedom presupposes a unity of form and content which
is unobtainable by theoretical reflection and can only be indicated as the
immediate practical standpoint of the free agent.
For Kant, it is impossible to ascertain the existence of free will theoreti-
cally because, given our sensible nature, we conceive every possible object
of consciousness a priori as something given to us which contradicts the
nature of free will, viz. to be something self-positing. He says, however,
that from the faculty of the understanding’s spontaneity, we can deduce
the logical possibility of a synthesis with a non-sensible intuition; indeed,
only as a boundary concept, but still this concept—of the Noumenon—
allows for a critique of speculative reason.3 This critique purifies the theo-
retical reason from all its possible infections by sensible determinations,
and makes it compatible with the pure—and thus also purely negative—
idea of freedom. As a result, we can think the possibility of free will as the
logical possibility to apply the categories of the faculty of understanding
to the noumenal sphere whose existence we cannot exclude, and whose
nature has to be defined in contradistinction to sensible nature. (These
characterizations do not define the intelligible objects as such, but our
3 I do realize that this is not the ‘common’ reception of Kant’s first Critique. I hold the
view, however, that in the reception of Kant the role of the intellectual intuition is system-
atically underestimated. Although we do not possess an intellectual intuition, it is a neces-
sary fiction that we must commit to if we want to think freedom. Kant’s concept of the
Noumenal brings both elements together: it articulates the possibility of pure, noumenal
freedom as purely logical. For the complete argumentation underlying this claim, I must
refer to the first part of my dissertation “Kant, Hegel, und die Frage der Metaphysik”.
70 arthur kok
finite rational articulation of them.) To actually accept this merely logical,

i.e. epistemologically meaningless, possibility as a real possibility, we need
to take the standpoint of practical reason.
In his criticism outlined in the SoL, Hegel challenges the very beginning
of Kant’s reasoning. In the introduction to The Science of Subjective Logic,
“Of the concept in general”, Hegel remarks:
Just as the Kantian philosophy did not consider the categories in and for
themselves, but declared them to be finite determinations unfit to hold the
truth, on the only inappropriate ground that they are subjective forms of
self-consciousness, still less did it subject to criticism the forms of the con-
cepts that make up the content of ordinary logic.4
In pointing out that Kant’s critical philosophy is not critical enough
because it does not reflect on the nature of the categories, Hegel legiti-
mizes his project of the SoL, which can be regarded as Hegel’s version of
the Kantian project of the critique of pure reason. So, to consider the cate-
gories not as a priori conditions for experience, but as that which they are
“in and for themselves”, is not hostile towards Kant, but thinks through
the original project of Kant more radically. For example, in the same text,
Hegel praises Kant for using the term ‘transcendental’ to the extent that
this term expresses that our conceptuality is constitutive for experience; a
claim which Hegel supports wholeheartedly. However, Hegel is also right
in pointing out that it is impossible that the spontaneous unity of the
faculty of understanding, i.e., self-consciousness, at the same time has an
a priori given categorical structure.
Interestingly, Hegel doubts the validity of Kant’s argument that the cat-
egories are “finite determinations” because they are “subjective forms”. The
incorrectness of this inference can indeed be demonstrated because, inso-
far as Kant already acknowledges that a subject must be self-conscious, he
must admit that the categorical forms are precisely subjective as far as they
have the form of self-consciousness. Consequently, the many categories
must be deduced as a coherent whole that as such expresses self-conscious-
ness.5 Kant’s transcendental deduction of self-consciousness, however, only
4 GW 12, 28. For all translations from the Science of Logic, I use G. W. F. Hegel, George
di Giovanni (transl.), Hegel Cambridge Translations: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The
Science of Logic, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
5 I do not want to let someone think that Hegel simply takes the Kantian categories and
‘applies’ to them self-consciousness. He develops the different categories as intrinsically
related to one another throughout the entire SoL. Hegel develops the categories of quantity,
quality and relation in the Objective Logic, but the categories of modality only take form
one-sidedly shows that self-consciousness is the necessary precondition

of any possible categorical structure, but Kant does not unfold how this
categorical structure in-itself has the form of self-consciousness. Therefore,
in Hegel’s eyes, Kant’s account of self-consciousness is not entirely in the
wrong direction, but falls short simply because it is—even measured by
Kant’s own criteria—far from exhaustive.
As a result, given the inner contradiction of a subject, which essentially
is a self-conscious faculty, but whose structure is a priori given, Kant’s
transcendental self-consciousness is not an adequate articulation of self-
consciousness in-itself. The conceptual nature of the categories as subjec-
tive forms of self-consciousness should not be grasped as the pure, yet
finite, determinations that are left-over after abstracting from all content;
instead, conceptuality is, in itself, an act of abstraction; and consequently,
this act of abstraction must be comprehended as a self-conscious act. This
also seems to be Hegel’s move when he elaborates that the transcendental
self-consciousness, or the ‘I’, still is a limited and inadequate represen-
tation of self-consciousness. In the introduction to The Objective Logic,
“General division of the logic”, Hegel clarifies this:
However, if there was to be a real progress in philosophy, it was necessary
that the interest of thought should be drawn to the consideration of the for-
mal side, of the “I,” of consciousness as such, that is, of the abstract reference
of a subjective awareness to an object, and that in this way the path should
be opened for the cognition of the infinite form, that is, of the concept. Yet,
in order to arrive at this cognition, the finite determinateness in which that
form is as “I,” as consciousness, must be shed. The form, when thought out
in its purity, will then have within itself the capacity to determine itself, that
is, to give itself a content, and to give it as a necessary content—as a system
of thought-determinations.6
We see that the relation between concept and self-consciousness is no
longer left in the dark. The concept-in-itself is adequate to the infinite
form which is the adequate form of the self-consciousness. So, when Hegel
says that “the finite determinateness [. . .] must be shed”,7 his intention is
not to get rid of finitude as such, but of the specific falsely asserted finitude
in the Subjective Logic. This is important, because the transition from the Objective Logic to
the Subjective Logic can compared to that from consciousness to self-consciousness in the
PhoS. So it is impossible to say of a singular, i.e. abstracted, category like quantity that it
has the form of self-consciousness. We can only derive the unity of self-consciousness from
the intrinsic relatedness of the categories. Cf. Cobben (2003).
6 GW 21, 48.
7 The original German text says ‘abstreifen’, which literarily means ‘to strip off ’.
72 arthur kok
in the Kantian sense. Although the creation of “a system of thought-

determinations” is the task of the SoL, its grounding idea, i.e., the infinite
form as a radicalized form of Kantian self-consciousness, is not developed
in the SoL, but its presupposition.8 The philosophical grounding of this
idea, i.e., the actual development from a Kantian-like transcendental self-
consciousness, or the ‘I’, to self-consciousness as an infinite form or as
concept, is found in the self-consciousness chapter of the PhoS.
2. The Metaphysical Significance of the Phenomenology of Spirit
Although the SoL might be the most metaphysical work of Hegel, we

must not forget that the topic of the PhoS, viz. the possibility of abso-
lute knowledge, has an outspoken metaphysical character. Furthermore,
whereas the beginning of the PhoS is not, like in the SoL, the standpoint
of absolute knowing, but an outline of the assessment of its possibility,
the PhoS’s project is infinitely closer to Kant’s project of the CPuR than the
SoL because the CPuR thematizes the possibility of metaphysics, too.
Nonetheless, the PhoS has a distinctively different program than the CPuR
because, in the end, Hegel does not deny that absolute knowledge is pos-
sible. Kant, on the other hand, rejects that such knowledge is possible,
and maintains that we ought to limit our knowledge aspirations to the
sensible world which is distinguished from the supersensible world of
intelligible beings. We have already seen, however, that Hegel traces back
this difference to the fact that the distinction between theoretical and
practical reason is absolute for Kant. Hegel does not accept the Kantian
separation between the sensible and supersensible world.
Despite the fundamental similarity between the PhoS and the CPuR,
viz. to take the unity of reason as the crucial building block for metaphys-
ics, the mere definition of the problem in the PhoS is already an attempt
to overcome the difference between theoretical and practical reason, and
sensible and supersensible nature. For Hegel, philosophical knowledge is
knowledge of substance. Hegel’s main influence here is Spinoza, especially
8 Cf. GW21, 32: “In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have presented consciousness as it
progresses from the first immediate opposition of itself and the subject matter to absolute
knowledge. This path traverses all the forms of the relation of consciousness to the object
and its result is the concept of science. There is no need, therefore, to justify this concept
here (apart from the fact that it emerges within logic itself ). It has already been justified
in the other work, and would indeed not be capable of any other justification than is pro-
duced by consciousness, as all its shapes dissolve into that concept as into their truth.”
in his capacity as critic of the Cartesian conception of substance. Sub-

stance can only exist as one, not as a plurality of substances, as Descartes
thinks. It is the same as the absolute because it encompasses oneness and
manifold. This is, again, anti-Cartesian, since Descartes famously distin-
guishes between the one as a substance, i.e., res cogitans, and the many as
a different substance, i.e., res extensa. Henceforth, the Spinozist concep-
tion of substance articulates the absolute unity of reason.
Hegel does not simply commit to this conception of substance, but
takes seriously Kant’s criticism of Spinoza. Kant denies that Spinoza has
formulated a substantial insight. The latter’s representation of the abso-
lute is not real knowledge, but a subjective representation, to the extent
that it is the result of a reflection that is necessarily mediated by a practi-
cal standpoint, which in the end reduces morality to virtue, i.e., to some
natural denomination to do good.9 The problem is that this involves two
subjects: a thinking subject and a moral one, of which, according to Kant,
the inner unity cannot be thought. Whereas this twofoldness obviously
again has to do with the Kantian separation between theoretical and
practical reason, Hegel understands that he must resolve this separation
if he is to make sense of his claim that philosophical knowledge is knowl-
edge of substance. He makes explicit the underlying problem of thinking
substance is that the subject lacks unity. Consequently, to think the unity
of the subject would also make it possible to think substance, since for
Kant the latter presupposes the former.
On the other hand, the sole criterion for a subject’s unity is that it must
be existing oneness; therefore, it is only possible to think the unity of the
subject if we think it as substance. The fundamental philosophical prob-
lem of the PhoS—How to think substance?—can only be affirmatively
9 In my opinion, in short, Kant’s criticism of Spinoza has both theoretical and practical
characteristics. Theoretically, Kant rejects the possibility to have substantial knowledge,
i.e., knowledge of the thing-in-itself, in general. In the second of the Critique of the Power
Judgment, the Critique of Teleological Judgment, however, Kant puts forward a practical
objection to Spinozist ethics (§ 87). In Spinozist ethics, morality exists, but only as virtue,
and there is no transcendent God. As a result, Kant argues, morality must be immediately
reflected in nature. In such ethical position the difference between nature and reason is
entirely lost, and the obvious question: why should nature meet this expectation?, cannot
be posed. Consequently, Spinozist ethics cannot express what Kant values most about
morals, namely that they are based on rules. In other words, morality exists not as nature,
but in our relation to nature. I believe that for Kant this practical objection is decisive,
and that this objection is clearly overcome in Hegel’s posing of the question: What is sub-
stance? Hegel would certainly not deny that morals are rules for behavior, and that there
is a fundamental—yet not contradictory—difference between nature and morality.
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answered when we think substance as subject. Hegel expresses the fact

that the truth of substance is that it is subject in his formulation that
the absolute is ‘the self-movement of spirit’. On the one hand, Hegel
conceives the absolute as something whose existence is fully contained
within itself, but, on the other hand, to give the self-movement a spiritual
character makes explicit that Hegel’s absolute only exists in-itself as a self-
comprehending subject.
Thus, Hegel’s spirit is not opposed to nature, but his idea of spirit opposes
the standpoint that nature is immediately identical to substance. Again,
this refers to Spinoza, who can be regarded as the most concise protago-
nist of the idea that substance is nature. Spinoza distinguishes between
natura naturens and natura naturata, which indicate, respectively, nature
as self-cause and nature as something caused. As this natura naturens,
nature exists as an absolute, and fully encompasses the natura naturata. In
this absolute, all difference is made subordinate to the self-contained
oneness of the self-cause. This conception of the absolute is vulnerable
to Kant’s criticism because it does not take into account the moment of
subjectivity. In taking substance as spirit, Hegel basically wants to think
the self-contained oneness of the self-cause as the self-positing of the
subject. This shift, however, whereas it aims to integrate Kant’s critical
stance, implies that the conception of the absolute as self-cause must
be challenged.
Hegel’s self-consciousness presents an alternative to the idea of the
self-contained oneness of the absolute. He introduces a different idea
of selfhood which he calls ‘recognition’. If Hegel’s concept of recognition
has to be understood as an answer to this fundamental problem inher-
ited from modern philosophers such as Spinoza and Kant, this tells us
some things about the way we should read the self-consciousness chapter.
Firstly, the subject matter of the PhoS is not an individual consciousness,
but the infinite form of substance. This infinite form is not yet known at
the beginning, although Hegel hypothesizes that we should think it as sub-
ject. Secondly, it makes no sense to read the PhoS from a developmental
perspective, in which self-consciousness emergences from consciousness,
because Hegel precisely wishes to transform the idea of self-cause which
is closely linked to the idea of emergence. For the same reason, it is use-
less to employ the view of developmental psychology to understand the
PhoS.10 The abstract and exclusively philosophical purport of the PhoS,
10 E.g. Kesselring (1981), who compared Hegel to Piaget, is correct in claiming that it
is meaningful for developmental psychology to try to find the logical shapes in the differ-
viz. the unfolding of the infinite form, is purely logical. Only from this
perspective does a comparison with Kant’s project of the possibility of
metaphysics make sense.
3. Self-consciousness as Recognition
In the self-consciousness chapter of the PhoS, Hegel develops self-

consciousness as a relation of recognition. Hegel’s critical analysis and ref-
utation of the representation of self-consciousness as the ‘I’ in this chapter
can be read as a criticism of Kant’s transcendental ‘I’, although Hegel’s
formulation of the ‘I’ as a tautology targets a broader range of ‘I’-thinkers,
which also includes Descartes and the early Fichte.11 In the present assess-
ment of the self-consciousness chapter, I hope to elucidate that Hegel’s
critique of the ‘I’ is clenched together in his claim that the ‘I’ has the shape
of desire, which turns out to be a contradiction-in-itself. Hegel’s alterna-
tive shape for self-consciousness, viz. recognition, overcomes this contra-
diction of desire because it essentially grasps itself as a relation to an other
self-consciousness.
Somewhat disobeying the linearity of the original self-consciousness
chapter, but for the sake of clarity, I will start with outlining Hegel’s first
determination of recognition. Of course, this determination is the result of
a preceding analysis, viz. the contradiction of the ‘I’, which I reconstruct
retrospectively. My disobedience is motivated by the fact that most inter-
preters of the self-consciousness chapter wrongly believe that the relation
of recognition, which is introduced halfway through the self-consciousness
chapter, describes a relation between individuals. Not only do I think this
view is decisively mistaken, but also this presumption would make it diffi-
cult to understand the relation to Kant’s idea of self-consciousness. Hence,
I will first make some remarks on this issue, even though they might seem
slightly out of context.
ent stages of the psychological development of an individual. However, his claim that the
purely logical development in the PhoS could benefit from the insights of developmental
psychology is incorrect. Developmental psychology still is an empirical science that pro-
duces only contingent knowledge.
11 With the early Fichte, I mean the Fichte of the Science of Knowing 1794. After that,
Fichte writes new versions of the Science of Knowing several times. The last complete ver-
sion of it, which stems from 1812, is much more developed than the 1794 version. Hegel
probably has not read any Science of Knowing after 1794. Especially Reinhard Lauth and
Helmut Girndt have done excellent research on the late Fichte.
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To see how Hegel introduces the term ‘recognition’ in the PhoS, let us
consider the following quote from the PhoS:
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being recognized.12
Two things have to be kept in mind when interpreting this. Firstly, Hegel
clearly says that to recognize others is not so much a feature of self-
consciousness, but that self-consciousness only exists as something recog-
nized. Secondly, the phrase “for another” does not refer to other individuals,
but functions as an antithetical concept for “for itself ”. Despite the fact
that most interpretations of this text are inclined to assume that Hegel
speaks here about a plurality of concrete self-conscious individuals who
mutually recognize each other, there is no reference to individuals. More
importantly, Hegel treats “in being recognized” as an ontological qualifi-
cation of self-consciousness, i.e., there exists no self-consciousness other
than in the shape of the being-recognized. In other words, we are not yet
in the position to say in what form it makes sense to speak about a real
self-consciousness. The follow-up question Hegel thus understandably
addresses directly after this, is what a being’s determination as ‘being-
recognized’ means, and how it may solve this fundamental question.
Hegel explicates this determination as follows:
The twofold significance of the distinct moments has in the nature of self-
consciousness to be infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness
in which it is posited.13
This quote undermines any interpretation which assumes that, for Hegel,
recognition primarily describes a relation between pre-existing individuals.
Already the image of an individual, or even a plurality of individuals, pre-
supposes a manifold and a oneness that have been reconciled in one way
or another. In Hegel’s picture, however, the possible unity of the one and
the many is highly problematic. Of course, Hegel would agree that self-
consciousness can only exist as the unity of oneness and manifold, but
this unity cannot have the shape of an immediately given entity.
12 GW 9, 114; Miller, 111. I slightly modified the translation. Miller translates “als ein
Anerkanntes” with “in being acknowledged”. This translation does not express clearly
enough that ‘Anerkanntes’ is an inflexion of ‘Anerkennung’, which is Hegel’s word for rec-
ognition. Cf. Pinkard’s translation: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself by way of its
existing in and for itself for an other; i.e., it exists only as a recognized being.” (Pinkard
2012, 81; unpublished but can be found on the web.)
13 GW 9, 114; Miller, 111.
This impossibility is made explicit by Hegel when he shows that there

is a “twofold significance” to self-consciousness. The meaning of this “two-
fold significance” can only be understood in the light of a post-Kantian
account of transcendental self-consciousness, especially Fichte’s, that
interprets Kant’s transcendental self-consciousness, the ‘I’, as a self-
relation, the “I am I”. This self-relation, which is further examined as desire
in the next section, basically entails that the unity of self-consciousness
can encompass manifold or difference because it is in-itself the external-
ization of itself from itself, and henceforth, is the source of difference.
However, in becoming other-than-itself, self-consciousness remains the
same existence because the becoming simply is the exertion of its imma-
nent nature. The “twofold significance” of this self-relation is, therefore,
that self-consciousness is at the same time a relation, i.e., the negation or
externalization of itself, and the negation of this relation because through
the first negation it does not become another existence. For Hegel, this
evident contradiction is the inevitable result of Kant’s transcendental ‘I’;
and the concept of recognition is introduced to solve the contradiction.
In this regard, it makes sense to read the self-consciousness chapter in
the PhoS as a discussion with Kant. Observed from this highly abstract
standpoint, the connection with Hegel’s discussion with Kant in the SoL
also becomes more visible. Firstly, we see that Hegel’s problem with
Kant, viz. that Kant’s unity of self-consciousness could not account for
the fact that the faculty of understanding was in itself differentiated in a
manifold of categories, is systematically thematized here as the question:
What is the unity of self-consciousness? Secondly, when Hegel introduces
‘recognition’ in the PhoS, his choice of words is remarkably close to that
of the SoL. Just as in the SoL, the infinite form of self-consciousness is
presented as the result of overcoming the problematic representation of
self-consciousness as an ‘I’. This gives us a good reason to believe that rec-
ognition is indeed meant to be the first shape of the infinite form, which
is characteristic for the SoL.
4. The Contradiction of the Self-certainty of Self-consciousness
Similar to Kant, Hegel takes self-consciousness to be the essence of

empirical consciousness. Empirical consciousness can be defined as the
cognition of an object, i.e., it exists insofar as the cognized object exists.
However, the object thus cognized cannot be conceived of as an exter-
nal impulsion for consciousness because the object is only definable as
an object in relation to consciousness; therefore, the object does not
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exist for itself, but only for consciousness. Yet, then, consciousness is not
identical to the object, but exists as the other, for whom the object is an
object. Since empirical consciousness, i.e., the immediate identity with
the object, turns out to be a contradiction in itself, its essence must be the
exact opposite of itself. The position of empirical consciousness, i.e., that
existence is purely objective, implies that there is no selfhood. Thus, the
counter position of consciousness is the standpoint that existence essen-
tially is selfhood or subjectivity; in other words, self-consciousness.
Kant grasps this selfhood as the transcendental subject. This subject
does not refer to a concrete individual, but to the unifying act of thinking,
which is the necessary condition for every representation to be an object of
experience, and which is called subject because it has to be spontaneous,
i.e., it has to be selfhood. Also for Hegel, thinking about selfhood should
not be confused with thinking about individuals; although, in opposition
to Kant, Hegel’s subject is not inferred from the fact that sensible intuition
alone is insufficient to think the possibility of experience, but derived from
the contradiction of consciousness. As a consequence, there is a funda-
mental difference between Kant’s conception of selfhood and Hegel’s con-
ception. We have already seen that Kant introduces selfhood as a separate
faculty, the understanding that has an a priori structure. Precisely as far as
Kant does not derive this structure from his critique of sensible intuition,
but merely uses this critique to legitimatize that the a priori categories can
be obtained through abstraction, i.e. exclusion, from the sensibly given,
he cannot conclude otherwise than to say that this transcendental sub-
ject is finite because it does not encompass sensible intuition. In Hegel’s
case, however, the conclusion that empirical consciousness is not able to
identify an object tells us something about the nature of the object. The
result that an object only exists for a subject defines the object as a whole,
and Hegel’s conception of selfhood thus encompasses the entire world of
the senses.
In the beginning of the self-consciousness chapter, Hegel takes as his
starting point the thesis that the subject exists in this encompassing man-
ner. In doing so, he already takes self-consciousness as an infinite form,
which, however, is not yet adequately expressed as this infinite form. In
the course of the self-consciousness chapter, it will become clear that the
infinite form cannot be immediately real, but that this reality has to
be a mediated one. (We will shortly see that it is mediated by life.) The
infinite form that takes itself to be immediately real is what Hegel calls
“the I”. This ‘I’ is not fully comparable to Kant’s transcendental subject,
because this subject is not an infinite form and does not encompass the
sensual world. However, we have also seen that under this condition, Kant
cannot account for the spontaneity of self-consciousness. In order to solve
this problem, it makes sense to represent the ‘I’ as an infinite form that
shares the most important characteristic of the transcendental subject,
namely that it is the result of the exclusion of sensible nature.
The self that is thus conceived of as an ‘I’ exists purely as a relation to
itself. It is a self-positing subject, whose existence is immediately given
with its essence. (Again, this is not an adequate description of Kant’s posi-
tion, but the only meaningful way to understand his notion of spontaneity.
Of course, the impossibility of this immediate identification, which Hegel
will point out, is also articulated by Kant, but in an inconsistent fashion.14
Precisely in this way, we can see that Hegel does not simply refute Kant,
but provides the Kantian project with its proper derivations—nonethe-
less changing the status of metaphysical knowledge.) On the one hand,
the self-positing subject is the immediate unity of subject and substance,
but on the other hand, it is also self-consciousness, i.e., the essence of
consciousness.
The essence of consciousness was that it is in-itself for-an-other, i.e.,
the difference between essence and existence, which means that self-
consciousness is a self-relation, i.e., the unity of essence and existence
that is at the same time the sublation of otherness. The self-positing of
self-consciousness, therefore, must be a movement of externalization—
becoming other than itself—and the sublation of this otherness. However,
the movement must consist of different moments, selfness and otherness,
that must have relative independence opposite one another. For a self-
positing subject, this relative independence has no meaning whatsoever
because it takes both moments to be immediately the expression of its
one existence. Within this configuration, the moment of otherness can-
not become explicit, so it is negated in the sense that it is excluded rather
than included. Hegel correctly assesses that the representation of self-
consciousness as the ‘I’ results in an exclusion of nature.
14 In the §§ on the transcendental deduction of the categories of the understanding,

Kant explicitly says that the spontaneity of the understanding cannot be the ground of
the existence of objects. His argumentation is based, however, on the distinction between
understanding and intuition, which Hegel does not accept. Still, we should not simply
assume that Hegel takes the opposite position, i.e., that the subject is the ground of
existence. For Hegel, the problem is the use of the notion of grounding. Once we have
transformed our conception of what ‘grounding’ means, we can—within certain boundar-
ies—say that the subject’s essence is to become ground of its existence.
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Hegel does not deny that self-consciousness actually has such a struc-
ture that contains the moments of externalization and sublation of oth-
erness, but in the immediate certainty of the self, this structure remains
not only implicit, but is even repressed. The self of this specific certainty
is the result of a repression, but it does not know this. As a result of this
unawareness, the ‘I’ cannot be the truth of self-consciousness. We have
already seen that the self-certainty cannot only be maintained through the
exclusion of nature, but insofar as this nature is characterized as empirical
nature, it has no existence in-itself; and, it is not really possible to repress
something that does not exist. However, insofar as the essence of empiri-
cal nature is consciousness, i.e., to exist for-an-other, there is somehow
a moment of otherness implicated. This other is, of course, the subject;
yet, taken as this result, it follows that the subject must exist as a sensible
being. Although the nature of sensibility is inadequately understood in
terms of sensible consciousness, we can commit to the assumption that
every sensible being must at least be a living being. We will see that this
life of self-consciousness is exactly that, which is repressed by the self-
certainty of self-consciousness.
The introduction of life in the self-consciousness chapter has puzzled
many interpreters, but there is no reason at all to be surprised. In fact, at
the end of the preceding consciousness chapter, Hegel already concludes
that the essence of consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness as self-relation,
is also the essence of life:
This simple infinity, or the absolute Notion, may be called the simple essence
of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence
is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself
every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates within itself but does
not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical, for the differ-
ences are tautological; they are differences that are none. This self-identical
essence is therefore related only to itself; ‘to itself ’ implies relationship to an
‘other’, and the relation-to-self is rather a self-sundering; or, in other words,
that very self-identicalness is an inner difference.15
This quotation makes clear that the logical result of the consciousness
chapter, viz. the sublation of all difference, constitutes a pure identity
with itself. The essence of this identity is, as Hegel points out, that there
exists no otherness for it. On the one hand, this results in the reduction
of differences to sameness, which means that they have a tautological
15 GW 9, 94–5; Miller, 100.

character. On the other hand, however, it results in the fact that the self-
relation must be understood as a whole. So, it cancels out all differences
to the extent that it no longer possesses any kind of opposedness against
anything else. This all-encompassing character of the self-relation, which
Hegel later calls self-consciousness, is of course not adequately articulated
in the expression that all differences are tautological because, insofar as
differences are excluded, otherness is placed outside of the unity with
itself, and—without mediation—the holistic nature of the self-relation
cannot be maintained.
Despite being purely logical, the result of the consciousness chapter is
not a single clear-cut idea of self-consciousness, but a double-sided one.
It is, nonetheless, indisputably logical because the sublation of all differ-
ence has in itself this double-sided result of being the exclusion as well
as the inclusion of otherness. Self-consciousness, taken as the essence of
consciousness, incorporates both moments. In contrast to consciousness,
in which basic separate moments were unity and difference, both basic
moments of self-consciousness bring together unity and difference in a
separate way. The ‘I am I’, or the tautology of self-consciousness, which
sublates difference in the sense that it represses otherness, is separated
from the other kind of sublation which abrogates difference through tak-
ing itself to be otherness. Now, this second moment, which is the true
internalization of difference, articulates a form of self-consciousness that
is at the same time the essence of life.
It is important to remember that, although we have to infer from the
fact that consciousness is the presupposition of self-consciousness that
self-consciousness presupposes life, is it wrong to assume that conscious-
ness knows that it is living. Hegel rejects the notion of self-affection which
is employed by Hume and, more moderately, Kant, because consciousness
does not have life as its object but as its presupposition. Hegel compre-
hends the relation between consciousness and its life as a negation, too,
as is elaborated in the following quote:
Infinity, or this absolute unrest of pure self-movement, in which whatever
is determined in one way or another, e.g. as being, is rather the opposite of
this determinateness, this no doubt has been from the start the soul of all
that has gone before; but it is in the inner world that it has first freely and
clearly shown itself.16
16 GW 9, 96; Miller, 101.

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Hegel calls the infinity—read: truth—of consciousness “absolute unrest”

because it is defined by its absolute impossibility to produce any deter-
mination, i.e., to identify anything at all. We have seen that consciousness
is indeed unable to determine any object because the object in-itself is
both sameness and otherness in an irresolvable manner. The movement
of consciousness results in an endless inversing, i.e., a constant passing-
over-into, of any possible object’s determination in its opposite. However,
to grasp this movement of inversion at once inevitably means to break out
of the movement and to be no longer immersed in it. The “inner world”
that is thus shown, and which is the life of consciousness, sublates all
inversion: In the inversion of the object’s determination, the substance
remains the same.
This selfsame substance differs from the empiricist’s illusion that there
is objective matter existing independently from consciousness. In fact, log-
ically, it is the negation of the object, which means that it is subject. Still,
it is not comparable to the Kantian transcendental subject, but essentially
a subject that encompasses the entire world of appearances as its inner
world. In the consciousness chapter, Hegel does not further specify the
characteristics of this encompassing self-subsisting infinity, but in the self-
consciousness chapter, it reemerges as life. In the self-consciousness chap-
ter, the self-subsistence of the infinite form turns out to be self-conscious
life. First, Hegel compares the in-itself of this self-subsistence to the spe-
cies, a term used in biology to unite a manifold of individual organisms
(the exemplars of the species), only to conclude that as a species, life can-
not be self-conscious. This is so because organic life is also characterized
by a relation to inorganic nature.
The unity of the species is not merely a subjective projection of the
biologist, but is, to a certain extent, practically recognized by the individ-
ual exemplars of the species in the activity of sexual reproduction. Their
sexual behavior can be seen as subservient to the existence of the species
as a whole, rather than their individual existence. In this regard, Hyppolite
remarks that the birth of the child is the death of the parents.17 The spe-
cies and the individuals relate to one another as the universal form to its
realization. The species comes into existence through externalizing itself
into a manifold of individuals, yet the essence of this individual does not
17 Hyppolite (1946), 151, Footnote 15: “Les deux mouvements se rejoignent, et la vie est
bien ainsi un cycle. L’individu se nie lui-même, mais cette auto- négation est la produc-
tion d’un autre être ou d’une subsistance individuelle. Ainsi ‚la criossance de l’enfant est
la mort des parents’.”
lie in the individual insofar as it exists separately from the other individu-
als, but in the unity of the species. Therefore, the essence of the individual,
as an individual of the species, lies in the sublation of the individual. The
sublation of the individual, which can be exemplified by sexual repro-
duction (especially when this sexual behavior takes the shape of a self-
sacrifice) has, in its basis, the form of a self-negation. However, it is not a
real self-negation because the self of the organism is both the species and
the individual. At no point in the continuous circular process of coming
to be and passing away of the individuals of the same species does the self
become detached from itself. Instead, the subsisting self is the movement
of organic life as a whole.
In the movement of life, described as species, it is not the self that is
negated, but the negation is only introduced as a moment of the whole.
Under this condition, it is impossible to speak about a self-conscious move-
ment because every difference between the individuals of the species is a
relative one which is dissolved in the continuous process of reproduction.
From another perspective, however, we would have to say that even the
existence of the species as a whole is not unconditioned. As evolution
theory points out, the survival of species depends on material conditions
and the species’ ability to adapt to these conditions. This means that we
cannot maintain the idea that species are absolutely self-subsisting. For
us, it is obvious that organic life can only exist in places where inorganic
matter has a configuration that allows for the possibility of life. So, we can
hardly be surprised by the fact that Hegel stresses that the self-subsistence
of the species is characterized by a fundamental dependency on an outside
world.18 Still, in the light of the development of the PhoS, the dependency
of life on inorganic nature poses an interesting problem. The result of the
consciousness chapter, namely, was that the essence of inorganic nature
is life; in other words, inorganic nature has no other self than that of the
subject. The fact that, for its subsistence, this subject is again dependent
on inorganic nature, suggests that inorganic nature is not mere appear-
ance, yet has to manifest itself as something, which has no reality for us.
18 Please note that this is not the reason why Hegel considers the species not to be a real
self-subsistence in the end. The species is an inadequate concept of substance, because it
is self-subsisting only in-itself but not for-itself. A real self-subsisting being must always
have self-consciousness. In the transition from the life of the species to the self-conscious
life, it will become clear that precisely that, which becomes for-itself, is the fact that life is
depending on inorganic nature.
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To understand how Hegel develops the relation between organic and

inorganic nature as constitutive for the existence of self-consciousness, we
have to go back to the beginning of the consciousness chapter. Already
at the most primitive level of consciousness, viz. sense-certainty, Hegel
remarks, on the side, that animals sublate the being-other of objects by
eating them. Sense-certainty takes the absolute or the in-itself as the
nature, which is immediately taken as the object of consciousness. We
have already seen that such nature is not for-itself, but only for-an-other.
It is a selfless nature without subsistence, and this pure difference without
identity is the nothingness of appearing nature. At the end of the sense-
certainty chapter, Hegel remarks—clearly as a joke—that empiricists
are, in a certain respect, dumber than animals, for the animals at least
practically acknowledge the nothingness of sensible objects by consum-
ing them. However, when Hegel introduces his basic idea of life as an
organic nature that preserves itself through consuming inorganic nature,
the initially harmless joke turns out to have an unexpected, yet implica-
tive, undercurrent.
When we take this selfless nature as inorganic nature, i.e., as the earth,
it must exist as the means of the preservation of the natural species. The
pure difference, which was dismissed at the end of the consciousness
chapter as unessential, as the absolute nothingness of appearance, is now
re-introduced again; not as something subsisting in-itself, but as some-
thing on which self-subsisting nature is depending for its very existence.
(Viz. the earth on which the organism lives.) In other words, the reality
of difference, whose acknowledgment and explication Hegel deemed cru-
cial for the PhoS’s success from the very beginning, can only be articu-
lated through making explicit this relation of dependency which is innate
to the self-conscious subsistence of human life. In retrospect, the sudden
movement to underline the relevance of the selfless nature, which was
previously discarded as the absolute nothingness of appearance, is not
so sudden. Re-appropriated from the perspective of self-consciousness,
Hegel’s remark about the animals eating from the earth also makes clear
that the presumably evident nothingness of appearance, i.e., the subjec-
tive certitude of self-certainty, is in fact not absolute at all, but the result
of negating nature by consuming it. To show that I am not overanalyzing
Hegel here, let us have a look at the following quote:
In the first moment there is the existent shape; as being for itself, or being in
its determinateness infinite substance, it comes forward in antithesis to the
universal substance, disowns this fluent continuity with it and asserts that it
is not dissolved in this universal element, but on the contrary preserves itself
by separating itself from this its inorganic nature, and by consuming it.19
Here Hegel speaks about the consuming of inorganic nature exactly in
the sense that the living being preserves its independency “by separating
itself from this its inorganic nature”. Although we clearly see that this rela-
tion to inorganic nature describes a relation of neediness, i.e., dependency
from nature, for the living being, the whole point of consuming is to reject
nature. Yet, this implies, on the one hand, that the living being is only
independent from its nature as far as it fulfills this negation. On the other
hand, however, it is impossible to fulfill the negation through consuming
nature because the movement of negation determines the independency
of life; henceforth, the negation must be such that the negated is at the
same time preserved. In relating to nature as something that has to be
consumed, this is not the case:
What is consumed is the essence: the individuality which maintains itself at
the expense of the universal, and which gives itself the feeling of its unity
with itself, just by so doing supersedes its antithesis to the other by means of
which it exists for itself. Its self-given unity with itself is just that fluidity
of the differences or their general dissolution.20
For a living being, whose existence depends on nature, nature is essential.
This truth is the opposite of the subjective certitude of the desire, viz. that
nature is unessential. Holding on to this certitude, the self will continu-
ously experience nature as something hostile: To exist, it must prove that
nature is unessential through negating it, but this very activity is in itself
a dependency from nature, so nature will inevitably return as this oppos-
ing hostile essence that must be negated again. Entangled in the irresolv-
able contradiction, desire is unable to become aware of the fact that this
negating is the movement of life in-itself. Therefore, for us, the shape of
desire turns out to be immediately related to nature, i.e., to a satisfaction
of needs which it is unable to sublate, precisely because desire excludes
any dependency from nature.
Systematically, it is of the utmost importance that this specific emphasis
on the life of self-consciousness has the implication that self-consciousness’
tautology, or identity-with-itself, is not immediately true for self-conscious-
ness, but the result of a negation. This negation is neither the self-negation
19 GW 9, 107; Miller, 107.

20 GW 9, 108; Miller, 108.
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of the species’ individual, nor that of consuming nature, nor nature negat-
ing us. The nature of self-conscious life is that it does not exclude anything
by negating. In that regard, it is incomparable to the species because, for
the species, the relative independency of inorganic nature is not recog-
nized as such. The only negation that can satisfy self-consciousness, i.e.,
that can objectify the truth of its subjective self-certainty, is the negation
which has as a result that inorganic nature cannot be negated; and, that
the self ’s essence must be the same as the essence of nature. In other
words, nature must have a self, too. Here, the result of the consciousness
chapter returns for the third time, but from a completely opposite per-
spective: The self of inorganic nature, i.e., the subject, is not the self of
self-certainty, but the other self.
In this context, Hegel brings up that “Self-consciousness achieves its
satisfaction only in another self-consciousness”.21 Although this is, no doubt,
one of the most famous phrases from Hegel’s PhoS, I hope that my analysis
until now makes clear that the content that is expressed here is far from
unambiguous, even far from a clear-cut solution to the problem which
we are facing: the identity of the self. Of course, the obvious importance
of this sentence is that the existence of another self is crucial to the exis-
tence of self-consciousness, but it is often overlooked that the necessity
of the existence of another self-consciousness has no other ground than
self-consciousness’ dependency from nature. But, this very fact makes the
necessity of the other self-consciousness ambiguous. Self-consciousness
turns out to be doubled in itself, i.e., it contains real difference within itself.
This duplicity of self-consciousness fundamentally differs from the mani-
fold of individuals of the species because the self-conscious individuals
are not immediately dissolved into the self-subsisting unity of the species,
but they remain infinitely opposed to each other as different individuals.
Their unity, and henceforth the unity of self-consciousness as such, is
mediated in-itself.
At this point, we are able to clear out one of the most common misun-
derstandings—from Gadamer to Honneth—about the self-consciousness
chapter in the PhoS: At the level of self-consciousness, it makes no sense
to speak about self-conscious individuals. Just as Kant in the CPuR, Hegel
deals here with the general form of self-consciousness, which has noth-
ing to do with concrete individuals. The duplicity of self-consciousness is
also not expressed in the manifold of individuals, but in the fact that self-
21 GW 9, 111; Miller, 110.

consciousness has the logical structure of being in-itself a relation to oth-

erness. Consequently, the other self of self-consciousness is not another
individual, but the sublation of nature in the form of otherness. We have
seen that the self of self-consciousness can only exist through negating
nature, but also that it is not capable of achieving this. So, desire is unable
to realize its certainty, unless it is faced with a reality in which nature is
already sublated. The other self-consciousness presents this reality, and
precisely, therefore, it satisfies self-consciousness.
Notwithstanding the fact that Hegel speaks about satisfaction, as if self-
consciousness still exists as desire, the only logical conclusion of this ‘sat-
isfaction’ is that the contradiction of desire is now for desire, itself. The
self-certainty of self-consciousness is definitively disproven, and Hegel
must come up with another shape of self-consciousness which integrates
the insight that we have just gained. This new shape of self-consciousness,
which will turn out to be the adequate spiritual shape, is recognition.
5. The Lord/Bondsman Relation
Halfway through the self-consciousness chapter, Hegel thus concludes

that the first attempt to think the substance as self-consciousness, viz. as
the immediate unity of being and subject in the shape of a self-positing
subject, the ‘I am I’, fails because this ‘I’ has the shape of desire; and, desire
is an contradiction. However, consistent with Hegel’s logic of determined
negation, the negative result of this refutation can be taken up as a new
shape for self-consciousness, which Hegel calls recognition. This new certi-
tude is promisingly described by Hegel as the “turning point” of conscious-
ness because here, for the first time, consciousness “steps out into the
spiritual daylight of the present”.22 In the way in which Hegel expresses
himself, it again becomes clear what the goal of his entire undertaking
is: Self-consciousness must be conceived as the essence of conscious-
ness. This fundamentally means that the absolute self ’s dependency from
nature must be articulated in a manner that does not compromise the
absoluteness of the self ’s subsistence.
Hopefully, we now have acquired a better understanding of what Hegel
means when he defines recognition as the fact that “Self-consciousness
exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another”.23
22 GW 9, 113; Miller, 110–111.

23 GW 9, 114; Miller, 111.
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The new subjective certitude of self-consciousness that it exists only in rela-

tion to another self-consciousness, i.e., as recognized, is the logical result
of the self-certainty of self-consciousness in the sense that the implicit
assumption of self-certainty, viz. that self-consciousness is the essence of
consciousness, now becomes the explicit content for self-consciousness.
In other words, although it is clear for us that self-consciousness is in-
itself sublated nature—a fact that, so far, can only be acknowledged by
the reader of the PhoS—can only become explicit within a relation of
recognition. We also already know why this is the case. It is impossible for
the self to negate nature through exclusion because nature is a moment
of its existence; but, for the self-subsistence of self-consciousness, nature
must be unessential; therefore, self ’s existence is both essential and unes-
sential to the self-subsistence of the self. Consequently, the self-subsisting
essence of existence is self ’s absolute other, through which the self is itself.
In other words, in the other as other, the self is one with itself. This abso-
lute other thus is not simply another self-conscious individual, as some
interpreters think, but is the transcendent self-subsisting of existence,
and existence must negate itself to become aware of its self-subsistence
as spirit.
Recognition is the identity of the self explicated as a relation to abso-
lute otherness. The part of the self-consciousness chapter that is called
“Lordship and bondage” is dedicated to showing that this identity is a
purely logical relation which can only be represented indirectly. I realize
that this interpretation of the lord/bondsman relation sounds surprising,
especially to those who believe that the lord and the bondsman refer to
concrete individuals, but nonetheless, it follows irrefutably from the logi-
cal development of the PhoS. Most interpreters acknowledge that Hegel’s
position is that self-consciousness can only exist under the condition
of social order. This social order is fundamentally characterized by two
‘social roles’. Firstly, we have the role of the bondsman. The bondsman
is the self-consciousness that serves the other self-consciousness, i.e., it
satisfies the other’s needs, so that the other is no longer opposed by nature
(as desire was). This other self-consciousness has, secondly, the role of the
lord. The lord rules over the bondsman and uses him to work nature, so
that the lord is able to enjoy it.
To this extent, I have drawn a familiar picture, but a fact that is often
overlooked in this picture is that the lord’s mastery over the bondsman
also makes him the ruler of nature. Precisely this feature of the lord is the
key to understand what is at stake here. We have seen that, in the shape
of recognition, the other self-consciousness is not an undetermined other,
but is sublated nature. This knowledge is for us, but still has to become
knowledge of self-consciousness because the very essence of self-consciousness
is defined as being in the possession of this knowledge. Factually, the lord/
bondsman relation articulates that the ‘satisfaction of self-consciousness’
consists of a differentiation between labor and enjoyment which is a clas-
sical Aristotelian distinction, but these are not just concrete activities.
Since they are the activities of a free and spiritual being, we could say
that enjoyment and labor metaphorically express, respectively, the pure
and impure reality of absolute freedom. I will call the pure reality of
absolute freedom ‘subsistence’ and the impure reality of it ‘existence’.24
Together, they constitute the absolute essence of human nature. On the
one hand, they form a dialectical opposition; on the other, they are an
absolute difference within the oneness of substance.
Therefore, the division between lord and bondsman as two shapes
that together define the essence of self-consciousness, principally solve
the fundamental question of the PhoS: how to think the unity of oneness
and difference? The first part of the self-consciousness chapter has left us
with the insight that unity—not a unity, but unity as such—is sublated
nature which, on the one hand, means that nature is negated, but on the
other hand, self-consciousness’ dependence on nature is made explicit.
Nature cannot be negated and made explicit at the same moment, so both
sides must be divided over different shapes. Logically, this follows from
the result that the self of self-certainty could not realize itself immediately.
The self-subsisting essence of the self must be understood as a mediation,
which qua form, already implies a relation consisting of two moments.
What is new, however, in the “Lordship and bondage” passage in the
PhoS is that this truth has to be obtained by self-consciousness. There-
fore, in the reconstruction of the experience of self-consciousness, Hegel
repeats the logical development from immediacy to mediation. Of
course, we know beforehand that the attempt to realize the subjective
24 Hegel does not distinguish between existence and subsistence. He speaks about rea-
son that realizes itself. In this context, ‘substance’ refers the whole of reason; not only
reason that expresses itself, but also to the reason’s returning back to itself. The ‘reality’
of reason is in the end not the same as the ‘reality’ of reason’s realization; or to put it
differently, reason is not the same as its realization. To my taste, to express this crucial,
often overseen difference between the absolute and its realization in English without los-
ing the clarity of Hegel’s German language, it is acceptable to reformulate the intended
conceptual distinction with new terms. Consequently, I will use the term ‘subsistence’ to
indicate the reality of the absolute as such, i.e., the substantiality of the in-and-for-itself,
and I distinguish it from the self-realization of the absolute which I will call ‘existence’.
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certitude of recognition immediately will necessarily fail, but only through

the experience of this failure can self-consciousness obtain the truth of
recognition.
The first shape in which self-consciousness tries to realize itself is in
the “trail by death”.25 The trail by death is an engagement between self-
consciousnesses in which they fight until one of the self-consciousnesses
dies. Again, this is not to be taken literally, but as imaginative construc-
tion that has to help us to understand the more abstract and unimagi-
nable logical development that it expresses. From an external standpoint,
the one self-consciousness recognizes the other as other to the extent
that the nature, which has to be killed, is conceived as something identi-
cal to the self. However, the otherness of the other self-consciousness is
only expressed insofar as it is negated. In the actual killing of the other
self-consciousness, which should be the affirmation of the initial certitude
that the other is also a self, the other ceases to be a self and the certitude is
contradicted.
Instead of endlessly wracking our brains about why the otherness of the
other can only be experienced in the killing of the other, we should focus
on the underlying logical problem, which is crystal clear. Hegel points
out that the characteristic of the trail by death is self-consciousness’ will-
ingness to put its life at stake. Self-consciousness trying to realize itself
immediately as sublated nature means that it no longer tries to prove that
nature is unessential otherness, as desire did, but takes otherness to be
something which negates itself. We know, however, that the self-negation
of the other presupposes the negation of the self, because in this relation
the self could only take the other as self-negating insofar as it has put its
own life at stake. As a result, self-consciousness has no experience and no
knowledge of the fact that it has put its life at stake.
Therefore, the systematic problem of the trail by death is the fact that
the otherness of the other is recognized because self-consciousness is
self-negation; but at the same instance, this recognition is immediately
negated; so, it cannot become an explicit content for self-consciousness.26
Self-consciousness has now also experienced that it is impossible to real-
ize its certitude—to be sublated nature—immediately, but it does not yet
know the truth of this experience, viz. the fact that the negation of the
25 GW 9, 119; Miller, 114.

26 As a result, it is senseless to speak about the “struggle for recognition” as an actual
struggle between self-conscious individuals, as Honneth (2008) does.
other is a self-negation, because in the negation of the other, the other-

ness is not preserved. Nonetheless, self-consciousness must go through
the experience of a trail by death, because nature can only be sublated
by the experience of the inessentiality of life. For us, it is clear that this
inessentiality of life is the result of a self-negation, and thus presupposes
the essentiality of life.
What does this essentiality of life mean here? The truth of self-
consciousness is not the existence of self-consciousness, but that its sub-
sistence determines what self-consciousness in-itself is. This is the essence
of spirit, which Hegel calls “freedom”. Still, subsistence comprises exis-
tence in superseding it, and the negation of existence is a self-negation. In
the transitory movement in which self-consciousness becomes that which
it is in-itself—sublated nature—, the essentiality of life is preserved as
that which is overcome in the representation of self-consciousness as sub-
lated nature. This is a threefold movement. Firstly, since sublated nature
is not a given, but is the result of a movement of self-consciousness, it is
outside self-consciousness; as this outside, it is nonetheless the essence
of self-consciousness; henceforth, self-consciousness exists in-itself out-
side of itself, i.e., it is in the other. This is not surprising for us, because
this is exactly the definition of recognition. Therefore, secondly, it is the
experience of the essentiality of life—that is thus sublated in the other—
that makes it is possible for consciousness to actually displace itself in
the other, and take the other instead of himself to be the essence of self-
consciousness. Thirdly, this being-in-otherness is the transcendent sub-
sistence of the existence of self-consciousness and, as such, the essence
of self-consciousness only subsists through this movement of becoming
other than itself.
In the lord/bondsman relation, Hegel unfolds this fundamental move-
ment in its entirety for the first time because, 1) the lord represents the
power over nature; 2) as such it represents the essence of the bondsman;
3) the bondsman’s representation of its essence being outside of itself, viz.
as the lord, is again essential to the very subsistence of the lord. As such, it
explicitly contains, in my view, the whole movement of spirit, but in a highly
undifferentiated way.27 This means that in the lord/bondsman relation
27 I do realize that to say that the whole is present in this part of his philosophy is kind
of a sweeping statement because, according to the adage of systematic philosophy, ‘the
parts presuppose the whole, and the whole presupposes the parts’; so, it is quite evident
that even the smallest part implicitly contains the whole. What I mean to say is that here
we can understand what the whole of spirit actually is.
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no moment of the self-movement of absolute spirit is left out or excluded.

At most, we can say that the essential differentiatedness of being-in-itself,
which is experienced as such here, is comprised in the lord/bondsman
relation in one mode of existence, which means that in the representation
of freedom as the lord, the reality of freedom is exclusively connected
with one specific social order. At the end of this paper, I will briefly dis-
cuss this point, although it certainly needs further clarification.
The self-negation of consciousness, which is the presupposition of
self-consciousness, is experienced in the “fear of death”.28 Building fur-
ther on the imagery of the trail by death, Hegel asks us to visualize a self-
consciousness that, without knowing it, puts its life at stake and loses the
struggle. In this case, self-consciousness experiences that its initial cer-
titude that its life was unimportant to it is wrong, because without its
life, it ceases to be a self, and goes asunder in the power of nature. The
self-consciousness has no way of knowing what holds power over it, so it
is impossible that self-consciousness experiences the power of the other
self-consciousness. In fact, it is clear that not the other self-consciousness,
but nature, has this hold over him. Ultimately, it is not confronted with
the power of the other self-consciousness, but with its mortality.
In the manifestation of its mortality, self-consciousness experiences its
dependency on nature. Because self-consciousness does not yet possess
any positive sense of self, such as one of embodiment, this experience is
purely negative: Self-consciousness not only experiences its body solely in
its possible destruction, but also, whereas this fact disproves its initial cer-
titude that life has no importance to it, self-consciousness’ first reaction
is to alienate itself from this bodily existence and regard it as inessen-
tial. However, it is no longer possible for self-consciousness to maintain
that its own existence is independent from nature. To preserve its self,
consciousness must negate its existence altogether, and take up the posi-
tion that the essence of its existence subsists in the other. As a result, the
self-consciousness that experiences the fear of death in the trail by death
will subject itself to the other self-consciousness because it sees its own
essence in the other.
From an outside perspective, we see that the life of the self-conscious-
ness is, indeed, in the hands of the other self-consciousness; and that it
holds this power because it has put its life at stake, which means that
it takes itself to be sublated nature. On the one hand, the desire to realize
28 GW 9, 125; Miller, 117.

this certainty, which could not be satisfied on the level of the trail by death,
is now satisfied by the subjection of the serving consciousness because the
latter’s bondage sublates nature in taking the other self-consciousness as
its essence. So, precisely because the bondsman negates itself, the other
self-consciousness can appear as sublated nature, i.e., as the lord or the
bondsman’s essence, thus giving the bondsman its compelling reason
to subject to the lord. This situation, in which two self-consciousnesses
hold each other in place, can never be the result of a linear or chrono-
logical development: In this specific sense, the distinction between lord
and bondsman is a dialectical one. Again, it is Hegel’s construction: The
subjection takes place because the other appears as sublated nature; yet
the other is sublated nature precisely because subjection takes place. Lord
and bondsman presuppose each other, and the purpose of this metaphor
for mutual dependency is to explicate the truth of self-consciousness.
The metaphor of the lord and bondsman primarily functions to clar-
ify the fact that self-consciousness is a self-negation, meaning that con-
sciousness can only be thought without contradiction as a finite existence,
which nonetheless transcends its finiteness insofar as it subjects itself
to the infinite self-subsisting form, i.e., freedom. To further understand
what it means to take freedom as the sublation of nature, it is useful to
compare it to Hegel’s understanding of organic life as a species. As a spe-
cies, life can survive the death of the individual exemplars through repro-
duction. In this regard, organic life is in-itself infinite in the sense that
it has overcome the absolute power of nature, which takes the shape of
death. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Hegel uses the term ‘subjection’
when he describes the relation between the individuals and the species:
If we distinguish more exactly the moments contained here, we see that we
have, as the first moment, the subsistence of the independent shapes, or
the suppression of what diremption is in itself, viz. that the shapes have no
being in themselves, no enduring existence. The second moment, however,
is the subjection of that existence to the infinity of the difference.29
The first moment, the “suppression” of difference, is the negation of other-
ness, which was exemplified by the ‘consumption’. The individual exemplar
of the species must suppress nature to maintain itself, and in that sense, it
is its existence’s subsistence, but because every living organism will ulti-
mately lose this battle against nature, this subsistence has no endurance.
To the exemplar of the species, however, nature’s manifestation as a death
29 GW 9, 107; Miller, 107.

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force is not an alien force, because insofar the death of the individual is
the condition for the reproduction of the species it has become a moment
in the continuity of the species as a whole.
Therefore, the subsistence of the individual’s existence is not this exis-
tence in-itself, but the transcendent unity of the species. However, as Hegel
has already pointed out, the species does only subsist as the manifold of
individuals. So the species—and this goes for all organic nature—does not
exist independently from nature, but it is able to persist, given the forces
of nature.30 Hegel’s analysis that the individual’s existence subsists as the
species also means that the species is not a transcendent entity besides
nature. When Hegel expresses that the subsistence is “the subjection of
that existence to the infinity of the difference”, he articulates the fact that
the species exists as the negation of nature (as a force) too, but expres-
sively, i.e., nature is negated and preserved in the subsistence. In other
words, the infinite form does not exist without its finite realization.
Applied to the lord/bondsman relation, we finally see the essential
point of the bondsman’s subjection to the lord, and why Hegel calls it the
turning point of consciousness. The problem of the species was that it
was not able to really preserve nature in its negation because the species
does not actualize its subsistence consciously. The bondsman’s subjection
to the lord describes the same subjection as the one to the species, but
from the perspective of consciousness. The bondsman who subjects to the
lord, in fact, subjects to the same infinite of difference, but this time as
consciousness, meaning that the bondsman is the consciousness that has
felt the infiniteness of difference as such, i.e., it has felt that it is impos-
sible to exclude nature. Of course, this insight is still only for us and not
for consciousness itself, but consciousness at least has experienced that
nature exists as something in itself.
This experience, which has already been described as the fear of death,
makes clear that self-consciousness can only exist under the condition
of a social order. Still, the absolute power, which Hegel attributes to the
lord, is not to be understood as a new external force that represses
the consciousness of the bondsman. The sole reason that this social order
must exist is the fact that the power of nature has to be overcome in
order for self-consciousness to exist. In other words, Hegel’s point is that
30 To put it more simply: For its existence, an organism depends on a specific configu-
ration of physical laws, but the whole of this organism cannot be reduced to the whole
of physical laws.
the very existence of self-consciousness presents us with the fact that we

are no longer subjected to the power of nature, but to the power that has
overcome the power of nature. Of course, the power of nature cannot
be cancelled out: The power of nature, in the form of death, is absolute
and unavoidable, as well. Also, we have already seen that the lord can
only manifest itself as lord, i.e., as sublated nature, because the bondsman
mediated between him and nature. This gives rise to the question: In what
sense can we actually overcome nature?
This brings us finally to the metaphysical purport of the self-consciousness
chapter. So far, we have seen that the lord/bondsman relation, when put
in metaphysical terms, envelops the idea that the substance does not exist
independently from what its finite realization entails. This relation can be
described as one between subsistence and existence, i.e., subsistence is
not independent from existence, but is only as the essence of existence.
Furthermore, this relation is a pure self-relation, i.e. the subsistence
expresses nothing more than that which existence in itself is. So subsis-
tence depends on existence, precisely because it is, in actu, the articula-
tion of what existence in itself is. Nature is sublated in the comprehension
of nature in itself. Self-consciousness subsists in the knowledge of its exis-
tence. In the consciousness of ourselves as self-conscious beings that also
have a body, i.e., that are also natural beings under the reign of death, we
maintain ourselves as substance. In other words, we subsist in the insight
that we are the unity of mind and body, and that there is no mind without
a body, and no body without a mind.
Conclusion
The philosophical knowledge, which consists in the self-knowledge of the

subject, is distinguished from the Kantian transcendental subject in the sense
that it encompasses sensible intuition. However, sensible intuition is not
encompassed within the subject, in the sense that there is an intellectual
subject which posits sensible nature, as if sensible nature is merely the
product of a self-positing subject. We have seen that such a self-positing
subject, or the ‘I am I’, cannot be thought without contradiction because
it excludes nature rather than produces it.
In this way, Hegel develops his notion of self-consciousness well beyond
Kant’s problematic idea of self-consciousness as the transcendental ‘I’, but
nonetheless, preserves one very important element of Kant’s analysis. Just
as does Kant, Hegel maintains the idea that sensible nature, in relation to
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the subject’s existence, has a relatively independent existence. It would

absurd to attribute to Hegel the idea that ‘spirit’ means that we produce our
body through thinking. All we can do is comprehend our bodily existence.
Still, Hegel is more differentiated on this point than Kant. For Hegel, sen-
sible nature is not simply intuited, making the acknowledgment of its exis-
tence problematic (Hegel does not have to posit the Thing-in-itself ), but
as far as we can differentiate between lifeless nature and organic nature,
viz. through understanding lifeless nature as a moment of organic nature, we
are able to formulate an insight in our own bodily existence.
Just to be sure, this is not just a true insight; it is the only possible way
to think about nature philosophically. The most important implication
is a negative one: It is absolutely impossible to think inorganic nature as
something that has an existence independently from us, like most con-
temporary, empirically-oriented thinkers still do. Lifeless nature has no
self, or at least not a self that we are able to say anything about (I mean, if
God has created nature then He would be the self of nature, but this is not
a philosophical idea) but we can solely grant lifeless nature a relatively
independent existence insofar as we know that we need lifeless nature
to maintain ourselves. So, we can express lifeless nature’s independency
merely in terms of our own neediness as bodily beings. Nonetheless, it
is a form of knowledge. I think this knowledge has a transcendental sta-
tus, but not in exactly the same way as Kant’s subject is transcendental.
Comparable to Kant, Hegel’s self-consciousness, or subject, is transcen-
dental in the sense that it is the openness towards that which nature is in-
itself; but, Kant cannot think transcendental subject as openness towards
nature, as Hegel does; and therefore, Kant is forced to come up with his
surrogate theory about the categories of the understanding, which Hegel
so fiercely criticized in his SoL.
Finally, I want to make one brief consideration about my reading of the
self-consciousness chapter. I think this reading is convincing and sheds
a different light, not only on the importance of the PhoS to understand
Hegel’s entire philosophical position, but also on the overall metaphysical
position, which Hegel defends. However, I have briefly mentioned already
that one differentiation, which is also very important for Hegel’s position,
is not yet explicated in the lord/bondsman relation. In a way, although the
lord represents freedom as sublated nature, it still manifests itself histori-
cally as a power that is also natural. This aspect is important to understand
Hegel’s idea of historical development. For example, in ancient Egypt, the
lord was represented as the pharaoh, who was both man and god. As a
result, the lord was given contingent features, most importantly the fact
that the pharaoh is mortal. The highly sophisticated Egyptian death cult
shows how they somehow could not accept these contingent features, but
had not yet understood that the lord cannot be fully represented by any
objective experience.
Only at the level of the Greek Polis, i.e., after a significant historical
development, does this essential differentiation become explicit in the
distinction between divine law and human law. Of course, this distinction
is implicit in the lord/bondsman relation, but appears there as a contra-
diction: The transcendent essence of the lord cannot be unified with its
material appearance as this or that lord. Still, this problem, and Hegel’s
solution for it at the end of the PhoS, cannot be properly comprehended
without understanding the precise role of the self-consciousness chapter.
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D. Wilkins (2002), online source.
Cobben, P. (2003): The logical structure of self-consciousness. in: A. Denker, M. Vater
(Eds.), Hegel’s Phenomenology of spirit: New critical essays, Humanity Books, New York:
Amherst, 193–212.
—— (2009): The Nature of the Self: Recognition in the form of right and morality, Berlin/
New York: de Gruyter.
—— (2012): The Paradigm of Recognition: Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death, Bos-
ton-Leiden: Brill.
Fichte, J. G. (1794): Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift für seine
Zuhörer, hrsg. von F. Medicus, Hamburg: Meiner, 1997.
Giovanni, G. di (2010) Transl.: G. W. F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, Cambridge University
Press
Hegel, G. W. F.: Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, bisher 32 Bde., Hamburg: Meiner, 1968 ff.
Hollak, J. (1962): De structuur van Hegels Wijsbegeerte, in: Tijdschrift voor Philosophie (24),
Leuven, 351–403 & 524–614.
Honneth, A. (2008): Von der Begierde zur Anerkennung. Hegels Begründung von Selb-
stbewußtsein, in: K. Vieweg; W. Welsch (Hrsg.), Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes:
Ein kooperativer Kommentar zu einem Schlüsselwerk der Moderne, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Houlgate, S. (2005): An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd edition,
Oxford: Blackwell.
Hyppolite, J. (1946): Genèse et structure de la Phénoménology de l’esprit de Hegel, Paris.
Kant, I.: Akademieausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, bisher 29 Bde.,
Berlin 1900 ff.
Kesselring, T. (1981): Entwicklung und Widerspruch. Ein Vergleich zwischen Piagets
genetischer Erkenntnistheorie und Hegels Dialektik, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Kok, A. (2011): Sublimity, freedom, and necessity in the philosophy of Kant, in: D. Loose
(Ed.), The sublime and its teleology, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 79–114.
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—— (2013): Kant, Hegel, und die Frage der Metaphysik. Über die Möglichkeit der Philosophie
nach der kopernikanischen Wende, HegelForum Studien, München: Wilhelm Fink.
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Press.
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tiviteit: Kant, Hegel en Schelling over het Ik, Tilburg University Press, 3–31.
Pinkard, T. (1994): Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, Cambridge University
Press.
Pippin, R. (1989): Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Chapter Six
Recognition—future hegelian challenges

for a contemporary philosophical paradigm
Christian Krijnen
1. Hegel as a Challenge
Though it seems somewhat excessive to characterize the theory of recogni-

tion as a “well-established and mature research paradigm in philosophy”,1
it cannot be denied that for the past couple decades there has been
intensive debate about recognition which has commanded ever greater
attention.2 This debate began with topics in practical philosophy, espe-
cially political and social philosophy. As it developed, however, recogni-
tion has achieved thematically and historically such broad significance,
that a new philosophical paradigm indeed seems to be in the making:
Recognition turns out to be a fundamental concept, relevant not only for
understanding political issues, but for our human world as a whole. Hence,
the concept of recognition now includes such notions as subjectivity,
objectivity, rationality, knowledge, personality, sociality, identity, other-
ness, nature, logic, etc. The protagonists in this debate seek to make Ger-
man idealism fruitful for contemporary problems. Whereas neo-Kantians
a century ago also sought to update German idealism, though focussing
on Kant as the philosopher of modern culture,3 contemporary theorists of
recognition intend to rejuvenate Hegel’s philosophy.4
This attempt to return to Hegel exhibits rather divergent interpretations
of his philosophy, and also a remarkable turning away from Hegel’s mature
system, as outlined in his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften
of 1830. Hegel’s philosophical project of developing self-knowledge of the
idea through the three elements of pure thought, nature and spirit appears
1 Cf. Zurn 2010, 1.

2 Cf. for an overview, e.g., Schmidt am Busch (2010).
3 Heinrich Rickert published 1924 a book with this much-telling title. The title, of
course, suppresses how much of Hegel is effective in neo-Kantianism. Cf. for Hegel and
neo-Kantianism Krijnen (2008).
4 Cf. as placeholders for many Honneth (2001), Siep (2010a) and Cobben (2009b).
100 christian krijnen
to his critics just as unconvincing as, e.g., his non-dialogical, monologi-

cal, concept of rationality and normativity. By contrast, I shall argue that
Hegel as systematic philosopher confronts the contemporary paradigm of
recognition with difficult and far-reaching questions concerning its own
foundation, both methodologically and thematically. Consider first the
following background considerations.
According to the protagonists of recognition, the principle of recogni-
tion is central to Hegel’s practical philosophy in his Jena period, especially
in his unpublished “Geistphilosophie” (1805/6) and Phänomenologie des
Geistes (1807).5 Yet it can hardly be said that in these texts Hegel develops
a comprehensive theory of recognition. Hence it is little surprise to find
detailed, though independent attempts to interpret e.g. the Phänomenolo-
gie as the core of Hegel’s theory of recognition.6 And Hegel’s later philoso-
phy, as published in his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften
(1830) and the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), does not seem
to pay much attention to the principle of recognition (let alone the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition). It is subordinated to other, more embrac-
ing principles. Hegel’s later works are characterized by a relation to logic
very different to his early works. This reflects a further important contrast:
In his early works, Hegel, inspired by Kant, elaborated something like
‘practical philosophy’.7 Yet in the course of his intellectual development
Hegel criticized Kant’s moral philosophy and philosophy of religion ever
more radically. Hegel’s mature views present a philosophy of spirit which
seeks to overcome the opposition between theoretical and practical philos-
ophy, or more precisely: from the start it has already overcome that oppo-
sition. Unlike Hegel, however, the protagonists of recognition conceive
Hegel’s philosophy of spirit as ‘practical’ philosophy; indeed, ‘Hegel’s practi-
cal philosophy‘ functions, in various permutations, as a popular book title.8
5 Cf. influential studies like Siep (1979).

