1. LAUREL VS.

MISA
G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947

FACTS:
A petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino
Citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by
the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that:
a. the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance
of Filipino citizen thereto was then suspended;
b. that there was a change of sovereignty over these
Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of treason.
HELD:
The petitioner is guilty of treason, as a citizen owes permanent allegiance to their
government or sovereign. Inhabitants of
territory occupied by enemy military forces may commit treason against their legitimate
government if they give aid and comfort to their enemies. The petitioner's theory that
their allegiance was "suspended" would lead to disastrous consequences for small and
weak nations, violating human rights and public conscience. This theory would sanction
invaders' actions, forcing people of a free and sovereign country to commit political
suicide. The change of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
prosecution for treason committed during the Commonwealth, as it is an offense against
the same government and sovereign people, as Art. XVIII of the Constitution states.

2. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002

FACTS:
In the impeachment proceedings against President Joseph Estrada, five criminal
complaints were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found probable cause for filing criminal information against Estrada
and other respondents, including petitioner Jinggoy. Jinggoy filed a "Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion" claiming no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him
liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling
and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A.7080; he
is entitled to bail as a matter of right. for trial and bail as a matter of right. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion, and the court proceeded to arraign the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder is proper.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner's contention that R.A. 7080 does not apply to him is based on the
premise that the amended information charged him with only one act or offense, which
cannot constitute plunder. However, the information is divided into three parts: the first
paragraph charges President Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner
Jinggoy Estrada; the second paragraph outlines how the accused conspired in
committing the crime of plunder; and the following four sub-paragraphs describe in
detail the predicate acts constitute of the crime of plunder and state the names of the
accused who committed each act.
The phrase "on several instances" in the Amended Information is not applicable to the
petitioner, as it is a series of predicate acts. In the case at bar, the different accused and
their criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass,
accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth. In American jurisdiction, the presence of
several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures: a wheel or
circle conspiracy, where a single person or group deals individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the "spokes"), and a chain conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband.
In Philippine jurisdiction, conspiracy may be alleged as a mode of committing a crime or
as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is charged as a crime, there is less
necessity of reciting its particularities because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offence charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal
liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-
principals regardless of their degree of participation in the crime. The liability of the
conspirators is collective, and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of
others.
Here, the information alleged in general terms how the accused committed the crime of
plunder, using the words "in connivance/ conspiracy with his co-accused." These words
are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former President in
committing the crime of plunder.

3. PEOPLE VS. ABAD

G.R. No. L-447, June 17, 1946

FACTS:
Francisco Abad was found guilty of three counts of treason for aiding and comforting the
Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces. The prosecution presented
witnesses, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel, who testified that Francisco demanded
Magno's surrender of a revolver. Francisco appealed, arguing that the lower court erred
in finding him guilty on the first count due to the lack of witnesses. The Solicitor General
suggests that two witnesses should be present for each circumstance at each stage in
cases of simple, continuous, and composite treason.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the theory of the Solicitor General is correct.
HELD:
The Solicitor General's theory is incorrect. The two-witness rule must be applied to all
external manifestations of an overt act. Francisco's search for the revolver at the Ibarra
house is a single overt act, distinct from his requiring Magno to produce it.
The search should have been a separate act, and the lower court erred in not
recognizing the first count as unproven and ruling Francisco guilty.

4. US VS. LAGNAYON
G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904

FACTS:
Lagnason was charged with treason and sentenced to death in the occupied Province
of Occidental Negros. He led a band of men in arms, led by Dionisio Papa, who aimed
to establish an independent government. On October 29, 1902, the band attacked
Murcia, but was driven off by Constabulary forces. Lagnason and his party were
captured, and about twenty of his men were killed. Two policemen working with the
Constabulary were also killed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lagnason is guilty of the crime of treason
HELD:

The acts of violence committed by an armed

body of men
with the purpose of overthrowing the
Government waswith the purpose of
overthrowing the Government was
“levying war against the United
States”“levying war against the United
States”
was treasonwas treason
,,
whether it was done by ten men or thousand
men. (whether it was done by ten men or
thousand men. (
US vs.US vs.
HanwayHanway
))
oo

