BIBLIOTIIECA EPHEMERIDUM TIIEOLOGICARUM LOY ANIENSIUM

CLII

THE MYRIAD CHRIST

PLURALITY AND THE QUEST FOR UNITY
IN CONTEMPORARY CHRISTOLOGY

EDITED BY

T. MERRIGAN AND J. HAERS

LEUVEN UITGEVERII PEETERS

UNIVERSITY PRESS LEUVEN - PARJS - STERLING, VIRGINIA
2000
 ISBN 90 5867 009 0 (Leuven University Press)
D/2000/1869/9
ISBN 90-429-0900-5 (Peeters Leuven)
D/2000/0602/105
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The myriad Christ: plurality and the quest for unity in contemporary christology / edited
by T. Merrigan and J. Haers.
p. cm. - (Bibliotheca Ephemeridwn theologicarum Lovaniensium; 152)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9058670090 (University Press: alk. paper) - ISBN 9042909005 (Uitgeverij
Peeters: alk. paper)
1. Jesus Christ--Person and offices--Congresses. I. Merrigan, Terrence. II. Haers,
Jacques. HI. Series.
BT202 .M94 2000
232--d<:21
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© 2000 - Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium)
PREFACE
The papers gathered here are the fruit of an international congress
held at the Faculty of Theology of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
18-21 November, 1997. The theme of the congress serves as the title of
the present work, The Myriad Christ: Plurality and the Quest for Unity
in Contemporary Theology. The title of the congress and the book is
largely self-explanatory. What is at issue is the multiplicity of portraits
of Jesus which characterizes the contemporary theological landscape,
and the challenges thrown up by this multiplicity. To survey the state of
contemporary christology is to be reminded of those celebrated lines
from William Butler Yeats' poem, The Second Coming:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
00-058022
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-<limmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Can properly Christian discourse survive if its traditional center, the
God-man, Jesus Christ, is dissolved into a myriad of disparate and even
conflicting images and notions? Is the quest for unity in christology illu-
sory and even counterproductive? And what are the preconditions for
authentic christological discourse? In an age such as ours when the dis-
cipline has been opened up to all comers, Yeats' vision of a situation in
which "the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passion-
ate intensity" does not seem so farfetched. But how are we to acquire
the insight which will allow us to know when that state of affairs has
been reached? Where are we begin our quest? These are the sorts of
questions which this collection considers.
The first group of papers assembled here; "The Quest for a Theologi-
cal Norm", addresses the question of the starting point of christology,
especially in the light of the contemporary experience of pluralism. The
second group, "Biblical and Patristic Perspectives", examines some of
the 'classical' sources of, and approaches to, christological discourse. The
third group, "The Plurality of Religions and Cultures", reflects on the
development of christology as the discipline spread beyond the 'classical'
 CHRISTOS POSTMODERNUS
AN ATTEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOGY

From the outset of the Christian era, the central place of Jesus Christ
in Christianity has evoked much theological reflection and controversy,
and this remains the case in our days of postmodernism and plurality.
What is the truth about Christ? How does he fulfill his role of being 'the
way, the truth, and the life' (Jn 14,6). In a recent article in Concilium,
Pierre Gisel wrote the following: "The christological truth presupposes
that one dissociates oneself from every christolatry, precisely because of
the truth which it reveals, concerning God as well as concerning human
beings" 1• Consequently, Jesus Christ is better considered not so much as
the divine founder of Christianity but as its continual central point of ref-
erence. He is locus of revelation and mediation: "body and shape in
which the human and the divine, the divine and the human [ ... ] appear,
are linked to each other or are 'mediated"' 2. In this manner, Jesus is
'Jesus Christ'. Moreover, he is neither the substitute for God, nor a
super-man, but the (ultimate) reference to God (Father, Spirit). Whoever
praises the person of Jesus Christ, because of himself, without heeding
the essential linkage to the twofold theological problem of the truth and
identity of God, and the truth and identity of human beings, yields to the
seduction of (christolatric) absolutism.
This seduction of absolutizing Christ is only one part of the story. In
the wake of (modern totalizing) master narratives, which for the most
part have lost all plausibility, and in view of the generally acknowledged
plurality of world religions, Christian claims about Jesus would seem to
be under attack. These claims are addressed especially to the definitive
character of the revelation which occurred in Jesus Christ and his
urtiqueness as mediator of salvation, or to phrase it differently: the
divinity of the human being Jesus Christ. In Christian circles too, nowa-
days, truth claims can no longer easily withstand a tendency towards rel-
ativization. For, in the eyes of many contemporaries, all religions are
equal. Hence, no religious founder can be privileged. Jesus Christ must
then be regarded as a religious genius like Buddha or Mohammed -
human beings at the origin of a world religion, praiseworthy but nothing

l. P. GISEL, De grenzen van de christologie of de bekoring van de ahsoluutheid, in

Concilium (1997) I, 75-85, p. 76 (my translation).
2. Ibid., p. 78 (my translation).
578 L. BOEVE
more. At the other end of the religious spectrum, the reactive rise of
diverse fundamentalisms expressing absolute truth claims about Jesus
Christ, represent a major consequence of this relativization of what is
considered to belong among the central truths of Christianity.
This situation, being challenged and tempted by both absolutism and
relativism, leaves theology with some serious questions about the self-
perception of Christianity and the centrality of Jesus Christ. The old
answers appear to be inadequate. In our so-called postmodern condition,
theology seems in need of new patterns of thought, a new approach to
address the challenges of Christianity's self-perception and the centrality
of Jesus Christ herein, thus engaging in a new fides quaerens inte/lec-
tum. A large number of contemporary theologians dedicate their
research to this endeavor.
