By Musharraf Nazir (0345-6502340)

The need for statutory interpretation The Need for Statutory Interpretation
Reasons for Unclear Meaning in Acts of Parliament:
Despite the aids mentioned above, many cases come before
the courts because there is a dispute over the meaning of an
Act of Parliament. In such cases the court's task is to decide
the exact meaning of a particular word or phrase. There are
many reasons why the meaning may be unclear:

A broad term • Broad Terms:

• Words covering multiple possibilities leading to
There may be words designed to cover several possibilities; interpretation issues.
this can lead to problems as to how wide this should go. In • Example: 'Type' versus 'Breed' in the Dangerous
the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 there is a phrase: 'any dog of Dogs Act 1991.
the type known as the pit bull terrier' which seems simple
but has led to problems. What is meant by 'type'? Does it
mean the same as breed'? In Brock v DPP (1993) this was the
key point in dispute and the Queen's Bench Divisional Court
decided that 'type' had a wider meaning than 'breed'. It
could cover dogs that were not pedigree pit bull terriers, but
had a substantial number of the characteristics of such a
dog.

• Ambiguity Ambiguity:
• Words with multiple meanings, causing confusion
This is where a word has two or more meanings; it may not over which meaning applies.
be clear which meaning should be used.

• A drafting error
Drafting Errors:
The Parliamentary Counsel who drafted the original Bill may • Errors made by Parliamentary Counsel during the
have made an error which has not been noticed by drafting of a bill.
Parliament; this is particularly likely to occur where the Bill is
amended several times while going through Parliament.

• New developments New Developments:

• Changes in technology or circumstances not
covered by existing legislation.
New technology may mean that an old Act of Parliament
• Example: Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981).
does not apparently cover present- day situations. This is
seen in the case of Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981)
where medical science and methods had changed since the
passing of the Abortion Act in 1967.
• Changes in Language Use:
Changes in the use of language
The meaning of words can change over the years. This was • Evolution of word meanings over time causing
one of the problems in the case of Cheeseman v DPP (1990). interpretation challenges.
The Times law report • Example: Cheeseman v DPP (1990).

of this case is set out below in the activity section.

Literal Approach vs. Purposive Approach

Cheeseman Case Illustration

• Literal Interpretation:
• Courts took literal words into account.
• Debate over whether defendant's act fell within
the specific wording of the law.
• Questions raised regarding the officers' status as
'passengers' in the context of the incident.
• Purposive Interpretation:
• Focus on preventing the behavior the law aimed
to curb.
• Emphasis on broader intent rather than the
precise wording of each word.
Conflict and Major Issues
• Judicial Dilemma:
• Debate between examining words literally or
accepting legislative limitations in covering every
scenario.
• European law leans toward the purposive
approach.
• European treaties lack precision, requiring judges
to fill in gaps.
Rules in English Law
• Three Interpretation Rules:
• Literal Rule
• Golden Rule
• Mischief Rule
• Differing Approaches:
• Judges may prefer one rule over another.
• Interpretation may vary based on the judge
hearing the case.
• Precedents set by interpretations form guidelines
for future cases.
• Importance of Understanding:
• Different rules can lead to contrasting decisions.
• Vital to comprehend each rule's implications in
• statutory interpretation.
The literal rule
Under this rule courts will give words their plain,
ordinary or literal meaning, even if the result is
not very sensible.
This idea was expressed by Lord
Esher in R v Judge of the City of London Court (1892) when
he said:
'If the words of an act are clear then you must follow them
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has
nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has
committed an absurdity. The rule developed in the early
19th century and has been the main rule applied ever since
then.
It has been used in many cases, even though the result has
made a nonsense of the law.
This is illustrated in Whiteley v Chappell (1868) where the
defendant was charged under a section which made it an
offence to impersonate 'any person
entitled to vote'. The defendant had pretended to
be a person whose name was on the voters' list, but who
had died. The court held that the defendant was not guilty
since a dead person is not, in the literal meaning of the
words, entitled to vote.
The rule is also criticised because it can lead to what are
considered harsh decisions,
as in London North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946)
where a railway worker was killed while doing maintenance
work, oiling points along a railway line. His widow tried to
claim compensation because there had not been a look-out
man provided by the railway company in accordance with a
regulation under the Fatal Accidents Act. This stated that a
look-out should be provided for men working on or near the
railway line 'for the purposes of relaying or repairing' it. The
court took the words 'relaying' and 'repairing' in their literal
meaning and said that oiling points was maintaining the line
Literal Rule in Law
• Definition: Courts interpret words in statutes based on
their plain, ordinary, or literal meaning, even if it leads to
nonsensical outcomes.
• Origin: Introduced by Lord Esher in R v Judge of the City of
London Court (1892) and established in the 19th century,
this rule remains prominent in legal interpretation.
Rule in Esher v R v Judge of the City of London Court (1892)
• Principle Established by Esher:
• Clear adherence to the words of an act, irrespective of
leading to a manifest absurdity.
• Court's Role Defined:
• No authority to question legislative absurdity; must
adhere strictly to the clear wording of the law.
• Historical Development:
• Emerged in the early 19th century and has remained a
fundamental rule in legal interpretation.
• Application in Legal Precedents:
• Despite resulting in nonsensical outcomes, this rule has
been consistently applied across numerous cases.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868):
• Offence Description
• Defendant charged for impersonating someone
entitled to vote.
• Case Details
• Defendant posed as a deceased individual listed
on the voters' list.
• Court ruled defendant not guilty because a
deceased person isn't entitled to vote.
• Criticism of the Rule
• Potential for harsh decisions due to literal
interpretation.
London North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946)
• Case Summary: Railway worker's death during
maintenance work.
• Issue: Widow claimed compensation due to lack of a look-
out man per regulations.
• Regulation Clause: Required a look-out for men "relaying
or repairing" railway lines.
• Court Ruling: Interpreted "relaying" and "repairing"
literally.
• Outcome: Oiling points deemed maintenance, not covered
for compensation.
and not relaying or repairing, so that Mrs Berriman's claim
failed.
Fisher v Bell (1961)
A shopkeeper had a flick-knife displayed in his shop window
with a price tag on it. The Restriction of Offensive Weapons
Act 1959 made it an offence to 'offer' such flick-knives for
sale. In ordinary contract law, goods on display in shops are
not offers' in the technical sense but an invitation to treat
preparatory to a customer making an offer.
Lord Justice Parker applied the literal rule of statutory
interpretation and found that the shopkeeper had
committed no offence.
With decisions such as the two above it is not surprising that
Professor Michael Zander has denounced the literal rule as
being mechanical and divorced from the realities of the use
of language.
Another problem of using the literal rule occurs when a
word has more than one meaning. It may be difficult to
decide which meaning should be used.
The golden rule
This rule is a modification of the literal rule. The golden rule
starts by looking at the literal meaning but the court is then
allowed to avoid an interpretation which would lead to an
absurd result. There are two views on how far the golden
rule should be used. The first is very narrow and is shown by
Lord Reid's comments in Jones v DPP (1962) when he said:
'It is a cardinal principle applicable to all kinds of statutes
that you may not for any reason attach to a statutory
provision a meaning which
So under the narrow application of the golden rule the court
may only choose between the possible meanings of a word
or phrase. If there is only one meaning then that must be
taken. This narrow view of the golden rule can be seen in
practice in
Criticism:
• Harsh Outcomes: Can lead to harsh judgments, criticized in
cases like London North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman
(1946).
Fisher v Bell (1961)
• Case Overview
• A shopkeeper and the display of a flick-knife in the shop
window.
• Legal Background
• Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959.
• Definition of 'offer' regarding the sale of flick-knives.
• Interpretation and Ruling
• Application of the ordinary contract law regarding
goods displayed in shops.
• Invocation of the 'invitation to treat' concept.
• Lord Justice Parker's use of the literal rule of statutory
interpretation.
• Finding: No offence committed by the shopkeeper.
Mechanical Nature: Criticized by Professor Michael Zander for
being divorced from practical language use.
The Golden Rule: Summary
I. Introduction
• Modification of the literal rule.
• Allows deviation from literal meaning to avoid absurd results.
Narrow Application
Case: Adler v George (1964)
• Background:
• Official Secrets Act 1920: Offence to obstruct Her
Majesty's Forces 'in the vicinity' of a prohibited place.
• Defendants obstructed HM Forces inside the prohibited
place.
• Defendants' Argument:
• Not guilty as the Act's literal wording didn't apply to
those inside the prohibited place; it applied only to
those 'in the vicinity' (outside but close).
• Court's Decision:

Adler v George (1964). In this case, the Official Secrets Act
1920 made it an offence to obstruct Her Majesty's Forces in
the vicinity' of a prohibited place. The defendants had
obstructed HM Forces actually in the prohibited place. They
argued they were not guilty as the literal wording of the Act
did not apply to anyone in the prohibited place. It only
applied to those 'in the vicinity', i.e. outside but close to it.
The Divisional Court found the defendants guilty as it would
be absurd if those causing an obstruction outside the
prohibited place were guilty, but anyone inside was not. The
words should be read as being 'in or in the vicinity of the
prohibited place. The second and wider application of the
golden rule is where the words have only one clear meaning,
but that meaning would lead to a repugnant situation. In
such a case the court will invoke the golden rule to modify
the words of the statute in order to avoid this problem.
A very clear example of this was the
Case: R v Allen (1872)
R v Allen (1872)
The defendant tried to marry again while he was still
married. He was charged under s 57 of the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, which makes it an offence for
whosoever being married shall marry again without the
previous marriage being ended.
The defendant argued that he could not be guilty, as his
second marriage was void. The court, using the narrow
application of the golden rule, decided that 'shall marry'
should be interpreted as going through a ceremony of
marriage, so the defendant was guilty. If any other meaning
were given to these words, the offence was incapable of
being committed.
• Divisional Court found defendants guilty to avoid
absurdity:
• Absurd if obstruction outside the place was
guilty, but inside wasn't.
• Interpretation: Words should be read as 'in or in the
vicinity of the prohibited place.'
• Golden Rule Application:
• Second, broader application: Words have one clear
meaning but lead to a repugnant situation.
• Court modified statute's words using the golden rule to
avoid the problem.
• Background
• The defendant attempted a second marriage while still
being legally married.
• Charged under s 57 of the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861.
• Legal Argument
• Defendant claimed innocence as the second marriage
was void.
• Court's interpretation using the narrow application of
the golden rule.
• Court Decision
• 'Shall marry' interpreted as undergoing a ceremony of
marriage.
• Defendant found guilty; any other interpretation
rendered the offense incapable of being committed.

Advantages of use of the literal rule Advantages of the Literal Rule

1. Follows Parliamentary Intent
2. Upholds Democratic Law-making
• The rule follows the words that Parliament has 3. Prevents Judicial Law Creation
used. Since Parliament is the democratic law- 4. Ensures Exact Law Application
making body, it is right that the judges should apply 5. Enhances Legal Certainty
the law exactly as it is written. Using the literal rule
to interpret Acts of Parliament prevents unelected
judges from making law.
• Using the literal rule should make the law more
certain, as the law will be interpreted exactly as it is
written by Parliament. This makes it easier for
lawyers and the public to know what the law is and
how judges will interpret it.
Disadvantages of use of the literal rule Disadvantages of the Literal Rule
1. Assumption of Perfect Drafting
2. Inadequacy in Covering Intentions
• The literal rule assumes every Act will be perfectly
3. Potential Ambiguity in Words
drafted. In the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, Parliament
4. Risk of Unfair Decisions
used the word 'type' of dog, whereas it should have 5. Criticisms by Legal Experts
used the word 'breed', as there is no such thing as a
type of dog.
• When the law is drafted, it is not always possible to
cover every situation that Parliament intended; see
Whiteley v Chappell (1868).
• Words may have more than one meaning so that the
Act is unclear.
• Following the words in an Act exactly can lead to
unfair decisions; see London and North Eastern
Railway Co. v Berriman (1946). Professor Michael
Zander has denounced the literal rule as being
mechanical and divorced from the realities of the
use of language

Wider Application
case of Re Sigsworth
(1935), where a son had murdered his mother. Case of Re Sigsworth (1935)
• Background:
The mother had not made a will, so normally her • Son murdering his mother.
estate would have been inherited by her next of kin • Legal Implications:
according to the rules set out in the Administration of • Absence of the mother's will resulted in the estate
Estates Act 1925. This meant that the murderer son would being inherited by her next of kin under the
have inherited as her 'issue'. There was no ambiguity in the Administration of Estates Act 1925.
words of the Act, but the court was not prepared to let a • The Act implied that the murderer son would
murderer benefit inherit as her 'issue'.
from his crime, so it was held that the literal rule should not • Legal Interpretation:
apply, and the golden rule would be used to prevent the • Literal Rule vs. Golden Rule:
repugnant situation of the son inheriting. Effectively the • Literal rule: No ambiguity in the Act's
wording.
court was writing into the Act that the 'issue' would not be
• Court's decision: Refusal to allow a
entitled to inherit where they had killed the deceased.
murderer to benefit from the crime.
• Application of the Golden Rule:
The golden rule respects the exact words of Parliament • Court's stance to prevent the
except in limited situations. Where there is a problem with repugnant scenario of the son
using the literal rule, the golden rule provides an 'escape inheriting.
route'. • Writing into the Act that the
'issue' would not inherit if they
It allows the judge to choose the most sensible meaning had killed the deceased.
where there is more than one meaning to the words in the
Act. It can also provide sensible decisions in cases where the
literal rule would lead to a repugnant situation. It would
clearly have been unjust to allow the son in Re Sigsworth to
benefit from his crime. This shows how it can avoid the
worst problems of the literal rule.

It is very limited in its use, so it is only used on rare

occasions. Another problem is that it is not always possible
to predict when courts will use the golden rule. Michael Zander's Description of the Concept:
• Termed a 'feeble parachute'
Michael Zander has described it as a 'feeble parachute'. In • Represents an escape route
other words, it is an escape route but it cannot do very • Limited effectiveness in action
much.

Advantages of the golden rule Advantages of the Golden Rule

1. Respects Exact Words of Parliament
2. Allows Judicial Discretion
This rule respects the exact words of Parliament except in
3. Sensible Interpretation in R v Allen (1872)
limited situations. It allows the judge to choose the most 4. Prevents Repugnant Situations
sensible meaning; see R v Allen (1872). 5. Example: Re Sigsworth (1935)

It can also provide sensible decisions in cases where the

literal rule would lead to a repugnant situation; see Re
Sigsworth (1935).

Disadvantages of the golden rule

Disadvantages of the Golden Rule
6. Limited Usage
• It is very limited in its use, so it is only used on rare
7. Rarity of Application
occasions, and it is not always possible to predict when 8. Unpredictability in Court Application
courts will use the golden rule over the literal rule. 9. Critique by Michael Zander
10. Comparison to a 'Feeble Parachute'
Michael Zander has described it as a 'feeble parachute'. In
other words, it is an escape route but it cannot do very
much.