6 Cf. for instance Cobben (2009b), who, in order to hold his thesis, is forced to press
the Phänomenologie into a different programmatic corset and to ascribe to this work a
different place in Hegel’s system. Kok (2013) follows Cobben in this.
7 Cf. for the Kantianism of the young Hegel, e.g., Bondeli (1997), Fulda (2003, Teil I) and
Henrich (1971); for the development of the young Hegel cf. also Siep (2010a, 24–62).
8 Cf. e.g.: Siep 2010a; Pippin 2008; Rózsa 2005. As for many others, for Honneth too
Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit is “practical philosophy” (2001, 17 f., 41). Also Quante
follows this route; he emphasizes a “primacy of the practical” as Hegel’s “pragmatic” root
(2011, 238). Cf. also Quante 2011, 24 f.: Here Quante states that the free will is the basic
principle of Hegel’s “practical philosophy”, and 19 f. he is of the opinion that the “central
goal” of Hegel’s “whole practical philosophy” is to reconcile the tension between individual
interests and the ethical (sittlich) collectivity, i.e. to develop an “Aristotelian conception
recognition—future challenges 101
In contrast, Hegel’s Enzyklopädie conceives philosophy as philosophy of

the idea, and conceives of spirit in its objective dimension not as practi-
cal, but as free spirit, embedding the distinction between theoretical and
practical in a new, more fundamental constellation of philosophy of spirit.
It is essential to Hegel’s mature philosophy (both in the Logik and in his
philosophy of spirit) to sublate the traditional, pervasive and influential
distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, and between
the theoretical and the practical.
Hence it is unsurprising that many theorists of recognition favor Hegel’s
early philosophy, and regard his mature philosophy either (a) as insuffi-
cient for a philosophy of recognition, which must instead be developed,
e.g., from the Phänomenologie;9 or (b) as requiring considerable modifica-
tion to become relevant to contemporary philosophy. The first strategy
can at best conclude that, from a systematic point of view, there is a con-
tinuity concerning the theme of recognition in Hegel’s development. In
order to determine this continuity, however, certain perspectives of the
younger Hegel must guide the interpretation of Hegel’s mature philoso-
phy. This results in the view that Hegel’s later philosophy is retrograde
with respect to the Phänomenologie.10 On the second strategy, Hegel’s
view that philosophy and its disciplines should be determined within the
framework of a ‘system’ of philosophy, granting the Logik even a founda-
tional and guiding role for a contemporary philosophy of recognition, is
dismissed as ‘metaphysical’.11 Hegel is said to hold implausibly specula-
tive, metaphysical premises, together with a corresponding teleological
concept of history and a Euro- and Christocentrism which simply fail in
the face of today’s multicultural society.12
of moral philosophy (Ethik)” for “modern society”. Cf. on this also my footnote 39.—All
translations from German texts into English are mine.
9 Halbig et al. (2004b, 10) concurr that in the contemporary debate about Hegel’s
heritage, especially the Phänomenologie is central to efforts to revitalize Hegel’s views for
contemporary philosophy.
10 Cf. Cobben (2009b). Also Brandom is fascinated by Hegel’s Phänomenologie, most
notably he appreciates the tight connection between normativity and sociality, which
according to him Hegel conceives in terms of mutual recognition; Brandom gives Hegel’s
philosophy a neo-pragmatist coating (cf., e.g., 2006; 2005; 2002; 1999). Accordingly, he
reads Hegel’s text through (social)subjectivist glasses, which do not seem to fit to Hegel’s
objectivist orientation. Brandom too must restrict the role of the Logik for the system of
philosophy, and modify Hegel’s method of philosophical knowledge.
11 Cf., e.g., Honneth 2001; 1994.—Very critical about Hegel’s system is also Quante
(2011, chap. 3).
12 Cf. Siep 1979; 2010a; 2010c.
These general considerations are specified and corroborated by the

following three considerations: First, Hegel’s concept of philosophy as a
science of the absolute idea and its non-metaphysical character must be
considered more closely (§ 2). This provides the basis for showing that
and why Hegel’s philosophy is not practical philosophy (§ 3). Finally, both
two considerations highlight some significant features of embedding the
paradigm of recognition within Hegel’s philosophy of the idea (§ 4).
2. Speculative Idealism, not Metaphysics
I now consider critically two presuppositions of the recognition debate

from a Hegelian perspective. The first concerns the relation between
metaphysics, logic and the system of philosophy. The second concerns
the place of the Phänomenologie in Hegel’s philosophical system.
(1) Metaphysics can be conceived as fundamental knowledge transcend-
ing nature, or our experience of nature, insofar as metaphysics concerns
the basic, systematic structure of our concepts and their interconnections,
which we presuppose in thinking about objects, and the ontology implicit
in our conceptual scheme, which makes possible our thought of objects.
This conception of metaphysics is insufficient for understanding meta-
physics within German idealism, which is guided by a more determinate
concept of metaphysics, based upon the distinction between a metaphys-
ica generalis and a metaphysica specialis. Moreover, for Kant as for Hegel,
metaphysics has a thematic,13 and also a methodic determination,14 accord-
ing to which metaphysics is dogmatic insofar as it fails to reflect critically
upon its own foundations. Due to Kant’s critical analysis of metaphysics,
and from the perspective of the history of philosophy, Hegel (E, § 27)
brands metaphysics as “former metaphysics”. Although Hegel seeks to sur-
pass Kant’s transcendental philosophy through his speculative idealism,
Hegel does not restore metaphysics against Kant’s intentions.15
13 E.g. that metaphysics is about “supersensible” (übersinnliche) objects, capturing con-

ceptually objects “in-themselves” (Ansich), the “essence” (Wesen) of things.
14 Irrespective of whether metaphysics is described as a type of knowledge, lacking
“critique” (Kritik), as Kant puts it (cf. the prefaces and introduction of his Kritik der reinen
Vernunft), or as an “attitude of thought towards objectivity” which consists only in the
“perspective of understanding towards objects of reason” (Verstandes-Ansicht der Vernunft-
Gegenstände: E, § 27), which in a “naïve way” (E, § 26) supposedly obtains knowledge of
its objects, but in fact only sells “the determinations of thought as the fundamental deter-
minations of things” (E, § 28, cf. I, 46 f.).
15 As Fulda (1988; 1999; 2003; 2004a) has shown in detail.
Instead of reviving pre-Kantian metaphysics, in Hegel’s speculative ide-

alism the science of logic supercedes pre-Kantian, but now superfluous
metaphysics (cf. I, 46 with E, § 24). By conceiving of logic as the “genu-
ine” metaphysics (I, 5), Hegel gives metaphysics a thematic and methodic
significance very different to its pre-Kantian predecessors.16 At the same
time, Hegel deviates from Kant’s transcendental concepts of general and
special metaphysics. For Hegel, metaphysics should not take its determi-
nations as determinations of “substrates”, gathered from “representation”;
instead it considers the “nature” of the determinations of thought and their
“value” as such (an und für sich: I, 46 f.). In this context, Hegel states what
is methodologically essential: that in philosophical knowledge the “nature
of the content” itself “moves”; hence, the content itself “posits” and “gener-
ates” its determination (I, 6). Such a logic is no pre-Kantian metaphysics,
but a logic of the (absolute) idea; namely a logic that evolves itself through
an immanent process of determination, beginning with thought as the
indeterminate immediate (‘Being’, Sein) and completing this evolution by
comprehending its own evolution (‘absolute idea’). This self-movement
of the ‘concept’ must of course be a justified movement: it occurs in the
‘form of necessity’ (E, § 9). Already this suggests that, according to Hegel,
philosophy has only one content and object: the idea, more precisely: the
absolute idea (II, 484), i.e. the “concept which comprehends itself ” (sich
begreifende Begriff: II 504), the “absolute truth and all truth” (E, § 236, cf.
II, 484). Therefore, the idea is not a being (Seiendes). Instead, the absolute
idea proves itself to be the method, i.e. the processuality proper to the deter-
minations of pure thought, treated in the Logik, together with the system
of these thought-determinations. So conceived, philosophy does not
plague itself with substrates of representations, or any other ‘pre-given’;
the absolute idea contains all determinacy within itself (II, 484).
Containing all determinacy in itself, the idea is not exhausted merely as
a logical idea. Taking the whole of philosophy into account, the absolute
idea is addressed by Hegel in three perspectives of determination: within
pure thought, within nature and within spirit.17 Hence Hegel’s philo-
sophical program must include nature and spirit, i.e. the realms of reality,
16 For Stekeler-Weithofer, Hegel makes an “ontological turn” (2005, 155), leading from
the “critique of knowledge” (i.e. Kant) to a “critical ontology of meaning” (sinnkritischen
Ontologie: 2005, 153). Such ontological readings of Hegel nolens volens pave the way for
ontological misinterpretations of Hegel: As a critical ontology of meaning, ontology is no
longer what it used to be as an ontology. Quante too reads Hegel’s theory of rationality,
including the logic, as an ontology (cf. 2011, 23 f., 29, 31 f., 84, etc.).
17 Cf. for this and what follows: Krijnen 2008, 4.2.1.2.
within philosophy; they must be included in an immanent development

of the idea which acknowledges ‘experience’.18 The logic functions here as
the “foundation” of any natural or spiritual determination.19 Because of its
radical foundational role, Hegel qualified the logic as both the “first” and
the “last” science of the system of philosophy (II, 437). This implies, inter
alia, that each and every determination—whether empirical or philosoph-
ical determinations of nature and spirit, which fund the empirical—has
its basis in logic, while at the same time the logic is retained in the other
realms of the philosophical system as their foundation, and finally, at the
end of the system, logic becomes a logic that comprehends itself as a logic
that is the unity of nature and spirit, and, hence, is the grounding prin-
ciple of reality. By reaching this insight, philosophy—a figure (Gestalt) of
the absolute spirit—comprehends itself as truly a science of foundations,
or conversely: as truly a science of totality.20
Regarding Hegel’s programmatic conception of philosophy, I see
no reason to side with theorists of recognition who, in making Hegel’s
philosophy of right relevant today, argue that for “methodological” rea-
sons Hegel’s argumentation fails, because it rests on his logic, which
purportedly is fully unintelligible to us due to its “ontological” concept
of spirit.21 However, vague reference to the “theoretical and normative
conditions of the present age”22 hardly suffices for such a far-reaching
estimate of Hegel’s logic. To the contrary, any interpretation of Hegel’s
18 Immanent development is meant here as a methodological qualification. As far as

the content is concerned, speculative idealism, according to its self-understanding, is com-
mitted to the ‘fruitful bathos of experience’ (Kant). Hegel leaves neither the empirical
dimension nor the history of philosophy aside: he acknowledges empirical and philosophi-
cal knowledge as material, but he (trans)forms this material to conform with the knowl-
edge claim of his speculative philosophy and the methodology belonging to it. Cf. Krijnen
2008, 190 ff.
19 II, 224, cf. Hegel TWA, Bd. 8, § 24, Z 1. Hegel denotes the logic also as the “pure
figure” (reine Gestalt) of the “intellectual view of the universe” (I, 31) as well as “inner
figurator” (inneren Bildner) and “pre-figurator” (Vorbildner: II, 231) of his philosophy of
reality (Realphilosophie).
20 Cf. for the logic as the last science: Krijnen 2008, 4.2.3, esp. pp. 228 ff. The absolute
spirit is, however, not just “the spirit which knows that it has to appear in the finite life that
Hegel conceives of as world history” (Kok 2013, § 6.8.3); the “transcendental openness” for
which Kok pleads does not cover Hegel’s concept of absolute spirit. Absolute spirit entails
a specific closure of spirit; Hegel thinks openness and closure together in such a way that
this unity is not only a “unity of spirit and nature”, but a unity of the idea, nature and spirit.
From the perspective of the history of philosophy, philosophy is a particular (jeweiliges)
knowledge of totality; cf. Krijnen 2008, chap. 4; 2010.
21 Honneth 2001, 12 ff.
22 Honneth 2001, 13 f.
concept of objective spirit which neglects its relation to Hegel’s system of

philosophy, neglects essential determinations of Hegel’s concept of phi-
losophy.23 Hegel himself understands his Rechtsphilosophie as an elabo-
ration of his philosophy of objective spirit (E, § 487 A; cf. §§ 483–552).24
Accordingly he also notes that the Rechtsphilosophie borrows its method
from the Logik (R, §§ 2 Z with 31):25 The Logik plays a fundamental role
for the Rechtsphilosophie, both as such and concerning its specific content.
The elaboration of the Rechtsphilosophie follows the developmental pro-
cess of self-knowledge of the absolute idea as absolute spirit.26 In accord
with the logic of a speculative development of concepts, the beginning of
the philosophy of objective spirit must concern a concept of spirit that
is maximally extrinsic to the concept attained by subjective spirit: ‘right’
(Recht, ius, justice).27 Hegel overcomes the outwardness of the idea within
23 By contrast, for Honneth it is important that the “genuine” (eigentliche) substance”

of Hegel’s philosophy of right can be provided by an account of objective spirit that does
not refer to Hegel’s system of philosophy (2001, 14 f.).
24 Vgl. R, § 2: “Die Rechtswissenschaft ist ein Teil der Philosophie. Sie hat daher die
Idee [. . .] aus dem Begriffe zu entwickeln oder, was dasselbe ist, der eigenen immanenten
Entwicklung der Sache selbst zuzusehen.”
25 Generally, Hegel’s two philosophies of reality regard their object as necessarily con-
forming to the “self-determination of the concept” (E, § 246).
26 Hence, as a spirit that has not been reached within the philosophy of objective spirit.
Objective spirit is a finite spirit, not a cognitive self-relation. Only in absolute spirit is a
figure of knowledge reached “in which knowing reason [is] free for itself ” (E, § 552). The
concept of spirit, and hence also the concept of the absolute idea, is actualized only with
the concept of absolute spirit.—Cobben (2009b, 137, cf. 143) is surprised that regarding
absolute spirit there is a considerable difference between Hegel’s Phänomenologie and his
Rechtsphilosophie: in the latter, absolute spirit plays no role on the level of social institu-
tions. According to me, this absence of the absolute spirit fits well to Hegel’s program
of philosophy as self-knowledge of the absolute idea as absolute spirit: it results from
the function absolute spirit has within Hegel’s system of philosophy. That is why—pace
Cobben (2009b, 148)—Hegel does not conceive right and morality as “objective and abso-
lute spirit”. For Hegel, right and morality are both figures of objective spirit, because they
are, unlike the absolute spirit, not forms of self-knowledge of spirit as spirit. For Cobben
the “logical structure” of the Rechtsphilosophie cannot be understood without considering
Hegel’s intention to connect the epochs of European history with corresponding forms
of the self (2009b, 8, cf. Chap. 7–9). In his Enzyklopädie, however, Hegel himself takes a
different tack. Whereas for Cobben the Rechtsphilosophie is to be understood as an elab-
oration of the rationality developed in the Phänomenologie (2009b, 116), within Hegel’s
system of philosophy the Rechtsphilosophie is an objectivation of free spirit, i.e. of the
final stage of subjective spirit. Here, Hegel shows that and how spirit can be a knowing
spirit, both theoretically and practically: Spirit must be free spirit, a spirit that “knows”
and “wants” itself as free (E, § 482). Such a spirit is autonomous in the sense that it can
determine itself. This spirit is free, but pre-social and pre-individual, as sociality and indi-
viduality (of subjects) play no role prior to the philosophy of objective spirit.
27 More precisely, abstract right as the existence (Dasein) of freedom in the form of pos-
session. According to Hegel’s concept of right, the concept of right, as existence of the
objective spirit by realizing (realisieren) this concept of right, by making

explicit the abstract generality of that concept as the beginning of series
of meanings (II, 488 ff. with 241; E, § 84).28
(2) The philosophical system outlined by the mature Hegel, oriented
towards self-knowledge of the idea, also entails that the Phänomenologie
des Geistes is demoted as a paradigm of philosophy. This demotion not
only strikes the introductory function of the Phänomenologie,29 but also
the (partial) integration of this work in the Enzyklopädie.
When the Phänomenologie appeared, for Hegel it had the function of
an introduction within the system of science, especially in its founda-
tional discipline: in the logic (cf. I, 7 f.). Whereas Hegel first conceived
of the Phänomenologie as the first part of the system, later the Phänom-
enologie no longer functioned as an introduction to, nor first part of,
the system.30 Hegel even excludes the Phänomenologie from the order
of the system, insofar he integrates essential parts of the Phänomenologie
into the philosophy of subjective spirit in the Enzyklopädie. In addition,
the Enzyklopädie obtains a new introduction (E, §§ 1–18), and the logic
of the Enzyklopädie even an introduction of its own (E, §§ 19–83). The
Phänomenologie, within the system outlined by the Enzyklopädie, surely
does not have the task of introducing us into philosophy. Hegel sometimes
writes of the Phänomenologie as a superfluous introduction into the logic,31
though he never fully gave up the introductory role of the Phänomenologie
des Geistes (he holds to it even in the second edition of his Seinslogik of
1832):32 Non-philosophical consciousness (natürliches Bewußtsein) retains
its right to be led to the standpoint of speculative philosophy.
free will that has freedom as its “inner determination and goal”, must be actualized in an
“external pre-given objectivity”, so that the concept is perfected as “idea” (E, §§ 483 f.). In
the beginning of this process, the subjectivity of free spirit does not manifest itself in a free
spirit, but in an external matter (äußerlichen Sache) in which “I” put my “will” (E, §§ 488
f.). Cf. Krijnen 2012b.
28 Against this background of Hegel’s conception of philosophical justification, the jus-
tificatory status of “social pathologies”, which is extremely important to Honneth (2001,
16 f., 49 ff.; 2008), is just as problematic as his conception of philosophical foundations of
reality. Cf. Krijnen 2011a, 189 ff.
29 Cf. in detail Krijnen 2008, 59 ff. with 90 ff.
30 Cf., e.g., Bonsiepen (1988, L ff.) and Jaeschke (2003, 180 (§ 6)) about the place of the
Phänomenologie in Hegel’s intellectual development.
31 According to Hegel, an introduction via the route of a self-completing skepticism—
i.e. the route of the Phänomenologie—is ‘unpleasant’ and ‘superfluous’ (E, § 78 A).
32 Cf. 1990, 9 (footnote); I, 29 ff., 53; cf. the note to the second edition of the Phänom-
enologie (PG, 448).
Furthermore, the Logik is capable of justifying itself: The “concept of sci-

ence” results from the Logik itself (I, 29); the determination of the method
of philosophy is part of the Logik, whereas the Phänomenologie turns out
only to be an “example” of this method (I, 35). Although the Phänom-
enologie might serve as a possible route to the Logik, the Phänomenologie
is not constitutive for the Logik in the sense of a necessary condition for
its standpoint.33 The section ‘With what must science begin?’ (I, 51–65)
makes clear that the Phänomenologie cannot serve as the beginning of the
Logik, because the opposition between consciousness and object (as well
as that between thematized (‘for it’) and thematizing (‘for us’) conscious-
ness), constitutive for the Phänomenologie as an introduction, contains
too many presuppositions. Science must begin with (pure) ‘being’ (Sein),
regardless of whether one reaches the Logik by the Phänomenologie or by
what Hegel’s calls a ‘decision’ or ‘resolution’ (Entschluß: I, 52–54).
A look at the Phänomenologie within the Enzyklopädie (E, §§ 413–439)
shows significant differences to the Phänomenologie of 1807, also sub-
stantiating my thesis that Hegel downgrades the Phänomenologie. In first
instance, this concerns the different embedding and focus of the develop-
ment: The Phänomenologie of 1807 aims to examine appearances of true
knowledge in order that subsequent forms of its appearance introduce
natural consciousness into a scientific philosophy as pure, comprehend-
ing knowledge.34 This introduction departs from the basic opposition of
Hegel’s time: the opposition between subjectivity on the one side and that
which restricts this subjectivity on the other: the subject-object dualism.
The paradigmatic figure of this opposition, both for common sense and
for philosophy, is consciousness.35 At the end of the history of its edu-
cation, in “absolute knowledge” (PG, 422–433), consciousness has over-
come subject-object dualism. The appearing knowledge becomes actual,
it becomes philosophical knowledge. This knowledge, then, is developed
in the system of philosophy; the Phänomenologie concludes with only an
immediate knowledge of the absolute.
33 Kok (2013, § 4.2.1 f.) is of a different opinion. Concerning Hegel’ system, Kok takes the
Phänomenologie to be necessary for introductory and foundational reasons. However, Kok’s
argumentation considers neither Hegel’s elaborations of the self-foundational capacity of
the Logik, nor Hegel’s remarks about the deficient argumentative (called räsonieren) and
historical character of ‘introductions’ (cf. Krijnen 2008, 62 f.).
34 Hegel presents the program of the Phänomenologie mainly in the Introduction (PG,
53–62). For recent literature, cf. for instance Fulda (2003, 81 ff.; 2008).
35 Hegel’s Phänomenologie therefore is shaped as a “science of consciousness” (PG, 61)
which is a science of “knowing as it appears” (PG, 434).
In the system of philosophy, this absolute proves itself to be the abso-

lute idea. For Hegel, the absolute idea is the only theme of philosophy.
Hence, philosophy is “presentation of the idea” (E, § 18). The Phänome-
nologie, however, only concerns consciousness, i.e. a specific aspect of the
idea, as a case of application of the philosophical method. In his Enzyk-
lopädie, Hegel treats consciousness in this narrow sense; accordingly, in
his philosophy of subjective spirit he positioned consciousness as a link
between ‘anthropology’ and ‘psychology’ (E, §§ 413 ff.). From this embed-
ding in the Enzyklopädie, it becomes clear that the problem of conscious-
ness is part of the philosophy of the idea and what the specific profile of
consciousness is.
The philosophy of spirit too is philosophy of the idea: philosophy of the
idea, “returning from its otherness to itself ” (E, § 18), arriving at its “being-
for-itself ” (E, § 381). The task of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit is to compre-
hend the absolute as spirit (E, § 384 A). Again, this comprehension is a
function of actualizing the absolute idea: at the end this process of actual-
izing, the absolute idea knows itself in an adequate way, i.e. in the form
of the concept. As the actualization of the absolute idea within the ele-
ment of spirit is complete when the spirit is freed from all forms not
adequate to its concept; because spirit achieves this freedom only through
its own activity (Tätigkeit), the philosophy of spirit addresses the spirit as
“producer of its own freedom” (TWA 8, § 382 Z). In the realm of spirit,
spirit is ‘free spirit’ (E §§ 382, 384).
As subjective spirit, the development of free spirit concerns this spirit
itself in a narrow sense. Because the “concept” of spirit becomes “for it”,
its being (Sein) becomes “with itself, i.e. becomes free” (bei sich, d.i. frei
zu sein: E, § 385). Hence, the development of subjective spirit is one of
increasing self-knowledge; the levels of its development are levels of spir-
it’s self-knowledge, and hence also of the absolute idea as spirit. The phi-
losophy of the subjective spirit must clarify how spirit determines itself
to knowledge. In accord with the logical idea, this concerns both the theo-
retical and the practical dimension of knowledge, and has three levels of
development: First, (subjective) spirit “in itself ” as “soul” or “nature spirit”
(Naturgeist); second, (subjective) spirit “for itself ” as “consciousness”;
third, (subjective) spirit in and for itself as “spirit that determines itself, as
subject for itself ” (E § 387), as a subject of theoretical and practical activ-
ity. On the first level Hegel overcomes the opposition between body and
soul; on the second he masters the opposition between (conscious, self-
conscious) I and world, enabling him, on the third, to overcome the oppo-
sition between theoretical and practical reason, thinking and willing.
On the second level spirit is conceived as consciousness. For Hegel, this

level is articulated especially by Kant and Fichte. Hegel writes that they
achieve at most a “phenomenology”, though not a “philosophy” of spirit;
they do not attain to the “concept”, to spirit “in and for itself ”: they con-
sider the “I” only “in relation to something else” (E, § 415 A), not as spirit
determining itself within itself (E, § 387). In Hegel’s view, consciousness
contains constitutively the opposition between subject and object—an
opposition Hegel must overcome. Overcoming this opposition in the
development of (subjective) spirit is tantamount to rejecting any philoso-
phy of consciousness or self-consciousness as a paradigm for Hegelian
philosophy.
Once the soul becomes an I, it becomes a consciousness (E, § 412).
The development towards reason as the concept of spirit overcomes the
abstractness of spirit qua consciousness and self-consciousness (E, §§ 416 f.).
Hegel’s doctrine of recognition (E, §§ 430–436) emphasizes that self-
consciousness is not an individuated but a general self-consciousness
(E, §§ 435 f.). This level of spirit as general self-consciousness achieves the
intrinsic relation between subject and object, and thus “reason” (E, § 437),
though as a “simple identity”, hence only in its abstractness (E, § 438).36
This identity is only the initial figure of what Hegel calls “spirit” as “know-
ing truth” (wissende Wahrheit) of itself (E, § 439, cf. §§ 440 ff.). Accord-
ingly, not in phenomenology, but rather in psychology, and hence in the
philosophy of the properly37 subjective dimension of spirit, do we com-
prehend what knowledge is: an endeavor of the free spirit, both theoreti-
cal and practical.
3. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit is not Practical Philosophy
(1) For Kant, the concepts of science and of system are closely related;
architectural unity constitutes the scientific character of our knowl-
edge (KrV, B 860), also within philosophy. Kant develops his philosophy
accordingly, following Aristotle’s38 influential division of philosophy into
theoretical and practical philosophy, or into the realms of nature and of
36 Therefore de Vos (2010) is right that self-consciousness cannot clarify its own
structure.
37 Hegel occasionally characterized his psychology as “genuine doctrine of the spirit”
(II, 437).
38 Cf. Nik. Eth. VI 2–4, I 1, 1095a5 f., X 6–7 and Met. I 2.
freedom. The original unity of these two branches, however, was a major
challenge to German idealists, not least to Hegel. Nevertheless, theoreti-
cians of recognition, such as Siep or Honneth, according to their own self-
understanding, elaborate a practical philosophy,39 purportedly: Hegel’s
practical philosophy.
This practical impetus of contemporary theory of recognition is unsur-
prising, since the discourse about recognition was (and is) largely moti-
vated by politics, human rights, democracy, globalization, economization
and multiculturalism, hence, by socio-political matters.40 In that connec-
tion, though, one rather would have expected, at least programmatically,
a turn to Kant’s presently much debated, and highly vaunted, practical
philosophy, especially his Critique of Practical Reason and his Metaphys-
ics of Morals. Yet to many theorists of recognition, Kant’s views appear
inferior to Hegel’s. They raise standard arguments against Kant’s practical
philosophy: the individualistic and contractual account of his theory of
justice is supposed to be inadequate for understanding social relations;
furthermore, Kant’s empty ethical formalism is to be overcome by a Hege-
lian idea of substantial ethical life, just as Kant’s atomistic and monologic
concept of reason is said to lead to a deficient concept of subjectivity,
because the subject is essentially social.
This farewell to Kant would require a study of its own, far beyond the
present article.41 Hegel, to be sure, engaged seriously with Kant’s architec-
ture of reason. To develop his concept of philosophy as a speculative doc-
trine of the absolute idea, Hegel needed not only to sublate the restrictions
of both theoretical knowledge under the idea of the truth and practical
knowledge under the idea of the good (II, 429 ff.), he also had to sub-
late the opposition between the theoretical and the practical operations
of the spirit in a doctrine of free spirit (E, §§ 445 ff.): the terminus of
39 As noted (cf. my footnote 8), Honneth characterizes Hegel’s philosophy of objective

spirit as practical philosophy (2001, 17 f., 41), understands the philosophy of objective spirit
as ethics, moral philosophy, philosophy of right or ethical theory of legal right (2001, 20 f.,
31 f., 53), takes the free will to be a moral principle (2001, 34, Anm. 16), etc. Siep dealt in
many studies with Hegel’s “practical philosophy”; recently he tried to sound out its “lim-
its and actuality” (Grenzen und Aktualität) (2010a). In the terminology of Hegel’s mature
works, he means by practical philosophy Hegel’s philosophy of “objective spirit” (2010b,
14).—Also beyond the discourse of recognition it is common to talk about Hegel’s practi-
cal philosophy or ethics, cf., a.o., Peperzak (1991; 2001, 387) or Düsing (2002, 1984; 2000,
289 ff.; 1999, 120 ff.). The standard translation of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is ‘ethical life’. Recently,
Buchwalter (2010) and Vieweg (2012) published on Hegel’s ‘practical philosophy’.
40 Cf. for instance the work of Habermas, Honneth, Taylor and Fraser.
41 Cf. in this volume the chapter of Donald Loose.
Hegel’s philosophy of subjective spirit and starting point of his philosophy

of objective spirit is free spirit as a unity of theoretical and practical spirit.
Whoever treats Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit as a practical philos-
ophy, should explain what then is Hegel’s theoretical philosophy: is it the
logic, the philosophy of absolute spirit, the philosophy of subjective theo-
retical spirit? Is it parts of these, or a combination?42 Should the philoso-
phy of objective spirit not primarily be understood from Hegel’s concept
of spirit, and hence consider the concept of the practical as determined
within the context of the concept of spirit? Whoever seeks to understand
it in another way, or who reads, e.g., the philosophy of spirit as an ethics,
should make explicit his own understanding of what ‘practical’ and ‘ethi-
cal’ mean—most likely taken from the history of philosophy—and justify
this understanding in the context of Hegel’s philosophy, before character-
izing Hegel’s philosophy by such concepts. To be sure, Hegel’s philosophy
of spirit offers formal and substantive points of contact for practical phi-
losophy and for ethics beyond Hegel’s own views, but Hegel’s philosophy
of spirit is neither of these.
I now examine more closely the idea, widespread in the recognition
discourse, that Hegel has a ‘practical’ philosophy, and make clear that and
why Hegel doesn’t have one, and indeed, that it would be a real challenge
for the protagonists of recognition to show how a genuine practical phi-
losophy is possible within the framework of Hegel’s speculative system.
First I address Kant’s concept of theoretical and practical philosophy (2).
I then consider Hegel’s overcoming of this opposition in the logic (3) and
in the philosophy of spirit (4). These considerations reveal that Hegel
offered no practical philosophy (5).
(2) Reconsidering Kant is very illuminating for understanding Hegel’s
conceptions of the absolute idea and of free spirit, because Hegel’s deter-
mination of the forms they each sublate are recognizably Kantian: Kant’s
architectonics is Hegel’s template.
Kant consistently divides philosophy into theoretical and practical
parts, and divides their respective domains into those of nature and free-
dom. Accordingly, he distinguishes theoretical knowledge from determi-
nation of the will, and accordingly also the philosophy of nature from
philosophy of morals (as “practical legislation according to the concept
42 Halbig et al. (2004a, 14 f.) use the opposition ‘theoretical—practical’ without hesita-
tion to assess Hegel’s relevance. Accordingly, they do not consider what Hegel’s theoretical
philosophy would be.
of freedom”).43 More precisely, Kant specifies the human intellect as such,

qua higher capacity for knowledge, i.e. reason in the wide sense,44 as a
capacity to think and therefore to judge. He conceptualizes thinking as a
synthesis effected through judgments. Both theoretical and practical rea-
son are ways of thinking, hence judging: the determination of objects of
experience occurs in theoretical judgments; the determination of the will
occurs in practical judgments. One and the same pure reason does both,
operating in a theoretical or a practical direction.45 Whereas theoreti-
cal reason is about objects which are given to it from elsewhere, namely
through sensory intuitions, practical reason relates to objects which it can
itself produce, since practical reason is immediately about the determina-
tion of the will by the representation of an object.
For Kant the determinability of the subject through freedom is not
expressly the theme of theoretical philosophy, but of practical philosophy.
However, due to the determinability of the theoretical subject through
the law of (theoretical) validity, made explicit by Kant in his theoretical
philosophy—hence, by another causality than that of nature—, the theo-
retical and the practical cannot be defined against each other, as Kant
actually does.46 Hegel aims to overcome Kant’s opposition between theo-
retical and practical philosophy and to sublate it in a higher, more original
unity:47 For Hegel, ‘practical’ philosophy is a deficient form of knowledge,
inadequate to his concept of philosophy. Consequently, it is not a basis of
any of the disciplines of his philosophy of reality (Realphilosophie).
(3) The inadequacy of practical knowledge is discussed in Hegel’s doc-
trine of the idea in the Logik. According to Hegel, the idea as truth is the
unity of concept and reality, of subject and object (II, 408 ff.; E, §§ 213–215).
Subject and object function here as moments of comprehensive think-
ing, by which this constellation is known on different levels of its logical
actualization, the idea finally revealing itself to be the absolute idea as
a unity of subject and object that knows itself in the mode of the con-
cept. The different levels of the idea’s self-knowledge correspond to dif-
ferent ideas; each of them specifies, in its specific way, the idea qua unity
43 Cf. KrV B 868 f., 830; KpV A 29; KdU V 167 f., 171, 174, 178 f., 416, etc. On Kant’s archi-
tectonic, see Krijnen 2011b; 2013.
44 Not in the narrow sense as a ‘capacity to conclude’.
45 Cf. Kant KpV A 31 f., 96 f., 159; AA IV, 391.
46 Cf. Krijnen 2011b; 2013.
47 Cf. for Hegel’s Frankfurt period for instance Siep (2000, 29 f.), for the Phänomenolo-
gie Cobben (2009a).
of subject and object.48 This ‘becoming for itself ’ of the concept as the
“ideal content of the idea” (des ideellen Inhalts der Idee: E, § 213) occurs
as the “process” of the idea overcoming the “hardest opposition in itself ”
(II, 412 f., cf. E, § 215).49 Beginning from the idea in its immediacy (‘the
idea of life’), this process results in the idea of knowledge. As the “idea
of knowledge”, the idea achieves the determinacy of relating to itself qua
idea (sich zu sich als Idee verhält: II, 429). In knowledge, the opposition,
the “one-sidedness of subjectivity and that of objectivity”, is sublated in
“One activity” (E, § 225). This process of sublation evolves in two distinct
directions.50 One direction of knowledge is the drive of cognition towards
“truth”, i.e. the “theoretical” activity of the idea. Here, the “one-sidedness
of subjectivity” is sublated by taking in, through the subjective activity of
cognition, the “existing world” (seiende Welt), which counts here as the
“genuine, truthful objectivity” (wahrhaft geltende Objektivität) as such.
The other direction of knowledge is the drive towards the “good” real-
izing itself: “volition”, the “practical” activity of the idea. Here, the “one-
sidedness of the objective world”, counting in this regard as mere “show”
(Schein) and “inconsequential form” (nichtige Gestalt), is likewise sub-
lated: by “determining” it through the “subjective inwardness” (Innere des
Subjektiven), counting in this regard as the “genuine, truthful objectivity”,
by the subject “forming” (einbilden) objectivity.
Neither of these processes of knowledge suffices to comprehend the
effective activity (Wirksamkeit) of the concept; in neither case does
the concept correspond with itself in its objectivity. The indicated dou-
bling of the idea is characteristic of the idea of knowledge as subject-
object unity (cf. E, § 225). Likewise characteristic is that, in both cases,
the unity to be achieved by the speculative concept is actualized from the
subjective side.51 Both processes of knowledge are also distinct: The idea
of knowledge is characterized as a process which evolves in two converse
directions. In the theoretical idea (idea of truth), the one-sidedness of
subjectivity is sublated by taking the presupposed extant world (which
provides the content) into the subjective. In the practical idea (idea of the
48 Hegel distinguishes the ‘idea of life’ (II, 413 ff.; E, §§ 216–222), the ‘idea of knowledge’
(II, 429 ff.; E, §§ 223–225) and the ‘absolute idea’ (II, 483 ff.; E, §§ 236–244).
49 For a presentation of Hegel’s doctrine of the idea, see, e.g., Düsing (1976, 289 ff.)
or Schäfer (2002); for detailed examination, including the philosophy of spirit, see Fulda
(2004b).
50 Cf. E, §§ 225 f., 233; II, 429 ff., 438, 477 f., 480 ff.
51 The absolute idea on the level of the idea of knowledge is the “idea in its subjectivity
and thereby in its finitude as such” (II, 438, cf. 413).
good), the one-sidedness of subjectivity is sublated by forming (Hinein-

bilden) the subjective into the objective world.
To this extent, Hegel’s view is an exaggeration of Kant’s, since accord-
ing to Kant’s transcendental turn concerning the problem of philosophi-
cal foundations, whatever is ‘given’ is not objectivity as such. Still, Kant
defines nature and freedom against each other in a way that Hegel’s char-
acterization reveals to be a deficiency of Kant’s transcendental philoso-
phy: On the one side, reason is thought to be the ground of objectivity
(and not only an infinite goal); on the other side theoretical and practical
reason are determined against each other without comprehending their
difference from their ‘common root’.52
Hegel shows the logical deficiency of the indicated theoretical and prac-
tical processes of knowledge in such a way that the theoretical and the
practical idea cannot be separated; hence they cannot be distinguished
from each other, and so they cannot be determined against each other:
Each taken by itself determines the concept only inadequately; they are
not figures of knowledge that conform to speculative philosophy. Consider
more closely Hegel’s accounts of theoretical and practical knowledge.
a) Theoretical knowledge, in its “outer action”, functions under the
direction of the concept, making up the “inner thread” of its progress
(E, § 226). Therewith, theoretical knowledge has “left” its “starting point”,
i.e. the encountered given of its content; because of its own knowledge
claim, the “concept that relates to itself ” takes its place (E, § 232, cf. II,
477). Hence, within the framework of theoretical knowledge, concept and
object are related to each other insufficiently: the concept has not yet
become the “unity of itself in its object or its reality” (II, 476 f., cf. 440;
cf. E, §§ 231 f.). Rather, by emphasizing the self-reference of the concept,
the idea reaches something non-given, something which belongs intrinsi-
cally or immanently to the subject: the theoretical idea itself makes the
transition to the “idea of volition” (E, §§ 225, 233), of the “practical”, of
“action”, the good (II, 477).53
b) In the realm of the “idea of the good”, the mere giveness of the
content has been overcome (cf. E, § 233; II, 477 f.) and the objective has
obtained the form of a “free unity and subjectivity” (II, 478). Still, the actu-
alization of the good is conceived here as an “infinite progress”, and hence
52 Cf. Krijnen 2013.

53 Cf. Krijnen (2012b) for a problem-oriented discussion of Hegel’s identification of the
capacity of determination and volition.
is determined only as an “ought” (E, § 234; cf. II, 479 f.). The idea of the
accomplished (vollendet) good remains therefore absolute only within
the determinacy of “subjectivity”: also in this conception of knowledge,
concept and reality are inadequately related to each other as extrinsic
(äußerlich) purpose (II, 479 f.). The practical idea lacks exactly that moment
characteristic of the theoretical idea’s relation to reality as genuine being
(II, 480 f.). Accordingly, the practical idea prevents its own actualization:
as such it must be “supplemented” by the theoretical (II, 481; cf. E, § 234);
otherwise, what actualizing goals, executing the good (in general: prac-
tical knowledge) means or is would remain unintelligible. In practical
knowledge, too, the “view” this type of knowledge has “of itself ” (eigene
Ansicht von sich) proves to be a deficient determination of the concept: it
“restricts” (begrenzt) the “objective” concept (II, 482). This objective con-
cept no longer relates the subjective and the objective to each other extrin‑
sically; on the contrary, they are now related intrinsically. As in the case of
the theoretical idea, knowledge and volition cannot be distinguished from
each other; hence neither can they be determined against each other.
Making explicit the goal or purpose of knowledge proper to the idea of
truth and to the idea of the good shows that another concept of knowl-
edge is necessary. This other concept must no longer be relative to any
opposition between the subjective and the objective; instead, it must
be absolute insofar as it is determined only by and from itself and pres-
ents itself accordingly, as the absolute idea. The absolute idea sublates
the structure characteristic for the idea of knowledge (Idee des Erkenn-
ens): the doubling, the hardest opposition, the reconciliation achieved
from the side of the subject. Within the absolute idea, “actuality” has
the “concept” as its “inner ground and actual existence”, and the sub-
ject “knows” itself as the “concept which is determined in and for itself ”
(II, 483). As a result, a figure of knowledge appears which is not knowledge
of objects of theoretical and practical reason, but knowledge of reason itself.
Therefore, the absolute idea is the only content and object of philosophy
(II, 438, 483 f.). As such an idea, it proves to be the identity of the theoreti-
cal and practical idea (II, 483)—and the starting point for all that follows
in Hegel’s system.
(4) Two aspects of the absolute idea within the element of reality, as
developed in the Enzyklopädie, are of particular interest here:
a) Just as Hegel’s system philosophy programmatically aims at self-
knowledge of the idea as absolute spirit, his philosophy of spirit is bound by
the Delphic oracle’s command to self-knowledge (E, § 377). Accordingly,
the philosophy of subjective spirit aims to clarify how spirit, as ‘concrete
spirit’, determines itself to knowledge; hence, knowledge is not only to be

regarded as the logical idea of knowledge (E, § 387). In the Logik the idea
of knowledge differentiates itself into subject and object, so that subject
and object are not interrelated by the concept. Instead, here the concept
is active only on the side of the subject. In contrast, for the spirit, as the
“idea” which, returning from nature, has become “for itself ”, it is charac-
teristic that the “concept” is both its “object” and its “subject” (E, § 381).
Hence, spirit is the absolute idea which has become for itself, the truly
“rational” (vernünftig) “speculative” concept.
Within subjective spirit, Hegel integrates aspects of his doctrine of the
logical idea so that theoretical and practical spirit do not form a dual-
ism. Instead, the conceptual relation between thinking (theoretical spirit)
and the will (practical spirit) is retained. In the introductory sections of
his philosophy of spirit, Hegel opposes the “dismemberment” (Zersplit-
terung) of the “vivid unity of the spirit” into an assortment of distinct,
mutually independent capacities, forces or activities (E, § 379). With the
transition to the absolute idea, Hegel overcame this dualism in his doc-
trine of the logical idea. In contrast to the Logik, within the philosophy of
spirit, the idea of knowledge is construed from the start in relation to the
absolute idea.
b) Spirit, too, which begins with subjective spirit, reveals a structure
which develops out of the opposition between the theoretical and the
practical into an internally differentiated unity. Hegel’s point is that
the theoretical and the practical already belong together in knowledge.
Therefore, on the level of the philosophy of reality, too, it is mistaken to
conceive of knowledge in terms of an antinomy between the theoreti-
cal and the practical. Ultimately, knowing spirit not only determines the
object of knowledge, but at the end of the development of theoretical
spirit, a constitutive aspect of the self-knowing of the idea, theoretical spirit
knows itself “as that which determines the content” (als das Bestimmende
des Inhalts: E, § 468), i.e. as practical spirit. Thinking and willing, hence,
are not mutually independent entities, capacities, forces, or activities
(E, § 445 A; R, § 4 Z). As in the doctrine of the logical idea, both cognitive
processes are designed to liberate themselves from their initial, one-sided
subjectivity: Whereas theoretical knowledge starts by finding a content
which exists unto itself, yet ultimately determines this content as its own
(hence, being present with itself in the other, i.e. being free), determining
itself as a singularity in itself; practical knowledge starts with this self-
determination and ends with spirit, which by setting and actualizing pur-
poses, achieves the form of generality, thus transforming the will into a
“thinking will” (E, § 469, cf. § 443). Just as thinking as the “free concept”
turns out also to be free in its “content” (E § 468), so the will overcomes
its subjectivity by a self-determination that is freedom (E, § 480).
In subjective spirit as free spirit (E, §§ 481 f.), all activities of theoretical
spirit and practical spirit are oriented towards the goal of freedom, and
so are relative to that goal. Only such a self-determining entity is able to
achieve truth, i.e., objectively valid convictions. The theoretical and prac-
tical dimensions of spirit come together in the “actual free will” as the
“unity of theoretical and practical spirit” (E, § 481), in spirit which knows
and wants itself as free. Without this spiritual capacity to determine itself,
to free itself from mere subjectively valid determining grounds and to
determine itself by general, objectively valid ones (hence, determining the
content of knowledge), there is no spiritual activity which justifiably can
claim to be true knowledge.
(5) These considerations show that Hegel does not pursue practi-
cal philosophy. On the contrary, he intends to overcome the opposition
between theoretical and practical philosophy from within, replacing it by
a structure which, as absolute idea, is the truly scientific perspective of
knowledge, and as free spirit, provides a conception of the subject which
is able to actualize its purpose, freedom, within an “externally found objec-
tivity” (E, § 483). Hegel’s philosophy of reality is developed on the level
of the absolute idea. Accordingly, the idea of knowledge in the philoso-
phy of spirit is from the start construed in terms of the absolute idea. To
grant parts of the philosophy of spirit an independent status, for instance
(self-)consciousness, practical spirit or objective spirit, neglects that
within Hegel’s philosophy of spirit—unlike in his philosophy of nature—
the stages of conceptual development do not exist for themselves: spir-
it’s determinations and stages are “essentially only moments, conditions,
determinations of the higher stages of the development” (E, § 380), which
are organized according to the absolute idea.
Consequently, the claims of the theoretical and of the practical as such,
and hence also those of this influential, traditional division itself, lead to
more fundamental, more encompassing concepts, such as those of the
absolute idea and free spirit. Already in his early writings Hegel sought
to overcome the opposition between freedom, subjectively understood,
and nature, understood as an instrument of, or an obstacle to, freedom,
through a concept of freedom designed to reconcile what is divided.
Nature too must be conceived as a manifestation of the idea, and so as
something determined by principles which subsume and subordinate the
theoretical and practical conceptions of nature, by conceptualizing nature
itself as freedom in Hegel’s sense: as being with oneself in one’s other.

Furthermore, freedom is the ground of theoretical and practical spirit and
of their relation, whereas they remain conceived dualistically within the
contexts of the ideas of truth and of the good. Their dualism is overcome
by Hegel through the transition from the logical idea of knowledge to
the absolute idea; and it does not recur in the development of subjective
spirit. Hegel’s system of philosophy (strictly speaking, his Phänomenologie
des Geistes too, in which stages of consciousness as appearing knowledge
lead to the Logik) addresses theoretical and practical knowledge, includ-
ing their objects, though not from their own perspectives. Accordingly,
Hegel’s system of philosophy provides neither practical knowledge nor
theoretical knowledge; instead, it comprehends these types of knowledge
speculatively within his system of philosophy.
What, then, can practical philosophy be within the framework of Hegel’s
mature philosophy? Kant’s project of practical philosophy, i.e., a philoso-
phy from the perspective of the practical, not from the absolute idea, is,
in view of the practical-societal concerns of contemporary recognition
theory, too important to dismiss, even if one is not satisfied with Kant’s
execution. Is such a practical philosophy possible within Hegel’s mature
philosophical system? If so, where, and how would it look? Within Hegel’s
speculative philosophy, would a practical philosophy be able to develop
its genuine practical impetus? What roles would Hegel’s doctrines of the
logical idea and of subjective spirit play? These are intriguing Hegelian
challenges to the contemporary paradigm of recognition.
4. Recognition as a Paradigm?
(1) With this, I come to the final of the three Hegelian challenges. It is
linked to the two preceding challenges, both of which touched upon the
problem of a philosophical architectonic of reason. The third challenge
concerns problems arising from a general system philosophical perspec-
tive on the attempt to elevate recognition to a philosophical paradigm.
Twentieth-Century philosophy put paid to the venerable idea of a phil-
osophical system. A frank assessment, however, would indicate that it is
high time to revisit the quest for a philosophical system. The idea of such
a system is complex, of course, especially so as Hegel conceived it. Nei-
ther these complexities, nor the controversies about them, can be consid-
ered here. Here it suffices to note that any philosophy which purports to
inherit the mantel of German Idealism—as do the current discussions of
recognition—cannot dispense with important features of Hegel’s idea of a

system of philosophy.54 According to Hegel, philosophy without system is
simply unscientific (E, § 14 A; PG, 21 f.); Hegel’s method “extends” itself as
“absolute” (II, 490 f.; I, 7) or “speculative” (E, §§ 79, 82) into a system; for
Hegel, “the true is the whole” (PG, 19; cf. E, § 14 f.), and all aspects of his
system are characterized as necessary (E, §§ 9 with 1, cf. 81 A).
Accordingly, recognition must be conceived as a systemic concept. If
recognition is to be philosophically paradigmatic, it must be conceived as
the most fundamental concept in the system of philosophy. Within the
context of Hegel’s conception of philosophy, this raises many fundamen-
tal methodological and systemic questions, questions about the beginning
of thought, the division of the parts of the system of philosophy and the
completion of the system. The paradigm of recognition must deal produc-
tively with such questions, at the very least, to assure itself about its own
determinacy, and the soundness of its own presuppositions.55
Here I can only consider one aspect of these questions, an aspect
related to Hegel’s monism, including his view that the idea develops itself
through the elements of logic, nature and spirit, an aspect which also con-
cerns the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy.56
(2) The philosophical school of South-West neo-Kantianism indeed trans‑
formed the concept of recognition into a paradigm of philosophy, while
also reshaping the idea of a system of philosophy against the backdrop
criticisms of Hegel which remain current today.57 The South-West neo-
Kantians too sought to revitalize German idealism. Based upon a Fichte-
inspired interpretation and appropriation of Kant, they reconceived
recognition as a fundamental concept of philosophy, its disciplines and its
54 On the history of the idea of a philosophical system, Hegel’s system and its relevance,
see Krijnen (2008).
55 The three “reasons” Quante (2011, § 3.4) gives for the collapse of Hegel’s system are
unconvincing, already because his considerations are to sketchy compared to his profound
presentation of Hegel. Regarding the relevance of Hegel’s idea of a system, I reach quite
different, more nuanced conclusions (cf. Krijnen 2007; 2008; 2010). Like Honneth and
Siep, Quante too must disown much of the core of Hegel’s thought in order to revitalize
the remainder.
56 Ikäheimo and Laitinen (2011, 8 f.) distinguish four meanings of recognition: iden-
tification, acknowledgment, interpersonal recognition, institutional recognition. They take
‘identification’ very broadly, so that it includes everything that is. In Hegel’s words, it thus
becomes a logical determination of thought. It would therefore be of great interest to
integrate the different meanings of recognition into one conception of totality; this they
do not provide.
57 Cf. Krijnen 2001; 2008.
systematic division.58 Neo-Kantianism, however, remains unrecognized in

the current debates about recognition. If the term ‘neo-Kantian’ occurs at
all in the Anglo-Saxon literature, it usually means something like contem-
porary philosophy developed within a Kantian conceptual framework (for
instance, O’Neill, Höffe, Korsgaard, Herman).
For the South-West neo-Kantians, as for Hegel, the traditional distinc-
tion between the theoretical and the practical is inadequate. The South-
West Neo-Kantians claim to identify a fundamental axiological relation
(axiotisches Grundverhältnis) in which reason itself is related to theoreti-
cal and practical activity, so that the specific link between activity and the
practical is dissolved. The fundamental discipline for this operation is the-
ory of knowledge; in neo-Kantianism, theory of knowledge is philosophia
prima. According to Heinrich Rickert, the object of knowledge qua crite-
rion is not some kind of being, but must be conceived as an ought, and
hence as a value. The knowing subject, then, proves to be a subject that
‘takes a position’, and consequently it is a subject who ‘recognizes’ values:
Values are, from the perspective of the subject, the ‘what’, the ‘object’, the
‘goal’ of taking any position: knowing is taking a position toward values.
As it is put in contemporary theories of inferential semantics: subjects
follow rules.59 As Kant puts it—and not without reason, this is the motto
of Rickert’s book about the Gegenstand der Erkenntnis60—, the relation of
our representations to an object is based on a rule.
On the basis of such insights, the activist theory of knowledge is made
fruitful axiologically: It contains principles with relevance far beyond
the realm of knowledge; they acquire a universal function, determining the
whole system of philosophy. On the South-West neo-Kantian view, ‘theo-
retical’ culture contains fundamental relations which are philosophically
58 Although Brandom (cf., 2002, 46; 2006; as well in this volume) emphasizes that
intentionality, knowledge, and action are all normative, and he advocates an encompass-
ing concept of normativity, it is only partially correct to praise Kant for this idea. Such
a Kant interpretation was initiated by Fichte, picked up by Hegel and the neo-Kantians,
all of whom were more interested in the ‘spirit’ than in the ‘letter’ of Kant. This ‘activist’
model of philosophy entails many problems, such as the determinacy of the genuine prac-
tical and its place within the system of philosophy; cf. Krijnen 2012a.
59 Cf. for instance Brandom 1994.
60 “Wenn wir untersuchen, was denn die Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand unseren
Vorstellungen für eine neue Beschaffenheit gebe, und welches die Dignität sei, die sie
dadurch erhalten: so finden wir, daß sie nichts weiter thue, als die Verbindung der Vorstel-
lungen auf eine gewisse Art nothwendig zu machen und sie einer Regel zu unterwerfen”
(KrV, B 242).
paradigmatic insofar as they recur as basic structures in all cultural

realms. Making fundamental theoretical relations fruitful axiologically,
hence paradigmatically, leads Rickert to a relation that he characterizes
as the “starting point” and “common root” of all philosophy: the “correla-
tion between valid values and the valuing subject” (1928, 438). As a conse-
quence, any meaningful structure (Sinngebilde), and hence culture, has the
structure of a subject relating to values guiding its actions. By recogniz-
ing values the subject shapes culture. All philosophical disciplines, then,
treat values (specific orientations for subjects, more precisely: for humans
as rational beings) and their realization61 by subjects who recognize them
(thus producing ‘cultural goods’).
(3) The theory of knowledge shows that theoretical meaning—that
is, meaning constituted by the value ‘truth’ and the subjects valuing
this value—is characterized by an objective or noematic aspect and by
a subjective or noetic aspect. Therefore, recognition can become a fun-
damental logical concept, obtaining system-axiological relevance. To put
it with Hegel, the fundamental axiological relation of South-West neo-
Kantianism has both a logical aspect and, on that basis, an aspect of the
philosophy of reality, more precisely: of spirit. These neo-Kantians, like
Hegel, regard logic or theory of knowledge as an objective logic, as a logic
of “comprehending thought” (I, 23); they address thought as principle of
objectivity. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between Hegel’s
view and those of the South-West neo-Kantians, starting with the logical
basis of the fundamental axiological relation, especially concerning the
‘idea of knowledge’ and the ‘absolute idea’:62
Considered in the perspective of the system of philosophy, by using
basic concepts of logic, the South-West neo-Kantians identify a fundamen-
tal axiological relation which consists in the self-formation of the subject:
The founding principle systemically ordering all the subject’s activities
regarding values (Wertverhalten), and hence all realms of values, is the
self-formation of the concrete subject by values which are valid ‘tran-
scendentally’, that is to say: their validity does not depend on the subject;
on the contrary, such values qualify the subject’s subjectivity. Rickert con-
ceives self-formation as a relation between subjectivity, conditional fulfill-
ment, on the one side and objectivity, an unconditional task, on the other.
61 —in the sense of: shaping reality according to values.

62 Cf. for a more extensive account: Krijnen 2008, 349 ff. Here, the dimension of the
philosophy of spirit is expressly de-emphasized (2008, 356, Anm. 199).
The ordering of the system, then, is guided by various possibilities for ful-
filling (completing) this unconditional task (Vollendung).
Hegel also affirms a fundamental logical relation with systemic implica-
tions: a relation of the subject’s self-knowledge qua self-realization of the
concept, hence of the absolute idea. This suggests a similarity between
the neo-Kantian’s fundamental axiological relation and Hegel’s doctrine
of the idea. Whereas the neo-Kantian analysis of knowledge presents rela-
tions which prove to be paradigmatic for non-cognitive realms, Hegel’s
idea develops itself speculatively into itself, first in logic and then in
reality, which is founded in the idea, which manifests itself until it knows
itself as spirit.63 Notice that the neo-Kantian doctrine of the fundamen-
tal axiological relation seems to involve a distance between subject and
value (i.e. the normative factor), unlike Hegel’s logical doctrine of the
idea. However, Hegel emphasizes this distance in his philosophy of real-
ity, more precisely: in his philosophy of spirit. Here the constellation of a
‘subject’ which subordinates itself to ‘values’ and so shapes ‘culture’ has its
proper place. Within the context of his determination of practical spirit,
Hegel even comes to a positive assessment of the ‘ought’ (Sollen), which
he had criticized so sharply at the level of the logical idea. In the develop-
ment of the practical spirit (E, §§ 469 ff.) it becomes clear that and how
spirit, by “giving itself its own content” (E, § 469), contains a “doubled
ought” (gedoppeltes Sollen) in its self-determination (E, § 470). In his way,
Hegel etches the relation of spirit to validity, progressing from conditional
to unconditional formation of the spirit.64
The fundamental axiological relation is the basic constellation of the
South-West neo-Kantian system of philosophy; it is a relation of self-
formation. Although the neo-Kantians regard theory of knowledge as first
philosophy, they do not systemically articulate this self-formation as self-
knowledge: self-knowledge as the fundamental constellation of the develop-
ment of the system of philosophy. Hegel, on the contrary, does so: he achieves
the required return into the concept in the absolute idea. Such a return
into the concept is indispensable, regardless of whether Hegel’s or the neo-
Kantian conception of knowledge would require logical revision (which
would have, of course, numerous implications for the internal relations of
knowledge and the system). The required return into the concept is part
of the knowledge claim of philosophy: philosophy is the science of ‘totality’.
63 Cf. Krijnen 2008, 4.2.3 f.; 2006.

64 For detailed comparison between the fundamental axiological relation and Hegel’s
philosophy of spirit, see Krijnen 2012b, § 2.4.
The speculative movement of the concept rules out any neo-Kantian, axi-
ologized fundamental logical relation, which elaborates theoretical phi-
losophy as one cultural realm among others: Hegel advances a progress
of the self-determination of the idea, from the logical into the real, and
through the real back into itself.
(4) This problem of the division or ordering of an idealist philosophi-
cal system is only one of many which arise when comparing Kantian
and Hegelian conceptions of normativity. Another problem concerns the
determinacy of the practical. Properly speaking, Hegel has no practical
philosophy; instead he transforms the opposition between theoretical and
practical philosophy through the absolute idea and free spirit. Whereas
Hegel’s option raises the question: How is practical philosophy possible
once it has been idealized within his philosophical system?, the South-West
neo-Kantian option raises a question about the particular determinacy of
the practical: What can practical philosophy be once it is axiologized?
The fundamental axiological relation integrates ‘theoretical’ and ‘prac-
tical’ reason. Because knowledge includes ‘recognizing values’, and so is
a kind of ‘practical’ behavior,65 Rickert thinks this overcomes the tradi-
tional position, in which theory and practice, or more generally, theo-
retical and practical values were opposed (1928, 438; 1929, 689). This
axiologizing of the sphere of knowledge entails that traditional concepts of
‘practical’ philosophy are transformed axiologically, thus becoming fun-
damental concepts of philosophy as such, and hence, of all philosophical
disciplines, including such concepts as autonomy, duty, conscience etc.,
which concern the validity-noetic aspect of the axiological relation (their
‘immanent meaning’).66
This approach faces a problem about the particular character of practical
philosophy. Considering carefully the treatment of the practical within the
South-West school makes clear that the project of transforming practical
reason into an axiological foundation is very difficult.67 It also makes clear
that the relation between theoretical and practical reason recurs in a subli-
mated form—despite neo-Kantian efforts to universalize practical reason.
Consequently, the primacy granted to practical reason loses its particular
practical character: it is replaced by a primacy of self-formation, which
appears in various kinds of self-formation (knowledge, morality, religion
etc.), and so in various ‘cultural realms’ (Kulturgebiete). Thus the systemic
65 Cf. Rickert 1914, 208 ff.; 1928, 185 f., 434, 438; 1929, 689 ff.
66 Cf. Rickert 1911, 161; 1914, 209; 1921, 309 f.; 1928, 435 ff.; 1929, 690, 694; 1934, 179 ff.
67 Krijnen 2012a.
construction of neo-Kantian philosophy of culture as the elaboration of a

philosophy of recognition again raises the question: Is the determination
of the totality as the ground of everything, i.e. the topic of philosophy, best
conceived as a whole of well-ordered constellations of self-formation, or as
a whole of well-ordered constellations of self-knowledge?68
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Chapter Seven
THE TRAGEDY OF MISRECOGNITION—THE DESIRE

FOR A CATHOLIC SHAKESPEARE AND HEGEL’S HAMLET
Simon Critchley
One version of the post-Kantian settlement in philosophy is that the criti-

cal dismantling of the claims of dogmatic metaphysics in the Critique of
Pure Reason has the consequence that questions concerning the ultimate
value of human life pass from the domain of religion to that of art. Kant’s
critique of metaphysics achieves the remarkable feat of showing both the
cognitive meaninglessness of the claims of traditional philosophy to know
the supersensible, while establishing the moral necessity for the primacy
of practical reason, that is, freedom. Yet, the question that this raises is
how can freedom take hold or manifest itself in the world of nature if
that world is governed by causality and mechanistically determined by
scientifically established natural laws? Doesn’t Kant leave human beings
in what Hegel would call the amphibious position of being both freely
subject to the moral law and determined by an objective world of nature
that has been stripped of any value and which stands over against me as
a world of alienation?
The philosophical task after Kant was how to achieve a reconciliation
of the dualisms of nature and freedom or pure and practical reason. The
view that is adumbrated in Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment and
announced with increasing conviction in Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic
Education of Man and incipient romantic and idealist trends in the Ger-
manophone 1790s, is that the artwork is the vehicle for such reconcilia-
tion. The artwork provides a sensuous image of freedom and brings into
harmony the domains of pure and practical reason. In the breathtaking
1796 single folio fragment, ‘The Oldest System-Programme of German Ide-
alism’, the authors (the text is variously attributed to the erstwhile college
chums, Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling, although it usually thought to best
represent the ideas of the latter, who was in his early 20s at the time)
write, ‘The highest act of reason, which embraces all ideas, is an aesthetic
act, and that truth and goodness are brothers only in beauty’. As Schelling
declares in 1800, ‘art is the organon of philosophy’ or ‘the keystone in the
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entire arch’ that will span the regions of nature and freedom that Kant
had divorced.
But what is meant by ‘art’ here? For Schelling, the highest exemplar of
art is drama and the highest manifestation of drama is tragedy, in par-
ticular Sophoclean tragedy. As Peter Szondi has convincingly shown, what
begins with Schelling is a philosophy of the tragic (das Tragische), which
has an almost uncanny persistence in the Germanophone intellectual tra-
dition. In his 1802–3 lectures, Philosophy of Art, Schelling writes, and the
Kantian echoes in this formulation resound,
The essence of tragedy is thus an actual and objective conflict between free-
dom in the subject on the one hand and necessity on the other, a conflict
that does not end such that one or the other succumbs, but rather such that
both are manifested in perfect indifference as simultaneously victorious and
vanquished.1
For Schelling, it was precisely this sort of equilibrium between freedom
and necessity that the Greeks—by which he means Sophocles’ Oedipus
the King, where this play weirdly but not untypically figures as a synecdo-
che for an entire culture—achieved in tragedy.
The Greeks sought in their tragedies this kind of equilibrium between jus-
tice and humanity, necessity and freedom, a balance without which they
could not satisfy their moral sensibility, just as the highest morality itself is
expressed in this balance. Precisely this equilibrium is the ultimate concern
of tragedy. It is not tragic that a premeditated, free transgression is punished.
That a guiltless person unavoidably becomes increasingly guilty through fate
itself, as remarked earlier, is the greatest conceivable misfortune. But that
this guiltless guilty person (dieser schuldloser Schuldige) accepts punishment
voluntarily—this is the sublimity of tragedy (das Erhabene in der Tragödie);
thereby alone does freedom transfigure itself into the highest identity with
necessity.2
Tragedy is the keystone in the arch that unites freedom and necessity,
practical reason and pure reason. In other words, the tragic is the com-
pletion of philosophy after Kant. And it is philosophy’s completion in a
sublime act. Namely, that Schelling’s claim above is that what the Greeks
sought in their tragedies was an equilibrium between ‘justice and human-
ity, freedom and necessity’, and this equilibrium is what finds expression
1 Schelling 1989, 251.

the tragedy of misrecognition 131
in tragedy. The sublimity of tragedy is the free acceptance of punishment

by this guiltless guilty one.
If art is the completion of philosophy and tragedy is the pinnacle of art,
as the identity of freedom and necessity, and if this was somehow the case
for the tragic Greeks, then the vast question that this raises, and which
Schelling spends the remaining pages of the Philosophy of Art groping
towards, is to what extent tragedy is realizable in modernity. The prob-
lem here can framed by Schelling’s assertion that ‘modernity lacks fate’,
namely that it has no sense of the movement of necessity as that against
which the activity of the free subject collides.3 Otherwise said, modernity
is the experience of contingency. Ancient tragedy is defined by an expe-
rience of fate that imposes an error, or what Aristotle called hamartia,
in the subject. This is not possible in the modern world. Schelling writes
that ‘the element of character takes the place formerly occupied by fate’.
1. We Need a Sophocles of the Differentiated World
This is where we can turn to Shakespeare and Hamlet. Schelling compares

English commentators on Shakespeare to a bunch of drunken farmers
quarreling in front a country pub wholly ignorant of the beautiful theatri-
cal landscape that surrounds them. In other words, Shakespeare requires
a more sober and systematic Germanic interpretation. This is the key to
Schelling’s interpretation of Shakespeare, and I quote at length,
If we now summarize our findings and express succinctly Shakespeare’s rela-
tionship to the sublimity of the tragedy of antiquity, we must call him the
greatest creator of character. He cannot portray that sublime, purified and
transfigured beauty that proves itself in the face of fate, a beauty that coin-
cides with moral goodness. [. . .] He knows that highest beauty only as indi-
vidual character. He was not able to subordinate everything to it, because
as a modern—as one who comprehends the eternal not within limitation,
but rather within boundlessness—he is too widely involved in universal-
ity. Antiquity possessed a concentrated universality, and viewed allness (die
Allheit) not in multiplicity but rather in unity.
There is nothing human that Shakespeare did not touch upon; yet he
touches it only individually, whereas antiquity touched it in totality. The ele-
ments of human nature from the lowest to the highest lie dispersed within
him. He knows it all, every passion, every disposition, youth as well as age,
the king and the shepherd. If our world were ever lost, one could recreate

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it from the series of his works. Whereas that ancient lyre enticed the whole
world with four strings, the new instrument has a thousand strings; it splits
the harmony of the universe in order to create it, and for that reason it is
always less calming for the soul. That austere, all-soothing beauty can exist
only in simplicity.4
If Shakespeare’s genius lies in his creation of character, then the freedom
of character plays itself out in a world without fate, a world where the
four-stringed ancient lyre has been replaced with a thousand-stringed
beast. That is to say, with the emergence of the differentiated world of
modernity, what disappears is the possibility of tragic sublimity. Schell-
ing’s seemingly hopeful question—the question with which the Philoso-
phy of Art ends, or rather, fades out—is whether there can be a modern
Sophocles. Or, as he puts it, ‘We must, however, be allowed to hope for
a Sophocles of the differentiated world [. . .].’5 As the long quotation above
makes clear, despite his genius, this new Sophocles cannot be Shakespeare.
He was, in the final analysis, too Protestant to allow for this possibility.
Schelling writes, ‘Shakespeare was a Protestant, and for him this (i.e. the
Fatum of antiquity) was not a possibility’.
What, or rather who, is required in order to recover the sublimity of
ancient tragedy, is a ‘[. . .] southern, perhaps Catholic, Shakespeare’.6 That
is to say, someone who can allow for the public, institutional reconcilia-
tion between the fact of error or, in Christianity, sin, and the possibility
of redemptive grace. This leads Schelling to a closing, and rather desper-
ate, reading of Calderón, where Schelling discusses just one play by the
Spanish dramatist, read in A. W. Schlegel’s German translation. Regardless
of the undoubted virtues of Calderón, what interests us here is the des-
peration on Schelling’s part to discover a Catholic Shakespeare, a Sopho-
cles of modernity. I think it is the same desperation that leads the young
Nietzsche initially towards the possibility of a rebirth of tragedy through
the music or more properly the opera of Wagner, and which leads the
later Nietzsche in his last writings on music, towards Bizet’s Carmen. In
The Case of Wagner, a very late text, after seeing Carmen for the twenti-
eth time, Nietzsche writes, ‘so patient do I become, so happy, so Indian,
so settled—To sit five hours: the first stage of holiness’.7 And again, ‘this
music is cheerful, but not in a French or German way. It’s cheerfulness
4 Schelling 1989, 270 f.

7 Nietzsche 1967, 157.
is African; fate hangs over it [. . .] il faut méditerraniser la musique’.8 So

deep is the Wagnerian sickness in Nietzsche, that he’ll accept anything—
Mediterranean, Indian, African, that might allow him to recover his health.
Sadly, it didn’t work.
Schelling’s Philosophy of Art concludes with a quasi-Nietzschean pathos
of mourning at the passing of great art in modernity. The final words of
the lectures read like a premonition of the later arguments of The Birth
of Tragedy,
I will remark only that the most perfect composition of all the arts, the uni-
fication of poesy (Poesie) and music through song, of poesy and painting
through dance, both in turn synthesized together, is the most complex the-
ater manifestation, such as was the drama of antiquity. Only a caricature has
remained for us: the opera, which in a higher and nobler style both from the
side of poesy as well as from that of the other competing arts, might sooner
guide us back to the performance that ancient drama combined with music
and song.
Music, song and dance, as well as all the various types of drama, live only
in public life (öffentlichen Leben), and form an alliance in such life. Wherever
public life disappears, instead of that real, external drama in which, in all its
forms, an entire people participates as a political and moral totality, only an
inward, ideal drama can unite the people. This ideal drama is the worship
service (Gottesdienst), the only kind of truly public action that has remained
for the contemporary age, and even so only in an extremely diminished and
reduced form.9
With the disappearance of public life in modernity—what Hegel would
call Sittlichkeit, ethical life—the possibility of tragic sublimity, under-
stood as a genuinely political artwork, i.e. an artwork that legislates for
the community, has evaporated. We are left with a caricature of ancient
tragedy in the form of the opera, on the one hand, and the empty, ideal-
ized ritual of the church service, on the other hand. Modern art, on this
view, is nothing else but the expression of the absence of the public realm.
It is with this nostalgic northern longing for a southern Catholicism that
Schelling’s Philosophy of Art ends.
2. Unbearable Contingency—Hegel’s HAMLET
It is here, as an antidote to the desire for a Catholic Shakespeare that

I’d like to turn to Hegel. For us, Hegel is the philosopher of the tragic.
8 Nietzsche 1967, 158 f.

134 simon critchley
He is the philosopher with the deepest understanding of the nature of

tragedy: its internal movement, contradictions and collisions, indeed
what we might call the collisional character of tragedy. If that manner
of conceiving experience that Hegel calls ‘dialectics’ can be understood
as thinking in movement, then it is arguable that dialectics has its gen-
esis in tragedy, or at least in a certain understanding of tragedy. Although
it might be said that Schelling also sees tragedy dialectically in terms of
the collision between freedom and necessity, the vital difference between
them turns on the question of history. Schelling, like so many literary
critics that follow him, offers a philosophical idealization of tragedy that
lacks a historical understanding of art’s unfolding. As Benjamin notes,
what he calls ‘the philosophy of tragedy’ is, “a theory of the moral order
of the world, without any reference to historical content, in a system of
generalized sentiments.”10 What is misguided in the multiple iterations
of ‘the philosophy of tragedy’ from Romanticism onwards is its universal-
istic a-historicism usually based on a series of metaphysical assumptions
about a purported human nature.11
For Hegel, and this is already clear from his reading of the Antigone in
the Phenomenology of Spirit onwards, tragedy is the aesthetic articulation
of the historical disintegration of ethical life or Sittlichkeit through the
strife of civil war and the life and death struggle between the essential
elements of the political life of the city-state. In tragedy, the substance of
ethical life divides against itself, dissolving in war and splitting into a mul-
titude of separate individual atoms. This passes over into the impotent
Stoicism of the solitary self in a world defined by law, i.e. Rome, and the
experience of modern self-alienation that Hegel associates with the word
‘Kultur’. History must form an essential part of any account of tragedy.
This is where we can shed some light on the Danish gloom of Hamlet.
Moving (not unproblematically, it must be acknowledged) from the
early Hegel of the Phenomenology to the late Hegel of the Aesthetics—and
indeed the 1237 pages of the Aesthetics conclude and culminate with a
stunning interpretation of Hamlet—in modern tragedy individuals do not
act for the sake of the substance of ethical life. What presses for satisfac-
tion, rather, is the subjectivity of their private character. In ancient tragedy,
the conflict at the heart of the substance of ethical life finds expression in
opposed but equally justified characters, each of whom embodies a clear
10 Benjamin 1989, 101.

11 See Williams 1966.
‘pathos’: Antigone versus Creon, or Orestes versus Clytaemnestra. How-

ever, if conflict in ancient tragedy finds articulation in the externality of
substance, then in modern tragedy the conflict is internal to subjectivity.
Hegel and Schelling seem initially very similar on this point. Hegel
asserts that in the portrayal of individual characters Shakespeare stands
‘at an almost unapproachable height’, making his creations ‘free artists
of their own selves’.12 As such, Shakespeare’s tragic characters are ‘real,
directly living, extremely varied’ and possessing a ‘sublimity and striking
power of expression’. Yet—and here comes the dialectical underside of
this claim—creatures like Hamlet lack any resolution and capacity for
decision. They are dithering figures in the grip of ‘a twofold passion which
drives them from one decision or one deed to another simultaneously’. In
other words, thinking of Schmitt, they are Hamletized, vacillating char-
acters inwardly divided against themselves. Upheld only by the force of
their conflicted subjectivity, characters like Hamlet or Lear either plunge
blindly onwards or allow themselves to be lured to their avenging deed by
external circumstances, led along, that is, by contingency.
In the vast sweep of an ancient dramatic trilogy, like the Oresteia, what
is at stake in the agon or dramatic conflict is eternal justice shaped by
the power of fate, which saves the substance of the ethical life of the city
against individuals, like Orestes and Clytaemnestra, who were becoming
too independent and colliding violently with each other.13 Hegel insists,
and I think he is right, that if a similar justice appears in modern trag-
edy, then it is more like criminal justice, where—as with Macbeth or with
Lear’s daughters—a wrong has been committed and the protagonists
deserve the nasty demise that’s coming to them. Tragic denouement in
Shakespearean tragedy is not the rigorous working out of fate, but ‘purely
the effect of unfortunate circumstances and external accidents which
might have turned out otherwise and produced a happy ending’.14 Hegel
enjoyed a happy ending, as we will see presently, but the point is that the
modern individual must endure the contingency and fragility of ‘all that
is mundane and must endure the fate of finitude’.
Yet—and this is where Hegel’s remarks on Hamlet begin to cut much
deeper—the problem is that we cannot bear this contingency. Hegel argues
that, ‘[. . .] we feel a pressing demand for a necessary correspondence
12 Hegel 1975, 1217 f.

