D can plea for affirmative defence, self defence, if D has used reasonable lawful force to

prevent a crime or protect property from unlawful force or to give effect to lawful arrest or
termination of trespasser. It is a defence for all crimes and may lead to complete acquittal. The
principle for self defence is provided by s. 3 Criminal Law Act 1967 and governed by Section 76
of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act.
Self-defence can be pleaded even if D mistakenly believed that exercise of force is necessary for
protection (Beckford). However, if mistake occurred due to voluntary intoxication, D may not
be able plea successful defence, under S76(5) CJIA 2008 (Taj, Hatton). Similarly, if mistake
occurred due to insane delusion, then also D may not be able to claim defence, but can
consider defence of insanity (Oye). However, D must be acting, defensively in order to prevent
that threat, not for revenge and reasonable (Wilkinson).
S76(6) provides that D believed that force exercised was disproportionate than it would not be
reasonable in given circumstances, however proportionality of force varies with nature and
degree of threat (A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983)).
The use of force must be immediately necessary and no other options are available for defence
(Attwater).
D had no obligation to retreat or to seek help when faced with unlawful threat (Field).
When original attack is provoked by D, it does not disentitled D to use reasonable force for
defence. In Rashford, D received complete acquittal when force used was for justifiable reason
and was proportionate to that threat. However, in situation where D deliberately provoked the
attack, he will not able to claim self-defence (Keane). Marsh v DPP (2015).
If there is risk of attack and Defendant had honest belief of an imminent attack, then he can
make a pre-emptive strike.
A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983): It was said that the manufacture and storage of firebombs as a
protective measure could negate liability for an offence amounting, in effect, to the possession
of an explosive substance for an unlawful purpose

Lord Griffith in Beckford: A man about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to
strike the first blow or fire the first shot; circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike.

Whether the force exercised is proportionate or not is decided objectively, not form D’s point
of view.
If D overreacts it does not mean that used of force is disproportionate but Jury will consider
that factors that there can be errors while acting under tensity or extreme stress (Owino) so,
Jury will consider that whether level of force was reasonable (Press and Thompson).
Lord Morris in Palmer v R: ‘Detached reflection cannot be expected in the face of an uplifted
knife’.
S76(6) of Criminal justice and immigration Act 2008 also provides that force will be considered
unreasonable if it is disproportionate. S76(7) provides some factors upon which
disproportionality of force demands that person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be
able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action and he has honest and
instinctive belief in exercising such a force which will be considered as strong evidence that it
was necessary in such a situation.
In Clegg court dismissed the ground of self defence by stating that D fired the fourth shot, at
person after the danger has passed therefore use of force become simultaneously
unreasonable and disproportionate.
When D shot burglar by overreacting and used excessive force, it was ruled that it is question of
law and will be accessed objectively and D’s honest belief was not conclusive (Martin).
In Yaman Jury concluded that D used excessive force despite the fact that D was mistaken and
he honestly believed to be necessary.
S76 of 2008 Act is amended by adding new subsections 5A, which provides more relaxes
approach while accessing the reasonable reaction of householder.
Force will not be regarded as reasonable if D believed that force employed was grossly
disproportionate in given situation. Mr Justice Cranston said that when force is exercised
grossly disproportionate than it will be automatically unreasonable (Collins) but it does not that
force which is disproportionate is regarded as reasonable but it will be question of fact for jury
(Ray).