The Mischief Rule

The mischief rule
This rule gives a judge more discretion than the other two
rules. The definition of the rule comes from Heydon's case
(1584), where it was said that there were four points the
court should consider. These, in the original language of that
old case, were:
1. 'What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide
3. What was the remedy the Parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
• Overview
• This rule grants judges greater discretion
compared to other statutory interpretation rules.
• Originating from Heydon's case (1584), it outlines
four key points for court consideration:
1. Pre-Act Common Law
• Understand the state of the law prior to the
enactment of the Act in question.
2. Identify Mischief and Deficiency
• Determine the lacuna or deficiency in the
common law that necessitated the Act.
3. Parliamentary Remedy
4. The true reason of the remedy.
"Then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy."
Under this rule, therefore, the court should look to see what
the law was before the Act was passed in order to discover
what gap or 'mischief" the Act was intended to cover. The
court should then interpret the Act in such a way that the
gap is covered. This is clearly a quite different approach from
the literal rule.
Cases using the mischief rule
The mischief rule was used in Smith v Hughes (1960) to
interpret s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which said 'it
shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or
solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of
prostitution'. The court considered appeals against
conviction under this section by six different women. In each
case the women had not been 'in a street'; one had
been on a balcony and the others had been at the windows
of ground-floor rooms, with the window either half open or
closed. In each case the women were attracting the
attention of men by calling to them or tapping on the
window, but they argued that they were not guilty under
this section since
they were not literally 'in a street or public place'. The court
decided that they were guilty, with Lord
Parker saying:
'For my part I approach the matter by considering what is
the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this
was an Act to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk
along the streets without being molested or solicited by
common prostitutes. Viewed in this way it can matter little
whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is
standing in the doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or
whether the window is shut or open or half open.
• Explore the remedy intended by Parliament to
address the deficiency in the common law.
4. Reason behind the Remedy
• Uncover the rationale behind the remedy
implemented by Parliament.
• Interpretation Approach
• Judges are tasked with construing the law to
suppress the identified deficiency and advance
the intended remedy.
• Emphasizes a departure from the literal rule by
focusing on filling gaps and addressing
shortcomings in the law based on pre-Act
conditions.
Case: Smith v Hughes (1960) - Application of the Mischief Rule
• Background
• Interpretation of s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act
1959
• The provision criminalized loitering or soliciting by
common prostitutes in a street or public place for
the purpose of prostitution.
• Court Proceedings
• Appeals against conviction by six different women
under this section.
• Details of the women's locations: one on a
balcony and the others at ground-floor room
windows (half open or closed).
• Actions involved attracting attention by calling or
tapping on the window.
• Argument and Decision
• Women argued they were not guilty as they were
not literally 'in a street or public place.'
• The court found them guilty despite their
locations.
• Interpretation using the Mischief Rule
• Lord Parker's perspective:
• Aim of the Act: Cleaning up the streets to
prevent harassment or solicitation by
common prostitutes.
• Emphasis on the Act's purpose rather
than the literal location of the
solicitation.
• Whether the prostitute solicits on the
street, stands in a doorway, balcony, or
at a window (shut, open, or half open) is
immaterial to the Act's purpose.

A similar point arose in Eastbourne BoroughCouncil v Stirling
(2000) where a taxi driver
was charged with 'plying for hire in any street' without a
licence to do so. His vehicle was parked on a taxi rank on
the station forecourt. He was found guilty as, although he
was on private land, he was likely to get customers from the
street. The court referred to Smith v Hughes and said that it
was the same point. A driver would be plying for hire in the
street when his vehicle was positioned so that the offer of
services was aimed at people in the street.
Elliot v Grey (1960)
The defendant's car was parked on a road. Its wheels were
off the ground as it was suspended jacks and its battery was
missing. The defendant was charged with the offence of
using an uninsured vehicle on the road contrary to the Road
Traffic Act 1930. The defence argued that the car was not
being used on the road as it was not able to be driven.
When interpreting the Act, the court applied the mischief
rule and decided that the car was being used on the road. It
was a hazard to other road users and it needed to be insured
in case of an incident or causing an accident. The Act was
aimed at ensuring road users were compensated if injured
by hazards on the road.
Note
It is clear that the three rules can lead to different
decisions on the meanings of words and phrases.
Advantages of the mischief rule
• Judges have greater flexibility in decision making as
it allows judges to look at the gap in the law that the
Act was designed to cover.
• It is preferred to the literal and golden rules as it
achieves Parliament's intention.
Cases Utilizing Statutory Interpretation
Eastbourne Borough Council v Stirling (2000)
• A taxi driver was charged with 'plying for hire in any
street' without a license, parked on a taxi rank on
private land at a station forecourt.
• Verdict: Found guilty because although on private
land, the driver could attract customers from the
street.
• Reference to Smith v Hughes was made, highlighting
that positioning a vehicle to offer services to people
in the street constituted 'plying for hire.'
Case: Elliot v Grey (1960)
Scenario:
• The defendant's car was parked on a road.
• The wheels were off the ground as it was suspended on
jacks, and its battery was missing.
• Charged with the offence of using an uninsured vehicle
on the road contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1930.
Defence Argument:
• The defence contended that the car was not being used
on the road as it was not capable of being driven.
Court Interpretation:
• The court applied the mischief rule when interpreting
the Act.
• Decision: The car was deemed to be used on the road.
• Reasoning:
• The parked car posed a hazard to other road
users.
• It was necessary for the car to be insured in
case of an incident or causing an accident.
• The Act aimed at ensuring compensation for
road users if injured by hazards on the road.
Advantages of the Mischief Rule
1. Greater Flexibility in Decision Making
2. Preference Over Literal and Golden Rules
3. Recommendation by the Law Commission
 • Its use has been recommended by the Law
Commission.

Disadvantages of the mischief rule

Disadvantages of the Mischief Rule
1. Risk of Judicial Law Making
• There is a risk of judicial law making as judges are 2. Potential for Legal Uncertainty
effectively re-writing the words of statutes. 3. Reliance on Extrinsic Aids

• Use of the mischief rule may lead to uncertainty in

the law, making legal advice difficult.

• It relies on the use of extrinsic aids to meet what is

thought to be Parliament's intention.

Rules of language Rules of language

Even the literal rule does not take words in complete
isolation. It is common sense that the other words in the Act
must be looked at to see if they affect the word or phrase
which is in dispute. In looking at the other words in the Act
the courts have developed
a number of minor rules which can help to make the
meaning of words and phrases clear where a particular
sentence construction has been used.
Overview
• Language interpretation involves more than literal
rules.
• Consideration of surrounding words is essential for
understanding disputed terms or phrases.
• Courts have developed minor rules aiding in clarifying
meanings within specific sentence constructions.

These rules, which also have Latin names, are:

1. the ejusdem generis rule

2. the express mention of one thing excludes others
3. a word is known by the company it keeps.

Rules of Language Interpretation

The ejusdem generis rule
1. Ejusdem Generis Rule
This states that where there is a list of words followed by • Limits general words to the same kind as specific
general words, then the general words are limited to the words in a list.
same kind of items as the specific words. This is easier to • Illustrated in cases like Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd
understand by looking at cases. (1970) and Allen v Emmerson (1944).

In Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd (1970) a workman had injured

his eye when brickwork which he was removing splintered.
He claimed compensation under the Construction (General
Provision) Regulation 1961. These regulations made it a duty
for employers to provide goggles for workmen when
'breaking, cutting, dressing or carving of stone, concrete,
slag or similar material.

The court held that brick did not come within the term 'a
similar material'. Brick was not ejusdem generis with stone,
concrete, slag. The reason was that all the other materials
were hard, so that bits would fly off them when struck with a
tool, whereas brick was a soft material. This ruling meant
that the workman's claim for compensation failed.

There must be at least two specific words in a list before the

general word or phrase for this rule to operate.

In Allen v Emmerson (1944) the court had to interpret the

phrase 'theatres and other places of amusement' and decide
if it applied to a funfair. As there was only one specific word,
'theatres', it was decided that a funfair did come under the
general term 'other places of amusement' even though it
was not of the same kind as theatres.
2. Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius
Expressio unius exclusio alterius (the mention of one thing
• If a list lacks general words, the Act applies only to
excludes others)
listed items.
• Example: Tempest v Kilner (1846) regarding the
Where there is a list of words which is not followed by
Statute of Frauds 1677.
general words, then the Act applies only to the items in the
list. In Tempest v Kilner (1846) the court had to consider
whether the Statute of Frauds 1677 (which required a
contract for the sale of 'goods, wares and merchandise' of
more than £10 to be evidenced in writing) applied to a
contract for the sale of stocks and shares.

The list 'goods, wares and merchandise' was not followed by

any general words, so the court held that only contracts for
those three types of things were affected by the statute;
because stocks and shares were not mentioned they were
not caught by the statute.
3. Noscitur a Sociis
Noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps)
• Words are interpreted in context with other words in
the Act.
This means that the words must be looked at in context and
• Involves analyzing sections within the Act, as seen in
interpreted accordingly; it involves looking at other words in
cases like Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere
the same section or at other sections in the Act. Words in
(1965) and Bromley London Borough Council v
the same section were important in Inland Revenue
Greater London Council (1982).
Commissioners v Frere (1965), where the section set out
rules for 'interest, annuities or other annual interest'. The
first use of the word 'interest' on its own could have meant
any interest paid, whether daily, monthly or annually.
Because of the words 'other annual interest' in the section,
the court decided that 'interest' only meant annual interest.