No distinction was anywhere made

between aNo distinction was anywhere
made between a
foreign enemy and a rebel or insurgent so far
asforeign enemy and a rebel or insurgent so
far as
the act of “levying of war” is concerned.the
act of “levying of war” is concerned.
oo
The defendant was engaged in an attempt
toThe defendant was engaged in an
attempt to
overthrow the Government and was
capturedoverthrow the Government and
was captured
after an armed contest. It does not matter
howafter an armed contest. It does not matter
how
vain and futile his attempt was; the
actsvain and futile his attempt was; the
acts
performed by him constituted a levying of
war.performed by him constituted a levying of
wa
The acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of
overthrowing the Government was “levying war against the United States” was treason
whether it was done by ten men or thousand men. (US vs Hanway)
No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign enemy and a rebel or insurgent
so far as the act of “levying of war” is concerned.
The defendant was engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government and was
captured after an armed contest. It does not matter how vain and futile his attempt was;
the acts performed by him constituted a levying of war.

5. PEOPLE VS. BATE

G.R. No. L-1547. January 28, 1949

FACTS:
Bate was found guilty on six counts of treason. On one count, the appellant who was
then armed and who was accompanied by several undercover men arrested Francisca
Bacalla and took her to Sgt. Yoshida, chief of the Japanese Military Police, where she
was investigated and maltreated. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, only one
witness Felisa Taboado testified as to Bacalla's arrest by the appellant and only one
witness, Conrado Bao, the cook of Sgt. Yoshida testified about her investigation at
Yoshida's house by the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant can be held guilty for treason.

HELD:
 Yes. Although not sufficient to prove the overt acts of which Bate is accused,
nevertheless, the evidence may be considered as proof of his adherence to the enemy.

4. 6. PEOPLE VS PORDALES

FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:

7. PEOPLE VS. MORALES

G.R. No. L-4533 May 28, 1952
FACTS:
Morales was charged with the crime of treason. He insists that his mere presence is not
sufficient to constitute treason.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant can be held guilty of treason.
HELD:
Yes. Morales was carrying a firearm and was seen behaving as a guard. During the
Japanese occupation, nobody could carry a gun freely in the presence of Japanese
soldiers, unless he was an agent of or in cahoots with the enemy. It is far-fetched to
suppose that the defendant happened to be in the place above mentioned as a mere
spectator. Openly carrying a firearm, while going with Japanese soldiers, can only be
reconciled with the idea that the man was in league with and had the confidence of the
enemy.

8. PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA
G. R. No. L-9529, [August 30, 1958 ]104 Phil. 450
FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation, Filipino citizen Pedro T. Villanueva served as a secret
agent, informer, and spy for the Japanese Imperial Army's Detective Force in Iloilo
province. He participated in punitive expeditions and committed robberies, arson, and
mass-murders. Witnesses testified against Villanueva, who denied the overt acts and
claimed his acceptance of the position was for the good of the people. Villanueva was
sentenced to death by the People's Court for treason, but the case was elevated to the
Tribunal for mandatory review.
ISSUE:

Whether or not his denials and

defense of duress exerted by the
Japanese Imperial Army upon
him will suffice to exempt him
from the crime of treason
Whether or not his denials and defense of duress exerted by the Japanese Imperial
Army upon him will suffice to exempt him from the crime of treason.
HELD:
The Court ruled that mere denial by appellant cannot prevail upon the positive assertion
and corroboration of the statements of witnesses for the government establishing
incriminating facts. It is a well settled rule of evidence that as between positive and
negative testimony, the former deserves more weight and credit. With regard to his
defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon him for which he had to
serve in the Detective Force of the Japanese Army, the defendant was not able to
present sufficient proof that he was indeed coerced or compelled by the Japanese but
merely stated self-serving testimonies.
Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, the fear must be well-
founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily harm must be present
and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat. A threat of future injury is not enough.
Hence, the decision of the lower court was affirmed with modifications on the
indemnities imposed and that the penalty of death be commuted to reclusion perpetua
due to lack of sufficient votes to impose the justifiable penalty of death.