On other occasions, I have already proposed the model of an 'open
narrative' as an adequate paradigm to situate Christianity after the fall of
master narratives in the postmodern condition 3• In what follows, I will
first briefly sketch the main lines of this model; afterwards, starting
from this model, I will focus especially on a contextually plausible con-
ception of the central place of Jesus Christ within Christianity, a con..
ception which also yields some indications regarding the hermeneutical
position of Christian theology.
CHRISTIANITY AS AN OPEN NARRATIVE
The model of the 'open narrative' is based on patterns of thought
developed by critical postmodern philosophers4• In their critique of the
3. See the references in the following footnotes.
4. These include the French philosophers of difference, such as J.-F. Lyotard, J.
Derrida, M. Foucault, etc. These paragraphs are inspired by some of Lyotanrs
thoughts; see La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir, Paris, Minuit, 1-979
(transl. The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge, Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1984); Le diffirend, Paris, Minuit, 1983 (transl. The Differend.
Phrases in Dispute, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988); Le postmoderm
exp/iqut aux en/ants. Correspondance 1982-1985, Paris, Galil6e, 1986 (transl The
Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985, Minneapolis, University of Min-
nesota Press, 1993); L'inhumain. Causeries sur le temps, Paris, Galilee, 1988 (transl.
The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991). See also: Pere-
grinations. Law, Form, Event, New York, Columbia University Press, 1988. For a the-
ological evaluation, see my Theo/ogie na het christelijke grote verhaaL In het spoor
van Jean-Franr;ois Lyotard, in Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie 5S
(1994) 269-295 (with a swrunary in English), and my Bearing Witness to the Dijfer-
end: A Model for Theologi:ing in the Postmodern Context, in Louvain Studies 20
(1995) 362-379.
CHRISTUS POSThtODERNUS: AN ATTEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLCX:.Y 579
grand or master narratives, these philosophers resolutely discard every
hegemonic identification of the truth with a particular narrative. Having
become conscious of the finitude, the particularity and the contingency
of existence, no one can claim to have access to Truth-as-such. One does
not possess truth; absolute truth claims are no longer plausible. From
now on, the space for Truth-as-such is left empty. Of course, this must
not stop us speaking about truth. Although one indeed is unable to take
hold of the truth, one can, so to speak, remain in it, or relate to it. This
happens when one vigilantly holds on to the tension between the always
contextually determined articulation of particular truth claims and the
irreducible inarticulate Truth-as-such - i.e., when one is aware of the
unsurpassable gulf between one's own particular narrative and the in se
inexpressible Truth to which it bears witness. Truth. then, can no longer
be regarded in terms of appropriation but as relational - no longer as
something one can acquire.
For J.-F. Lyotard, the 'event' implies a fundamental questioning of
each articulation of truth. Such an event can be characterized as a hap-
pening of difference, in the sense of a 'differend' experienced in the
interruption of a particular discourse or narrative by that which can
never be grasped by the narrative itself. With this term, Lyotard points
to the experience of a breach caused by the paradoxical situation in
which one feels unable to express the full richness of Truth with a word,
a phrase, a narrative, and senses at the same time the urgency to testify
to it After/through the event, one can not not-speak, even if one is con-
scious that words necessarily fail. For, due to the contemporary critical
consciousness, Truth rather appears in speech as an empty place which
may never be filled up. Its appearance in speech qualifies, and if neces-
sary, criticizes, truth claims. Nevertheless, it also provokes testimony to
truth, albeit an impossible testimony, because, due to the particular and
contextual nature of language, it is always in a sense closing the event.
In this regard, one can say that the event as an experience of difference
results from a sensibility for the unutterable word, the non-expressible
phrase, the inconceivable thought. Lyotard then argues for a philosophy
which starts from a sort of contemplative openness for the event and
bears witness to it, refusing to weaken or negate it in hegemonic thought
patterns. So doing, philosophy testifies to that which does not lend itself
to expression in words. Instead of a grand or master narrative, in our
view, postmodern philosophy strives to become an open narrative: an
always particularly and contextually embedded openness to, and testi-
mony to the irreducible heterogeneity which accompanies human
attempts at truth.
580 L. BOEVE
It is my conviction that - within a theological perspective - this radi-
cal hermeneutic position is very recognizable to those mindful of the
deus semper major. In speech we refer to God but we do not lay hold of
God. This religious insight thoroughly relativizes every pretension of
this speech. At the same time, it actually points to its seriousness. After
all, it is only via our ever-particular language that we are able to make
reference to God: language is unmistakably the way to God - and thus
not to be belittled - even if one has to admit that it does not reach God.
Consequently, for the religious consciousness, a Christian narrative is
not an autonomous and static entity; it never contains the truth itself but
is an ever contextually anchored expression of the relationship of the
believer to God who is truth'. In other words: a Christian narrative, and
theology as its reflexive moment, is the expression of the relationship
between the word (our words) and the Word (the Logos), between artic-
ulation in tradition (traditions) and the inarticulateness of the original
Traditio6 • To stand in this tension is to be prevented from slipping into a
hegemonic truth-story, with absolute truth claims.
As a result, Christian narratives can never afford to fossilize. They
must be engaged in a continuing process whereby every articulation is
ultimately put under critique by the interruptive experience of the event.
by the inexpressible which always breaks up each new expression. Each
word is a word too little and a word too much. In a Christian perspective
'event' is the happening of grace, a grace-experience in which God
reveals Godself as inexhaustible Love, to which every human expression
and answer in word and deed necessarily falls short. From within itself,
by the event of grace, in which the ungraspability of God is revealed, the
Christian narrative is challenged to open itself, i.e., to respect and bear
witness to the event of grace - though being conscious that such a wit-
ness inevitably fills in the openness.