Presumptions Presumptions

The courts will also make certain presumptions or 1. Presumptions Overview

assumptions about the law, but these are only a starting
point. If the statute clearly states the opposite, then the
presumption will not apply and it is said that the
presumption is rebutted. The most important presumptions
are:
A presumption against a change in the common law
2. Presumption against a Change in Common Law
3. Presumption of Mens Rea in Criminal Cases
4. Presumption of the Crown's Non-Binding Nature
Unless Explicitly Stated
5. Presumption Against Retroactive Application of
Legislation

In other words it is assumed that the common law will apply

Legal Presumptions
unless Parliament has made it plain in the Act that the
common law has been altered. An example of this occurred 1. Presumption against Common Law Change
in Leach v R (1912), where the question was whether a wife • Common law applies unless explicitly altered by Parliament.

could be made to give evidence against her husband under
the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Since the Act did not
expressly say that this should happen, it was held that the
common law rule that a wife could not be compelled to give
evidence still applied. If there had been explicit words saying
that a wife was compellable then the old common law would
not apply. This is now the position under s 80 of the Police
• Example: Leach v R (1912) - Common law prevailed when statute didn't expressly
alter it.
• Current stance: S 80 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows one spouse
to testify against the other in violent crime cases.
2. Presumption of Mens Rea in Crimes
• Conviction requires proving the intent to commit the crime.
• Sweet v Parsley (1970) - Lack of knowledge absolved the defendant.
• Mens rea requirement not overridden by the Act.
3. Crown Not Bound by Statute Unless Explicit

and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which expressly states that • Statutes don't automatically bind the Crown unless explicitly stated.
4. Non-Retrospective Application of Legislation
in a crime of violence one spouse can be made to give • Acts of Parliament apply from their enactment date and not retrospectively.
evidence against the other spouse.

A presumption that mens rea is required in criminal cases

The basic common law rule is that no one can be convicted

of a crime unless it is shown that they had the required
intention to commit it. In Sweet v Parsley (1970) the
defendant was charged with being concerned with the
management of premises which were used for the purposes
of smoking cannabis. The facts were that the defendant was
the owner of premises which she had leased out and the
tenants had smoked cannabis there without her knowledge.
She was clearly 'concerned in the management' of the
premises and cannabis had been smoked there, but because
she had no knowledge of the events she had no mens rea.
The key issue was whether mens rea was required; the Act
did not say there was any need for knowledge of the events.
The House of Lords held that she was not guilty as the
presumption that mens rea was required had not been
rebutted.

3. A presumption that the Crown is not bound by any statute

unless the statute expressly says so

4. A presumption that legislation does not apply

retrospectively This means that no Act of Parliament will
apply to past happenings; each Act will normally only apply
from the date it comes into effect.

Unified approach Unified Approach to Interpretation

So how do all these rules fit together? Sir Rupert Cross wrote
that there was a unified approach to interpretation, so that:
1. A judge should start by using the grammatical and
ordinary or, where appropriate, technical meaning of the
words in the general context of the statute.
2. If the judge considers that this would produce an absurd
result, then he may apply any secondary meaning which the
words are capable of bearing.
• Starting Point: Grammatical and Ordinary Meaning
• Secondary Meaning in Case of Absurd Results
• Implied Words and Limited Power of Alteration
• Utilizing Aids and Presumptions
Limitations of the Unified Approach
• Literal Approach Basis
• Exclusion of the Purposive Approach
• Contemporary Shift Towards the Purposive Approach
• Differing Judicial Opinions on its Application

3. The judge may read in words which he considers to be

necessarily implied by the words which are in the statute,
and he has a limited power to add to, alter or ignore words
in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible,
unworkable or absurd.

4. In applying these rules the judge may resort to the various

aids and presumptions (see sections 7.7 and 7.10).

However, this unified approach is based on the literal

approach and does not allow for the purposive approach.
Today there is a move towards the purposive approach,
although not all judges agree that it should be used.
COMMENT
COMMENT
Should there be one preferred rule?
Should there be one preferred rule?
Need for Consistency
It would be helpful if there was one specific method of • Advocating for a Single Method
statutory interpretation which was always used in cases. At • The current scenario allows judges to select
their preferred approach to statutory
the moment it is entirely up to the individual judge who is interpretation.
hearing the case to use whichever rule or approach he
wants. Some judges may use the literal rule; other judges
may use the mischief rule or the modern purposive
approach. This makes it difficult for lawyers to advise on
what meaning a court may put on a disputed phrase in an
Act of Parliament.
In some instances, a judge may decide to use the literal rule
in one case and the mischief rule in another case. This
happened with Lord Parker, who used the mischief rule in
Smith v Hughes (see section 7.5.1) but in the case of Fisher v
Bell he used the literal rule. It could be said that this means
that a judge decides what result he wants in the case and
then finds the rule which brings about that result.
In 1969 the Law Commission proposed that Parliament
should pass an Act of Parliament which would mean that the
mischief rule was to be used in order 'to promote the
general legislative purpose'. However, this proposal has
been ignored, although Lord Scarman in both 1980 and 1981
introduced a Bill on the matter into the House of Lords. The
first time he was forced to drop the proposal; the second
time the House of Lords voted for it, but the matter was
never taken to the House of Commons.
There is an argument that, even if there were an Act of
Parliament, there would still be variations in which rule
judges would use. This has been shown in New Zealand,
which has a law that encourages interpretation 'as will best
ensure the attainment of the object of the Act'. Even though
this should mean that this is done in every case, one writer
points out that it is sometimes difficult to discover which
approach has been used and 'the most that can be said is
that some judges at some periods have been fairly
consistent in using the approach that they prefer'.
The purposive approach
This goes beyond the mischief rule in that the court is not
just looking to see what the gap was in the old law; the
judges are deciding what they believe Parliament meant to
achieve. The champion of this approach in English law was
Lord Denning. His attitude towards statutory interpretation
is shown when he said in the case of Magor and St Mellons v
Newport Corporation (1950):
• Lack of a standardized method leads to
ambiguity in legal advice and courtroom
expectations.
Judicial Discretion
• Diverse Application of Rules
• Judges exercising discretion: Literal, Mischief,
or Purposive approach.
• Illustration: Lord Parker's use of different
rules in distinct cases (Smith v Hughes and
Fisher v Bell).
Past Legislative Attempts
Historical Attempts at Reform
• Law Commission's 1969 proposal for a
Mischief Rule-focused Act.
• Efforts by Lord Scarman in 1980 and 1981
within the House of Lords, not pursued in the
House of Commons.
Effectiveness of Legislation
• Impact on Judicial Decision-Making
• Debate on whether legislation would
standardize interpretation despite observed
variations.
• New Zealand's experience with a similar law
emphasizing interpretation aligned with the
Act's objectives.
The argument persists that even with legislative guidance, judicial
discretion could still lead to differing interpretations, as evident in New
Zealand's legal system.
The Purposive Approach
Overview
• Goes beyond the mischief rule
• Aims to discern Parliament's intended purpose rather than
merely identifying gaps in old law
Lord Denning's Perspective
• Lord Denning advocated for interpreting statutes to fulfill
Parliament's intentions
• Stressed the importance of filling gaps and making sense of
enactments for effective implementation
Criticism from the House of Lords
• Lord Simonds criticized Denning's approach as a usurpation
of legislative function
'We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and carry
it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making
sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive
analysis.
However, his attitude was criticised by judges in the House
of Lords when they heard the appeal in the case. Lord
Simonds called Lord Denning's approach 'a naked
usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise
of interpretation' and pointed out that 'if a gap is disclosed
the remedy lies in an amending Act'.
Another judge, Lord Scarman, said:
'If Parliament says one thing but means another, it is not,
under the historic principles of the common law, for the
courts to correct it. The general principle must surely be
acceptable in our society. We are to be governed not by
Parliament's intentions but by Parliament's enactments.'
This speech shows the problem with the purposive
approach.
Should the judges refuse to follow the clear words of
Parliament?
How do they know what Parliament's intentions were?
Opponents of the purposive approach say that it is
impossible to discover Parliament's intentions; only the
words of the statute can show what Parliament wanted.
The European approach
The purposive approach is the one preferred by most
European countries when interpreting their own legislation.
It is also the approach which has been adopted by the
European Court of Justice in interpreting European law. This
influence of the European preference for the purposive
approach has affected the English courts in two ways. First
they have had to accept that the purposive approach is the
correct one to use when dealing with European law. Second,
using the purposive approach for European law is making
judges more accustomed to it, and therefore more likely to
apply it to English law.
Finding Parliament's intention
• Proposed that gaps in statutes should be addressed
through amending Acts rather than judicial interpretation
Lord Scarman's View
• Emphasized adherence to the words of the statute, not
Parliament's presumed intentions
• Argued that the courts should abide by Parliament's
enactments, not its intentions
Challenges with the Purposive Approach
• Difficulty in accurately discerning Parliament's intentions
• Opponents argue that only the words of the statute reflect
Parliament's will, making intentions difficult to ascertain
The European Approach
The European Approach
Purposive Approach in European Countries:
• Preferred method for interpreting their
legislation.
• Adopted by the European Court of Justice for
interpreting European law.
Impact on English Courts:
• Acceptance of Purposive Approach:
• Acknowledgment that the purposive
approach is correct when dealing with
European law.
Influence on English Law:
• Increased familiarity among judges due
to applying the purposive approach to
European law.
• Greater likelihood of applying the same
approach to English law.
There are certain ways in which the courts can try to
discover the intention of Parliament and certain matters
which they can look at in order to help with the
interpretation of a statute. Internal Aids for Statutory Interpretation