9. PEOPLE VS. RACAZA

[ G.R. No. L-365, January 21, 1949 ]82 Phil. 623

FACTS:

Racaza was found guilty on fourteen

counts
of treason. The trial court found the
aggravating
circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior
strength, treachery and employment of
means for
adding ignominy to the natural effects
of the crim
Racaza was found guilty on fourteen counts of treason. The trial court found the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength, treachery and
employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the finding of the trial court is proper as regards the aggravating
circumstances.
HELD:
No. Evident premeditation, superior strength, and treachery are, by their nature,
inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty.
Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is a long, continued process
requiringfixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning. Treachery is
merged in superior strength. To overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance
movements, the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to
whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute, superior force, and it
was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue
its inhabitants by his brutal rule.

10. PEOPLE VS ICARO

11. No. Evident premeditation,

superior strength,
12. and treachery are, by their
nature, inherent in the
13. offense of treason and may not
be taken to
14. aggravate the penalty.
Adherence and the giving of
15. aid and comfort to the enemy is
a long, continued
16. process requiringfixed,
reflective and persistent
17. determination and planning.
Treachery is merged in
 18. superior strength. To overcome
the opposition and
19. wipe out resistance movements,
the use of a large
20. force and equipment was
necessary. The enemy to
21. whom the accused adhered was
itself the
22. personification of brute, superior
force, and it was
23. this superior force which
enabled him to overrun the
24. country and for a time subdue its
inhabitants by his
25. brutal rul
[ G. R. No. L-2956, May 23, 1951 ]89 Phil. 12

FACTS:
Icaro was found guilty of treason. He denies that he was a Makapili.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant can be held guilty of treason.
HELD:
Yes. The point becomes unnecessary, since adherence to the enemy may be inferred
from the overt acts of treason committed by the appellant, consisting in the arrest of
persons suspected of being guerrillas who, with the exception of one Emilio Biscocho,
were never seen again, especially because the appellant was armed and in company
with armed Japanese soldiers and other Filipinos.

11. PEOPLE VS ROBLE

[ G.R. No. L-433, March 02, 1949 ]83 Phil. 1

FACTS:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to death by the First Division of the People's Court. The court held that the facts alleged
in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders, with the result that the
penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum
degree. It opined that the killings were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated
by the circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed
band.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty is correct.
HELD:
No. As decided in People v. Racaza, evident premeditation, superior strength, and
treachery are,by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to
aggravate the penalty. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
appellant's spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the
maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to
reclusion perpetua.

12. PEOPLE VS. MANGAHAS

[ G.R. Nos. L-5367 & L-5368, June 09, 1953]

FACTS:

The defendants were found guilty of the crime of treason. They claim that there is no
proof of adherence to the enemy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of treason.

HELD:

Yes. The acts of arresting guerrillas, commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work,
drilling in the plaza, going around the town carrying firearms, and the fact that before the
outbreak of the war they were members of the Ganap Party and in the latter period of
the Japanese occupation of the Makapili organization, are more than sufficient proofs of
adherence to the enemy.

13. PEOPLE VS. PEREZ

[ G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949 ]83 Phil. 314

FACTS:

Perez furnished women for immoral purposes to the enemies. He was convicted of
treason.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Perez is guilty of treason.

HELD:

No. The law of treason does not proscribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its
inhabitants. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature;
degree and purpose. As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and
comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not
merely as individuals, and, in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile
designs. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially
tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United States.

14. PEOPLE VS FERNANDO

[ G.R. No. L-1138, December 17, 1947 ] 79 Phil. 719

FACTS:

Fernando was found guilty of the crime of treason. He claimed that he was forced into
the service of the Kempei-tai, the Japanese military police organization.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason.