13 Ref. Hegel’s essay on Natural Law.
14 Hegel 1975, 1231.
136 simon critchley
between the external circumstances and what the inner nature of those
fine characters really is.’15
Thus, we want Hamlet’s death not simply to be the effect of chance,
owing to the accidental switch of poisoned rapiers. The Tragicall Histo-
rie of Hamlet, Prince of Denmarke affects its audience profoundly and it
seems that there is a deep need—at once aesthetic and moral—for some-
thing greater than mere accident. It is as if there is something unbear-
able about the contingency of life that finds articulation in Hamlet and
elsewhere in Shakespeare. This is what leads, I think, to the longing
for a Catholic Shakespeare in Schelling, to Benjamin’s claim that Hamlet
is a Christian tragedy of Providence or indeed the nostalgic memory
of that Christian longing in Schmitt. It is the yearning for a redemptive
artwork that would both reveal our modern, alienated condition and heal
it. It is a nostalgic yearning for reconciliation between the individual and
the cosmic order that one finds all over Shakespeare criticism.
Such nostalgia is indeed one way of interpreting the character of Ham-
let, bound by a longing that is his very paralysis. From his warped idealiza-
tion of his father as a lost hyperion who offers one assurance of a man, to
his dream of a perfected act that does not overstep the modesty of nature
and strikes at the exactly right time, to his overblown rage centered on
the thought of multifarious villains—‘O villain, villain, smiling, damned
villain!’ ‘That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain’—Hamlet might
be seen as a conservative rebellion against the contingency and atomized
anomie of the new social order. And, not to belabor the Freudian points, his
chief complaints center on the figures of his Oedipal triangle—himself,
his mother, and Claudius—with the dead father propped up as all that
is right in a world gone to hell. Perhaps it is this yearning for a Catholic
Shakespeare which must be given up in order to see Hamlet aright and see
ourselves in its light. Perhaps we will have to dispense with the Ghost’s
Purgatorial prayer for an unadulterated life, for Catholic absolution, for
an absolute. In a deep sense, that I try to explain in a forthcoming book,
Hamlet is a tragi-comic melodrama, at times a farce.
2.1 Hegel Likes a Happy Ending

Hegel doesn’t put it as strongly as this, and, in any case, he has a dialecti-
cal trump card up his sleeve: tragedy is overcome by comedy and both
15 Hegel 1975, 1231.

are overcome by philosophy. The failure of aesthetic reconciliation leads

to the requirement for philosophical reconciliation. From a Hegelian
perspective, Schelling is wrong because his philosophical idealization of
tragedy lacks a historical understanding of art’s unfolding. For Schelling,
the structure of art in its highest expression, i.e. drama, is deduced from
tragedy. The history of art since Greek tragedy is a falling away from that
ideal. For Hegel, by contrast, not without some nostalgia for the loss of
Greek ethical life and his deep admiration for Sophocles, comedy sup-
plants tragedy, and comedy is the very element in which art dissolves
and prepares the passage for conceptual elaboration, namely philosophy.
Comedy—and one thinks both of Aristophanes, whom Hegel constantly
praises, as well as Shakespeare’s comedies and also of Hegel’s wonderful
reading of Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew in the Phenomenology of Spirit—is
the raising of art to the level of cognition where it then dissolves. Hegel’s
system is a comedy and has to be a comedy, insofar as history culminates
with the institutional expression of freedom in the form of the modern
state. Funny. This is where we could begin a meta-critique of Hegel, along
the lines one can find in the very young Marx.16 But the aesthetic point
is that perhaps Hegel will always have the last laugh, that comedy stands
higher than tragedy, and that the true comédie humaine is philosophy.
This is why Hegel likes a happy ending. He makes the brilliant remark,
that might echo in the ears of contemporary partisans of trauma, loss and
generalized aesthetic miserabilism,
I must admit that for my part a happy denouement is to be preferred. And
why not? To prefer misfortune just because it is misfortune, instead of a
happy resolution, has no other basis but a superior sentimentality which
indulges in grief and suffering and finds more interest in them than in the
painless situations that it regards as commonplace.17
The tragedy of suffering, such as we find in Sophocles, is only ethically
justified when it serves some higher outlook, such as fate, otherwise it is
simply an Eeyore-esque wallowing in misery (which, incidentally, makes
Hegel closer to Winnie the Pooh). A happy ending would be better. If
art—and Hegel is thinking in particular of Greek statuary—is the unity of
the idea and appearance in sensuous ideality, then comedy can only pres-
ent this unity as self-destruction. For Hegel, the absolute can no longer be
16 I am thinking of Marx’s ‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State’, from 1843, when
Marx was in his mid-twenties. See Marx 1975, pp. 57–198.
17 Hegel 1975, 1232.
138 simon critchley
contained within aesthetic form. Comedy is art’s dissolution and its pas-
sage beyond itself. This is why comedy is the entrance into philosophy.
And of course the turn from comedy towards philosophy out from
one’s being-as-misery-guts is already foreshadowed by Hamlet. After the
encounter with the Ghost, Hamlet cautions Horatio, ‘there are more things
in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy’, and
then promptly (and weirdly, one might add) tells him that his plan is to
put on an antic disposition. The next time we hear from Hamlet, he is
the clownish provocateur in the fishmonger scene with Polonius, followed
by the Hamlet of satirical philosophical sparring with Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern. The oscillation between tragi-comedy and philosophy, is an
imbroglio best summed up by Hamlet himself as he hurtles towards the
limits of rationality,
Hamlet O God, I could be bounded in a nut shell and count myself a king of
infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams
Guildenstern Which dreams indeed are ambition, for the very substance of
the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream.
Hamlet A dream itself is but a shadow
Rosencrantz Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality that it
is but a shadow’s shadow
Hamlet Then are our beggars bodies and our monarchs and outstretched
heroes but the beggars’ shadows—Shall we to court? For, by my fay, I can-
not reason.
Who else other than Hegel could follow Hamlet’s reasoning here, where
substance dialectically reverses into shadow, infinite space is a bad dream,
ambition is a ghost that takes flight in sleep, and a monarch is found only
in the shade of a beggar’s body. Hamlet’s self-consciousness is the Hege-
lian prowess of the tautological infinity of a nutshell—an identity that is
its own undoing. What aesthetic reconciliation can there be? Perhaps this
helps explain T. S. Eliot’s statement that Hamlet is an artistic failure, along
with his scathing critique that the longing for creative power in the mind
of a critic has led to a particular weakness where instead of studying a
work of art they find only their semblable. Goethe sees Hamlet as Goethe
and Coleridge sees Hamlet as Coleridge.
3. Hamlet is a Lost Man
What finds expression in Schelling and the shoals of philosophers and

literary critics who swim in his wake, beginning with Coleridge, is an aes-
thetic absolutism. This is the conviction that the antinomies of modernity
can be reconciled in a dramatic total artwork that would restore the sub-
stantiality of ethical life in a tragically sublime act. Having seen the old
order dissolve into suspicion, surveillance and political violence, we get it
all back in a new and reconciled form with God in his heaven and a true
king on his throne. Against this, what I think Hegel’s reading of Hamlet
adumbrates, is that reconciliation in modern tragedy is a fake reconcili-
ation. It shows how the desire for an absolute unravels into an experi-
ence of self-dissolution and non-identity. The final scene of Hamlet, like
the final scene of King Lear, is not the triumph of some Christian idea
of providence nor is any rebirth of Attic tragedy. It is simply a stage full of
corpses, what Adorno perspicuously sees as a crowd of puppets on a
string, what James Joyce sees, in an eerily prophetic remark, ‘The blood-
boltered shambles in act five is a forecast of the concentration camp’.18
In other words, Hamlet is a Trauerspiel whose force is tragi-comic and
whose macabre ending verges on the melodramatic. As Melville writes of
Hamlet in Pierre: or, The Ambiguities, he falls ‘dabbling in the vomit of his
loathed identity’.
But there is one further and fascinating twist in the tail of Hegel’s read-
ing of Hamlet. Looked at from the outside, it might seem that Hamlet’s
death is accidentally caused by the unfortunate switcheroo of swords. But,
on two occasions, Hegel advances a brief but perspicuous psychological
profile of the Danish prince. What he finds inside Hamlet is morbidity,
melancholy, worry, weakness and most of all, in a word repeated three
times in these passages, disgust. Hegel writes,
But death lay from the beginning in the background of Hamlet’s mind. The
sands of time do not content him. In his melancholy and weakness, his
worry, his disgust at all the affairs of life, we sense from the start that in all
his terrible surroundings he is a lost man, almost consumed by inner disgust
before death comes to him from outside.19
Hamlet is a lost man. He is the wrong man. He should never have been
commanded by the Ghost to avenge his murder. His disgust with the
world induces not action but acedia, a slothful lethargy. Hamlet just lacks
the energy. As Hegel writes,
His noble soul was not made for this kind of energetic activity; and, full
of disgust with the world and life what with decision, proof, arrange-
ments for carrying out his resolve, and being bandied from pillar to post,
18 Joyce 1986, 154.

19 Hegel 1975, 1231 f.
140 simon critchley
he eventually perishes owing to his own hesitation and a complication of

external circumstances.20
It is my contention that will be elaborated below that what is caught sight
of by Hegel is a Hamlet Doctrine that turns on the corrosive dialectic of
knowledge and action, where the former disables the latter and insight
into the truth induces a disgust with existence. Rubbernecking the chaos
and wreckage of the world that surrounds him while chattering and pun-
ning endlessly, he finally finds himself fatally struck and strikes out impet-
uously, asking Horatio to sing him a lullaby.21 Do we even like Hamlet? Is
he a nice guy? I don’t think so.
3.1 Hamlet’s Multiple Misrecognitions

Let me conclude with some remarks on the tragedy of misrecognition in
Hamlet. The melancholic Danish prince misrecognizes Polonius for the
King when he kills the former thinking it was the latter. He misrecognizes
Ophelia for his mother, saying to her all the nasty things he wanted to say
to Gertrude, ‘Get thy way to a nunnery’, ‘God gave you one face and you
make yourselves another’, and so on. Hamlet calls Ophelia the whore that
he suspects his mother to be. Hamlet confuses Gertrude with Claudius
and Claudius wit Gertrude. In one amazing moment, he even calls Clau-
dius his mother. When the King protests, Hamlet’s reasoning is as follows,
‘Father and mother is man and wife. Man and wife is one flesh—and so:
my mother’.
Hamlet cannot strike out at the one he hates—namely, Claudius—
and whom he cannot kill. He can only kill the one he idealizes, namely
Laertes, who is a kind of double for Hamlet. He says of Laertes, ‘By the
image of my cause I see the portraiture of his’. Laertes is a mirror that
Hamlet holds up to himself and, as we’ve known since Lacan, all that we
experience in the mirror is misrecognition or méconnaissance, not our-
selves but some imaginary other that fascinates us and holds us in thrall
to our self-deception. It is not myself that I see in the mirror, but some
sickly, captivating reflection that I am not.
But Hamlet’s most fundamental misrecognition is in his relation to his
own desire. He cannot recognize his own desire because he always lives
through the desire of the other, doing the other’s bidding. Even if they
20 Hegel 1975, 1226.

21 Some of this formulations are borrowed from Elizabeth Bryant.
share the same name (which was an innovation that, somewhat mysteri-
ously, Shakespeare added to the source texts for the Hamlet story), the
desire to revenge his father’s murder is the Ghost’s desire, not his own.
Hamlet Senior commands Hamlet Junior. He is also in lockstep with his
mother’s desire throughout the play. It is not a question of Hamlet’s own
desire that perplexes and punishes him. It is the enigma of her desire.
What does Gertrude want? Was will das Weib?
At either end of the play, when Hamlet suspends his wish to return to
Wittenberg (good old protestant Lutherstadt), it is the desire of Claudius.
Similarly, the whole conceit that leads up to the final, fatal, foil fight is
not Hamlet’s plan; it is Claudius’s. Hamlet dies wearing his enemy’s colors.
Hamlet does not live in his own time or at his own hour, but at the time
and hour of the other.
Hamlet’s desire is deeply inhibited and inhibition turns inward into a
narcissistic melancholy that is unable to sustain any love for the living.
Hamlet only loves what is dead: his idealized ghostly phallic father; the
old court fool whose skull he idly toys with, Yorick; and poor Ophelia. His
narcissistic desire is only unleashed in relation to the other qua dead, i.e.
qua impossibility. It is only when Ophelia is dead that Hamlet can declare
his love for her, screaming in the grave in a life and death struggle with his
double, Laertes,
I loved Ophelia. Forty thousand brothers
Could not, with all their quantity of love,
Make up my sum.
Hamlet’s dazzling linguistic brilliance—his ceaseless punning, antic dis-
position and manic ratiocination—flows directly from his narcissistic
inhibition of desire. Dostoevsky famously wrote in The Brothers Karama-
zov that hell is the incapacity to love. The Ghost of his father might well
spend his days in painful, purgatorial fire, but Hamlet is in hell. This is
why Denmark is a prison. This is why the world is a prison.
To make things even worse, Hamlet is a very bad Aristotelian. He under-
goes no reversal or peripeteia, nor does he experience any recognition or
anagnoreisis. This is why Hegel is right to insist that Hamlet is a lost man.
Furthermore, in my view, Hamlet—the play, not the persona—permits
no katharsis, no release or sublimation or purification of desire (how-
ever we understand that fuzzy and hard-to-define Aristotelian concept).
Hamlet—the persona and not the play—exhibits a relentless intelligence,
a melancholy inwardness that occasionally flips over into manic energy
and exuberance. But we feel no release at the end of the play, which, of
142 simon critchley
course, is Shakespeare’s longest (Hamlet in its entirety sometimes feels

like Hamlet in its eternity). From beginning to end, the sheer violence
and percussive power of Shakespeare’s language has us rolling around
on the floor or biting the carpet. And nor should Hamlet permit us any
katharsis. If Hamlet is the quintessentially modern tragedy, this is because
it enacts the tragedy of modernity, which also allows us no relief, release
or the satisfaction of desire. Hamlet is a wonderful, proto-Beckettian tragi-
comedy, a Trauerspiel without redemption, a mournful, melancholic and
melodramatic farce.
And so is our world.
Literature
Benjamin, Walter (1989), The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. J. Osborne. London:
Verso.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1975): Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Vol. 2.
Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Joyce, James (1986): Ulysses. Ed. H. W. Gabler et al. London : Bodely Head.
Marx, Karl (1975): Early Writings. Ed. L. Coletti. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Nietzsche, Friedrich (1967): The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner. Trans. W. Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage.
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1989): The Philosophy of Art. Ed., trans., and introd. by
Douglas W. Scott. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
Williams, Raymond (1966): Modern Tragedy. London: Chatto and Windus.
Chapter Eight
Recognition and Dissent

Schelling’s conception of recognition and its
contribution to contemporary political philosophY
Emiliano Acosta
In the present chapter I offer an alternative notion of recognition consist-

ing in understanding it in terms of fundamental and foundational dissent.
By dissent I primarily mean the action of not-accepting the (universal)
validity of a proposition or a system of propositions (e.g. a law, a request,
a right, a duty, a set of moral or ethical values or a particular vision of
the world) without necessarily offering at the same time an alternative
to what has been refused. Dissent is fundamental when it consists in
not-accepting the principles supporting a determinate request. Dissent is
foundational, when the discrepancy between the parts necessarily leads
to the establishment of a new framework (set of values, set of rules for a
rational discussion, etc.), in which the subjectivities involved in this act
can be integrated as well as freely express and defend their positions with-
out declining their original demands nor losing their original identities.
My thesis is that thinking of recognition in terms of dissent makes vis-
ible some problems in the usual understanding of recognition in contem-
porary debates on ethics, politics and right, such as the one about the
conditions for a fair dialogue between cultures and/or religions. In doing
so, this alternative to the broadly used concept of recognition opens up
the possibility for reconsidering the way how the theoretic framework in
such debates uses to be built up. This alternative comprehension of rec-
ognition is based on Schelling’s New Deduction of Natural Right (1795/96).
I will firstly examine the widespread notion of recognition, according to
which recognition basically consists in social inclusion of individuals in an
already established social order or system of values and meanings. I will
analyze two cases of the modern struggle for recognition and very briefly
refer to Kant’s and Fichte’s accounts on recognition in order to illustrate
this way of conceiving and materializing recognition and to identify its
critical points. Then I will offer a reconstruction of Schelling’s concept of
recognition and show at what extent his account on recognition can be
144 emiliano acosta
employed to solve the critical points in the traditional understanding of

recognition and of some of its related concepts.
Introduction
Without a doubt the concept of recognition is one of the most significant

contributions of German Idealism to the history of philosophy. Unlike
other concepts and methodological tools developed by German Idealism,
which also have been treated in other periods of the history of Western
Thought (such as the deduction of the categories or the conflict between
morality and law), the question of recognition belongs originally to Ger-
man Idealism. Indeed, German Idealists have been the first philosophers
who have made of this question a philosophical problem and who have
conceived it as fundamental part of a philosophical system. Furthermore,
the concept of recognition enjoys in our present a remarkable potential to
question some presuppositions in the fields of politics, morals, ethics and
philosophy of right as well as to philosophically open up the phenome-
non of inter-subjectivity in its own complexity. This is why recognition—
unlike other concepts of German Idealism, which in our days can only be
a subject for a historiography of the philosophy—is present and at work
in fundamental contemporary political philosophical debates such as the
debate on distribution and recognition.1
Nevertheless, the diversity of conceptions of recognition in German
Idealism remains still almost unexplored. On the one hand, in current
political philosophy, for example, it is taken for granted that Hegel’s con-
cept of recognition is the only one forged by German Idealism or it is
the only one that deserves to be examined or criticized. The first claim
can be traced back to a certain lack of information or to a narrow con-
cept of recognition. The second claim is supported by the conviction that
Hegel’s account is the only one that has been consistently and completely
developed. Accordingly, other conceptions of recognition are considered
as uncompleted or deficient variations of the same idea and as such they
can and must, for that reason, be subsumed in Hegel’s account. However,
a first exploration in the conceptions of recognition in the German Ideal-
ism (Schiller’s, Schelling’s, Fichte’s and Hegel’s perspectives on this topic)
let see that the differences between them lie in fundamental points such
1 See i.a. Fraser/Honneth 2003; Fowler 2009; and Jerlinder/Danermark/Gill 2009.

recognition and dissent 145
as the method, the way of considering the relationship between identity

and difference and between unity, duality, particularity and totality, and
the manner how rationality, destination of man and moral individual are
conceived. So, a classification of these conceptions of recognition as mere
variations of the same concept or idea actually obscures the originality
of the contributions of these philosophers. Therefore, only lack of infor-
mation or the denial of the relevance of each of these accounts, makes
possible the usual identification of “Hegel’s concept of recognition” with
“recognition in German Idealism”.2
On the other hand, philosophical research on recognition in German
Idealism has been hitherto almost exclusively concentrated on Hegel’s
concept of recognition, be it focusing on topics such as the differences
and similarities between the concepts of recognition Hegel has elaborated
in his Jena period, in his Phenomenology of Spirit and in his philosophy
of right,3 be it privileging one of this versions over the others.4 Although
Fichte’s theory on recognition uses to be mentioned as well, it is very often
described as a previous (unsatisfactory, incomplete?) step to Hegel.5
I do not ignore that scholars recently have directed their attention to
philosophers like Schiller, Schelling and Fichte in order to reconstruct
their particular views on recognition within German Idealism6 as well as
to other 18th Century thinkers, such as Rousseau, who have influenced the
political and moral thinking of German Idealists.7 Some of these new con-
tributions attempt at showing the specific character recognition embodies
in each case. Nevertheless, concerning Schelling’s concept of recognition
2 See Honneth 1996; Fraser 1995 & 2000; Fraser/Honneth 2003; Deranty/Petherbridge/
Rundell/Sinnerbrink 2007.
3 See Williams 1997.
4 Among the scholars that privilege Hegel’s understanding of recognition during his
Jena period over the later systematization of recognition in the horizon of a history of
self-consciousness, we would like to mention Siep (1974, 155–207), Habermas (1973, 161 f.;
1988, 43 and 94) and Honneth (1996, 5, 18, 29 and 107). About the significance that the
displacement of the focus from the Phenomenology of Spirit to Hegel’s Jena writings had
for the studies on recognition, see Williams 1997, 13 ff. and Sherman 1999, 206–207. For
criticisms against Honneth’s and Habermas’ interpretations see: De la Maza 2009, 227–251
and Williams 1997, 14.
Among the scholars who on the contrary give more importance to the concept of rec-
ognition as it has been developed in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit, we can mention
A. Kojève (1980), maybe one of the most influential representatives of this current. For
most recent contributions see i.a. Cobben 2002 and Josifovich 2008.
5 See Siep 1998, 113 and 122; 2010, 98; Habermas 1973, 162; Honneth 1996, 12, 16–17;
Williams 1992, 63 f.
6 See Acosta 2012; Rockmore/Breazeale 2006 and Conde/Maraguat 2011.
7 See Neuhouser 2008.
146 emiliano acosta
there has still not been an examination of the particularity of his account,
namely his proposal of thinking recognition in terms of dissent. On the
contrary, scholars seem to overlook the fact that, as I will show, for Schell-
ing the foundational conflict between the individuals described in his New
Deduction of Natural Right is a condition of possibility for the establish-
ment of what Schelling calls the moral world and, consequently, for the
constitution of subjectivities as moral individuals. Some of them consider
Schelling’s systematization of the act of dissenting as a threat for morality;8
other scholars see in Schelling’s view of recognition only a “resilient indi-
vidualism” opposed to Fichte’s “social or intersubjective account”;9 other,
finally, focus on the difference between Fichte and Schelling concerning
the legitimation of right by each philosopher, without wondering if these
differences are to be related to the difference between Schelling’s and
Fichte’s concepts of recognition.10 Hence, it seems that the problem in
recovering Schelling’s own concept of recognition is not the use of Hegel’s
concept of recognition as interpretative criterion, but the decision of
the interpreters of examining Schelling’s concept of recognition from a
Fichtean perspective.
1. Recognition as Inclusion in an Already Established Status Quo
The concept of recognition basically refers to an act by means of which the

parts involved in this action acknowledge each other as equals. This act
can consist in recognizing the dignity, the rights and the liberties of the
other as a human being, as a citizen or as a worthy member of a par-
ticular social body in a broad sense. Normally the act of recognition
brings together individuals that already have been included in a certain
class (the humanity, a particular social and/or political body, etc.) and
others that until then were not recognized as equals and therefore have
been hitherto excluded from the benefits of belonging to the concerned
group. Hence, recognizing each other as equals implies for both parts a
certain change in the manner of thinking of humanity, rationality and/
or citizenship and, consequently, of considering oneself as a human
and rational being and as a citizen. So, recognition is an inter-subjective
8 Cf. Conde 2011, 41.

9 Vater 2006, 207–209.
10 See Hoeltzel 2006, 212–226.
action by means of which subjectivities re-constitute their identities

reciprocally. Accordingly, identity is always a process where the other(s)
essentially take(s) part. Recognition, then, implies a modification of both
parts involved in this act. Furthermore, if we pay attention to the mod-
ern struggle for recognition as well as to the appliance of this concept in
contemporary political philosophy, then we will see that recognition is
always conceived in terms of inclusion in an already established order
and that the argumentation in every claim for recognition is based on the
acceptance of the legitimacy of this order and on an agreement about
the basic principles of the discussion. However, this situation let arise an
asymmetry between the excluding actors (who are required to include
the others) and the excluded (and therefore to be integrated) individu-
als. For on the one hand the status quo, the legitimacy of which is rec-
ognized by both parts, has been unilaterally established, namely only by
the part required to recognize the other; on the other hand the principles
for “rationally” discussing, the set of moral values and the meaning of the
words that are at work in the respective struggle are provided exclusively
by the same part. As a consequence, excluding actors, the authority or
social body, enjoy a position in the discussion higher than the position
of the excluded. And such an asymmetry happens even if the respective
discourse is articulated by the excluded individuals, since what it has to
be recognized in their discourses is the belonging of the hitherto excluded
individuals to the group or class, which one of the parts, the including
one, belongs to. In other words: even when the demand for recognition
comes from the excluded part, the argument is based on the set of values
and the vision of the world of the excluding part.
In order to illustrate these initial considerations, I will now refer to two
cases of the modern struggle for recognition: the emancipative discourse
of B. De Las Casas arguing for recognition of the humanity of Amerindi-
ans, and the emancipative discourse of M. Astell arguing for recognition
of the equality between men and women.
1.1 B. De Las Casas and M. Astell’s Struggle For Recognition

As Laclau and Mouffe affirm, every struggle for recognition of rights
and liberties or of gender, social, religious, economic or cultural equal-
ity begins with the emergence or rise of a particular idea concerning
equality, freedom or brotherhood (a democratic discourse). This idea
transforms the sense people give to a certain relation of subordination,
commonly accepted or tolerated until that moment, letting it then appear
148 emiliano acosta
as a situation of domination or oppression. This displacement of meaning

opens up the possibility for subverting or simply transforming the men-
tioned relation by means of a determined emancipative praxis.11
In the case of Bartolome De Las Casas (1484–1566) the discourse is
articulated by a member of the excluding and oppressing part. De Las
Casas was a Dominican friar who beside of having been the first resident
Bishop of Chiapas, was the first subject of the Spanish monarchy who
openly denounced the atrocities committed by the Spanish colonizers
against the indigenous peoples. Now, the idea that let De Las Casas see
these atrocities as such is that we all are God’s children and, consequently,
everyone deserves to be treated equally. A crime against an aboriginal is a
crime against humanity and therefore against its creator, God. The argu-
ment of De Las Casas is based on the same principles of the authorities.
His strategy to convince the Spanish authorities of the rightness and fair-
ness of his claim basically consists in making them aware that they are not
acting upon the (moral, religious, scientific) principles they recognize as
true and, consequently, their acts contradict the Divine Will. So, De Las
Casas’ emancipative discourse is not against the principles of the oppres-
sors, but he is requiring them to act consistently.
In his A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies (1552), addressed
to prince Philip II (later king of Spain), De Las Casas claims that the
Amerindians must be recognized, firstly, as human beings and, secondly,
as subjects of the Spanish Crown. The dispute initiated by De Las Casas is
based on the implicit agreement between him and the Spanish authorities
in following two points: firstly, the Christian religion is the true one and,
secondly, the Spanish occupation and annexation of the “New World” is
not an act against any kind of justice or natural or positive right. Indeed,
for De Las Casas there is no difference between human being and God’s
child. Moreover, he did not recognize the sovereignty of the Amerindian
authorities nor their institutions. Consequently, the aboriginals are not
actually recognized as what they really are, but as children of a foreign
god, the Christian God, and subjects of a foreign king, the Spanish mon-
arch. So, the recognition of the humanity of Amerindians begins with or
is only possible by means of neglecting the particularity of Amerindians.
B. De las Casas identifies rationality with the 16th Century Spanish com-
mon way of thinking, judging reality, and private and publicly behaving.
Indeed, one of the arguments of De Las Casas for the recognition of the
11 Cf. Laclau/Mouffe 1987, 173.

humanity of the Amerindians (which implies that they have souls, which
also have to be saved for the glory of God) consists in demonstrating that
Amerindians can and want to learn the truth revealed in the Holy Scrip-
tures and that they would very easily be integrated in civil life according
to the laws and customs of the Spanish Kingdom.12
Let us now consider an emancipative discourse articulated by the other
part in the modern struggle for recognition, namely by the excluded/disre-
spected or disregarded individual or group. At the end of the well-known
Querelle des Dames, a philosophical and theological debate initiated actu-
ally by male theologians and philosophers, where the main questions
were whether women are human beings and whether they have a soul,
and where the arguments for the equality between man and woman were
principally based on the Christian conception of man and woman as cre-
ated in God’s own image, we find Mary Astell (1666–1731) advocating for
equality between man and woman with arguments deduced from the
Christian Beliefs too. She said for example: “If God had not intended that
Women shou’d use their Reason, He wou’d not have given them any, ‘for
He does nothing in vain’ ”.13 Like De Las Casas, her strategy consists in
radicalizing the moral and religious values and the interpretation of real-
ity of the excluding part in order to show their inconsistency. Like De Las
Casas, Astell is saying to the authorities: if what you say is true, namely
if God is almighty, you have to recognize that we, women and men, are
equals. As one can see, her attack is not directed against the principles of
the world-view of the authorities, but against the misapplication of them.
Put in her own words: “If all men are born free, how is it that all women
are born slaves?”14
Despite her challenging spirit, her discourse cannot emancipate from
the ideology of the excluding authority. Indeed, this subjectivity (M. Astell)
does not introduce itself as a woman but, as the title of one of his pam-
phlets reads, as Daughter of the Church of England. She is, consequently,
not recognized as a women, but as what the other part consider a worthy
human being. She is then recognized as an equal, only because she shares
the same religious and political convictions of the authority. Let us say
it again: this strategy of radicalization did not mean a criticism of the
principles supported by the authorities, but of the way they interpret and
12 Cf. De Las Casas 2009, 15–16.

13 Astell 1705, 6 (quoted from Sutherland 2005, 97).
14 Astell, M.: Some Reflections on Marriage. 4th ed. with additions. London: Printed for
W. Parker, 1730, p. 150.
150 emiliano acosta
apply them. Thus, her criticism departs from her acceptation of the moral
values and world-view of her oppressors. This explains why for M. Astell
there is nothing wrong in the identification, implied in her emancipative
discourse, between “member of the Church of England” with human being.
This also clarifies why for M. Astell her struggle for equality does not enter
in contradiction with her support of a theocratic government form, which
is a political system based on the idea of an original inequality between
the members of the royal family and the plebs in a kingdom. If we do
not understand this discursive strategy and its unavoidable undesirable
effects, then we will not understand why she, despite the emancipative
and egalitarian character of her claim, was a monarchist and then we will
believe of having found contradictions in her thinking.15
In both mentioned cases recognition is attempted by means of radical-
izing the principles sustaining the discourse of the respective oppressor/
excluding part. This radicalization process presupposes that both parts
share the same principles and world-view. But this is only possible if one
of both parts, the disregarded/excluded one, succeeds in becoming the
other (the Amerindians become Christians, women become members of
the Church of England). This process of becoming an Other is always posi-
tively regarded as a practice of ‘purification’ or progress in the develop-
ment of the rationality and freedom of the concerned individuals. Hence,
this particular mode of recognition, consisting in inclusion of individuals
in an already established social order, is based on a process of identifica-
tion of both parts that implies the necessity of a purification of the indi-
vidual identities belonging to the excluded part in the struggle.
1.2 Kant and Fichte

If we take a look to pre-Hegelian philosophical accounts on recognition
we will find the same logic of inclusion by means of identification and
purification. Kant’s appeal for the recognition of the dignity of all men
without distinctions, for example, consists in the inclusion of all individu-
als under a concept of humanity that presupposes among other elements a
particular concept of freedom, duty and rationality, and as a consequence
15 An example of this kind of misinterpretation of Astell’s way of thinking can be found

in R. Perry article on Mary Astell: “All the contradictions of the period we call ‘The Enlight-
enment’ were embodied in the life and writings of Mary Astell, a feminist intellectual
who lived from 1666 to 1731. She argued for the rights of women yet she upheld absolute
monarchy in the state” (Perry 1984, 13).
of these premises, also a particular emancipative program for the human-

kind inserted in a teleological view of history in terms of a secularized
History of Salvation.16 Every individual (the others) is, according to Kant,
worth to be treated as a rational being. This is for Kant a duty for every ratio-
nal being, and neglecting this duty is a crime against humanity.17 But this
generous and charitable gesture presupposes a certain act of the excluded
individuals consisting in really becoming a rational (free) being, namely,
in emancipating from “its self-incurred immaturity, primarily in terms of
religious matters”.18 Kant’s enlightened emancipative discourse requires
the individual to change his or her identity in order to be recognize/
include in the big family of humanity. The same way of arguing can be
found in Fichte’s concept of recognition. Not without reason one of its
core concepts is the summon (Aufforderung) to freely act in the world.19 The
other element of Fichte’s theory of recognition which is common with
the two analyzed cases is the appeal to an epistemological or argumenta-
tive objective instance in order to show the inconsistency of the discourse
and pretensions of the part that does not want to recognize the other.20
1.3 Problems Inherent to this Manner of Conceiving Recognition

The radicalizing process in both analyzed discourses is not a criticism of the
intension of the concept of human being defended by the excluding
part, but a critical revision of the extension of the same concept. So, the
struggle and the later inclusion of certain individuals does not produce
any substantial change in the conception of human being inherent to the
respective oppressive discourse, but merely a growth of its extension.
The meaning horizon that served to justify the exclusion or misrecogni-
tion of some individuals or social groups does not suffer any change. The
discourse of the oppressor certainly no longer neglect the fact that, for
example, women and Aboriginals are rational and human beings as well,
but keeps neglecting a different (broader) idea of equality, which would
make visible, for example, that also non-catholic people do not deserve to
be treated as slaves or “beings without soul” (no-rational beings or things)
and that there is no ontological difference between kings and plebs and
16 See Kant 2006a, 2006b.

17 Kant 2006b, 21.
18 Kant 2006b, 22.
19 Cf. Fichte 2000, 37–39.
20 Fichte 2000, 46–47.
152 emiliano acosta
that therefore a monarchy based on theological arguments is as contrary

to reason as women discrimination. Hence, in the two described cases
the struggle for recognition based on radicalizing the principles of the
excluded part certainly enables excluded people to consider his or her
situation as unfair, but it reaffirms the excluding potential of the concept
of humanity the excluded wanted to be part of. In this sense, it can be said
that the illustrated emancipative discourses are progressive and conserva-
tive at the same time.
Recognition implies a reciprocal influence between the parts involved
in this action. This reciprocity naturally leads to a transformation of the
implicated subjectivities. But in the analyzed cases the transformation of
each of both parts is different. Indeed, the including agent changes merely
quantitatively his or her concepts, which his or her way of considering
and treating the hitherto excluded individual(s) was based on. What on
the side of the including actor changes is only the extension of the con-
cept of humanity. On this side of the struggle it is said: “X is also worth
to be treated as a rational being”, “(s)he is one of us”. But, the meaning
of “rational being” or of this “us” is not put under discussion. Quite differ-
ent is the kind of transformation the act of recognition demands to the
excluded individual(s): they effectively suffer a qualitative change, since
they cease to be what they were in order to adopt a new identity.
So, we see that in the analyzed cases the reciprocity of the act of recog-
nition implies an asymmetrical relationship between the involved parts.
Recognizing the dignity, the humanity, the rights or the freedom of the
Other(s) means in these cases recognizing that the Other is actually not
an Other, but an individual with the same predicates belonging to the
including group. This is what I would like to call recognition according to
a logic of identity. The inclusion of the other(s) occurs through identifica-
tion of the excluded with the set of values and ideas of the including group.
As a consequence, the otherness of the other(s) is not recognized as such,
but exclusively as something that hinders the demanded recognition.
The real problem arises, as soon as we realize that this neglected other-
ness is always the conflictive point in the struggle. The struggle is actu-
ally never solved, but repressed. The inclusion implied in the described
manner of understanding and realizing recognition results in a transfor-
mation of the identity of the individuals that were until then excluded.
Excluded individuals cease to be or to have the predicate(s) that hindered
the demanded recognition: in order to be recognized as equals, Amerin-
dians become God’s Children, women become members of the Church
of England. In both cases the difference that originated the conflict is

neutralized by neglecting it. The real source of the problem, namely the
conflictive point in each case that contradicted the established social
order and could contribute for a revision and transformation of this order,
is never identified nor treated. In these cases the struggle can certainly
lead to the integration in the social body of hitherto excluded individuals,
but cannot guarantee the ceasing of the mechanisms of exclusion inher-
ent to the respective social order nor the repetition of these mechanisms
by the new integrated members.
So, we can now see how this kind of recognition functions: only those
individuals who accept the rules and the principles, on which the respec-
tive universality (citizenship, humanity, etc.) is built, are recognized as
equals. Consequently, excluded individuals can only be recognized (be
respected, heard and understood), if they adapt their individuality to
the criteria of the respective universality, namely, if they are able, like
Shakespeare’s Caliban, to articulate their demands in the language of the
oppressor. The inclusion of new groups is exerted by means of a logic of
identification.
Inclusion by means of identification and transformation of the iden-
tity is inherent to the usual concept of recognition. Identification consists
here in a transformation of the identity of the excluded subjectivities.
This transformation appears as a process of purification of the individuals.
Accordingly, the particularity of the individuals, their otherness, is con-
sidered as a contaminating element, which everyone must emancipate
from, in order to be accepted as a worthy member of the community. In
the model of recognition according to a logic of identity the conflict that
originated the struggle, remains always outside of the discussion, since the
rational discussion about whether the respective individuals deserve to be
recognize as equals is only possible if the excluded individuals adapt their
discourse to the principles of the other part. As a consequence, the real
problem is never visible, namely, the challenge of accepting, tolerating
and valuing this singularity, this otherness, that disagrees with and ques-
tions the established social order.
2. Schelling’s Concept of Recognition
But, how must recognition be conceived in order to solve the mentioned

problems? I have suggested that Schelling’s account on recognition in his
154 emiliano acosta
New Deduction of Natural Right (1796/97)21 can serve as a model for such
a conception of recognition. I will now examine his concept of recogni-
tion in this early essay paying special attention to how subjectivity and
intersubjectivity (principally understood as a community of moral beings
or the moral world) are constituted, how new social actors are integrated
in this community, how a fair framework for discussion is established,
and, finally, what rationality and tolerance do mean within this theory of
recognition.
2.1 Dissenting and Resisting the Will of the Other

Recognition happens for Schelling essentially and initially by means of
dissenting, i.e. individuals can be recognized as rational and free beings
only in and through the act of dissenting. This is precisely what Schelling
in the footnote to the § 15 of his Natural Right states:
That a being similar to myself on outward appearance can be modified by
my purposive intention is no proof that it is human; it could be a teachable
animal. This is confirmed by the observation that those whose demands
never meet the resistance of another human will eventually lose respect for
the docile human species, and finally for human dignity itself. Only when I
address the will of another and when he rejects my demands with his cat-
egorical “I will not! ” or else when he is willing to give up his freedom for the
price of mine, do I recognize that behind his face there dwells humanity,
and in his breast freedom.22
The described encounter of rational beings by means of which reciprocal
recognition happens, materializes in the form and dynamic of dissent. The
categorical “I will not” or its correlative expressed in the will of, if needed,
clashing against the other, are two ways of resisting the overwhelming
pretensions of the other individual. Resistance against a determined par-
ticular will is for Schelling the original manifestation of rationality. On the
contrary, agreeing with or simply following the will of the other(s), does
not necessarily proof for Schelling that the concerned individual is ratio-
nal. So, in resisting what the other pursues or in experiencing a resistance
to the own purpose, individuals constitute as rational beings and recog-
nize each other as such. One could argue that this inherence between
recognition and dissent is for Schelling contingent, but according to his
deduction this conflictive scenario of dissent is necessary, since it is i) a
21 Schelling 1980. From now on quoted as NDNR.

22 NDNR 223.
condition of possibility for the realization of the supreme demand each

individual manifestation of reason in time and space necessarily follows;
ii) it is as such a consequence necessarily deduced from Schelling’s con-
ception of individual subjectivity; and iii) it is condition of possibility for
conceiving ethics and right as necessary moments in the establishment
of a fair society.
2.2 Subjectivity and Subjectivities (Unarticulated Multiplicity)

Schelling conceives the individual rational being essentially as a power, a
force, whose destination (Bestimmung) consists in striving at accomplish-
ing the supreme imperative of universal reason. This imperative says: “Be!
In the highest sense of the word; cease to be yourself as a phenomenon;
endeavour to be a noumenon as such!”23 For Schelling being and acting
are—applied to the case of the rational being—two ways of referring to
the very same thing. Individuals are nothing but actions directed to let
absolute freedom appear on earth. By absolute freedom Schelling means
becoming a force without any resistance at all: “[e]ndeavour to subject
every heteronomous power to your own autonomy, endeavour by free-
dom to extend your freedom to an absolute, illimitable power.”24 Hence,
a rational being is originally nothing but a dynamic process of acting in
and transforming the world. This is why the principle is enunciated in the
form of a practical postulate or imperative. In order to become a “nou-
menon as such”, i.e. to make real the absolute (unconditional) freedom of
reason, the individualized reason must impose its will in the world.
Nevertheless, this individualized reason is not alone in the world.
According to the presupposition that the empirical realm is the realm of
multiplicity,25 the manifestation of reason in the world cannot material-
ize in one subject, but in a multiplicity of rational individuals. As a result,
the phenomenalization of universal reason adopts the form of an unar-
ticulated plurality of rational beings, namely of forces striving at realiz-
ing a goal, which idealiter is the same, but materialiter is different, since
their actions occur in time.26 Differences among the particular perspec-
tives and pursued goals of the individuals are, consequently, necessary.
23 NDNR 221 (§ 3).

24 NDNR 222 (§ 4).
25 NDNR 224 (§ 20).
26 “§ 17: Its ultimate goal [sc. of the individual as free causality]l is not objective and
therefore not empirical. But because the free causality strives for it only in an infinite
sequence of time, its striving is empirical. § 18: Although the ultimate goal of all moral
156 emiliano acosta
Therefore, they would not have to be considered as wrong or irrational

nor they should be overcome or annihilated. Rational individuality is for
Schelling not reducible to a higher instance, be it the “right” world-vision
or set of values supported by an individual; a group or a class and then
accepted or radicalized by the other(s), be it the “right” world-vision or set
of values resulting from a consensus among the parts.
Because of its pretension of being right, namely of universal validity
of its perspective and actions, individual power can certainly always be
a threat to every community. Nevertheless, according to the premises
of Schelling’s deduction of right, this conflictive potential should not be
excluded from social life nor transformed or “purified”. This is why the
solutions Schelling offers for this problem, namely the realms of ethics
and rights, are merely strategies to administrate these powers in the less
harmful and more productive way for the community and at the same
time without committing an outrage against the sacred autonomy of each
individual.27
2.3 Intersubjectivity, the Moral World as a Complex of Antagonistic Forces

But, how does this unarticulated multiplicity become an articulated one
or an organic unity? How does Schelling explain the transit from subjec-
tivity to intersubjectivity? In other words: how do individuals become
moral individuals? How do the moral world emerge?
Reason, understood as an illimitable power empirically individualized,
is for Schelling life (Leben). By life Schelling means “autonomy in the
world of phenomena” (Autonomie in der Erscheinung, § 9, my translation),
“scheme of freedom”.28 Life is a force directed or destined to impose its
power everywhere, to subjugate every heteronomic power to its auton-
omy. In this sense, life is causality. In its unceasing striving, this causal-
ity experiences two different kinds of constraints, which can be classified
according to Kant’s distinction between “boundary (Grenze)” and “limit
(Schranke)”.29 The former refers to a constraint that can be overcome, the
latter refers to a constraint impossible to overcome.
beings is intellectual and therefore identical, their striving, as an empirical striving (§ 17),
is not identical.” (NDNR 224, §§ 17–18)
27 Cf. NDNR 226 (§ 33) and 232 (§§ 71–72).
28 NDNR 222 (§ 9).
29 Cf. Kant 2004, 102–115 (§§ 57–60).
Schelling distinguishes in rational individualized life two kinds of cau-

salities: a physical, directed to nature, and a moral one, directed to other
moral beings.30 The physical causality experiences a limit. In striving at
transforming nature rational life experiences soon or later an absolute
impediment. On this side of the limit rational life can transform the real-
ity of nature, however there are limits imposed to rational life that as such
are impossible to overcome. The moral causality experiences, on the con-
trary, boundaries, which means that the possibility of overcoming them
is always present. As Schelling affirms in the quoted footnote of § 15, only
when moral causality cannot beat this boundary, namely when this cau-
sality experiences moral resistance, recognition happens. The moral world
is constituted by a series of such experiences:
When I feel that my freedom is limited, I recognize that I am not alone
in the moral world, and the manifold experiences of my limited freedom
teach me that I am in a realm of moral beings, all of whom have the same
unlimited freedom.31
The moral resistance that cannot be overcome let experience morality.
This resistance articulates in the already quoted “I will not”. This demand
is a manner of saying “here is humanity”.32 But contrary to the cases ana-
lyzed in (2) and to Fichte’s interpretation of this sentence in his System
of Ethics (1798),33 this voice becomes audible and comprehensible not
because it has been adapted to the ear of the other, but because the
other has been obliged to hear it, since ignoring or overcoming it was
not achievable at all. This voice of dissent is expression of a freedom that,
like the freedom experiencing the moral constraint, considers itself as an
unrestricted force.
The clash of forces described by Schelling is a fundamental dissent. For
the divergence is about the principles, since each of the forces involved
in the struggle is convinced of being the only or the right manifestation
of universal reason on earth. For Schelling the fundamental divergence
about the supreme goal of reason is inherent to the nature of rational life,
because it is necessary deduced from the indeterminacy and the objective
30 Cf. NDNR 222 f. (§§ 8–12).

31 NDNR 223 (§ 15).
32 NDNR 223 (§ 13).
33 Fichte quotes this passage of Schelling’s New Deduction of Natural Right, but only in
order to justify the need of a Doctrine of Ethics in a system of philosophical sciences (cf.
Fichte SSL, GA I/5, 204 f.).
158 emiliano acosta
incomprehensibility of the imperative.34 Furthermore, on both predi-

cates of the imperative is based the thesis of the infinitude of the strive
of individual reason: because of its absolute character, the goal cannot be
objectified; because it cannot be objectified (theoretically conceived), its
realization is only conceivable in the form of a praxis guided by the regu-
lative idea of an “nonfinite act”.35
According to Schelling’s deduction of natural right, rational individuals
are originally related to each other through the clash of their purposes.
The original liaison is the divergence in the principle, i.e. they disagree in the
definition of the goal every rational being ought to pursue.
Therefore the unconditional causality of moral beings becomes antagonistic
in the empirical striving and I begin to oppose my freedom to the freedom
of all others.36
The co-constitution of individuals as moral individuals does not result
of establishing a higher instance, where conflicts cease. On the contrary,
conflicts creates the links that brings all individuals together articulating
the diversity of goals. The moral world is for Schelling essentially a com-
plex of antagonistic interrelations.
Now as I conceive of my freedom as being in opposition to the causality of
others who are like me, it becomes my causality, that is, a causality which is
not the causality of moral beings as such (the causality of the entire moral
world). I become a moral individual.37
2.4 Mechanism of Inclusion, Establishment of a Fair Framework

for Discussion, and Rationality
The individualized powers constituting the moral world can only be related
to each other under the form of reciprocal resistance. In the moral world
all individuals are recognized as equals, because they all are moral. But
becoming and being recognized as a moral individual does not imply
to renounce to the own singularity, which is actually the origin of inter-
subjective conflict. The differences expressed in the conflict of will and
goals are constitutive for the moral world. Only individuals who do not
let be purified are worth to be integrated in the community. As a result,
34 Cf. NDNR 223 (§ 16).

35 Ibid.
36 NDNR 224 (§ 21).
37 NDNR 224 (§ 22).
the community is a plurality of antagonistic world-visions. Inclusion is not

accomplished by means of identification, but, on the contrary, by means
of self-differentiation. Equality is based on the fundamental differences
between the individuals. Everyone is equal, as far as the unrestricted free-
dom of each one is recognized as such.
Understanding the moral world as a complex of antagonistic forces
guarantees the constitution of a fair framework in order to discuss how
to solve the conflicts inherent to the establishment of every society and its
institutions. For, unlike the analyzed cases, there is no pre-established sta-
tus quo regulating or conditioning the act of recognition. The conflictive
character of the encounter is for Schelling necessary, since the recognition
needed to established rational communication between the individuals,
happens exclusively through dissent. The moral world is not the neutral-
ization of the original conflict between individuals by means of introduc-
ing a universal normative instance (ethics and right), but the complete
realization of it. The instances of basic social agreements corresponds
with the realms of ethics and right, which are a product of the antago-
nistic interaction of individuals who have already recognized each other
as equals.
This realm of conflictivity functions in Schelling’s deduction of natu-
ral right as condition of possibility for the establishment of the spheres
of right and ethics as necessary normative frameworks for the realization of
a fair community of rational and free individuals. Hence, for Schelling the
further conflicts between the individual will and the universal will (sub-
ject of ethics), and between the individual will and the will of all individu-
als (subject of right), must be solved without neglecting the conflictive
nature of the moral world. Following Schelling’s essay, a fair socially and
politically organized community results of recognizing that dissent does
not represent an obstacle, but the soil, which rules and institutions must
be based on.
Hence, dissent or differences inherent to each individuality essentially
belong to rationality. Accordingly, the moral world does not represent for
Schelling a normative instance or an instance of mediation in or solution
of the conflicts, but the effective reality of the controversial nature of rea-
son. Thus, a rational claim for recognition is not the one that can adapt
itself to the set of values and the grammars of the dominant group, but the
one that does not recognize the universal validity of the status quo and
resituates the conflict in a sphere where the only solution presupposes the
creation of a new framework capable to integrate all the differences as a
solution for the conflict. Hence, thinking rationality in terms of dissenting
160 emiliano acosta
and resisting force, as Schelling proposes, offers a broader concept of

rational discussion. Furthermore, it let think of tolerance in political
terms, namely as a condition of possibility for a fair discussion aimed at
guaranteeing the design of fair institutions.
Conclusion
Schelling’s New Deduction of Natural Right offers a model of recognition

according to a logic of difference: only dissenting powers (free causalities)
are recognized as moral individuals, i.e. as worthy individuals deserving to
be respected and heard. No transformation, no identification, are needed
in order to include individuals in the community. This community, the
moral world, results of the interaction of the subjectivities which develops
in the dynamic of dissent. Each subjectivity or each group is integrated in
this new social framework that has emerged from reciprocal dissent. Con-
sidering the reception of this essay and some dominant positions in cur-
rent debates on political philosophy, I would like to very briefly share
some reflections as a conclusion.
It is not truth that, Schelling’s “resilient individualism”38 is a threat to
the community, but precisely the opposite: a factor that makes possible a
fair community, where every individuality is respected in his or her oth-
erness. Nevertheless, his deduction of natural right is certainly a threat,
but only for the pretensions of universality of the principles and ideology
sustained by the established social order. In this sense, Schelling’s view of
the transforming potential of dissent can be seen in our present as a criti-
cal contribution to discourses proposing an antagonistic (radical) democ-
racy, since his account on recognition shows that a theory of antagonistic
intersubjectivity must not necessarily be non-essentialist, as it is com-
monly affirmed.39 The critical potential of his conception of recognition
by means of dissenting can also be seen in the prevalence of fundamental
and foundational dissent above fundamental and foundational consen-
sus, which clashes against current theories of consensus and communica-
tive praxis. Indeed, the basic consensus postulated by these theories as
a condition of possibility for a fair discussion, insists in the necessity of a
transformation of individuals (becoming an Other) in order to be heard
and presents the same critical points identified in (2). This can be seen for
38 Vater 2006, 207.

39 Cf. Mouffe 2005, 71.
example in Habermas’ proposal for integrating religions in the framework

of a rational discussion.40
As already said, the relevance of Schelling’s account on recognition lies
principally in the fact that it is developed without presupposing an already
established social order or a determined set of values still not institution-
alized. Moreover, for Schelling the act of recognition does not necessarily
require a previous transformation of both parts or of one of them in order
to integrate both parts in the same community. These ideas can serve
today for thinking a practice of bracketing the validity of the established
status quo as an instrument to guarantee the productivity and fairness of
a rational discussion about social and political conflicts. They open up a
different meaning horizon as well, where not only rationality, but also
tolerance and multiculturalism can be thought in a new manner.
Firstly, Schelling gives us elements to broaden our usual understanding
of rationality, which could serve to integrate in current debates discourses
today labeled for example as fundamentalist or anti-democratic. Accord-
ing to Schelling’s account on recognition, this kind of discourses, which
challenge the dominant definition of what is rational and what not, are
precisely the positions that should be integrated in the discussion in order
to conform the dissent needed to justify the necessity of a creation of a
new framework for a rational discussion. A framework that can guaran-
tee a free exchange of world-visions with these discourses could avoid
that these positions seek other ways to be heard. Secondly, Schelling’s
account on recognition permits to think of tolerance in political terms in
opposition to the usual moral connotation of tolerance and its implicit
identification with a kind of indifference. Whereas tolerance is used to
be considered on the level of relationships between private persons, be
it as an undesirable effect or as a practice we are obliged to exert, so the
other tolerate us; according to Schelling tolerance is a tool for securing
and enriching the social and political debates. Concerning multicultural-
ism, finally, Schelling’s understanding of recognition in terms of dissent
let us consider cultural and religious differences as something constitutive
of each human being. This surely questions the common way to assuring
pluralism in our societies consisting in reducing the cultural or religious
expressions of the individuals to the private sphere of life, under the pre-
text of being protecting the neutrality or laicism every democratic system
40 Cf. Habermas 2001, 41 and 52 f.; 2005, 13.

162 emiliano acosta
needs. In this sense, Schelling’s conception of dissent shows the necessity

of redefining the public space.
It has been shown that an attempt at recovering Schelling’s concept of
recognition in its own element is relevant, not only because it contributes
to fill up the lack of information mentioned in the introduction about the
diversity of perspectives within German Idealism, but also because it offers
a totally different way to think of recognition not only in comparison with
other German Idealists, but also in comparison with the current way to
consider it. Schelling’s recognition offers a different way to conceive the
co-constitution of subjectivities in terms of inter-subjectivity, the founda-
tion of a fair and rational community, the mechanisms for including new
social actors and establishing a fair framework for discussion and, finally,
a different way to understand rationality, tolerance and multiculturalism.
All these elements forms a conceptual constellation based in the compre-
hension of recognition in terms of dissent, namely that individuals can
be recognized as rational and free beings only in and through the act of
dissenting.
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Chapter Nine
KANTIAN VERSION OF RECOGNITION

THE BOTTOM–LINE OF AXEL HONNETH’s PROJECT
Donald Loose
When dealing with an architectonic of concepts, ruled by a notion of the

final end of the whole system and the cohesion of the concepts involved,
the fundamental distinction between an a priori deduction, implying a
transcendental foundation, and a genealogy of the empirical conditions
of the realization of those concepts should be kept in mind. In the Kantian
version, any form of recognition will be grounded on the noumenal idea
of freedom and its implications, whereas the conditions of its empirical
representation will be normatively evaluated in terms of that idea. Con-
versely, the normative validity of the a priori idea will not be considered
to be generated by or dependent upon its possible ways of realization,
although contingent historical conditions will, of course, influence in a
pragmatic and technical way the modus of its possible realization. There
will indeed be a factual and historical evolutionary interaction between
the noumenal and the empirical.
Although Honneth disagrees with Kant as to the possibility and the
validity of such a purely a priori deduction, he implicitly subscribes to
Hegel’s notion of the normative validity of the concept of freedom, and
applies it as a criterion for authentic moral, affective, juridical and social
recognition, or for the disregarding of this recognition. In order to con-
ceive of the forms of the disregarding of recognition or the pathological
forms of its cultivation, a normative concept of true recognition must be
presupposed. However, this results in a shattered complex of unclearly
related, mutually irreducible forms of recognition, including emotional
self-confidence, juridical respect and social esteem, all three of which are
equally constitutive of an integral recognition of the moral dignity of the
human person. Contrary to the Kantian project, it appears that the disre-
garding of the constitutive distinction between the absolute norm of the
noumenal and the realm of the phenomenal—or the moral a priori and
its implications—results in a diffuse collection of concepts of practical
reason, which lacks the constitutive foundational element of their unity.
166 donald loose
The reduction of everything to the same pragmatic level results in the

shattering of practical reason into unconnected fragments of morality,
right and the social struggle for recognition.
This article does not intend to offer an alternative to the Hegelian anal-
ysis of recognition that Honneth refers to exclusively. Rather, it points to
the moral dimension as a precondition for a correct understanding of the
reasonable foundation of the project. From a Kantian perspective, I would
firstly like to emphasise the absolute priority of morality and the objective
constitutive rational ground which is its basic founding principle, and then
to sketch the consequences of this for a coherent understanding of moral
and juridical recognition. Secondly, I respond to some criticisms of the
Kantian paradigm. Finally, I sketch a route towards a critical horizon of
the factual ethical life and its already implemented forms of recognition.
1. Morality, Reason and Recognition
In ‘Recognition and moral obligation’ the author wants to stress that it is the
internal link to particular duties or rights—the relations of recognition—
that makes it possible to speak of a morality of recognition at all (Hon-
neth 1997, 16 f.). A similar idea is expressed by Hegel in his Philosophy of
Right, which holds that three levels of ethical life can be distinguished
by reference to the kind of underlying obligations in each particular
case. According to Honneth, the three forms of recognition analyzed in
A Struggle for Recognition develop, on a more abstract level, an equiva-
lent conditional relation between personal integrity, social interaction
and moral obligation. From the outset, an ambiguity arises with regard to
the foundational element of the entire argument. On the one hand, three
forms of recognition—the form of recognition through which the value
of individual needs is affirmed (duties of care and friendship), the form of
recognition through which the moral autonomy of the individual has to
be respected in his equal treatment, and the form of recognition through
which the value of individual capabilities has to be recognized—all seem
to be respected on an equally basic level. These three modes of recogni-
tion, taken together, are to constitute the moral perspective, insofar as
they possess an obligatory character solely within the framework of dis-
parate forms of social relationships. These three moral attitudes cannot be
ranked from the perspective of some superior vantage point. On the other
hand, Honneth agrees that there is a normative restriction with regard
to the requirement that recognition should be accorded via a mode that
kantian version of recognition 167
follows from the relevant type of social relationship. This follows from
the universal character of the mode of recognition by respect, because we
have to recognize all human beings who enjoy equal rights to autonomy.
For moral reasons, we may not choose social relationships whose realiza-
tion would require a violation of those rights.
In this sense, Honneth explicitly agrees that a morality of recognition
follows from the intuitions that have always prevailed in the Kantian
tradition as to the absolute priority of the rights of all subjects to equal
respect for their individual autonomy. It is explicitly emphasised that the
developmental logic of the struggle for recognition can only be discovered
via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on the basis of the
dynamics of moral experiences (Honneth 1995, 139). Further, the question
must be answered as to what it can mean to say that, under the conditions
set by modern legal relations, subjects reciprocally recognize each other
with regard to their status as morally responsible persons. Moreover, that
trait, which is supposed to be shared by all subjects, cannot be taken to
refer to human abilities whose scope or content is determined once and
for all. It will rather turn out to be an essential indeterminacy as to what
constitutes the status of a responsible person.1
However, in opposition to Kant, it is not duty and inclination that nor-
mally confront one another, but rather various obligations, which with-
out exception possess moral character because they express a different
relation of recognition in each case (Honneth 1997, 33). Nevertheless, the
moral character of recognition is linked to the limitation of egocentrism,
including a reference to the Kantian idea of respect and the conviction
that any representation of worth thwarts our self-love.2 The subject, moti-
vated by respect for the law, forbids himself from performing all sorts of
actions that would simply be the effect of his egocentric impulsion. In the
act of recognition, a similar decentralization is at stake: one recognizes
in the other something of value which is the source of legitimized claims
that refute self-love (Honneth 2004, 41 f.; 1992, 332). Honneth clearly pre-
supposes, in agreement with Hegel, a concept of normative truth as the
basis of the plea for recognition, and the criterion for its being disregarded
or for its pathological forms. That which can be called ‘rational’ with ref-
erence to social reality is a function of the fulfilment of moral rather
1 Honneth 1995, 110; see also Honneth 1992, 305–341.

2 GMM, 4:401 note; DoV, § 25, 6:450.
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than cognitive requirements (Honneth 2000, 30, note 15). However, he

also develops the pathologies of moral freedom and juridical freedom as
equally relevant for a reconstruction of a true conceptualization of free-
dom and recognition (Honneth 2000 and 2001).
It is clear that in the Kantian version, moral autonomy is the uncontested
precondition for any possible true realization of freedom and any form of
recognition. Any form of inter-subjective recognition between persons is
based upon the a priori personal recognition of the validity of lawfulness
(moral obligation) in a practical sense—what Kant calls the unique fac-
tum of practical reason. This is in fact a practical variation of the recogni-
tion of lawfulness in nature (natural laws), which is the representational
typos of moral law. The categorical imperative of moral law obliges by
means of the recognition of its lawfulness as such (the irrefutable univer-
sality of its obligation). From a Kantian perspective, it is the way in which
a rational being is aware of itself as a reasonable essence that implies an
unconditional and unconditioned claim of recognition (Girndt 1990). The
pure apperception of the self has its foundation in the consciousness of
being an intelligible object to oneself, and this understanding refers to
the capacity of being a rational subject of self-determination—the abil-
ity to determine oneself as a self different from the subject regulated by
empirical laws (CPR, B 574). Agents deliberating about possible maxims
of action are guided by reason. They ask themselves how to act and why.
Implicitly or explicitly, their deliberation cannot be reduced to pragmatic
or technical prudence—their reflection ultimately always implies ques-
tions regarding final ends and general principles. Asking whether the end
of an action itself is worth pursuing amounts to asking whether and how
to act upon one’s inclinations. A general principle of reasonable action
presupposes a subject conceiving of his or her will as a form of causality
on the basis of reason, and not dependent upon inclination, in the sense
that agents regard themselves as being able to choose to act in a way that
runs counter to inclination if they see reason to do so. The subject is
aware of its own capacity for self-determination in the praxis of self-
determination. This praxis is the recognition of a fact of practical reason:
it is reason’s activity in producing the consciousness of reason’s (moral)
obligation (Willaschek 1992; Metzler 1992; Kleingeld 2010). Practical rea-
son proves itself practical (CPrR, 5:42). It proves its reality and that of its
concepts through the deed of self-recognition.
The analysis is not infected by intuitionist claims to have moral insights
that are not properly available in Kant’s own terms. The fact of reason is
inseparably connected with, and indeed identical with, consciousness of

freedom of the will, whereby the will of a rational being that, as belonging to
the sensible world, cognizes itself as, like other efficient causes, necessarily
subject to laws of causality, yet in the practical is also conscious of its exis-
tence as determinable in an intelligent order of things—conscious of this
not, indeed, by a special intuition of itself but according to certain dynamic
laws that can determine its causality in the sensible world (CPrR, 5:42).
As Kleingeld argues, the entire argument can be cast in the presumably
non-moral terms of a theory of action, and can be regarded as the articu-
lation of the self-understanding of agents who take themselves to be rea-
soning about which maxims to adopt and why. The fundamental law of
reasonable action is what we call moral law (Kleingeld 2010, 70). The con-
sciousness of being capable of reasonable action, which is to be ruled by a
universal law in one’s self determining praxis, is human self-obligation. To
not be determined by heteronomous obligation but rather to be oneself
the determining principle of the universal determining ground of one’s
actions means to be free. It is indeed consciousness of being summoned
(aufgefordert) to determine oneself freely which is intrinsically given
in any reflection—including the auto-reflection of a subject on itself—
while any reflection has to respect the appeal of reason aiming at universal
validity, just as truly free determination of the self can only be understood
as satisfying universality (Girndt 1990, 80). “He judges, therefore, that he
can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes
freedom within him, which, without the moral law, would have remained
unknown to him” (CPrR, 5:30). This double belonging of the subject to the
world of inclinations and the world of reason implies that a reasonable
subject, as soon as it reflects on itself as sensible, understands itself as also
belonging to an intelligible world—a moral kingdom (Reich der Sitten).
It involves the idea of an order and a system of laws different from that
of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the sensible world. It ulti-
mately implies the conception of a whole system of rational beings as ends
in themselves (GMM, 4:458). Therefore, “pure apperception of the self ”
appears to be mediated by the idea of practical lawfulness and the implied
idea of an intelligible whole ruled by it, implying the exhortation to its
realization.3
3 “Der Gedanke meiner selbst als eines vernünftigen Wesens ist also nach Kants Auffas-
sung untrennbar vom Gedanken einer intelligiblen Verstandes-Welt und eines diese Welt
bestimmenden Gesetzes, zu dessen Verwirklichung in der Sinnenwelt sich ein vernünftiges
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Kant therefore grounds the obligation towards any form of recognition

in the a priori obligation of recognizing the self and any other human
being as a self-determining self and an end in itself. This implies a form
of asymmetry between the person respecting the other, and the person
so respected (Prauss, 2008, 95 f.). However, the asymmetry can already
be detected in the person’s ability to afford respect, as this presupposes
the self-respect afforded by the phenomenal person towards his own
noumenal identity. Authority and responsibility constitute intra-personal
self-obligation. This fundamental form of self-esteem cannot be grounded
in a process of mutual communication, with each ascribing rights to the
other. Every person as an end in itself demands unconditional respect
of his noumenal person from any other person, just as he is obliged to
respect himself and any other person. If we are not self-conscious of the
fact that moral and juridical obligations are grounded in our personal self-
obligation to respect the noumenal character of any person, including
that of ourselves, morality and right could only be grounded in external
obligation and force. Only a normative concept, which is considered to
be a normative standard for every rational being capable of self deter-
mination, can lead to inner obligation. It is absolute even if its applica-
tion is dependent on all sorts of contingent contextual conditions. The
fundamental basis of reciprocal recognition can be formulated as “I will
on a rational universal ground that you will in a rational universal way
in the same way as I will”. The moral as well as the juridical claim of
recognition—normative authority—is based on an argument that is not
dependent upon empirical or contextual conditions of reciprocal recog-
nition as such. Every person capable of being self-conscious of his or her
being an end in itself has the self-obligation to respect himself and to be
respected as an end in itself. This obligation is a universal obligation, and
includes a self obligation of the self towards itself.
In the Kantian version, the normative obligation of recognition cannot
ultimately be generated out of factual symmetrical relations. Its norma-
tive character is presupposed and its reciprocal obligation is implied in
the normative concept of human dignity (the awareness of the noumenal
self, i.e. the universal character of the self ) which generates the obligation
Wesen aufgefordert weiss. Das anscheinend unmittelbare vernünftige Selbstverständnis

ist also, wie die Reflektion auf dieses Selbstbewusstsein zeigt, an sich oder in Wahrheit
vermittelt durch den Gedanken einer ideellen Ordnung, ohne deren Konzeption die eines
vernünftigen Selbst unmöglich wäre” (Girndt 1990, 81).
of recognition of any other self as a noumenal free subject. A human being

has duties only to human beings (himself and others) since his duty to any
subject entails moral constraint by that subject’s will (DoV, § 16, 6:442).
To be conscious of oneself as an empirically contingent subject, ruled
by needs and desires, already presupposes the immediate consciousness
of the obligation of an unconditioned self-determination, which is itself
mediated by the universal rule of practical reason’s obligation. Without
reason’s notion of the unconditioned, even knowledge of the conditioned
would be impossible. Such knowledge presupposes the ability to distance
oneself from the limited and contingent empirical identity from a theo-
retical and practical perspective. It implies the capacity to consider one-
self as another and to be able to judge oneself as another and from the
perspective of another.
Every human being has a conscience and finds himself observed, threat-
ened, and in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal
judge, and this authority watching over the law in him, is not something
that he himself voluntarily (willkürlich) makes, but something incorporated
in his being. [. . .] One constrained by his reason sees himself constrained
to carry it on as at the bidding of another person. For all duties a human
being’s conscience will have to think of someone other than himself (it is
other than the human being as such) as the judge of his actions. A human
being who [. . .] judges himself in conscience must think of a dual personal-
ity in himself (DoV, § 13, 6:438).
The human being as the subject of the lawgiving which proceeds from the
concept of freedom and in which he is subject to the law that he gives
himself (homo noumenon), is to be regarded as someone other than the
human being as a sensible being endowed with reason.
To be able to distance oneself from the physical or psychological empir-
ical conditions of the self, and from the social contextual conditions of its
self-consciousness, is the necessary precondition to be able to recognize
any other person as being equally free and to be able to recognize the
contingent conditions of the freedom of the other and the particularity of
his own contextual perspective on his or her freedom. Common human
understanding not only presupposes the ability to think for oneself, but
also to think from the perspective of everyone else, and always to think
in accordance with oneself. The first obligation is that of an unprejudiced
way of thinking, the second is that of the broad-minded way of thinking,
and the third is that of consistence. (GMM, 4:438; CPJ, § 40, 5:294). To
be with oneself in the other (Im Anderen bei sich Selbst sein) presupposes
that everyone is able to be with the other while being a proper self, and
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this implies the ability to recognize the splitting up of the self into an
empirically singular self and the noumenal dimension of humanity (homo
noumenon). To be with oneself in the other therefore presupposes the
awareness of being united with the other dimension of the other too—a
dimension other than his or her contingent singularity.4 Therefore, Kant
underlines that when he bows before a humble common man, in whom
he perceives uprightness of character to a higher degree than he is aware
of in himself, he in fact bows to the example that displays to him a law
that strikes down his self-conceit (CPrR, 5:77).
As self critical awareness of our own psychological, social and cultural
specificity is thus mediated by the idea of an ideal order, mankind has
to realize unconditionally. No reasonable self-knowledge in psychological
or social respect is possible without the idea of a reasonable universal
order, transcending our particular ends. To understand one’s own rea-
sonable motives for action would be as unconceivable as the idea of act-
ing responsibly.5 The moral law obliges one primarily to limit one’s own
choice of will (Willkür), but it also implies the positive unconditional obli-
gation to respect the free choice of other free rational beings. Primarily
negative rules of limitation, formulated in a system of rights, ultimately
refer to the positive moral obligation to respect the other being as an end
in itself. One of the formulae of the categorical imperative is “so act as
to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other,
in every case as an end withal, never as a means only”, while a reason-
able being not only understands himself as an end in itself but also every
other reasonable being as an end in itself (GMM, 4:428 f.). This uncondi-
tional moral obligation to recognize the worth of any other person is not
conditioned by empirical reciprocity, or by any other social or physical
4 According to Stern, Hegelian recognition differs from Kantian ‘respect’ as “each self-
consciousness must also realize and accept that its well-being and identity as a subject is
bound up with how it is seen by the other self-consciousness” (Stern 2002, 74). However,
the famous passage in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Mind on ‘Lordship and Bondage’ can
be read in a Kantian way: “It has no power to do anything for its own behalf if that object
does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is absolutely the double
process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself
does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only
so far as the other does the same.”
5 “Ohne den Gedanken einer das Individuum und seine Zwecke übersteigende universa-
len Vernunftordnung ist also kein vernünftiges, soziales wie individuelles, Selbstverständ-
nis möglich, und der Gedanke eines auf vernünftige Einsicht und rationale Begründung
angelegten Wesens so undenkbar wie die Konzeption verantwortbaren Handelns” (Girndt
1990, 82–83).
particularity. It is asymmetrical, but functions reciprocally, as it is univer-

sal and categorical. Although unconditional recognition requires reciproc-
ity, no one can be forced to undertake such reciprocity, as unconditional
recognition can only be granted freely when the other’s will is as free as
one’s own will. The logic of unconditional recognition cannot aim at any-
thing extrinsic to unconditional recognition: its final end is the universal,
reciprocal, unconditional realization of a reasonable universal order of
recognition. Universal recognition implies the recognition of recognition
as reciprocal and universal. Self-consciousness understood as reasonable
understanding of the self is identical to the recognition of any other as
self-conscious, and any unconditional recognition of the other as an end
in itself is identical to the reasonable self-understanding of the self as an
end to be respected in itself, by oneself as well as by another.
From the Critique of pure Reason onwards, Kant refers to ‘a moral world’
insofar as it may be in accordance with all the ethical laws, which, by
virtue of the freedom of reasonable beings, it can be, and which, in accor-
dance with the necessary laws of nature, it ought to be. Although he warns
us that this world must be conceived of only as an intelligible world, inas-
much as an abstraction is made of all conditions (ends), and even of all
impediments to morality (the weakness or depravity of human nature),
and that we have to consider it merely as an idea, we should neverthe-
less understand it as a practical idea, which may have and ought to have
an influence on the sensory world, so as to bring it as far as possible into
conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world therefore has objective
reality, not by referring to an object of intelligible intuition—for of such
an object we can form no conception whatsoever—but by referring to
the world of sense (conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in its
practical use) and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it, insofar as
the liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of
moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom
of all others (CPR, B 836). The moral law transfers us in idea into a nature
in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with suitable physical power,
would produce the highest good, and it determines our will to confer on
the sensible world the form of a whole of rational beings (CPrR 5:43). The
realm of ends (Das Reich der Zwecke) (GMM, 4:433; CPJ, § 86, 5:444) or
corpus mysticum will have to become the ‘highest good in the world’ (CPJ,
§ 87 5:450). It is a fundamental principle to which even the most basic
human reason is compelled to give immediate assent, that if reason is
to provide a final end a priori at all, this can be nothing other than the
human being (each rational being in the world) acting in accordance with
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moral laws (CPrR, 5:109 f.; CPJ, 5:447), and this idea always already has its
historical and cultural, juridical form of realization. To be a self-determin-
ing rational being means to be a historically situated citizen, living in a
constitutional juridical state, ruled by the ideal of a realm of ends (Reich
der Zwecke) which has its implication in historical forms of reciprocal rec-
ognition, not only between persons, but also between cultural differences,
and autonomous peaceful states.
2. Kantian Pathologies of Right and Morality?
In Suffering from Indeterminacy, Honneth seems to underline to a greater

extent than in Struggle for Recognition the indispensable character of
morality, as well as of right, for an authentic development of recogni-
tion. He considers the idea of general free will to be the basic principle
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Honneth 2000, 23). Hegel has cleverly
pursued the aim of conceiving of both abstract right and morality as
socially influential complexes of ideas that, once assigned to their proper
places in society, would reveal themselves as necessary components of
the institutional relations of communicative freedom (Honneth, 2000,
34). Nevertheless, Honneth is convinced of the fact that ‘if we do accept
the circumstance that the social world already always offers points of ori-
entation to our moral deliberation, then the categorical imperative itself
ceases to function as a form of self-justification’ (Honneth 2000, 54).6 He
refers exclusively to Hegel’s critique of Kant in his Philosophy of Right.
The normative concept of freedom proposed by Kantian thinking seems
to be obliterated by two conceptions of freedom in themselves equally
incomplete: the purely negative concept of freedom of choice, conceived
of as deciding in a way that is completely free from and excluding any
natural inclination on the one hand, and freedom of positive option on
the other hand, which is a reflective choice between two given positive
options or determinate contents. Hegel considers the latter version to be
equally deficient insofar as it is also determined by negativity. One has to
choose between the heteronomy of inclinations and the external obliga-
tion of moral law that has no ground in any natural disposition (Honneth
2000, 24–25).
6 The French version (Honneth 2008, 74) incorrectly—although not erroneously—

even translates this as: l’impératif catégorique perd sa fonction fondatrice.
Honneth then elaborates upon Hegel’s synthesis of the positive deter-

mination of the act, based upon the option model and the awareness of
not being limited by inclination as the truth of the doubly negative con-
cept of freedom.
In order for the will to be able to will itself as free it must limit itself to those
of its needs, desires and drives of which the realization can be understood as
an expression or confirmation of its own freedom; but this is only possible
if the object of the need or inclination itself possesses the quality of being
free, because only this kind of ‘other’ can actually enable the will to enjoy
an experience of freedom (Honneth 2000, 26).
He rectifies the double pathology of moral indeterminacy as a result of the
emptiness of the formal categorical imperative and the unlimited charac-
ter of negative juridical freedom.
2.1 Moral Indeterminacy?