Intrinsic aids to interpretation 1. Long Title

2.
These are not rules as such, but judges can use certain
features within the statute to help make the meaning of
some words clearer:
3.
1. The long title may explain briefly Parliament's
intentions.
4.
2. Older statutes usually have a preamble that sets out
Parliament's purpose in enacting that statute.
Modern statutes either do not have a preamble or 5.
contain a brief one; for example, the Theft Act 1968
states that it is an Act to modernise the law of theft.
3. Other useful internal aids are any headings before a
group of sections, and any schedules attached to the
Act.
• Brief explanation of Parliament's intentions.
Preamble in Older Statutes
• Defines Parliament's purpose in enacting the statute.
• Modern statutes either lack a preamble or contain a
concise statement, e.g., Theft Act 1968.
Headings and Schedules
• Headings preceding sections and attached schedules
provide useful internal aids.
Marginal Notes
• Explanation of different sections.
• Not considered indicative of Parliament's intention,
inserted post-debates by printers.
Innovative Approach in Specific Acts
• Arbitration Act 1996 (s 2)
• Statement of principles of the Act within an
interpretative section.
• Encourages and supports the use of the
purposive approach in statutory
interpretation.

4. There are often also marginal notes explaining

different sections, but these are not generally
regarded as giving Parliament's intention as they will
have been inserted after the parliamentary debates
and are only helpful comments put in by the printer.

5. An unusual approach was taken in the Arbitration

Act 1996, where a statement of the principles of the
Act is set out in an interpretative section, s 2. This is
a new development in statutory drafting and one
that could both encourage and help the use of the
purposive approach.
Extrinsic aids to interpretation
Extrinsic aids to interpretation
1. Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation
• Extrinsic aids are matters outside the Act which may • Definition and Role
help a judge explain the meaning of words in an Act. • Types of Extrinsic Aids
They are: 2. Traditional Extrinsic Aids
• previous Acts of Parliament on the same topic • Previous Acts of Parliament
• Earlier Case Law
• earlier case law - the higher the court, the greater
• Historical Setting
authority the decision (see next chapter on judicial
• Dictionaries of the Time
precedent) 3. Evolution of Considerable Extrinsic Aids
 • the historical setting • Changing Perspectives
• dictionaries of the time the Act was passed. • Accepted Extrinsic Aids by Judges
4. Expanded Scope of Extrinsic Aids
• Originally, there were strict rules that other extrinsic
• Hansard
aids should not be considered. However, attitudes
• Reports of Law Reform Bodies
have changed and the following can be considered • International Treaties
by judges:

• Hansard
• reports of law reform bodies
• international treaties.