HELD:

Yes. It is incredible that, while appellant was undergoing detention and maltreatment for
his alleged connection with the resistance movement, the Japanese should, without
much ceremony, upon appellant's show of willingness to abide by their order to serve
them, release him, provide him with firearms, and put under his charge a group of
Filipino informers in the service of the Kempei-tai. To place appellant in such a
responsible position, full of opportunity and means either of helping the Japanese or
sabotaging their military efforts, appellant must beforehand have shown them strong
evidence of adherence and loyalty for the Japanese to trust him.

15. PEOPLE VS MUNOZ

[ G.R. No. L-880, December 17, 1947 ]79 Phil. 702

FACTS:

Muñoz was found guilty of treason. He alleged his presence at about one hundred yards
from the raided hideout was due not to his own will but to the fact that the Japanese
brought him to the place to carry foodstuffs, with hands tied at his back.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is held guilty of treason.

HELD:

No. The inherent in verisimilitude of appellant's testimony is evident. There was no

reason for the Japanese to carry foodstuffs not needed for such a short expedition and
it is inconceivable that they should let him bring them on his shoulders with his hands
tied and as prisoner, needing to be guarded by soldiers who had to fight against the
guerrillas. By said testimony, it appears absolutely certain that appellant had voluntarily
rendered effective service as an agent of the Japanese. Even crediting to him whatever
benefits some individuals, including his witnesses, derived from the help he rendered
them, the fact that he was thus able to help them shows his influence upon the
Japanese, gained through his usefulness to the latter.

16. PEOPLE VS. NUNEZ

[ G.R. No. L-2321, January 31, 1950 ] 85 Phil. 448

FACTS:

Nuñez was convicted of the crime of treason and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The counsel for defendant pleaded the attendance of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority when she committed those treasonable acts.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty is proper.

HELD:

No. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, when the culprit is over 15 and under 18
years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period, upon this culprit. Treason is punished by reclusion temporal
to death. According to the rules for graduating penalties provided in Article 61 of the
Revised Penal Code, "when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full
extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of
the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." In this instance, the penalty
next lower in degree is prision mayor, to be imposed in its medium period, on account of
the absence of modifying circumstances.

17. PEOPLE VS. CANIBAS

[ G.R. No. L-2193, February 01, 1950 ] 85 Phil. 469

FACTS:

Canibas was found guilty of treason on two counts. The first count has not been
established by the oaths of at least two witnesses. There are no two direct witnesses to
any of the component parts that made up the whole overt act of appellant's membership
in the Makapil.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason.

HELD:

Yes. The testimony on this branch of the case is sufficient proof of adherence to the
enemy. Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by two witnesses. Clear intent
and knowledge may be gathered from the testimony of one of the witnesses, or from the
nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.

18. PEOPLE VS DE LOS SANTOS

G.R. No. L-1975 December 21, 1950

FACTS:

Francisco de los Santos was charged with treason. He contends that he did not
participate in the killings of Castro de la Vega and there is no evidence that he took part
in the killing of the other three persons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is charged guilty of treason.

HELD:

Yes. His participation in the apprehension, investigation and torture of the victims,
makes him responsible for the acts of his companions. There is evidence sufficient in
law for a finding that there was conspiracy, common purpose and concerted action by
and between the appellant and his companions which render each and every one of the
participants in the unlawful acts perpetrated, no matter how minor or insignificant be his
part, responsible for all such acts.

19. PEOPLE VS. ADRIANO

[ G.R. No. L-477, June 30, 1947] 78 Phil. 561

FACTS:

Adriano was convicted of treason. The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to
substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the
Makapili organization. Even the findings of the court are not borne out by the proof of
two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one of the
various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is held guilty of treason.

HELD:

No. Membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of

two witnesses. Where two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of
them is believed by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled
to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and
tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding the
truth.

20. PEOPLE VS. ECLETO

[ G.R. No. L-1006, June 28, 1949 ] 84 Phil. 12

FACTS:

Escleto was charged with treason on three counts. No two witnesses testified in any
specific act of the defendant. The People’s Court believed, however, that the same
evidence is sufficient to prove beyond question defendant's adherence to the enemy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is held guilty of treason.