DRIVING OFFENCE AND PRIVATE DEFENCE

DURESS
Lord Murnaghan said that D claim defence for his criminal obligations if there are threats of
immediate death or serious violence in greater extent which cannot bear by ordinary human’s
power (A-G v Whelan).
1. Lord Bingham provided some factors for claiming defence of Duress, in Hassan, that threat
must be as to death or serious injury against D, which must be substantial reason for
committing the crime and need not to be sole reason (Valderrama-Vega). Serious injury does
not include severe pain (Quayle), similarly False imprisonment threats will not ground for
defence (Dao) but threat of rape can be (R v A).
Defence of duress was not available when D after escaping danger area continue to apply force
because of threats (DPP v Bell), an objective is applied to access when a reasonable person
would stop acting (DPP v Mullally). However, there must be a threat of serious physical
violence (GAC; Baker and Wilkins).
2. Moreover, it must be proof that threat was against the D himself or his family or someone for
whom D regard himself responsible. Threat can be aimed against D’s partner (Hurley v Murray)
or any family member (R v Z) or for whom D has assumed the responsibility or it may include
fear of pregnant women towards her foetus (GAC).
However, defence of duress was not available when Defendant argued that he became so
depressed in prison that he would have committed suicide, if they had not escaped prison, COA
provided that duress cannot be successful because threat of death and emotion were created
by Defendant themselves (Rodger and Rose). Here, COA did not allowed the defence of duress
because such emotions and thoughts were created by Defendant themselves and allowing for
defence would require amendments in previous law, which was not substantial and even not in
public interest.
In Shayler, an unclear threat to general public was considered not to be sufficient, when he was
not in such position to protect threat to general public. It also implies that threat should not be
directed from Defendant only.
3. Jury will be entitled to decide objectively that whether D’s act was reasonable, here Jury will
also consider that his respond to threat was in proportionate manner or not (Lord Hailsham in
Howe). However, in case D mistakenly assumed that there is threat against him, or against
anyone for whom D is responsible, such mistaken assumption will not be ground for defence,
unless his belief was reasonable (Hasan confirmed Lord Lane argument in Graham). Moreover,
there is requirement that threat need to be immediate (Abdul Hussain) or he has reasonable
believe that he would die or would suffer serious injury imminently (R v N).
Moreover, D has good reason to fear what was said to him (Graham). In Hegarty courts refused
to change the standard of reasonableness upon medical evidence that D was emotionally
unstable and was grossly elevated neurotic state. Even person with learning disorder may be
subjected to determination of reasonable firmness (Bowen).
However, where D has suffered family violence or rape and unable to avoid the threats can be
considered as evidence (Sewell). At same time self-induced attribution may not be considered
(Flatt).
R v A (2012): D convicted of the offence of perverting the course of justice when she falsely
retracted allegations of rape against her husband apparently believing that she would suffer
serious injury by her husband if she did not.
This fear was real but not based on reasonable grounds since no threat of violence had been
made to her when she made the false retractions.

4. it must be shown that D has committed or participated in crime only due to presence of
threat, if crime conduct can be committed in absence of threat, then defence would not be
available (Valderrama-Vega).
5. Moreover, there must be unavoidable threat or no evasive action by D, if threat could be
avoided by seeking police protection or raising security alarm, then defence would not be
available (Gill). However, it is not reasonably possible to call police or seek help (Hudson and
Taylor). Lord Bingham provided that Defence would only be available when D apprehended
imminent or almost imminent death or severe injury for failure to act, according to threat
(Hassan).
6. Similarly, if Defendant voluntarily had laid himself to the situation which is open for duress,
then defence would be available (R v Z). loss of courage due to voluntary intoxication cannot be
relied upon also (Graham).
In Sharpe, defence for Manslaughter was not available because he joined a criminal gang
voluntarily and he was aware that there might be a threat to force him for commission of
crime, defence may also be rejected when it was reasonably known to defendant (Hasan). Also,
applicable where Defendant led the risk of persuading even outside the boundary of criminal
(Heathe). Similar, conclusion was reached in Mullaly.
7. Duress may be successful defence to all crimes (Wilson (Ashlea)) except crime of Murder
(DPP v Lynch), attempted murder and treason (Gotts).
Duress can be argued for conspiracy to murder (Ness).
DURESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Defence of circumstances was firstly recognized as separate defence in Martin, it was provided
that Defendant’s conduct in such a way in order to avoid threat of killing or causing serious
injury.
Defence was successful when he drives over pedestrian precinct in order to avoid threating
violence from gang members, towards himself and passengers (Willer). Defence may be
available even he has reasonable mistaken believe (Conway).
Defence of circumstances was pleaded first time, in Pommell in which D argued that he
intended to take the gun to police station following day and gun was in his possession to avoid
killing.
COA ruled that

S and L (2009): Duress of circumstances was ruled available to a charge of employing

unlicensed security guards as means of addressing the risk of a terrorist attack on their premises
which abutted a public highway.
R v Petgrave (2018): COA affirmed that it would in a case where the D was charged for causing
serious injury by dangerous driving, when he had mounted the pavement and injured the victim
in trying to escape from a dangerous gang.