Hansard
Hansard
Hansard is the official report of what was said in Parliament Definition:
when an Act was debated. • Hansard is the official report of parliamentary
debates surrounding the enactment of legislation.
Until 1993, there was a firm rule that the courts could not Historical Perspective:
look at what was said in parliamentary debates. Some years • Pre-1993:
earlier, Lord Denning had tried to attack this ban in his • Courts were prohibited from considering
parliamentary debates (Davis v Johnson -
judgment in Davis v Johnson (1979), which involved the
1979).
interpretation of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial
• Lord Denning challenged this rule.
Proceedings Act 1976. He admitted that he had indeed read • 1993 and Beyond:
Hansard before making his decision, saying: • Pepper v Hart (1993): Relaxation of the
ban on using Hansard in interpretation.
Some may say... that judges should not pay any attention to • Majority acceptance for limited use of
what is said in Parliament. They should grope about in the Hansard.
dark for the meaning of an Act without switching on the Shift in Judicial Stance:
light. I do not accede to this view • Pre-1993 Views:
• Lord Denning's Perspective: Advocated
In the same case, the House of Lords disapproved of this, for considering parliamentary debates in
and Lord Scarman explained its reasons by saying: interpretation.
• House of Lords' Disapproval: Highlighted
the unreliability and potential confusion
'Such material is an unreliable guide to the meaning of what
stemming from using parliamentary
is enacted. It promotes confusion, not clarity. The cut and
debates for interpretation.
thrust of debate and the pressures of executive • Post-1993 Ruling:
responsibility... are not always conducive to a clear and • Pepper v Hart's Verdict: Allowed
unbiased explanation of the meaning of statutory language: referencing Hansard in limited instances.
However, in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart (1993), the Parameters for Consultation:
House of Lords relaxed the rule and accepted that Hansard • Conditions for Use:
could be used in a limited way. This case was unusual in that • Ambiguity, obscurity, or absurdity in
seven judges heard the appeal, rather than the normal panel legislation.
of five. These seven judges included the Lord Chancellor, • Clear statements from a minister or bill
who was the only judge to disagree with the use of Hansard. promoter alongside necessary
The majority ruled that Hansard could be consulted. Lord parliamentary material for
understanding.
Browne-Wilkinson said in his judgment:
• Lord Browne-Wilkinson's limited
acceptance for consulting Hansard.
The exclusionary rule should be relaxed so as to permit
reference to parliamentary materials where: (a) legislation is
ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an absurdity: (b) the
material relied on consists of one or more statements by a
minister or other promoter of the Bill together if necessary
with such other parliamentary material as is necessary to
understand such statements and their effect; (c) the
statements relied on are clear. Further than this I would not
at present go
CASE EXAMPLE
Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart (1993)
Teachers at an independent school were having their
children educated at a reduced rate, which was a taxable
benefit based on the 'cash equivalent of the reduction.
Under s 63 of the Finance Act 1976, 'cash equivalent could
be interpreted as either the additional cost of providing the
reduction to the teachers or the average cost of providing
the schooling to the public and the teachers.
In its decision, the House of Lords referred to statements
made by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury during a
parliamentary stage, which showed that the intention was to
tax employees on the basis of the additional cost to the
employer of providing the concession.
Discussion
Now, Hansard may be considered, but only where the words
of the Act are ambiguous or obscure or lead to an absurdity.
Even then, Hansard should only be used if there was a clear
statement by the minister introducing the legislation, which
would resolve the ambiguity or absurdity. The Lord
Chancellor opposed the use of Hansard on practical grounds,
pointing out the time and cost it would take to research
Hansard in every case. Since 1993, Hansard has been
referred to in a number of cases, even sometimes when
there did not appear to be any ambiguity or absurdity. The
Lord Chancellor's predictions on cost have been confirmed
by some solicitors, with one estimating that it had added 25
per cent to the bill. On other occasions, it is clear that
This demonstrates the historical evolution and the shift in judicial
attitudes towards referencing Hansard in legal interpretation,
particularly emphasizing the conditions and limitations imposed
post the Pepper v Hart case in 1993.
Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart (1993)
Case Overview: Taxable Benefit for Teachers at an
Independent School
Background
• Teachers receiving reduced-rate education for their
children, considered a taxable benefit.
• Determination of the 'cash equivalent' under s 63 of the
Finance Act 1976.
Interpretation Options:
• 'Cash equivalent' may signify either:
• Additional cost incurred by the employer to offer
the reduction to teachers.
• Average cost of schooling provided to the public
and teachers.
House of Lords Decision:
• Reference to statements by the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury during parliamentary stages.
• Intention: Taxation based on the employer's additional
cost in providing the concession.
Discussion
Use of Hansard in Statutory Interpretation
• Limited Application of Hansard:
• Hansard is admissible only in cases where statutory
words are ambiguous, obscure, or result in absurdity.
• Emphasis on clear ministerial statements resolving
ambiguity or absurdity.
• Historical Opposition to Hansard Usage:
• Lord Chancellor's practical concerns regarding time and
cost associated with researching Hansard.
• Predictions on increased legal costs affirmed by some
solicitors.
• Actual Usage and Impact:
• Post-1993, Hansard referenced in several cases,
sometimes without apparent ambiguity.
Hansard has not been helpful or that the court would have
reached the same conclusion in any event.
In Jackson and Others v Her Majesty's Attorney-General
(2005), the Law Lords again approved the use of Hansard as
an aid to statutory interpretation. They said:
In some quarters the Pepper v Hart principle is currently
under something of a judicial cloud. In part this is due to
judicial experience that references to Hansard seldom assist.
In part this seems also to be due to continuing
misunderstanding of the limited role ministerial statements
have in this field. It would be unfortunate if Pepper v Hart
were now to be sidelined. The Pepper v Hart ruling is sound
in principle, removing as it did a self-created judicial
anomaly. There are occasions when ministerial statements
are useful in practice as an interpretive aid, perhaps
especially as a confirmatory aid
Reports of law reform bodies
As with the use of Hansard, it used to be the case that
reports by law reform agencies should not be considered by
judges. However, this rule was relaxed in the Black Clawson
case in 1975, when it was accepted that such a report should
be looked at to discover the mischief or gap in the law that
the legislation based on the report was designed to deal
with. After all, a piece of legislation drafted following a law
reform report is likely to follow closely the
recommendations of the reform body and its reasoning.
International conventions
In Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd (1980), the House of
Lords decided that the original convention should be
considered, as it was possible that in translating and
adapting the convention to the legislative process, the true
meaning of the original might have been lost. The House of
Lords in that same case also held that an English court could
consider any preparatory materials or explanatory notes
published with an international convention. The reasoning
behind this was that other countries allowed the use of such
materials, known as travaux préparatoires, and it should
therefore be allowed in the UK in order to get uniformity in
the interpretation of international rules.
• Confirmed cost escalation in legal bills due to Hansard
usage.
• Instances where Hansard proved unhelpful or did not
significantly impact court conclusions.
• Judicial Recognition and Critique:
• Jackson and Others v Her Majesty's Attorney-General
(2005): Law Lords reaffirm Hansard's role.
• Recognition of judicial skepticism towards Hansard's
effectiveness.
• Emphasizing Pepper v Hart's foundational role, despite
current skepticism.
• Acknowledgment of occasional usefulness of ministerial
statements as interpretive aids.
Contemporary Views on Pepper v Hart Principle and Hansard
This summary encapsulates the evolution of the use of Hansard in statutory
interpretation, covering its limited scope, practical challenges, actual
impact, judicial critique, and recognition of its occasional utility in
interpreting legislation.
Reports of Law Reform Bodies
• Previously disregarded in judicial decisions
• Relaxed in Black Clawson case (1975)
• Used to identify legislative intent and address legal gaps
• Legislation based on these reports closely follows
recommendations and reasoning
International Conventions
• Original conventions considered vital
• Original meaning may be lost in translation to legislation
• English courts can refer to preparatory materials and
explanatory notes
• Aims for uniformity in interpreting international rules
across countries
The impact of EU law and the Human Rights Act 1998 on
statutory interpretation
The European approach
The purposive approach is preferred by most European
countries when interpreting their own legislation. It is also
the approach that has been adopted by the Court of Justice
of the European Union in interpreting EU law. This influence
of the European preference for the purposive approach has
affected English judges in two ways:
1. They have accepted that the purposive approach is
the correct one to use when dealing with EU law.
2. Using the purposive approach for EU law has made
judges more accustomed to it, and therefore more
likely to apply it to English law. Even though the UK
is leaving the EU, judges are likely to continue using
the purposive approach, as it has become so well
accepted in English law.
The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) says that, as
far as it is possible to do so, legislation must be read and
given effect in a way which is compatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).This approach applies
where one of the Convention rights is in issue, but it does
not apply otherwise.
An example of a court taking the HRA into account in their
decision was the following case.
A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(2004)
This case was heard by the House of Lords. Section 23 of the
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 gave the
government power to indefinitely detain foreign
The European Influence on English Law Interpretation
• Purposive Approach in Europe
• Most European countries favor the purposive
approach for interpreting their legislation.
• Court of Justice of the European Union employs
the purposive approach for interpreting EU law.
• Impact on English Judges
• Acceptance of Purposive Approach
• English judges acknowledge the validity
of the purposive approach in interpreting
EU law.
• Adaptation in English Law
• Usage of the purposive approach in EU
law influences English judges.
• Despite the UK's exit from the EU, judges
are inclined to continue using the
purposive approach due to its integration
into English law practices.
The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998
• Section 3 Requirement
• Legislation must be interpreted compatibly
with the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) as per Section 3 of the Human
Rights Act 1998 (HRA).
• Applies specifically when a Convention right
is in question; otherwise, this provision
doesn't apply.
• Illustrative Case
• Courts incorporating the Human Rights Act in
their decisions.
• An example is the following case [case
name/details needed here].
Case: A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(2004)
• Court: House of Lords
• Issue: Challenge against Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism
Crime and Security Act 2001 allowing indefinite detention
of foreign international terrorist suspects.
international terrorist suspects pending the making of a
deportation order. It was challenged by nine men being
detained.
It held that the indefinite detention of foreign prisoners
without trial under this section was incompatible with the
European Convention on Human Rights - Article 5 (the right
to liberty) and Article 14 [the right of non-discrimination).
The court observed that the UK does not have a tradition of
detention without trial and the section discriminated
between nationals and foreign nationals. As a result of this
decision the government had to introduce the Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005 which allowed for suspects of any
nationality to be subjected to a control order.
• Detainees: Nine men being held under this provision.
• Ruling: Found the indefinite detention under Section 23
incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights:
• Article 5 (right to liberty)
• Article 14 (right of non-discrimination).
• Observation:
• UK lacks the tradition of detention without trial.
• The section discriminated between nationals and
foreign nationals.
• Result: Government required to introduce the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005, allowing control orders for suspects
of any nationality.

Conclusion Conclusion: Evolution of English Courts' Interpretation

• Shift towards the Purposive Approach:
The attitude of English courts to interpretation has changed • English courts have shown a notable shift in
over recent years with a move towards the purposive recent years, favoring the purposive approach in
approach and the increasing use of extrinsic aids. However, interpretation.
the method used in interpreting a statute is still left to the • Increasing reliance on extrinsic aids has also
individual judge and it is quite possible that one judge will become a prevalent trend.
prefer the literal view, while another judge could form the • Judicial Discretion:
• The method of interpreting a statute remains at
opposite conclusion by applying the mischief rule or the
the discretion of individual judges.
purposive approach.
• Different judges may adopt contrasting
approaches, such as the literal view, the mischief
rule, or the purposive approach.
This diversity in judicial interpretation methods may lead to varying
conclusions among judges, reflecting the evolving landscape of
statutory interpretation in English courts.

Section A

1. Who discussed idea of literal rule .? 2

2. Name leading judge in Fisher v Bell . 2
3. How many applications in golden rule , name them. 2
4. Whats meaning of in the vicinity , Adler v George. ? 2
5. Write names of common law rules of interpretation. 2
6. Who was killed in Re Sigsworth? 2
7. Who was champion of purposive approach ? 2
8. What is hansard? 2
9. Write three rules of language with reasonable detail. 5
10. Explain ejusdem genris . 5
11. Explain express unius exclusio alterius. 5
 12. Write facts of Adler v George 1964. 6
13. Explain Hansard. 6

Section B

14. Explain the common law of rules of interpretation. 15

15. Write a detail note on Golden Rule supported by case laws. 10
16. Make a comparison between literal approach and purposive approach . 10
17. Explain Rules of language . 10
18. How can a judge find out intention of parliament . 15
19. What is impact of EU law and human Rights Act on statutory interpretation . 10
20. Explain intrinsic aid . 10

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Modal Answers

1. Who discussed idea of literal rule .? 2

Lord Esher discussed the idea of literal rule in the context of English Law in the case of R v
Judge of the city of London court..