HELD:

No. As held in People v. Adriano, the authors of the two-witness provision in the
American Constitution, from which the Philippine treason law was taken, purposely
made it severely restrictive and conviction for treason difficult. Each of the witnesses
must testify to the whole overt act; or if itis separable, there must be two witnesses to
each part of the overt act. Every action, movement, deed, and word of the defendant
charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.

21. US VS. MAGTIBAY

[ G.R. No. 1317, November 23, 1903 ] 2 Phil. 70

FACTS:

Magtibay was convicted of the crime of treason. There was no other evidence in the
case to show that he had ever joined the forces of General Montalon, except the
testimony of the inspector as to the confession made when he was captured and the
commission as second lieutenant found upon his person.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason.

HELD:

No. There can be no conviction, unless two witnesses testify to the same overt act of
treason. There is no such testimony in this case. The evidence of the Government
related exclusively to the desertion of the defendant and his capture.

22. PEOPLE VS. TULIN

[ G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001]

FACTS:

Cheong San Hiong was found guilty as an accomplice to the crime of piracy. He argues
that hewas convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State
to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct.

HELD:

No. Suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of M/T Tabangao
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later
brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and
sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.

23. PEOPLE VS. MARCAIDA

[ G.R. No. L-953, September 18, 1947 ]79 Phil. 283

FACTS:

Marcaida was found guilty of treason. It appears that, although three witnesses testified,
for all legal purposes, it is the same as if no witness had testified at all. The second
witness contradictedthe first one on very important facts, and the third contradicted both
the first and the second.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is held guilty of treason.

HELD:

No. Each and every one of the three witnesses for the prosecution testified to the effect
of belying the testimonies of the other two, in such a way that it is not possible to accept
the testimony of one of them without rejecting at the same time the testimonies of the
other two. Even without the two-witness rule in treason cases, there is no legal basis to
convict appellant upon the testimony of anyone of the three witnesses, as each one is
belied by the other two.

24. PEOPLE VS. CATANTAN

[ G.R. No. 118075, September 05, 1997 ] 344 Phil. 315

FACTS:

Catantan was found guilty with violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 otherwise
known as theAnti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. He contends that the trial
 court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave
coercion. He further argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential
that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of Catantan is correct.

HELD:

No. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized
in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of
piracy. While it may be true that victims were compelled to go elsewhere other than their
place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat.
The testimony of one of the victims shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel
through force and intimidation.

25. PEOPLE VS LOL-LO

[ G. R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922 ] 43 Phil. 19

FACTS:

Lol-lo and Saraw were charged with the crime of piracy. They demurred that based on
the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of appellants is correct.

HELD:

No. It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and
as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of
the case. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes
has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it
matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

26. PEOPLE VS. TOLENTINO

[ G.R. No. L-29419, August 31, 1971] 148-B Phil. 430

FACTS:

Tolentino was found guilty of the crime of murder. He contends that there was no
conspiracy, as it was through sheer chance that he made his appearance at the scene
of the crime when the combatants were confronting each other and that all he did was
to hold the deceased by the collar with the intention of pacifying them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of Tolentino is correct.

HELD:
 Yes. What was done by him did not entail the responsibility that the law imposes on a
principal. His criminal liability amounts at most to that of accomplice. Lack of complete
evidence of conspiracy creates the doubt whether he had acted as principal or
accomplice in the perpetration of the offense, which resolves the question in his favor,
by holding that he was guilty of the milder form of responsibility, that is guilty as a mere
accomplice.

27. PEOPLE VS. CORBES

[ G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997 ] 337 Phil. 190

FACTS:

Corbes was found guilty as principals by conspiracy of the crime of robbery with
homicide. He contends that conspiracy was not sufficiently proved since it cannot be
inferred solely from his mere presence at the crime scene.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is correct.

HELD:

Yes. The evidence failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law to establish
conspiracy which jurisprudence dictates must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. No less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required. Where the quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal or
accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of liability, that of a mere
accomplice.