Since the Christian narrative, or, Christian tradition, in the way it has
reached us - primarily in the form of texts and stories - is not identical
with God, but is indeed the way to God, the main issue in reading the
traditional texts is not the word itself but the relationship of the word to
the Word7 • From this perspective, tradition is recognized as an ongoing
5. See my De weg, de waarheid en het !even. Religieuze traditie en waarheid in f.U
postmoderne context, in Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie 58 (1997) 164,.
188 (with a summary in English).
6. See my Tradition, (De')Canonization, and the Challenge of Plurality, in A. VAN DER
Koon en K. VAN DER TOORN (eds.), Canonization and DecaMnization (Studies in the His-
tory of Religions, 82), Leiden, Brill. 1998, 371-378.
7. See also my Between Relativizing and Dogmatizing: A Plea for an Open Concept
of Tradition, in East Asian Pastoral Review 32 (1995) 327-340.
CHRISTUS POSTMODERNUS: AN ATfEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOOY 581
recontextualization process of this relationship. Time and again believers
have sought for clues in their personal and conununal, historically devel-
oping and changing context in order to give form in word and deed to
the experience of grace as inexhaustible divine gift of love. And theol-
ogy for its part - as fides quaerens inte/lectum - looked for patterns of
thought to express reflexively what has been held in faith.
In what follows, I would like to use the thought patterns of the model
of the 'open narrative' to elaborate theologically, in a contextually plau-
sible way, the central place of Jesus Christ within the Christian narrative.
As my starting point I take the christological dogma of Chalcedon, a
dogma which, as Karl Rabner pointed out already in 1954, must not only
be considered an 'Ende' of a process of christological doctrinal develop-
ment, fixing orthodoxy, but, at the same time an 'Anfang' for further
reflection - which he pursued by means of his transcendental-theologi-
cal method8• In the next section, I will examine the status of the Chal-
cedonian formula itself. Afterwards, I will relate its status to its content.
Then I will answer the question of what it can mean to Christians, who
within the framework of the Christian narrative feel engaged by a reli-
gious sensibility which has become definitively apparent in Jesus Christ,
to profess of this Jesus Christ that he is both God and human. In the last
section, I draw some conclusions towards a contextually anchored
methodological apophasis in christology.
THE STATUS OF THE CHALcEDONIAN CHR!STOLOGICAL FORMULA
Christians from the fourth century professed at Nicaea (325) and Con-
stantinople (381) that the one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is con-
substantial with the Father (oµool'Kno,; ti/l 1tatpi), that this Lord Jesus
Christ became human, was crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried,
and, according to the testimony of Scriptures, rose on the third day9 • In
the fifth century, they further expressed the specificity of Jesus Christ by
professing that Jesus is - simultaneously and yet distinctly - God and
human. The Council of Chalcedon (451) professed that the Lord Jesus
8. Cf. K. RAHNER, Chalkedon - Ende oder A,ifang?, in A. GRII.LMEIER & H. BAcm
(eds.), Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart. Ill. Chalkedon heute,
Wilrzburg, Echter, 1954, 3-49.
9. Cf. H. DENZINGER, Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen
Lehrentscheidungen, 37th corrected and enlarged edition by P. HDNERMANN,
Freiburg/Basel/Rome/Wien, 1991, p. 63 (m. 125) and pp. 83-84 (m. 150). See also: N.
TANNER, Decrees of Ecwnenical Councils, 2 vols., Washington OC, Georgetown Univer-
sity Press, 1990, vol. 1, p. 5 and p. 24.
582 L. BOEVE
Christ is one and the same Son, at the same time perfectly and truly God,
and perfectly and truly human, according to his divinity consubstantial
with the Father, and according to his humanity consubstantial with us,
except for sin. Somewhat further in the text the council fathers pro-
claimed that Christ is known "in two natures (Bv Mo <pOOE<nv), which
undergo [in their union] no confusion, no change, no division, no sepa..
ration (ucrurxu,ms, <'t,pEmOli;, <'t.8tutpfams, a.xOlpicnms)". Unlike their
union, the essence of both natures is not dissolved but preserved, and
this in one person (µiu 01t6cnumi;), namely the Son, God, the Word, the
Lord Jesus Christ, as taught by the prophets, instructed by Jesus Christ
himself, and as handed down to us by the council fathers of Chalcedon
in their profession of faith 10.
In view of a correct understanding, one ought to investigate the spe-
cific status of the Chalcedonian formula, 'one person acknowledged in
two natures'. In fact, this formula is a - professed - dogmatical and doc-
trinal statement which was meant to conclude (but, as history shows, re-
opened) a conflictual process of reflection. The formula is a doctrinal
expression, belonging to theological discourse. In the context of the
time, the council fathers intended to bear witness to the mysterious real-
ity of faith with which they were confronted in faith, profession, and
preaching. Therefore, they used in a creative way the reflexive patterns
of the time which were available to them. This creative process of recon-
textualization resulted in a metaphorical statement, allowing them to
refer to that which had not been put into words before, that for which no
one had a language; at least no language which offered, in the context of
their time, in light of the reigning reflexive framework, enough doctrinal
stability to express the specificity of the historical human being Jesus,
called in faith the Christ, the Son of God, Logos-incarnate. This was
done in such a way that, against monophysitism and Nestorianism, both
Jesus' historical humanity and his professed divinity were really
acknowledged. And this metaphorical statement worked (historically), to
a certain degree. It succeeded in signifying in a contextually plausible
way the mystery of Jesus Christ as perceived in faith - in other words:
it was a striking evocation of the religious sensibility of the Christians
(i.e., theologians) of the time.