I do not understand the Hegelian analysis as an alternative to the Kan-
tian version, in the way it is presented by Honneth in opposition to so-
called Kantian exteriority. Honneth presents Kantian freedom as an act
of self-determination which is a reflective choice between inclinations or
motives for action, the existence of which one unfortunately has no con-
trol over. It leads to the Kantian dualism of duty and inclination, between
an ideal moral law and completely external natural inclination. However,
in the Kantian analysis of true freedom, a combination of the objective
determining ground (objectiver Bestimmungsgrund), which is lawfulness
that functions as the primary principle of self-determination, has to be
combined with the possibility of freeing oneself from naturally disposed
inclinations, based on positive subjective self determination, through the
principle of choice, manifested in respect for the law. A complete version
of the Kantian doctrine of free choice cannot be reduced to the distinc-
tion between that which is done from duty (aus Pflicht) and that which
is done from inclination (aus Neigung—GMM, 4:397). That which is done
from inclination cannot be understood in a parallel way to that which is
done from duty as it cannot be conceived of as equally freely motivated.
That which is done from inclination does not refer to practical reason
and freedom of the will in the same way as that which is done from duty.
As far as it belongs to sensibility, the incentive of inclination belongs to a
heteronomous causality of nature, and acts performed out of inclination
must be understood as acting by natural causes. To act from inclina-
tion means to act in accordance with one’s satisfaction (GMM, 4:399).
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Inclination, then, is a determining ground (Bestimmungsgrund) or moti-

vating ground (Bewegungsgrund) (GMM, 4:401). Therefore, Kant explic-
itly asserts what he himself underlines as being a morally important
observation
that freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar
to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive (Trieb-
feder) except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim
(has made it into a universal rule for himself, according to which he wills
to conduct himself ); only in this way can an incentive, whatever it may be,
coexist with the absolute spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom).
(Religion, 6:24).
According to Kant, moral law is itself an incentive in the judgement of
reason.
Contrary to Honneth’s reading of Kant, this means, first of all, that from
the perspective of freedom, nothing can yet be, in any external or het-
eronomous sense, an incentive or a motive as such. It has to be judged
as an incentive, while freedom itself always has to constitute any heter-
onomous inclination as an incentive to free choice. Conversely, a motive
seems always to be based upon an inclination which can lead to an incen-
tive for the choice of the will. Moral law does not exclude all inclinations
but only excludes all immediate influence on the will (CPrR, 5:80). The
lawgiving form, insofar as this is contained in the maxim (in der Maxime
enthalten), is therefore the only thing that can constitute a determining
ground of the will (CPrR, 5:29). The determining ground is regarded as the
supreme condition of all maxims (CPrR, 5:31). Reason requires the form of
universality as the condition of giving to a maxim the objective validity
of a law (CPrR, 5:34).
The categorical imperative is this specific form of self-legislation and
self-execution of the law (sic volo sic jubeo) which originates as a form of
law by isolating it from all determination as to the content of the maxims.
The self-critical reflection on the particularity of the incentive is the only
way to attain a universalizable ground of determination of the will. Prac-
tical reason is confronted with a purposiveness of all kinds of pragmatic
maxims, technical and hypothetic imperatives, with respect to which it is
required to apply an a priori determined lawfulness. The intellectual or
moral sensus communis is not an empirical or constructivistic generality,
but the individual recognition of the necessity of thinking of one’s own
feeling of being oriented towards a common cause as a faculty that every
other reasonable being is also endowed with autonomously, and which is
therefore also to be respected in every other as an end in itself.
Although receptivity for the law is characterized by opposition and

resistance to natural predispositions, the transcendental analysis of the
subjective ground for the determination of morality raises the question
concerning the natural conditions for the possibility of this resistance.
Kant outlines these in the analysis of the feelings of pleasure and displea-
sure (Lust—Unlust) in § 60–69 of the 2nd book of Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Point of View. Pleasure and displeasure, enjoyment and pain
are not opposed merely as opposites (Gegenteil, contradictory) but also
as counterparts (Widerspiel, contrary). To be absolutely contented in life
would entail idle rest and the coming to a standstill of all incentives, or the
dulling of sensations and the activity connected with them. Life would not
even be experienced at all, since the feeling of life is nothing other than
the changing perception of pleasure and pain. We are very well aware
of the fact that we can also relate the expression ‘what pleases’ and ‘dis-
pleases’ to the intellect, in which case these will not simple coincide with
pleasure and pain. The intellectual sublation of direct sensuous pleasure
and of the agreeable and disagreeable in enjoyment involves them in the
dialectics of the pleasurable experience of the stimulus to leave a certain
state, which in itself is a feeling of displeasure. Conversely, we understand
the intellectual boredom of invariability and remaining in one and the
same state, which is primarily recognized as pleasurable. These dialectics
of the ultimately intellectually pleasant feeling, which presented itself in
the natural order as unpleasant, constitutes the ambiguity that character-
izes the intellectual feeling of moral resistance. The experience of one’s
own power to develop a counterforce as counterincentive is a pleasurable
feeling that is entirely in a class of its own. The mind finds itself moved
in the representation of the sublime confrontation with nature, including
its own natural incentives, and freedom. Sensible feeling, which underlies
all our inclinations, is indeed the condition of that feeling we call respect,
but the cause determining it lies in purely practical reason and this feel-
ing, on account of its origin, must be called practically affected (CPrR,
5:75). From the concept of incentive (Triebfeder) to compliance with the
law arises the concept of interest (Interesse) which can only be attributed
to beings gifted with reason and which signifies an incentive of the will
insofar as it is represented by reason (CPrR, 5:79).
In that sense, for Kant as well as for Hegel, culture constitutes the
development of this creative antagonism of pleasure and displeasure.
Nature appears in culture not only as a heteronomous force which must
be resisted, but also as an ally that, by means of its antagonisms and
forms of violence, occasions progress. Conversely, culture manifests itself
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as a force promoting nature and the teleology of nature’s ultimate end

(Endzweck der Natur). The enhancement of our skills—the creativity that
manifests itself in the dissatisfaction with the existing circumstances of
civil society—leads precisely to ever newer and higher forms of civiliza-
tion. Life as such, with regard to our enjoyment of it, which depends on
fortunate circumstances, has no intrinsic value of its own at all. Life has
value only with regards to the use it is put to, and the ends at which it is
directed. It is not luck, but only wisdom that can secure human dignity
and the value of life for the human being (Anthr., 7: 239; cf. Loose 2011,
53–78). The culture of human dignity is the culture of the value of the
life of the human being as such. In a reflective judgement, the reign of
ends, wherein every member can be recognized as an end in itself, can
be seen as the end of nature itself and as the sublation of our natural
inclinations.
2.2 External Juridical Obligation?

A similar abstraction is at stake in the pathologic concept of right, quali-
fied as the guarantee of unlimited negative freedom, freed from any
dependence, and capable of contracting freely. The dichotomy of right
and morality implies an equally empty concept of right. Just as moral-
ity has been sketched as an external determination without real self-
determination, right is conceived of as unlimited, without freely chosen
self-limitation. One could consider it as already symptomatic of this that
Hegel and Honneth start their analyses with the concept of abstract right
and reconsider morality only in a second movement to correct the double
heteronomy by the always already given content of ethical life (Sittlich-
keit) and its obligations.7 Honneth considers juridical law as an exclu-
sively external obligation, identifying the discourse of right with the liberal
right of private possession and the unlimited right to enter freely into a
multitude of contract relations and to do for its own interest everything
which is not forbidden by a conventional legal system. Such a concept of
right cannot prevent us from considering any other person simply as a
means for one’s own ends. When we consider the fundamental right to
be the advantage that allows me to withdraw from all concrete relations
and social roles in order to persist in unlimited openness, it is of course
clear that such a concept of right will need corrections so as to enable
7 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts § 148–149: Pflicht as Sittliche Notwendigkeit.

real juridical recognition of persons in the civil society. The negative idea
of undetermined rights and legal isolation requires the compensation of
its positive converse: the right to engage in common free enterprises
of juridical revendications—claims to legal rights and demands (Honneth
2000, 51; 2011, 155).
Note that the Kantian definition of right is as follows: “Any action is
right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a uni-
versal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist
with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” (DoR, 6:230).
In Perpetual Peace he explicitly underlines that
Rightful (i.e.) external freedom cannot, as is usually thought, be defined as a
warrant to do whatever one wishes unless it means doing injustice to others
[. . . as] the definition is an empty tautology [. . .]. In fact, my external and
rightful freedom should be defined as a warrant to obey no external laws
except those to which I have been able to give my own consent (Peace,
8:350 note).
The relation between right and morality cannot be exclusively reduced
to the dichotomy of internal or external motivation. Morality and right do
not imply an exclusive distinction: “Ethical duties involve a constraint for
which only internal lawgiving is possible, whereas duties of right involve a
constraint for which external lawgiving is also possible” (DoV, 6:394).
Honneth stresses, with Hegel, a correction of the so-called pathology
of abstract right, that a moral dimension will always be implied in the
full concept of a right. True acceptance of any legal obligation will pre-
suppose a freely reflecting commitment and adherence to the obligation.
In his discussion with Kant, he should not even exclusively reintroduce
that inner moral motive and he should not conceive of it as an equally
external obligation of the categorical imperative. As Honneth himself
argues, in agreement with Wildt (1982), the only valid objection made
by Hegel against the empty character of the categorical imperative might
be the blindness to context. Honneth erroneously believes that one can
compensate for this lack of context by reference to already institution-
alized practices, even concluding that the categorical imperative then
loses its function of self-justification (Honneth 2000, 57). This can only
hold when we consider those practices as already reasonable and evalu-
ated by a moral criterion, a conviction that Honneth, as well as Hegel,
would accept. However, even in the Kantian version, that moral criterion
is no more reduced to the motive of purely inner self-obligation than in
the post-Kantian criticism. Unfortunately, it is this distinction between
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external and internal obligations that Fichte as well as Hegel and Honneth
maintain.8 The vicissitudes of the Kantian distinction between internal
and external obligations obliterated another fundamental aspect of the
Kantian relation between morality and right. It is only by reintroducing
the object of the public act and the distinction between means and ends
that one can produce a more adequate conception of inter-subjective and
public recognition.
Kant defines the human being as one who has the end of its existence in
itself, who determines his ends himself through reason, or, where he must
derive them from external perceptions, can nevertheless compare them to
essential and universal ends (CRJ, 5:233). While everyone is confronted
with the universal, noumenal dimension of his existence, everyone has
to consider everyone as an end in itself. Disregarding the fundamental
human condition—in a moral as well as in a juridical sense—must then
be defined as denying this human a priori; i.e. by using someone only as
a means. The first level of recognition can be defined as not simply using
somebody merely as a means but respecting him or her also as an end in
itself. The ultimate reciprocal respect of humans would then be to con-
sider the other only as an end in itself. We can reconsider this fundamen-
tal Kantian distinction as the distinction and inner connection between
right and morality (Prauss, 2008). If we reintroduce the idea of an end,
and of man’s status as an end in itself in the concept of right, we are
immediately involved in inter-subjective relations and are not trapped in
a morally external mode of coercion or obligation in the juridical recogni-
tion of the other. As an implication of this correction, based on Kantian
criteria, we are obliged to recognize the autonomy of any person who is
independently able to competently take up responsibility. This is what
right demands, and its claim is intrinsically defined by interpersonal rela-
tions between subjects who are to be considered as free, which implies
being respected as being free. Only when we must consider a person as
8 Hegel and Fichte develop the Kantian distinction between the definition of right
and morality exclusively as internal or external obligations. Hegel Grundlinien § 106:
Zusatz. Moreover, they consider both concepts of obligation as hierarchically ordered.
Right increasingly becomes a primary level, objectively compelling everyone in modern
times towards becoming a person. In his earlier Jenaer System, Hegel then considers the
state as the institution that does not need to consider the individual inner motivations of
the citizen. However, he is also convinced that the state needs the mental adherence of its
citizens in order to be able to realize its ends. Religion can support such adherence, but
legal obligation is a more objective guarantee than such a purely subjective motivation for
adherence. In the Enzyklopädie § 552, the relation is even reversed. The state is grounded
on moral adherence, with religion behind it as its basic support. (Prauss 2008, 45 f. Further
discussion in: Kersting 1993; Höffe 1979; Steigleder 2002).
being unable to take up responsibility, we are still morally obliged to con-

sider him or her too as an end in itself, even if we can no longer consider
him or her also as a means for our ends. A person who is unable to con-
sider him or herself as an end in itself or to determine freely his or her
own will, cannot be considered to be willing him or herself to be treated
as a mere object and as a means for someone else’s ends.9
There is no fundamental distinction between the external and internal
aspect of actions. Every action is internal and external. Disrespect or to
consider someone as only a means is a juridical as well as a moral evil. A
complication of this reading is that we are then only specifically obliged
in a moral sense towards those who are unable to defend their rights for
themselves. Prauss seems to accept this only in its negative form. Specifi-
cally moral evil, moral disregard or a lack of moral recognition could be
defined as the treatment of one who is unable to determine his or her
ends, as only a means. Juridical disrespect arises when we do not also
consider one as an end in itself, although we behave correctly towards
the other who is able to stand up for his or her own rights. In both cases,
we disregard the other’s status as an end in itself, and therefore juridical
disrespect is in itself a lack of moral recognition. Only the natural situa-
tion of the other—his empirical context or social condition—defines my
juridical or moral obligation. This empirical aspect is what Kant explicitly
deals with in his doctrine of virtue. There, we cannot make an abstrac-
tion of the obligation to the end of the action (DoV, 6:382). Therefore the
moral obligation is imperfect, subject to the personal synthetic judgement
of the actor himself as well as to the empirical conditions of the other. It is
thus an open-ended obligation. It depends on my own contingent empiri-
cal capabilities and the empirical context of the other person as to what I
may be obliged to do. In this sense the distinction between external and
internal obligations is secondary.
Both moral and juridical obligations are objectively and contextually
determined. The fundamental distinction between an external obliga-
tion in a system of right and the inner motivation of moral self-obligation
should not be seen as the ultimate criterion of right versus morality, and
9 Prauss acknowledges that Kant himself never characterizes our morally obligatory
relation to others as constituting a specific obligation to recognize him or her as only an
end in itself (Prauss 2008, 73). On the contrary, one of the formulations of the categorical
imperative reads “so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of
any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.” To consider one as only
an end in itself, the formula of the moral maximum, would rather be a definition of love:
“the duty to make others’ ends my own” (DoV, 6:450; Prauss 2008, 74).
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there is an intrinsic moral obligation at the basis of a system of rights inso-

far as we have always to respect every other person also as an end in itself.
Moreover, another fundamental aspect of the external (äusserlich) char-
acter of obligation is its publicity (Prauss 2008, 44). It is external while it
intrinsically has the potential of communicability, to be externalized as a
rule for all. This changes the perspective on the rule of the state, as will
be further developed in my final remarks.
3. A Critical Perspective on the State
Honneth reads Hegel’s analysis of the ethical life as a normative reconstruc-

tion. In the final remarks on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he concludes:
Given conditions of social life are to be scrutinized from well-established,
habitual practices, which possess an inner normativity in the sense that
they can be reproduced only when certain duties and rights are customar-
ily accepted, it would be better and more fitting to speak of practices and
institutions that owe their entire facticity solely to their following certain
moral rules (Honneth 2000, 59).
That would be the reason why those practices and institutions would
always be able to regenerate new instances of morally justifiable claims
of reciprocal recognition, and capable of successful institutional self-
reproduction in the future. Kant warned, with regard to the history of
philosophy and its future, that even successful results in the past do not
guarantee any success in the future. It is only the critical way of thinking
that is still open. The critical movement of the Enlightenment does not
establish an enlightened time, but merely a time of never-ending critical
self-enlightenment.
Deceit, violence, and envy will always surround man, even though he
is himself honest, peaceable, and benevolent; and the righteous ones besides
himself that he will still encounter will, in spite of all their worthiness to be
happy, nevertheless be subject by nature, which pays no attention to that, to
all the evils of poverty, illness and ultimately death (CPJ, § 87).
Man is an animal which, if it lives among others of its kind, requires a
master. His selfish animal impulses tempt him, where possible, to exempt
himself from the law he wishes to have in order to limit the freedom of
all. He thus requires a master who will force him to obey. But where does
he get this master ? The master is himself an animal (Idea, VI).
A threefold original predisposition to the good in human nature can
always be perverted into a form of evil. The predisposition to the animality
of the human being as a living being will not only generate a love for
which reason is not required (self-love, propagation of the species through
the sexual drive, and community with other human beings) but it can
develop into savagery, and bestial vices of gluttony, lust and wild lawless-
ness as well. The humanity in us that simultaneously involves our ratio-
nality is indeed the predisposition to culture. It grounds the inclination to
gain equal value in the consideration of others—to be recognized—but
it also generates jealously and rivalry. Malignancies, such as envy, ingrati-
tude, and joy in other’s misfortune, are vices of culture. Finally, man is a
personality, as a rational and simultaneously a morally responsible being.
Its predisposition is to respect moral law as a sufficient incentive to the
power of choice (Religion, 6:26–28).
Notwithstanding Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s triptych of the ethical
life, Kant stresses that only the third dimension can ever be responsible
for any free decision in the other (natural or cultural) spheres, and this
makes the urgency of individual moral responsibility all the more required
as it is always able to transform into radical evil. Hegel would criticize
such a vision of mankind, where the good always seems to be conquered
by evil, where purity is never attained and should never be considered as
acceptable and where there is no inner or outer satisfaction. For Kant,
the critical way implies an infinitely open future but no presence of the
infinite in the finite. Finite reasonable beings remain eternally incapable
of incarnating the infinite, as God has not revealed himself nor descended
to earth, while man never becomes divine (Weil 1990, 167).
We can and must of course refer to the historical development towards
the universal recognition of all individuals, people and states in a cos-
mopolitan world-order, but post-modern history also warns us that a
backsliding into tyranny, the corruption of civil society, individual as well
as institutional greed, such as in the world of finances, and disrespect of
labour conditions by multinationals is at least an equally recognizable
logic of history.
The question remains as to whether the highest good in the world is
achievable, and as it should be promoted, insofar as it is in our estima-
tion a final end, whether we are able to do so (CPJ, 5:450; CPrP, 5:125).
The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature to human freedom
is not only a transcendental principle of the power of judgment, but also
a metaphysical one. A transcendental principle is one through which the
universal a priori condition under which things can become objects of our
cognition at all is represented. By contrast, a principle is called metaphysi-
cal if it represents the a priori condition under which singular objects,
184 donald loose
whose concept must be given empirically, can be further determined a

priori. The principle of practical purposiveness of nature which must be
conceived of in the idea of the determination of a free desire as a will
is, besides a transcendental principle, also a metaphysical principle, as
such a will must still be given empirically (CPJ, 5:181–182). Although the
determining grounds of causality in accordance with the concept of free-
dom (and the practical rules that it contains) are not found in nature,
and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in subjects, never-
theless the reverse is possible (not in regard to the cognition of nature of
course, but in regard of the consequences of the supersensible to the sensi-
ble). Reason is causality through freedom, whose effect in accordance with
its formal laws is to take place in the world. The effect in accordance
with the concept of freedom is a final end (or its appearance in the sen-
sible world), which should exist, for which the conditions of its possibil-
ity in nature, in the nature of a subject as a sensible being (that is, as a
human being) is presupposed (CPJ, 5:196). Our real hope is the noumenal
dimension of the judging individual. The noumenal and the phenomenal
are linked in the power of judgement and the perspective of hope it nec-
essarily implies. It implies a subjective practical belief in a creator of the
world, a moral lawgiver and a final judge of history, transcendent to
the contingent march of history.
The foundation of the pure principles of morality—a foundation of
the metaphysics of morals—is not yet dealing with morality of human
beings or their ethical life. It develops what is absolutely valid in practice
for rational beings as such. However, when it comes to the moral life of
real existing human beings—when the ground has to be defended in the real
human anthropology—metaphysics of morals itself has to be developed
on the basis of its principles. The finite rational being, who is not prac-
tical reason as such, then proves to be depraved, wicked and radically
evil, precisely because he is a being of free choice (Willkür) and can deny
freedom, although never lose consciousness of the moral law, the indica-
tion of his free will (Wille). Therefore, the human being is this struggle.
The ultimate struggle is the struggle against himself—not the struggle of
everyone against everyone else in the external state of nature, but the
struggle inside his own heart.10 Neither civil society nor the state can wage
10 Hobbes’ statement on the state of nature should not only be read as relevant for the
obligation to leave the political state of nature, but also for it to leave the ethical state of
nature where a bellum omnium in omnes is still to be overcome. Religion, 6:97.
this struggle on his behalf. Honneth has no reserves as to Hegel’s convic-

tion that the modern concept of right supposes itself to have a justified
claim sanctioned by the state and the extension of the individual sphere
to that of social realizations or institutions in general.
According to Hegel’s usage of the concept of ‘right’ in his Philosophy of
Right, primarily it is not individuals who are entitled to general rights, but
rather those social forms of existence, that in fostering the self-organization
of the ‘free will’, have shown themselves to be the ‘basic goods’ of society’.
The bearers of rights are the social spheres and practices that lay a justified
claim on society to be preserved and fostered in their entirety (Honneth
2000, 29–30).
For Kant, too, morality is submerged in the world. The thing in itself,
knowable as such only by the Thing in itself which is God, must become
phenomenal, and is only receivable as phenomenon. Pure will, known
unto the human being as moral law, must be united not only in an invis-
ible church of purely morally intentioned beings but also in an institu-
tionally ruled external community, based on external as well as internal
experiences of empirical testimonies of human reason. Human commu-
nity is constituted by positive laws, which are reasonably defendable as
obligatory in nature, although always subject to judgement by pure prac-
tical reason and the community of freely and responsibly deciding citi-
zens: “Obey the authority who has power over you (in whatever does not
conflict with inner morality)” (DoR, 6:371). A moral community aiming
at the reign of ends but already representing—as a scheme—this tran-
scendent reign in a reign of terrestrial peace can be understood as a reign
of universal mutual recognition of all (Weill 1990). One can, of course,
opt for logic as such and make an abstraction of its possible ontological
implementation ( fiat logica et pereat mundus) or accept the tragic dimen-
sion of human existence as unavoidable ( fiat mundus et pereat iustitia).
The Kantian adagium fiat iustitia et pereat mundus considers every human
being from the perspective of respect for his worth.11
11 Kant at least reminds us that nobody should ever be forgotten as a final human being,
and as an end in itself. Prauss mentions Hegel’s cynical remarks in the Introduction of his
Philosphy of History, referring to the heroes of history and the importance of their deeds, to
which the small fry have to be sacrificed, although he mentions that he does recall having
read someone—he doesn’t even mention Kant by name—who considers each of those
small individuals to be a subject and an end in itself lest the heroes treat them as mere
means. (Prauss 2008, 95).
186 donald loose
Therefore, even Honneth concludes his critical actualization of the

Hegelian project as a deconstruction of what he calls “the over-institution-
alization of the ethical life” in the state.12 The notion of a public, political
space or the representation of a democratic formation of the collective will
of the people is essential. People should be represented in the role of the
sovereign. Kant considers the head of the state (Oberhaupt) as an entity
of thought that represents the entire people (ein das gesammte Volk vor-
stellendes Gedankending), which then requires a physical entity to repre-
sent the supreme authority of the state and to impose this idea effectively
on the people’s will. The citizen can, through his freedom of choice
(Willkür), accept that law as the determining ground for his actions, either
out of duty (as a moral obligation and a duty of virtue) or on the basis of
any other incentive (as a mere duty of right); or he can, of course, reject
it. The distinction between universal Wille and personal Willkür in every
agent implies that the personal struggle is never overcome. On many occa-
sions, the power of choice of an agent will be determined by an externally
legislating Wille, the political legislating assembly, and one does not in this
case will the law as a law for oneself. The universal obligation of the rule
of right is not related to the maxims of the citizens; in other words, to the
motives for obedience to the law. The law of right prescribes the neces-
sary actions. The obligation of the law as such is what Kant calls a strictly
juridical obligation or a duty of law (Rechtsplicht). It is obligatory by virtue
of the lawful character of the obligation itself. In this sense, its obliga-
tory character can be experienced as external, due to consciousness of the
irrefutable character of the obligation as constraint of the law (Zwang des
Gesetzes) in contrast to one’s own maxims. It is based on the definition of
the will as such (Wille) and not on the character of the personal choice
of the will (Willkür) and its own maxims (DoR, 6:232).
The grounds of the necessity to obey are located not in the inner con-
sciousness of moral law but in the universal claim of freedom (Flikschuh
2010, 51–70). Therefore, right is not a transaction between conflicting
claims, or a struggle of reciprocal recognition, to be arranged by recipro-
cal agreement, but is rather based upon a coercive law which applies to
everyone. No unilateral or bilateral will can ever serve as a coercive law
for everyone, since that would infringe upon freedom, in accordance with
12 Honneth 2008, 127 (this passage is not included in the English translation). See also
Honneth 2011, 471 f., and the critique of Habermas 1999, 186–229, although Habermas does
not intend to return to Kant. On the contrary, he considers Hegel’s trust in the Spirit of
History to be an undesirable backsliding to Kantian subjective mentalism.
universal laws. Only a will which imposes an obligation upon everyone;

in other words, only a collective, general (common) and powerful will—a
general, external or public lawgiving that is accompanied by power—can
guarantee public freedom (DoR, 6:256).
The fundamental unity of universal practical reason and right cannot
lead to a dualism between the moral world and a purely external world
of coercion. Although Kant demonstrates his concept of strict right by
analogy with the mechanics of heteronomous natural determination,
he ultimately reinterprets the dynamics of natural coercion, force and
juridical obligation as means from the perspective of the ultimate end
of nature: culture. They can even be judged reflectively as means for the
final end: human freedom. The possibility of not considering that which
is constitutive for the realization of the human dignity of man merely as
an external means to an equally external end but, on the contrary, also
as a symbolic representation of that end in itself, implies that we may
consider the obligation of juridical reciprocal recognition as the represen-
tation of the final end of mankind itself: human freedom as the final end
of creation. Moreover the mechanic model of external force is superseded
by the organic model of life where everything is to be seen as reciprocal
means and ends, although here again the political relevance is only sym-
bolic: i.e. interpreted as ‘organization’ from the perspective of the only
possible final end which is human freedom (CPJ, 5:375 note).
Finally, we cannot very well make obligation (moral constraint) intui-
tive for ourselves without thereby thinking another will. And although the
representation of our duty with regard to a God—as pure will—is prop-
erly speaking a duty of a human being to himself, reason in giving univer-
sal laws, can be seen in a symbolic way as a the spokesman of another’s
will (DoV, 6:487). In a note in Perpetual Peace Kant writes what could be
read as flattery, but rather appears to be a warning to those who hold
political power and its institutions:
Many have criticized the high sounding appellations which are often
bestowed on a ruler (such as ‘the divine anointed’, or ‘the executor and rep-
resentative of the divine will on earth’) as gross and extravagant flatteries,
but it seems to me without reason. Far from making the ruler of the land
arrogant, they ought rather to fill his soul with humility. For if he is a man
of understanding (which we must certainly assume), he will reflect that he
has taken over an office which is too great for a human being, namely that
of administering God’s most sacred institution on earth, the rights of man.
He will always live in fear of having in any way injured God’s most valued
possession (Peace, 8:352–353).
188 donald loose
To judge ourselves as being judged from a perspective not only tran-

scendent to nature but also to history and institutions, which at the same
time allows us to come to a reflective judgement about the possible syn-
thesis of nature and history with freedom, appears to be the indispensable
metaphysical background of our faith in the politics of recognition.
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E. Matthews: Critique of the Power of Judgement. Cambridge 2000.
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M. Gregor: The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge 1996.
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M. Gregor: The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge 1996.
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gabe Bd. VIII. Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose. In: H. Reiss
(Ed.) Political Writings, Cambridge 1970, 41–53.
—— (Peace): Zum ewigen Frieden. Akademie Ausgabe Bd. VIII. Perpetual Peace. In:
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Chapter Ten
Anerkennung – Ein Ausweg aus einer Verlegenheit?
Kurt Walter Zeidler
Das Stichwort ‚Anerkennung‘ fand erst in den letzten Jahrzehnten Ein-

gang in philosophische Lexika, denn die Konjunktur des Begriffs fällt nicht
zufällig in eine Gegenwart, die ihr philosophisches Profil als post-modern,
post-metaphysisch, post-analytisch, post-marxistisch oder post-struktura-
listisch kennzeichnet. Diese Kennzeichnungen sollen die Verabschiedung
überlebter Theorieansprüche und den Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern signa-
lisieren, verraten aber zugleich, dass neue Gewissheiten nicht gefunden
sind. Das Präfix ‚post‘ ist Ausdruck einer Verlegenheit, denn es verrät,
dass die Überwindung des zu Verabschiedenden noch nicht gelungen
oder, positiver formuliert, dass sie noch im Gange ist oder dass, dies wäre
die post-moderne Lesart, die Überwindung des zu Verabschiedenden in
der Verabschiedung aller Gewissheiten besteht und somit gar nicht zu
erwarten ist, dass wir an neuen Ufern ankommen und dort festen Boden
gewinnen könnten. Die Konjunktur des Begriffs ‚Anerkennung‘ verdankt
sich solcher Verlegenheit und ‚Anerkennung‘ ist insoweit tatsächlich ein
neues Paradigma der Philosophie. Präziser formuliert: Nachdem die Leit-
begriffe der Moderne: Vernunft, Menschheit, Geschichte, Kultur, Wissen-
schaft fragwürdig und die ihnen zugehörigen Theoriekomplexe nach und
nach immer brüchiger geworden sind, ist inmitten der Trümmer vormali-
ger Erklärungsmodelle und Orientierungsangebote immerhin das elemen-
tare Bedürfnis nach Verständigung aufrecht geblieben und Anerkennung
zum Schlüsselbegriff avanciert. Denn ‚Anerkennung‘ changiert im Kno-
tenpunkt der genannten Leitbegriffe der Moderne und könnte darum der
Schlüssel sein, der den Zugang zu allen Arten der Verständigung öffnet.
Die Anerkennungsdiskurse der Gegenwart decken dementsprechend ein
breites und facettenreiches Spektrum ab: sie reichen von Versuchen der
Verständigung darüber, was ein zur Verständigung über sich selbst und
zur Kommunikation mit anderen befähigtes Selbst überhaupt ist, über die
sozial-ontologische Frage nach den Konstitutionsbedingungen sozialer
Entitäten und Identitäten, bis zu aktuellen politischen Diskursen – von
der Genderdebatte bis hin zu Fragen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. Der
192 kurt walter zeidler
Begriff Anerkennung bedient verschiedenste Interessen und gerade dort,

wo von einer ‚Theorie der Anerkennung‘ ist, trifft man vor allem auf eines –
auf Interessen.
Auch die historische Spurensuche, auch der Blick über zwei Jahrhun-
derte zurück auf die erste kurzlebige Konjunktur, die der Begriff ‚Aner-
kennung‘ um 1800 erfahren hat, liefert vielerlei Anregendes, aber wenig
Erhellendes, das zu einer ‚Theorie der Anerkennung‘ beitragen könnte.
Hegel, bei dem eine solche Theorie am ehesten zu suchen ist, da er mit
dem Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitel in der Phänomenologie des Geistes
den Anstoß und die Vorlage für die Anerkennungsdiskurse der Gegenwart
geliefert hat, entfacht auf wenigen Seiten ein Feuerwerk an Gedanken-
blitzen, das denn auch unterschiedlichste Interpretationen provoziert,
das aber allenfalls Bruchstücke für eine ‚Theorie der Anerkennung‘, wenn
nicht gar deren Dementi liefert, konstruiert Hegel doch eine gleicherma-
ßen zirkuläre wie gegenläufige „Bewegung des Anerkennens“. Die Bewe-
gung verläuft zirkulär und gegenläufig, weil sie im Ausgang vom „Begriff
des Selbstbewußtseins“ einerseits die reziproke Anerkennung des einen
durch ein anderes Selbstbewusstsein voraussetzt, andererseits aber vor-
gibt, die Reziprozität der Anerkennung aus dem Antagonismus vereinzel-
ter für sich seiender Selbstbewusstseine entwickeln zu können oder sie
vielmehr „für das Selbstbewußtsein“ dieser angeblich zunächst nur Für-
sichseienden allererst entwickeln zu müssen. Mit anderen Worten: die
„Bewegung des Anerkennens“ kommt als Bewegung nur in Gang, wenn
ihre Voraussetzung, die zugleich ihr Ziel ist, außer Kraft gesetzt wird.
Die Brüchigkeit dieser Konstruktion ist Hegel sehr wohl bewusst, sie ist
aber – wie er gleich am Beginn des Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitels aus-
führt – kein Fehler der Konstruktion, sondern „liegt in dem Wesen des
Selbstbewußtseins“: sie liegt in seiner „Doppelsinnigkeit [. . .] unendlich
oder unmittelbar das Gegenteil der Bestimmtheit, in der es gesetzt ist, zu
sein. Die Auseinanderlegung des Begriffs dieser geistigen Einheit in ihrer
Verdopplung stellt uns die Bewegung des Anerkennens dar.“ Diese „Aus-
einanderlegung“ der „geistigen Einheit in [. . .] die Bewegung des Aner-
kennens“ soll demnach das, was das „Selbstbewußtsein [. . .] an und für
sich“ ist, nämlich „ein Anerkanntes“ (PhG, 145 f.),1 für uns zur Darstellung
bringen.
1 PhG = G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, in: E. Moldenhauer u. K. M. Michel

(Hrsg.), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke in 20 Bdn., Bd. 3, Fft/M. 1970.
anerkennung – ein ausweg aus einer verlegenheit? 193
Hegel bringt damit sowohl vorgreifend den ‚Begriff des Geistes‘,2 das
Grundthema der Phänomenologie, wie auch ihr Darstellungsprinzip zur
Sprache, das ihren gesamten Aufbau beherrscht; man könnte daher die
gesamte Phänomenologie des Geistes als Hegels ‚Theorie der Anerkennung‘
interpretieren. Der (selbst-)bewusstseinstheoretische Vorgriff auf den
‚Begriff des Geistes‘ und seine phänomenologische Darstellung ‚für uns‘
ist allerdings nicht seine adäquate Explikation. Auch wenn man gutwil-
lig unterstellt, die Phänomenologie sei die rundum gelungene Darstellung
des Bildungsprozesses, in dem das Bewusstsein nach und nach für sich
erfährt, was es an sich ist, bleibt sie doch Darstellung von Gestalten und
Gestaltungen des Bewusstseins, bleibt also bewusstseinstheoretische Ana-
lyse und reflexionslogische Darstellung auch der Gehalte, die zureichend
nur vernunfttheoretisch oder – in der Terminologie von Hegels Wissen-
schaft der Logik – nur „begriffslogisch“ zu explizieren sind. Diese Einsicht,
die den wesentlichen Punkt der Differenz zwischen dem Hegel der Phä-
nomenologie und dem Hegel der Wissenschaft der Logik bezeichnet und
in der Folge und bis heute maßgeblich die Divergenz der unterschied-
lichen Hegel-Interpretationen und Schulen bestimmt, klingt auch im
Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitel an: Hegel deutet die Differenz zwischen
phänomenologischer Darstellung und logischer Explikation an, wenn er
den „reine[n] Begriff des Anerkennens“ begriffslogisch als Schluss expli-
ziert, in dem „Jedes [. . .] dem Anderen die Mitte [ist], durch welche jedes
sich mit sich selbst vermittelt und zusammenschließt, und jedes sich und
dem Anderen unmittelbares für sich seiendes Wesen, welches zugleich
nur durch diese Vermittlung so für sich ist. Sie anerkennen sich als gegen-
seitig sich anerkennend “ (PhG, 147).
So sehr zeitgenössische Anerkennungstheorien auf die Reziprozität
und Symmetrie der Anerkennung setzen und daraus ihre Motivation für
die ‚Reaktualisierung‘ Hegelscher Theoriestücke schöpfen, so wenig ist
der „reine Begriff des Anerkennens“ ihr Thema: Hegels Geistphilosophie
und spekulative Logik sind für den soziologisch-sozialphilosophischen
Diskurs nicht ‚anschlussfähig‘, bedauert man doch ausdrücklich, dass
in der Phänomenologie eine „bewußtseinsphilosophische Programmatik
[. . .] die Vorherrschaft über alle intersubjektivitätstheoretischen Einsich-
ten“ Hegels gewinne, da er sein früheres, „noch unfertige[s] Modell des
2 „Das Bewußtsein hat erst in dem Selbstbewußtsein, als dem Begriffe des Geistes, sei-
nen Wendungspunkt, auf dem es aus dem farbigen Scheine des sinnlichen Diesseits und
aus der leeren Nacht des übersinnlichen Jenseits in den geistigen Tag der Gegenwart ein-
schreitet“ (PhG, 143 f.).
‚Kampfes um Anerkennung‘ “, der „bislang die moralische Bewegungskraft

gewesen war“, nunmehr auf die „Funktion der Bildung des Selbstbewußt-
seins“ beschränke (Honneth 1992, 103 f.; vgl. Habermas 1969). Ein sozio-
logisches Denken, dem es keine Schwierigkeit bereitet, die ‚moralische
Bewegungskraft‘ von der ‚Bildung des Selbstbewusstseins‘ zu isolieren,
weil es seinen philosophischen Impetus ausschließlich einer ‚moralischen
Bewegungskraft‘ verdankt, die von der Konfrontation von monologischer
(Selbst-) Bewusstseinstheorie und intersubjektiver Sozialtheorie zehrt, hat
weder Raum noch Muße für die Logik des „Begriffs“ und versichert denn
auch freimütig, dass die Hegelsche Logik „uns aufgrund ihres ontologischen
Begriffs des Geistes inzwischen vollkommen unverständlich geworden ist“
(Honneth 2001, 13). Bemerkenswert an dieser Versicherung ist immerhin
das ‚inzwischen‘, das einen Lernprozess unterstellt, über den man gern
Näheres erfahren hätte, weil ‚unser‘ Unverständnis dann nicht bloß kon-
statiert, sondern womöglich erklärt werden könnte. Der angedeutete Lern-
prozess hat jedoch nie stattgefunden; ‚unser‘ Unverständnis beruht schlicht
darauf, dass die sogenannte ‚Kritische Theorie‘, der Honneth verpflichtet
ist, den Geist (Hegel) bzw. den Begriff der Vernunft durch ein Ideal ersetzt
hat,3 womit sie freilich nicht allein steht, hat doch die gesamte nach-
idealistische Philosophie die ‚Ideen‘ kurzerhand durch ‚Ideale‘ ersetzt:
durch hybride Vorstellungen, wie die Menschheit, die Geschichte, der Fort-
schritt, die Kultur, die Gesellschaft, die Wissenschaft, die Sprache usf., die
allesamt zugleich Gegenstände und Normen sein sollen.
Die nach-idealistische Philosophie hat den Himmel leergefegt und ihn
sogleich mit Ideen bevölkert, die sie selbstredend nicht als Ideen, son-
dern als konkrete Wesenheiten verstanden wissen wollte. Sie ist darum
eine Menagerie allgemeiner Wesenheiten, mit Arten und Unterarten
und Bastarden und Varietäten sonder Zahl, und ihr im Bewusstsein ihrer
Modernität vor ihr selbst verborgener Begriffsrealismus gedeiht umso üppi-
ger, je selbstbewusster sie wähnt, sich von allen Mythen befreit und die
‚traditionelle‘ Philosophie überwunden und hinter sich gelassen zu haben.
Der uneingestandene Begriffsrealismus der Moderne erklärt, warum ihre
Leitbegriffe sich so rasch abgenutzt haben und an Stelle der von ihnen
3 Unmissverständlich ausgesprochen hat dies Max Horkheimer in seinem für die

gesamte Richtung programmatischen Aufsatz Traditionelle und kritische Theorie: „Die kri-
tische Theorie hat [. . .] keine spezifische Instanz für sich als das mit ihr selbst verknüpfte
Interesse an der Aufhebung der Klassenherrschaft. Diese negative Formulierung ist, auf
einen abstrakten Ausdruck gebracht, der materialistische Inhalt des idealistischen Begriffs
der Vernunft“ (Horkheimer 1937, 292).
angebotenen Erklärungsmodelle und Orientierungshilfen in der post-

modernen Philosophie allein das elementare Bedürfnis nach Verständi-
gung übrig geblieben ist. Auf die eingangs gestellte Frage, ob das neue
Paradigma Anerkennung oder gar eine ‚Theorie der Anerkennung‘ einen
Ausweg aus den post-modernen, post-metaphysischen und sonstigen Ver-
legenheiten der Gegenwartsphilosophie zu bahnen vermöge, kann mit-
hin – im Lichte der angesprochenen Verlegenheiten – eine zunächst nur
kryptische Antwort gegeben werden: Anerkennung könnte der Schlüssel
sein, der den Zugang zu allen Arten der Verständigung öffnet, wenn man
den Schritt von der ‚Anerkennung‘ zum ‚reinen Begriff des Anerkennens‘
und zum Bedenken der Vermittlung wagte, die das ‚Phänomenologie‘ und
‚Logik‘ übergreifende Generalthema Hegels ist, nämlich der Begriff, der
nicht bloß bewusstseinsimmanente Vorstellung oder Zeichen für ein
Bezeichnetes ist, sondern „das Subjekt [. . .], welches [. . .] die wahrhafte
Substanz ist, [. . .] welche nicht die Vermittlung außer ihr hat, sondern
diese selbst ist“ (PhG, 36).
Die Antwort klingt kryptisch, weil sie ein Logikkonzept ins Spiel bringt,
das in der Gegenwart nicht nur den Proponenten einer soziologischen
Anerkennungstheorie „vollkommen unverständlich“ geworden ist. Nach-
dem man sich angewöhnt hat, unter dem Titel ‚Logik‘ nur noch Kalküle
zu verstehen und ‚Philosophie‘ zum schillernden Oberbegriff für diver-
seste Forschungen, Meta-Theorien und Programme geworden ist, muss
die Erinnerung an das Konzept einer spekulativen Logik massives Unver-
ständnis oder – das Unverständnis perpetuierendes – bloß historisches
Interesse provozieren. Dass dem so ist und dem Unverständnis auch ein
gut und redlich gemeintes systematisches Interesse nicht abhelfen kann,
demonstriert die Geschichte des Hegelianismus, der trotz angestrengter
und vielfältiger Bemühungen im besten Falle Schlaglichter auf Hegels Den-
ken wirft, mit seiner Logik des Begriffs aber so gut wie nichts anzufangen
weiß und daher in systematischer Hinsicht völlig unfruchtbar geblieben
ist. Dieser Vorwurf ist nicht zu verwechseln mit der von zeitgenössischen
Theoretikern des Bewusstseins (den Antipoden der Theoretiker der Inter-
subjektivität) formulierten Kritik, wonach „der gesamte Hegelianismus in
der Bewußtseinstheorie dogmatisch und unproduktiv geblieben“ sei, da
„er das Selbstbewußtsein [. . .] nach dem Reflexionsmodell [beschreibt],
das bereits alles voraussetzt“ (Henrich 1970, 281). Hegel setzt kein ‚Refle-
xionsmodell‘ voraus, das als Modell für irgendwelche Beschreibungen
dienen könnte; hätte er irgendein ‚Modell‘ anzubieten, wäre ja erst recht
unverständlich, warum der Hegelianismus „in der Bewußtseinstheorie [. . .]
unproduktiv geblieben“ ist. Die notorischen Schwierigkeiten, die Hegel
seinen Schülern und Interpreten bereitet, resultieren vielmehr aus dem

Umstand, dass er keine Modelle voraussetzt, sondern nach den Bedingun-
gen allen Setzens und Voraussetzens fragt und damit alle bloße Beschrei-
bung und alles Reden, Reflektieren und Urteilen über Gegenstände oder
Phänomene oder Tatsachen zu unterlaufen sucht. Diese Intention, die in
Hegels Verständnis nicht subjektive Absicht, sondern Aufgabe jeder Phi-
losophie ist, die ihren Namen verdient, ist einer an Beschreibungen, an
Phänomenanalysen und szientifischen oder politischen oder sonstigen
Idealvorstellungen orientierten ‚Moderne‘ und ‚Post-Moderne‘ kaum zu
vermitteln: der Versuch, den ursprünglichen lebendigen Logos zur Spra-
che zu bringen, in dem jegliches Sprechen über Gegenstände, Phänomene
oder Tatsachen gründet, wird leichtfertig als Repristination eines – horri-
bile dictu – ‚metaphysischen‘ oder ‚ontologischen‘ Denkens oder schlicht
als ‚Logos-Mystik‘ abgetan.
Denkverbote und das Bei-Seite-Schieben von Fragen haben freilich
noch nie irgendwelche Probleme gelöst, weshalb ‚offiziell‘ verbotene und
verdrängte Fragen gleichsam durch die Hintertür und in neuer Kostü-
mierung in den offiziellen Diskurs drängen: darum wird das Schweige-
gebot, das sich ‚Moderne‘ und ‚Post-Moderne‘ in Sachen Metaphysik und
Ontologie auferlegt haben, durch die Anerkennungsdiskurse – in ihrem
Zusammenhang könnte allein schon der Neologismus ‚Sozialontologie‘
hellhörig machen – indirekt in Frage gestellt, steht hinter den Diskursen
über Intersubjektivität, Gerechtigkeit, Selbstbestimmung und dergleichen
doch das ungestillte Bedürfnis nach einem adäquaten Begriff des Men-
schen. Genau davon ist in der Phänomenologie unter dem Titel ‚Selbst-
bewusstsein‘ die Rede. Vom Begriff des Menschen ist die Rede, wenn
Hegel von der „sich im Selbstbewußtsein realisierenden Unendlichkeit“
spricht: von seiner „Doppelsinnigkeit [. . .], unendlich oder unmittelbar das
Gegenteil der Bestimmtheit, in der es gesetzt ist, zu sein“ (PhG, 145). Vom
Begriff des Menschen ist auch die Rede, wenn Hegel feststellt, dass die
im „Begriff des Selbstbewußtseins“ immer schon vorausgesetzte Rezipro-
zität der Anerkennung, gar nicht der als Kampf inszenierten „Bewegung
des Anerkennens“ bedarf, da auch das „Individuum, welches das Leben
nicht gewagt hat, [. . .] als Person anerkannt werden“ kann (PhG, 149).
Hegel bekräftigt damit die Einsicht, dass das „Selbstbewußtsein [. . .] an
und für sich [. . .] nur als ein Anerkanntes [ist]“ (PhG, 145), was allerdings
bedeutet, dass die durch die „Bewegung des Anerkennens“ für uns dar-
gestellte „Auseinanderlegung des Begriffs dieser geistigen Einheit“ nicht
die Explikation des Begriffs „dieser geistigen Einheit“, sondern nur die im
Einzelnen jeweils unvollständige und zwangsläufig einseitige Darstellung
ihrer „Momente“ sein kann, die „teils genau auseinandergehalten, teils in

dieser Unterscheidung zugleich auch als nicht unterschieden oder immer
in ihrer entgegengesetzten Bedeutung genommen und erkannt werden
müssen“ (PhG, 145 f.).
Mit diesen einleitenden Überlegungen zum Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-
Kapitel4 bringt Hegel unüberhörbar die Darstellungs- und Methodenpro-
bleme zur Sprache, die aus dem bewusstseinstheoretischen Vorgriff auf
den Begriff des Geistes bzw. aus der Differenz zwischen der logischen Expli-
kation der „geistigen Einheit“ und ihrer phänomenologischen Darstellung
und (zum Zwecke dieser Darstellung vorzunehmenden) „Auseinanderle-
gung“ resultieren. Diese Überlegungen können freilich weder verhindern,
dass eine Hegel-Rezeption, die an der „sich im Selbstbewußtsein reali-
sierenden Unendlichkeit“ und deren logischer Explikation kein Interesse
hat, das Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitel ihren aktuellen und spezifische-
ren Interessen dienstbar macht, noch können sie verhindern, dass auch
die Konsistenz und Verständlichkeit von Hegels eigenen Ausführungen
unter den Darstellungs- und Methodenproblemen leiden, die aus dem
bewusstseinstheoretischen Vorgriff auf den Begriff des Geistes resultie-
ren. Das zeigt sich am augenfälligsten an der vordergründig die gesamte
Argumentation beherrschenden Intersubjektivitätsthematik, kommt die
als interpersonaler Kampf inszenierte „Bewegung des Anerkennens“ doch
zum einen für das Bewusstsein erst am Ende des Geist-Kapitels, in dem
„gegenseitige[n] Anerkennen, welches der absolute Geist ist“ (PhG, 493)
an ihr Ziel, zum anderen „in der Form des Ansichseins“ (PhG, 579), d.i.
als „im allgemeinen Selbstbewußtsein gesetzt“, erst im religiösen Geist der
„Gemeinde“ (PhG, 568; vgl. 574), und zuletzt – in der Form des Ansich-
und Fürsichseins – erst im „absoluten Wissen“ (PhG, 582 f.). Die Darstel-
lungs- und Methodenprobleme zeigen sich ebenso daran, dass die dem
interpersonalen Kampf eingeschriebene intrapersonale „Bewegung des
Selbstbewußtseins“ im Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitel nur implizit zur
4 Ihrer zentralen Bedeutung wegen, sei die angeführte Stelle im Zusammenhang zitiert:
„Das Selbstbewußtsein ist an und für sich, indem und dadurch, daß es für ein Anderes an
und für sich ist; d. h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes. Der Begriff dieser seiner Einheit in
seiner Verdopplung, der sich im Selbstbewußtsein realisierenden Unendlichkeit, ist eine
vielseitige und vieldeutige Verschränkung, so daß die Momente derselben teils genau
auseinandergehalten, teils in dieser Unterscheidung zugleich auch als nicht unterschie-
den oder immer in ihrer entgegengesetzten Bedeutung genommen und erkannt werden
müssen. Die Doppelsinnigkeit des Unterschiedenen liegt in dem Wesen des Selbstbewußt-
seins, unendlich oder unmittelbar das Gegenteil der Bestimmtheit, in der es gesetzt ist,
zu sein. Die Auseinanderlegung des Begriffs dieser geistigen Einheit in ihrer Verdopplung
stellt uns die Bewegung des Anerkennens dar“ (PhG, 145 f.).
Darstellung kommt: Weil die Momente der Anerkennungsbewegung „auch

als nicht unterschieden oder immer in ihrer entgegengesetzten Bedeu-
tung genommen und erkannt werden müssen“, hat das Tun des einen,
wie das des anderen Selbstbewusstseins zwar „die gedoppelte Bedeutung,
ebenso wohl sein Tun als das Tun des Anderen zu sein“ (PhG, 145 f.), doch
kommt die „gedoppelte Bedeutung“ seines Tuns dem Selbstbewusstsein
an dieser Stelle nicht zum Bewusstsein: da für das Selbstbewusstsein nur
das „gedoppelte Tun“ thematisch wird, in dem „jeder auf den Tod des
Anderen“ geht (PhG, 148), wird die intrapersonale Anerkennungsbewe-
gung überlagert und verdeckt durch die phänomenologische Darstellung
des interpersonalen Kampfes.
Der intrapersonale Aspekt kommt zwar zur Sprache, wenn Hegel mit
Blick auf den Begriff des Menschen feststellt, dass auch das „Individuum,
welches das Leben nicht gewagt hat, [. . .] als Person anerkannt werden“
kann und einschränkend hinzu fügt: „aber es hat die Wahrheit dieses
Anerkanntseins als eines selbständigen Selbstbewußtseins nicht erreicht“
(PhG, 149). Diese Einschränkung kann sicherlich nicht im Sinne der
vordergründigen interpersonalen Konnotationen des Themas „Herrschaft
und Knechtschaft“ verstanden und einfach dahingehend interpretiert
werden, dass das „Individuum, welches das Leben nicht gewagt hat“
nicht Herr eines Knechtes sei: Verstünde man die Aussage als Beschrei-
bung sozialer Tatsachen, wäre sie nachweislich falsch. Sie ist daher im
Sinn einer intrapersonalen „Bewegung des Anerkennens“ zu verstehen:
als Hinweis darauf, dass die „Selbständigkeit [. . .] des Selbstbewußtseins“
die Herrschaft über sich selbst, d.i. über seine bloß animalische Existenz
und (Trieb-)Natur und gegebenenfalls auch die Bereitschaft verlangt, mit
seinem Leben für sich und seine Sache einzustehen. Der intrapersonale
Aspekt der Anerkennungsbewegung – die Bewegung, verstanden als
Emanzipation vom Zwang der Natur und zumal als Emanzipation vom
Zwang der eigenen Natur, der „Begierde“ – ist in Hegels Überlegungen
zweifelsohne präsent, steht er doch unübersehbar sowohl im Fokus der
im Selbstbewusstseins-Kapitel zuvor erfolgten Exposition des Begriffs des
Selbstbewusstseins (PhG, 137 ff.), wie auch der nachfolgenden Überlegun-
gen zur ‚Freiheit des Selbstbewusstseins‘ (PhG, 155 ff.); der intrapersonale
Aspekt trägt aber nicht die Terminologie und den Argumentationsgang
des Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitels.
Terminologie und Argumentationsgang des Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-
Kapitels erklären sich aus den Beweisabsichten und den literarischen
Vorlagen Hegels. Seine literarischen Vorlagen und Anspielungen sind
vielfältig: Hegel bemüht die biblische „Furcht des Herrn“ ebenso, wie die
Topoi der zeitgenössischen bürgerlichen Kritik an den Privilegien des
Adels. Entsprechend vielfältig sind Hegels Beweisabsichten. Fasst man die
Terminologie und Argumentation des Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitels
tragenden Beweisabsichten im Telegrammstil zusammen, dann steht in
ihrem Zentrum der Versuch, über die „Bewegung des Anerkennens“ aus der
Hobbesschen Lehre vom Naturzustand die Rousseausche volonté géné-
rale zu entwickeln und damit zugleich den Formalismus der Kantischen
und Fichteschen Philosophie, wie auch aller Vertragstheorien zu überwin-
den, wobei systematisch im Hintergrund seiner Überlegungen – weniger
bekannt, aber maßgebend sowohl für die Namengebung des Kapitels und
die ursprüngliche Asymmetrie des Anerkennungsverhältnisses, wie auch
für das Beweisziel und die Methode der Phänomenologie – die Erinne-
rung an Platons ‚Ideenkritik‘ im ersten Teil des Parmenides steht (Platon,
Parm. 133). Mit der Erinnerung an dieses, wie Hegel in der Vorrede sich
ausdrückt, „wohl [. . .] größte Kunstwerk der alten Dialektik“ (PhG, 65),
wären wir beim eigentlichen, dem ideenkritischen und vernunfttheoreti-
schen Thema Hegels (vgl. PhG, 567 f.; 583), dem die „Bewegung des Aner-
kennens“ im Ausgang vom Naturalismus und Nominalismus des Hobbes
den Durchbruch verschaffen soll: bei dem „Subjekt [. . .], welches [. . .]
die wahrhafte Substanz ist, [. . .] welche nicht die Vermittlung außer ihr
hat, sondern diese selbst ist“ (PhG, 36) oder, in aller Kürze gesagt, beim
‚Geist‘ oder, in Kantischer Terminologie, bei der ‚Vernunft‘, die jedoch –
so Hegels Kritik – bei Kant und Fichte zwar zur Sprache, aber nicht zur
Realität komme.
Verortet man Hegels Kritik in Kants Systematik, dann ist vor allem die
Triebfedern-Lehre angesprochen (KpV A 127 ff.), d.i. die Lehre von dem
intellektuellen Gefühl der ‚Achtung‘ vor dem Sittengesetz, das als Triebfe-
der zur Befolgung des Gesetzes motivieren und solcherart die Realisierung
des Vernünftigen befördern soll. Und in genau diesem systematischen
Zusammenhang spricht denn auch schon Kant beiläufig von ‚Anerken-
nung‘, wenn er in der Metaphysik der Sitten, im § 37 der Tugendlehre, mit
Bezug auf die „Tugendpflichten gegen andere Menschen aus der ihnen
gebührenden Achtung“ näher ausführt:
Achtung, die ich für andere trage, oder die ein Anderer von mir fordern
kann (observantia aliis praestanda), ist also die Anerkennung einer Würde
(dignitas) an anderen Menschen, d.i. eines Werths, der keinen Preis hat,
kein Äquivalent, wogegen das Object der Werthschätzung (aestimii) ausge-
tauscht werden könnte (AA VI, 462).
Der Terminus ‚Anerkennung‘ steht an dieser Stelle für die ‚Achtung‘, die
ich dem anderen schulde, da er als vernünftiges Wesen ein ‚Zweck an sich
selbst‘ ist bzw. in seiner Person die Menschheit und mithin das Sittenge-
setz repräsentiert. Folglich ist schon in Kants beiläufigem Gebrauch des
Begriffs ‚Anerkennung‘ das Bündel an logischen, ontologischen, anthro-
pologischen, soziologischen und rechts- und moralphilosophischen Pro-
blemen angesprochen, das die Anerkennungsdiskurse bis heute an- und
umtreibt: Inwieweit kann man im Horizont des logischen Nominalismus
und ontologischen Singularismus der Neuzeit überhaupt davon sprechen,
dass ein Einzelnes seine Gattung repräsentiert? Gibt es spezifische Eigen-
schaften, die den einzelnen Menschen zum Repräsentanten der Mensch-
heit qualifizieren? Welche Bedingungen führen zur Vergesellschaftung
der Individuen? Wie sind individuelle Bedürfnisse und Freiheitsrechte in
einer Gesellschaft miteinander zu vereinbaren? Und wie – so wird man
Kant angesichts der ‚kritischen‘ Unterscheidung von Sinnes- und Verstan-
deswelt fragen müssen – sind die aus der Verstandeswelt ergehenden For-
derungen in dieser unserer Welt zu realisieren?
Johann Gottlieb Fichte hat diese Fragen – und damit beginnt die Kar-
riere des Anerkennungsbegriffs – insoweit aufgenommen, als er die meta‑
physische Vorstellung, die Kants gesamte praktische Philosophie motiviert,
nämlich die Vorstellung eines moralischen commercium substantiarum,
d.i. einer Gemeinschaft reiner Verstandeswesen, in der die Freiheit jedes
Einzelnen mit der Freiheit Aller zusammenstimmt (vgl. KrV A 316/B 372;
A 808/B 836), in seiner Grundlage des Naturrechts (1796) als Verhältnis
der reziproken Anerkennung „freier Wesen“ bestimmt und dieses Verhält-
nis kurzerhand zur Grundlage des Rechtsverhältnisses erklärt. Da das
„Verhältniss freier Wesen zu einander [. . .] das Verhältniss einer Wech-
selwirkung durch Intelligenz und Freiheit“ ist, kann keines „das andere
anerkennen, wenn nicht beide sich gegenseitig anerkennen: und keines
kann das andere behandeln als ein freies Wesen, wenn nicht beide sich
gegenseitig so behandeln“ (Fichte 1796, 44). Das solcherart „deducirte
Verhältniss zwischen vernünftigen Wesen, dass jedes seine Freiheit durch
den Begriff der Möglichkeit der Freiheit des anderen beschränke, unter
der Bedingung, dass das erstere die seinige gleichfalls durch die des ande-
ren beschränke”, nennt Fichte „das Rechtsverhältniss; und die jetzt aufge-
stellte Formel ist der Rechtssatz“ (Fichte 1796, 52).
Die ‚Deduktion‘ des Rechtsverhältnisses durch die Vernunft garan-
tiert jedoch – die konkreten Rechtsverhältnisse in Deutschland um 1800
demonstrieren dies überdeutlich – keineswegs seine Realisierung. Hegel
sucht darum in seiner Jenenser Zeit nach Mitteln und Wegen um die
Realität des als vernünftig erkannten Rechtsverhältnisses sicher zu stel-

len. Er will die realen Bedingungen der Formierung des vernünftigen
Rechtsverhältnisses rekonstruieren und, damit einher- und schließlich
darüber hinausgehend, die Geschichte des zu sich selbst kommenden
Geistes darstellen. In diesem Zusammenhang grundlegend und wegwei-
send ist die im Aufsatz Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des
Naturrechts (1802/03) formulierte Kritik an der praktischen Philosophie
Kants und Fichtes, die mit „dem, was praktische Vernunft heißt, [. . .]
allein die formelle Idee der Identität des Ideellen und Reellen zu erken-
nen“ geben, mit dieser Idee aber nicht aus der Differenz heraus und zur
Realität kommen, da sie „die praktische Vernunft [. . .] als ein Kausalitäts-
verhältnis zum Vielen“ begreifen (Hegel 1802, 455), indem sie, wie Hegel
wenige Seiten später erläuternd ausführt, dieses Viele oder „Reelle unter
den Namen von Sinnlichkeit, Neigungen, unterem Begehrungsvermö-
gen usw.“ als das mit der Vernunft nicht Übereinstimmende bestimmen,
wohingegen „die Vernunft darin bestehe, aus eigener absoluter Selbsttä-
tigkeit und Autonomie zu wollen und jene Sinnlichkeit einzuschränken
und zu beherrschen“ (Hegel 1802, 457). Die der praktischen Philosophie
Kants und Fichtes zugrundeliegende „Vorstellung“, sei zwar durchaus real
und „auf das empirische Bewußtsein und die allgemeine Erfahrung eines
jeden“ gegründet (ebda.), sie werde aber nur der „Seite der relativen Iden-
tität, des Seins des Unendlichen im Endlichen“ gerecht, nicht jedoch dem
absoluten „Standpunkt der Sittlichkeit“ (Hegel 1802, 458), der die „abso-
lute Identität des Ideellen und Reellen“ verlange (Hegel 1802, 455).
Nachdem er den absoluten „Standpunkt der Sittlichkeit“ zunächst – im
System der Sittlichkeit (1802/03) – am antiken Polis-Modell orientiert, wobei
er inhaltlich Platon und Aristoteles, sowie methodisch Schellingschen
Vorgaben folgt, setzt Hegel in den Jenenser Realphilosophien bzw. Syste-
mentwürfen der Jahre 1803–1806 anhand des Fichteschen Begriffs der
Anerkennung eine Dynamik in Gang, die den absoluten „Standpunkt
der Sittlichkeit“ als Resultat der Selbstaufhebung des Naturzustandes
und zugleich als Überwindung aller Vertragstheorien darstellt, die nolens
volens von einen (fiktiven) Naturzustand ausgehen. In der ‚Geistesphi-
losophie‘ der Jenaer Systementwürfe I (1803/04) stellt Hegel den Kon-
flikt als eine Kollision zwischen einzelnen „Totalitäten des Bewußtseins“
dar, so dass bereits „das gegenseitige Anerkennen überhaupt, [. . .] bloß
als solches, als Setzen seiner als einer einzelnen Totalität des Bewußt-
seins in eine andere einzelne Totalität des Bewußtseins“, einen „Kampf
um das Ganze“ provoziert (Hegel 1803/04, 217), in dem jeder „gegen den
andern seine ganze erscheinende Totalität, sein Leben, an die Erhaltung
irgendeiner Einzelnheit setzt, und [. . .] jeder auf den Tod des andern
geh[t]“ (Hegel 1803/04, 219 f.). Der um die „Erhaltung irgendeiner Einzel-
heit“, d.i. um Besitz, geführte Kampf um das Ganze, erweist jedoch: „Dies
Anerkennen der einzelnen ist [. . .] absoluter Widerspruch in ihm selbst“,
denn dies Anerkennen „realisiert sich nicht, sondern hört vielmehr auf
zu sein, indem es ist“ (Hegel 1803/04, 221). Indem aber das Bewusstsein
„diese Reflexion seiner selbst in sich selbst [macht], daß die einzelne
Totalität, indem sie als solche sich erhalten, sein will, sich selbst absolut
aufopfert, sich aufhebt und damit das Gegenteil dessen tut, worauf sie
geht“, ist diese einzelne Totalität „eine sich selbst aufhebende, und sie ist
eine anerkannte, die im andern Bewußtsein als sie selbst ist; sie ist hiemit
absolut allgemeines Bewußtsein. Dies Sein des Aufgehobenseins der ein-
zelnen Totalität ist die Totalität als absolut allgemeine, als absoluter Geist“
(Hegel 1803/04, 221 f.). Die Voraussetzung, von der die Anerkennungsbe-
wegung ausgeht: die Annahme vereinzelter „Totalitäten des Bewußtseins“,
hebt sich mithin ob ihrer Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit selbst auf. Und Hegel
bestätigt und spitzt diesen Grundgedanken in den Jenaer Systementwür-
fen III (1805/06) zu, wenn er lapidar feststellt, dass das „Verhältnis [. . .]
was der Naturzustand genannt wird; das freie gleichgültige Sein von Indi-
viduen gegeneinander“, einzig darin besteht, „eben dies Verhältnis aufzu-
heben, exeundum e statu naturae“ (Hegel 1805/06, 196 f.).
Der kursorische Blick in Hegels Jenenser Werkstatt demonstriert, wel-
che Grundüberlegung die „Bewegung des Anerkennens“ im Herrschaft-
Knechtschaft-Kapitel antreibt: Es geht um den Ausgang aus dem fiktiven
Naturzustand oder – mit dem Kant der Friedensschrift (1795) zu spre-
chen – um das „Problem der Staatserrichtung“, das freilich unschwer und
folglich „selbst für ein Volk von Teufeln (wenn sie nur Verstand haben)
auflösbar“ ist (AA VIII, 366). Hegels „konflikttheoretische Dynamisierung
des Anerkennungsmodells Fichtes“ (Honneth 1992, 31) beruht somit auf
genau dem schlichten Interessenkalkül, der bereits die naturwüchsigen
Egoisten des Thomas Hobbes dazu bewegt, den Naturzustand zu verlas-
sen, ihren selbstmörderischen Kampf5 zu beenden und den Gesellschafts-
vertrag abzuschließen, durch den sie ihr je individuelles ‚Recht auf Alles
(ius in omnia)‘ auf den Souverän übertragen. Die über Hobbes hinausge-
henden ‚Zutaten‘ Hegels bestehen im Wesentlichen darin, dass er 1) die
5 „Ihm als Bewußtsein erscheint dies, daß es auf den Tod eines Anderen geht, es geht
aber auf seinen eigenen, Selbstmord, – indem er sich der Gefahr aussetzt“ (Hegel 1805/06,
203).
immanente Selbstwidersprüchlichkeit des Naturzustandes akzentuiert,

2) durch die Anerkennungsterminologie den der „Bewegung des Aner-
kennens“ zugrundeliegenden Interessenkalkül verschleiert und 3) darin,
dass er die Vertragskonzeption von vornherein unterläuft, indem er an
die Stelle des Souveräns den „Geist“ setzt. Dieser Schritt ist entscheidend,
denn der Vorgriff auf den „Geist“ erlaubt, die interpersonale „Bewegung des
Anerkennens“ und die intrapersonale „Bewegung des Selbstbewußtseins“
miteinander zu verschränken. Somit kann Hegel im Rahmen seiner Geist-
philosophie und seiner Konzeption einer substantialen Sittlichkeit den der
Anerkennungsbewegung zugrundeliegenden Interessenkalkül erheblich
anreichern; insbesondere kann er der Anerkennungsbewegung die schon
im Naturrechtsaufsatz geforderte Konkretisierung der Vernunft einschrei-
ben, indem er unter den Titeln ‚Herrschaft‘ und ‚Knechtschaft‘ auch das
intrapersonale Verhältnis von ‚Vernunft‘ und ‚Sinnlichkeit‘ begreift und im
Bilde des interpersonalen Kampfes implizit zur Darstellung bringt, wie „die
Vernunft [. . .] jene Sinnlichkeit einzuschränken und zu beherrschen“ ver-
mag (Hegel 1802, 457). Die intrapersonale Interpretation bleibt jedoch auf
die interpersonale Argumentation angewiesen, weil sie die Asymmetrie
von Herr und Knecht aus eigenen Stücken nicht begreiflich machen kann:
sowenig sich die ‚Vernunft‘ aus der ‚Sinnlichkeit‘ entwickeln oder herlei-
ten lässt, sowenig ist zu begründen, warum die ‚Sinnlichkeit‘ der ‚Knecht‘
sein soll, der aus Todesfurcht vor der ‚Vernunft‘ kapituliert. Die ebenso
beziehungsreichen wie verklausulierten Anreicherungen und Zusatzüber-
legungen tragen denn auch, wie sich an der Rezeptionsgeschichte zeigt,
nicht gerade zur Verständlichkeit des Herrschaft-Knechtschaft-Kapitels
bei und können vor allem die in sich widersprüchliche Grundüberlegung
nicht sanieren: Die Fiktion fürsichseiender Selbstbewusstseine im Natur-
zustand wird nicht dadurch real, dass man einen wirklichen Kampf unter-
stellt, der sich im Nachhinein seinerseits als Fiktion erweist.
Versucht man zu verstehen, warum Hegel diese in sich widersprüchli-
che Grundüberlegung bemüht, dann ist zu betonen, dass er sich der Fik-
tion genauestens bewusst ist, macht er doch nicht erst an dieser Stelle,
sondern schon am Beginn der Phänomenologie bewussten strategischen
Gebrauch von Fiktionen: Das vereinzelte Selbstbewusstsein und der
Naturzustand sind ebenso fiktiv, wie das einzelne ‚Dieses‘ und der ein-
zelne ‚Dieser‘ mit denen Hegel im Eingangskapitel über „Die sinnliche
Gewißheit“ (PhG, 82 ff.) operiert. Beidemale greift Hegel dankbar die
Fiktionen des neuzeitlichen logischen Nominalismus und ontologischen
Singularismus auf, um ihn von seinen eigenen Voraussetzungen her aus
den Angeln zu heben. Beidemale macht Hegel diese Fiktionen stark um
die Phänomenologie in Gang und das „natürliche Bewußtsein“ auf den

„Weg der Verzweiflung“ zu bringen, der „die bewußte Einsicht“ vermit-
teln soll „in die Unwahrheit des erscheinenden Wissens, dem dasjenige
das Reellste ist, was in Wahrheit vielmehr nur der nicht realisierte Begriff
ist.“ (PhG, 72). Höchst problematisch an der in der Phänomenologie ange-
wandten Methode eines ‚sich vollbringenden Skeptizismus‘ ist freilich
der Umstand, dass es sich beidemale nicht um Fiktionen des ‚natürlichen
Bewusstseins‘ handelt, sondern um literarische Fiktionen unserer neu-
zeitlichen Verstandeskultur. Problematisch an dieser Methode ist zudem,
dass „der nicht realisierte Begriff “ nur thematisiert werden kann im Vor-
griff auf den ‚realisierten Begriff ‘, der als solcher aber nicht mehr Thema
der phänomenologischen Darstellung sein kann. Wie wir feststellen
mussten, krankt die – gleichviel ob interpersonale oder intrapersonale –
„Bewegung des Anerkennens“ an beiden Methodenproblemen. Darum ist
die vorläufige Antwort auf die Frage nach der Tragfähigkeit des Paradig-
mas ‚Anerkennung‘ oder einer ‚Theorie der Anerkennung‘ zu bekräftigen:
‚Anerkennung‘ könnte der Schlüssel sein, der den Zugang zu allen Arten
der Verständigung öffnet, wenn man den Schritt zum ‚reinen Begriff des
Anerkennens‘ und mithin zum Bedenken der Vermittlung wagte, die das
‚Phänomenologie‘ und ‚Logik‘ übergreifende Generalthema Hegels ist,
nämlich zu dem Begriff, der nicht bloß bewusstseinsimmanente Vorstel-
lung oder ein Name oder Zeichen für ein Bezeichnetes ist, sondern „das
Subjekt [. . .], welches [. . .] die wahrhafte Substanz ist, [. . .] welche nicht
die Vermittlung außer ihr hat, sondern diese selbst ist“ (PhG, 36).
Literatur
Fichte, J. G. (1796): Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre.