28. PEOPLE VS. ELFANO

[ G.R. No. L-32573, November 25, 1983] 211 Phil. 50

FACTS:

Elefaño was convicted of murder. He contends that the prosecution failed to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence the claim that the lower court failed
to heed the constitutional mandate as to the standard that mustbe satisfied, namely,
proof beyond reasonable doubt before such constitutional presumption can be
overcome.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct.

HELD:

No. As the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses testify concerning
the events that did take place, the conclusion arrived at is entitled to full respect,
unless, of course, it could be demonstrated that he failed to appreciate the significance
of a relevant fact or circumstance or, what is worse, that it was ignored.

29. PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

FACTS:
 Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus that the respondent judge of the lower court be
ordered to continue the proceedings in a civil of said court, which were initiated under
the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in
said case on the ground that the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur
had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in
the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the respondent is correct.

HELD:

No. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and,
by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good
and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

30. PEOPLE VS SAN JUAN

[ G. R. No. L-2997, June 29, 1951] 89 Phil. 359

FACTS:

San Juan was found guilty of treason on eleven counts. He insists that there is a
discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason.

HELD:

Yes. Although the other counts have not been proven in accordance with the two-
witness rule, the first count is sufficient to support a conviction, his adherence to the
enemy being implied from the overt acts charged and established thereunder, and
confirmed by his admission.

31. PEOPLE VS. VICTORIA

[ G.R. No. 369, March 13, 1947] 78 Phil. 122

FACTS:

Victoria was sentenced to the supreme penalty of death for committing treason and
that the commission of the acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately
augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission
thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty is proper.

HELD:

No. The circumstances in question are essential elements of the treason he has
committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act,
by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different
times, it being a continuous crime, so much so that there are some accused of treason
for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not changing
the nature of the offense committed.

32. PEOPLE VS ADLAWAN

[ G.R. No. L-456, March 29, 1949 ] 83 Phil. 194

FACTS:

Adlawan was convicted of the complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and
rape. He contends that the court erred holding that the crime committed is a complex
crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct.

HELD:

Yes. The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein
alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for
which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the
general charge, they cannot be used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant should, therefore, be
held guilty of treason only.

33. PEOPLE VS PRIETO

[ G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948 ] 80 Phil. 138

FACTS:

Prieto was found guilty of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical
injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the finding of the lower court is proper.

HELD:

No. In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished
by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the
deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime
and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.
So, a defendant may not be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason.

34. PEOPLE VS DE CASTRO

[ G.R. No. L-3025, August 16, 1949 ] 84 Phil. 306

FACTS:
 On or about December 26, 1945, De Castro was caught in possession of a
Japanese pistol. He was charged with illegal possession of firearm. He admitted the
allegations but invokes the provisions of Proclamation No. 1 of the President of the
Philippines, dated July 20, 1946, as exempting him from criminal liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the claim of the appellant is correct.

HELD:

No. Proclamation No. 1 fixed the period within which any person in possession of
firearms might, without incurring any criminal liability, surrender the same. Provided,
that it shall not in any way affect any case pending in court, on the date of the
passage of this Act, for violation of section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the
Revised Administrative Code. Since the present case was already pending in court
when Proclamation No. 1 was issued, the accused was not exempted from criminal
liability.

35. PEOPLE VS. BADILI

[ G.R. No. L-565, June 27, 1949 ] 84 Phil. 71

FACTS:

Badili was found guilty of treason. He served the enemy as a secret agent to
apprehend members of the resistance movement, and that with the aid of two fellow
agents he captured Lt. Pacifico Rosales, who was a member of the Philippine Army
and engaged in the resistance movement; and that as a result of the treasonous
acts of the accused and his companions, Lieutenant Rosales was prevented from
pursuing his patriotic activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason

HELD:

Yes. The act of the accused in apprehending and preventing Lieutenant Rosales
from pursuing his activities as a member of the guerrilla forces constituted an aid to
the enemy.