The metaphorical power of the formula stemmed from the fact that the
Fathers, in using the terminology available, kept vivid what in general
IO. DENzl:NGER, Kompendium, pp. 142-143 (nr. 302); TANNER, Decrees, p, 86. For a
dogma-historical explanation of these doctrinal professions and a basic bibliography, see
C. ANDRESEN, Handbuch der Dogmen- wul Theologiegeschichte. Band I. Die Lehren--
tvdcklung im Rahmen der Katholizitiit, Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1982.
CHRISTIJS POSTh1ODERNUS: AN ATTEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOGY 583
theological terms can be called the tension between the inexpressible
mystery of faith which resists articulation, and the historical context
determining all articulation; as religious language, the formula is rather
an expression of this tension than its neutralization and, accordingly, it
interrupts theological and religious discourse, rather than discursively
completing it. But, of course. this metaphorical power only remains
active if this tension can be preserved. And this can be done in two
ways11_
(I) When metaphorical language becomes most current in (or is com-
pletely adopted by) a particular vocabulary, the metaphors implied risk
becoming dead metaphors. In, and from, the context in which they
appear, they are provided with a specific, generally accepted and deter-
mined meaning. Metaphors have then become closed in themselves;
they no longer really interrupt; they no longer succeed in referring
beyond the discourse in which they play their role. In the case of reli-
gious metaphors, they lose the ability to bear witness to the indefinable
- yet defined - religious sensibility to the ungraspable Other, to which
the Christian narrative ultimately testifies. A dead metaphor leaves the
tension between inexpressibility and expression behind. In fact, once
become closed in itself, the metaphorical formula, 'one person in two
natures', functions only within theological discourse, and this no longer
as an interruptive metaphor, but instead as an argument, an unproblem-
atical element to be situated in the logical unfolding of a theological sys-
tematical exposition. Or the metaphor completely turns to stone, as hap-
pened with the title 'Christ', which has become a sort of name to
indicate the One whom Christians regard as the center of their narrative.
Language, on the other hand, which succeeds in vividly maintaining
the tension between inexpressible mystery and contextual articulation,
escapes from the ever-threatening process of closing the metaphor.
Accordingly, one consciously attempts to be present in this process, and
warns - simultaneously criticizing and testifying - against the conse-
quences of complete closure. One of the options in this regard is the cre-
ation of new metaphors, with the intention of pointing at the tension
revealed in the old metaphorical formula.
(2) The threat of dying metaphors is only one problem theology has to
face. Beyond this, one has to take into account that any metaphorical
dynamism is strictly related to the context in which metaphors appear
and live. This is of major importance when contexts change. We noticed
11. These observations are partly inspired by Donald Davidson's theory of metaphor,
especially as received by Richard Rorty (see R. RORTY, Contingency, Irony, and Solidar-
ity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 14 ff.).
584 L. BOEVE
already that religious language, because of that which it intends to
express, is in need of a process of adjustment when contextual shifts
occur. More specifically the vocabulary and the tension evoked in it
necessitate recontextualization. If one does not succeed in recontextual-
izing, the tension disappears and only dated meaningless language
remains, which in the end alienates because it is unable to refer to that
which is revealed in the tension. In such cases theology degenerates into
a closed and strictly argumentative discourse, not only without a beyond,
but also without contextual rootedness. 'One person in two natures',
then, no longer evokes a religious sensibility for the distinctive status of
Jesus Christ, but becomes mere a disengaged definition 12 •
In support of this argument I wish to point to the following formal
elements which accentuate strongly the witnessing, referring character
- versus a more argumentative, defining and determining character -
of the Chalcedonian dogma. First of all, this council statement - how-
ever doctrinal it may seem - is primarily a credal formula, and not as
such a defining description of a state of affairs. A creed implies a
bringing to verbal expression of an engagement, of a being gripped, a
turning towards someone to whom one stands in an (asymmetrical)
relation, and thus always implies submission and receptivity. In the
vocabulary of the model of the open narrative: a profession of faith is
intrinsically related to a contemplative basic attitude. In professing,
one intends to put into words that which reveals itself in the space of
this contemplative openness.
A second element pointing to the witnessing character of the Chal-
cedonian formula, consists of the manifest paradox expressed in the dog-
matical wording - a paradox which does not define from within the current
discourse but refers beyond. This paradox is strongly accentuated by the
12. See for this also: E. ScHlu.EBEECKX, BreukEn in christelijke dogma's, in IDEM et
al. (eds.), Breuklijnen. Grenservaringen en zoektochten. FS T. Schoof, Baarn, 1994, 15-
49, esp. pp. 26 e.v. (= Ruptures Jans les dogmes Chdtiens, in ET-Bulletin 8 (1997) 1, 11-
38, esp. pp. 21-31). Schillebeeckx develops the idea that it is also thanks to ruptures IUKI.
shifts in dogmatic formulas, that dogmas can remain true. He analyzes the tension
between religious sensibility, testimony, and context, and provides six reasons which rel-
ativize an 'immobility of dogma'. 'The first reason Schillebeeckx provides is of immedi-
ate relevance to our subject: the expressive but context-dependent power of language
necessarily causes ruptures in our understanding when contexts change. Schillebecckx
gives the following example: the meaning of 'person· and 'nature' at Chalcedon is
immensely different from what we understand by these in our days, In his opinion, the
Chalcedonian definition, when literally repeated in our time, would be heretical and
involve a hocus-pocus-language. "In the eyes of a modem hwnan being, a being which
shares the human nature is consequently also a human person. This is something which
undoubtedly does not contradict Chalcedon as such, but the neo-chalced.ionianism derived
from it, and which is dominant in many Christian churches" (pp. 30-31, my translation).