In: Johann Gottlieb Fichte‘s sämmtliche Werke. Hrsg. von I. H. Fichte, III. Bd. Berlin: Veit
und Comp. 1845, 1–385.
Habermas, J. (1969): Arbeit und Interaktion. Bemerkungen zu Hegels ‚Jenenser Philosophie
des Geistes‘. In: ders.: Technik und Wissenschaft als ‚Ideologie‘. Frankfurt/Main: Suhr-
kamp, 9–47.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1802): Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts,
seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven Rechts-
wissenschaften. In: ders.: Werke in 20 Bänden. Hrsg. von E. Moldenhauer u. K. M. Michel.
Bd. 2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970, 434–530.
—— (1803/04): Jenaer Systementwürfe I. In: ders.: Gesammelte Werke (Akademieausgabe),
Bd. 6. Hrsg. von K. Düsing und H. Kimmerle, Hamburg: Meiner, 1975.
—— (1805/06): Jenaer Systementwürfe III. In: ders.: Gesammelte Werke (Akademieaus-
gabe), Bd. 8. Hrsg. von R. P. Horstmann, Hamburg: Meiner, 1976.
—— (PhG): Phänomenologie des Geistes. In: ders., Werke in 20 Bänden. Hrsg. von
E. Moldenhauer u. K. M. Michel. Bd. 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970.
Henrich, D. (1970): Selbstbewußtsein. Kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie, in: F. Bubner,

K. Cramer, R. Wiehl (Hrsg.), Hermeneutik und Dialektik, FS für Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Bd. 1, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 257–284.
Honneth, A. (1992): Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Kon-
flikte, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
—— (2001): Leiden an Unbestimmtheit. Eine Reaktualisierung der Hegelschen Rechtsphilo-
sophie, Stuttgart: Reclam.
Horkheimer, M. (1937): Traditionelle und kritische Theorie, in: Zeitschrift für Sozialfor-
schung 6, 245–294.
Kant, I. (AA): Kants gesammelte Schriften. Hg. Kgl.-Preuß. (Dt.) Akademie der Wissenschaf-
ten. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900 ff.
—— (KpV): Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Riga: J. F. Hartknoch, 1788.
—— (KrV): Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Riga: J. F. Hartknoch, 1781 (KrV A), 1787 (KrV B).
Platon (Parm.): Parmenides. Gr./Dt. Hrsg. und übers. von E. Martens. Stuttgart: Reclam,
1977.
Chapter Eleven
Recognition of norms and recognition of persons

Practical acknowledgment in Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer
Introduction: From Desire to Self-Governance
“Be a person and recognize others as persons.” As such, it is a kind of

gnomon or oracle, a short formula for a deep, i.e., comprehensive thought.
It is nevertheless, in a sense, Hegel’s categorical imperative. It is made
explicit in his Philosophy of Right. The imperative obviously has two parts,
or better, two moments: the subjective—or as I would like to already call
it—absolute moment of becoming and being a person, and the objective
or relational moment of acknowledging (all) other human individuals as
persons. But the question is still open concerning how the moments relate
to each other, the aspect of being a person and acknowledging others as
persons and the aspect of being recognized by others as a person. This
is indeed one of the central questions for any systematic interpretation
of Hegel’s philosophy altogether, and of his Phenomenology of Spirit in
particular.
The usual reading of the passages on the so-called struggle for recogni-
tion in the 4th chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which are obvi-
ously relevant for our question, goes back to Karl Marx, Georg Lukács1 and
Alexandre Kojève.2 The majority of readers support this reading, including
Jean Hyppolite, Jürgen Habermas, Terry Pinkard and Robert B. Brandom,
just to name a few. It says roughly the following. The difference between
mere consciousness (whatever this might be—in most interpretations this
is not at all clear) and self-consciousness of a self-standing (selbständig)
person is a result of an ominous struggle for recognition—the title of a
1 G. Lukács, Der junge Hegel und die Probleme der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin(O.)
1986, 377 ff., 558 ff.
2 A. Kojève, Hegel, Frankfurt/M. 1975, chpt. V, 217 ff.
208 pirmin stekeler-weithofer
well-known book by Axel Honneth.3 The idea seems to be this: Only an

individual who is recognized, i.e., sufficiently lauded and praised and not
always criticized and sanctioned, can develop self-conscious personhood.
But such a view goes back to George Herbert Mead rather than Hegel.4
Mead had reminded us of the fact that only children who are loved by
their parents develop some robust self-consciousness in the strongly posi-
tive sense of the German word Selbstbewusstsein, which, in some contrast
to the English word, conceptually includes autonomy or self-determina-
tion (Selbstbestimmung) in such a way that the person is neither over-
critical with her own doings nor overly self-indulgent nor in some other
way self-centered. Hegel allegedly says that the human individual has to
fight for recognition in order to become a full autonomous person. But a
moment of reflection shows that any such fight, for example, against one’s
father or mother, would more likely result in insecurity and self-doubt
rather than self-reliant self-certainty; that is, it would have the opposite
effect from the good one that is expected.
Another story about what Hegel says here seems convincing at first
sight: People become servants if they fear death more than submission
under their lords. This is indeed one of Hegel’s insights into the social
structure of freedom and serfdom: people turn themselves freely into
servants (or even slaves) when they prefer saving their lives, health or
relative well-being over the dangers of fighting for freedom and indepen-
dence. Even in the darkest tyranny, the authority of the tyrants still must
be freely recognized by the subjects in some way or another. The very
power of the lords consists in the fear of their repression and sanctions in
the case of disobedience. The subjects comply with the will of the mas-
ters because of this fear. This holds good even for persons who carry out
the sanctions against others, starting with state administration or police
in the wide sense of the old German term Polizey. Hegel’s central point
is this: Any obedience to the commands of a lord is already free recogni-
tion, even in cases of complying because of fears for one’s own safety or
wellbeing. Hence, the power of any ruler is a result of our free action.
We are therefore responsible for the very power of the ruler. This shows,
moreover, that the logical contrast and the conceptual inter-dependence
3 Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Kon-

flikte, Frankfurt/M. (Suhrkamp) 2003.
4 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society. From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist (1934,
ed. Charles Morris).
recognition of norms and recognition of persons 209
between what I do and what we do are much more complicated than most
seemingly harmless theories of collective action say or admit.
In any case, it seems plausible to assume that precisely those who
freely refuse to risk their lives for fear of death or repression are prone to
become the subjects of their masters. They obey those who threaten them
by their willingness to fight. Hence, the ones who are willing to fight for
life and death tend to become the lords. The ones who fear the fight tend
to turn into servants or slaves like the lower castes in India.
It would, however, be absolutely unconvincing if Hegel or his interpret-
ers would claim that the menace of war by the (future) lords and the fear
of death by their (future) subjects really were the historical and systematic
basis of all normative authority and its recognition. In fact, Hegel explic-
itly denies this interpretation. And even if he had not, it would remain
unclear how individual commands of individual persons (which as such
belong to the logical level of singularity, Einzelheit) could turn into general
norms (on the logical level of generality, Allgemeinheit), addressing all of
us at least in a generic way. How could individual obedience turn into
the satisfaction of fulfillment conditions of generic normative forms? In
fact, to be able to act freely and to obey commands already presupposes
the rational capacity to follow instruction, and the conceptual norms of
correct thinking, speaking, distinguishing, inferring and acting properly
in response to recognizing the authority of such a normative structure.
Hence, the normative structure of such proprieties, the notions of what
is true, proper, correct, or right in all different dimensions of these words
cannot be introduced at all on the basis of a fear directed against some
real or, in the case of God, some fictitious lord. It is also unclear why—as
Hegel seems to claim—the servants should ultimately become the true
lords. It certainly is true that the lords would not survive without their
subjects, just as a queen bee cannot survive without the working bees.
Only the servants seem to interact with the world; and they appear to be
doing all the real work and are, therefore, the backbone of the economy
and welfare of society. But this fact—or rather, this way of looking at
these things—does not prove the case. I think it is not even clear what
the case is. Thus we certainly need a more detailed and more convincing
story than the one told by most interpretations of Hegel’s Phenomenology,
especially of its most famous 4th chapter.
The basic problem of interpretation concerns Hegel’s structural analy-
sis and dialectical method. It has to be reconstructed as a complex argu-
mentation with significant tensions. Most interpreters find only a series
of claims, which they attribute to Hegel supported by some citations and
paraphrases taken out of context. In contrast, I believe that such narrative

interpretations of philosophy are not adequate. We need reconstructions
of the arguments in the philosophical texts or, if this is not possible, argu-
ments for the claim that the argumentation fails.
How does Hegel, for example, lead us to the alleged insights of the roles
played by a possible struggle for recognition of authority (rather than of
persons!) in a possible fight for life and death? And how does this story fit
into the context of becoming a self-conscious and autonomous person?
Instead of arguments, one often finds praise of Hegel’s genius (for exam-
ple, in Hyppolite’s interpretation). But it remains unclear what this genius
should consist in. Brandom reads the connection of desire and self-con-
sciousness as a kind of move from erotic bonds to mutual recognition of
persons. But then, again, the whole idea of struggling for recognition loses
all plausibility. Why should sexual desire, which pervades the whole ani-
mal kingdom in some sense, be a sufficient moment in developing the
authority of reason and reasons? And what is it to recognize persons as
persons? Is it not rather the recognition of the authority of norms and the
very concept of normativity that is at issue here?
My contention is, in fact, that Hegel’s arguments amount to the fol-
lowing: Real or true recognition of normativity consists in the actual per-
formances according to the relevant generic (forms of ) action; and this
consists not merely in assurances or verbal declarations of recognition,
but rather in actually following the norms and rules in appropriate actions.
Nonetheless, a motivational structure is involved, which ultimately rests
on the bodily structure of desire and its satisfaction. We have to see how
that desire in the form of general animal appetite contrasts and relates
to already conceptually formed intentions. The fulfillment conditions of
a wish must already be conceptually determined in some way or another.
Unfortunately, the conceptual contrast among intentions, wishes and
desires is usually underestimated, especially in their relations to the logi-
cally most complex and most important aspects of perfective verbs. A
standard example is the act of killing someone. In the course of events, we
might be forced to change aspects or even words, as the following example
clearly shows: Someone might have the intention and might already be in
the process of killing someone. But if the person survives (even only by
chance) the action will count only as a mere attempt at killing. Similarly,
we might (assume of ourselves that we) intend to do something, but if we
do not seriously attempt to fulfill the success conditions of the intention,
we might be forced to downgrade our intention: what seemed to be an
intention turns out to be a mere wish. On the other hand, desires and
their satisfactions play a parallel logical role in (our subjective control of )

fulfillments of intentional conditions, in the same way that sensations do
in conceptually informed perceptions, apperceptions and intuitions.
Notice that Hegel’s word Wahrnehmung already refers to appercep-
tive intuition (Anschauung), i.e., to conceptually informed perception5 of
things that are posited in some spatial and temporal “place” with respect
to us, and not merely with respect to me. Mere sensation (Empfindung)
is not located in this way. As Kant had explained, the content of any per-
ception or idea (Vorstellung) must be such that its content can be made
explicit. It does not matter if we only use labels or title words to mark
some of the conceptual differences or whole propositions. In every case,
conceptual content is either implicitly or explicitly dependent on pos-
sible linguistic acts or judgments. But notice that we need not actually
accompany our perceptions, ideas or doings with whole sentences or
whole descriptions. Being able to name some differences with holophras-
tic labels or titles is often more than enough. But it is true: If we were not
at all able to say what we are doing in contrast to what we are not doing
or not willing or intending to do, our doings would not be actions. In fact,
Hegel radicalizes Spinoza’s insight that any conceptual determination is
conceptual differentiation. And he adds the role of language in making
the conceptual contrasts explicit.
In contrast to mere animal perception, intuition is already participa-
tion in a joint practice of deictically referring to one and the same thing
in a joint spatial order of present states of affairs and events. Presence
(Gegenwart) is already spatially and temporally extended; it lasts as long
as the relevant process of comparison lasts, for example, the burning of a
match, a walk to town or a whole life. In other words, presence is never
just a temporal point; and the words “here” and “now” always refer to tem-
porally extended events that are actualized at spatially extended places, in
contrast to “there” and “then.” One of the deepest insights of Kant’s tran-
scendental aesthetics is that any empirical assertion or (ap)perceptual
reference to the actual empirical world in intuition (Anschauung) pre-
supposes some subjective stance and perspective of a real speaker to the
events and things: What is here from my perspective is there from yours;
what is left from my perspective is right from yours (or in the mirror).
5 The expression “conceptually informed perception” goes back to Terry Pinkard

and is also used by John McDowell. I read it as a translation of the traditional word
“apperception.”
Altogether, I want to show here that Hegel’s topic is recognition of

norms as forms of joint practices rather than recognition of individuals as
persons. Recognizing an individual as a person consists at first in recog-
nizing practically the normative forms of personal interactions. It consists
in accepting the other as one of us, as a participant in our practices. With-
out this context, it would be totally unclear what it means to recognize
others as persons.
We obviously must first become persons by learning and self-formation,
i.e., by acquiring the competence to act as a person, i.e., to take proper
part in personal interactions and transpersonal practices before we can
recognize other persons as persons. This personal competence consists in
recognizing, in actual practice, the norms of the relevant generic actions,
especially of the actions that involve speech acts. We must learn the dif-
ference between correct and incorrect actions. We must also learn the
difference between mere subjective satisfaction of conditions for correct-
ness and sufficient fulfillments. But how do we evaluate this sufficiency?
The conditions of truth in the case of informative speech acts or claims
of knowledge are a most important but special case, fulfillments of inten-
tions and promises are another, fulfillments of conditions of ethics and
morality are a third and subjective prudence and practical reason belong
to a fourth case. In all these cases, we evaluate proprieties or fulfillment
conditions of individual and joint actions as individual or collective per-
formances of certain forms to act. We have to look for the appropriate
generic actions, which are usually already aspects of or, as Hegel says,
moments of more comprehensive joint practices.
Even though the result of my reading seems in some respects the same
as that of the popular interpretation, the structure of argumentation is
quite different. The point in common is the insight into the sociality of
reason6 and the analysis of human spirit as a joint form of human life
and practice. The differences concern the overall argument, and the deci-
phering of Hegel’s use of metaphors, analogies, even allegorical images as
structural models in his logical and conceptual arguments. Such models
are theoretical pictures in structural arguments and not just genial stories
about some alleged genesis of authority.
6 Cf. Terry Pinkard Hegel’s Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge (Univ.
Pr.) 1994.
1. Self-certainties in Knowledge
1.1 Why Do We Need Self-Consciousness in Knowledge?

Hegel starts chapter four of his Phenomenology of Spirit with a reflection
on the results of the previous chapters: “In the previous modes of cer-
tainty, that what is true for consciousness” (i.e., what I would judge as
true, for example, on the ground of my own perception) “is something
other than itself.”7 This is so because I always perceive something else
and not just myself, as we would say even in cases when I perceive some
parts of my body. The same holds for other forms of knowing or knowl-
edge claims. “But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of
it.” It is certainly not clear what this oracle means. I believe that Hegel
wants to say that we must get rid of the idea that what we know about
the world can be neatly separated from what we know about ourselves
and vice versa: All we know concerns relations and relational processes
of ourselves to the world and to ourselves (which includes our relations
to the world).
The first mode of certainty (the German word is Gewissheit and stands
for subjectively certain knowledge claims) had been sense certainty, i.e.,
the idea that we relate to the world by mediation of our senses and that the
most immediate objects in our epistemic relation to the world are sense
data (sensations, Empfindungen) that we find in our own body, so to speak.
However, we cannot talk about such data as sortal objects. They cannot
be individuated; they cannot be distinguished or re-cognized as individual
objects in the outer world, that is, of real intuition; nor can they be inter-
preted as being caused by objective things or events in the real world.
That is, there is no immediacy in our cognitive relations to “real and
actual” things or events (“in themselves and for themselves”) in the real
and actual world, neither with respect to alleged sense data or sensual
phenomena (in or of our body) nor with respect to the appearing things
or events and their causal efficacy.
Moreover, any talk about causes and causing involves and presupposes
some talk about causing forces and causal rules or laws—which obvi-
ously belong to our (system of ) understanding (Verstand) rather than to
a merely bodily (animal) faculty of sense-perception: No law or rule or
force or cause can be perceived as such. The fact that forces and laws are a
7 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 166, ed. Wessels / Clairmont (Meiner) p. 120.

matter of thought was the insight of Berkeley. This insight came via Hume
down to Kant and Hegel. What we can perceive are at best the effects of
objective things and their dispositional forces. They are results that already
presuppose knowledge of regular correlations between distinct (different
and differentiated) events or affairs and our perceptions of them, e.g., of
relative movements and inner changes of things with respect to us and
to other things. It does not make any sense to doubt these fundamental
facts of our relations to the world. They are, so to speak, material and con-
ceptual truths. When skeptical doubt wants proofs for such basic truths
it turns into subjectivist idealism with its autistic attitude towards the
world. This is the attitude of an animal or even plant, as Aristotle saw
and Hegel has seen again.
It is a trivial, but often underestimated, logical fact that there is no
immediate knowledge of forces and causes. Hence, there is also no imme-
diate knowledge of things that allegedly cause this or that effect in our
perceptive system—as, for example W. V. Quine still believes and thus falls
prey to Hegel’s logical criticism of all kinds of empiricism, and idealistic
and dogmatic scientism (which is unfortunately frequently called “natu-
ralism”). Hegel reveals these versions of belief philosophy to be dogmatic
and even inconsistent commentaries on the real process of apperceptive
intuition (Wahrnehmung in Hegel’s sense) and already conceptually artic-
ulated joint experience (Erfahrung). In fact, (joint) experience is always
already far more complex than the empiricist reduction of the word to
sensual experience (merely an autistic version of “experience”) suggests.
We make experience in using our linguistic, theoretical and practical tech-
niques by evaluating their general success and by being aware generically
of dangers of failures. In doing so, we normally expect and usually (nor-
mally, regularly) have sufficient success. In the case of failure, we must
correct our errors. In fact, failures are the motor of technical development,
including the dialectical development of norms and forms of rational
judgment (distinctions) and the corresponding generic or default infer-
ences for normal (paradigmatic, standard or canonical) cases.
Default rules canonize conditions of normality. Idealizations are artic-
ulations of such norms, detached from the special problems of singular
applications. They articulate what holds as such, in itself, an sich, i.e., for
us, according to our ideal conceptual postulates. These postulates are set
(gesetzt) by us in our conceptual system, in which we—taken as a collec-
tive subject of general and generic episteme, so to speak—attach default
inferences to standard differentiations that are labeled with words or sys-
tematically defined by the truth or classification conditions that belong to
the sense and meaning of our (descriptive, empirical) sentences. Depend-

ing on the situation we use them in all kinds of “assertions,” that is, in
all possible speech acts, not merely in informative claims. The infer-
ences appear implicitly as normal expectations or orientations in practi-
cal contexts. And they appear as allowances for deriving other sentences
or “propositions” in language games, in which we make some of these
inferential orientations explicit. Default inferences are the backbone of
all knowledge; they turn our verbalized differentiations into thick con-
cepts, which all have two moments, a moment of contrast or distinction
and a moment of dispositional content. The very task of scientia (which
is much more than the scope of the English word “science”) is improving
the (generic, default) harmony between the conditions of distinctions or
classifications on one side, the corresponding default inferences and nor-
mal, canonized, expectations on the other. In other words, scientia is not
empirical historia, which tells narrative stories about what has empirically
happened. Rather, it entails elaborating the concept (Arbeit am Begriff )
by developing theories. Scientia is thus a joint praxis that includes the
development of conceptual differentiations and inferences in the social
sciences and Geisteswissenschaften (including jurisprudence) that go far
beyond mere narrative and historical humanities and cultural studies. In
these disciplines, causal explanations play a major role only in connection
with rational choice and free action.
Of course, we also need some logic for applying ideal theoretical con-
cepts and their generic differences and default inferences expressing stan-
dard dispositions: There is no relation to the world that only remains in
the merely theoretical domain of things as such. This domain is a merely
intellectual world in itself (a mundus intelligibilis). We have to take into
account what the singular things and events are for themselves. The word
“for” refers back to the Latin word “pro” which stands for any relation.
In fact, Hegel’s category of being for itself stands for any relation R for
which the rule holds: if xRy than x=y, where the equality sign “=” expresses
the relevant identity of the object we refer to (which may be a purely
abstract or an empirical object of discourse). That is, being for itself is
the category that defines the very identity of the object. As a result, any
worldly object of our knowledge has the logical form of a being in-and-
for-itself. The category of being in itself refers to the generic type, genus
or species and the generic level of conceptual or theoretical truths. It is
thus narrowly related to the category of generality. The category being for
itself refers to the relevant notion of singular cases and is thus narrowly
related to the category of singularity. The categories of particularity and
of being in-and-for-itself thus correspond to reasonable applications of

generic knowledge in actual, empirical, singular cases.
All in all, (joint) experience is always already holistically situated in
joint practices. This insight leaves the empiricist myth of the given far
behind, as well as the myth of some alleged stimulus meanings, as Quine
wants to have it. The logical form of perceiving things and “making experi-
ence” must be understood differently from the way the empiricist tradi-
tion does—and even from the English connotations in the use of the word
“experience.” There is no immediate foundation of experience, in contrast
to mere autistic sensations—especially because there is no immediacy in
the notions of causes and causing, forces and powers, possibilities and dis-
positions. In this context, Hegel’s crucial insight is that reality (Wirklich-
keit) refers not merely to what we actually perceive by our senses. Rather,
reality is a modal notion. Any event or state of affairs that deserves the
label “real” is a positively evaluated possibility. This is a logically profound,
and a fairly complex, thesis. I mention it here only to make clear that we
should be aware of the difficulty of the notions of possibility, disposition
and reality.
In a second round of reflection, Hegel asks what we mean when we
speak of an object that is allegedly directly perceived. “What the object
immediately was in itself—mere being in sense-certainty, the concrete
thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force—proves to be
in truth, not this at all (. . .).”8 That is, we realize that what we take as the
object perceived is not just a bundle of sense data. What we perceive is
always already conceptually formed. In a sense, this was a basic insight of
Kant’s. Hegel’s main achievement consists in getting rid of Kant’s unhappy
talk of a thing in itself, which is, by Kant’s own definition, transcendent
with respect to our knowledge and, as such, at least for us incomprehen-
sible. It is even inconsistent: Any thought about a possible thing in itself
is already a cognitive access to it and must be evaluated as meaningful or
meaningless. Hegel therefore sees that we have to give a better sense to
the phrases “as such,” “in itself ” or an sich. For this, we should go back
to Plato’s use of the phrase kath’auto, which means something like “ideally”
or “in principle,” that is, “in normal and standard cases.” This “in-itself turns
out to be a mode in which the object is only for others (. . .)”9—namely,
for us.

Unfortunately Plato’s kath’auto has been misread by a whole philosoph-

ical tradition. This explains why Kant, like Hume, wants to get rid of its
metaphysical misunderstandings. He does so by declaring that we cannot
know anything about the thing in itself. Rather, all knowledge must refer to
appearances. Hegel sees, however, that the traditional use of the phrase “in
itself ” or per se must be understood differently. When we use the phrase
we are referring to generic things or theoretical and ideal things of thought
in a realm of things produced by mere thinking. These things are merely
intelligible, hence, at first sight, merely abstract entities. Or rather, when
we use the phrase “in itself ” (“as such,” an sich, per se, kath’auto) we refer
to some theoretical moment or aspect in our language use. Such things
in themselves, which we separate from the context by focusing on their
generic features, exist, in a sense, only for us, not for themselves. Only we
have theories and theoretical concepts. Only we refer to generic forms and
ideals. Ideal forms or theoretical entities are never self-standing things.
Therefore it is semantic nonsense to assume that things in themselves
could produce sensations causally. It is nonsensical to say that pure con-
cepts, like pure numbers, could produce thoughts causally. What we do
here is this: We talk about generic types and say that they apply to some
singular case. We attach, so to speak, our concepts to specific, singular,
cases. Thereby, we turn them from being mere objects of reflective think-
ing into conceptually determined objects of possible perception, in Hegel’s
demanding sense of Wahrnehmung that already is apperceptive intuition,
that is, perceptual reference to things or events in a spatial and tempo-
ral order relative to me as the observing speaker together with a generic,
but often implicitly presupposed, characterization of what I refer to. What
empiricists and materialists or physicalists claim to be a causal relation
between the object and our perception is now understood as a logical
relation: We conceptually attribute to the object the inferential disposi-
tion, force or power of regularly producing corresponding reactions, e.g.,
sensations, by which we can or could perceptively identify the object in
sufficiently good conditions of our apperceptive access to it.
Now, Hegel introduces the difference between consciousness and
self-consciousness in the following way: “With self-consciousness, then,
we have . . . entered the native realm of truth.”10 The emphasis rests on
“native” or einheimisch. The immanent domain of truth belongs to self-
consciousness insofar as the topic is knowledge about the very concept of

knowledge and truth: “It is a kind of knowledge of itself in contradistinc-

tion to knowledge of other things.”11 Hegel says further: “Let us look now
how the form or gestalt of self-knowledge appears.”12
Consciousness is knowledge in the subjective form “I claim/know that p.”
But in this form, I can express, as such, only subjective assurance and cer-
tainty (Gewissheit). Even though there is a difference between “I am just
of the opinion that p” and my expressive claim that p, we cannot simply
deduce the truth of p from the claim. We must always respect, and take
into consideration, the logical scope of the speaker, the hidden “I” in any
speech act. This shows why it is crucial to see this difference between “I
know,” “he knows,” “one knows” and “we know.” In the latter phrases, too,
there is a hidden speaker, such that they cannot express joint knowledge
in an immediate way. This is the reason there is no knowledge sideways
on, as John McDowell and Thomas Nagel have put it.
“I know that p” is basically only a declaration of a knowledge claim. An
assessment in a generic we-mode13 can turn such a subjective declaration
into objective knowledge. In doing so, we propose to canonize the claim,
make it general. We say that it can be recognized as (sufficiently) true.
This says that the claim can be recognized by us. Notice that in such a case
we appeal to a generic sense of “us.” This generic “us” or “we” somehow
corresponds to “one.” We say something like: “one could or should accept
it.” Kant’s transcendental “I” is, in fact, a generic “we,” and any real claim
in which “I say that we know that p” reduces somehow to the claim “I say
that p.” In precisely this logical sense, the category of the I is a we and the
we is always an I, as Hegel famously says. The truth of any knowledge-
claim therefore presupposes self-conscious knowledge of the fact that we
always have to start with subjective claims on the side of the performing
speech acts, and with some presupposed trans-subjective fulfillment con-
ditions that usually surpass what a speaker can control immediately and
totally from his limited and finite perspective. This insight is crucial for
the very logic of the difference between belief and knowledge, between
seeming to be true and being true.
Hegel now characterizes self-knowledge as a “return from being some-
thing else to itself.”14 In fact, the very word “self-consciousness” expresses

13 Cf. Raimo Tuomela, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social
Notions. Stanford (Univ. Pr.) 1995.
this return in an act of reflection in the sense of the Latin reflectere

animum. In any self-knowledge, I have to identify somehow the content
of what I say about myself with my being myself. That is, a claim about
myself is true if and only if I am such as the claim says. This formula can
be read in a very general way, such that it includes all performative speech
acts as well. If I say, for example, that I promise to help you tomorrow, I
have to make the speech act fully true by helping you tomorrow, that is, by
making myself into the person I promise today that I shall be tomorrow.
If I do not keep my promise, then I am acting against a personal faculty
and my reliability as a person in personal relations. In the same way, Kant
saw that lying deprives me of my personal stance, at least in part: A liar,
if he is known as one, cannot properly interact with other persons. By not
complying to the norms of truth, he loses some of his personal attributes
and faculties, turns himself into a merely rational animal. Hegel’s ironic
label for a merely intelligent animal or homo rationalis oeconomicus is
geistige Tierheit: If there could be a merely rational animal it would not
be a personal subject. But any merely rational subject is just abusing her
personal powers, i.e. our personal morality and ethos, just as any liar or
merely rational egotistic human is simply abusing personal norms of good
interaction for the sake of her own desires and private interests.
1.2 The Principle of Apperception in Intuitions and Representations

Any identification of myself with what I say or think about myself is only
relatively immediate, for example when I am actually not aware about the
form of my reaction. It is nevertheless always mediated by some norm
or form of correct identification. In self-knowledge, I somehow turn myself
(together with my own knowledge) into an object or topic of my self-
reflecting knowledge. This follows from the very meaning or concept of
self-knowledge, which must be knowledge of knowledge or consciousness
of consciousness. Hegel’s famous attack on all philosophy of subjective
reflection of some mystical or “intuitive” introspection (Reflexionsphiloso-
phie) thus addresses only the fact that one does not usually know what
self-reflection logically is. And it is crucial to see that Hegel asks what it
is to know something about one’s own knowledge, or to be conscious of
one’s own consciousness.
Hegel’s word Bewusstsein is a categorical title which stands for know-
ing something in the full sense of a conceptually determined epistemic
relation to the real world. It greatly surpasses mere vigilance, awareness,
or attention, which we share as such with animals. Hegel does not tell us
stories about an alleged immediate self-consciousness. He shows why the

very notions of self, knowledge and self-knowledge are logically complex,
especially when we refer to ourselves in the future or in merely possible
future or past situations. When Oedipus finds out that he himself has
killed his father or when I find out that I myself have spoiled the milk, we
still have comparably easy examples.
Just like the Cartesian insight into the presuppositional or transcen-
dental relation between any act of doubt as a version of thinking and the
performative way of being a thinker, Kant’s principle of apperception also
points to the presupposition of “I think” in any act of re-presentation of
some possible or real thing in the world. Hegel’s insight is, in this context,
that no representation can be immediate. This is so because it is always
already mediated by thinking and understanding (Verstand) as the com-
petence of following rules and fulfilling law-like conditions of correctness
in judgments or actions. In other words, no thinking and no speaking, no
judgment and no assessment of a judgment can be immediate, especially
because the correctness and truth conditions always transcend the mere
feeling of satisfaction of the merely individual subject here and now. They
are all always already mediated by the normativity of general, common
criteria, norms, laws or rules of correctness in the dimension of truth in
the case of assertions, of moral or aesthetic perfection in the case of other
actions and speech acts.
Hegel asks what the word “self-consciousness” could mean, i.e., he
asks for the conceptual conditions of possibility of talking about self-
consciousness in the usually intended sense. This sense goes far beyond
mere self-awareness and self-attention. And I repeat: Self-consciousness
in the sense of self-knowledge is formally a difficult notion, for it entails
knowing something about oneself that usually surpass by far any mere
knowledge about my body (here and now). Hence, I am at the same time
the subject and the object of the knowledge. How can this be?
Our first remark is this: The first term “subject” often stands for what
I am, the term “object” for the topic (subject-matter) of my judgments.
Hegel’s observation is, in a sense, Fichtean. I have to split myself up into
two moments, the subject and the object, and I must look at me as if I
were some other thing. When it comes to the status of self-knowledge
with respect to truth or epistemic normativity or authority, I have to
acknowledge the opinion of myself about myself as true. This means that
I represent myself in a kind of self-model and acknowledge the model
as fitting to who or what I am. But then, Hegel sees beyond Fichte that
acknowledgement is always a performative attitude towards judgments
and action. The judgments might be about me or about other things. In

such cases, the question must be answered whether a self-model or judg-
ment about my self really is true or should instead be contrasted with a
case in which it is recognized only because it seems to be true (to me).
1.3 Desire and Satisfaction as Performative Self-relations

Now we can come back to the passages in which Hegel talks about
the structure of desire (Begierde). He sees that feelings of satisfaction
somehow make things true merely by being satisfied. We have seen, more-
over, how we make self-models and judgments about ourselves true by
acting in a certain way—and by being content with the results. In such
cases, self-knowledge turns into active and practical self-determination.
But at first, the question of self-knowledge tends to be answered by
an “unmoving” (bewegungslos) tautology, as in Fichte’s formula “I am I.”
But such a formula does not help us. It does not represent a judgment
that has content. It is in a sense no meaningful speech act, no move or
action in our language game that can be understood as having a definite
and well-determined meaning. In a sense, practical self-determination in
intentional actions can be understood more easily than self-knowledge
since it is not merely a verbal self-commentary. In other words, being in
the sense of performing forms of life includes being the personal subject
or actor of my actions and speech acts. This is the very topic of Hegel’s talk
about Gestalten des Seins. The topic is the form of our performances in the
actualization of our competence to live a human life. Here self-knowledge
or self-consciousness turns into a practical reality.
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is in total a conceptual analysis of
the notion of self-consciousness in its broadest sense. The explication of the
concept of self-knowledge finds in this practice and action the correspond-
ing Fürsichsein or being for itself. In the case of performing a personal
life, this being for itself consists in the actual realization of the concept
of self-knowledge. As such, it is different from mere Ansichsein, being as
such, which is an abstract moment of what we as humans and persons
generically or ideally are. As a result, self-consciousness is in and for itself
conceptually determined self-knowledge and is not at all immediate. It is
mediated by generic knowledge and generic concepts that I and we apply
to my and our own life. The only feature of immediacy we can find here is
the immediacy of the performance itself: In judgments about myself and
ourselves, I myself and we ourselves must judge accordingly. In a case of
full-fledged self-knowledge, I should have an awareness, or knowledge,
of what self-knowledge is conceptually, and how the very concept—the

content of our talk about self-knowledge and self-consciousness—relates
to sensitivity and understanding, rationality and reason, mind, soul, and
spirit, i.e., to the corresponding concepts and what they are concepts of
and for.
When Hegel talks about object and subject, he speaks in a generic way,
similar to when we say that “the lion is a wild animal” or “the American
loves freedom.” If we talk about the lion, the Germans, or about the self or
self-consciousness, we are not talking about one single lion or many or all
lions, all individual Germans or all persons. We are talking about what it is
to be a self or what self-consciousness is. In precisely this sense Hegel says
that the generic object of consciousness is the world in its whole exten-
sion. The generic subject of being is the unity of the (implicit, practical)
self, which is, in a way, already self-consciousness. Nevertheless, we may
or must distinguish the self which I am from self-consciousness or self-
knowledge, which takes the self, at least formally or grammatically, as the
object or topic of its reflections and explications.
This gives rise to the following questions: What does the unity of the
self consist in? How should we understand the unity of the subject’s self-
consciousness? And how should we grasp the relation between the self (of
me in the sense of whoever speaks) and the world at large? Hegel’s initial
surprising answer, as I have already indicated, is this: This unity is desire
altogether (Begierde überhaupt). Its surprising formulation helps us to see
the connection between desire and life:
Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one is
the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception, which how-
ever for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; and the second,
viz. itself which is the true essence15 and (it) is present in the first instance
only as opposed to the first object. In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits
itself as the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity
of itself with itself becomes explicit for it. But for us [who analyze the con-
cept, PSW] or in itself, the object which for self-consciousness is the nega-
tive element has, on its side, returned into itself, just as on the other side
consciousness has done. Through this reflection into itself the object has
become Life. What self-consciousness distinguishes from itself as having
being, also has in it, in so far as it is posited as being, not merely the character
15 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 167, ed. Wessels / Clairmont (Meiner) pp. 121 f.
Hegel uses the German word Wesen here in the sense of the Greek ousia, i.e. he talks here
about being myself as I am, not as I picture myself; this being is being already in the sense
of Heidegger: it is the process of actualizing a form of life.
of sense-certainty and perception, but it is being that is reflected into itself,

and the object of immediate desire is a living thing.16
Some of Hegel’s sentences are too long for our modern, impatient taste,
and they want to achieve too much even for the readers of his time. But
the thought is fairly straightforward: The unity of the subject or person is
not actual memory, as Lockeans such as Derek Parfit claim even today,
but the actual and real life. Any individuality of higher animals, hence of
persons, is defined by life: The living being cannot be split into two parts.
This is a universally generic truism, a material but conceptual and not just
empirical (statistical) truth.
The unity of merely actual self-certainty is, however, not enough, even
though desire already shows a basic temporal structure of animal life. In
it, actual life relates to future life. The desire of a subject is to live a good
life according to the possibilities and faculties of the genus or species.
The individual wants, so to speak, to continue its life as well as possible.
This observation could be called “naturalism” with respect to the notion
of the good and one could talk about natural goodness, had these labels
not been sometimes abused.
The object of desire of a living being is, in the end, her life itself. Most
readers think that Hegel is talking of some other living being here. But we
see this cannot be correct once we have some understanding of the argu-
ments. The other life, to which an animal or person stands in a relation
if she herself is in the status of desire, is the life she desires in contradis-
tinction to the life she is just actually performing.17 In other words, it is
the living being itself that satisfies in its further life its desire—but not
without the means of the surrounding world. Satisfaction as such consists
in the good way in which the life goes on. This good way is not arbitrary.
Usually satisfaction of desire consists in a life that corresponds to the form
16 ‘Der Gegenstand, welcher für das Selbstbewusstsein das Negative ist, ist [. . .] für uns
oder an sich ebenso in sich zurückgegangen als (= wie, PSW) das Bewusstsein andererseits.
Er ist durch diese Reflexion in sich Leben geworden. Was das Selbstbewusstsein als seiend
von sich unterscheidet, [. . .] ist in sich reflektiertes Sein, und der Gegenstand der unmit-
telbaren Begierde ist ein Lebendiges’. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 168, ed. Wessels /
Clairmont (Meiner) pp. 122.
17 ‘An dem Leben, welches der Gegenstand der Begierde ist, ist die Negation entwe
der an einem Andern, nämlich an der Begierde, oder als Bestimmtheit gegen eine andere
gleichgültige Gestalt, oder als seine unorganische allgemeine Natur. Diese allgemeine
selbständige Natur aber, an der die Negation das Absolute ist, ist die Gattung als solche,
oder als Selbstbewusstsein. Das Selbstbewußtsein erreicht seine Befriedigung nur in einem
andern Selbstbewusstsein’. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 175, ed. Wessels / Clairmont
(Meiner) p. 126.
of life of the living being, just as satisfaction of hunger consists in eating,

not in getting blows to the stomach, which might too stop the sensation of
hunger as a naturally felt desire to eat. Similarly, the right satisfaction
of thirst consists in drinking etc.
Hegel now explicitly turns from the (generic) individual to the species
or genus. This should not surprise us any more. Hegel explains that the
unity of human life consists in the unity of living a human form of life, to
which a certain form of reflection on life is an essential part. One aspect
or moment of this reflection is merely subjective self-certainty and actual
self-awareness; another is more complicated and detached self-knowledge
that must include at least some knowledge of the genus (our species) and
its generic form of a good life in all its possible varieties, in contrast to a
bad, deprived, sick, or failed life.
In the end we find a unity: the unity of life as the real on-going process,
its generic form, which is actualized in a particular way in the very pro-
cess, and some awareness or better consciousness of this process. Hence
we must distinguish and identify the process and its form, the process
and reflection, the subject of the process and reflection. I—as the object
I talk about—stand in a relation to the category being-for-itself to me
as the subject who is leading my life.18 In other words, in the process of
living I stand in a relation to something other than myself. In an implicit
way I relate to forms of a good life given by our species; in an explicit way
they are forms as objects of my conscious reflections. Life always exists as
a unity of genus in itself and individuation for-itself.19 But the irreducible
18 ‘Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the
same time the dissolution of these existent differences; and the dissolution of the splitting-
up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming of members. With this, the two sides of
the whole movement which before were distinguished, viz. the passive separatedness
of the shapes in the general medium of independence, and the process of Life, collapse
into one another.’ Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 171, ed. Wessels / Clairmont (Meiner)
pp. 123 ff.
19 ‘Sie (also die Einheit) ist die einfache Gattung, welche in der Bewegung des Lebens
selbst nicht für sich als dieses Einfache existiert; sondern in diesem Resultate verweist das
Leben auf ein Anderes, als es ist, nämlich auf das Bewusstsein, für welches es als diese
Einheit, oder als Gattung ist. Dies andere Leben aber, für welches die Gattung als solche
und welches für sich selbst Gattung ist, das Selbstbewusstsein, ist sich zunächst nur als
dieses einfache Wesen, und hat sich als reines Ich zum Gegenstande [. . .]. Das einfache
Ich ist diese Gattung oder das einfache Allgemeine, für welches die Unterschiede keine
sind, nur, indem es negatives Wesen der gestalteten selbständigen Momente ist; und das
Selbstbewusstsein hiermit seiner selbst nur gewiss, durch das Aufheben dieses Andern,
das sich ihm als selbständiges Leben darstellt; es ist Begierde.’ Hegel, Phenomenology of
Spirit, § 172, ed. Wessels / Clairmont (Meiner) pp. 125 f.
subjectivity of us (as higher animals) always already consists in the unity

of performing (my) life in the process of (my) life. This is accompanied by
present (actual, immediate) reflective self-awareness or attentive reference
to myself in the surroundings where I am. In this sense, we, like all ani-
mals, are at the same time the “origins and results of our behavior” in the
“practical world of our life,” as Kambartel aptly says.20 And we know this
at least implicitly, in the mode of more or less immediate self-awareness.
This unity of myself as a living being with the object of my immediate self-
awareness and reflective subjectivity is, according to Hegel, the simple
species or genus of the living being in question, it belongs to the form
of life of the higher animals in question with their subjectivity. The spe-
cies, genus or life form of the species (of humans or lions, for example)
does not exist as such in the singular process of life (“der Bewegung des
Lebens selbst”), for a singular animal can be sick, mutilated, a monster or
only a bad exemplar of the species. In actual reality, however, there are
only the individual animals. But the life of each of them refers implicitly
to the limited possibilities of living a good life as a member of the spe-
cies in contradistinction to the possibilities of a bad life, of mishaps and
monsters. In this regard, we should not forget that my own life refers in a
sense to “something else than what I immediately am,” namely, as I read
this passage, to a good life.
2. The Dependencies in Self-consciousness: Governance and Serfdom
2.1 Immediate Satisfactions in Actual Awareness and Self-controlled Truths

But what does it mean when Hegel talks about the “other life, which as
such is the species.”?21 And what does it mean to say that its being for
itself (or Fürsichsein) is the species or genus? In what sense is this other
life self-consciousness? And what does it mean to say that as such it is “at
first only as this simple being (Wesen),” which has itself as a pure “I” as its
object (“sich als reines Ich zum Gegenstande”)?22
In order to understand this passage, we should remember that “spe-
cies” (Art) and genus (Gattung) both translate Plato’s term eidos which
20 Friedrich Kambartel, “Geist und Natur. Bemerkungen zu ihren normativen Grundla

gen”, in Gereon Wolters u.a. (Eds). Homo Sapiens und Homo Faber. Berlin (de Gruyter)
2005, pp. 253–265.
refers not only to the extension or class of individuals but to their form of
being as well. In our case, we talk about the general, personal, form of a
human life. In a sense, we share immediate self-knowledge, namely self-
awareness of mere subjectivity, with some higher animals. But we humans
apply always already some self-control of the normality condition con-
cerning whether the relevant satisfaction-conditions of a sufficiently good
human life are fulfilled or not; in doing so, we as members of our species
refer to the form or eidos of the species. Frequently, we realize that such
fulfillment conditions are not properly fulfilled; but we often know also
that they are in relevant ways sufficiently fulfilled. Controlling fulfillments
always surpasses mere feelings of satisfactions or non-satisfactions as
mere bodily answers to subjective desires in the sense of animal appetites
in their present immediacy. Such a desire or appetite includes, negatively
speaking, the avoidance of painful sensations (Schmerzempfindungen).
The immediate motives for my behavior often lie in an attempt to avoid
pain and to satisfy my desires. The desire structures are given as such by
the merely natural life form of the animal species. In other words, desire
and pain show the very core of subjectivity and pre-reflective self-aware-
ness in a quite fundamental way.
So we see that Hegel’s “desire” is a title for the life-supporting animal
appetite of subjectivity. Only higher animals have it; plants do not, as far
as we know. (And we should never just ascribe mystical properties arbi-
trarily, for example, desire to plants or thinking to animals). Plants are
no subjects, not because they are not individuated as higher animals, but
because the form of their life, their kinesis, is totally different. They do
not show the same form of movements in pursuing goals and desires and
avoiding pain as animals do.
In short, Hegel uses the title-word “desire” as a label for the actual unity
of life performances of living beings that have and show what I call sub-
jectivity. Humans have what I call personal subjectivity. We are born as
natural subjects. But we have to develop our personality or personal sub-
jectivity. And we do this by developing our personal relations to other
personal subjects, by learning to act properly and to cooperate.
The fundamental self-certainty can now be seen as a merely subjective
one: It is realized in immediate states of pain and desire and in merely
subjective feelings of satisfaction or, in the case of pain, of feeling its end.
On the face of it, it might have been unclear what the expression
“this other life” refers to. The standard reading assumes that Hegel is
already talking about two persons. However, thinking and comprehending,
intention and action are possible only in a we-mode, as I would like to call
it, borrowing a phrase from Raimo Tuomela, but not precisely in his sense.
Such a we-mode is, in a complex way, generic. Hegel is, in fact, always
already talking about us. He does not want to claim that the I is a we and
the we is an I. He rather wants to show us that in any situation in which I
use the word “we” it is trivially I who appeal to us. And in any case where
I refer to myself by the use of the word “I,” I say that we can acknowledge
the truth of the assertion about me (at least in the end).
Hegel’s secret method is not to follow Fichte’s dogmatic claims; rather,
it is a method of naming and showing logical forms. The difficult task of
interpreting is, therefore, to read the sentence, “Self-knowledge achieves
its satisfaction by another self-consciousness,”23 in its context appropri-
ately, namely as showing and making explicit what happens when we
are satisfied.
I add a short reflection on the nature of an immediate desire in the
sense of an animal appetite—in contradistinction to the nature of an
intention, which is always already mediated by a conceptual determi-
nation of what is intended and which governs the action in my pursuit
of its fulfillment: Desire as such is only an immediate, present state of
desiring. If it is already directed to an object; it presupposes some aware-
ness and attention. This is still a rather meager concept of mere proto-
consciousness. It is, so to speak, animal consciousness or mere vigilance
with awareness and attention. As such it is a present directedness to
objects in the actual world around oneself. The faculties of awareness,
attention and vigilance do not differentiate between (higher) animals and
men. In contrast, true intentions are always already embedded in actions
by which we pursue the goal of fulfilling some conceptual conditions. This
fulfillment is often inhibited, however, by our desires and their relatively
immediate demand for immediate satisfaction. As a result, we learn about
the contrast between immediate satisfactions of mere desires and sustain-
able fulfillments of intentions. We learn, moreover, that intentions can
collapse into mere wishes if I do not comply with the norms that tell me
what to do in order to fulfill the intentions actively. Hegel’s word for this
compliance is “work” or “labor,” (Arbeit). It refers to the action that fulfills
an intention. Hegel aptly calls such an action or work “inhibited desire,”
(gehemmte Begierde).

Animals and sometimes humans too have a desire for something that
they want to incorporate directly. Ownership is a kind of institutionally
extended incorporation. I want something, meaning I want to make it
into something that is my own. In both cases, Hegel says, the goal is to
deny and “sublate” the difference between being something other and
being my own. I make other things into my own. This is the basic form of
recognition: I take general norms as guidance for my own action. Only this
reading brings the case of animal desire (in eating and drinking, hence
of the mysteries of bread and wine) into contact with recognizing the
authority of general norms. In any attempt to perform a certain action
properly, that is to fulfill the normative conditions that define the form of
the (generic) action as such (an sich), I make the form and norm of the
action into my own. This is recognition of its form. The norm (to do this
or that) in a performance or actualization of this or that generic action (to
say the truth for example instead of lying or erring) thus turns, in the end,
into my own authority. This and only this is recognition of normativity
and acknowledgement of the authority of norms.
But of course, in singular cases we still have to distinguish between
the sincere wish and accurate will to follow a norm correctly and the
(joint) judgment if an action—for example, a speech act of affirmation or
claiming—really fulfills the objective (i.e., trans-subjective) conditions of
accurate and correct rule-following or the corresponding norms.
2.2 From Immediate Desires to Sustainable Intentions

Any relation to the world has its roots in practical attitudes. A relatively
immediate relation is governed by the structure of appetitive desire and
its satisfaction, which we share with animals. Since the content or fulfill-
ment condition of a wish is—in contrast to a mere desire—animal appe-
tite or pro-attitude, wishes and intentions that are already conceptually
pre-determined are already mediated by (possible) linguistic representa-
tions of fulfillment conditions. An appetite ceases by disappearing. Inten-
tions, like commands or orders, are fulfilled by proper actions. Wishes
already demand correct fulfillments.
So we have, on the subjective and performative level, a structure of
immediate satisfaction of desires, on the conceptual level the normativ-
ity of proper fulfillment of conditions that can be generically shown or
verbally articulated, for example, as criteria for correct fulfillments in con-
tradistinction to incorrect ones or mere apparent fulfillments. Hence, if I
am only satisfied, it is possible that the relevant conditions are still not
really or truly fulfilled. What I recognize might not be the same as what
one ought to recognize. This holds for any knowledge claim, also for those
that belong to my self-knowledge or Selbstbewusstsein.
Nevertheless, any fulfillment is still rooted in satisfactions. As such,
they are subjective. In this sense, they are ideal. Animals are idealists, as
Hegel says in a deeply ironical way; for animals, fulfillments are always
only satisfactions. Humans transcend this subjective idealism (and any
form of naïve empiricism) by addressing the difference between merely
subjective satisfaction and objective fulfillment. But it is clear that we can-
not totally abstract from the ideal sub-structure of subjective satisfaction
in any actual recognition.
There is no view from nowhere, or everywhere, not even from side-
ways-on. The only objectivity we can arrive at is trans-subjectivity or a
kind of joint knowledge in a generic we-mode, which is the same as what
one can know.
Struggles of recognition may appear now in the form of a fight to
acknowledge the differences between subjective feelings of satisfaction
and trans-subjective (or objective) fulfillments of conceptual conditions.
In order to understand this difference, we must understand the differ-
ences between actual joint satisfaction, whereby each of us is actually
somehow satisfied, and normative fulfillment, whereby each of us should
be satisfied if the joint practice is understood correctly. As a result, actual
score-keeping attitudes are not enough to define success. The conceptual
content must be given generically. We must start with generic fulfillment
conditions in conceptual differentiations and default inferences. The cor-
responding rules or norms of material but generic differences and infer-
ences exist in a public domain of canonized normality.
Notice that any desire, and any fulfillment, is not only a relation to an
object but a self-relation. In this sense, the object of immediate desire or
appetite is the “living thing itself.” But any object of a desire is self-standing
for itself; and there may be some hindrance for immediate appropriation.
In some cases, we need planned action and joint work in order to over-
come possible obstacles. In this sense, the structures of care (Heidegger’s
Sorge) in wishes, intentions, plans and self-consciously controlled actions
are in the form of inhibited desire or conceptually transformed appetite:
conceptual fulfillments replace immediate satisfactions.
We arrive at the higher level of satisfaction with claims of fulfillment.
For any immediate satisfaction of inhibited appetite, we do not need the
additional structure of conceptually determined intentions. Intention is
thus conceptually inhibited, transformed and “sublated” (aufgehoben)

desire or appetite. It mediates between me (as I am now, perhaps before
the fulfillment) and me who has arrived at the right place or achieved the
goal. This content of an intention (Absicht)—which is always already
more than a wish because it is a normative relation to my own future
action, as Brandom rightly sees and says—is at first only given by some
re-presentation of a possible state of affairs, namely my seeing to it that p,
whereby I do and must play a certain active role. Animals live in merely
presently given orientations. In contrast, human orientations are given by
thought, hence by the concept(s).
As we have already seen, the very notion of self-consciousness involves
two different aspects of consciousness or even a double consciousness,
the one which knows something and the other that is the object of this
knowledge or controlled by it, for example when a mere (self )certainty
should be evaluated as (self )knowledge or a mere feeling of satisfaction
as a real and true fulfillment of some objective condition.
In intentional actions in which I actively see to it that p, we logically
have two parts of me: There is the part of me who actually lives and actu-
ally performs something right now; and then there is a description of who
I will or should be if I will or should have fulfilled the (truth conditions of
the) intention. If we bring an intention into an analogy of a self-command,
which is structurally plausible—any objections with regard to the differ-
ences notwithstanding—an obvious question arises. Who, in such a self-
relation, is the master that commands and who is the servant that has to
act accordingly? The structural analogy shows what a whole philosophi-
cal tradition has articulated in famous allegories: The thinking soul is
the master and the performing body is the servant; or rather, this is the
way things should be according to the traditional picture. The soul has to
subdue the bodily impulses of immediate desires, or rather, to transform
them into a power that supports the will or intention of the master, just as
the charioteer (thought) and the good horse (the will) together keep the
bad horse (the desire who wants to back out into the woods of immediate
satisfaction) on the right path in Plato’s famous simile.24
Plato’s simile represents a relation between two moments or aspects
of (self )consciousness. The chapter on lordship and bondage in Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit thus analyzes some intra-personal relation using
social, political or inter-personal relations as a model for structural, i.e.,
24 Plato, Phaidros 246 a b.

analogical explication. Hegel thus proceeds just like Plato does in his
Republic—which is a book not merely on the state but also on the con-
stitution of the soul.
2.3 A Struggle of Life and Death between Desire and Intention

If I want to fulfill my intentions by my deeds, I must do what the inten-
tions say has to be done and achieved. Often I do not do it when I fol-
low instead my immediate desires. In such a case, the former intention
collapses into an empty wish. Hence, there is, in our analogical simile, a
struggle of life and death between intention and desire, the thinking and
willing soul and the sensing body, the hopeful master and the servant. It
is the deed itself that decides who wins. But since the deed is the actual
performance of the servant, it is the body—i.e., the whole bodily person
and not just an abstract soul—that decides in the end who wins. This is
the reason why the master or the willing soul has to take into account the
bodily desires as leading motives and moments in any active realization
of goals.25
If this is how we should read Hegel, then he is not talking here about
a struggle for recognition between persons. Nor is he referring to a real
fight for life and death. The topic is instead an allegorical struggle between
desire and intention, body and soul, and the problem of the soul to get the
appropriate recognition of the body. Perhaps we always have to force and
lure ourselves into a practical recognition of what we should do—accord-
ing to our own intentions and according to our general knowledge about
what is good and right to do. When Hegel talks about work or labor of the
servant, he is talking about the difficulty of performing actions by actual-
izing complex intentions defined by the generic action and its norms of
proper fulfillment.
But why should the servant, if it is the body, fear the master? What
is the power of the master? In which sense is the master fearless with
respect to the menace of death, whereas the servant fears death?
25 ‘In diesen drei Momenten ist erst der Begriff des Selbstbewusstseins vollendet;
a) reines ununterscheidbares Ich ist sein erster unmittelbarer Gegenstand. b) Diese Unmit-
telbarkeit ist aber selbst absolute Vermittlung, . . . sie ist Begierde. Die Befriedigung der
Begierde ist zwar die Reflexion des Selbstbewusstseins in sich selbst, oder die zur Wahrheit
gewordene Gewissheit; c) aber die Wahrheit derselben ist vielmehr die gedoppelte Refle-
xion, die Verdoppelung des Selbstbewusstseins. Es ist ein Gegenstand für das Bewusstsein,
welcher an sich selbst sein Anderssein oder den Unterschied als einen nichtigen setzt
und darin selbständig ist. [. . .] Hiemit ist schon der Begriff des Geistes für uns vorhanden.‘
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 176, ed. Wessels / Clairmont (Meiner) pp. 126 f.
This part of the simile does not seem to fit to our story. It therefore
seems more plausible to proceed, just like in the standard interpretations
of the text, from a general structure of appropriation to a fight between
persons for power, property and recognition of authority. Insofar as prop-
erty is a substructure of power, we would immediately arrive at an analy-
sis of the lord’s power over slaves and servants. This power seems to rest
on a menace of sanctions if the servants and knights do not comply. The
fear of the lord would be, somewhat ironically, the beginning of wisdom.
Man would turn into a creature, as Kant has said, who is always in need
of a master. But how should a merely abstract object of reflection, the
soul, menace the body and bring the body by some fear of death to act in
a certain way, according to the content of intentions and other demands
of duty?
However this may be, it would be a far-fetched idea if Hegel started with
a differentiation between animal desire or appetite and human intentions
and jumped immediately to an analysis of personal, even political rela-
tions between lords and servants. It is much more plausible that Hegel
uses the social structures here, just like Plato does in his Republic and in
other dialogues, in order to explicate inner or mental structures or rela-
tions in a kind of society of mind.26 But perhaps this is only a first step,
followed by a criticism of the whole picture with respect to features that
it cannot properly depict. And this is precisely how I would like to read
Hegel’s considerations.
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Chapter Twelve
Finitude, Rational Justification & Mutual Recognition
Kenneth R. Westphal
Introduction
Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justifica-

tion in non-formal, substantive domains—i.e., in both empirical knowl-
edge and in morals—is in fundamental part socially and historically
based, although these social and historical bases of rational justification
are consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and
with strict objectivity about basic moral principles. Indeed, to judge fully
rationally that one judges—in ways which provide rational justification
of one’s judgment about any substantive matter—requires recognising
one’s inherent fallibility and consequently also recognising our mutual
interdependence for assessing our own and each other’s judgments
and their justification. Despite growing attention to Hegel’s account of
mutual recognition, its most fundamental significance and role in rational
justification—and in Hegel’s account of rational justification—has been
widely neglected.
Only a few facets of Hegel’s analysis can be examined here, though I
make this a virtue by arguing that very minimal premises regarding our
cognitive finitude suffice to justify Hegel’s two key theses (above), and
indeed, transcendentally. Please note two caveats. First, I argue that in
fundamental part rational justification in substantive domains is social
and historical. With Hegel, I argue against strong individualism, whilst
affirming the mutual interdependence of social and individual aspects of,
or factors in, rational justification.1 Second, my topic is rational justifica-
tion. Neither I nor Hegel equate or reduce truth to warranted assertability.
Truth in the non-formal domain of empirical knowledge involves proper
classification or description, in short ‘correspondence’.2 Hence the social
1 This accords with Hegel’s moderate collectivist social ontology; Westphal (2003),
§§ 29–37.
2 On Hegel’s affirmation of the correspondence account of the nature (not the criteria)
of truth, see Westphal (1989), 17, 63, 67, 87, 111–14, 162. The counterpart issues in matters
moral are more complex; see Westphal (2013).
236 kenneth r. westphal
and historical aspects of rational justification in non-formal domains do

not entail that truth is merely a social or historical (i.e., historicist or con-
versationalist) phenomenon.3
1. Deduction, Scientia and Infallibilism
1.1 Hegel adopted from Kant the legal sense of ‘deduction’ as the justi-
fication or proof of an entitlement, of a rightful claim.4 What form(s) of
proof or justification can we attain in our inquiries? ‘Infallibilism’ is the
thesis that justification sufficient for knowledge entails the truth of what
is known. Though some substantive claims are infallible—for example,
Descartes infallibly knew he existed each and every time he considered
whether he did—typically infallibility is achieved by stripping candidate
claims of any further implications. Perhaps one cannot at any moment be
mistaken about what one at that moment seems to experience. However,
such self-evidence is a function of the logic of ‘seems’, not of any apparent
content, nor of any special infallibility or reliability, of apparent experi-
ence. Such self-evidence is evidence for nothing else; only thus can it be
infallible. When more substantive claims are made, however, appeals to
self-evidence face a challenge Hegel repeatedly highlighted, to distinguish
reliably in principle and in practice between these two cognitively very
different scenarios:
(i) Grasping a truth, and only on that basis having, and recognizing one
has, infallible knowledge of it.
(ii) Being utterly, even incorrigibly convinced one has grasped a truth, and
solely on that basis claiming (mistakenly) to have infallible knowledge
of that purported truth.
This distinction holds regardless of the truth or falsehood of the claim in
question; it is a cognitive distinction marking a crucial justificatory differ-
ence. No advocate of self-evidence has devised plausible criteria for dis-
tinguishing reliably between them, in connection with claims substantive
enough to contribute to justifying further substantive claims (see West-
phal 2007–08, § 5).
3 On Hegel’s rejection of historicism, see Beiser (1993).

4 KdrV B116–121; WdL, GW 11:20.5–18, 20.37–21.11, 33.5–13; 21:32.23–33.4, 33.20–34.1,
54.28–55.5, cf. Rph § 2 & R.
finitude, rational justification & mutual recognition 237
1.2 Infallibilism is ill-suited to substantive domains. The alternative is fal-

libilism, according to which justification sufficient for knowledge strongly
indicates the truth of what is known, but does not entail it. Infallibilists have
condemned fallibilism as capitulating to scepticism. Clarifying why falli-
bilism is not a sceptical capitulation requires distinguishing between for-
mal and non-formal domains. Strictly speaking, formal domains are those
which involve no existence postulates; only thus can sentences be true
solely due to their form. Strictly speaking, the one purely formal domain
is a careful reconstruction of Aristotle’s Square of Opposition (Wolff 1995,
2000, 2009). All further logical or mathematical domains involve vari-
ous sorts of existence postulates, including semantic postulates. We may
define ‘formal domains’ more broadly to include all formally defined logis-
tic systems (Lewis 1970, 10). The relevance of any such logistic system
to any non-formal, substantive domain rests, however, not upon formal
considerations alone, but also upon substantive considerations of how
useful a specific logistic system may be within a non-formal, substantive
domain (Lewis 1929, 298; cf. Carnap 1950). Within any specified logistic
system, deduction suffices for justification only within that system; the use
of that system within any non-formal domain of its application requires
further justificatory resources, not limited to formal deduction. This holds
too for the use of that system in justifying any particular claim within its
domain of application. Within any substantive domain, fallibilism is no
sceptical capitulation, not because infallibilist standards of justification
are too stringent, but because in principle they are inappropriate to any
and to all substantive domains. Within any substantive domain, a merely
logical possibility has no cognitive status and so cannot serve to ‘defeat’
or to undermine (refute) an otherwise well-grounded line of justificatory
reasoning within that domain.5
2. Fallibilism and the Social Dimensions of Rational Justification
Rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains is fallible. Con-

sequently, to judge substantive matters rationally is to judge them thus:
5 Westphal (2011b). Only in formal domains is truth a matter of provability; this is an

important reason to distinguish between justification and truth in non-formal domains.
To the best of my present abilities, understanding and information, this con-

clusion is justified for the following reasons and in the following regards—
what do you think?
Because rational judgment is fallible, and because it involves one’s own,
as it were, ‘perspectival’ assessment of the relevant evidence, principles
and the interrelations among these, rational judgment in substantive
domains is also fundamentally social. Constructive mutual criticism facili-
tates constructive self-criticism and renders it a social phenomenon by
facilitating the identification of discrepancies between our conceptions
of our knowledge and of the objects of our knowledge, and our experi-
ence of the objects we know and our experience of our own cognitive
constitution and activities in knowing those objects; and analogously in
regard to action, regarding either intended and actual consequences or
intended and actual justifying reasons of our actions.6 The essential social
dimensions of constructive self-criticism are highlighted by the following
considerations.
2.1 First, the norms, principles and objects or events involved in any
judgment have implications far beyond one’s present context, and indeed
far beyond the purview of any individual person, even in commonsense
judgments such as ‘This is a physical object’, or ‘That is a goldfinch’ (Austin
1965, 354). The indefinite scope of these implications is, in part, a feature
of the ‘open texture’ of our empirical concepts: our empirical judgments
cannot rule out that objects may behave very differently than we expect,
based on how we conceive and thus classify them (Westphal 2005, § 2).
Consequently, the scrutiny of the norms and principles one uses even in
simple empirical judgments, as also the scrutiny of one’s own judgments,
falls not only to oneself but also to others.
2.2 Second, these norms, principles, classifications and judgments have

the content they do and are justified to whatever extent they are through
their critical scrutiny by all concerned parties, presently, historically and
in the future. Even the most ordinary and commonsense concepts, norms
and classifications have this kind of social history. Commonsense was at
one time thoroughly animistic; for a millennium in the Occident it was
broadly Aristotelian. Only with great difficulty did Occidental commonsense
6 This point rests upon Hegel’s analysis of the possibility of constructive self-criticism;
see Westphal (1998), (2011a).
become Newtonian, and in some regions of the Occident today common-

sense is still struggling with (or against) Darwinism.
2.3 This point can be illustrated with an example from Gerd Buchdahl.7
Buchdahl invites us to assess Hume’s view that possibility is a function of
conceivability by asking whether it is possible to conceive of flowers grow-
ing on the moon. Of course we can picture flower-like cartoon images
protruding from a picture of lunar soil and increasing in size, or even
passing through the externally visible aspects of morphological develop-
ment from a shoot to a mature plant. However, these are only images,
even if they were drawn, say, by a Blumenbach, a Buffon or an Audubon.
Plants as we actually know and conceive them (starting no later than early
elementary school science classes) are biological organisms which require
nutrients, water, sufficient carbon dioxide in the surrounding atmosphere
and indeed sufficient atmosphere to maintain a suitably temperate envi-
ronment, where the relevant ‘suitability’ is a function of the plant’s physi-
ology. None of these conditions is satisfied by the moon; hence plants
cannot grow on the moon. This is true, not as a matter of conceptual
stipulation, but of conceptual understanding of some aspects of the nat-
ural causality involved in plant physiology, developed historically by a
large collective of pioneering biologists, some of whose results have now
rightly become commonsense and part of elementary science education.
Analogous points can be made across the spectrum of our commonsense
conceptions and beliefs. To factor out the social and historical bases of
our plethora of commonsense conceptions and beliefs by appealing to
notions of ‘narrow content’, according to which the core content of our
beliefs or concepts is strictly and entirely introspectable, would render us
bereft of commonsense conceptions and beliefs, including those required
to understand the very point of defining or appealing to (alleged) ‘narrow
content’.
2.4 Third, the very terms in which we formulate our views and investigate
whatever issues we do are acquired, that is, learned, in various ways from
various groups (Westphal 2012). This is especially plain in any kinds of
expertise—the so-called ‘division of cognitive labour’—though it behoves
us to recall that ‘cognitive labour’ includes both experts and commoners,
7 Buchdahl (1969), 368–71; I have modified and abbreviated his example to suit the
present context.
and both intellectual as well as manual labour. Where and when we do

innovate by devising new conceptions, methods, procedures, techniques,
materials etc., we human beings can do so only by exploiting inherited,
socially acquired conceptual, methodological and often technical as well
as material resources. We initially adopt these resources by being taught
them as the best-available and best justified resources for the domain at
issue (cf. Burge 1989, 2003). Through our use of these resources, we may
augment their justification, extend their use or further refine their charac-
ter and also, on the basis of our grounds for such modifications, justify these
successors. Yet also in cases where we identify the limits, defects or inade-
quacies of these resources, or confront novel circumstances which require
refashioning our resources, we human beings do so only in and through
using those resources in ways which substantially inform and indeed
make possible our development of improved successors. In these ways,
individual innovation, and the justification individuals develop for their
innovations, are socially based. The idea that human creation must be
ex nihilo, which is required for creation to be a strictly individualist phe-
nomenon, even on that lesser scale called ‘innovation’, has had far more
credence in our intellectual and cultural history than it deserves, though
it lives on in contemporary philosophical appeals to ‘Crusoe cases’, in
which internalists characteristically neglect Robinson Crusoe’s having
been raised by others to adulthood prior to his unfortunate voyage.8
2.5 As mentioned (§ 3.1), the judgments each of us make and the prin-
ciples we use to make them have implications which far transcend one’s
present situation and indeed one’s entire purview. Among these are impli-
cations for domains, issues and examples one might never attend to, or
ever be able to attend to. This indicates a fourth important social dimen-
sion of the rational justification of individual judgment: We require the
critical assessment of others who are engaged in other activities and con-
cerns, both directly and indirectly related to our own, because they can
identify implications of our judgments and the justifying grounds of our
judgments which we cannot. None of us can simulate for ourselves the
confrontation of our rational judgments with the loyal opposition by also
playing for oneself the role of the loyal opponent. While important, being
one’s own devil’s advocate is inherently limited and, of course, fallible.
8 This is one indicator of why mere ‘acceptance’ as such is a poor indicator of justifica-
tory status.
Each of us can do our best to try to determine what those who disagree
with us may say about our own judgments, and we may do fairly well at
this, though only if we are sufficiently broad-minded and well-informed
to be intimately familiar with opposing analyses of and positions on the
matter at hand. However, even this cannot substitute for the actual criti-
cal assessment of one’s judgments by knowledgeable, skilled interlocutors
who actually hold differing or opposed views, or views only tangentially
related to our own. Inevitably and ineluctably we have our own reasons
for selectively gaining expertise in some domains rather than others, for
focussing on some issues rather than others and for favouring some
kinds of accounts rather than others. However extensive our knowl-
edge and assessment may be, we cannot, so to speak, see around our
own corners. Our own fallibility, limited knowledge and finite skills and
abilities, together with the complexities inherent in forming informed,
well-reasoned judgments, require us to seek out and take seriously the
critical assessment of any and all competent others. Failing to do so ren-
ders our judgments less than maximally informed, less than maximally
reliable and so less than fully rationally justified.
Therefore, due to our fallibility and limited knowledge, both factual and
inferential, any particular judgment anyone makes about any substantive
matter is justified to no greater extent than that to which the judge does
his or her utmost to exercise informed judgment on that occasion, which
due to our fallibility requires us to submit our judgments to critical scru-
tiny by all concerned parties and to respond constructively to their con-
sidered assessments of our judgment. Hence in non-formal, substantive
domains rational justification is socially based. We are each responsible
for the critical assessment of our own and of others’ rational judgments.
Genuine and fully rational judgment requires constructive self-critical and
mutually critical assessment of each and everyone’s judgment. Any con-
sensus thereby reached is and remains justified—and remains justificatory
of conclusions based upon it—because it identifies the very best available
principles, evidence and conclusions, and because it always remains open
to continuing and to future critical re-assessment.9
9 At this point, my account converges in many regards with those of Longino (1990,
1994, 2001), Solomon (1994) and Haack (1998), chapter 6. However, my aim to prove my
key thesis transcendentally requires abstracting from the empirical features of collective
scientific research to which they rightly draw attention.
3. Contra Cartesianism
3.1 The typical rejoinder to these considerations takes the form, ‘yet
couldn’t we in principle assess our own judgments fully for ourselves,
without relying on others?’ This appeal to what we allegedly could do ‘in
principle’ is an open invitation to Cartesian pipe-dreams of rational self-
sufficiency, because the only constraints on such possibilities ‘in principle’
are the law of non-contradiction, the logically contingent premise ‘I think,
I am’, whatever one can introspectively identify as one’s ‘own’ (putative)
thoughts or experiences and the uncharted expanses of one’s imagina-
tion. If mere logical possibilities are relevant to justification, the only pos-
sible form of justification is infallibilist, the only possible kinds of mental
contents are ‘narrowly’ (if deceptively) non-social (recall the point from
Buchdahl; above, § 3.3), whilst the so-called logical gap between one’s
apparent experiences and their putative objects (namely, that the former
could be as they are, whilst also being false) condemns one directly to the
infallibilist internalism so familiar from the Cartesian ego-centric predica-
ment.10 If such views may avoid precisely that ego-centric predicament
by rejecting representationalist accounts of perception, they construct an
equally pernicious one by mistaking rational justification for defending
one’s view come what may against critics and dissenters.
3.2 Internalism about mental content or about justification may be con-

sistent with realism about ordinary objects and events, but strict internal-
ism of either variety precludes justifying such realism. This complex issue
may only be considered briefly here, by noting a revealing example of
social influences on apparently basic features of human visual perception.
The Müller-Lyer illusion is familiar, as is the fact that, even after compre-
hending its character, those who experience it cannot make themselves
simply and literally see two equal length lines, conjoined to either con-
verging or diverging ‘arrow-heads’.
The Müller-Lyer illusion results from inappropriate correction of visual
information by our visual system’s constancy mechanisms.11 Perceptual
‘constancy’ systems allow us to perceive objects in our environment as
maintaining their size through changes in distance and angle of view,
despite vast changes in the arc which any object subtends within one’s
10 All of this is entailed by the project of defeating Descartes’ evil deceiver.