2. Name leading judge in Fisher v Bell . 2

Lord Parker was the leading judge in the case of Fisher v Bell.

3. How many applications in golden rule , name them. 2

The golden rule has two applications: the narrow and the broad approach.

4. Whats meaning of in the vicinity , Adler v George. ? 2

"In the vicinity" in Adler v George meant physically nearby or close in proximity.

5. Write names of common law rules of interpretation. 2

Common law rules of interpretation include the literal, golden, and mischief rules.

6. Who was killed in Re Sigsworth? 2

Re Sigsworth involved the killing of the testator, Mrs. Sigsworth, by her son.

7. Who was champion of purposive approach ? 2

Lord Denning was a champion of the purposive approach in legal interpretation.

8. What is hansard? 2
Hansard refers to the official edited verbatim report of debates in the UK Parliament and its
committees.

9. Write three rules of language with reasonable detail. 5

Three Rules of Language in English Law:
 a. Literal Rule: This rule requires judges to interpret statutes based on their plain
and ordinary meaning, focusing on the exact wording regardless of potential
absurdities or outcomes.

b. Golden Rule: Under this rule, if the literal interpretation leads to an absurd or
unreasonable result, judges can modify the interpretation to align with the
purpose of the statute while still staying within the bounds of the law.

c. Mischief Rule: This rule involves considering the issue or 'mischief' that the
statute aimed to address and interpreting it in a way that suppresses the
mischief and advances the remedy intended by the law.

10. Explain ejusdem genris . 5

Ejusdem Generis: It's a rule of interpretation that states when general words follow specific
words in a list, the general words are interpreted to be limited to the same kind as the specific
words. For instance, if a law refers to vehicles like cars, trucks, and other motor vehicles, 'other
motor vehicles' would be interpreted within the context of things similar to cars and trucks.

11. Explain express unius exclusio alterius. 5

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius: This principle means that the expression of one thing
implies the exclusion of another. If a law explicitly mentions certain things, it implies the
intention to exclude other similar things not mentioned. For example, if a regulation lists specific
animals allowed in a park, the absence of dogs from that list would imply their exclusion.

12. Write facts of Adler v George 1964. 6

Adler v George (1964) Facts: In this case, Adler was accused of obstructing a member of the
police force 'in the execution of his duty.' Adler had obstructed a police officer in a legal duty,
but the wording in the statute mentioned "a member of the police force," which was
interpreted narrowly. The court ruled in favor of Adler, as the specific officer he obstructed was
not on duty as a member of the police force at that specific moment.

13. Explain Hansard. 6

Hansard: It refers to the official edited verbatim reports of debates in the UK Parliament. In legal
interpretation, referring to Hansard means looking at the discussions and debates in Parliament
regarding the passing of a law to understand the legislative intent behind the statute. However,
using Hansard to interpret statutes is controversial and subject to restrictions due to the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty.

14. Explain the common law of rules of interpretation. 15

The common law rules of interpretation in English law serve as a guiding framework for judges
when interpreting statutes. These rules aim to ensure consistency and clarity in understanding
 legislative intent. Below is an explanation of the common law rules of interpretation,
referencing relevant cases to illustrate their application.

Literal Rule: The literal rule emphasizes interpreting statutes based on their plain and ordinary
meaning, focusing on the actual words used in the statute. The primary goal is to give effect to
the intention of Parliament as expressed in the wording of the law. An essential case
exemplifying this rule is Whiteley v. Chappell (1868) where the court held that the defendant
couldn't be prosecuted for impersonating a person "entitled to vote" as a deceased person was
not technically entitled.

Golden Rule: The golden rule allows for a departure from the literal meaning when applying the
literal interpretation would lead to an absurd or unjust outcome. In Adler v. George (1964), the
court used the golden rule to avoid an absurd outcome by allowing the defendant to be
convicted under the Official Secrets Act despite a strict literal interpretation that seemed to
exempt espionage. This rule permits an alternative interpretation that aligns with the
Parliament's intended purpose without distorting the language excessively.

Mischief Rule: The mischief rule involves identifying the problem or "mischief" that the statute
aims to remedy and interpreting the law in a way that addresses this issue. Heydon's Case
(1584) established this rule by advising courts to consider four things: What was the common
law before the making of the Act? What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide a remedy? What remedy did Parliament intend to cure the mischief? What is the
true reason for the remedy? The case of Smith v. Hughes (1960) exemplifies the application of
the mischief rule in interpreting statutes related to soliciting in the street, where the court
considered the purpose of the law in its social context.

Purposive Approach: The purposive approach goes beyond the literal meaning to discern the
legislative intent by considering the purpose or objective behind the law. Although traditionally
not part of the common law rules, this approach gained prominence over time. In Jones v. Tower
Boot Co. Ltd (1997), the House of Lords applied the purposive approach to the interpretation of
the Sex Discrimination Act, emphasizing the importance of looking beyond the literal words to
fulfill the statute's purpose of preventing discrimination.

In conclusion, the common law rules of interpretation in English law—Literal, Golden, Mischief
rules, and the evolving Purposive approach—play a crucial role in guiding judges in
understanding and applying statutes. These rules ensure a balanced approach to statutory
interpretation, aiming to uphold the Parliament's intentions while addressing legal ambiguities
and societal concerns.

15. Write a detail note on Golden Rule supported by case laws. 10

The Golden Rule in English law is a principle of statutory interpretation used by judges to avoid
absurd or unreasonable outcomes when applying legislation. It allows judges to depart from the
literal meaning of words in a statute if following that literal meaning would lead to an absurd
result. The rule permits a more flexible approach to interpretation while still respecting the
intent of the legislation.

Case Law Illustrations of the Golden Rule:

 Adler v George (1964): In this case, the defendant was charged under the Official Secrets Act
1920, which made it an offense to obstruct a member of the armed forces "in the vicinity" of a
prohibited place. The literal interpretation would have acquitted the defendant as he was not
within the prohibited place. However, the court applied the Golden Rule and convicted him,
stating that "in the vicinity" should be interpreted to prevent an absurd outcome.

Re Sigsworth (1935): The Administration of Estates Act 1925 stated that a person who murders
another cannot inherit from the victim's estate. In this case, the defendant murdered his mother
to inherit her estate. The literal interpretation would have allowed him to inherit as he was the
next of kin. However, the court applied the Golden Rule to prevent him from benefiting from his
crime.

R v Allen (1872): The Offenses Against the Person Act 1861 made it an offense to marry while
still legally married to someone else. The defendant argued that he hadn't legally married his
second wife, so he wasn't guilty. The court applied the Golden Rule, emphasizing that the law
should not be evaded by technicalities and convicted him.

Significance and Limitations:

The Golden Rule serves as a tool for judges to prevent absurd outcomes while interpreting
statutes. However, its application is limited to cases where the literal interpretation leads to
absurdity, ambiguity, or inconsistency. It allows the judiciary to maintain the spirit of the law
without rigidly adhering to the literal wording.

In conclusion, the Golden Rule, demonstrated through various cases in English law, provides
judges with discretion to deviate from literal interpretations when necessary to uphold the
intention and purpose of legislation, preventing unjust or absurd outcomes.

16. Make a comparison between literal approach and purposive approach . 10

Comparison between Literal Approach and Purposive Approach in English Law:

1. Interpretation Focus:

• Literal Approach: Emphasizes the strict adherence to the actual wording of the
law or statute. It interprets statutes based solely on the literal meaning of the
words used.

• Purposive Approach: Focuses on the underlying purpose or intention behind

the law. It considers not only the literal wording but also the intention of the
lawmakers and seeks to achieve the statute's purpose.

2. Methodology:

• Literal Approach: Primarily relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words within the statute without delving into extraneous factors.

• Purposive Approach: Takes a broader view, considering the context, legislative

history, and purpose behind the law to interpret it in a way that aligns with the
intended objective.
3. Flexibility:

• Literal Approach: Generally rigid and limits interpretation to the literal meaning
of the words, sometimes leading to outcomes that might seem absurd or
impractical.