CHRISTIJS POSTMODERNUS: AN ATfEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOOY 585
four verbal adverbs: (dcruyx(m,)s, &.,pi:im,x;, &.8tmpi:,ox;, axropicr,ox;).
Concerning the simultaneously held divinity and humanity of Jesus
Christ, it is affirmed that both natures are not fused, are not changed in
their union, but at the same time that they are neither two non-related
parts of a larger whole, nor separated from each other 13 • Both terms,
which in current language are considered to be opposites, are affirmed of
the same Jesus Christ, without lifting the irreconcilability 14 •
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL DoGMA DoES WHAT IT EXPRESSES
AND EXPRESSES WHAT IT DoES
The paradox just referred to, calls for further investigation. Apart
from the formal observation that it really is a paradox, it appears that -
on the level of meaning and significance - the formula intends to think
transcendence and immanence, God and humanity, as mutually related;
in fact, it is concerned with putting in a reflexive manner this relation, or
mediation, between God and world, in which Christians find themselves
situated, and which they know to be present in the person of Jesus
Christ. Neither monophysite nor Nestorian positions could sustain this
tensile relationship to the very end, and destroyed the paradox. For it is
precisely in the paradox that the opportunity is provided to bear witness
to that which as such cannot be grasped in words.
The christological dogma is central to the Christian narrative because
it attempts to express what, as a formula, it does. The christological
dogma not only consists of a reference to the religious truth which took
shape in Jesus Christ, but offers at the same time the method of this ref-
erence. In this regard, it is worthwhile to recall Richard Schaeffier's
observation in Religion und kritisches Bewuj3tsein that religious dis-
course, as a world- and self-critical consciousness, gives expression to
the being phenomenon, the being-not-God of the world and religion 15 .
13. A more complete elaboration of the meaning of these temts can be found in
P. KNAUER, Die chalkedonische Christo/ogie als Kriterium fur jedes christliche
Glaubensverstdndnis, in Theologie und Philosophie 60 (1985) 1-15, pp. 10-11.
14. W. PFDLLER argues in reference to G. Sauter for the importance of 'aporia' in the-
ological discourse: "Endet Chalcedon aporetisch, dann ist es immer noch die Frage. ob
dies nicht unwnglinglich oder gar tbeologisch angemessen ist" (Pliidoyer fur eine 'nach-
kla.ssische' Christologie, in Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Theologie wul Philosophie 39
(1992), 130-154, p. 137 - I do not assentto all of the claims defended in this article). The
reference to G. SAUTER is to GrundzUge einer Wissenschajtstheorie der Theologie, in Io.
(ed.), Wissenschaftstheoretische Kritik der Theologie, Mtinchen, 1973, 211-232, pp. 238
ff.: 'Die Aporie: angemessenes Reden von Gott'.
15. See R. SOiAEFFLER, Religion und kritisches Bewuj]tsein, Freiburg, Alber, 1973.
586 L. BOEVE
Precisely in examining the proper conditions - the non-identity between
world and God-, religious discourse bears witness to God. In this way,
the christological dogma expresses not only the relation between God
and world (language), and thus the nature of our speaking about God,
but is also already a bearing witness to the inexpressible God. Simulta-
neously, it attempts to be an expression of both the method and content
of the Christian narrative. As Knauer states: the christological dogma of
Chalcedon is the criterium for all understanding of the Christian faith 1'.
This, however, on the condition that one succeeds with an adequate
recontextualization. We can indeed attempt to investigate and reappro-
priate the Christian metaphysics of being from antiquity, and thus try to
understand the Chalcedonian dogma in its context. But this metaphysics
is no longer able to elucidate reflexively our contemporary condition.
Moreover, it no longer functions as the contextual background of our
sensibility and language.
A RECONTEXTUAt.lZATION OF THE CHAt.CEDONIAN DoGMA
IN THE POSTMODERN CONTillCT
In the meantime, that context has changed dramatically. Nowadays
the credal formula 'one person in two natures' is repeated as a doctrinal
statement, in a way which, especially in view of current post-metaphys-
ical thought patterns, must be conceded to be a decontextualized way.
Only a serious recontextualization which departs from the religious sen-
sibility expressed in our contemporary context - and, in the case of the-
ology, in current reflexive frames - could restore to this dated credal for-
mula its power to refer beyond, so that it may again testify to this
religious sensibility. With this, I refer not to the 'original' referring
potential, which could never be retrieved from its context, but to a new
evocation of the tension between word and Word (Logos), between
articulation and the resistance to articulation - a witness of the event of
grace, as this is perceived in the contemporary religious sensibility. We
proceed as follows.