11 Gregory (1963), (1967), (1968), (1970), (1973), (1974).
Fig. 1. The Müller-Lyer Illusion
visual field as the distance between the perceiver and the object changes.
In this regard, it is very fortunate—indeed, it is vital—for our abilities to
identify and re-identify physical objects that our visual systems do not
follow the laws of geometrical optics.
Cross-cultural research shows that there is a decided social influence
upon human perception at this basic level. This level is ‘basic’ because it
affects visual appearances, regardless of our judgments or beliefs about
what we sense. Groups which do not build rectilinear structures suffer
either very little or not at all from the Müller-Lyer Illusion (Deregowski
1973, 1980). This perceptual example is germane to my explication of
rational judgment insofar as it undermines both strong individualism and
strict internalism about mental content: it belies glib distinctions between
‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ perceptual content because it shows that social fac-
tors enter into what would otherwise be considered to be ‘narrow’ per-
ceptual content and it shows that ‘narrow’ cannot be distinguished from
‘broad’ perceptual content on the basis of purported ‘narrow’ content.12
The only way internalists can salvage ‘narrow’ mental content is to
repeat Descartes’ (2nd Med., ¶9, AT 7:29) fiat of defining sensing strictly
speaking in terms solely of what one seems to sense. So doing may be
‘irrefutable’ to the satisfaction of egocentrically entranced internalists,
but such fiat reinstates insoluble global perceptual scepticism because it
reinstates infallibilism, about rational justification, though in a substan-
tive domain (putative empirical knowledge) to which in principle it does
not pertain.
12 ‘Broad’ perceptual (or mental or conceptual) content is in part specified by environ-

mental or organic features of a perceiver.
As I hope we have already recognized, much more is required to justify

one’s view in any substantive philosophical domain than merely to escape
overt self-contradiction. Views which aspire to no more than that can well
be expected to be useless for anything more than arguing amongst the
like-minded of that otherwise hermetic cultural circle. To devise a theory
of rational justification on the slender basis of individualism and internal-
ism about mental content, in order, in effect, to comply with the dictates
of Descartes’ evil deceiver, is to devise a theory for some merely logically
possible cognizant subject, not for human beings. Satisfying oneself by
one’s own best lights is no substitute for justifying one’s claims rationally
and it makes error far more incorrigible than it need be. Descartes is
instructive in this regard, too: his argumentation in the Meditations suf-
fers five distinct, vicious circularities (Westphal 1989, 18–34).
Our concern must be the rational justification, so far as we can obtain
it, of our best judgments, using the best of our actual—rather than our
imagined, feigned—rational capacities, abilities, skills and information.
For reasons reviewed above (§ 3), our rational capacities are finite: we
lack omniscience, we lack omni-competence, we can only base our judg-
ments upon information, principles, evidence, examples and reasonings
we in fact have and use. Our legitimate and ineluctable predilections
to focus on some activities, issues or inquires rather than others, the
division of cognitive labour this naturally generates, and the manifold
implications of our own judgments for domains and issues beyond our
cognizance, entail that others have information which bears upon, and
can provide for rational assessment and justification—or revision—of our
own judgments, no matter how ordinary or expert our judgments may be.
The present account aims to understand the kind of rational justification
we can and often do have in substantive domains, not the kinds we might
have if we were ‘in principle’ some other kind of utterly self-sufficient,
though merely logically possible rational being.
4. Rational Justification Requires Mutual Recognition
All of these considerations and measures (§§ 2–4) are required, and
understanding all of them is required, in order rationally to judge that ‘I
judge’, and not merely to utter the words ‘I judge’, thereby merely feigning
rationality. The central significance of Hegel’s account of mutual recogni-
tion (Anerkennung) for rational justification is this:
For anyone accurately and justifiedly to judge that she or he is a rationally

competent judge requires:
(1) Recognising one’s own rational fallibility,
(2) Judging that others are likewise rationally competent judges,
(3) Recognising that we are equally capable of and responsible for assessing
rationally our own and each other’s judgments, and
(4) Recognising that we each require each other’s assessment of our own
judgments, in order to scrutinise and thereby maximally to refine and
to justify rationally our own judgments.
This rich and philosophically crucial form of rational self-consciousness
requires our correlative consciousness of others, that we are all mutu-
ally interdependent for our capacity of rational judgment, our abilities to
judge rationally and our exercise of rational judgment.
Moreover, this requirement is transcendental: unless we recognise
our critical interdependence as fallible rational judges, we cannot judge
fully rationally, because unless we acknowledge and affirm our judgmen-
tal interdependence, we will seriously misunderstand, misuse and over-
estimate our own individual rational, though fallible and limited powers
of judgment. Thus recognising our own fallibility and our mutual inter-
dependence as rational judges is a key constitutive factor in our being
fully rational, fully autonomous rational judges, so far as is humanly—
or individually—possible. Only by recognising our judgmental interde-
pendence can we each link our human fallibility and limited knowledge
constructively with our equally human corrigibility, with our ability to
learn—especially from constructive criticism. This form of mutual recog-
nition involves mutually achieved recognition of our shared, fallible and
fortunately also corrigible rational competence. This recognition involves
recognising the crucial roles of charity, tolerance, patience and literal for-
giveness in our mutual assessment of our rational judgments and those of
others, to acknowledge that oversights, whether our own or others’, are
endemic to the human condition, and not as such grounds for blame or
condemnation of anyone’s errors.13 Therefore, fully rational justification
in substantive domains requires us to seek out and to actively engage with
those who critically assess our judgments.
13 Hegel, PhdG, GW 9:359.9–23, 360.31–361.4, 361.22–25, 362.21–29/¶¶666, 669–71; cf.

Westphal (1989), 160–4, 181–3; (2009).
The present account implies, of course, indeed in many ways, that

rational justification comes in degrees or extents. My main aim is to iden-
tify the social dimensions of rational justification in non-formal, substan-
tive domains by explicating the character of fully rational judgment. It
is a further question to consider the extent to which any individual or
any group exercises rational judgment on any particular occasion, though
considering this question, too, requires exercising rational judgment to
our utmost—and hence collective—abilities. In any particular case,
who is competent to assess which judgments, in which regards and to
what extent, can vary significantly; this is part of the cognitive division
of labour. These points can be clairified by considering briefly how these
social dimensions of rational justification entail that rational justification
in substantive domains is also an historical phenomenon.
5. Mutual Critical Assessment and the Historicity of Rational Justification
5.1 Obviously, assessing any piece of important reasoning requires sub-

stantive training in the relevant issues. Yet such training does not suffice to
assess the reasoning in question. Assessment requires autonomous judg-
ment about the merits of the case made in and by that piece of reasoning.
To resolve the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion, the justification of
any substantive view in a non-formal domain requires and must be based
upon the thorough, constructive internal critique of all relevant opposed
views so far as we can determine them, whether historical, contemporary
or possible. This is built into Hegel’s concept of ‘determinate negation’.14
Because the list of relevant alternative views can always be extended, in
part by devising new variants on previous accounts, and in part doing
so when confronting new kinds of circumstances, rational justification is
fallible and inherently provisional. Consequently, rational justification in
substantive domains is fundamentally historical, because it is based on
the current state of knowledge, because it is fallible and thus provisional
and because the list of relevant alternatives and information typically
expands historically.
Recall that the fallibility, revisability and consequent provisionality at
issue here centrally concerns cognitive justification, though when we find
some claims or judgments to be unjustified in some regard(s), this typically
involves reconsidering or revising their contents, too, which bears upon
14 PhdG, GW 9:57.1–17, 58.12–22/¶¶80, 81; Westphal (1989), 14–15, 99–128; (1998).

their truth and (in)accuracy, and upon the truth and accuracy of our new
information and understanding. Both kinds of revision occur in first-order
domains of inquiry, at the theoretical level in the sciences and in philoso-
phy, though they take different forms and occur to different extents and in
different ways at each of these levels. Here some brief observations about
science and engineering history must suffice.
5.2 Reviewing the development of the empirical sciences (and like-

wise developments within any empirical science) in view of the present
account reveals many concrete examples of discoveries and innovations
being made in just the ways highlighted by the present explication of
rational judgment and its social and also natural bases. For example,
in 1938 Hahn and Strassmann bombarded uranium salts with neutrons.
Yet even after exacting re-examination of their procedures, theories
and explanations, they could not resolve their equivocal results. Their
chemical tests indicated that their experiment produced Barium, which
contradicted everything they knew about nuclear physics. Shortly after
learning of their results, Lise Meitner devised an alternative interpreta-
tion of their results which achieved both consistency and showed that
they had succeeded at producing—for the first time—nuclear fission. To
achieve her pioneering result, Meitner had to draw upon what she had
learned from others (including Hahn and Strassmann) about both chemis-
try and nuclear physics, yet her innovative re-thinking of these conceptual
and experimental resources enabled her to produce a revolutionary (and
sound) explanation of Hahn and Strassmann’s otherwise deeply puzzling
results. This example nicely illustrates how individuals can contribute
to social institutions (in this case, scientific institutions, including disci-
plinary methods and theories), though only by drawing upon conceptual
and material resources which are socially and historically developed and
communicated.15
5.3 The case is similar across engineering. To devise a solution to an

assigned problem, engineers as a matter of course use established kinds
of devices and designs, tailoring them to the specific parameters of the
current problem, in order to plan and assemble the required works.
Significant engineering problems arise when available designs and devices
15 This example, and this interpretation of it, were brought to my attention by Will
(1997), 102.
cannot readily be adapted to the present, and hence problematic situa-

tion. Such situations call for genuine innovation. The parameters of the
specific problem can be determined, in many important regards, by deter-
mining the reasons why available designs and devices are insufficient. This
kind of specification affords a focussed search for the required innovation.
There are no algorithms for innovation; innovation is required precisely
where standard procedures are insufficient. Yet the history of engineer-
ing repeatedly shows how innovative engineers can be. Of course, prior
innovation—beginning in ancient and indeed pre-historic times with the
simple machines—is what produced today’s stock of available designs and
techniques—for any ‘day’ we may select. The same phenomenon is found
across the trades and in all kinds of production, economic or otherwise.
5.4 Individual innovation relies upon unappreciated resources and upon

unappreciated possibilities of modification found within established, ‘tra-
ditional’ practices, in response to unfulfilled aims and aspirations found
in those practices or in unexpected circumstances or turns of event; typi-
cally, in a combination of all of these. In these ways ‘tradition’ and ‘rea-
son’ are deeply intertwined, because the traditions we now have (for any
relevant ‘now’) generally are the product of intelligent, rational activities
guided by our manifold efforts to cope with ourselves, our neighbours,
our societies and the natural and social world we inhabit. Current prac-
tices and procedures may not, of course, have been devised by particularly
sound or splendid reasoning, yet it is reasoning none the less, and indeed
such cases are precisely those which most benefit from critical scrutiny of
their current and on-going effectiveness.
Conclusion
These broad, central insights into the character and requirements of

rational judgment are very far from philosophical commonplaces, as is
the present explication of the social and historical aspects of rational jus-
tification in substantive domains. That we often engage in constructive
mutual criticism is nothing new. Neither is it news that we often thwart
it instead. What we achieve by constructive mutual criticism and how we
achieve it are far from obvious, nor is much notice taken of it by most the-
ories of cognitive justification.16 If the present account is correct, we can
16 There are some notable recent exceptions, e.g., Longino (1990, 1994, 2001), Haack
(2003), chapter 6. Readers familiar with the original American pragmatists will recognize
and ought to engage in constructive self- and mutual criticism because

only in this way can we achieve genuine, fully rational justification, to the
extent humanly and individually possible, and thus only in this way can
we aspire to achieve it in any substantive domain.
Hegel was the first to understand and to argue that these social and
historical aspects of rational justification in substantive domains are con-
sistent with—indeed ultimately they require—realism about the objects
of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about basic moral norms.
It is still widely supposed that ‘pragmatic realism’ is oxymoronic. This
supposition, Hegel rightly argued, rests on a series of false dichotomies
(Westphal 2003). In non-formal domains cultural and intellectual his-
tory—including all forms of empirical inquiry—play central, ineliminable
roles within rational, cognitive justification. Philosophy itself, as a rational
examination of substantive issues within substantive domains, is essen-
tially historical and social. Hegel elevated the history of philosophy to a
specifically philosophical discipline because he recognized (already in the
1807 Phenomenology of Spirit)17 that comprehensive, critical, philosophical
history of philosophy is essential to rational justification in non-formal,
substantive domains of philosophical inquiry.18
Literature
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Beiser, Frederick (1993): ‘Hegel’s Historicism’. In: idem., ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Hegel (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 270–300.
Buchdahl, Gerd (1969): Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins
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ascent and vapid conversationalism.
17 Harris (1997) argues in detail—and convincingly—that Hegel’s history in the Phe-
nomenology is far better than has been recognized, and that the Phenomenology contains
Hegel’s genuine philosophy of history; his surprising finding merits and rewards close
study.
18 I extend my sincere gratitude to Paul Cobben and Christian Krijnen, whose kind
invitation to address their conference on recognition (Tilburg, September 2012) prompted
these further reflections; I warmly thank them and all the participants for their lively and
helpful discussions of the draft presented, and throughout the conference.
—— (1980): Illusions, Patterns and Pictures: A Cross-Cultural Perspective. New York, Aca-
demic Press.
Descartes, René (1964–76): Ch. Adam and P. Tannery, eds., Oevres de Descartes, rev. ed.;
cited as ‘AT’, by volume: page number.
Gregory, R. L. (1963): ‘Distortion of visual space as Inappropriate Constancy Scaling’.
Nature 199: 678–680. Rpt. in: Gregory (1974), 342–379.
—— (1967): ‘Comments on the Inappropriate Constancy Scaling Theory of Illusions and
its Implications’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 19.3:350–356. Rpt. in:
Gregory (1974), 350–356.
—— (1968): ‘Perceptual Illusions and Brain Models’. Proceedings of the Royal Society
171:279–296. Rpt in: Gregory (1974), 357–379.
—— (1970): The Intelligent Eye. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
—— and E. H. Gombrich, eds. (1973): Illusion in Nature and Art. London, Duckworth; New
York, Scribner’s.
—— (1974): Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing. London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Haack, Susan, 1993. Evidence and Inquiry. Oxford, Blackwell.
—— (1998): ‘Reply to Bonjour’. Synthese 112:25–35.
—— (1998): Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
—— (2002): ‘A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification’. In: M. Huemer, ed.,
Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (New York, Routledge), 417–31.
Harris, H. S., 1997. Hegel’s Ladder, 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass., Hackett Publishing Co.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1968–): H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler, eds., Gesammelte Werke. Published
by the Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akadamie der Wissenschaften in association with the
Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Hamburg, Meiner. Cited as ‘GW ’, by volume:page.
line numbers.
—— (1807): Phänomenologie des Geistes. Bamberg and Würzburg, Goebhardt; critical ed.:
W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, eds., GW 9; cited as ‘PhdG’, ‘¶’ designates consecutive para-
graph numbers, correctly provided by T. Pinkard in his draft translation, forthcoming
(eventually) with Cambridge University Press.
—— (1812, 1816, 1832): Wissenschaft der Logik (1st ed.: 1812, 1816, Nürnberg, Schrag;
Bk. 1, 2nd ed: 1832, Stuttgart und Tübingen, Cotta); critical edition: F. Hogemann and
W. Jaeschke, GW 11, 12, 21 (Bk. 1, 2nd ed.); cited as ‘WdL’.
—— (1821): Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts; oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft
im Grundrisse. Berlin, Nicolin; critical ed.: K. Grotsch and E. Weisser-Lohmann, GW 14;
cited as ‘Rph’ by § , ‘R’ designates Hegel’s published Anmerkungen; ‘Z’ designates lecture
note material.
—— (2010): G. diGiovanni, tr., Science of Logic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;
provides pagination from GW.
Kant, Immanuel (1998): J. Timmerman, Hg., Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hamburg,
Meiner; cited as ‘KdrV’, ‘A’ and ‘B’ indicate the first (1781) and second (1786) editions,
respectively.
Lewis, Clarence Irving (1929): Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge.
New York, Charles Scribners; rpt. New York: Dover, 1956.
—— (1970): J. D. Goheen and J. L. Mothershead, Jr., eds., Collected Papers of Clarence Irving
Lewis. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Longino, Helen (1990): Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Ojbectivity in Scientific
Inquiry. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
—— (1994): ‘The Fate of Knowledge in Social Theories of Science’. In: F. Schmitt, ed.,
Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge (Lanham, Md., Rowman &
Littlefield), 135–57.
—— (2001): The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Solomon, Miriam (1994): ‘Social Empiricism’. Nous 28.3:325–43.
Westphal, Kenneth R. (1989): Hegel’s Epistemological Realism: A Study of the Aim and
Method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Dordrecht & Boston, Kluwer.
—— (1998): ‘Hegel’s Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion’. In: J. Stewart, ed., The
Phenomenology of Spirit Reader: A Collection of Critical and Interpretive Essays (Albany,
SUNY Press), 76–91.
—— (2003): Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the Phenomenology of
Spirit. Cambridge, Mass., Hackett Publishing Co.
—— (2005): ‘Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Chaos’. Philosophical Investigations
28.4:303–23.
—— (2007–08): ‘Intelligenz and the Interpretation of Hegel’s Idealism: Some Hermeneutic
Pointers’. The Owl of Minerva 38.1–2:95–134.
—— (2009): ‘Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit’. Dialogue 48.4:1–47.
—— (2011a): „Urteilskraft, gegenseitige Anerkennung und rationale Rechtfertigung‟. In:
H.-D. Klein, Hg., Ethik als prima philosophia? (Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann),
171–193.
—— (2011b): ‘Self-Consciousness, Anti-Cartesianism and Cognitive Semantics in Hegel’s
1807 Phenomenology’. In: S. Houlgate and M. Baur, eds., The Blackwell Companion to
Hegel (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell), 68–90.
—— (2012): ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’. Theory and
Research in Education 10.1:3–25.
—— (2013): ‘Objective Spirit: Right, Morality, Ethical Life & World History’. In: A. deLauren
tiis and B. J. Edwards, eds., A Companion to Hegel (London, Continuum), 157–178.
—— forthcoming: ‘Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Substantive Domains’.
Dialogue: Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Will, Frederick L., 1997. K. R. Westphal, ed., Pragmatism and Realism. Lanham, MD,
Rowman & Littlefield.
Wolff, Michael, 1995. „Was ist formale Logik?‟ In: C. Fricke, P. König and T. Petersen, Hgg.,
Das Recht der Vernunft. Kant und Hegel über Denken, Erkennen und Handeln (Stuttgart,
Frommann-Holzboog), 19–31.
—— (2000): „Kantische Urteilstafel und vollständige Induktion: Nachtrag zu meiner Kon-
troverse mit Ulrich Nortmann‟. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54.1:86–94.
—— (2009): Abhandlungen über die Prinzipien der Logik, 2nd rev. ed. Frankfurt am Main,
Klostermann.
Chapter Thirteen
Inter-Personality and Wrong
Klaus Vieweg
Hegel’s innovative theory of personality testifies to the continuing and

enduring modernity of his conception of Objective Spirit as a philosophy
of the practical. The cornerstone of the entire building of this philoso-
phy of freedom will be erected here. An array of problematics contained
therein ranges from the concept of the person, personality and inter-
personality, fundamental rights [Grundrechte], property, the formation of
the natural as self-formation and formation of external nature, sustain-
ability, appropriation, intellectual property to contract, wrong [Unrecht],
‘second coercion’ [zweiten Zwang] and punishment. In the following dis-
cussion the problematic of wrong and Hegel’s concept of ‘second coer-
cion’ will take centre stage.
1. The Concept of the Person
The beginning, the first determination, consists in immediacy and inde-

terminacy. Here we find a fundamental idea of Hegel’s, already made
explicit in §§ 5 and 6 of the Rechtsphilosophie: this first indeterminacy
itself represents a certainty, namely an abstract identity. Accordingly § 5
starts with the universal and abstract, the infinitely self-relating, simple
self-reference of the will, the “I” as immediate relationship to itself.1
With this negative determination and the merely abstract, not yet
determinate relationship to itself—“I can abstract from everything, but
not from thinking, because abstracting is itself thinking”2—the will is now
inherently individual will: “The will which is free in and for itself, as it is
in its abstract concept, is in the determinate condition of immediacy [. . .]
1 § 34, A: The abstract—“Such a thing also exists—it is Being that doesn’t yet move or
relate to what is different, is therefore immediate”.
2 “Abstraction is the determinateness of this standpoint.”—“Still lacking determination
or opposition, in itself [in sich selbst]” (§ 34 A). I can behave ‘negatively’ to all further
particular determinations (drives, needs, qualities), can disregard them. Therein lies the
fundamental equality of persons.
254 klaus vieweg
inherently individual will of a subject” (§ 34). “Spirit in the immediacy of

its self-secured freedom is individual, but one which knows its individual-
ity as absolutely free will” (Enc § 488). In this formal, self-conscious and
otherwise empty, simple relation to itself, in its exclusive individuality,
the subject is a person (§ 34, 35).3 Personality entails “that, as this person,
I am completely determined in all respects [. . .] determinate and finite,
yet simply pure self-reference, and thus I know myself in my finitude as
infinite, universal, and free” (§ 35).4 With personality the concept as such
is expressed; the person however gives the concept the determinacy of
reality (§ 279). The beginning of Hegel’s practical philosophy, its founda-
tion, is grounded with this new concept of the person, upon which the
further development of the theory of freedom rests.
As the first stage in the development of the concept of right in the
Grundlinien abstract right and the determination of personality are logi-
cally underpinned by the doctrine of the concept and the transition to the
doctrine of judgment, here in the form of qualitative judgment, as judg-
ment of immediacy and abstract universality. The finite person can know
themselves as universal, infinite, free (§ 35). Regardless of the above-
mentioned particularity of the will in the determination of the abstract
person, it remains for the personality at first something indifferent: “my
universality—the absolute justification, from which all else follows”
(§ 35, A). The first chapter turns on the logical principle of individuality
(Individuality—I) that is immediate universality (Universality—U). The
(free) will is at first immediate and its concept therefore abstract—simply
personality. It is “first immediate, and hence as a single being” (Enc § 487),
as the abstract formal universality of willing. The concept of the person
(personality) demands a knowledge of oneself as abstract I, a thinking
knowledge of oneself, the I (re)cognizes itself.5 Every self-reflecting and
willing I which (re)cognizes itself as such, is a person: the individual is
the universal. As this pure being-for-myself I am simply related to myself,
I attribute this to myself and recognize myself. My will, my right, the right
of the individual, thereby count as universal, infinite. “Indeed law [Recht]
and all of its articles [Bestimmungen] are based on free personality alone,
3 “Spirit as free, self-conscious being is the self-same I, which in its absolute negative
relation is first of all exclusively the I of a free being or Person” (PEO, 59).
4 “The ‘pure relation to myself ’ of personality is therefore the purely cogitative and
position-taking (thus voluntative) relation of a self-conscious and embodied individual to
itself ” (Siep 1992, 101). Cf. Quante 1997, 73–94.
5 Cf. Siep 1992, 98–115.
inter-personality and wrong 255
on self-determination, which is the very contrary of determination by

nature” (Enc § 502).
In the Rechtsphilosophie the following has a central place: “The univer-
sality of this will which is free for itself is formal universality, i.e. the will’s
self-conscious (but otherwise contentless) and simple reference to itself in
its individuality; to this extent, the subject is a person” (§ 35). In terms of
§ 5 this formal, abstract will counts as the determinateness of the begin-
ning: my will is respected and legitimated independently of its particular-
ity and independent of all further determination, it is therefore ‘justified’.
The particularity, the determinateness of the will, is initially disregarded,
which is why one can speak of abstract right (§ 37). It will be shown,
however, that in the last instance nothing at all can be abstracted from
particularity (P): the relation individual-particular (I—P) must finally be
taken into account, which then marks the boundary of abstract right.
In personality we find the absolute justification of the free will, my uni-
versality is this absolute justification, my will counts as universal, without
other props or grounds (§ 35). Law [Recht] and all its articles [Bestim-
mungen] are grounded alone on the free personality, on the concept of
the person, which Hegel describes expressly as the fundament of self-
determination (§ 502).
2. Personality and Inter-Personality—Recognition

of the Person and Legal Capacity
The way out of the simple ‘I want’ in the talk of the I, this I which wills
itself as I, is what Hegel denotes with the concept of legal capacity [Rechts-
fähigkeit]. It entails ‘be a person’, the summons to be a subject, someone
who knows their universality (exactly the justification mentioned above),
a subject to whom this characteristic can be applied. Insofar as they
knows themselves as person, every subject ascribes themselves this legal
capacity, recognises themselves thus. With this central term of recogni-
tion comes a further indispensable element: the idea of the development
of self-consciousness towards universal self-consciousness—mutually
respecting absolute independence now has the status of an absolute justifi-
cation for every individual person. Here we have the general as universal,
simply what is generally valid, the absolute equality of individuals stand-
ing in the relation of recognition, who are equal precisely insofar as they
are taken exclusively to be persons. Relations such as servitude, slavery or
despotism fail a priori to count as forms of freedom: neither the master
256 klaus vieweg
nor servant count as free; they ‘are in the same relationship’ of unfreedom.
Here we abstract from non-equivalent, non-symmetrical forms of recogni-
tion, though; these have the condition of their possibility in the absolute
or universal character of personality.
In the reciprocal being-recognised of persons as persons we have an
intrinsic moment of Hegel’s concept of freedom. Against the interpreta-
tion of Hegel’s departure-point as ‘individualism’ or ‘liberalism’, against
the thesis of ‘repressed inter-subjectivity’ (M. Theunissen) or Hösle’s view
that Hegel ‘thought of the person in a way wholly detached from inter-
subjectivity’,6 it can be countered that a moment of recognition is implied
in Hegel’s starting point. “That the fundamental equality of all legal sub-
jects in Hegel’s philosophy of right is indisputable is due to the fact that
in the universality of self-knowing knowledge a relation of mutual recog-
nition is already implicit.”7 On this Hegel remarks in his Encyclopedia: “I,
the infinite self-relation, am as a person the repulsion of me from myself,
and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons, in
my relation to them and in my recognition by them, which is mutual”
(Enc § 490).
The second part of the precept of abstract right includes inter-
subjectivity in the form of inter-personality as an under-defined form of
inter-subjectivity. It runs: ‘respect every other individual I as a person, as
a subject with legal capacity [rechtsfähige Subjekte]’. “As person you have
existence, being for others, you are free for yourself, you are, you should
exist as free, as person for yourself, and everyone should be thus” (Hegel
1974a, 174). Upon this inter-personality Hegel then builds the various
forms of inter-subjectivity which are further developed in the Grundlin-
ien, those which can be identified in moral contexts (in the family, in
civil society, in corporative-associations which become a ‘second family’
or ‘miniature states’) and finally also in the State itself. Fundamentally
therefore we can identify three main stages in of inter-subjectivty in the
Grundlinien: a) inter-personality, b) moral inter-subjectivity, and c) ethical
inter-subjectivity. Hegel’s philosophy of subjectivity proves itself from the
outset to be a theory of inter-subjectivity.
6 Hösle 1988, 491.

7 Siep 1982, 258.
3. Wrong and the Theory of ‘Second Coercion’
Contract lies at the basis of formal-abstract recognition, the mutual rec-

ognition of contracting partners as persons and proprietors, whose par-
ticular characteristics remain unimportant. Inter-personality proves to
be the first form of inter-subjectivity, as formal-abstract inter-subjectivity.
The second stage of inter-subjectivity, moral inter-subjectivity, places
§ 112 centre stage, in the setting of the moral sphere. Here, on the level of
abstract right, my will exists objectively through the externalisation
of property; the externalisation is thus objectification, a form of the
universal.
This identity consists solely in the similarity of formal willing and
the mutual respecting of personality. Contract is posited purely through the
person as contracting partner, thus it is not about an in- and for-itself
general will but about a still deficient form of universality. This unity or
identity of different wills constitutes inter-personality, which combines
two moments: I am and remain a proprietor and my existence remains
likewise as property, my objectivity counts as ‘free self-consciousness of
another’ (§ 72, A).
Hegel’s critique addresses all modern contract theories, which built
their theorems on the indeterminateness of the contract. Though the con-
tractual represents a moment of relatedness, nevertheless ethical asso-
ciations such as the family and the state cannot be attributed to mere
contractual agreement and consensus. Such reductions to the contractual
involve invalid extrapolations of regulations of property and of abstract
law as such into other, more complex spheres of right and communality.
The contractual-consensual—which a) proceeds from arbitrary free choice,
where b) the identical will is merely common and thereby a still deficient
form of universality, and where c) the objects of contracts are individual
external things (§ 75)—represent a first form of inter-subjectivity, con-
tractual inter-personality, which however proves insufficient on its own to
ground a conception of the rational sociality of free subjects.
Contract displays the difference between universal and particular wills
and with it right as the commonality of particular wills and their acci-
dental or arbitrary agreement; a difference that leads consequently to an
opposition of universal and particular wills, to particular right as an illu-
sion [Schein] (§ 82). In this sense Hegel introduces ‘wrong’ [das Un-Recht]
as the third stage of abstract right; according to the Science of Logic, the
truth of appearance consists in its invalidity or nothingness [Nichtigkeit].
258 klaus vieweg
Abstract right, pushed to its conclusion, can pass over into wrong in
the form of contravention. The will, in the form of its outer existence (the
body and external property) can be infringed, afflicted, injured or suffer
violence, and through such violence can suffer coercion (§ 90). Abstract
right has “for its object only what is external in actions” (Kant 1902 ff., AA
VI, 232). The will which is in-and-for-itself free cannot be coerced, the
“free will in its concept will not be damaged” (Hegel, 1983, 52); only as a
living being can a human be placed under coercion and “only he who wills
to be coerced can be coerced into anything” (§ 91).8 Hegel then adds,
Since it is only insofar as the will has an existence in something determi-
nate that it is Idea or actually free, and since the existence in which it has
embodied itself is the being of freedom, it follows that force or coercion is in
its concept immediately self-destructive because it is an expression of a will
which annuls the expression or determinate existence of a will” (§ 92).
This first coercion must always remain wrong [unrechtlich], the abstractly
taken coercion destroys itself in its own concept, it is no free act
(§§ 92 & 93). Here Hegel follows Kant’s considerations on law, where
law is bound up with the authority to coerce, and Kant’s idea of second
coercion.9 If a wrong, illegitimate coercion “is a hindrance or resistance
that occurs to freedom” then an opposing coercion can be viewed as “hin-
dering a hindrance to freedom”, thus generating the authority to coerce
the first coercion. “Right and the authority to coerce therefore mean one
and the same thing” (Kant 1902 ff., AA VI, 232). Against the coercion of
heteronomy a second coercion appears justified. Thus Kant speaks of the
law “of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the freedom of
everyone under the principle of universal freedom” (ibid.).
Hegel directly adds to this, that violence against a natural being in which a
will resides also counts as coercion. Insofar as the affected will is only
a particular will against the universal (thereby not a free will or will in-
itself ), we must speak of ‘coercion in itself ’ or of first coercion. Against such
a particular will, against the merely natural or the arbitrary, against het-
eronomy, a counter-coercion can be exerted, which according to Hegel
8 The “free will in and for itself cannot be coerced (see § 5), except in so far as it fails
to withdraw itself from the external dimension in which it is caught up, or from its idea
[Vorstellung] of the latter (see § 7). Only he who wills to be coerced can be coerced into
anything” (§ 91).
9 “The person has, e.g. a right to property. The freedom of the will thereby receives an
external existence. If this is attacked, so is my will attacked. That is violence, coercion.
Herein lies immediately the authority of second coercion” (Hegel 1974b, 296 ff.).
appears to be merely a first coercion but is nevertheless a second coercion—

that coercion embodied in, say, teaching or raising taxes. But “the merely
natural will is in itself a force directed against the Idea of freedom as that
which has being in itself, which must be protected against this uncivilized
[ungebildeten] will and given recognition within it” (§ 93 A). It a question
of a second coercion, which follows the first as its sublation [Aufhebung].
Coercion is legal “only as the sublation of a first, immediate coercion”
(Enc § 501). It is therefore a question of law or right [Recht] against injus-
tice or wrong [Unrecht]. Again this situation of ‘coercion’ refers ahead to
the State, where arbitrary free choice and the merely natural represent a
first compulsion against common interests and concerns, and where the
rational (in the form of the unity of I—P—U) must be invoked (for exam-
ple, in the form of the levying of duties and taxes or demands for services
from the State) against it. Coercion is thus justified exclusively as second
coercion, as the authority to act against the heteronomic. Hegel then makes
explicit that abstract right as coercive right can only be legitimated via the
‘detour’ of enacted coercion or wrong. In Hegel’s words: the second coer-
cion, understood as sublation of the first or wrong coercion (overcoming
coercion through coercion), can only be considered legitimate as a coer-
cion against wrong [Un-Recht] and as the re-establishing of right [Recht].10
As a consequence this negation of the negation—“obstructing an obstacle
to freedom” (Kant 1902 ff., AA VI, 231)—makes right into something valid
and compelling—a real power.
Punishment—expression of second coercion—must be seen as belong-
ing to the deed of the criminal. Punishment reverses the first part (the
wrong, contravening deed) and thereby completes the deed—punishment
for a crime is “not an external but rather an essential result of the action,
posited by the action itself [. . . .], flowing from the nature of the act, a
manifestation of the same” (Hegel 1999, 15–16). Punishment is “only
the manifestation of [the criminal’s] own criminal will” (Enc § 140). Herein
lies the core idea of an action-theoretical legitimation of state punishment.
A crime counts (and this forms the basis of the idea of punishment) as
‘an essentially invalid or nugatory [nichtige] act, a violation of free will
10 Punishment cannot be understood as mere coercion: “Punishment is the re-

establishing of freedom, and the criminal remains free or is made free as well as the
punishment being rationally or freely enacted” (Nat, 480). The heading mentioned
in the Encyclopedia—“Right against Wrong” [Das Recht gegen das Unrecht] surely cap-
tures the matter better. But “considerable problems of understanding” associated with the
Rechtsphilosophie, such as those claimed by Schnädelbach (2000, 298), are not present.
The idea of ‘second coercion’ is also missing in Schnädelbach’s presentation.
260 klaus vieweg
as will” (Hegel 1983, 52). The practical-logical core-thesis thus runs: crime
contradicts the concept of free will and the concept of free action. In a legal
context, wrong represents an unauthorized action—legal guilt—and thus
demands a reversal in law, by means of punishment. The infringement
of law as “positive external existence” (§ 97) is in itself void [nichtig], and
this infringement is itself destroyed [vernichtet] in punishment (negation
of the negation).
The real evil is the infringement of right, of the universal. The crimi-
nal has, “according to the concept, done something against himself, which
must be brought to reality” (PEO, 60, emphasis mine). In punishment the
infringement of law as law is sublated—“one must focus on justice and
reason—that is, freedom must preserve its existence; sensual drives etc.
should not be venerated” (§ 99, Z).
It can be maintained that a coercion against wrong has legitimacy
exclusively in the sense of self-defense, certainly not as coercion and vio-
lence against substantial personal rights, such as assaults on integrity or
property, upon religious views or artistic creation. The strict right of coer-
cion cannot infringe the moral realm, neither can it distinguish here, e.g.,
between murder and manslaughter, between deed and action. The neces-
sary transition to the sphere of morality is unmistakably anticipated. It
must be possible explicitly to ascribe wrongdoing to the free deed of the
actor: injury through free deeds. Free omissions belong explicitly to this
class of free deeds too.11 Of course legal transgressions have effects upon a
victim, but the law itself remains incapable of injury, the ‘positive’ trans-
gression [Verletzung] is only that of the particular will of the perpetrator.
In punishment we see manifesting itself the necessary annulment of ille-
gitimacy [Vernichtung der Nichtigkeit], the sublation of the crime.
In this brilliant and topical theory of punishment, so clearly grounded in
a theory of action,12 the procedure of the understanding [Verstand ] proves
insufficient; the theory essentially approaches the concept [Begriff ]. Pun-
ishment can be designated ‘just’ insofar as it constitutes the perpetrator’s
will in itself, even as his demand and his right (!) as an accountable subject.
In injuring the universal, injuring right as such, the perpetrator has just as
much injured himself. Punishment thus constitutes “a right of the criminal
himself, is posited in his very action” (§ 100). Punishment must therefore
11 In the Allgemeines Landrecht we find the passage: “Morality of the Crime” (§ 16).
“Whoever is incapable of acting freely, with him no crime and therefore no punishment
takes place” (Th. II, Tit. XX.; Th. II, Tit. XX, §§ 7 & 8).
12 Cf. Mohr 1997; Pawlik 2004.
be added on to the criminal act, is already posited in the criminal act,

must be conceived as an internal moment of the wrongdoing. Punishment
can be taken to be the restoring of equilibrium, something in which the
perpetrator himself has an objective interest (which of course would not
be admitted or accepted by every law-breaker). In this way punishment
can be viewed as a manifestation of the crime, as the ‘other half ’ of the
criminal act, as the turning of the crime against the criminal. The Erinyes,
Greek Goddesses of Revenge, Hegel notes, symbolize “man’s own deed
and the consciousness which ails him, torments him, insofar as he knows
this deed as evil” (Hegel PhRel, 127). These Goddesses are “the just and
precisely therefore the well-intentioned”—the Eumenides, likewise, are
“the criminal’s own deed, which claims him” (Hegel 1999, 4).
The implicit reference to the exceeding of this eternal recurrence of
revenge in a ‘third’ judgment as well as the explicit reference to the Sci-
ence of Logic in § 95 and especially to §§ 497–500 of the Encyclopedia
requires that we once more bring the underlying logic into view. In rela-
tion to law and judgment, it concerns the further-determined structure
of judgment.13
3.1 The Logically Grounded Structure in Judgment

Unintentional Wrong Deception Crime
negative judgment infinite-positive judgment infinite-negative
judgment
“the flower is not red” “this flower is this flower” “the flower is not a table”
The criminal deed is an
evil deed
illusion [Schein] in itself law [Recht] as illusion law as void [Nichtiges]
(truth of illusion)
universality recognized universality as illusion negation of universality
3.2 The Simple-Negative Judgment

The simple-negative judgment forms the transition to the infinite
judgment.14 Unintentional wrong corresponds to this transitional form,
which will be demonstrated with the example of civil litigation—a mere
special right finds its negation, while law as such is affirmed. In the judg-
ment ‘this flower is not red’ only the particular color, not color as such is
13 This logical anchoring is analysed by both Mohr (1997, 98 ff.) and Hösle (1987); cf.
also Siep (1982, 269).
14 Cf. Enc §§ 173 & 497 and WdL 317–324.
262 klaus vieweg
negated. In relation to a contract it might run: ‘this contract is not legal, it

doesn’t conform to the law’, whereby this type of contract doesn’t infringe
upon the legality of contracts per se, rather “something is negated only as
the property of the other party, it being conceded that it should only be
theirs if they had the right to it; and it is only the title of right that is in dis-
pute; the universal sphere of right is therefore recognized and maintained
in that negative judgment” (WdL 325). Hegel reveals that such judgments
by no means contain truth, although they may be correct within a limited
sphere of imagination and thinking. It may be true that I take a theft to
be an action, but the theft is, according to Hegel, “an act which does not
correspond to the notion of human activity” (Enc § 172, Z).15
3.3 The Infinite Judgment as Identical—Deception

In deception, by contrast, the deceiver knows of his wrong, but gives the
appearance of right, by striking an agreement which lacks the universality
of law. The formal relationship is maintained, the other will is respected,
personality recognized, but the body of the law regarding the disposal of
a thing is injured [verletzt]. It has its validity within the contract (a vol-
untary agreement to exchange a thing), but the aspect of universality-in-
itself is missing (§ 88). This wrong of deception is based on the infinite
judgment as identical (Enc § 173 & § 498).
3.4 The Infinite-Negative Judgment—Crime

Unlike the deceiver, the thief doesn’t give himself the appearance [Schein]
of law, he respects neither the will of others nor the universal, respects
neither the subjective nor the objective side of legality. In crime, by con-
trast, we have an infinite-negative judgment in the full sense “a judgment
in which even the form of judgment is set aside [. . .] It is supposed to be a
judgment, and consequently to contain a relation of subject and predicate;
yet at the same time such a relation is supposed not to be in it” (WdL 324).
Judgments in the form ‘Spirit is not yellow’ or ‘The rose is not an elephant’
are certainly true, but nonsensical nevertheless.
This applies also to the judgment ‘Crime is an action’, because action
(understood in its full, emphatic sense) and evil are mutually exclusive.
Evil is not a sufficient predicate of free action. By negating the universality
15 Truth consists in the agreement [Übereinstimmung] of the object with itself, i.e. with
its concept.
of deeds, the universal side of the predicate of personhood (Hegel 2000,

§ 413), crime infringes the free personality of others per se. It destroys too
the particular, the subsumption of a thing under my will, as well the uni-
versal, legal capacity itself, along with property, or the right to things as
a right to bodily integrity, the right to life. In the case of ‘violent injury
to life and limb’ my personality also loses its recognition. Therein we see
the transition from private law (contract as a means of composition) to
criminal law. It is necessary to distinguish whether the existing will in
its entire scope (legal capacity as the infinite in the predicate of person-
hood) is infringed (death, slavery, religious coercion—an interesting list)
or only a part thereof (theft). In theft (as distinguished from robbery), the
criminal infringes subjective infinity, insofar as he uses personal violence
against me (§ 96).
Hegel refers in this context to the judgment-structure: “crime may be
viewed as an objective instance of the negatively infinite judgment. The
person committing a crime [. . .] does not, as in a suit about civil rights,
merely negate the particular right of a person to some definite thing, but
the right of that person in general”—he has “violated law as such, that
is, law in general” (Enc § 173, Z).16 The criminal deprives me of some-
thing, negates my particular right (the right of the other) and thereby
simultaneously violates right as such.17 He injures, me (the other), him-
self and the universal (PEO, 60). “Crime is, however, the infinite judgment,
which negates not merely the particular right, but the universal sphere as
well, negates right as right” (WdL, 325).18 Anticipating the stages of moral-
ity and ethical life (violently-evil will, evil action), Hegel attaches the char-
acteristic of nonsensicality to such actions: the infinite judgment “does
indeed possess correctness, since it is an actual deed, but it is nonsensical
because it is related thoroughly negatively to ethical life which constitutes
its universal sphere” (WdL 325).19 It becomes clear how necessary is the
step beyond the sphere of abstract right, because implicitly the definition
16 The “negatively infinite judgment in which the genus [Gattung] and not merely the
particular determination—here the apparent recognition—is negated [is] the violently
malevolent will, which commits a crime” (Enc § 499).
17 “Whoever unlawfully damages someone by a free act, who commits a crime, makes
himself not only responsible to the victim but also to the State whose protection he enjoys”
(Allgemeines Landrecht, Th. II, Tit. XX, § 7).
18 In the negative-infinite judgment subject and predicate fall wholly apart.
19 “A bad [wrong] action has an existence which isn’t adequate to its concept. If an
action is judged to be bad [wrong], still its unreason has an aspect which is in accordance
with reason (similar to a badly-built house)” (PEO, 55).
264 klaus vieweg
‘evil’ is already required: “A more realistic example of the infinite judg-

ment is the evil action” (ibid. p. 324 ff.).
“The positive moment of the infinite judgment [lies in the] reflection of
individuality into itself, whereby it is posited for the first time as a deter-
minate determinateness”, just as the subject “as individual is posited”
(ibid. p. 325). The individual, like the universal, is no longer posited as
merely immediate, but as reflected into itself. The judgment of existence
has been sublated in the judgment of reflection (ibid. p. 325 ff.).
* * *
Hegel’s recognition-based philosophical theory of wrong [Unrecht] can
be seen as something radically new, as a concept that is still highly rel-
evant today. Its intellectual power and fascination derives from its logical
grounding—this is an essential reason for its topicality.
Literature
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (TWA): Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Hg. v. Eva Moldenhauer
und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
The following volumes are cited and abbreviated:
—— (Enc) Enzyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (TWA, Bd. 8–10).
—— (Nat) Naturrechtsaufsatz (TWA Bd. 2).
—— (PEO) Philosophische Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse (TWA, Bd. 4).
—— (PhRel) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (TWA, Bd. 17)
—— (WdL) Wissenschaft der Logik (TWA, Bd. 6).
—— otherwise all paragraph numbers (§) refer to Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
(TWA, Bd. 7)
—— (1974a) Philosophie des Rechts. Nach der Vorlesungsnachschrift K. G. v. Griesheims
1824/25. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzbook.
—— (1974b) Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831, Bd. 3. Hg. v. Karl-Heinz Ilting.
Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974,.
—— (1983) Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft Heidelberg 1817/18 mit
Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818/19. Nachgeschrieben von P. Wannemann. Hg. v. C.
Becker et al. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
—— (1999) Philosophie des Rechts: Nachschrift der Vorlesung von 1822/23 von K. L. Heyse.
Hg. v. E. Schilbach. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
—— (2000) Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1817, Gesam-
melte Werke Bd. 13. Hg. v. Wolfgang Bonsiepen et al. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Hösle, Vottorio (1987) Das abstrakte Recht. In: Christoph Jermann (Hg.): Anspruch und
Leistung von Hegels Rechtsphilosophie. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987, 55–99.
—— (1988): Hegels System, Vol. 2: Philosophie der Natur und des Geistes. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner.
Kant, Immanuel (1902 ff.) Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Berlin: Preußischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften.
Mohr, Georg (1997) Unrecht und Strafe (§§ 82–104). In: L. Siep (Hg.), G. W. F. Hegel.
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 96–124.
Pawlik, Michael (2004) Person, Subjekt, Büger: Zur Legitimation der Strafe. Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot.
Pippin, Robert (2007) Hegel’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press.
Quante, Michael (1997): Die Persönlichkeit des Willens als Prinzip des abstrakten Rechts.
Eine Analyse der begriffslogischen Struktur der §§ 34–40 von Hegel Grundlinien der
Philosophie des Rechts. In: L. Siep (Hg.): G. W. F. Hegel. Grundlinien der Philosophie des
Rechts, 73–94.
Schnädelbach, Herbert (2000) Hegels Praktische Philosophie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Siep, Ludwig (1982) Intersubjektivität, Recht und Staat in Hegels Grundlinien der Philoso-
phie des Rechts. In: Dieter Henrich & Rolf Peter Horstmann (Hg.): Hegels Philosophie des
Rechts. Die Theorie der Rechtsformen und ihre Logik. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 255–276.
—— (1992) Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
—— (2005) G. W. F. Hegel. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Chapter Fourteen
The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes

in Hegel’s Lordship and Bondage
Sasa Josifovic
1. Outline of the Reception History
Hegel spricht hier daher keineswegs über soziale Verhältnisse zwischen

einem Herren als Arbeitgeber und einem Knecht als Arbeitnehmer, wie die
zwar einfallsreiche, aber eben thematisch ganz großzügige, in diesem Sinn
spekulative Lektüre von Marx über Lukács [. . .] über Kojève bis zu Axel
Honneths [. . .] Kampf um Anerkennung im Grunde behauptet, und wie sie
leider üblich geworden ist. (Stekeler-Weithofer 2004, 60)
Hegel’s famous chapter Lordship and Bondage has advanced to one of the
most intensively discussed passages in the reception history of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit,1 both, in its original version from 1806/07 as well as
the compact and modified version in the Encyclopedia. It inspired famous
interpreters such as Lukács (Lukács 1938/1948) and Kojève (Kojève 1947),
or later Siep (Siep 1979 and 2000) and Honneth to develop sophisticated
theories of recognition, human interaction, and the “moral grammar of
social conflicts” (Honneth 1998). It also provided the groundwork for influ-
ential theories of social and psychological2 aspects of mutual recognition,
including elaborate theories of human desire and its importance for the
development of human self-consciousness and personal identity.3 In the
reverberation of Siep’s interpretation, the relation of the lord and bonds-
man has also been interpreted against the background of the natural law,
while Lukács and Kojève initiated a Marxist tradition that focused on the
reciprocal influence and co-constitution of class-identity and personal
1 I use Miller’s translation but I refer only to the original text.

2 Inspired by Kojève’s reading, especially Lacanian scholars including Zizek contrib-
uted to a psychoanalytic theory of recognition, most famously represented by Lacan’s
“mirror stage”.
3 In the first place: Kojève, Lacan, and Zizek.
268 sasa josifovic
identity, desire and the system of needs, and, of course, the relation of
desire/needs and personal identity. Theunissen (Theunissen 1982) even
argues that in Hegel’s concept of recognition, specifically in the Philosophy
of Right, we find the prefiguration of Marx’s claim that the freedom of
an individual is not limited by the freedom of the other individual in an
interpersonal encounter: moreover, the encounter represents the offspring
of an authentically human sort of freedom and practice. Edith Düsing
(Düsing 1986 and 1990) identifies a specific difference between Fichte’s
concept of mutual recognition and Hegel’s theory of recognition which
she believes to be substantially rooted in spirit. She also emphasizes the
fact that the whole sphere of interpersonal recognition represents only a
transitory moment and that Hegel’s theory advances in favor of the rec-
ognition between the individual subject and the absolute spirit. But after
all, most interpreters agree on the substantial importance of the mutual
interpersonal recognition for the constitution of self-consciousness and
spirit in Hegel’s philosophy.
Even 200 years after the initial publication of the thematic passages we
find substantial controversy concerning the relation of subjectivity and
intersubjectivity in Hegel’s philosophy. Frank (Frank 1991, 31) argues that
Hegel’s intellectual movement advances in favor of intersubjectivity. He
even finds fault with Hegel’s “dissolution” of subjectivity in intersubjectiv-
ity, while Schulz (Schulz 1984) argues that Hegel’s consideration of inter-
subjectivity within the history of self-consciousness represents a merely
transitory moment. Similarly, Habermas (Habermas 1968) criticizes that
Hegel had given up the intersubjective approach which he had advocated
in Jena and reduced it to a monological concept of spirit.
Against this background and the strong consensus concerning the
intersubjective importance of Hegel’s theory of recognition we notice a
certain surprise reading Stekeler-Weithofer’s initially quoted statement
that, at least in regard to Lordship and Bondage, this whole tradition of
Hegel studies might be classified as “fancy (einfallsreich)” but remains
rather “generous (großzügig)” in regard to the primary subject of the the-
matic chapter, and that Hegel “does not at all speak of social relations
between a lord as employer and a bondsman as employee” in this pas-
sage. And what is even more surprising about his approach is not the
provocation of a long and strong tradition but the fact that there is sub-
stantial truth in his interpretation. Inspired by Hubig (Hubig 1985) and
Luckner (Luckner 1994) as well as McDowell, he argues that “Lordship
and Bondage” represents an allegory on the interplay between the mind and
the dialectic of normative attitudes 269
body4 combined with the corresponding dialectic of self-determination

and self-necessitation. He takes the relevant aspects of modern speech-
act-theory and theory of action into account and argues that the primary
mode of recognition thematic in Lordship and Bondage concerns the prac-
tice of self-constitution. The Mind, the lord, raises the claim to determine
the body but, according to Stekeler-Weithofer, it is the body, the bonds-
man, who, after all, realizes the plan. Thereby the body practically recog-
nizes the plan which would remain a mere aim (Absicht) if it were not
executed by the body. Stekeler-Weithofer’s most interesting point con-
cerning recognition consists of the emphasis of the relevance of practice.
Recognition is not only a verbal commitment but the concrete act that
realizes an aim, plan, end, etc., and thereby contributes to the concrete
practice of self-determination.
Similarly, Cobben (Cobben 2009, cf. Cobben 2013) argues that the the-
matic chapter represents the interplay of the pure self and its living body or
the real self. According to his interpretation, which I strongly support, the
famous life-and-death-struggle primarily represents the attempt of the pure
self to prove its independence from life. But the experience of the fear of
death transforms its concept of pureness as well as its concept of life and
the relation between its pureness and life, which leads to a higher form of
intra-subjective recognition and evolution of self-consciousness.
2. The Systematic Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit
There is a specific set of Hegelian concepts that determines the structure

of the Phenomenology. First of all, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is an
exposition of “the appearance of knowledge”. In contrast to the Science
of Logic, where knowledge is presented in the “pure mode of thinking”,
the Phenomenology exposes it in the mode of difference between the sub-
ject and object as well as in a specific distance to the authentic mode of
spirit, the pure thinking. It provides a “complete” (GW 9, 56) determina-
tion of the cognitive, normative and volitional structure of subjectivity,
systematically organized as a series of cognitive faculties with gradually
increasing achievement potentials and a gradual approximation to the
4 “Wie kann ich meiner selbst bewußt sein? Was ist das für eine Beziehung zwischen
mir und mir, meinem Selbstbewusstsein und meinem Bewusstsein oder auch meinem
ganzen Ich oder Selbst und meinem Leib?” (Stekeler-Weithofer 2004, 60)
270 sasa josifovic
authentic performance of the absolute spirit. But, however, it consists of

a series of cognitive faculties that are, without exemption, deficient in spe-
cific aspects and degrees. The complete outline of the Phenomenology of
Spirit provides the complete insight into the structural determination
of Subjectivity, the specific relations between the subject and object of
cognition in every mode of thinking, the involved faculties, their specific
cognitive claims, performances and achievement potentials as well as
their deficits.
Hegel argues that the ‘new spirit’ is “the whole which, having traversed
its content in time and space5 [Hegel actually speaks of expansion instead
of time and space],6 has returned into itself, and is the resultant simple
notion of the whole” (GW 9, 15). Thus the new spirit, the concept of spirit
that Hegel advocates, represents the result of a specific intellectual move-
ment which is from one point of view a gradual progress of “education” or
“path of the natural consciousness which presses forward to true knowl-
edge” (GW 9, 55) and from the other, opposite point of view the return
from the maximal expansion of spirit into its authentic and substantial
mode—into itself. In retrospect, from the point of view of the complete
Phenomenology, the beginning of the “series of configurations which
consciousness goes through along this road” (GW 9, 56), the sense cer-
tainty, represents the maximal “expansion” of spirit, and every following
moment represents a gradual return into itself.
This whole “history of the education of consciousness itself to the stand-
point of science” (GW 9, 56) represents a masterpiece of the idealistic
“history of self-consciousness”, (Düsing 1993) a concept that was originally
introduced by Fichte (1799)7 and Schelling (1800)8 and received its most
impressive representation in Hegel’s Phenomenology.
Basically, the idealistic “history of self-consciousness” is a systematic
exposition of the human cognitive faculties organized in a very spe-
cific way. Inspired by de Condillac’s famous thought experiment of an
5 Miller’s translation is irritating at this point because it eliminates the most essential
metaphor “expansion”. I must therefore refer to Hegel’s original text: “Er [der neue Geist]
ist das aus der Sukzession wie aus seiner Ausdehnung in sich zurückgegangene Ganze, der
gewordene einfache Begriff desselben” (GW 9, 15).
6 Hegel speaks of the “succession” as a form of the “expansion” of the spirit.
7 Claesges argues that Fichte presents the first history of self-consciousness in his Foun-
dations of the Science of Knowledge from 1794. Cf. Claesges 1981 and Claesges 1974.
8 Düsing argues that Schelling did not have any knowledge of Fichte’s concept as he
authored his “System of Transcendental Idealism”. I provided some evidence in support of
this standpoint in: Josifovic 2008, 28.
inanimate, insentient being (a statue) that acquires the senses one after
another and thus gradually awakes to sentient life (de Condillac 1754)
the German Idealists develop the concept of a systematic exposition of the
human cognitive faculties in the form of a successive acquisition of these
faculties. Not unlike de Condillac’s statue, the natural consciousness
goes through a series of educational levels thus pressing forward to its
actual substance, or, in other words, the actual substance of knowledge.
Hegel’s history of the education of consciousness represents a specific
form of the history of self-consciousness that emphasizes the return from
the appearance of knowledge to the substance of spirit. But in general, the
history of self-consciousness points out the successive acquisition of cog-
nitive capacities.
In all types of the idealistic history of self-consciousness, Fichte’s,
Schelling’s, and Hegel’s, the whole process of the education of the natural
consciousness is monitored by a specific instance to which in Düsings
words we refer as “reflecting consciousness”.9 Thus the interpretation
of the history of self-consciousness in general and the Phenomenology
of Spirit in particular requires the awareness for the point of view from
which a particular passage argues. On every level of the education of
the natural consciousness we must distinguish the passages that expose
the given state of education or the current process of its acquisition (the
actual experience of education) from the passages that reflect upon the
current state from the point of view of true science. Thus Hegel distin-
guishes between the way things appear for the natural consciousness, or
“for itself (für es)” and “in itself (an sich)”. On every specific level of educa-
tion the natural consciousness remains unable to perceive the content as
it is given to us, the reflecting consciousness. The expressions “for us” and
“in itself ” (“für uns” and “ansich” or “an sich”) normally refer to the same
point of view while “for itself ” refers to the given state of the experience
of education. If, for example, Hegel states that “we already have before us
[Hegel: “für uns”] the notion of spirit”10 he clearly refers to the reflecting
consciousness and not the natural consciousness. The latter will have to
make the necessary experience, to acquire the necessary competence,
before it becomes able to understand what it unknowingly encountered
9 I adapted this expression from Schelling (Josifovic 2008, 28) and Düsing who distin-
guishes between “reflektierendes Bewusstsein” and “natürliches Bewusstsein” and empha-
sizes that these two elements determine the fundamental structure of the idealistic history
of self-consciousness. (Düsing 1993).
10 “Hiermit ist schon der Begriff des Geistes für uns vorhanden.” (GW 9, 108).
272 sasa josifovic
on this level of education. But after all, the education of the natural con-
sciousness to the standpoint of science represents a gradual acquisition of
the faculties that are necessary in order to make the conscious experience
of specific objects of cognition. On the educational level that is relevant
for us reading the chapter on self-consciousness and pressing forward
to concrete interpersonal recognition, the capacity that the natural con-
sciousness needs to acquire consists of the ability to unify self-conscious-
ness and alterity, identity and non-identity, “I” and “non-I” to the concept
of “another I”, the “alter ego”.11
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit represents a specific and unique
form of the history of self-consciousness and history of the education
of consciousness to the standpoint of science because it is structurally
determined according to the idea of self-performing skepticism (sich voll-
bringender Skeptizismus) (GW 9, 56).12 In contrast to the classical, espe-
cially Pyrrhonian skepticism which, according to Hegel, “only ever sees
pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this noth-
ingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results” Hegel’s
skepticism is based upon the principle of a “determinate nothingness, one
which has a content” and to which we refer by the concept of “deter-
minate negation” (GW 9, 57). On every particular level of education, the
natural consciousness undergoes a skeptical examination of its ability to
assert its cognitive claim by its performance. The relation between the
cognitive claim that it raises and the cognitive performance by which it
attempts to assert it represents the “criterion (Maßstab)” (GW 9, 58 ff.) of
this specific form of the self-performing skepticism.
This systematic framework provides the background for the evolution
of self-consciousness as presented in the relevant chapter including the
passage on Lordship and Bondage, and against this background we are jus-
tified to argue that this chapter presents a process of gradual acquisition
of all faculties and competences that are necessary for the performance
of a cognitive act qualified as self-consciousness, or, in the spirit of de
Condillac’s thought experiment: It presents the succession of faculties and
competences that an imaginary statue must acquire in order to be able to
11 I presented a detailed analysis of the duplication of self-consciousness and the iden-

tity of self-consciousness in such duplication in: Josifovic. 2008, 98 ff. and Josifovic 2009,
122 ff.
12 Miller uses the expression “thoroughgoing skepticism” to translate “sich vollbringen-
der Skeptizismus”, but I do not know what to think of this translation. Therefore I prefer
the reference to the original concept.
perform self-consciousness and furthermore to recognize other beings as

intentional, self-conscious agents. Thus the analysis and discussion of the
intra-subjective sphere of the genesis of self-consciousness must always
precede the discussion of the intersubjective, social relations—and the
allegedly unspectacular, simple encounter of two individuals along with
the emerging process of recognition must not be imported as a tacit pre-
condition of Hegel’s theory. Moreover, Hegel’s substantial contribution
to the theory of recognition consists particularly of the systematic expo-
sure of the involved cognitive faculties and competences. And from this
point of view I will argue in favor of an intra-subjective interpretation
of the dialectic of recognition as a precondition13 of the intersubjective
interaction of empirical individuals. The concept of recognition that
Hegel introduces in the chapter on self-consciousness refers primarily to
the first-personal self-reference within specific acts of self-cognition and
self-constitution. It is determined by the supersession of the fundamental
structure of consciousness in self-consciousness.
3. The Evolution of Self-Consciousness and the Emergence

of Intra-Subjective Recognition
In contrast to consciousness to which an object is given as something

other than the subject, self-consciousness is fundamentally determined by
(specific forms of ) the identity of subject and object: The subject is now
the object of its own cognition or self-constitution.14 Hegel outlines this
structural difference at the beginning of the thematic chapter. But from
the point of view of the natural consciousness the experience of this dif-
ference and moreover the ability to perform in a way that justifies the new
cognitive claim has yet to be made. On the beginning of its evolution, the
newly constituted faculty of self-consciousness consists only of the ability
to abstract from the content of consciousness (the object of cognition)
13 “Precondition” in the systematic sense of the history of the education of conscious-

ness to the standpoint of science.
14 This chapter actually represents the transition from mere cognition, which is typi-
cal for consciousness, to a series of specific types of self-consciousness of which some
are predominantly determined by aspects of self-cognition and some, more advanced, by
self-constitution. There is a broad agreement within the discourse community on the fact
that this chapter represents the offspring of the practical sphere of self-constitution and
the transition from a cognition determined by receptivity to cognition and constitution
determined by spontaneity.
274 sasa josifovic
and generate the certainty of its own identity. Thus it represents only the
“return from otherness” and a “motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’ ” (GW 9,
104) which has lost the difference, the “otherness” in form of objectivity.
This otherness is only negated here, neither preserved nor elevated, and
“since for it the difference does not have the form of being” the newly
constituted cognitive performance “is not self-consciousness”. (cf. Josifo-
vic 2009, 110) The lack of otherness represents the fundamental deficit
of this first type of self-certainty, and the intellectual movement, driven
by the determinate negation, advances to a performance that counter-
vails this deficit and generates a new form of self-certainty based upon
desire. (Josifovic 2009, 112) It further proceeds to individuality, (Josifovic
2009, 116) the pure self (Josifovic 2009, 118 ff.), and, only for us, to genus
(Gattung). (Josifovic 2009, 121 f.) This whole evolution is complete before
the outline of the unity of self-consciousness in its duplication (Josifovic
2009, 125 ff.) and finally Lordship and Bondage. This sequence of specific
types of self-certainty and self-consciousness represents the reason why
I initially mentioned that Hegel outlines specific forms of identity in his
theory of self-consciousness.15
To be more precise: Hegel begins this chapter with a structural descrip-
tion of self-consciousness in general:
But now there has arisen what did not emerge in these previous relation-
ships, viz. a certainty which is identical with its truth; for the certainty is
to itself its own object, and consciousness it to itself its truth. In this there
is indeed an otherness; that is to say, consciousness makes a distinction,
but one which at the same time is for consciousness not a distinction
(GW 9, 103).
The sublation16 of consciousness within self-consciousness consists of a
specific kind of negation (negare), preservation (conservare), and elevation
(elevare) of its fundamental structure. In reference to Reinhold’s so called
“sentence of consciousness (Satz des Bewusstseins)”17 the German Idealists
agree on a fundamental structure of consciousness (cf. Quante 2009, 96)
15 The exposition of this internal structure and its fundamental logic represents my
major interest in my contributions from 2008 and 2009.
16 Hegel’s concept “Aufhebung”, of which I am not sure whether to translate it as “sub-
lation” or “supersession”, implies the triad: negation, preservation and elevation (negare,
conservare, elevare).
17 “Im Bewusstsein wird die Vorstellung durch das Subjekt vom Subjekt und Objekt
unterschieden und auf beide bezogen”, in: Reinhold 1790, § 1.
which consists of the subject, object, and representation. According to this

structure, the subject distinguishes between itself and the object in every
act of conscious cognition. It furthermore distinguishes between itself
and the representation as well as the representation and the object, and
it relates to both (itself and the object) by means of the representation.
Thus a conscious act of any arbitrary object presupposes the conscious-
ness of the difference between the performing subject, the representation,
and the object combined with the consciousness that the representation
relates to both. If self-consciousness raises the claim to supersede the
fundamental structure of consciousness, it must first perform according to
this fundamental structure. It must distinguish between itself as subject
that performs the cognitive act, itself as object of its own cognition and
the representation of itself by the means of which it refers to both. Every
act of conscious awareness of oneself consists of three elements of which,
in one sense, none is identical to the other two and, in another sense,
all three refer to one and the same entity. Thus identity and difference
become constitutive elements of self-consciousness as result of the super-
session of the inherent structure of consciousness.
The specific meanings of identity and difference in use are clearly
defined. The performing subject has a representation of itself. It recog-
nizes this representation to a certain extent as a legitimate expression or
manifestation of itself. But at the same time it is aware of the fact that this
particular representation does not embrace its total nature. Consequently,
it refuses to identify fully with the given representation or, in other words,
to recognize it as a fully adequate representation of itself.18
This is the broader context in which Hegel makes the ascertainment that
self-consciousness “makes a distinction, but one which at the same time
is for consciousness not a distinction” (GW 9, 103). But his own theory of
the ideal evolution of self-consciousness in the context of the history
of education is much more sophisticated because it exposes the dynamics of
the detailed evolution and interaction of specific normative attitudes (ele-
ments of recognition) by the means of which the natural consciousness
(de Condillac’s imaginary statue) acquires the capacity to perform the
whole spectrum of subject-object-relations within self-consciousness.
18 Actually, in case of the self-referential consciousness the idealists tend to simplify

the fundamental structure of consciousness and distinguish only between the subject and
object. But what has been said above counts for this simplified version without as well.
276 sasa josifovic
Because of the fact that the Phenomenology of Spirit is organized accord-

ing to the principle of self-performing skepticism driven by the determinate
negation, we can always identify the specific cognitive claim, the perfor-
mance that is supposed to justify this claim and the deficit (Mangel) that
emerges from this relation and provides the ground for the manifestation
of the following cognitive claim, performance, deficit etc. Thus we recon-
struct the dynamics of the evolution of self-consciousness in the chapter
on self-certainty as follows:
Self-consciousness first negates the object of consciousness and gener-
ates the “motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’ ”. It preserves it in the desire-
based self-certainty and elevates it to a higher level in individuality. It
negates the dependence on life which is constitutive for individuality as
the natural consciousness advances to the educational level of the pure
self which it strives to confirm in the life-and-death-struggle. What seeks
to survive here is the pure self—and, ironically, it seeks its survival in the
independence from “life”:19
This pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists of showing itself as the
pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to
any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such,
that it is not attached to life (GW 9, 111).
The deficit (Mangel) of this claim consists of the fact that it is only an
expression of
abstract negation, not the negation coming from consciousness, which
supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded,
and consequently survives its own supersession (GW 9, 112).
Not before the encounter of the fear of death20 will the natural conscious-
ness make the experience that is essential for the further process of educa-
tion: “In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential
19 The concept of “life” represents the totality of contents that an individualized self-
consciousness generates in the whole series of acts of desire. Thus it represents the totality
of a specific form of content-determination. Consequently, a type of self-consciousness
that seeks independence from “life” must accept the loss of concrete determination—and
it will end up as lifeless and boring stoicism.
20 Cobben emphasizes the importance of the fear of death for the evolution of the pure
self. He demonstrates the fundamental difference between the pure self that enters the
life-and-death-struggle and the pure self that emerges from the productive encounter of
the fear of death. According to his interpretation, the latter, in contrast to the former, is
able “to ‘recognize’ itself in its body” (Cobben 2013, 162) and it acquires this ability by the
encounter of the fear of death, the “absolute lord”.
to it as pure self-consciousness” (GW 9, 112). These two elements of self-

consciousness, “purity” and “life”, determine the intra-subjective dialectic
of recognition. They are both of substantial importance for the evolution of
self-consciousness, but they articulate two opposite normative attitudes:
on one hand autonomy and on the other hand the rational capacity to
respond to the normative significance of the natural world, social world
or autonomously generated norms and reasons: independence and depen-
dence. Thus, similar to Stekeler-Weithofer and Cobben, I interpret the
interplay of the lord and bondsman primarily as an allegory on the dia-
lectic of these two elementary normative attitudes.
4. The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes: Independence and Dependence
The pure self represents the given standpoint of the education of the natu-
ral consciousness at the beginning of Hegel’s exposition of the duplication
of self-consciousness (GW 9, 109), the unity of itself within this duplica-
tion (cf. Josifovic 2009, 122 ff.), the struggle to manifest the pure self and
prove its alleged independence from life (GW 9, 111), the encounter of its
pure being-for-itself (“reines Fürsichsein”) in the face of the fear of death
(GW 9, 114 f.) and the further progress of recognition and education in
Reason and Spirit.
As we have noticed, the pure self refuses to accept any kind of depen-
dence. Thus its endeavor to “manifest what it is in itself ”,21 as Hegel
formulates in the Encyclopedia, is governed by the ideal of the practical
manifestation of pure independence.
On the most elementary level, the independence that it strives to mani-
fest concerns the relation of the subject of self-consciousness to the con-
tents that determine its concrete empirical appearance—the contents
or objects of consciousness. These contents are, on the most elementary
level, representations. But every empirical determination is, from the
point of view of the pure self, a contamination of its pureness. It inevita-
bly embraces a specific form of irreducible otherness22 and every kind of
21 Hegel 1830, § 425: “das zu setzen, was es an sich ist”.