• Purposive Approach: Offers more flexibility by allowing judges to look beyond

the literal words to ensure a more practical and just outcome, even if it involves
departing from the strict wording.

4. Adaptability:

• Literal Approach: Less adaptable to changing societal needs or unforeseen

circumstances as it strictly adheres to the original wording.

• Purposive Approach: More adaptable and responsive to changing societal

conditions, as it considers the broader objectives and aims to achieve a fair and
just outcome aligned with the statute's purpose.

5. Conflict Resolution:

• Literal Approach: May lead to interpretations that are technically accurate but
might not reflect the underlying legislative intent, potentially leading to unjust
outcomes.

• Purposive Approach: Aims to resolve conflicts or ambiguities in statutes by

focusing on the legislative intent and achieving a result that aligns with the
statute's purpose, promoting a fairer and more equitable resolution.

6. Acceptance and Evolution:

• Literal Approach: Traditionally more entrenched in legal interpretation;

however, there's a growing acknowledgment of its limitations in achieving
justice in complex cases.

• Purposive Approach: Gaining more acceptance over time, especially in cases

where a strict literal interpretation might lead to unjust or impractical
outcomes.

7. Balance and Application:

• Literal Approach: Provides certainty and predictability due to its strict

adherence to the written text.

• Purposive Approach: Balances flexibility with the need for legal certainty,
aiming to interpret statutes in a manner that aligns with the intended purpose
while maintaining legal coherence.

8. Judicial Discretion:
 • Literal Approach: Limits judicial discretion as judges are constrained by the
literal words of the law.

• Purposive Approach: Allows judges greater discretion to interpret statutes in a

manner that fulfills the legislative purpose, even if it requires departing from the
literal wording.

In conclusion, while the literal approach prioritizes the literal wording of the law, the purposive
approach seeks to achieve the intended purpose behind the law, often requiring a more flexible
and contextual interpretation to ensure a fair and just outcome.

17. Explain Rules of language . 10 Marks

Rules of Language in English Law

Introduction to Interpretive Rules

• Understanding the literal rule in context.

• Importance of considering surrounding words and phrases in an Act for clarity.

• Development of minor rules aiding interpretation: ejusdem generis, express mention, and word
association.

Ejusdem Generis Rule

• Definition and application in legal context.

• Case Law: Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd (1970).

• Interpretation of Construction Regulations regarding goggles for workers.

• Limiting the term 'similar material' through the ejusdem generis principle.

• Exclusion of brick due to differing characteristics from other listed materials.

• Requirement of at least two specific words before a general term for application of the rule.

• Case Law: Allen v Emmerson (1944).

• Examination of the phrase 'theatres and other places of amusement.'

• Determination of applicability to a funfair due to lack of multiple specific words.

Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius

• Explanation of this rule excluding items not explicitly mentioned.

• Case Law: Tempest v Kilner (1846).

• Evaluation of the Statute of Frauds 1677 regarding the sale of 'goods, wares and
merchandise.'

• Exclusion of stocks and shares due to absence from the specified list.
 Noscitur a Sociis

• Understanding words in context for interpretation.

• Case Law: Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere (1965).

• Analysis of the phrase 'interest, annuities or other annual interest.'

• Narrowing the scope of 'interest' based on surrounding words within the Act.

Conclusion

• Recapitulation of the importance of interpretive rules.

• Significance in ensuring precise legal interpretation and application.

• Continuous relevance and application in English Law, shaping judicial decisions and case
outcomes.

18. How can a judge find out intention of parliament . 15

Finding Parliament's Intention in English Law

Understanding the intention of Parliament is a crucial aspect of statutory interpretation within

the English legal system. Judges employ various aids, intrinsic and extrinsic, to discern this
intention. The multifaceted approach involves analyzing intrinsic features of the statute itself
and delving into extrinsic sources, such as precedents and legislative debates, to derive a
comprehensive understanding.

Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation

1. Long Title and Preamble: The long title and preamble often provide concise insights into
Parliament's intentions behind enacting a statute. For instance, the Theft Act 1968
exemplifies this by stating its purpose as the modernization of theft laws.

2. Headings and Schedules: Internal cues like headings and schedules within the statute aid
in deciphering the meaning of specific sections or provisions.

3. Marginal Notes: While these provide explanations, they're not regarded as definitive
indicators of Parliament's intention, often added after debates for reference purposes.

4. Innovative Approaches: Some statutes, like the Arbitration Act 1996, incorporate
interpretative sections explicitly outlining the Act's principles, fostering a more
purposive approach.

Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation

1. Previous Acts and Case Law: Referencing prior legislation on the same subject and
established case law, especially decisions from higher courts, can provide substantial
guidance.
 2. Historical Context and Dictionaries: Understanding the historical context during the
enactment of the law and consulting dictionaries from that period aids in
comprehending the intended meaning.

3. Hansard: Historically, courts were prohibited from considering parliamentary debates

(Hansard) for interpretation. However, the landmark case Pepper v Hart (1993) relaxed
this rule, allowing Hansard as an extrinsic aid under specific conditions.

Significance of Hansard

Hansard, the official transcript of parliamentary debates, was once deemed off-limits for
interpretation. This stance changed with Pepper v Hart, where the House of Lords permitted its
use under specific circumstances.

1. Historical Perspective: Pre-1993, courts strictly avoided consulting Hansard, considering

it unreliable due to potential biases and the complexity of parliamentary debates.

2. Pepper v Hart (1993): This pivotal case relaxed the rule, allowing Hansard usage in cases
of ambiguity or absurdity within legislation. The ruling outlined specific conditions for its
admissibility, emphasizing clarity of statements from a bill's promoter or minister.

Conclusion

The quest for understanding Parliament's intention in statutory interpretation involves a

meticulous examination of both intrinsic and extrinsic aids. While traditional cues like titles,
preambles, and historical context offer foundational insights, the acceptance of Hansard as an
extrinsic aid, albeit limitedly, signifies a paradigm shift in interpreting statutes. The holistic
approach adopted by the courts acknowledges the evolving nature of legal interpretation,
seeking to derive comprehensive meanings aligned with legislative intent while ensuring judicial
clarity and coherence.

19. What is impact of EU law and human Rights Act on statutory interpretation . 15

Impact of EU Law and Human Rights Act on Statutory Interpretation in English Law
European Influence on Statutory Interpretation
Purposive Approach and EU Law
The European preference for the purposive approach in interpreting legislation has significantly
impacted English law. English judges have acknowledged the validity of the purposive approach
in dealing with EU law. This influence is primarily observed through the Court of Justice of the
European Union, which consistently employs the purposive approach when interpreting EU
legislation. Consequently, English judges have embraced this approach in their interpretation of
EU law, recognizing its efficacy and applicability. Despite the UK's exit from the EU, the
widespread acceptance of the purposive approach within English law suggests its continued
usage, as it has become a well-established method.
Application of Purposive Approach in English Law
The utilization of the purposive approach in interpreting EU law has resulted in English judges
becoming more familiar and inclined towards its use. This familiarity has transcended EU law,
influencing the application of the purposive approach to English law itself. The adaptability and
effectiveness of this approach, as evident in EU law interpretation, have encouraged English
judges to apply it more broadly within the realm of English statutes.
Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998
Compatibility with Human Rights
The Human Rights Act 1998 stipulates that legislation should, wherever feasible, align with the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This provision necessitates interpreting laws in a
manner consistent with the rights outlined in the ECHR when those rights are in question.
However, this requirement does not extend to situations where ECHR rights are not at issue.
Case Law Illustration: A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004)
In the case of A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004), the House of
Lords addressed the compatibility of Section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act
2001 with the European Convention on Human Rights. This section allowed indefinite detention
of foreign terrorist suspects without trial, pending a deportation order. The court found this
practice to be incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR, highlighting that such detention
infringed upon the right to liberty and discriminated between national and foreign individuals.
Conclusion
The impact of EU law and the Human Rights Act on statutory interpretation in English law is
evident through the adoption of the purposive approach and the necessity to align legislation
with human rights principles. Case law, such as A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, showcases the courts' engagement with these legal frameworks to ensure
compatibility and protection of fundamental rights within the English legal system.