The christological dogma of Chalcedon (451) - Jesus Christ is simul-
taneously, unconfused but not separated, both God and human - did not
function on its own, but was understood as a further elaboration of the
first ecumenical councils of Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381). On
these occasions, the council fathers formulated the dogma of the Trinity
16. Cf. P. KNAUER, Die chalkedonische Christologie, pp. 10-11.
CHRISTUS POSTh10DERNUS: AN ATTEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOGY 587
and professed their faith in the one God, Father, Son, and Spirit (one
God in three persons). Chalcedon reflected upon the second person of
the Trinity 17 • The questions facing the council fathers focused upon what
later 18 came to be called the hypostatic union: how is one to understand
that the second person of the Trinity, the Son, the Logos, while being
God, is also a human being in Jesus Christ? (I have already mentioned
the conflictual context of this thematic, namely, nestorianism and mono-
physitism). It is important to notice that the starting point of reflection is
thus the divine Logos, the second person of the Trinity, who. as the
Nicene-Constantinopolitan symbolum teaches, is consubstantial with the
Father (6µoo6mo<; tip rrutpi). In other words: the problem which the
council fathers were facing can, in our context today, be described as the
problem of thinking the mutual relation between universality and partic-
ularity, taking into account that one starts from universality. More
specifically, how can one say of the universal God, the Son - 'through
whom all things came to be' - that He is at the same time a particular
human being? Focused adequately, the real problem is that of the par-
ticularity of the human being Jesus Christ. If God becomes human, what
of that humanity 19 ? And in coping in a creative-metaphorical way with
the vocabulary then available, evoking the paradox of 'one person in two
natures', the fathers succeeded in relating particularity to universality in
such a way that the former was not completely absorbed by the latter.
In the contemporary context we observe rather an inversion in the
christological discussion. It appears that the main theme is no longer the
reflexive clarification of particularity in the light of universality, but the
opposite: how can one think of universality in a context where 'particu-
larity' is more prominent? Indeed, the relation between particularity and
universality has changed as regards the Chalcedonian problem. The
postmodern condition, understood as radicalized modernity, is analyzed
17. In the counciliar acts, the definition of the doctrine of the 'two natures' follows
after the creed of Nicaea-Constantinople.
18. Cf. L. ULLRICH, Hypostatische Union, in W. BEINERT (ed.), lexikon der katholis-
cMn Dogmatik, Freiburg/Basel/Wien, Herder, 1987, 276-282, p. 278. The 'hypostatic
union' was officially mentioned for the first time at the second council of Constantinople
in 553.
19. Compare for example how G. MOLLER in the Uxikon der katholischen Dogmatik
(note 16), defines 'incarnation' (p. 286): "I[nkarnation] ist die Bezeichnung fOr die fun-
damentale Tat'iache des christlichen Glaubens, daB der dreieinige Gott in der Person des
ewigen Wortes, als der ewigen Selbstarn;sprache des Vaters, eine menschliche Wirk-
lichkeit sich unminelbar angeeignet hat, um durch sie als er selbst in der Sch5pfung
anzukommen zum Heil des Menschen. I[nkamation] kann den Akt der Annahme der
menschlichen Natur <lurch das Wort Gottes bezeichnen wie auch das bleibende
Angenommensein".
588 L. BOEVE
in terms of radical historicity, contingency, particularity and plurality. In
such a framework, the universality acknowledged by Christians in Jesus
Christ constitutes a problem. The concrete-particular, historically situ-
ated, contingent life-story of Jesus of Nazareth, called the Christ by the
Christian narrative, is to these same Christians - especially after the
pleas for a christology-from-below - in the first place, and with (rela-
tively) few problems - the narrative of the human being Jesus of
Nazareth, of whom it is said that he is at the same time God. Moreover,
this happens within a context in which one has become conscious of the
plurality of narratives, including religious narratives and, at the same
time, of the often exaggerated hegemonic pretensions of many of these
narratives. In this light, the christological problem does not appear as the
problem of the second person of the Trinity, God the Son, who became
a human being, but rather as the human being Jesus, called the messiah,
and proclaimed God by the Christians. In other words: how can one
think universality starting from particularity? A recontextualization of
the Chalcedonian christological dogma should answer this question.
A good example of the fact that the questions have changed is given
by the Flemish systematic theologian, Jef De Kesel, in his attempt to
interpret the '6µooucnos' of Nicaea20 • According to De Kesel, the con-
substantiality of the Son with the Father does not say as much about
Jesus Christ, as it does about the essence of God. It is not appropriate to
think about Jesus as starting from God - the opposite is true. "The
essence of God cannot be spoken about adequately without making ref-
erence to the historical and human event of Jesus. An immense inter•
vention in the concept of God is here at stake: with regard to its content,
God's essence is determined by the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ [ ... J After Him and because of Him, one must think and speak
differently about God" 21 •
How, then, is the particular human being, Jesus, both human and
God? As has been said, the christological dogma of Chalcedon did not
merely express the simultaneous humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ,
but pointed also to the tensile relation in which they stand towards each
other. The dogma indeed refers to 'one person in two natures', but the
four verbal adverbs accentuate the paradoxical character of this union of
divinity and humanity: to be sure, both natures are distinct from one
20. Cf. J. DE KEsEL, Hoe is Uw naam, waar zijt Gij te vinden? Over the verantwo-
or<fing van het christelijke geloof, Tielt, 1988, pp. 191-193. Also Peter Hilnermann accen-
tuates this shift (P. HDNERMANN, Jesus Christ. Gottes Wort in der Zeit. Eine systematis-
che Christologie, Milnster, 1994).
21. DE KESEL, Hoe is Uw naam, p. 192 (my translation).
CHRISTIJS POSTM:ODERNUS: AN ATTEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOGY 589
another, but not separated (axropicrtm<:;); on the one hand, they are not
confused (aO"llyxu,m<:;), but on the other, they cannot be considered to be
parts of a larger whole (aotmpetros); and moreover, both of them pre-
serve in their mutual relationship their own integrity ( a,peittm<:;). The
sentence following upon these four adverbs even underlines this tensile
relationship: by the union, the difference between both natures is not
lifted, but the distinctness is preserved22 • Precisely this being related of
the divinity with the humanity, and of the humanity with the divinity
enables the christological dogma of Chalcedon, when recontextualised,
to bear witness to the mediation in Jesus Christ between God and human
being, and to the relation between God and world (language).