22 Jaspers presents an impressive exposition of such “aspects of the self ” in his chapter
on the self in “Existenzerhellung” combined with the uneasiness that the subject experi-
ences in the encounter with every particular aspect. He begins with the Kantian “I in itself
(Ich überhaupt)” and advances to the physical appearance, the body, the social self, the
self-constituted by our achievements, self-reflection etc. In regard to every aspect, he dem-
onstrates our ability to identify with it, but at the same time we feel that we are more than
278 sasa josifovic
otherness is a kind of non-I (nicht-Ich). Any arbitrary empirical content

of determination or self-determination contains something inadequate
from the point of view of the pure self, and this inadequacy is irritating.
Thus, in Cobben’s words, the dialectic of normative attitudes concerns
the relation between the “pure” and the “real” self (Cobben 2013, 161) and
reflects the relation between the pure and empirical self in the Kantian
sense. The concept “empirical apperception” refers to a self-reflexive act
of cognition that embraces a concrete, empirical act of consciousness, to
which a specific content (representation) is given by receptivity. This con-
tent determines the empirical act of consciousness as well as the empiri-
cal act of self-reference. In another empirical instant the same subject is
confronted with another content of consciousness and, in reflection upon
this particular cognitive act, it generates another empirical apperception.
But on a higher level, the subject is able to reflect upon the series of given
empirical apperceptions and distinguish between its pure nature and an
arbitrary empirical representation. It claims its own identity indepen-
dently from the series of arbitrary contents of consciousness. And this is
the specific sense in which Kant defines the pure apperception: “I call
it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from the empirical one”
(Kant 1787, 132).
Not unlike Kant’s pure apperception, Hegel’s pure self claims indepen-
dence from particular empirical representations as well as the embodi-
ment of their totality, namely “life”. But since life is as essential to
self-consciousness as its pureness (GW 9, 112), the further process of the
education of the natural consciousness must advance in form of a dia-
lectical interplay of these two elements and not exclusively as a mani-
festation of the one-sidedly raised claim. The relevance of the dialectic
of independence and dependence is indicated in the title of this particu-
lar subchapter: “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness:
Lordship and Bondage”. Not only in the title but also in the current of
the history of self-consciousness, the experience of these two elemen-
tary normative attitudes of self-cognition and self-constitution precedes
the social implications and associations of lordship and bondage. Actu-
ally: independence and dependence represent the fundamental norma-
tive attitudes that determine all lordship-bondage-relations, or, in other
words: De Condillac’s imaginary statue must remain unable to perform
this particular aspect. I identify with my body to a certain extent but I claim to be more
than my body. The same is the case with my social roles, my achievements etc.
even the most elementary act of recognition as long as it has not acquired
the capacity to take the mentioned normative attitudes. Not before it has
acquired the full competence to master the complex dialectic of indepen-
dence and dependence will it become able to perform on higher levels of
interpersonal recognition. The only question that remains when we con-
trast Stekeler’s and Cobben’s approach to Honneth’s, Siep’s or Quante’s is:
Will it acquire these competences independently or in dependence from
concrete, empirical social interaction. There are references in the primary
text that can be interpreted in support of each of these standpoints.23 But
however we answer this particular question: my interpretation remains
untouched, because the claim that “independence and dependence”
represent a major concern of a subchapter entitled “Independence and
Dependence . . .” does not require any sophisticated justification.
The whole figure of duplication and unity of self-consciousness (GW 9,
109 f.) consists of clearly distinguished elements. The pure self represents
the standpoint of education as the natural consciousness begins to expe-
rience the “duplication” of self-consciousness and enters the process of
recognition. It claims pure independence from “life”. Thus it enters the life-
and-death-struggle from which a new elementary normative attitude of
self-consciousness emerges—dependence. As a result of the life-and-death-
struggle and the experience of the fear of death, the natural consciousness
generates a twofold representation in form of lordship (independence) and
bondage (dependence). These two roles represent two elementary norma-
tive attitudes as they specifically emerge from the life-and-death-struggle,
namely as separately represented by individual agents. But there is a broad
consensus within the discourse community that the process of the edu-
cation of natural consciousness to the standpoint of science includes
both positions as well as their interaction. Not only the bondsman, but
23 Quante (2009), for example, emphasizes the formula: “But the action of the one has
itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as
well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it
of which it is not itself the origin” (GW 9, 110). From an intra-subjective point of view
this figure could refer to the otherness of self-representation, but from an inter-subjective
point of view . . . However: This passage addresses the reflecting consciousness only and
it does not provide any evidence for the theory that interpersonal recognition precedes
the acquisition of the ability to experience independence and dependence. But if we
take the passage on labor and especially the phrase “service and obedience (Zucht und
Gehorsam)” (GW 9, 115) into account, we find some evidence for an intersubjective
interpretation. The only question remains: Does this passage refer to the current state of
education or does it represent a reflection from the point of view of the philosophizing
spectator? I am not sure.
280 sasa josifovic
also the lord represents a substantial level of the education of the natu-
ral consciousness determined by the successful manifestation of a defi-
cient cognitive claim.24 In the meanwhile, the experience of the fear of
death transforms the relation of the pure self to its body (cf. Cobben 2013,
162) and, what is more substantial: it generates a new normative attitude
that enables the self to incorporate dependence into the performance of
self-cognition and self-manifestation. The pure self was initially unable to
do this.
A more profound reading of Lordship and Bondage uncovers an even
more sophisticated dialectic of independence and dependence between
the lord and the bondsman, because it turns out that on a subtle level
of interpretation the lord who has, from one point of view, successfully
enforced the claim of pure independence from life is dependent from the
bondsman, while the bondsman happens to be more independent than
initially believed. And in regard to the relation between the lord and the
object of desire, we notice that the lord has succeeded in overcoming the
resistance of objectivity but he has not at all become independent from
the necessitation that desire imposes upon his volition. Thus, in regard to
independence and dependence, we have got the following situations:25
1. The pure self before the life-and-death-struggle

2. The ostensible representation of independence incorporated by the lord
3. The ostensible representation of dependence incorporated by the
bondsman
4. The subtle representation of dependence incorporated by the lord
5. The subtle representation of independence incorporated by the
bondsman
Furthermore the dialectic of normative attitudes includes a sophisticated

spectrum of interactions between:
6. The ostensible independence of the lord and the ostensible depen-

dence of the bondsman
24 Cf. reference to GW 9, 111, above.

25 I focus only on the spectrum of relations between the specified roles of the lord and
bondsman. But there is also a spectrum of normative relations between the self and life/
nature. I omit this aspect, not because it is irrelevant but only in order to keep things as
simple as possible.
7. The subtle independence of the bondsman and the subtle dependence

of the lord
8. The ostensible independence of the lord and his subtle dependence
from the bondsman
9. The ostensible dependence of the bondsman and his subtle indepen-
dence from the lord
10. The internal dynamics of ostensible independence and subtle depen-
dence of the lord
11. The internal dynamics of ostensible dependence and subtle indepen-
dence of the bondsman
The difference between the ostensible and subtle forms of every norma-
tive attitude reflects the two elementary standpoints of the history of
self-consciousness; and the emerging opposition between the way things
appear for the natural consciousness and the way they are for us, the phi-
losophizing spectators, determines the further progress of the education
of natural consciousness. The progress of recognition consists of the expe-
rience of the ostensible and subtle implications of normativity made by
the natural consciousness. In every specified role, it first makes the osten-
sible experience and advances to the experience of the subtle otherness
by recognition.26 Thus, as a totality, the natural consciousness gradually
evolves to the standpoint of Spirit and this evolution takes place in form
of a successive improvement of the cognitive, normative, and volitional
performance.
5. Desire and Enjoyment: Chains and Diseases of the Feudal Mind
A closer look at the relations between the self and “life” or nature, provides
us with some additional, more sophisticated material for the interpreta-
tion of the role that the lord plays in this allegory. According to Hegel’s
narrative, the lord has allegedly proven his independence from life in the
life-and-death-struggle and he has become the master of the bondsman
who still depends on life. He must maintain the claim to be independent
26 As a reference for the contrast between the way things appear in the first encounter
and the way they become in the current of recognition compare: “But just as lordship
showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its
consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a conscious-
ness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly
independent consciousness” (GW 9, 14).
282 sasa josifovic
from the bondsman because his power over him is based upon the main-
tenance of eminent dread and the avowal of dependence would eliminate
this dread. After all, his concept of normativity consists primarily of the
enforcement of power.
But in regard to the major interest concerning the evolution of self-
consciousness, not only the relation between the lord and the bondsman
but also the relation between the lord and life is of substantial relevance.
And ironically, we notice that the lord who claims full independence from
life—and even believes to have proven this independence –, is fully deter-
mined by desire and enjoyment (Genuss) (GW 9, 113). And here we find
one of these implications that make Hegel such a powerful philosopher:
In regard to the underlying concept of normativity we already noticed
that the lord represents the claim of independence. (Sentence 2) Further-
more we know that he depends on the bondsman’s labor and therefore he
is not as independent as he believes. (Sentence 4) But the determination
by desire and enjoyment brings the most fundamental aspect of his depen-
dence to light: The lord generates the contents of his volition in response
to natural inclinations. He is dependent from life.
Furthermore, we do not find any evidence in this allegory that the lord
is capable of incorporating the commitment to principles into his concept
of independence. But principles are the most elementary constituents of
the concept of autonomy in the Classical German Philosophy. Thus e.g.
Korsgaard states:
According to the Kantian conception, to be rational just is to be autono-
mous. That is: to be governed by reason, and to govern yourself, are one and
the same thing. The principles of practical reason are constitutive of auton-
omous action: they do not represent external restrictions on our actions,
whose power to motivate us is therefore inexplicable, but instead describe
the procedures involved in autonomous willing. But they also function as
normative or guiding principles, because in following these procedures we
are guiding ourselves (Korsgaard 2008, 31).
Since the lord’s concept of self-determination does not include the com-
petence to generate principles, his practice of alleged self-determination
is in fact external determination. He does not exercise volitional self-
determination but mere volatile, arbitrary conduct. And from the point
of view of the theory of freedom in Classical German Philosophy, this is
scarcely more than arbitrium brutum (Cf. Kant 1787, 562, 830).
Therewith we notice a twofold substantial deficit of the concept of inde-
pendence represented by the lord in regard to the standards of Classical
German Philosophy. On one hand, independence refers to the human
faculty of free choice to which we classically refer by the concept liberum

arbitrium or arbitrium liberum and which consists of the ability to over-
come given natural inclinations (stimuli) by the force of reason (princi-
ples, reasons, etc.). Secondly, independence refers to the Kantian concept
of autonomy: the ability to determine a specific kind of intelligible norma-
tivity which consists of principles. The lord fails to prove independence in
both ways: he is neither independent from the necessitation that the force
of desire imposes upon his conduct, nor does he prove the ability to deter-
mine reason-based principles that make rational choices possible. On the
basis of what does the lord make his choices? According to the narrative,
he is driven by desire and finds his satisfaction in the mere enjoyment of
the fruits of the bondsman’s labor.
Thus the natural consciousness must proceed in its education and
develop a more substantial concept of independence before it becomes
able to justify the claim which the lord believes to have justified. And in
regard to the occasionally mentioned association of the lord to the Kan-
tian concept of autonomy, we conclude that the lord does not at all rep-
resent the Kantian standpoint of autonomy in Hegel’s Phenomenology: He
represents the standpoint that is naively conceived of as autonomy but
deficient in regard to the underlying concept of independence.
6. Bondage: The “Truth of the Independent Consciousness”
The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the [. . .] con-

sciousness of the bondsman. [. . .] But just as lordship showed that its
essential nature is the reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in
its consummation will really turn into the opposite of what it immediately
is; as a consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and
be transformed into a truly independent consciousness (GW 9, 114).
The continuous experience of the fear of death in combination with the
“discipline of service and obedience” (GW 9, 115) contributes to a sub-
stantial educational progress of the natural consciousness incorporated
by the bondsman. The practice of labor as a form of “desire held in check”
and “fleetingness staved off ”27 (GW 9, 115) enables the natural conscious-
ness to attain the necessary distance from the necessitating force of incli-
nation and desire and to prove his mastery over nature. What the lord
27 “Gehemmte Begierde, aufgehaltenes Verschwinden”.

284 sasa josifovic
believes to have achieved in form of the abstract negation, the bondsman

practically achieves in form of labor—he becomes independent from the
natural determination by the force of desire and the appetite for enjoy-
ment. His labor does not serve to satisfy his desire but another person’s
desire. He therewith attends the subtle form of independence mentioned
in Sentence 5. It is not a form of social independence from the lord but
a more substantial form of independence from the determination by the
natural force of desire. Thus the bondsman qualifies for the specifically
human kind of freedom, liberum arbitrium: The ability to determine one’s
own volition and actions independently from the necessitating power
of nature. This experience of freedom will evolve to higher levels through
Stoicism, Reason and Spirit with all corresponding benefits and crises.
Conclusion
The lord, who ostensibly believes to be independent from nature (Sentence 2),
is in truth necessitated by the natural force of desire and enjoyment
(Sentence 5). The bondsman, who ostensibly appeared to be dependent
from the lord (3) proves to be independent (6) from nature. And since
the whole dialectic of normative attitudes primarily concerns the rela-
tion between the pure self and life, we conclude that the whole inter-
play of Lordship and Bondage provides the natural consciousness with
the necessary experience to develop an appropriate concept of freedom
and self-determination and engage into its practical manifestation. As a
consequence of the fear of death and labor, the natural consciousness has
entered the realm of the noumenal world. Consequently, it will make the
experience of a strictly noumenal kind of freedom on the next level of
education—Stoicism.
In de Condillac’s words: The statue has got a deficient concept of
freedom/independence as the natural consciousness goes into the life-
and-death-struggle. It maintains this concept unless it experiences the
fear of death and advances to a more substantial concept of freedom/
independence, which it seeks to confirm in the further progress of the
education of the natural consciousness to the standpoint of science.
In sum, Hegel’s theory of recognition represents a substantial con-
tribution to the philosophical understanding of social interactions and
the phenomena that emerge from these. His whole theory of Objective
Spirit represents a masterpiece of social philosophy. But according to the
specific structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the way the narrative is

organized, there is a specific order of the appearance of topics. The his-
tory of the education of the natural consciousness to the standpoint of
science is inspired by de Condillac’s famous thought experiment and thus
it exposes the cognitive, normative, and volitional structure of subjectivity
in form of an imaginary process of an imaginary successive acquisition of
these faculties and competences. From this point of view, the experience
of the ability to take the most elementary normative attitudes, such as
independence and dependence or enforcement of and response to power,
precedes the concrete performance of such highly sophisticated intersub-
jective relations as exposed in the chapter on Spirit.
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Chapter Fifteen
From love to recognition

Hegel’s conception of intersubjectivity
in a developmental-historical perspective
Erzsébet Rózsa
Thus what must happen first is recognition.1
1. Problem Definition
The objective of this study is to explicate the complex process of develop-

ment through which Hegel’s highly esteemed theory of intersubjectivity
achieves its systematically and thematically mature and varying forms in
the Phenomenology of Spirit, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and
Philosophy of Right. In this process of development, Hegel places great
significance on the concept of love. Love and recognition are forms of
interpersonal and/or social relationship through which Hegel elaborates
models of intersubjectivity. At the same time, these models demonstrate
differences which also express conceptual changes in Hegel’s philosophy.
In this study, strong emphasis is placed on the development of Hegel’s
interpretation of love. My goal is to contribute to the further differentia-
tion of Hegel’s theory of recognition and intersubjectivity.
During Hegel’s years in Jena, love, which was without a doubt still
his preferred basic shape of intersubjectivity in Frankfurt, and recogni-
tion, initially a derivative shape, gain a new, systematic classification.2
This development is accompanied by new meaning and additional con-
ceptual dimensions closely connected to the different kind of systemic
1 Cf. Hegel and the Human Spirit. A translation of the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy
of Spirit (1805/06) with commentary by Leo Rauch. Wayne State University Press, Detroit
1983, 114.—Abbreviation: JLPS.
2 For a developmental history of recognition in Hegel’s works, see L. Siep’s path-breaking
interpretation in: Id.: Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Untersuchun-
gen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie. K. Alber Verlag, Freiburg 1979.
288 erzsébet rózsa
formation in Jena.3 This development leads to the special significance of

recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.4 Nevertheless, there is no
linear development in Hegel’s concept of intersubjectivity. It is fascinat-
ing to see that these basic shapes of intersubjectivity are not regarded as
forms of self-consciousness in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit, as they are in
the Phenomenology of Spirit, but as forms of morality and ethical life. It is
extremely interesting that recognition is derived immediately from love in
the Philosophy of Spirit, written in Jena in 1805/06, but that this is not the
case in the Phenomenology of Spirit, written in 1807. The most interesting
thing, however, is that love is interpreted very similarly in 1805/06 to the
way it is much later in the encyclopedic Philosophy of Spirit and Philoso-
phy of Right, written in 1820. In 1805/06 as well as in his later, fully devel-
oped works, love is conceived as ethical love and is connected with the
conception of an ethical life. It is precisely this conception of love which is
the immediate, unmediated basis for the introduction or implementation
of recognition as the basic shape for ethical and social life in 1805/06.
In Hegel’s commentary from 1805/06, substantial differences become
clear not only in the status and significance of love in comparison to his
earlier conception of love in Frankfurt, but also in comparison to the
remarks on love in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit that introduce ethical love.
In particular, it is not ethical love in 1805/06 which is the first “determina-
tion” of love, but rather an additional determination within the framework
3 For the problematic of systemic formation in Jena, cf. R.-P. Horstmann: Introduction.
In: Jenaer Systementwürfe. III. Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes. Note o. 1. IX–
XXXVII.—For the effect of the systematic on significant aspects of Hegelian conceptions,
cf. E. Rózsa: The Question of Modern Individuality on the Points of Intersection of System,
Conceptuality, and Phenomenality. In: Id.: Modern Individuality in Hegel’s Practical Phi-
losophy. Brill, Leiden/Boston 2012, 3–12.
4 It is worth pointing out several contributions in recent comprehensive literature on
the issue of recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as the key work in regard to
this theme: A. Honneth: Leiden an Unbestimmtheit. Reclam, Stuttgart 2001; id.: Von der
Begierde zur Anerkennung. Hegels Begründung von Selbstbewusstsein. In: Hegels Phänom-
enologie des Geistes. Ein kooperativer Kommentar zu einem Schlüsselwerk der Moderne.
Edited by K. Vieweg/W. Welsch. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2008, 187–204; P. Stekeler-
Weithofer: Wer ist der Herr, wer ist der Knecht? Der Kampf zwischen Denken und Han-
deln als Grundform jedes Selbstbewusstseins. Ibid. 205–234; K. Karásek: Das Andere
seiner Selbst. Zur Logik der Anerkennungstheorie in der Phänomenologie des Geistes. Ibid.
253–269; M. Quante: “Der reine Begriff des Anerkennens”. Überlegungen zur Grammatik
der Anerkennungsrelation in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. In: Anerkennung. Edited
by H.-C. Schmidt am Busch/C. F. Zurn. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2009, 91–106; L. Siep:
Anerkennung in der Phänomenologie des Geistes und in der heutigen praktischen Phi-
losophie. Ibid. 107–124; A. Honneth: Arbeit und Anerkennung. Versuch einer Neubestim-
mung. Ibid. 213–228; P. Cobben: Anerkennung als moralische Freiheit. In: Philosophisches
Jahrbuch, 116. Jahrgang/I/2009, 42–58.
from love to recognition 289
of ethics.5 In connection with “ethical love”, it is followed immediately

by the introduction of recognition. This internal structure of love and its
unmediated link to recognition in the text at hand is correlated primarily
to the new and more prominent status of ethical life in Spirit. It is ethical
life that also (re)characterizes conceptions of intersubjectivity in 1805/06.
Accordingly, recognition comes to the fore, closely linked to the system
of rights and economics as components of ethical life. These conceptual
changes, whose decisive characteristic is social contextualization through
ethical life in spirit, make recognition become a basic encompassing social
structure which later becomes classified in Hegel’s practical philosophy. In
this sense, the Philosophy of Spirit conceived in Jena is a significant transi-
tion to his later work, but not only and not at all directly to the Phenom-
enology of Spirit, where it is the structure of self-consciousness, and not
ethical life that determines the conception of recognition.
Within this framework of interpretation, the Philosophy of Spirit from
Jena is the most significant document of a conceptual turning-point,
one also characterized by additional developments. This work contains
Hegel’s early motif of intersubjectivity, which can be recognized in love
in Frankfurt. This work also points in a direction which leads to the con-
ception of intersubjectivity in recognition through and in structures of
self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. What is characteristic,
however, is that the first version of ethics in 1805/06 is dominated by
basic figures which represent love and recognition together in ethical life,
i.e. not just one or the other.
At the base of different interpretations or accentuations, Hegel’s stable
position is that the subject is ab ovo intersubjective (the I as we, and we
as the I, as written in the Phenomenology of Spirit). He holds this posi-
tion from his early writings up to his final years in Berlin; it is one of
the fundamental elements constituting the conceptual continuity of his
complete works. Hegel’s basic position in regard to the communality,
sociality, and sociability of humanity represents the fundamental idea of
intersubjectivity, which can be seen in all the phenomena, structures, and
relations in humanity. This fundamental and principal consideration is at
the base of both love and recognition in all their differing variations. This
is another reason why the principle of intersubjectivity cannot be reduced
to practical-social relationships, as often happens in current discus-
sions about recognition. Hegelian intersubjectivity encompasses natural,
5 For differentiation of these aspects of love, cf. JLPS, 106–110.

inner-emotional, human-existential, epistemic, more or less institutional-

ized ethical, rightful, political, and economic dimensions of human life.
Love and recognition are forms in which this complexity of the human
condition is explicitly expressed—but in different ways. The undertaking
at hand is aimed at recapitulating the status of Hegelian recognition in the
history of its development, i.e. in the perspective of love as the basis for
the development of recognition. In this sense, the following study should
contribute to further differentiation of the significance of recognition.
In order to elucidate the development of how Hegel addresses recogni-
tion in the perspective of love, this study’s first step focuses on the text
on love written in Frankfurt, while the second step focuses on the Jena
Philosophy of Spirit. The first text shows clearly how love represents the
key concept of intersubjectivity in Hegel’s early works. In the second text,
on the other hand, Hegel gradually edges recognition into the foreground
of his conception of intersubjectivity, and he does so in relation to love.
This text is an important document of change as a “becoming” in which
recognition develops into the guiding, comprehensive socio-philosophi-
cal shape of intersubjectivity within ethical life: the shape in which it is
the “opposition of the will” instead of love that the subject puts at cen-
ter position.6 Parallel to this, love withdraws into the individual’s “inner
world” and into the ethical order of the family’s life. On the one hand, love
becomes an “ethical attitude”; on the other, it is institutionalized. In this
way, it attains its highest status in modern marriage and in the family. At
the same time, Hegel emphasizes that the loss of the central and com-
prehensive significance of love existing in works from Frankfurt does not
simply mean constriction or reduction of the issue of love. This concept
places new accents, such as responsibility, solidarity, charitableness, con-
cern, and provision in a self-differentiating ethical life and in the exten-
sive, partially institutionalized interpersonal relations associated with it.
This reinterpretation of love is accompanied by enrichment of content
for the overall concept of the human condition in shapes and phenom-
ena of ethical life, and clearly expresses the formation of fundamental
concepts of practical philosophy and their social contextualization.7 This
6 JLPS, 114.
7 The term ‘context’ is used in the sense given to it by D. Henrich. Cf. id.: Hegel im
Kontext. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2010 (first edition 1971), Forward, 7.—The differentia-
tion between two contexts does also have characteristics of the current use of the term
‘context’, but does not refute the primary endeavor to examine the work as a whole, even
in the specific field of ‘love’ and also to be able to interpret it as a motif in the overall work
from the developmental-historical perspective and in regard to recognition.
is the practical philosophy which does not reach its fully developed form
until much later, during Hegel’s time in Heidelberg.
The following interpretation is based on Hegel’s early text Fragments on

Religion and Love from 1797/98, which is his first important text on the
theme of love from his time in Frankfurt, and on his Philosophy of Spirit
from Jena in 1805/06, in which he first introduces recognition in connec-
tion with love, namely in the framework of ethical life.
2. Love as an Early Motif in ‘Fragments on Religion and Love’ in Frankfurt
Love is one of the greatest and, even today, most inspiring themes in
Hegel’s philosophy. In the multi-layered cultural horizon of Hegel’s time
in Frankfurt, but also in the early years in Jena, Hegel granted love exis-
tential significance,8 not only in the individual, but also and especially in
the interpersonal sense. In the “essence” of love, existence is expressed
as opposition, along with a striving to transcend this opposition.9 Love is
the form of unification which is suitable for overcoming opposition in the
lives of those who love.10 This concept is found in the document written
in Frankfurt named Fragments on Religion and Love. This kind of love also
shows the first traces of Hegel’s intersubjective model of humanity and of
8 The existentialist Hegel was discovered by P. Tillich. Cf. id.: Vorlesung über Hegel.
(Frankfurt 1931/32). Edited by E. Sturm. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York 1995.
9 G. W. F. Hegel: Love. In: Id., Early Theological Writings. Translated by T. M. Knox.
With an Introduction, and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner. The University of Chi-
cago Press, Chicago/Illinois 1948, 302–309. Here 303. Hegels juvenile fragments entitled
Entwürfe über Religion und Liebe were edited for the first time by Herman Nohl in his
collection of Hegels early “theological” writings: Hegels theologische Jugendschriften. Nach
den Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek in Berlin hrsg. v. H. Nohl. Mohr, Tübingen
1907. These fragments are only partially translated in english—besides the translation of
“Die Liebe” (Nohl, 378–382) by Knox “Two Fragments of 1797 on Love” (Nohl, 374–378)
were translated by H. S. Harris and published in Clio 8,2 (1979), 257–265—and the pages
entitled “Glauben und Sein” (Nohl, S. 382–385) still remain untranslated and are cited here
as a part of the German edition: [Entwürfe über Religion und Liebe] (1797/98). In: Werke in
zwanzig Bänden. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832–1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Ed.
E. Moldenhauer/K. M. Michel. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1986. Vol. 1, 239–254.—Abbre-
viation: ERL.
10 For the Hölderlinian-Hegelian theme of unification, cf. D. Henrich: Hegel im Kontext.
Note o. 7, 9–41, and C. Jamme: “Ein ungelehrtes Buch”. Die philosophische Gemeinschaft
zwischen Hölderlin und Hegel in Frankfurt 1797–1800. In: Hegel-Studien, supplement 23.
Bonn 1983, especially 110–112.—Ch. Taylor points out the broad background of the devel-
opment of ideas on unification as a fundamental intention in German culture. In: Ch.
Taylor: Hegel. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1993 (first edition: Cambridge 1975), 27.
the essence of an individual, a model which Hegel would thematize a few

years later and socially contextualize.11
In the existential philosophy of life and intersubjective context, love is
also understood as a form of feeling and as physical love.12 Against a sub-
stantial cultural-historical background, physical love and the emotional
state are interpreted as the “whole truth” in life within the framework
of immediate, unmediated interpersonal relations and in connection
with life and death. This whole is shown as the result of unification. Love
understood in this complex way comprises a tension-filled fundamental
structure of conflict as separation and opposition. Hegel places this conflict
at the center of his own scientific methodology within just a few years, but
he no longer accentuates love as much in Jena. In 1805/06, he mitigates
the tensions in love, especially in comparison to recognition.13
In Frankfurt, he conceives love especially as a fundamental orientation
in life whose essential characteristic is the mutual relationship between
one’s own I and another person who is at first a stranger. Love is thus a
fundamental relationship in life in several respects: 1. as the principle of
the interpretation of humanity in the existential-ontological sense in the
field of tension between one’s own I and the other person, 2. as an orient-
ing norm, basic attitude, and fundamental disposition in mutual relation-
ships, 3. as an orientation for expressions of terms and relationships in
humanity in all their forms (speech, body language, activity as the ideal
type of practices).
The love that is characterized by separation and opposition in human
life is inextricably connected with unification.14 Love as a higher form of
11 Siep provides a survey of the development of recognition in Hegel’s works as he

reconstructs the “pre-forms” like love in the early fragments from Frankfurt, unification
in the “spirit of Christianity”, and recognition as a synthesis of love and struggle in the
documents from Jena. In the second step of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit, he
points out gaining reconciliation between one’s self and substance. Cf. L. Siep: Anerken-
nung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. Note o. 2, 104–105.—Honneth updates recog-
nition, namely from the individual perspective of modern freedom. Cf. A. Honneth: Leiden
an Unbestimmtheit. Note o. 4.
12 E. and K. Düsing have published a survey on the theme of love in Hegel’s documents
from Frankfurt and focus on the ethical dimension of love. Cf. E. Düsing und K. Düsing:
Gesetz und Liebe. Untersuchungen zur Kantkritik und zum Ethik-Entwurf in Hegels Frank-
furter Jugendschriften. In: Subjektivität und Anerkennung. Edited by B. Merker/G. Mohr/
M. Quante. Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 1–14. The following interpretation aims at demon-
strating the rather complex structure of love in the documents from Frankfurt.
13 JLPS, 114.
14 Cf.: J. Kotkavirta: Liebe und Vereinigung. In: Subjektivität und Anerkennung. Note
o. 12, 15–31.
unification is, in the end, a question of existence.15 It thus represents a

constant challenge in an individual’s existence (one’s being and life) as he
or she is confronted with opposition and division. In order to surmount
this challenge in one’s existence and to overcome divisions, it is necessary
for individuals to have conscious epistemic acts, such as ideas and con-
ceptions of appropriate real-life intersubjectively understood attitudes,
feelings, and dispositions. The “measuring-stick” for human relationships
which should be used for this existential and, at the same time, pre-social
challenge in one’s existence is the “whole”. Using the whole as the scale
can be made valid through unification, which attains its highest form in
love.16 The true whole and love in life meet in and through unification,
which changes life itself. In this sense, Hegel expresses that it is in love
that life finds itself, and not simply in being.17 In the name of the living
being as the whole in life, Hegel criticizes the dispersion “in the mani-
fold of feelings”, writing that “a single feeling is only a part and not the
whole of life”.18
It is in the “manifold of feelings” that the whole of life develops and that
life finds itself “without any further defect”.19 This diversity is not made up
of random differences where the whole would simply be the result of an
arithmetic sum of special, separate, manifold feelings qua heteronomy in
the sense of Kant. That would lead to an “immature unity”20 in which the
multiplicity, as well as the opposition would remain unchanged as essen-
tial characteristics of the human condition, which would lead to disjoint-
edness in life. In contrast, “true” unification is based on the whole of “life
itself ” as the decisive fundamental orientation, and has its realization in
love as the “mature unity” in the “whole of life”. This unity can eliminate
or at least lessen the lack of being as inner turmoil or dispersion. The inte-
gration of very differing forms of opposition and of the manifold feelings
in which life finds the transforming power of love takes place through uni-
fying acts and actions. This integrating function is soon taken by reason,21
15 Hegel states: “Vereinigung und Sein sind gleichbedeutend”. Cf. ERL, 251.
16 Hegel remarks: “Die Vereinigung ist der Maßstab, an welchem die Vergleichung
geschieht, an welchem die Entgegengesetzten, als solche, als Unbefriedigte erscheinen”.
ERL, ibid.
17 Cf. Love, 305 (ERL, 246).
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid. Hegel emphasizes: “Die verschiedenen Arten des Seins sind die vollständigeren
oder unvollständigeren Vereinigungen.” ERL, 253.
21 Hegel criticizes reason but, a few years later, it is reason to which he attributes the
purifying methodological function in speculation. Cf.: Love, 305 (ERL, 246).
which has, from the outset, an epistemic as well as ontological-existential

and practical nature.22
It is Hegel’s concept of multiplicity that distances him from Kant’s
heteronomy, insofar as Hegel focuses on the diversity of shapes in highly
differentiated steps, forms, and phenomena of life as a structural charac-
teristic of life and the human condition.23 In contrast to Kant, Hegel is able
to overcome the lack of humanity, namely through just this multiplicity,
which represents “the whole of life” in its humanly structured form, let-
ting this “whole” then be the standard that can be used for the respective,
always manifold and opposing, concrete lifestyles. Even today, this con-
cept is interesting for discussions of the diversity of shapes in life and of
normative orientation for opposing, disrupted, and disjointed lifestyles.
As such a complex relation, love, the attitude towards existence, the
other person and oneself recommended by Hegel, is not ab ovo and can
never be absolute. There are always differences in content and in the form
of love for each individual and in the special relationship between lovers.
Unifying love does not destroy multiplicity: that would mean destruction
of love’s vitality. This also means that each individual can, should, and
may love in his or her own way. This is why love can also be just one alter-
native and optional: an individual can even decide against love and for
separation and opposition in interpersonal relationships and in life itself.
This brings contingency to love. This also means that love offers a higher
level of human life by overcoming separation and lack of humanity, but
does not exclude the “lower” moments and levels in the human condition.
For these reasons, love is of relative nature and includes as a possibility, as
well as a structural characteristic, plurality in interpersonal relationships
and lifestyles.
“Absolute relativity” is an extraordinarily important concept that is also
endorsed by the older Hegel. A human being never exists in the abso-
lute sense; one’s forms of being, consciousness, and relationships are
22 R.-P. Horstmann and D. Emundts recapitulate Hegel’s conception of love in his time
in Frankfurt solely as a speculative conception. In this one-sided perspective, they do not
recognize at all the special significance of the introduction of the dimension of actuality
for the issues of life and ethics. Pursuant to acceptance by the British economy, Hegel’s
concept of life and actuality also had practical-philosophical significance, which also had
an effect on the issue of love. Cf. D. Emundts/R.-P. Horstmann: G. W. F. Hegel. Eine Einfüh-
rung. Reclam, Stuttgart 2002, 22–24.
23 Cf. E. Rózsa: Der Mensch als Mangelwesen und das Bedürfnis der Technik. In:
Anthropologie und Technik. Ein deutsch-ungarischer Dialog. Edited by M. Quante/E. Rózsa.
W. Fink, München 2012, 11–31.
always relative and—according to existential, pre-social, and later social

intersubjectivity—relational, and thus manifold-pluralistic.24 Love as
a mutual relationship between one person and another links us in life
relationally and relatively, but never absolutely. Relations between people
change and are thus always conditional, relative, and dynamic. A human
being is always in a relationship to himself or herself and to one or more
others. According to Hegel, in this dynamic relationship one person is
always influenced by the external power of the other person on himself
and on the other person. The other person, the external being who has
power and gives opposition, is an unavoidable experience and thus also
a structural component in the human condition. A human being cannot
comprehend his own existence as an immediate, unmediated identity, but
rather always establishes it through the divisiveness and opposition which
connects him or her to the other person, who likewise has his or her own
experience in alienation and subservience. Otherness, alienation, subservi-
ence, and even power thus become constituents of love in life, just as they
become the formative dimension of “true life” in a separate, opposing,
insufficient, diversified existence. Without otherness, alienation, insuffi-
ciency, diversification, and power, the conception of the highest level of
unification as surmounting separation and opposition in and through love
in true, “vibrant” life is impossible. It is exactly these multiple forms of
opposition in love that specify its true worth. Even in our times, it is this
concept of Hegel’s, the perception of dynamic-relative relationality as an
existential characteristic and, at the same time, as a pre-social, practical,
and pluralistic intersubjectivity of love, whose significance for the interpre-
tation of human life can be inspirational.
This concept changes in Jena with the introduction of ethical love. Sub-
sequent to this change, intersubjectivity, which was understood in love
primarily in the existential sense in Frankfurt, was determined in Jena
institutionally in and through marriage and family and linked with shapes
and structures in the actuality of ethical life. The need for stability,
24 In regard to relationality as a Hegelian problem, it is interesting to look at Brandom’s

reflection which attributes this to the “rationalistic expressivism” which is supposed to
characterize Hegel’s own philosophic position. Brandom states: “Hegel’s version of expres-
sivism is further attractive in that it is not only pragmatic and inferentialist about the con-
ceptual but also relational, in the sense that the implicit and the explicit are each at least
in part constituted by their expressive relation to each other.” Cf. R. Brandom: Articulating
Reason. An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2001,
34–35.—The present contribution focuses on the internal-systematic nature of relational-
ity in Hegel’s philosophy, which Brandom disregards.
which Hegel interpreted in his early years as a need for religion and phi-
losophy as cultural forms of consolidation for a disjointed life, arises from
the motif of his own experiences in life, as Hegel writes in his Differenz-
schrift (a text on the differences between Fichte’s and Schelling’s systems
of philosophy).25 From his years in Jena, he searches for stabilizing factors
in life, not so much directly in individuals and their lifestyle, but rather in
ethical norms, attitudes, and stances fortified through rightful and eco-
nomic institutions. An important document of this conceptual change
is the Philosophy of Spirit, written in Jena; there is nowhere else where
Hegel links love with recognition as closely as here.26 The introduction
of the socio-philosophic model of recognition within the framework of
ethical life as a new conceptual focus gives love a different significance:
it becomes an “ethical attitude” which keeps the existential contrariness
in love and in life within limits. Ethical attitude is not identical with the
“collective whole” of the “old times” which Hegel introduced as idealized
collectivism in young years.27 The “ethical attitude” of love is a different
kind of unification in human relationships and has new accents: it links
the ethical-substantial contents of social institutions, norms, stances and
attitudes, such as devotion, solidarity, responsibility, welfare, compassion,
and the subjective components of individual freedom, such as the right
to self-determination and distinctiveness, a right that can be invoked in a
“particular existence” as the own lifeworld of each individual. Thus, love
may lose its comprehensive significance for concepts of intersubjectivity,
but it gains new determinations in responsibility, welfare, and solidarity.
This new constellation of ethical love can serve as a “subjective-substan-
tial”, i.e. ethical-communal and, at the same time, individual-evaluative
25 G. W. F. Hegel: The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy.

Translated by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf. State University of New York Press, Albany
1977, 89–94.—Throughout his life, Hegel linked the vacillating attitude of people in mod-
ern times with a need for philosophy and its stabilizing function. In this point, he was
influenced by various impulses. Schiller played an especially significant role in this: his
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man influenced Hegel’s perception of the function
of philosophy, as did the orientation of Kant’s philosophy and German idealism to repre-
sent philosophy in a system as the highest form of scholarship. Schiller characterized not
only modern character as vacillating, as did Goethe, but also the “spirit of the times”. Cf.
F. Schiller: Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. Edited by K. R. Berghahn.
Reclam, Stuttgart 2000, 17–20.—This problem also preoccupied Goethe, who describes
Hamlet as a vacillating young man characterized by vacillating melancholy. Cf. J. W. Goethe:
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. Goethes Werke in zwölf Bänden. Aufbau, Berlin/Weimar 1966,
Vol. 6, 309, 312.
26 Cf. JLPS, especially 106–108.
27 Ibid. 117.
orientation and attitude, thus as a complementary-stabilizing factor for the

respective particular lifestyle of the individual in modern times.28
3. From Love to Recognition in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit
In the Philosophy of Spirit from 1805/06, love consistently plays a signal role
as an early motif. In this text, strong existentialistic tones can still be found,
similar to those in the texts from Frankfurt.29 At the same time, however,
love is embedded in the developing Hegelian conception of social, rightful,
and economic relations (ethical life) which is made explicit by terms such
as possession, ownership, and recognition. It is recognition that becomes
the main term in this development of new meaning, whereby indications
that he has surmounted his earlier existentialist position become appar-
ent: recognition focuses on the “opposition of the free individual’s will”,
while it withdraws in “ethical love”. But even the later practice of phi-
losophy cannot be explained without the re-interpretation of love dat-
ing from 1805/06. The decisive step is that the existentialist dimension of
love gradually withdraws into the background, while its socio-philosophic
re-interpretation gradually moves into the foreground. This development
of recognition from ethical-social love takes place along the way toward
recognition becoming the primary socio-philosophic model.30
All of this is implemented in a multi-stage process of thought which is
recapitulated in the following.
3.1 Spirit as the Unity of Two Free Selves Qua Existential

and Communicative Determination of Intersubjectivity
According to Hegel it is through language that the true essence of the I,
Self, and subject is shown in Spirit—both as “inwardness” and as “unity
28 Moyar emphasizes complementarity in Hegel’s works, though limited only to the

Phenomenology of Spirit. Cf. D. Moyar: Die Verwirklichung meiner Autorität: Hegels
komplementäre Modelle von Individuen und Institutionen. In: Hegels Erbe. Edited by
C. Halbig/M. Quante/L. Siep. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2004, 209–253.
29 Cf. P. Tillich: Vorlesung über Hegel. Note o. 8.
30 For this reason, this text is also particularly significant for the explanation of a deci-
sive phase in the development of Hegel’s practical philosophy. This development cannot
be separated from the different variations of the system. The systematic formation, the
respective status of the themes of practical philosophy, and recognition represent an
enriching factor for the content that increases its relevance. Cf. E. Rózsa: Modern Individu-
ality in Hegel’s Practical Philosophy. Note o. 3, 41–62.
of two free Selves”31 This also means that intersubjectivity is an inevita-

ble component of being oneself in the existential sense, as Hegel held
in Frankfurt, but, and this is the new concept, there is also an inevitable
component of ethical-socio-cultural being characterized by “Spirit”. In
this, not only is the fundamental existential determination of human-
ity apparent, but it also indicates that from now on human existence as
Spirit is ab ovo also of socio-cultural nature, including the communicative
nature and expressivity on which Hegel now focuses.32 Nowhere else is
the emphasis on the communicative nature of human existence as strong
as in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit, where Hegel first understands this as
linguistic communication.
Inwardness, as an individual’s own unmediated world, is the first place
for the “union of two free Selves”.33 The relationship between “two free
Selves” develops in inwardness through acts of theoretical “meaning”
[Meinen], and this “meaning” is what dominates linguistic communica-
tion. This relation also has connections to actuality, namely through acts
of practical “meaning”, in possession, ownership, and recognition. Accord-
ingly, actual shapes of relations in love develop from “two free Selves” as
worldy-actual interpersonal shapes of ethical-social contextualized life.
What is meant by this?
Inwardness is the immediate, unmediated place in intersubjective rela-
tions, the first room for expressions by signs and language, the means of
expressiveness of intersubjectivity in the human condition.34 Through
their expression, these media show inwardness as a common world (shared
with one other individual or more) which is now also constituted by “the-
oretically” understood language, rather than by socio-practical acts. This is
where the “concrete nature” of intersubjectivity manifests itself as the first
form of the intersubjective Self. This means that the intersubjective nature
of the human condition is first manifested in its linguistic-communicative
character. In other words: language is a component of the formation of
being and consciousness for the inter-subject as his or her human Self,
31 JLPS, 89.
32 For differentiation in the epistemic, existential-ontological, linguistic and socio-
communicative dimensions of spirit, cf. Hegel’s explanation in: JLPS, 88–89.
33 Hegel later calls this structure in humanity “inner world”, which represents an inde-
pendent form of actuality which Charles Taylor then takes up again as inwardness. Cf. Ch.
Taylor: Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge/New York 1989, 111–208.
34 This expressiveness has been emphasized by Ch. Taylor and R. Brandom, among
others.
and as Hegel emphasizes, this takes place first within the framework of
the theoretical “meaning”.
The Spirit is not first formed as absolute or objective, but rather as
inwardness which is my world and which first expresses itself and exists
in linguistic and then in practical-social forms of communication. Being
becomes Self as a relation of “two free Selves” to each other qua inter-
subject, which expresses itself through linguistic and socio-practical
communication of the shared, common, intersubjective world and in this
manner first exists. It is this intersubjective-communicative, and not
the individual-atomistic Self that is the first point of departure for the
creation of subjects “from the Spirit”. This expressive shape of “two free
Selves” makes explicit that no human being exists or can exist without
linguistic communication as a basic “theoretical” form of intersubjectivity.
It is in linguistic-communicative intersubjectivity that the origin of the
human subject characterized by freedom as Self-liberation can be found.
By speaking and giving things names, a human being makes the thing
in-itself into his, his own, for-itself existing thing, whereby Self-liberation
in humanity first becomes possible. This dimension of the human condi-
tion is also an explanation for social contextualization, the significance of
which as a fundamental characteristic of Hegel’s philosophy as compared
to Kant’s is emphasized again and again nowadays.35
It is in the practical will/meaning of the Spirit that Hegel represents the
general structure of practices. The feeling of lacking something as a practi-
cally motivating drive first leads to rational processing of this situation
of the Self and the world, i.e. to setting goals and taking action, whereby
the confrontation of the Self and the world in the practical sense can be
conveyed (overcome). This takes place through satisfaction.36 For Hegel,
satisfaction is the first of the practices, clearly prior to labor, which differ-
entiates Hegel’s ideas from the classic British concept of economy.37
Drives are the I as a whole.38 Not life as a whole, as in the theoretical
“meaning”, but rather Self/the I as a whole represents the comprehensive
35 Cf. J. McDowell: Selbstbestimmende Subjektivität und externer Zwang. In: Hegels

Erbe. Note o. 28, 184–208.
36 For the present discussion on satisfaction as an element of “erotic awareness” in
respect to recognition, cf. R. Brandom: Selbstbewusstsein und Selbst-Konstitition. Die
Struktur von Wünschen und Anerkennung. In: Hegels Erbe. Note o. 28, 46–77.
37 For the significance of Hegel’s notion of economy for his concept of recognition, cf.
the very interesting contribution by P. Cobben in this volume.
38 The I as a whole makes the drive an object that is “not empty satiety, the simple feel-
ing of Self ” that is lost in desire and restored in its satisfaction. Instead, what disappears
horizon and scale for fulfilled existence. In the Self as a whole, it can be
seen how “left without an other” and “without content”, the first character-
istics found in the human condition in the practical field can be overcome
through satisfaction of the individual’s drives as a prototype of intersubjec-
tively mediated practices. In this “action”, the drive gets its own content
and becomes “the quiescent drive, become itself, fulfilled in itself ”.39 This
is “the work of the I: it knows its activity in this”. It is not in satisfaction
per se, but rather in doing as the practice or result of an activity, that the
work makes the Self to a whole and leads to its fulfilled being.40 Here, it is
not a matter of fulfilled life that can be achieved in love as true unifica-
tion in the existential sense, as in Frankfurt. That love, which was ideal-
ized in many respects, becomes differentiated in 1805/06 through social,
economic, and practical contextualization, but also through an emphasis
on linguistic communicativity.
In the practical approach, which is what matters here, the focus is on
“communication with the other”, but differently than in linguistic com-
munication.41 “Communication with the other” means several different
things. It is: 1. a form of being, 2. the communicative dimension of being,
in the first place, for “communication with the other” is its being in the I
as a distinctive feature, 3. action (“active character”) as practical dimen-
sion of the human condition in general. In these multi-layered relations
between existential, communicative, and practical aspects, the other and
alien becomes his own Self, he himself. “Communication with the other”
in this multi-faceted sense means: the Self is no longer left without an
other and without content in its communication and practical activities.
The void in practical being characterized by drive and lacking disappears,
and the Self becomes actively “appropriated”, “fulfilled” being. This is the
decisive orientation in the practical “meaning”, whose shapes are satisfac-
tion, activity, appropriation, and recognition.
It is interesting to see how Hegel makes the transition from mainly
theoretical-linguistic communication to the practical means for it. In this
transition, practical-communicative activity precedes economic activity.
The means as a medium of economic activity thereby integrates not only
is the pure form of indifference to the extremes of the drive. It is a question of “disappear-
ance of the opposing—(thus it is) being, but a fulfilled being”. Cf.: JLPS, 101.
39 JLPS, 100, 101, 102.
40 This horizon disappears in Brandom’s interpretation of “erotic awareness”, which
then also affects his interpretation of recognition in Hegel’s works. Cf. Note o. 36.
41 JLPS, 102.
linguistic communication, but also actual-cooperative communication of

practical shapes of the intersubject, which are formed and which are in
movement in modern economy and society. This is why it is not labor
in itself that is decisive in economic activity, but rather the production
which is reflected, not just linguistically, but also as actual-cooperative,
communicable, “universal” activity encompassing “all the details” and pos-
sibilities of its substance. Therefore, the means is also a component of
communication in both senses, and, as such, has increased significance
compared to satisfaction. In its purpose, satisfaction is only “one individual”
activity and lacks any communicative activity which would extend beyond
the limits of just one Self. The means, on the other hand, is the bearer of
cooperative-communicative activities and thus also a multiplying potential
of intersubjective activities: “the tool encompasses all such particularities”.
The increased significance found in this medium through its ability to
encompass all potential as well as all concrete details is brought to light in
the meaning of cunning.42 Cunning leads immediately to love, for drives
involve not just satisfaction, but also knowledge. This means that funda-
mental, practical motivation cannot be cut off from theoretical reflection.
This internal linkage is an inevitable characteristic of the human condi-
tion in all its shapes, levels, and phenomena. As knowledge, drive knows
its essence in the other. This kind of epistemically embedded linguistic and
actual-cooperative-practical intersubjectivity in the knowledge of one’s
own essence in the other is what is at the base of love and any other kind
of human relationship.
In this complex concept of knowledge, Hegel points out that not only
relation to each other, but also independence is a structural component
of love as a fundamental figure of intersubjectivity. Simply by being inde-
pendent, the other is thus also the opposing shape as well as itself. Each
person recognizes this kind of tension-packed intersubjectivity in love:
each person knows himself in the other. This knowledge of equality, which
originates in experiencing the opposition of independent Selves, results in
gestures of renunciation of one’s own Self—in the existential, as well as
in the practical sense. This renunciation of one’s Self is love.
It has become evident that in 1805/06 love develops primarily from
linguistic and actual-cooperative communicative (i.e., socially and econo
mically informed) intersubjective relations.
42 For Hegel’s interpretation of cunning, see cf. JLPS, 103.

3.2 From Love as “existing for the other” to Ethical Love. Institutionalization
of Interpersonal Relationships
The specific feature of love is renunciation of one’s Self, the withdrawal
of the Self/being for oneself and emergence of the Self/being for the other.43
How then does this act of renunciation comply with the self-centered
drive that is rooted in the insufficient human being and that cannot be cut
off from love? Drive has become knowledge, as we have seen: a human,
with the motivation force of drives, knows his/her essence in the other. It
is exactly this tension that characterizes the Self, which is rooted in nature
and Spirit and is also a double human Self in this sense; the intersubjective
subject has its origin in this elementary tension in its insufficient being.
That is what makes intersubjectivity the essence of love, too: “In itself
there is the supersession of both: each [of the two “Selves”] is identical to
the other precisely in that wherein it opposes it; the other, that whereby
it is the “other” to it, is itself. In the very fact that each knows itself in the
other, each has renounced itself—love.”44
This explanation reminds us of the conception in the Frankfurt text
on love. In Frankfurt as in Jena, Hegel comprehends the differentiation
between elementary human relationships “in immediate being” in and
through the concept of love. In that text, the concept is set forth in the
following way: “This self-negation is one’s being for another, into which
one’s immediate being is transformed. Each one’s self-negation becomes,
for each, the other’s being for the other. Thus the other is for me, i.e., it
knows itself in me. There is only being for another, i.e., the other is outside
itself.” He continues: “This recognition is love.”45 In love, each individual is
in opposition and recognizes himself/herself in the other person. Each one
is in this tension-packed relation, namely in a way that he/she is identical
to the other one, whereby he/she also has and wants to have “autonomy”.
Opposition (an individual’s autonomy) and equality (identification with
the other person) are thus basic structure of love and intersubjectivity
in the human condition in general. This fundamental relation in humanity
explains the relation between egoistic and sacrificing-altruistic motivation
43 For self-structure in Hegel, cf. R. Brandom: Selbstbewusstsein und Selbst-Konstitu-

tion. In: Hegels Erbe. Note o. 36, 52–55.—See also: E. Rózsa: Personale und soziale Iden-
titäten im Hinblick auf Strukturrelationen des Selbst bei Hegel. Before publication, in:
Hegel-Jahrbuch.
44 JLPS, 106.
45 Ibid. 107.
and acts, which are thus determined, first of all, by the human condition, and
not the social one.
In these remarks on love in the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel models the
archetype of intersubjective relationships on the human condition, and
he emphasizes the significance of linguistics and practical-cooperative
communication, at times still in an existentialist tone, but also at times
deviating from his existentialist-dominated Frankfurt conception. It is
not until the second part of his remarks that he focuses on ethical love.
With this, Hegel socially contextualizes, in existentialist tones, the text’s
strongly epistemic-communicative first determinations of love, and also
those based on cooperative-practical intersubjectivity. With this step, he
prepares for the immediate transition from love to recognition and to the
socio-philosophic model.46
The requirement emphasized in 1805/06 is recognition of all the
relations between the Self and the other. Even love first understood as
epistemic is to be comprehended as a whole, linking recognition not only
with the neo-platonic, mystic union, but also with Hegel’s conception of
practices and even with his theory of modernity. For this reason, recogni-
tion is not primarily understood here as a foundation in the sense of mod-
ern epistemology. Love as a whole directed at recognition means rather
assessing all the connections between interpersonal relationships and
making them an issue in order to be able to deal with them practically
and in an appropriate manner. This kind of love as a whole is a model for
the interpersonal relationships in modern society which are not identi-
cal with macro-structures of ethical life, such as politics or economy, but
which are connected with these and can be just as institutionalized.47
“Collective nature” now means modern ethical life, and no longer the old
one portrayed in the Phenomenology of Spirit from 1807, where Antigone
and Creon represent different basic figures of ethical life. In the Phenom-
enology of Spirit, Hegel also addressed modern ethical life, for example, in
the figure of Creon or in the framework of rights, but not as pronouncedly
as in 1805/06. Here, it is the family that is understood as the appropriate
institution for ethical love, which is inconceivable in the Phenomenology
of Spirit. Hegel sums up the aspects of the family in 1805/06 as follows:
“The [idea of the] family is decided in these elements: a. love, as natural,
46 This leads to conceptional parallelisms between the concept of ethical love from
1805/06 and the theory of love in the Philosophy of Right from 1820, but this issue cannot
be dealt with in this study.
47 JLPS, 109–110.
begetting children; b. self-conscious love, conscious feeling, sentiment

and language of the same; c. shared labor and acquisition, mutual service
and care; d. education [of offspring]. No single function can be made the
purpose [of the family].”48
Institutionalization is a decisive element in the new conception of love.
These thoughts cannot be found in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but are, in
contrast, in the Encyclopedia and the Philosophy of Right. Of Hegel’s con-
cepts, institutionalization of interpersonal relationships is the one most
closely connected with his developing theory of modernity. The mystic
union, the strong demand for an epistemological, communicative, and
practical foundation and Hegel’s first thoughts on the theory of moder-
nity are linked to the conception of love from 1805/06, but probably not
yet in a fully developed and systematic form. This multi-layered position
cannot be separated from the special position of recognition as a socio-
philosophic model and also belongs to the development of the concept
of recognition.
3.3 From Ethical Love as “self-conscious love” to Recognition of

“free individualities” in the “development of ethical being”
Cognition as knowledge of the whole in relationships of ethical love
leads immediately to recognition. This is a process of development which
extends from the natural individual to the social context of ethical life.
Each first becomes a “natural individual”, so that “his uncultivated natu-
ral Self is recognized”, as Hegel states.49 But the comprehensive horizon
of recognition is ethical life. In its name, Hegel polemicizes on chivalric
love and invokes the actuality and presentness of ethical life. This polemic
tone is more familiar in his later works: “High chivalric love falls within
mystic consciousness, which lives in a spiritual world regarded as the true
one, a world which now approaches its actuality, and in this world such
consciousness glimpses the other world as present. Friendship is only
in shared work, and [the emphasis on it] occurs in the period of moral
development”.50
An important characteristic of ethical love in modernity is that it is
“self-conscious”. This also means that the members of the family can/
48 JLPS, 109–110.—This last remark by Hegel refers implicitly to the distribution of dif-
ferent social positions among family members.
49 JLPS, 107.
50 Ibid.
should/want to retain their right to distinctiveness and self-determina-

tion. Renunciation of oneself is thus only one side of ethical love: mod-
ern individuals should not/do not want to/cannot renounce completely
their self-consciousness and their autonomy in their interpersonal rela-
tionships, either. “Self-conscious love” is the appropriate form of love and
intersubjectivity in a modern society. It is no coincidence that it is self-
conscious love that sets the foundation for the transition from ethical love
as an interpersonal community to recognition as a mutual socio-cultural-
practical approach.
Self-consciousness does not take center-stage in ethical love, however.
Recognition becomes the social form in which self-consciousness becomes
the dominant basic attitude of “free individualities” in the modern world.
Free individualities experience their communality, for example, in mar-
riage and the family or in fraternity, which is what they can and should
do consciously. These institutions educate the individual in mutuality, as
well as in autonomy. This double approach in ethical love is not dominant
in recognition, however: self-conscious, free individuals in a relationship
of recognition distance themselves from ethical love and its institutions.
Hegel illuminates the difference: “Love has become its own object, and
this is a being-for-itself. [. . .] Each [member] is the spiritual recognition
itself, which knows itself. The family, as a totality, has confronted another
self-enclosed totality, comprising individuals who are complete, free
individualities for one another”.51 He continues: “At the same time, they
are related to one another and are in a state of tension in regard to one
another”.52
Modern individuals are active in both worlds. In interpersonal relation-
ships, for example in the family, they understand themselves and deter-
mine themselves in a way with which they identify, while at the same
time keeping distance through their right to self-determination and dis-
tinctiveness. Self-consciousness is thus one strong foundation for free indi-
viduals, with the other being and remaining “mutuality”, i.e. identification
with others. Without any doubt, self-conscious free individuality, with
its relationships of recognition, is a higher shape of the subject than the
one attributed to the natural individual. It would be interesting to inves-
tigate how this conceptual thought links the Jena Philosophy of Spirit with
the Phenomenology of Spirit. But it is also important to remember that
51 JLPS, 110.
52 Ibid.
in 1805/06 the focus is on ethical love as a socio-culturally characterized

form of intersubjectivity, and not on the structure of self-consciousness.
Now it is ethical love that prepares and becomes the foundation for the
introduction of the higher form of intersubjectivity as “true” recognition.
Ethical love in its self-conscious form surmounts naturalness, which is
also the first, immediate foundation of recognition, as shown above. The
highest level of ethical love is one of “complete and free individualities
for one another”. Accordingly, in ethical love, this experience is expressed
as cognizance of a shared, common existence of self-conscious, free, and
autonomous individuals in the modern world. It is this fundamental struc-
ture of tension that characterizes interpersonal relationships in modern
society. Accordingly, ethical love is one basic shape of intersubjectivity,
the one which is ethical-collective, as well as self-conscious. The other
fundamental shape is socially contextualized, with recognition by free,
self-conscious individuals. Ethical love represents a shared life “for one
another”, whereby its subjects are and should also be self-conscious. Rec-
ognition, on the other hand, primarily denotes “true”, “known” “existence
for oneself ”, and mutuality fades into the background. Rightful-economic-
social relations of recognition represent a different kind of social contex-
tualization than ethical love in the family.
In accordance with this difference, determination of the person who
has rights in social relations of recognition arises. The person is not only a
formally defined form of the subject with a purely for-oneself structure, as
in natural right. The person is also shaped intersubjectively and socially;
this is why a human being can “necessarily” be recognized and recogniz-
ing. This rightful-social embedding of a human being as a person for him-
self or herself is the characteristic without which the “true”, i.e. functional
relation of recognition would be inconceivable. Hegel states: “Right is
the relation of persons, in their behavior, to others. It is the universal ele-
ment of their free being—the determination, the limitation of their empty
freedom. [. . .] the object, in general, is itself this creation of right, i.e., the
relation of recognition. In recognition, the Self ceases to be this individual;
it exists by right in recognition, i.e., no longer [immersed] in its imme-
diate existence. [. . .] Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives
recognition. This necessity is his own [. . .]. As recognizing, man is himself
the movement [of recognition], and this movements itself is what negates
his natural state: he is recognition. The natural [. . .] is not spiritual.”53
53 JLPS, 111.
It has become clear: recognition is a “becoming”, a process which

begins with the natural individual and continues in ethical love. It may
not, however, remain this way. “Their being for one another” in ethical
love is “the beginning” of recognition, indeed the second beginning.54
“Actual being-for-himself ” is the key to “true recognition”.55 This actual
being-for-oneself is one pole, the subjective one, in the basic structure of
recognition. The other, the objective-actual pole, is: “Universal recogni-
tion” is “spiritual actuality”.56 In this context of ethical actuality, ethical
love has been given only modest significance, however: it cannot liberate
the individual’s autonomy. The members of the family are held back from
complete liberation by the dominating mutuality in the family and by
their binding, shared world. But the experience of community in ethical
love also means reinforcement. This is why the person can become more
conscious, and thus also more consolidated, not only in his/her rights,
but also in his/her experiences through ethical love. These experiences can
also be gained in relations of recognition in which primarily the auton-
omy and self-consciousness of free individuals apply. Gaining experience
in ethical love through other social relations can strengthen “known”,
reasonably manageable, cooperative, and “true” mutuality, which is also
in the cooperating individuals’ own interest in stability. This idea can be
found in the Philosophy of Right from 1820.
The differences and the similarities between love and recognition are
shown in the “will which is intelligence”, which is now fulfilled: 1. in love
with the knowledge of the immediate unity of both—selfless—extremes,
2. with recognition and with each of them as a free Self.57 Each cognition
thus becomes recognition. The corresponding practical movement is in the
life-and-death struggle, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In 1805/06,
the ethical character of actuality of “universal recognition” is emphasized
and represents a deviation from the Phenomenology of Spirit.58
The positive result of this movement is “to know being as something
not alien”.59 In this complex-dynamic way, being develops to actuality,
the subject to the person—through the transformation of ethical love “for
one another” to social recognition with actual “being for oneself ”. In this,
54 JLPS, 114.
55 The greater result of the development of recognition is: “as someone for whom his
existence (which he had as property) no longer counts, but rather this: as his known being-
for-himself ”. JLPS, 117.
56 JLPS, 119.
57 JLPS, 118.
58 JLPS, 119.
59 JLPS, 118.
the differentiated social structure of ethical life is developed, and its first
shape is right. In this process, forms of subject, such as the person, arise
whose intersubjectivity in ethical actuality is not directly given, but rather
given up: it should be appropriated and practiced through the culture of
rights.60 This has far-reaching consequences for recognition, which proves
to be a multi-structured, increasingly more complex social relation that
one constantly re-learns. Cognition and knowing are epistemic media in
the socio-cultural field in which individuals become increasingly aware of
their intersubjectivity and should/want to communicate all that theoreti-
cally and practically. The immediateness of the intersubjectivity of love
has thus been lost. Ethical life is the form of actuality in the modern world
in which reflection on wide-ranging relations is primarily demanded. It is
this demand that links the concept of recognition in the Phenomenology
of Spirit to the conception from 1805/06.
The cognition in the love relationship—that the Self recognizes itself
for itself in the other as being for one another and that, for exactly this
reason, he or she can also recognize the true Self for itself in itself—can
be a significant experience for social forms and relations and thus become
productive for recognition. The experience of the Self in the other as the
core of ethical love can offer cognition of relations of recognition for free,
strongly self-conscious individuals in relations of recognition, cognition
which they can use meaningfully in their linguistic and actual-cooperative
communications and socio-relational activities. This experience in ethical
love is sufficient in itself, but not for relations of recognition in modern
times in which the differentiated opposition of the individual’s will domi-
nates and thus keeps generating conflicts. This is one of Hegel’s decisive
insights into the “development” of recognition in regard to love from
1805/06.
4. Outlook
Developed individuality with its “being for itself ” in recognition expresses

the withdrawal of the immediate intersubjectivity that was so prominent
in love in Frankfurt. Symptoms of modernity, which focuses on the figure
of the “developed Self ” (Brandom) in the person of rule of law, can be
recognized in this. Some of Hegel’s insights into the complex structures of
the modern world can already be recognized in the Jena Philosophy of Spirit.
60 For the culture of rights, cf. E. Rózsa: Modern Individuality in Hegel’s Practical Phi-
losophy. Note o. 3, 212–215.
Correspondingly, considerable differences can be established between the

early conception of love as the first basic shape of intersubjectivity in
Frankfurt and the 1805/06 conceptions of ethical love and recognition.
In the foreground of these thoughts, what Hegel wants to express in the
formulation “the strength that each one has in his being-recognized” can
be understood.61 The hero in modernity becomes the person who is based
on rights and who thus can “objectivize”, functionalize, and even exploit
human relationships. It is not the knight, but rather the citizen with his
rights who is the “hero“ focused on by Hegel in later years and, at the same
time, is characterized in a distanced and ironic manner.
In the “modern world”, love is then also functionalized, which is clearly
shown by the statement about begetting a child, the family’s property,
and especially the denial of love by the child even in 1805/06. The new
direction is also shown in Hegel’s demand for “satisfied love” as “mutual
service”.62 One could say that this is different from what is written in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, where he attributes the right to desire only to
the man. But the expression “service” refers to a kind of instrumentaliza-
tion of the other’s body, probably also through the mutuality of one’s own.
This is a new element in Hegel’s interpretation of love, in the background
of which his changing view of ethical life and the first basic outlines of his
theory of modernity are recognizable.
None of this is conceivable without the concept of recognition from
1805/06. This conception implies significant modifications in Hegel’s con-
cept of love, and these modifications have also motivated his views on fun-
damental structural changes in modern times. This is an important step
along the way, not only to the practical philosophy of the fully-developed
system and to the conception of modern times,63 but also to Hegel’s still
inspirational distance to the “modern world”.64
61 JLPS, 153.
62 Hegel writes: “Both parties realize their mutual love through their mutual service,
mediated in a third which is a thing. It is the mean and the means of love. And indeed,
just as the tool is the ongoing [objective] labor, so this third element is a universal as well;
it is the permanent, ongoing possibility of their existence.” JLPS, 108.
63 For these decisive conceptional issues, cf. R. Pippin: Hegels praktischer Realismus. Ratio-
nales Handeln als Sittlichkeit. In: Hegels Erbe. Note o. 28, 295–323; id.: Hegel’s Practical Philoso-
phy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 2008;
M. Quante: Die Wirklichkeit des Geistes. Studien zu Hegel. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 2011.
64 This essay originated within the framework of my Fellowship with the Research
Center for Basic Theoretical Issues of Constituting Norms for Medical Ethics and Bio-
Politics (Kolleg-Forschergruppe “Theoretische Grundfragen der Normenbegründung in
Medizinethik und Biopolitik”) at Westfalian Wilhelms-University in Münster. I am very
grateful to Nancy Kühler for the translation, to Alexander Lückener and Dean Moyar for
linguistic corrections and to Michael Quante for important advice.
Chapter Sixteen
Friendship in Hegel and its interpretation in theories

of recognition1
Jean-Christophe Merle
There is almost no controversy about the fact that we owe Fichte and
Hegel the thesis of the intersubjective or interpersonal formation of self-
consciousness considered as recognition. However, the theories of recog-
nition that rely upon Hegel claim much more than this thesis. According
to them, recognition should apply not only to the universal dignity of self-
conscious human beings, but also—to the same extent—to their particu-
lar and individual characters, that is, to their differences. In the following,
using the example of love—and particularly the example of friendship—
as it is treated by Hegel, I will attempt to show (i) that there are two
different, and radically heterogeneous, processes of recognition, of which
Hegel investigates only the first one—the interpersonal formation of self-
consciousness or the constitution of the self—and (ii) that this process
of recognition not only does not include the recognition of particular or
individual differences, but also that it expressly excludes it.
1. Love as Recognition of Individuality in Theories of Recognition
In the following, I will focus on friendship as a kind of love. Since Hegel

considers friendship as a kind of love in a comprehensive sense, as was
widely the case in his time, what he says about love is valid ipso facto
for friendship too. Unlike other kinds of love—especially marital love—
friendship does not necessarily presuppose gender difference nor consan-
guinity; although gender difference and consanguinity are fully compatible
with friendship (for instance, married couples ought to be friends, and
brothers and sisters may—but must not necessarily—be friends too). By
focusing on the specific kind of love that friendship is, I am intending to
1 I thank Roman Eisele and Konrad Utz for their useful comments on this paper.
312 jean-christophe merle
put aside for the purpose of this inquiry a few of the natural features of
some love relationships.
Ludwig Siep characterizes Hegel’s concept of love as follows:
One must retain the following four main features of love. (a) It is a conscious
unity of subjects. (b) It is a unity in which the members abandon their inde-
pendence in this relationship (of love), i.e., it is a unity without any opposi-
tion. (c) It is a relationship between ‘uneducated’ natural individuals. And,
finally, (d) it is [. . .] a unity of ‘being for oneself ’ and ‘being for something
else’, of self and ‘objectness’ (Siep 1979, 56)2
Whereas the first two main features seem to me to be correct, I consider
the third feature to be wrong. If I am right in finding it wrong, this is an
important point not only for the interpretation of Hegel’s theory, but also
for a majority of the theories of recognition, since most of the time they
refer back to Hegel. Siep’s interpretation inspires, for instance, the theory
of recognition of the Frankfurt School, such as that espoused by Axel Hon-
neth and Rainer Forst.
Referring to the same passages from Hegel’s Realphilosophie from his
Jena period, on which Siep bases his interpretation, Honneth asserts in
his famous book Struggle for Recognition: “As in the System of Ethical Life,
Hegel conceives of love as a relationship of mutual recognition, in which
natural individuality is first confirmed” (Honneth 1996, 37).3 Rainer Forst
explicitly refers to Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition at the end of the fol-
lowing passage of his Contexts of Justice, a book in which he attempts to
build a bridge between Habermas’ discourse ethics and communitarian-
ism, particularly Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition.
The closer and more stable the ethical community is, the more intensively
persons recognize one another both as unsubstitutable members and as
unique individuals. In love, the closest form of an identity-constitutive ethi-
cal community, the recognition of commonality is at the same time the
recognition of the particularity of the other; and it is a joint task to keep
2 Die folgenden vier Grundzüge der Liebe in den Jenaer Schriften müssen festgehalten
werden: a) sie ist eine bewußte Einheit von Subjekten, b) sie ist eine Einheit, deren Glie-
der ihre Selbständigkeit in dieser Beziehung (der Liebe) aufgeben, d.h. eine gegensatzlose
Einheit; c) sie ist eine Beziehung zwischen ‘ungebildeten’ natürlichen Individuen—und
schließlich d) sie ist [. . .] eine Einheit von Fürsichsein und Sein für Anderes, von Selbst
und ‘Gegenständlichkeit’.
3 Nicht anders als im ‘System der Sittlichkeit’ begreift Hegel die Liebe als ein Verhältnis
der wechselseitigen Anerkennung, in dem zunächst die natürliche Individualität der Sub-
jekte Bestätigung findet [. . .] (Honneth 1992, 64).
friendship in hegel and its interpretation 313
the balance between commonality and individuality (cf. Honneth 1995a,