36. US VS. BAUTISTA

[ G.R. No. 2189, November 03, 1906] 6 Phil. 581

FACTS:

Appellants were convicted of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and
destroy by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the
Government of the Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in Section 4 of Act No.
292 of the Philippine Commission. Counsel for appellants contend that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or
confession in open court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be
applied in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct.

HELD:
No. In consonance with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, the
crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime
of treason, and this constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases.

37. US VS CABALLEROS
[ G.R. No. 1352, March 29, 1905] 4 Phil. 350

FACTS:

The defendants have been sentenced as accessories after the fact in the crime of
assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of American school-teachers
because, without having taken part in the said crime as principal or accomplices, they
took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime. One of
the motives for the conviction which the lower court took into consideration in his
judgment is the fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of
the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the finding of the lower court is correct.

HELD:

No. The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the
crime is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that cannot render the
defendants criminally liable according to law. Thus, defendants and appellants are
acquitted.

38. SANTOS VS MISA

[ G.R. No. L-319, March 28, 1946] 76 Phil 415

FACTS:

The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the

Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned over last September, to
the Commonwealth Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a
political prisoner. Such detention, he claims, is illegal, because he has not been
charged before, nor convicted by, the judge of a competent court, and because he may
not be confined under Act No. 682, as he owes allegiance neither to the United States
nor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct.

HELD:

No. Petitioner’s foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of
Commonwealth Act No. 682. As stated by the Solicitor-General, he might be prosecuted
for espionage, a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender, and
considered as an offense against national security.

39. PEOPLE VS RODRIGUEZ

[ G.R. No. 60100, March 20, 1985 ] 220 Phil. 162

FACTS:
Appellants were convicted of the crime of piracy and were sentenced to suffer the
extreme penalty of death. They contend that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty despite their plea of guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellants is correct.

HELD:

No. Presidential Decree No. 532 amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
provides that if rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of
piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. Further, Article 63 of the same Code
provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.

40. PEOPLE VS KIO

[ G.R. Nos. L-6687y L-6688, July 29, 1954 ] 95 Phil. 475

FACTS:

The accused, then a passenger of Philippine Airlines plane en route from Laoag to
Aparri, compelled the pilot to change the route of the planeand when the pilot failed to
comply immediately with said order, he shot the pilot. The lower court sentenced him to
life imprisonment. The Attorney General maintains in its allegation that the lower court
committed error in not declaring that the accused committed the complex crime of grave
coercion with murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of Atty. General is correct.

HELD:

No. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in the event that a single fact
constitutes two or more offenses or when one of them is necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty is for the most serious crime, applying it in its
maximum degree. The accused ran two different facts, and not just one; therefore,
these two successive acts cannot constitute the complex crime of coercion with murder.
If the pilot had followed the order of the accused, this would not have felt the need to kill
him; the pilot was put in the hard choice to comply with the order, or die.

41. PEOPLE VS SIYOH

[ G.R. No. 57292, February 18, 1986 ] 225 Phil. 313

FACTS:

Appellants were found guilty of the crime of qualified piracy with triple murder and
frustrated murder. They contend that the lower court erred in finding that their guilt has
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention is correct.

HELD:
No. As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of
witnesses. The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination
of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which
was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a
reversal of the trial court's determination. Additionally, the claims of the appellants are
not convincing.

42. PEOPLE VS CATANTAN y TAYONG

G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu has appealed the conviction of Emiliano Catantan and
Jose Macven Ursal for piracy. The Pilapil brothers, Eugene and Juan Jr., were fishing
near Tabogon, Cebu, when Catantan and Ursal boarded a pumpboat. Catantan fired a
gun on the Pilapil brothers, who were then taken to Mungaz, Cebu, where the new
pumpboat ran out of gas. The Pilapils reported the incident to local authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion or Piracy under PD 532.

HELD:

No. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized
in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of
piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere
other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of
seizing their boat. The testimony of one of the victims shows that the appellant actually
seized the vessel through force and intimidation.