In his own person, Jesus Christ signifies what we have called the rela-
tion between Word (Logos) and word - the mutually being related of
Word (Logos) and word. The Logos incarnated in the word, becomes sig-
nified in the word, but does not identify itself with the word. The word
'evokes', thereby determining the indeterminable Logos, and precisely in
this determining distinguishes itself from the Logos. The word never
becomes Logos, but is the way to the Logos23• To affirm that Jesus Christ
is both God and human, means proclaiming that in person, life, speech,
and deeds, he was the definitive henneneutics of God, but that he - him-
self being God - only can he approached in a radical-henneneutical way.
He is the definitive revelation of God, and this precisely in the paradoxi-
cal relation of God and humanity established in his person because, as a
person, he gives expression to the tension between the word and the Word
(Logos). In as far as Jesus Christ is a signification of the divine reality, the
same religious hermeneutical--critical proviso applies to him as to all other
religious discourse. The '6µ000010,' of the Son indeed implies, then, that
precisely in his person, life and words, Jesus Christ is considered by
believers to be the definitive signification (revelation) of God - 'Whoever
sees me, sees the Father' (cf. Jn 14,9)- but it implies at the same time that
his person, life and words, being signification of God, can only be known
as the word about the Logos, while standing in a relationship to the Logos.
In other words: God's superfluous love has been revealed in a particular
life story that does not exhaust this love, but nevertheless signifies it in a
definitive way. As a particular life story, Jesus's narrative, entangled by
particularity, bears witness to the universality of grace, which as such can
never be articulated.
22. Cf. H. DENZINGER, Kompendium, p. 143.
23. See R. Schaeffier's considerations about the religious word as phenomenon, both
unveiling and veiling GOO's divinity. Cf. R. SCHAEFFER, Religion wuJ kritisches Bewujlt-
sein, pp. 3lff.

590 L. BOEVE
In this way, one can conclude that a recontextualization of the Chal-
cedonian dogma does reveal the structure of the open narrative within
Christianity. Jesus Christ, in person, expresses the relationship between
word and Word (Logos). Precisely this - and here Christianity confronts
its very specificity - makes him the paradigm of the 'open narrative' 24 •
TOWARDS A METHODOLOGICAL APoPHASIS IN OIRISTOLOGY
One outcome of the recontextualization of the Chalcedonian christo-
logical dogma is that any authentic theological discourse about Jesus
Christ will shape itself as an 'open narrative'. Precisely because of the
'definitiveness' of Jesus' revelation of God, he is - i.e., his person, life,
and words. and the Christian narrative about him - only approachable
within the terms of an 'open narrative'. Our words about the Lord Jesus
Christ are a discourse which ventures to enter the tension between the
word and the Word (Logos). This implies that the question of the mean-
ing of Jesus Christ - and this question is not without importance, since
christology presupposes and implies soteriology (the 'for our salvation'
of the creeds is at stake) - can only be answered within the framework
of an 'open narrative'.
This consciousness - in our context made explicit in the terminology
of the model of the 'open narrative' - appears to be alive already from
the beginning, in the first narrative witnesses of what we might call the
Jesus Christ-event. Our sources regarding Jesus, i.e., the Gospels, were
meant to be testimonial literature, and certain elements in these sources,
such as (some) parables, arguments, and stories were clearly intended to
underline sharply this witnessing character - understood in terms of the
tension between the word and the Word. That is why the gospels, as
24. It could be made clear that Jesus Christ in his person, life, wocds, and deeds is
indeed paradigmatic for the model of the 'open narrative'. In his life and his life story
Jesus bears witness to the event of grace; he holds contemplation and kerygma, openness
and testimony, together in an exemplary fashion (par excellence). In his openness towards
the Father, his contemplative basic attitude, and his bearing witness to the grace appear~
ing within this contemplative openness, he writes his life story as an open narrative, as
witness to the event of grace by which he willingly allowed his narrative be interrupted.
Moreover, he became himself an event of what in a Jewish vocabulary is called resurrec-
tion - the interruption of the narrative of suffering. and death - and, in a-. far as this was
told and retold in the Christian Jesus-narrative. he also became witness to this event. In
fact, the event of the resurrection revolutionizes the violently closed narrative of life and
death. As 'open narrative' Jesus Christ always refers beyond himself. For another account
of this, see L. BOEVE. Een christologie van de onderbreking, in J. HAERs and T. MFRRI-
0AN (eds.). Christus in veelvoud. Pluraliteit en de vraag naar eenheid in de hedendaagse
christologie (Didache: geloof en religie), Leuven, Acco, 1999, 91-112.
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I
It CHRISruS POSTMODERNUS: AN ATfEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTOLOOY 591
narratives of and about Jesus Christ, in the same way as the Chalcedon-
ian dogma, do (are) what they narrate, and narrate what they do (are).
f Only as 'open narratives' do they testify to Jesus Christ as the 'open nar-
I rative'. The fact that the early Church found it necessary to canonize
four of them, illustrates this remarkably well.
I Hence, the Gospels support the affirmation made in the recontextual-
ization of Chalcedon, namely, that Jesus Christ is the definitive
hermeneutics of God, but - as far as he is proclaimed God - he can only
be approached hermeneutically. The term 'incarnation' signifies this ten-
sile relation between the particular, context-determined word and the
indeterminate Word (Logos). The dynamic of the 'open narrative'
between word and Word (Logos) took flesh in Jesus Christ.