95–107) (Forst 2002, 285)4
Whereas both Honneth and Forst see in love the recognition of the “natu-
ral individuality” or “peculiarity” of the other, at first sight, Siep’s position
seems ambiguous. Siep’s formulation, according to which love is “a rela-
tionship between ‘uneducated’ natural individuals,” may be interpreted in
two different ways. It can be said that either (1) those who enter into this
love relationship are human beings who are “natural” individuals before
entering into it, and this relationship is a recognition of both partners,
without the partners remaining in this relationships the same “natural”
individuals as they were before, or (2) the love relationship itself consists
in a recognition of “natural” individuals. The first interpretation is uncon-
troversial, the second one is wrong. In his explanations to his aforemen-
tioned assertion, Siep precisely develops the second interpretation.
Now, [Hegel] expressly says about love that in it the individuals are recog-
nized ‘according to the totality, in which they belong to nature’ (VI, 302),
i.e., as “uneducated natural self ” (VIII, 210). The features through which one
individual differs from another obviously belong to this. Thus, the aban-
donment of independence in love cannot be a negation of the individual
uniqueness [. . .]. But the fact that in love natural individuality is recognized
means more: natural individuality itself is the object of love and makes the
beloved deserve to be loved. In so far as, in love, everybody must be able to
represent oneself as an ‘individuality that cannot be represented by anyone
else’. In this respect, the self-intuition in the other means that one knows
oneself as being taken up by this natural individuality of the other—and
conversely to know one’s own individuality as being essential for the other.
(Siep 1979, 58)5
4 Je ‘enger’ und fester die ethische Gemeinschaft, desto intensiver sind Personen als
unvertretbare Mitglieder und zugleich als einzigartige Individuen anerkannt. In der Liebe,
der engsten Form einer identitätskonstitutiven ethischen Gemeinschaft, ist die Anerken-
nung der Gemeinsamkeit zugleich die Anerkennung der Besonderheit des Anderen; und
es ist eine gemeinsame Aufgabe, die Balance zwischen Gemeinsamkeit und Individualität
zu halten (vgl. dazu Honneth 1992a, 153ff.).
5 Nun heißt es ausdrücklich von der Liebe, daß in ihr die Individuen ‘nach der Tota-
lität, in der sie der Natur angehören’ (VI, 302) bzw. als ‘ungebildetes natürliches Selbst’
(VIII, 210) anerkannt seien. Dazu aber gehören offenbar die Charakteristika, durch die
sich ein Individuum vom anderen unterscheidet. Die Aufgabe der Selbständigkeit in der
Liebe kann mithin keine Negation der individuellen Eigenart sein [. . .]. Daß die natürliche
Individualität in der Liebe anerkannt ist, bedeutet aber mehr: sie ist selber Gegenstand
der Liebe, macht die Liebenswürdigkeit des Geliebten aus. Insofern muß sich in der Liebe
tatsächlich jeder in seiner ‘unvertretbaren Individualität’ darstellen können. Das Sich-
Anschauen im Anderen bedeutet unter diesem Aspekt: sich gerade von dieser natürlichen
When Siep affirms that “recognition” means “to find again the self in the
other” (Siep 1979, 56), one must therefore understand by this: to find
again in the other, i.e., in the love relationship, the same self that already
existed before this relationship. In the following, I shall attempt to first
demonstrate that this view is incompatible with the necessity of love in
Hegel’s process of recognition, and then that this view is in equal mea-
sure incompatible with the way in which Hegel characterizes love and
friendship.
2. The Necessity of Love in Hegel’s Process of Recognition
Let us first inquire into what love as recognition in Siep’s quotation from
the Jenaer Entwürfe consists in. This passage (“Willen”: VIII, 202) examines
how, out of its two sides that manifest themselves as two “extremes”, the
will reaches a unity without any opposition in which it recognizes itself.
One extreme is the “interiority” of the will, the will as something universal,
which is without content and can give itself any arbitrary object as an end.
The other extreme is the “exteriority” of the will, the will as peculiarity, as
objectness. The drive (Trieb) consists in the interiority striving to make
the interiority suitable to itself.
The willing being (das Wollende) wills (will), i.e., it wants to posit itself, [it
wants] to make itself, as itself, its [own] object. It [the willing being] is free,
but this freedom is an empty one, a formal, bad one. It [the willing being]
is what is decided in itself, or it is the conclusion in itself. It is the universal
aim [Zweck]; [it] is the individual [das Einzelne], the self, activity, actuality,
it is the midway of both, the drive [. . .]. (Hegel VIII, 202)6
The will can have two features: “One character is the tension” (Hegel VIII,
208), the other one is the satisfaction of the drive, the “disappearance of
the opposition”, i.e., a “fulfilled being” (Hegel VIII, 204). It occurs when
both extremes know that it is the same as the other one.
The will has divided itself into the two extremes. It is entirely in the first
one, in the universal, like it is entirely in the other one, the individual.
Individualität des Anderen eingenommen wissen—und umgekehrt die eigene Individua-

lität als wesentlich für den Anderen wissen.
6 Das Wollende will, d.h. es will sich setzen, sich als sich zum Gegenstande machen. Es
ist frey, aber diese Freyheit ist das leere, formale schlechte. Es ist in sich beschlossen, oder
es ist der Schluß in sich selbst; es ist das allgemeine, Zweck; ist [es] das Einzelne, Selbst,
Thätigkeit, Wirklichkeit, ist es die Mitte dieser beyden der Trieb [. . .].
These extremes have to posit themselves into one, and the knowledge of
the latter has to become recognition [Erkennen]. This movement of the syl-
logism is posited by each of them being in itself what the other is. The one,
the universal, is the individual, the knowing self; likewise the individual
is the universal, because it is a self-relationship. But it has to become for
them. Or the sameness has to become a knowledge of them. (Hegel VIII, 209)7
This happens precisely in love, which is a specific relationship with
another ego. Love presupposes that the other I has the same nature as my
own I, i.e., that it is a will which has, on the one hand, a particular object,
but which is, on the other hand, also something universal, i.e., that which
can will any arbitrary aim. As Honneth says, the I (Ego) “is always given
to itself only as a reified subject of action, but in encountering the desire
extended to it by the other, it experiences itself to be the same vital, desir-
ing subjectivity that it desires of the other.” (Honneth 1996, 37; 1992, 63)
Both individuals realize this satisfaction of the will because (1) the will, as
universal, gives itself an object, though another object than its hitherto
existing object, and (2)—what constitutes love—the object is an object
that is common to both individuals and in which it knows or recognizes
itself. Thus, it is only because of point (2) that the “indifference” between
both extremes and their opposition is superseded.
[. . .] knowledge knows its essence in the other. [. . .] It is precisely because
each knows itself in the other that it renounces itself. Love.
Knowledge is precisely this double meaning. Each is the same as the other
in the respect in which he [has] opposed itself to it. Thus, differing from
one another is to posit oneself as the same as the other; and it is recognition
because it is the knowledge that its opposition changes into sameness. Rec-
ognizing precisely means to know that what is objective in its objectiveness
is the self. (Hegel VIII, 209)8
7 Der Willen hat sich selbst in die zwey Extreme entzweyt, in deren Einem er ganz ist,
dem Allgemeinen, wie im Andern dem Einzelnen. Diese Extreme haben sich in Eins zu set-
zen, das Wissen des letzteren in Erkennen überzugehen. Diese Bewegung des Schlusses ist
dadurch gesetzt, daß jedes an sich ist, was das Andre ist. Das eine, das Allgemeine
ist die Einzelheit, das wissende Selbst; eben so ist das Einzelne das Allgemeine, denn es ist
das auf sich beziehen. Aber es hat für sie zu werden. Oder diese Dieselbigkeit ein Wissen
derselben.
8 [. . .] das Wissen weiß sein Wesen im Andern. [. . .] Eben indem jedes sich im Andern
weiß, hat es auf sich selbst Verzicht getan. Liebe.
Das Wissen ist eben dieser Doppelsinn: [. . .] jedes ist darin dem andern gleich, worin
es sich ihm entgegengesetzt [hat]. Sein sich unterscheiden vom Andern ist daher sein
Sichgleichsetzen mit ihm; und es ist Erkennen ebendarin, daß es selbst diß Wissen ist, daß
[. . .] seine Entgegensetzung in die Gleichheit umschlägt [. . .]. [. . .] erkennen heißt eben das
gegenständliche in seiner Gegenständlichkeit als Selbst wissen.
This refutes the thesis according to which in the other or in the love rela-
tionship we find again the same self that existed prior to this relationship.
Indeed, the self is in no way—that is, neither for itself nor for the other
self—a preexisting object, but constitutes and determines itself among
friends or lovers first in the friendship or in the love relationship.
3. Hegel’s Characterization of Love
In the following, I attempt to show that Hegel’s characterization of love and

friendship is likewise incompatible with the conception of love in theories
of recognition. I have just formulated two elements of the satisfaction of
the will in love: (1) the will gives itself a new object that contains common
aims, common principles, common judgments of taste, etc.; (2) this new
object is common to this will and to the other in the love relationship.
Siep affirms the second element, while rejecting the first one:
The first movement is [second element] the movement of abandoning the
autonomy in favor of the unity with the other, [Rejection of the first ele-
ment] in which, nevertheless, each of them knows that its natural individ-
uality is the reference point of the other’s affection, and that insofar it is
recognized [by the other]. (Siep 1979, 67)9
If the love relationship really preserves “natural individuality”, one may
wonder (1) how each of the human beings can reach a relationship of
“unity with the other” and (2) which “autonomy” is actually abandoned by
each of them. The only way not to understand Siep’s quotation as being
contradictory is the following: According to Siep, the aforementioned
unity obviously consists in the fact that what unites these two human
beings is the reciprocity of their predilection for each other, their open-
ness to each other and their emotional participation in the fate and in the
feelings of the other. Honneth understands it explicitly in this way. In Das
Recht der Freiheit, Honneth describes “modern” love, which he explicitly
connects with Kant and Hegel, in the following way:
The subjects educate each other to assume reciprocal roles, which they hold
in order to benevolently participate in the vicissitudes of the life story and in
the transformations of the stance of its counterpart. [. . .] another novelty
9 Die erste Bewegung ist [2. Element] die der Aufgabe der Selbständigkeit zugunsten
der Einheit mit dem Anderen, [Ablehnung des 1. Elements] in der jeder der beiden gleich-
wohl seine natürliche Individualität als Bezugspunkt der Zuneigung des Anderen, insofern
als anerkannt weiß.
is that here, all at once, sentiments and stances are discussed in a dialogue
[. . .]. (Honneth 2011, 243)10
However, the following renunciation by which Honneth characterizes rec-
ognition is incompatible with such a unity:
Ego and Alter react simultaneously to another by restricting their egocentric
needs, whereby they make their other actions depend on the behavior of
their counterpart. (Honneth 2010, 31)11
This kind of recognition corresponds to the legal model of the condi-
tions for recognition already developed in Fichte’s Foundation of Natural
Rights (1796) and that reveals itself in Hegel as the result of the struggle
for recognition. In other words, this kind of recognition is another kind of
recognition. In this model of love, the reciprocal openness and participa-
tion are necessarily restricted.
Thus, we find in Hegel at least two models of Hegel’s love that collide
with another: (1) the reciprocity of the predilection for another, the open-
ness and the emotional participation, and (2) the restriction of the recip-
rocal needs. Siep’s view could be explained by the first model rather than
by the second one, but the latter is not to be completely excluded as
another possible explanation. Now, each of these two aspects of recogni-
tion through love in Hegel is incompatible with Hegel’s concept of love.
In friendship, the will of a friend is not restricted by the will of the
other. Rather, according to Hegel, both wills are the same will:
Ethical life, love is renouncing one’s peculiarity, one’s particular personality,
to extend [them] to universality,—likewise, family, friendship; here is the
identity of the one [person] with the other [person]. By acting in a way that
is just towards the other, I consider the other as being identical with me.
(Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II, 16:239)12
10 Die Subjekte erziehen sich dazu, wechselseitig Rollen anzunehmen, die sie zur
wohlwollenden Anteilnahme an den lebensgeschichtlichen Geschicken und Einstellungs-
wandlungen ihres Gegenübers anhalten. [. . .] neu ist auch, daß hier mit einemmal im
Zwiegespräch Empfindungen und Einstellungen zur Sprache kommen sollen [. . .].
11 Ego und Alter ego reagieren zeitgleich aufeinander, indem sie jeweils ihre egozentri-
schen Bedürfnisse einschränken, wodurch sie ihre weiteren Handlungen vom Verhalten
ihres Gegenübers abhängig machten.
12 Die Sittlichkeit, Liebe ist, seine Besonderheit, besondere Persönlichkeit aufzugeben,
zur Allgemeinheit zu erweitern,—ebenso Familie, Freundschaft; da ist die Identität eines
mit dem anderen vorhanden. Indem ich recht handle gegen den anderen, betrachte ich
ihn als identisch mit mir.
[. . .] however, friendship [. . .] requires a content, something substantial, as

its unifying aim. (Hegel, Ästhetik II, 13:152)13
In Siep’s quotation from the Jenaer Entwürfe, Hegel provides two examples
of friendship that furnish evidence for this identical will of the friends:
“There is friendship only in collective work [. . .] Theseus and Pirithous,
Orestes and Pylades” (Hegel VIII, 211).14 In the Ästhetik, Hegel develops
the same example of Orestes and Pylades. They were educated together
when they were children and “shared everything” (Euripides, Orestes,
735; cf. also Konstan 1997, 58ff.). In the Ästhetik, Hegel comments on this
example, saying:
Steadiness of friendship [. . .], Achilles and Patroclus, and, in an even more
intimate way, Orestes and Pylades, are the most beautiful archetypes among
the Ancients. Friendship in this sense finds its substrate and its period of life
in youth. [. . .] Now, youth, as the period in which individuals still live in the
collective indetermination of their actual condition, is the period in which
they unite with one another and closely merge into one mental disposition
(Gesinnung), one will and one activity that thereby each undertaking of one
of them becomes at the same time the undertaking of the other. (Hegel,
Ästhetik II, 13: 186f.)15
This implies that friends receive their particular character first through
their love relationship: “In love, in friendship, the person becomes itself,
and love gives [the person] its subjectivity, which is its personality.” (Hegel,
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion II, 16:239)16 From this results
the incompatibility of Honneth’s first model of love, as an empathic com-
munication of feelings, with Hegel’s concept of love. In fact, Hegel rejects
as untrue every friendship or love that rests on contingent—and hence
versatile—feelings:
13 [. . .] Freundschaft [. . .] fordert doch einen Gehalt, eine wesentliche Sache als zusam-
menschließenden Zweck.
14 Freundschafft ist allein im gemeinschafftlichen Werke [. . .] Theseus und Pirithous,
Orest und Pylades.
15 Festigkeit der Freundschaft [. . .], als deren schönstes Vorbild unter den Alten Achill
und Patroklos und inniger noch Orest und Pylades galten. Die Freundschaft in diesem
Sinne des Wortes hat die Jugend vornehmlich zu ihrem Boden und zu ihrer Zeit. [. . .] Die
Jugend nun, wenn die Individuen noch in gemeinsamer Unbestimmtheit ihrer wirklichen
Verhältnisse leben, ist die Zeit, in welcher sie sich einander schließen und so eng zu einer
Gesinnung, einem Willen und einer Tätigkeit verbinden, daß dadurch jedes Unternehmen
des einen zugleich zum Unternehmen des anderen wird.
16 In der Liebe, in der Freundschaft ist es die Person, die sich erhält und durch ihre
Liebe ihre Subjektivität hat, die ihre Persönlichkeit ist.
In modern dramas, one is interested in the passions that are represented, in

hardships, deprivations, and bad luck that are endured for love’s sake. But it
is a reserved interest, because of the contingent way in which this individual
has decided in favor of the other. Therein, one can see no necessity, because
the individuals, who are committed to the relationship, could just as well
abandon this relationship. (Hegel, Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie III:
516f.; admittedly, Hegel paradoxically finds an example of this in a novel,
Goethe’s Elective Affinities, cf. Ästhetik I, 12:399f.)17
4. “True friendship” without Making an Absolute Out of Love
Of course, the thesis according to which recognition and self-conscious-

ness can be obtained in the aforementioned way thanks to friendship
does not imply that, as soon as this kind of friendship ceases to exist, rec-
ognition would disappear. On the contrary, self-consciousness as well as
recognition remains once they are attained. However, each such particu-
lar friendship or love between two (or more) human beings is a particular
friendship or love that is admittedly of the same kind, yet not the same as
the friendship between any two other human beings. Furthermore, ethical
life obviously does not merely consist in such friendships and love rela-
tionships, but also in still other kinds of relationships that contribute to
the advancement of mutual recognition between human beings: the sys-
tem of needs or labor relationships, corporations, the state, etc. Therefore,
absolutizing the significance of friendship for the whole sphere of recogni-
tion would be wrong, and Honneth’s correct intuition, according to which
there are several spheres of recognition, is a valid implication from this.
But, on the other hand, this means neither (1) that friendship, as I
characterized it hitherto, is dispensable for the process of recognition nor
(2) that this modifies the nature of the friendship that I am dealing with.
Youth, in which Hegel locates friendship’s contribution to recognition, is a
period of life in which human beings are still living in “the collective inde-
termination of their actual condition”, i.e., still outside of further spheres
of recognition. The aforementioned quotation (Hegel, Ästhetik II, 13: 186 f.)
continues by mentioning a non-absolute friendship that exists in the con-
text of other social institutions:
17 In modernen Dramen ist einmal das Interesse die Leidenschaft, die dargestellt wird,
Härten, Entbehrungen, Unglück das für die Liebe geduldet wird. In diesem Interesse liegt
aber ein Frostiges, durch die Zufälligkeit daß dieß Individuum sich auf das andere gesetzt
hat, worin eine Nothwendigkeit nicht zu sehn ist, denn ebenso gut, als sie daran hangen,
könnten die Individuen das Verhältniß auch aufgeben.
[. . .] youth [. . .] is the period in which [. . .] each undertaking of one [of the

friends] becomes at the same time the undertaking of the other [friend].
In men’s friendship it is already no longer the case. [. . .] [Mature] men
meet and separate again. Their interests and occupations diverge and join
again. [In mature men] friendship, the most intimate mental disposition,
principles, and common directions remain, but [men’s friendship] is not
juvenile friendship in which neither of the friends decides something and
starts working at it without it directly becoming a common matter of both.
It essentially belongs to the principle of our innermost life that on the whole
everybody cares for oneself, i.e., that each person has the capacity to be who
they actually are. (Hegel, Ästhetik II, 13:186 f.)18
This passage provides evidence for both of my theses as well as exem-
plifying them. Firstly, juvenile friendship is indispensable for a more
mature friendship, because it produces the “innermost mental disposi-
tion, principles, and common directions” that provide the basis for the
more mature friendship. Furthermore, for Hegel, friendship remains an
important sphere of recognition, even in a ripe old age (see, for instance,
Pinkard 2000, 622 ff.). Secondly, the mature and relative friendship alters
nothing at all in the essence of friendship. Indeed, juvenile friendship not
only provides the basis for the more mature friendship, but in itself it also
bears the “truth” (Wahrheit) of friendship. In order to explain what he
understands by truth, Hegel precisely chooses the example of friendship:
Usually we call truth the concordance between an object and our represen-
tation. [. . .] On the contrary, truth in the philosophical sense means, to say it
in a universal and abstract way, a concordance between a content and itself.
[. . .] Incidentally, the deeper (philosophical) meaning of truth can already
be found in everyday language. For instance, one speaks of a true friend, and
one understands by that a friend whose course of action is suitable to the
concept of friendship. (Hegel, System der Philosophie, 8:89 f.: Enzyklopädie
§ 24, addendum 2)19
18 Die Jugend [. . .] ist die Zeit, in welcher [. . .] jedes Unternehmen des einen zugleich
zum Unternehmen des anderen wird. Dies ist schon in der Männerfreundschaft nicht
mehr der Fall. [. . .] Männer finden und trennen sich wieder, ihre Interessen und Geschäfte
laufen auseinander und vereinen sich; die Freundschaft, die Innigkeit der Gesinnung, der
Grundsätze, allgemeinen Richtungen bleibt, aber es ist nicht die Jünglingsfreundschaft, bei
welcher keiner etwas beschließt und ins Werk setzt, was nicht unmittelbar zu einer Ange-
legenheit des anderen würde. Es gehört wesentlich zum Prinzipe unseres tieferen Lebens,
daß im ganzen jeder für sich sorgt, d.i. selbst in seiner Wirklichkeit tüchtig ist.
19 Gewöhnlich nennen wir Wahrheit Übereinstimmung eines Gegenstandes mit unserer
Vorstellung. [. . .] Im philosophischen Sinne dagegen heißt Wahrheit, überhaupt abstrakt
ausgedrückt, Übereinstimmung eines Inhalts mit sich selbst. [. . .] Übrigens findet sich die
tiefere (philosophische) Bedeutung der Wahrheit zum Teil auch schon im gewöhnlichen
Now, in the case of the concept of friendship, this “concordance between

a content and itself ” does not consist in the recognition of the “natural”
individuality of the other that “cannot be represented” by someone else;
rather, it consists in the will recognizing itself or being recognized in the
other or by the other as a will whose unity is exempt from opposition. As
Siep notices, right after this, there occurs in the struggle for recognition
a “moment of distance, in which the individual claims independence and
distinction [from the others].” (Siep 1979, 63)20 The “truth” of friendship
or the “true friendship” belongs in Hegel’s thought to the process of rec-
ognition and it is defined as a step inside this process. Mature friendship
is no longer the “truth” of friendship or the “true friendship”.
On the contrary, Honneth takes over his concept of “modern” love
expressly from Schleiermacher’s romantic characterization of love. Accord‑
ing to Schleiermacher, friendship is a mutual “convergence with the
individuality [of the other] ad infinitum”, a communication between two
individualities (see Dilthey 1870, 107). Unlike Hegel’s concept of friendship,
according to Schleiermacher, friendship is not a step in the universal pro-
cess of recognition of the free will, but an irrational inclination originating
in the affinity of the souls. It is one thing to rightly assert that it belongs to
the dignity of a human being that such inclinations and feelings are duly
legally protected against discrimination, which partly inspired Charles
Taylor’s politics of differences, but it is another thing to wrongly assert
that this contributes to Hegel’s ethical life. As Paul Cobben demonstrates,
only if one deprives Hegel’s concept of love from its necessary dialectical
unity, that is, only in a post-dialectical determination of love does today’s
usual concept of love, considered as a contingent harmony between two
particular individuals, and today’s concept of recognition, considered as a
recognition of differences, become possible (cf. Cobben 2002, 145).
The misunderstanding of Hegel’s concept of friendship by many of the
commentators on Hegel’s thought may be due to their one-sided focus on
the aspect of unity in friendship and to the fact that Hegel fully excludes
from the “true” sphere of friendship any disagreement between friends
and any individuality of each friend as compared to the other one. For this
reason, even authors who are as inspired by Hegel as Konrad Utz (cf. Utz
2012) choose to deal with the issue of friendship from a non-Hegelian
Sprachgebrauch. So spricht man z.B. von einem wahren Freund und versteht darunter
einen solchen, dessen Handlungsweise dem Begriff der Freundschaft gemäß ist.
20 [. . .] ein Moment der Distanz, des Geltendmachens der Selbständigkeit und Unter-
schiedenheit des Einzelnen [. . .].
starting point. The focusing of Honneth’s theory of recognition on “other-

ness” is as one-sided as Hegel’s aforementioned one-sided focus, albeit
in the opposite direction (concerning my conception of friendship, cf.
Merle 2012).
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Index of Terms
absoluteness 244, 294–295, 299, 302, 306, 311, 313,

absolute knowledge (absolutes Wissen) 316, 319, 321
72, 107, 197 moral beings 154, 157–158, 200
absolute spirit (absoluter Geist) 92, belief (Glauben) 3, 6, 149, 184, 214, 218,
104–105, 111, 115, 197, 202, 268, 270 239, 243, 291
Achtung 199–200 body 20, 43, 68, 92, 95–96, 108, 138,
acknowledgment 43, 54–56, 84, 96, 207 146–147, 153, 213, 220, 230–232, 258,
action 262, 269, 276 n. 20, 277 n. 22, 280, 292,
communicative action 39–40 309
activity (Tätigkeit) 57–58, 63, 82, 85, 108, bondage or bondship (Knechtschaft) 26,
113, 117, 120, 131, 168, 177, 292, 300–301 93, 230, 267, 278–279, 283
administration of justice 47–48 bondsman (Knecht) 12, 13 n. 3, 20–23,
ancient 96, 131–135, 248 25–26, 29–32, 45, 88–89, 91, 93–95, 203,
animal 7, 13–16, 20 n. 23, 36, 182, 210, 267–269, 277, 279–284
211, 214, 219, 223, 225–228, 232
antiquity 131–133 capitalism or capitalistic 39, 49
antithesis 84–85, 222 Cartesian 73, 220, 242
appearance 25, 83–84, 97, 107, 137, 154, categorical
257, 262, 269, 271, 277, 285 categorical imperative (kategorischer
apperception 57–58, 63, 168–169, Imperativ) 168, 172, 174–176, 179,
219–220, 278 181 n. 9, 207
architecture 110 category/categories 69–71, 77–79, 96,
argumentation 69, 79, 104, 147, 197, 199, 144, 215, 218, 224
203, 209, 210, 212, 244 cause/causal
artist 138, 260 causal relation 217
association 257, 278, 283 character 5, 9, 58, 64, 72, 74, 81, 102,
assumption 45, 80, 134 107 n. 33, 109, 123, 131–132, 134, 136, 145,
asymmetric or asymmetry 150, 158–159, 166–167, 170, 172, 174–175,
(Asymmetrie) 31, 55, 59–60, 62, 147, 179, 182, 186, 222, 240, 242, 246, 248,
170, 199, 203 256, 296 n. 25, 298, 318
attitude child/children 45, 82, 148, 152, 208, 304,
attitude-dependence 3, 54–56, 58–60 309, 318
normative attitude 3, 8, 54, 60–62, 66, Christ
267, 275, 277–281, 284–285 Christianity 132
authority 3–4, 17–18, 25, 28–34, 53–55, citizen 146, 174, 180 n. 8, 186, 309
57–64, 66, 147, 149, 170–171, 185–186, civil society 45–48, 49 n. 23, 178–179,
208–210, 212, 220, 228, 232, 258–259 183–184, 256
autonomous 4, 68, 105, 174, 176, 208, coercion (Zwang)
210, 245–246, 277, 282, 306 second coercion 8, 253, 257–259
autonomy 3, 41, 42, 53, 55–56, 58–62, cognition 71, 77, 113, 137, 183–184, 270,
64, 66, 68, 123, 155–156, 166–168, 180, 272–275, 278, 280, 304, 307–308
201, 208, 277, 282–283, 305, 307, 316 comedy 136–138
commitment 3, 53–54, 55 n. 2, 56, 58,
beautiful 131, 318 60, 62–63, 66, 179, 269, 282
beauty 131–132 community
being community of value 48–50
human being 9, 36, 49–50, 53–54, 60, concept (Begriff ) 1–6, 8, 11–15, 18,
129, 146, 148–151, 161, 167, 170–171, 23–24, 28, 41, 55 n. 2, 57, 63, 67–69, 71,
173, 176, 178, 180, 183–185, 187, 240, 72 n. 8, 74, 76–77, 83 n. 18, 99–117, 119,
324 index of terms
120 n. 58, 121–123, 141, 143–147, 150–154, decision 107, 135, 146, 183
160, 162, 165, 167, 170–171, 174–175, demand 3, 41–47, 58, 60, 66, 135, 143,
177–180, 184–185, 187, 215, 217, 219, 147, 152–155, 157, 170, 172 n. 4, 179–180,
221–222, 227, 230, 246, 253–256, 258, 227–228, 232, 254, 259–260, 304,
260, 262 n. 15, 263 n. 19, 264, 268–273, 308–309
274 n. 16, 276 n. 19, 278, 282–284, democracy 110, 160
287–288, 290–291, 294–295, 298–299, dependence or dependency 3–4, 8, 22,
301–304, 308–309, 312, 317–318, 59, 62, 66, 68, 83, 85–87, 89, 92–93, 178,
320–321 267, 276, 277–280, 282
concept of recognition (Begriff des desire (Begierde) 5, 7, 20–23, 36, 75,
Anerkennens) 1–3, 5-6, 11–13, 41, 68, 77, 85, 87, 90, 92, 129, 133, 139–142,
74, 77, 99, 119, 143–146, 151, 153–154, 184, 198, 207, 210, 221–224, 226–232,
162, 192–193, 195, 200–204, 268, 273, 267–268, 274, 276 n. 19, 280–284,
288 n. 4, 299 n. 37, 304, 308–309, 299 n. 38, 309, 315
321 devotion 296
condition dialectics 8, 13, 68, 89, 93, 134, 140, 177,
precondition 6, 71, 166, 168, 171, 273 267, 269, 273, 277–280, 284
consciousness (Bewusstsein) dialogue 5, 143, 232, 317
self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) dichotomy 178–179
4, 7–9, 12–14, 17, 19–20, 23–29, 31–32, differentiation 89, 96–97, 211, 214–215,
35, 42 n. 10, 44–45, 67–72, 74–82, 229, 232, 287, 290, 298 n. 32, 302
83 n. 18, 84–97, 109, 138, 145 n. 4, disappearance 133
171, 172 n. 4, 173, 192, 194, 196, 198, discourse
203, 207–208, 213, 217–218, 220–222, democratic discourse 147
223 nn. 16–17, 224–225, 227, 229–231, emancipative discourse 147–152
245, 255, 257, 267–279, 281, 288–289, discourse ethics 312
305–307, 319 divine 53, 97, 183, 187
consensus 156, 160, 241, 257, 268, 279 dualism 5, 116, 118, 129, 175, 187
constitution 9, 18, 22, 57 n. 3, 146, 159, duplicity 86
231, 238, 268, 273 n. 14, 311 duty 123, 143, 150–151, 167, 171, 175,
consumption 93 186–187, 232
contingency 43, 131, 133, 135–136, 294
contract 8, 41 n. 7, 42, 53, 178, 253, 257, education 8, 47, 107, 239, 267, 270–272,
262–263 275–281, 283–285, 304
contradiction 71, 75, 77–78, 85, 87, 93, effect 11, 22, 135–136, 150, 161, 167, 184,
95, 97, 134, 150 208, 214, 244, 260, 288 n. 3, 294 n. 22
conviction 1, 117, 129, 138, 144, 149, 167, Egyptian 97
179, 185 embodiment 92, 278
corporation 48, 50, 319 emotional 165, 292, 316–317
creator 53, 131, 148, 184 empirical science 75 n. 10, 247
crime 148, 151, 259–263 empiricism 214, 229
criminal 135, 259–261, 263 employee 269
crown 148 Enlightenment 3, 53–55, 58–60, 66,
cult 97 150 n. 15, 182
culture (Kultur) 1, 5–6, 45, 53, 99, epistemology or epistemological 4, 67,
120–124, 130, 134, 143, 177–178, 183, 187, 70, 151, 303–304
191, 194, 204, 308 essence 14–15, 36, 44–45, 47, 68, 77–83,
custom 149 85–89, 91–93, 95, 97, 130, 168, 222,
291–292, 297, 301–302, 315, 320
death (Tod) esteem 6, 32 n. 2, 165
fear of death (Todesfurcht) 3, 40, exchange 42–43, 46, 161, 262
44–47, 49–50, 92, 94, 203, 209, 232, existence 15, 48, 60, 63, 69, 74, 77–80,
269, 276–277, 279–280, 283–284 82–86, 88–89, 91–96, 105 n. 27, 115, 140,
deception 262 169, 175, 180, 185, 198, 237, 256–258,
index of terms 325
260, 263 n. 19, 264, 276, 291, 293–296, harmony 34 n. 46, 44–46, 129, 132, 215,
298, 300, 306 321
experience 8, 20, 44, 46, 57, 70, 78, 85, heaven 138–139
89–92, 94, 97, 102, 104, 112, 131, 134, hero 55, 138, 185 n. 11, 309
139–141, 157, 175, 177, 213–214, 216, history
236, 238, 242, 267, 269, 271–273, 276, history of philosophy 102, 104 nn. 18,
278–281, 283–285, 295–296, 305–308, 20, 111, 144, 182, 249
315 history of self-consciousness 145 n. 4,
experiment 247, 271, 273, 285 268, 270–272, 278, 281
humanity 6, 16, 36, 130, 146–154,
fact of reason 168 172, 181 n. 9, 183, 289, 291–292, 294,
faith 188 298–299, 302
family 11, 24, 27, 31 n. 44, 32 n. 2, 39,
45–46, 48, 150, 256–257, 290, 295, idea 3–5, 11, 30 n. 41, 53–55, 57–60,
303–307, 309, 317 66–69, 72, 74–75, 81, 83–84, 95–96, 99,
fate 130–133, 135, 137, 316 101–106, 108, 110–119, 120 n. 58. 121–123,
fear (Furcht) 137, 139, 144–145, 147–148, 150–151, 158,
fear of death (Todesfurcht) 3, 40, 165–167, 169, 172–174, 179–180, 182, 184,
44–47, 49–50, 92, 94, 203, 209, 232, 186, 208, 210–211, 213, 232, 240, 253,
269, 276–277, 279–280, 283–284 255, 258–259, 272, 289, 307
finitude 7, 44, 71, 135, 158, 235, 254 ideal 27–28, 34 n. 46, 36, 39, 113, 133,
force 3, 34, 46, 49, 56, 59–60, 62–63, 66, 137, 172, 174–175, 194, 214–215, 217, 229,
94, 96, 116, 135, 139, 155–157, 159–160, 275, 277, 292
170, 177–178, 182, 187, 213–214, 216–217, idealism
231, 258–259, 283–284, 302 German Idealism 1, 56, 99, 102,
foundation 2, 4, 6, 47 n. 18, 100, 102, 104, 118–119, 129, 144–145, 162, 296 n. 25
106 n. 28, 114, 123, 162, 165–166, 168, 184, identification 79, 119 n. 56, 145, 150,
216, 254, 303–306 152–153, 159–161, 219, 238, 305
framework 5, 36, 39–40, 49, 101, 111, 114, identity 1, 7, 35 n. 47, 78, 80, 84–86, 88,
118, 120, 143, 154, 158–162, 166, 272, 99, 109, 115, 130–131, 138–139, 145, 147,
288–289, 291–292, 296, 299, 303, 309 151–153, 170–171, 172 n. 4, 201, 215, 222,
Frankfurt School (Kritische Theorie) 194, 253, 257, 268, 272–275, 278, 295, 312,
312 317
freedom ideology 46, 149, 160
subjective freedom 39, 48–49 illusion 82, 242–243, 257
freedom of choice (Willkür) 174, 179, imagination 34 n. 46, 242, 262
186 immediacy 22–23, 89, 113, 213, 216, 221,
realization of freedom 42–44, 46, 226, 253–254
168 imperative
friend or friendship 9, 24, 27, 166, 304, categorical imperative (kategorischer
311, 314, 316–322 Imperativ, Sittengesetz) 168, 172,
174–176, 179, 181 n. 9, 199, 207
gender 147, 311 inclination 24 n. 34, 167–169, 174–178,
generality 106, 116, 176, 209, 215 183, 282–283, 321
genus (Gattung) 200, 215, 223–225, independence or independency 3–4, 8,
263 n. 16, 274 22 n. 28, 23, 35, 40, 42, 44, 56, 59–60,
God 45, 73 n. 9, 96, 139–140, 148–149, 62, 66, 68, 79, 85–86, 96, 208, 224 n. 18,
152, 183, 185, 187, 209 255, 267, 269, 276–285, 301, 312, 313,
good 13, 34, 44, 47–49, 61–62, 73, 77, 110, 321
113–115, 118, 121, 173, 182–183, 185, 208, individual
217, 219, 223–226, 230–231 moral individual 145–146, 156, 158, 160
government 150 individuality 85, 105 n. 26, 153, 156,
Greece or Greek 42 n. 10, 97, 130–131, 159–160, 223, 254–255, 264, 274, 276,
137, 222 n. 15, 261 288 n. 3, 305, 308, 311–313, 316, 321
326 index of terms
injustice or wrong 8, 253, 257, 258, 259, practical knowledge 110, 112, 114–116,
264 118
institution 9, 17–18, 26, 28, 35, 39, 48, theoretical knowledge 110–111, 114,
50, 58, 61, 66, 148, 159–160, 180 n. 8, 182, 116, 118
185, 187–188, 305 labor
intention 3, 40, 71, 105 n. 26, 154, 196, labor process 40 n. 4, 47
210, 227, 229–231, 291 n. 10 language
intentionality 3, 20–21, 23, 27, 36, 66, language game 215, 221
120 n. 58 law
interaction 18, 29, 33, 44, 159–160, Divine law 97
165–166, 212, 219, 267, 273, 275, 279, human law 97
284 moral law (Sittengesetz) 129, 168–169,
interest (Interesse) 16, 23, 71, 100 n. 8, 172–176, 183–186, 199–200
115, 119 n. 56, 132, 137, 177–178, 192, 194 natural law 129, 135 n. 13, 168, 268
n. 3, 197, 219, 259, 261, 274 n. 5, 282, positive law 185
307, 319, 320 lawfulness 168–169, 175–176
internalization 81 legitimacy 48, 60–61, 147, 260
intersubjective 9, 17–19, 23, 25–28, liberalism 256, 322
30–35, 42, 146, 158, 268, 273, 279 n. 23, life
285, 289, 292–293, 298–303, 306, 311 animal life 13, 15, 223
interplay of forces 46 ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 6, 8, 110,
intuition 11, 69, 78, 79 n. 14, 95, 112, 133–135, 137, 139, 166, 178, 182–184,
167–169, 173, 211, 213–214, 217, 219, 319 186, 201, 203, 263, 288–291, 295–297,
303–304, 308–309, 317, 319, 321
judgment (Urteil) good life 44, 48–49, 223–225
aesthetic judgment (ästhetisches human life 84, 129, 212, 221, 224, 226,
Urteil) 5, 129 290, 292, 294–295
infinite judgment (unendliches organic life 82–83, 93
Urteil) 261–264 social life 8, 24, 25 n. 36, 28, 36, 156,
negative judgment (negatives 182, 288
Urteil) 34 n. 5, 261–262 life and death (Leben und Tod) 21, 134,
rational judgment 7, 214, 235, 238, 141, 209–210, 231, 292, 307
240–241, 243, 245–248 logic (Logik) 1, 6, 15, 70–71, 72 n. 8,
theoretical judgment 112 87, 100, 102–106, 111, 119, 121–122, 150,
justice (Recht) 31 n. 44, 39, 44, 47 n. 19, 152–153, 160, 165, 167, 173, 183, 185, 215,
105, 110, 130, 135, 148, 260 236, 261, 274 n. 15
justification lord (Herr)
absolute justification 254–255 lord/bondsman relation 68, 87–89,
rational justification 7, 235–237, 91, 94–97
240–246, 248–249 lordship (Herrschaft)
Lordship and Bondage (Herrschaft und
katharsis 141–142 Knechtschaft) 8, 88–89, 192–193,
kingdom 197–199, 202–203, 230, 267–269, 272,
animal kingdom 210 274, 278, 280, 284
moral kingdom 169 love 8–9, 18, 24, 27, 30, 32 n. 2, 34–35,
knowledge 39, 141, 181 n. 9, 183, 287–298, 300–309,
absolute knowledge (absolutes 311–319, 321
Wissen) 72, 107, 197
empirical knowledge 7, 235, 243, 249 machine 49, 248
knowledge claim 104 n. 18, 114, 122, marriage 45 n. 15, 290, 295, 305
218, 229 maxim 57, 176, 179, 186
metaphysical knowledge 4, 68, 79 mediation (Vermittlung) 6, 81, 89, 159,
philosophical knowledge 72–73, 95, 193, 195, 199, 204, 213, 231 n. 25
101 n. 10, 103, 104 n. 18, 107 metaphor 93, 212, 270 n. 5
index of terms 327
metaphysical or metaphysics 4, 6, 67–68, norms (Normen) 18, 28–31, 33–34,

72, 75, 79, 95–96, 101–103, 129, 134, 45–46, 49, 54–55, 58, 63–65, 207,
183–184, 188, 217 209–210, 212, 214, 219–220, 227–229,
methodological 4, 100, 103–104, 119, 144, 231, 238, 249, 277, 296, 309 n. 64
240, 293 n. 21 normative
mind and body 95, 269 normative attitude 3, 8, 54,
modality 70 n. 5 55 n. 2, 60–62, 66, 267, 275, 277–281,
modernity (Modernität) 5, 7, 131–133, 284–285
138, 142, 253, 303–304, 308–309 normative status 3–4, 18 n. 18, 53–55,
monarch or monarchy 138, 148, 150, 152 58–63, 66
money 40 n. 4, 50 normativity 53, 55 n. 2, 56, 65, 100,
monological (monologisch) 100, 268 101 n. 10, 120 n. 58, 123, 182, 220, 228,
morals 281–283
moral law (Sittengesetz) 129, 168, notion 1, 5–7, 9, 53, 55–56, 59–60, 64,
172–176, 183, 185–186, 199 67, 79–81, 95, 99, 143, 165, 171, 186, 209,
moral world 146, 154, 156–160, 173, 187 213, 215, 216, 218 n. 13, 220–221, 223,
morality (Moralität) 6, 8, 42, 44, 73, 230, 239, 262, 270–271, 299 n. 37
105 n. 26, 123, 130, 144, 146, 157, noumenal 58, 69, 165, 170–172, 180, 184,
166–167, 170, 173–174, 177–181, 184–185, 284
212, 219, 260, 263
mother 136, 140–141, 208 obedience 25 n. 36, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62,
movement 186, 208, 209, 279 n. 23
movement of recognition (Bewegung objection 73 n. 9, 179, 230
des Anerkennens) 6, 192, 196–199, objective
202–204, 306 objective logic 121
movement of self-consciousness objective spirit 16, 100 n. 8, 105, 106,
(Bewegung des Selbstbewusstseins) 110 n. 39, 111, 117
79, 91, 197, 203, 222 objectivity 7, 14 n. 9, 102 n. 14, 106 n. 27,
113, 114, 121, 229, 235, 249, 257, 274,
nature 1, 3–5, 8, 13, 15–16, 20, 22, 36, 280
40–42, 44–46, 50, 56, 58, 67–72, 73 n. 9, observation 154, 176, 220, 223, 247
74, 76–96, 99, 102–104, 108–109, 111–112, offspring 268, 273 n. 14
114, 116–117, 119, 129–131, 134, 136, 157, organism 44–45, 48, 82–85, 93, 94
159, 168–169, 173, 175, 177–178, 182–185, n. 30, 239
187–188, 227, 235 n. 2, 253, 255, 259, social organism 45, 48
275, 278, 280 n. 25, 281, 283–284, 294, origin 58, 158, 177, 299, 302
295 n. 24, 298, 302–303, 313, 315, 319
necessity 32–33, 60, 86, 103, 129–131, paradigm (Paradigma)
134, 150, 160–162, 176, 186, 306, 314, paradigm of recognition (Paradigma
319 Anerkennung) 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49,
need 13, 18, 20–22, 26, 29, 32–33, 36, 46, 102, 119
47 n. 19, 48, 57–58, 65, 70, 72 n. 8, 85, parents 82, 208
88, 92, 96, 131, 136, 157 n. 33, 162, 166, particularity (Besonderheit) 146, 148, 153,
171, 175, 178, 180 n. 8, 209, 210–211, 213, 171, 173, 176, 215, 254, 255, 312
215, 229, 232, 244, 253 n. 2, 268, 272, partner 257, 313
295–296, 317, 319 pathos 133, 135
neediness 85, 96 perceiver 243
negation perception
determinate negation 246, 272, 274, sense-perception 213
276 person (Person) 19, 33, 34, 35, 41–45,
neo-Kantian or neo-Kantianism 130, 165, 170, 171, 172, 178, 180, 181, 196,
South-West neo-Kantian or South-West 198, 200, 207, 208, 210, 212, 219, 223,
neo-Kantianism 119–123 231, 254, 255, 256, 257, 263, 292, 295,
non-contradiction 242 301, 306, 307, 308, 309, 320
328 index of terms
personal reason (Vernunft)

inter-personal (interpersonal) 8, 9, fact of reason 168
18, 19, 30, 33, 36, 119 n. 56, 180, 197, practical reason (praktische
198, 203–204, 230, 268, 272, 279, 287, Vernunft) 112, 114, 115, 123, 129, 130,
289, 290–292, 294, 298, 302–306, 311 165, 166, 168, 171, 175, 177, 184, 185,
intra-personal (intrapersonal) 170, 187, 201, 212, 282
197–198, 203–204, 230 theoretical reason (theoretische
personality Vernunft) 68, 69, 112
inter-personality 8, 256, 257, 259, 261, unity of reason 4, 68, 72, 73
263 reciprocal (reziprok, gegenseitig) 61, 152,
pharaoh 96, 97 154, 158, 160, 167, 170, 173, 174, 180, 182,
phenomenal 165, 170, 184, 185 186, 187, 192, 200, 256, 258, 268, 316,
philosophy 317
philosophy of consciousness reciprocity (Reziprozität) 152, 172, 173,
(Bewusstseinsphilosophie,—theorie) 192, 193, 196, 316, 317
2, 40, 109, 193–194 recognition (Anerkennung)
practical philosophy 1, 4, 99, 100, 101, concept of recognition (Begriff des
109–112, 118, 123, 290, 291, 297 n. 30, Anerkennens) 1–3, 5–6, 11–13,
309 41, 68, 74, 77, 99, 119, 143–146, 151,
theoretical philosophy 4, 68, 111, 112, 153–154, 162, 192–193, 195, 200–204,
123 268, 273, 288 n. 4, 299 n. 37, 304,
pleasure 308–309, 321
pleasure and displeasure 177 horizontal recognition 17–19, 26–28,
police 208 30–32, 35
possession (Besitz) 43 n. 12, 89, 105 interpersonal recognition 119, 268,
n. 27, 178, 187, 202, 297, 298 272, 279
power intersubjective recognition 17–19, 27,
deontic power 19, 26, 35 28, 32–35
power of choice 176, 183, 186 movement of recognition (Bewegung
power of nature 40, 44, 46, 92–95, des Anerkennens) 6, 192, 196–199,
284 202–204, 306
presupposition 48, 50, 72, 81, 92, 155, mutual recognition (reziproke
220 Anerkennung) 7, 13 n. 3, 14, 17,
principle 26, 28, 32, 35, 50, 100, 101 n. 10, 185,
principle of recognition 2, 17, 100 192–193, 196, 200, 210, 235, 244, 245,
progress 21, 150, 281, 283, 284 256, 257, 267, 268, 312, 319
properties 43, 46, 55, 226 social recognition 3, 41, 165, 307
property 8, 42, 43, 46, 47 n. 19, 232, 253, struggle for recognition (Kampf um
257, 258 n. 9, 260, 262, 263, 309 Anerkennung) 25 n. 36, 90 n. 26,
psychoanalytic 267 n. 2 143, 147, 149, 152, 166, 167, 194,
psychology or psychological 72, 74 n. 10, 196–198, 207, 210, 231, 317, 321
108, 109 theory of recognition or recognition-
punishment 8, 30, 130, 131, 259, 260, 261 theory 6, 99, 100, 110, 151, 154, 193,
pure self 42 n. 10, 269, 274, 276, 277, 195, 204, 267 n. 2, 268, 273, 284, 287,
278, 280, 284 312, 322
vertical recognition 18, 25, 28
quality 43, 70 n. 5 reconciliation 5, 115, 129, 132, 136, 137,
quantity 70 n. 5, 71 n. 5 138, 139, 292 n. 11
reconstruction 28, 30, 89, 143, 168, 182,
realization (Realisierung) 210, 237
realization of freedom 42–44, 46, 168 redemption 142
realm reflection
realm of ends (Reich der Zwecke) 173, self-reflection 219, 277 n. 22
174 relation
realm of spirit 15, 108 asymmetric relation 31, 152
index of terms 329
fundamental axiological second nature 22

relation 120–123 self /selves
interpersonal relation 36, 180, 290, pure self 269, 274, 276, 277, 278, 280,
292, 294, 303–306 284
intersubjective or inter-subjective real self 269, 278
relation 146, 158, 268, 273, self-awareness 220, 224, 225, 226
279 n. 23, 265, 289, 291, 292, 293, self-conceit 172
298–303, 306, 311 self-consciousness
lord/bondsman relation 68, 88, 89, 91, (Selbstbewusstsein) 20, 170 n. 3,
94–97 192–198, 203, 223 n. 16, 224 n. 19,
personal relation 219, 226 231 n. 25, 269 n. 4, 299 n. 36, 302 n. 43
self-relation 33, 77, 79, 80, 81, 95, self-constitution 8, 267, 269, 273, 278
105 n. 26, 229, 256, 315 self-determination 105 n. 25, 117, 122,
social relation 8, 21, 110, 166, 167, 268, 123, 168, 171, 175, 208, 221, 255, 269, 278,
273, 287, 289, 306–308 282, 284, 296, 305
subject/subject relation 40 self-love 167, 183
relationship self-realization 89 n. 24, 122
asymmetrical relationship 152 self-relation 33, 77, 79, 80, 81, 95,
human relationship 293, 296, 301, 105 n. 26, 229, 256
302, 309 self-sufficient or self-sufficiency 244
love relationship 308, 312, 313, 314, sense-certainty (sinnliche Gewissheit)
316, 318, 319 84, 203, 216, 222, 223
religion 5, 49, 100, 123, 129, 143, 148, 161, singularity 22, 116, 153, 158, 172, 209,
180 n. 8 215
representation 73, 78, 79, 91, 92, 103, social
120, 165, 167, 168, 177, 186, 187, 275, 277, social dimension 240
280, 320 social esteem 6, 165
reproduction 82, 83, 93, 94 social institution 26
res cogitans 73 social life 8, 24–25 n. 36, 28, 36, 156,
res extensa 73 182, 288
revolution or revolutionary 54, 247 social order 50, 88, 92, 94, 136, 143,
right 150, 153, 160, 161
abstract right 105 n. 27, 174, 178, 179, social organism 45, 48
254–257, 259, 263 social recognition 165, 307
fundamental rights 8, 253 social relation 21, 308
human rights 110 social structure 208, 289, 308
role society
institutional role 17, 18, 26, 27 civil society 45–49 n. 23, 178–179,
social role 88, 178, 278 183–184, 256
Rome or Roman 134 ideal society 27, 36, 39
romantic 5, 129, 321 modern society 101 n. 8, 303,
305–306
satisfaction 5, 7, 20, 22, 36, 42 n. 9, 46, solidarity 290, 296
85–87, 89, 134, 142, 175, 183, 209–212, soul 80–81, 108–109, 132, 139, 149, 187,
220, 221, 223, 224, 226–230, 243, 283, 222, 230–232
299, 300, 301, 314–316, species 82–84, 86, 93–94, 154, 183, 215,
Scepticism / Skepticism 223–226
(Skeptizismus) 106 n. 31, 204, 237, speech
243, 272, 276 speech act 218–219, 221, 228, 269
scheme 102, 156, 185 spirit (Geist)
school 119, 123, 239 absolute spirit 92, 104 n. 20, 105 n. 26,
science 111, 115, 202, 268, 270
empirical science 75 n. 10, 247 objective spirit 13, 16, 27, 36, 100 n. 8,
standpoint of science 8, 267, 270, 272, 105 n. 126, 106, 110 n. 39, 111, 117, 253,
273 n. 13, 279, 284, 285 284
330 index of terms
subjective spirit 2, 12–14, 16, 19, theoretical philosophy 4, 68, 111–112,

22 n. 31, 34 n. 46, 105 n. 26, 106, 108, 123
111, 115, 116–118 theoretical reason 68–69, 112
Spirit-Chapter (Geist-Kapitel) 197 theory
spiritual or spirituality 14, 36 theory of action 8, 169, 260, 269
state theory of communicative
state of nature (Naturzustand) 184, action 39–40
199, 201–203 theory of freedom 254, 282
statue 271, 273, 275, 278, 284 theory of intersubjectivity or
status inter-subjectivity 8, 144, 162,
normative status 3, 4, 18 n. 18, 53–55, 193–195, 256–257, 287,
58–63, 66 theory of justice 110
social status 58 theory of knowledge 120–122
Stoicism 134, 276 n. 19, 284 theory of recognition or
struggle (Kampf) recognition-theory
struggle for recognition (Kampf um (Anerkennungstheorie) 2, 6, 12, 37,
Anerkennung) 25 n. 35, 90 n. 26, 99–100, 110, 151, 154, 193, 195, 204,
143, 147, 149, 152, 166, 167, 194, 267 n. 2, 268, 273, 284, 287, 312, 322
196–198, 207, 210, 231, 317, 321 theory of self-consciousness 4, 67,
struggle of life and death or 274
life-and-death-struggle 231 thing
subject (Subjekt) thing-in-itself 4, 68, 73, 96
transcendental subject 4, 68, 78–79, totality (Totalität) 104, 119 n. 56, 122, 124,
82, 95–96 131, 133, 145, 201–201, 276 n. 19, 278,
subjectivity 1, 16, 22, 43 n. 11, 49, 68, 281, 305, 313
74, 78, 99, 106 n. 27, 107, 110, 113–117, tradition 45, 48, 54, 130, 167, 216–217,
121, 134–135, 149, 154–156, 160, 162, 230, 248, 268–269
225–226, 229, 256–257, 268, 270, 285, traditional (traditionell) 45, 53–55,
315, 318 59–60, 62, 101, 117, 120, 123, 129, 144,
substance (Substanz) 4, 24, 26–27, 42, 211 n. 5. 217, 230, 248
63, 72–74, 79, 82, 83 n. 18, 84, 87, 89, tragedy 5, 129–137, 139–140, 142
95, 105 n. 23, 134–135, 138, 195, 199, 204, transcendental
224 n. 18, 271, 292 n. 11, 301 transcendental ‘I’ 4, 67–68, 75, 77,
survival 83, 276 95, 218
syllogism (Schluss) 193, 315 transcendental philosophy 102, 114
symmetric or symmetry transcendental subject 4, 68, 78–79,
(Symmetrie) 31–32, 56, 60, 61, 193 82, 95–96
synthesis 17 n. 16, 69, 112, 175, 188, transcendence 44
292 n. 11 trust 186 n. 12
system truth 103, 109–110, 112–113, 115, 117–118,
system of needs 46, 47 n. 19, 48, 268, 121, 129, 140, 149, 160, 167, 175, 212–220,
319 223, 225, 227–228, 230, 235–237,
system of philosophy 101–102, 247, 257, 262, 269, 274, 283–284, 292,
104–105, 107–108, 118–122, 296 320–321
n. 25 truth condition 220
system of right 181
understanding (Verstand) 1, 4–7, 13, 16,
teleological or teleology 14 n. 9, 73 n. 9, 19, 30 n. 42, 37, 64–66, 69–70, 77–78,
101, 151, 178 79 n. 14, 87, 93, 96–97, 99, 102, 104 n. 18,
theoretical 110–111, 134, 137, 143–144, 145 n. 4, 152,
theoretical and practical 5, 47, 72–73, 159, 161, 166, 168–169, 171, 173, 187, 202,
100–101, 108–109, 111–112, 114–120, 213, 216, 220, 222–223, 238–239, 244,
123, 171, 214 247, 259 n. 10, 260, 284
index of terms 331
unity wisdom 178, 232

unity of reason 4, 68, 72–73 work
universality 22 n. 28, 47 n. 19, 131, 153, work of art 138
160, 169, 176, 254–257, 262, 317 world
inner world 81, 82, 290, 298 n. 33
value intelligible world (Verstandeswelt)
community of value 48, 49, 50 169, 173, 200
violence 139, 142, 177, 182, 258, 260, modern world 1, 131, 305, 306, 308,
263 309
virtue 31, 36, 55, 73, 173, 181, 186, 235 moral world 146, 157, 158, 159, 160,
volonté générale 199 173, 187
sensible world (Sinnenwelt) 72, 169,
welfare 209, 296 173, 184, 200
will (Wille) worship 133
free will 31 n. 44, 41, 69, 100 n. 8, wrong (Unrecht) 8, 43–44, 135, 253, 257,
106 n. 27, 110 n. 39, 117, 174, 184, 185, 258, 259, 264
254, 255, 258–260, 321
general will 257
Index of Names
Acosta 2, 5, 143 Fichte 2, 6, 75, 77, 109, 120 n. 58, 143–146,

Adorno 139 150–151, 157, 180, 199–202, 220–221, 227,
Antigone 134, 135, 303 268, 270–271, 296, 311, 317
Aristotle 109, 131, 201, 214, 237 Flikschuh 186
Astell 147, 149, 150 Forst 312, 313
Austin 238 Fowler 144 n. 1
Frank 118
Beckett 142 Fraser 39
Beiser 236 n. 3 Fulda 100 n. 7, 102 n. 15, 107 n. 34
Benjamin 134, 136
Berkeley 67, 214 Gadamer 86
Bizet 132 Gill 144 n. 1
Bondeli 100 n. 7 Girndt 75 n. 11
Bonsiepen 106 n. 30 Goethe 138, 296 n. 25, 319
Brandom 2–3, 18 n. 18, 20 n. 21, 30 Gregory 242 n. 11
nn. 41–42, 53, 101 n. 10, 120 nn. 58–59,
207, 210, 230, 295 n. 24, 298 n. 34, Haack 241 n. 9, 248 n. 16
299 n. 36, 300 n. 40, 302 n. 43 Habermas 39, 40, 50, 110 n. 40, 145 n. 4,
Breazeale 145 n. 6 161, 186 n. 12, 207, 268, 312
Buchdahl 239, 242 Halbig 101 n. 9, 111 n. 42, 297 n. 28
Buchwalter 110 n. 39 Hamlet 5, 129, 131, 133–136, 138–142,
296 n. 25
Canivez 12 n. 2 Hegel passim
Carnap 237 Heidegger 56, 222 n. 15
Chomsky 65 Henrich 100 n. 7, 290 n. 7, 291 n. 10
Claesges 270 n. 7 Hobbes 184 n. 10, 199, 202
Cobben 1–3, 9, 39, 40 n. 4, 42 n. 10, Hoeltzel 146 n. 10
44 n. 13, 50 n. 26, 71 n. 5, 99 n. 4, Höffe 120, 180 n. 8
100 n. 6, 101 n. 10, 105 n. 26, 112 n. 47, Hölderlin 129, 291 n. 10
145 n. 4, 249 n. 18, 269, 276 n. 20, Hösle 256, 261 n. 13
277–279, 288 n. 4, 299 n. 37, 321 Honneth 3, 6, 40, 41, 42 n. 10, 48–50, 86,
Coleridge 138 90 n. 26, 100 n. 8, 105 n. 23, 106 n. 28,
Conde 145 n. 6, 146 n. 8 110, 119, 145 n. 4, 165–167, 174–176,
Condillac 271, 273, 278, 284–285 178–180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 194, 208,
Critchley 2, 5, 129 267, 279, 288 n. 4, 292 n. 11, 312, 313,
315–319, 321–322
Danermark 144 n. 1 Horkheimer 194 n. 3
Deranty 145 n. 2 Horstmann 288 n. 3, 294 n. 22
Deregowski 243 Houlgate 67 n. 1
Descartes/Cartesian 73, 75, 236, Hubig 269
242 n. 10, 243–244 Hume 81, 214, 217, 239
Diderot 137 Hyppolite 82, 207, 210
Dilthey 321
Düsing, E. 268, 292 n. 12 Ikäheimo 2, 11, 19 n. 19, 119 n. 56
Düsing, K. 110 n. 39, 113 n. 49, 270–271,
292 n. 12 Jaeschke 106 n. 30
Jamme 291 n. 10
Eliot 138 Jaspers 277 n. 22
Emundts 294 n. 22 Jerlinder 144 n. 1
index of names 333
Josifovic 2, 8, 267, 270 n. 8, 272 n. 11 Perry 150 n. 15

Joyce 139 Petherbridge 145 n. 2
Pinkard 67 n. 1, 76 n. 12, 207, 211 n. 5
Kambartel 225 Pippin 20 n. 20, 67 n. 1, 100 n. 8,
Kant 1–6, 30 n. 42, 53–59, 63–64, 66–75, 309 n. 63
77–79, 81, 86, 95, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103, Plato 199, 201, 216, 217, 225, 230–232
109–112, 114, 118–120, 129–130, 143, Prauss 181, 185 n. 11
150–151, 156, 165, 167–168, 169 n. 3, 170, Pyrrho 246, 272
172–174, 176–177, 179–183, 185, 185,
186–187, 199–202, 211, 214, 216–220, Quante 100 n. 8, 103 n. 16, 119 n. 55, 279,
232, 236, 258, 278, 293–294, 296 n. 25, 288 n. 4, 292 n. 12, 309 nn. 63–64
299, 316 Quine 214, 216
Karásek 288 n. 4
Kersting 180 n. 8 Reinhold 274
Kesselring 74 n. 10 Rickert 99 n. 3, 120–121, 123
Kojève 145 n. 4, 207, 267–268 Rockmore 145 n. 6
Kok 2, 4, 67, 100 n. 6, 104 n. 20, Rousseau 55–56, 145, 199
107 n. 33 Rózsa 100 n. 8, 287, 288 n. 3, 294 n. 23,
Konstan 317 297 n. 30
Korsgaard 120, 282 Rundell 145 n. 2
Kotkavirta 292 n. 14
Krijnen 1–2, 4–5, 99, 104 nn. 18, 20, Schäfer 113 n. 49
106 n. 27–28, 121 n. 62, 249 n. 18 Schelling 5–6, 129–138, 143–146, 153–162,
201, 270–271, 296
Lacan 140, 267 n. 2 Schiller 5, 129, 145, 296 n. 25
Laclau 147 Schlegel 132
Laitinen 119 n. 56 Schmidt am Busch 3, 39–41, 50, 288 n. 4
Las Casas 147–149 Schnädelbach 259 n. 10
Leibniz 58 Schulz 268
Lewis 237 Sellars 63, 65
Locke 223 Shakespeare 5, 129, 131–133, 135–137,
Longino 241 n. 9, 248 n. 16 141–142, 153
Loose 2, 6, 165 Sherman 145 n. 4
Luckner 269 Siep 17, 110, 119 n. 55, 145 n. 4, 267–268,
Lukács 207, 267–268 279, 288 n. 4, 292 n. 11, 297 n. 28,
312–314, 316–318, 321
McDowell 211 n. 5, 218, 269, 299 n. 35 Sinnerbrink 145 n. 2
Maraguat 145 n. 6 Solomon 241 n. 9
Marx 36 n. 49, 39, 46, 137, 207, 267–268 Sophocles 130–132, 137
Maza 145 n. 4 Spinoza 72–74, 211
Mead 208 Stekeler–Weithofer 2, 6–7, 103 n. 16,
Melville 139 207, 268–269, 277, 288 n. 4
Merle 2, 9, 311 Stern 172 n. 4
Minsky 232 n. 26 Sutherland 149 n. 13
Moors 68 n. 2
Mouffe 147 Taylor 291 n. 10, 298 nn. 33–34, 312, 321
Moyar 297 n. 28, 309 n. 64 Theunissen 268
Tillich 291 n. 8
Newton 239 Tuomela 227
Nietzsche 132–133
Nohl 291 n. 9 Vieweg 2, 7–8, 110 n. 39, 253, 288 n. 4
Vos 109 n. 36
Parfit 223
Pawlik 260 n. 12 Wagner 132
Peperzak 110 n. 39 Walter 6, 191, 296 n. 25
334 index of names
Weil 198 Wittgenstein 56

Westphal 2, 7, 124 n. 68, 235, 237 n. 5 Wolff 237
Will 247 n. 15
Willaschek 168 Zeidler 2, 6, 191
Williams, R. 134 n. 11 Zizek 267 n. 2, 268 n. 3
Williams, R. R. 11 n. 1, 13 n. 4, 145 Zurn 39, 288 n. 4
n. 3, 4, 5

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Recognition—German Idealism

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/csgi

Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

List of Contributors . ....................................................................................... vii

2. Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—What Is It? . ................................ 11

3. The Paradigm of Recognition and the Free Market ....................... 39

4. From Autonomy to Recognition ........................................................... 53

5. The Metaphysics of Recognition: On Hegel’s Concept of

7. The Tragedy of Misrecognition—The Desire for a Catholic

12. F initude, Rational Justification & Mutual Recognition ............... 235

13. I nter-Personality and Wrong ............................................................... 253

14. The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel’s Lordship

15. F rom Love to Recognition: Hegel’s Conception of

16. F riendship in Hegel and Its Interpretation in Theories

Index of Terms ................................................................................................. 323

Emiliano Acosta is a Postdoctoral Researcher (Research Foundation Flan-

Robert B. Brandom is a Dinstinguished Professor of Philosophy at the

Paul Cobben is Professor of Philosophy at Tilburg University (The Nether-

Simon Critchley is Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy at the New School

University. His work concentrates on Continental philosophy; phenom-

Heikki Ikäheimo has a PhD from University of Jyväskylä in Finland (2003).

Sasa Josifovic (PhD University of Cologne). His main fields of interests

Arthur Kok, PhD (2012), studied philosophy in Tilburg and Berlin. He is

die Möglichkeit der Philosophie nach der kopernikanischen Wende, München

Christian Krijnen is a professor of Philosophy at the University of Tilburg and

Donald Loose is Thomas More Professor at Erasmus Univerity Rotterdam

Jean-Christophe Merle, professor at the Université de Lorraine, honorary

Erzsébet Rózsa (PhD 1984) is a Professor of Philosophy at the University

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Uni-

Klaus Vieweg, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, is Professor for Phi-

Kenneth R. Westphal is Professorial Fellow, School of Philosophy, Univer-

Kurt Walter Zeidler is a Professor for Philosophy at the University of Vienna.

For the philosophers in the tradition of German Idealism, the French

Paul Cobben (Tilburg University), Series Editor.

paradigm for philosophy claiming to actualize German idealist philoso-

Heikki Ikäheimo poses the question Hegel’s Concept of Recognition—

And understanding the sort of normative dependence and independence

of philosophy as a science of the absolute idea and its non-metaphysical

Spirit’ as a philosophy of the practical, as a theory of action. For Vieweg,

Jean-Christophe Merle explores the notion of Friendship in Hegel and

Finally, I would like to express my thanks to a number of people and

Hegel’s concept of recognition—what is it?

1 Robert Williams (1997, 1) suggests that recognition is not a “thematic” concept in

1. Recognition in Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

The text that I have in mind is the chapter ‘Self-consciousness’ in Hegel’s

2 See, for example, Canivez 2011.

Self-consciousness—which at least for pedagogical purposes often makes

2. Spirit, Freedom and Recognition

To get started with the theme of recognition in the Encyclopaedia Phi-

3 Another nowadays well-known fact about the chapter in Phenomenology of Spirit in

5 Hegel 1975, § 177.

As in the published version, also in the lectures Hegel identifies free-

with oneself in otherness” or “consciousness of oneself in otherness”. Con-

language we can say that on Hegel’s account finding ourselves in each

psychological constitution. To keep these two phenomena that are easily

18 For example Robert Brandom’s talk in Brandom 2009, p. 70 of “reciprocal recogni-

mode of recognition in this sense is recognizing someone as a bearer of

4. The Self-consciousness Chapter—A Brief Introduction

4.1 The Primitive Subject of ‘Desire’

4.2 Cultivation Through a “Process of Recognition”

master and thus cannot be conscious of himself affirmed by the latter. As

5. The Metaphysics of Recognition: On Hegel’s Concept of

7. The Tragedy of Misrecognition—The Desire for a Catholic

12. F initude, Rational Justification & Mutual Recognition ............... 235

13. I nter-Personality and Wrong ............................................................... 253

14. The Dialectic of Normative Attitudes in Hegel’s Lordship

15. F rom Love to Recognition: Hegel’s Conception of

16. F riendship in Hegel and Its Interpretation in Theories