Sec. 2(d) of PD No.2 defines Piracy as “Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as
pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.”

While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke
down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back
to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their “new” pumpboat ran out of gas so they
were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local
authorities.

43. MILO VS SALANGA

G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987

FACTS:

An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent
(accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private persons for maltreating
petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his
constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of
Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside
the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.Accused-
respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at
 the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner
Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that
accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the
crime of Arbitrary Detention.

HELD:

Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a
police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be
guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would
show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the
latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace
and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that
with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.

44. BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF

G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984

FACTS:
On December 1982, two search warrants were issued against petitioners to search the
premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the machines,
equipment, papers, documents, books and other written literatures alleged to be in
possession and control of Petitioner Jose Burgos Jr, the publisher-editor of We Forum
were seized. Petitioners filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with mandatory and prohibitory injunction to assail the validity of
the two search warrants issued against the petitioner.

Petitioners further prays for the return of the seized articles. Petitioner assailed the
validity of the two search warrants and prayed that the same be declared illegal for:
(a) failure of the respondent judge to conduct an examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and his witness as required under the Constitution and
Sec 4 Rule 126 of the ROC ; (b) said warrants pinpointed only one place
where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed therein; (c) that the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone; (d)That real property was
seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles, instruments,
etc.; and (e) search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col.
Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance of the premises could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

HELD:

When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the
alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Therefore, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's
application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended’ "does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have
done so.

45. SORIA VS DESIERTO

G.R. Nos. 153524-25, January 31, 2005

FACTS:

This is a case concerning the violation of private respondents of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. On or about 8:30 in the evening of Mary 13, 2001, Soria and
Bizta, petitioners, were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for
alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Petitioners were detained at the
police station at Santa, Ilocos Sur. Soria was released in the evening of May 14.
However, Bizta was continuously detained. Apart from illegal possession of firearm, it
was found out that Bizta has a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan. Bizta was brought
to the MTC of Vigan where she posted bail. an Order of Temporary Release was issued
thereafter. Notwithstanding the order of temporary release, Bizta remained in the
custody of the police because no order of release was issued in connection with the
alleged illegal possession of firearms. It was only on June 8, 2001 when Bizta was
released, thus he was detained for 26 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents violated Art. 125.

HELD:

No. the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by
law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by
one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of
B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post
bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if
he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

46. PEOPLE VS DICHOSO

GR NO. 101216-18 JUNE 4.1993

FACTS:

Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag, the accused, appealed from June 11, 1991 of the RTC
ofSan Pablo City where he has been convicted of the crime violating Sec. 15, Art. II and
Sec. 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to pay fine of P20, 000 and the
cost of suit. Likewise, Jaime Pagtakhan, was also charged with illegal possession of
regulated drug violating Sec.16, Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act. However, Sonia
Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because as for the words of the trial court
“she cannot be located”. The three cases were consolidated for a joint trial. In Branch
30 of the RTC San Pablo City. According to the accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso,
the said accusation of illegal possession of dangerous has been framed up or planted
evidence. Aside from that, he contends that the search warrant is a general warrant
which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated, and the search
conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible?

HELD:

The search warrant issued for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended is not a general search warrant. The warrant specifically specifies the location
to be searched and the items to be seized, as well as the offense involved, which is
illegal possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia. The appellant's
contention that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense is
unpersuasive. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically
with dangerous drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses that are closely
related or belong to the same class or species.

The court found that the search warrant in question does not come under the strictures
of the Stonehill doctrine. The warrant does not mention the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding for probable cause. The search warrant
also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description of
the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The rationale laid down in Prudente vs. Dayrit holds true in the instant case, as it upheld
the validity of a search warrant assailed as having been allegedly issued for more than
one offense since it did not contain any reference to any particular provision of P.D. No.
1866 that was violated, when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses. Since
Search Warrant No. 028 is valid, the articles seized by virtue of its execution may be
admitted in evidence. The trial court committed no error in denying the appellant's
motion to quash the warrant and refusing to dismiss the informations filed against him.