The radical features of the hermeneutics urged by the recontextualised
Chalcedonian dogma strongly evoke the current philosophical (and the-
ological) interest in apophatic or negative theology. Philosophers of dif-
ference use the apophatic method to stress the non-foundational, non-
groundable nature of our thinking and to emphasize the ever-withdrawing,
ungraspable character of the irreducible remainder of difference, or oth-
erness at the borders of our thinking, preventing this thinking from com-
ing to absolute truth, from realizing full presence. Apophatic theology
leads, or gives expression, to the sensibility of a limit, which thus opens
a narrative from the inside2-'. In this perspective, apophasis is considered
in their writing a philosophical notion, more a matter of method, without
a theological outcome. The fruits of the 'via negativa' are the experience
of indifferent difference, not the divine Otherness, kataphatically
revealed as the God of love, in whom Christians profess their faith 26 .
Nowadays, theologians can hardly expect philosophers to conclude their
discourse with the Christian God27_ Nevertheless, given the fact that
25. See, for example, J.-F. Lyotard's interest in the proscription of images in Jewish
thinking, and Derrida's reflections on Pseudo-Denis' Mystical theology. Cf.
J. F. LYOTARD, Heidegger et !es Juifs, ... (tr. Heidegger and the Jews, .... ); J. DERRIDA,
Comment ne pas parler. Dtntgations, in IDEM, Psyche. Inventions de /'autre, Paris,
Galilee, 1987, 535-595. See also I.N. BULHOF & L. TEN KATE (ed.), Ons ontbreken heilige
namen. Negatieve theologie in de hedendaagse cu/tuurfilosofie, Kampen, Kok Agora,
1992.
26. In this sense one could say, as Jean-Luc Marion said at a conference on religion
and postmodernism (Villanova University, Sept. 2.5-27, 1997) that deconstructivists like
Derrida perform the deconstruction of a type of deconstructionism (negative theology).
Cf. J.D. CAPUTO & MJ. SCANLON (eds.), God, the Gift and Postmodernism (The Indiana
Series in the Philosophy of Religion), Bloomington/Indianapolis, Indiana University
Press, 1999.
27. Consider the objections of J. Derrida to J.-L. Marion's phenomenology of the
donation, ultimately leading to the God-Giver, a<; revealed in the Christian tradition
(cf. J.-L. MARION, Die sans l'etre, Paris, PUF, 1991).
592 L. BOEVE C1-IRJSTUS POSTMODERNUS: AN ATTEMPT AT APOPHATIC CHRISTDLOOY 593

apophatical theology is a part of the Christian tradition, it is probably one's starting point, on the one hand, the contextual and particular set-
obvious that theologians carefully study how negative theology func- ting of the Christian narrative (or rather, narratives), and, on the other
tions in contemporary philosophical reflection as an attempt at non- hand, the inexhaustible experience of grace in Jesus Christ. More specif-
metaphysical thinking. This must be done. not to adopt this philosophi- ically, one begins from a necessary, but at the same time, fruitful mutual
cal usage merely as if it is theology, but to engage it in the relation between both, which allows us to recontextualise the claims of
recontextualisation pursued at present28 • In view of our christological Christianity in a non-hegemonic way.
elaborations, we may contend that, as a matter of fact, the same apophat-
ical impetus is structurally present in the radical hermeneutics stemming Faculty of Theology Lieven BOEVE
from the tensile relation of the word to the Word (Logos), from the per- Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
ception of Christ as the paradigm of the 'open narrative' 29 • Because of St. Michielsstraat 6
the Word (Logos), the word is both kataphasis and apophasis, or more B-3000 Leuven
precisely, kataphasis conditioned by apophasis. Precisely this combina-
tion opens, what we could call, a third way in which the Word (Logos)
is referred to, no longer in either kataphatic affinnation or apophatic
negation, but in 'de-negation' or (in French) 'de-nomination', which
overcomes both affirmation (predication) and negation (suspension of
predication): words about the Word (Logos) no longer function proposi-
tionally but pragmatically. In other words, theology and, from our per-
spective, christology, does not involve a metaphysics of presence, nor of
absence, but of present absence, revealed in the tension between the
word and the Word (Logos). In the word, the Word (Logos) is present by
its withdrawal (what Pseudo-Denis referred to as 'hyper-ousia'). Pre-
cisely this constitutes the nature of the Word (Logos), and leaves the
word really word.
To conclude: it ought to be clear that the model of the 'open narra-
tive' is not only given from the context laid upon the Christian narrative,
but, once acquired, is rediscovered as the basic structure at the heart of
Christianity. The attempt to match this model and Christianity reverses
into a real theology and, for our purpose, a real christology of the 'open
narrative'. Doing theology thus no longer falls prey to fundamentalist
truth claims or relativist indifference, to christolatry or to religious rela-
tivism. By recontextualising the Christian narrative in dialogue with l
2
j
contemporary critical consciousness, Christianity realises, by means of l
its apophatical impetus, the relational dimension of truth, and critically
dissociates itself both from narratives of hegemonical appropriation of
1
l
truth and relativist dismissals of any truth claim. Hereby, one takes as
iI
28. The ideas proposed here are influenced by J.-L. Marion's presentation referred to
in note 27. See also his Prolegumenes a la chariti, Paris, Editions de la difference, 1986; l,
and Dieu sans J'etre.
29. Cf. the paradoxical title of Derrida's Sauf le nom, Paris, Galilee, 1993 (save the
name, or, except for the name).

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