Wa0007.

PC 46
VIth NOVICE INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023
VITH NOVICE INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF TIQUAR
W.P. (Civil) NO. XX OF 2023
IN THE MATTER OF
M/S SUN CARBON LTD. PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF TIQUAR RESPONDENT 1

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN TRADE RESPONDENT 2
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONER, SEZ RESPONDENT 3
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF TIQUAR.
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR.
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... VIII
SUMMARY OF FACTS............................................................................................................. IX
ISSUES ......................................................................................................................................... XI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................. XII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................... 1
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE? ..................................................... 1

1.1 THIS PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR. .............. 1
1.2 EXISTENCE OF AN EQUALLY EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IS NO BAR TO APPROACHING THE
SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION....................................................... 3
1.2.1. The Actions of the Respondents Violate the Principle of Natural Justice ................ 4
1.2.2. Statutory Relief under SEZ is not an efficacious and adequate remedy ................... 5
1.3 PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO EQUALITY UNDER ARTICLE 14 HAS BEEN VIOLATED. ................... 6
2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE

RESTRICTION LIMITS ON THE IMPORT OF PETCOKE BY CALCINERS IS
CONSTITUTIONAL? .................................................................................................................. 8
2.1 THE QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON IMPORT OF PETCOKE BY CLACINERS VIOLATES

ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR. ................................................................................ 8
2.1.1 Failure to pass the test of reasonable classification. ................................................. 9
2.1.2 The decision to Impose Quantitative Restrictions is Arbitrary............................... 11
3. WHETHER THE DGFT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE

PETCOKE QUOTA TO SUN’S SEZ UNIT? .......................................................................... 12
3.1 DGFT’S REFUSAL TO ALLOCATE PETCOKE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 ........................ 12

3.2 THE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SUN’S UNIT IN SEZ ....................... 14
3.3 LOCATION OF SUN’S UNIT IN SEZ IS A RELEVANT CONSIDERATION. ................................. 15
[I]
MEMORIAL FOR PETITIONERS
3.4 SUN’S SEZ UNIT PRODUCTION VIS-À-VIS PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ...... 16
PRAYER ...................................................................................................................................... 17
[II]
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
S. No. Abbreviation Expansion
1. § Section/sections
2. ¶ Paragraph
3. AIR All India Reporter
4. Anr. Another
5. Co. Company
6. CPC Calcined Petroleum Coke
7. DC Development Comissioner
8. Del Delhi
9. DGFT Director General of Foreign Trade
10. Ed. Edition
11. EPCA Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control)

Authority
12. FGD Flue Gas Desulphurizer
13. FT(D&R) Act Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act,

1992
14. FTP Foreign Trade Policy
15. GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tarriff
16. Ltd Limited
[III]
17. M/s Messrs
18. Mr. Mister
19. NDC Nationally Determined Contributions
20. No. Number
21. NO2 Nitrogen
22. Ors. Others
23. Prop. Proposition
24. Publ Public
25. Pvt. Private
26. R/W Read with
27. RPC Raw Petroleum Coke
28. SC Supreme Court
29. SCC Supreme Court Cases
30. SEZ Special Economic Zone
31. SO2 Sulphur Dioxide
32. UNCCC Union Nation Climate Change Conference
33. W.P. WRIT PETITION
34. WTO World Trade Organisation
[IV]
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF CASES REFERRED:
I. CASES
1. A.K. Kraipak v. India .......................................................................................................... 4
2. A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ................................................................................................ 3
3. Abhimanyu Sharda Son Of Narayan vs The State Of Rajasthan ...................................... 11
4. Ajay Hasia Etc vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors .......................................................... 14
5. Chiranjeet Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India.................................................................... 2
6. Citizen, consumer and Civic Action Group v. Union of India ......................................... 16
7. Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University ................................................................................... 10
8. Dr. N. Surender Kumar, And Another vs The Union Of India ......................................... 14
9. E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu ................................................................................ 11
10. Fateh Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR ................................................................................ 5
11. Gauri Shanker v. Union of India ......................................................................................... 9
12. Harbans Lal v Commissioner.............................................................................................. 5
13. Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan ......................................................................................... 9
14. K.K.Kochunni vs. State of Madras, .................................................................................... 2
15. Kanu Sanyal v. Distt. Magistrate, ....................................................................................... 2
16. Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P ............................................................................................ 2
17. Kinkri Devi And Anr. vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors........................................ 16
18. Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand ...................................................................................... 4
19. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh ........................................................................ 8
20. LIC v. Escorts Ltd ............................................................................................................... 2
21. M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, ........................................................................................... 11
22. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India ....................................................................................... 5
23. Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, ................................................................................. 10
24. Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner ..................................................... 5
25. National Co-operative Bank v. Ajay Kumar....................................................................... 5
26. National Legal Ser.Auth vs Union Of India & Ors ............................................................ 9
27. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India .......................................................... 3
[V]
28. R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority .................................................................. 11

29. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India ...................................................................... 2
30. Rain CII Carbon (Vizag) Ltd. v. Union of India............................................................... 10
31. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. Bal Mukund Bairwa ........................................ 8
32. Rakhaldas Mukherjee v. S P Ghose .................................................................................... 5
33. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana ...................................................................... 4
34. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, .................................................................................. 2
35. S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India .................................................................................... 13
36. Satwati Deswal v. State of Haryana .................................................................................... 4
37. Shayaro bano vs Union of India........................................................................................ 11
38. Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U. P.......................................................................... 3
39. Smt Chand Garg Bai v. State of UP .................................................................................... 4
40. Smt Ujjam Bai vs State Of U.P ........................................................................................... 5
41. State of Madras vs. V.G.Row ............................................................................................. 1
42. State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ..................................................................................... 1
43. Tata Cellular v. Union of India ......................................................................................... 11
44. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar ............................................ 2
45. TELCO Ltd. v. State of Bihar, ............................................................................................ 2
46. Union of India v. International Trading Co. ....................................................................... 8
47. Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan, .................................................................................. 10
48. V.K. Vanaja v. Union of India, 2019 .................................................................................. 6
I. STATUES
1. Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992
2. Special Economic Zones Act, 2005
II. RULES
1. The Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006
III. POLICY
1. Foreign Trade Policy 2015-20
[VI]
IV. OTHER AUTHORITIES

1. Director General of Foreign Trade, S.O. 5375(E) (Notified on October 23, 2018)
2. Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for NCR (EPCA), Report 91
(October 6, 2018)
3. Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for NCR (EPCA), Report 114
(July 26, 2018)
4. Director General of Foreign Trade, S.O. (E) (Notified on July 26, 2018)
5. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Guidelines for regulation and
monitoring of imported Petcoke in India (Issued on September 10, 2018).
V. BOOKS
1. Vol. 1, M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexus 2018)
[VII]
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of
Tiquar. 1 It is humbly submitted by the respondents to the jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Tiquar
under Article 32 of the Constitution of Tiquar.
1
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part\
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law
empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by
the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution
[VIII]
SUMMARY OF FACTS
PARTIES
1. In the present case the petitioner is Sun Carbon Ltd. (hereafter referred to as “Sun”). Sun
is a company with offices in Jaquar, Union of Tiquar and manufactures Calcined
Petroleum Coke (hereafter referred to as “CPC”) which is a critical raw material for the
Aluminium industry.
2. The respondents are Union of Tiquar, Director General of Foreign Trade (hereafter
referred to as “DGFT”) appointed by the Central government under Section 6 of Foreign
Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 (hereafter referred to as “FT(D&R) Act”)
and Development Commissioner, SEZ (hereafter referred to as “DC, SEZ”).
BACKGROUND
3. On 10.04.2017, the Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority (hereafter

referred to as “EPCA ''Tiquar through a Report recommended that the distribution, sale,
and use of furnace oil and pet coke be strictly banned in Tiquar. The reason for such a
recommendation was high Sulphur emissions due to the use of such fuels.
4. On 26.07.2018 based on the said report of the EPCA, Union of Tiquar, banned the import
of pet coke (both RPC and CPC) in Tiquar. This was a blanket ban on such imports.
5. On 9.10.2018, Union of Tiquar via an amended notification based on the representations

by the Association of Petcoke manufacturers, the Union of Tiquar, while continuing the
ban on the usage of imported pet coke [RPC and CPC] as fuel, permitted six industries
viz., (i) cement, (ii) lime kiln, (iii) calcium carbide, and (iv) gasification industries, (v)
graphite, and (vi) calciners to import pet coke for use as feedstock after taking into
account the pollution potential of pet coke.
6. On 27.01.2020, via an amended notification, the Union of Tiquar permitted the calciners
to import Petcoke for feedstock but with an upper limit restriction of 1.4 MMT per
[IX]
annum of Petcoke as the total allowable import limit. DGFT was directed to allocate a
Petcoke quota to eligible calciners under the limit of 1.4 MMT per annum on an annual
basis, based on their proportionate plant capacity. This was based on EPCA's concerns
over the notification dated 9.10.2018 that permitted import of Petcoke for calciners which
can reportedly be classified as a highly polluting industry.
ISSUES INVOLVED
7. In 2021 Sun also constructed a new calcining plant in a Special Economic Zone. When
Sun applied to the DGFT for the allocation of Petcoke, the DGFT denied allocation on
the ground that Sun’s Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Plant was not in operation on date
of the notification dated 27.01.2020.
8. Sun applied to the DC, SEZ seeking permission to import the raw materials i.e., RPC and
CPC to Sun’s SEZ Unit for manufacture, blending and re-export of the finished product
i.e., CPC [Toll Manufacturing/Job Work], per the SEZ Act, 2005, and SEZ Rules, 2006.
The DC, SEZ rejected the plea citing a notification dated 27.01.2020 wherein Union of
Tiquar permitted the calciners to import Petcoke for use as feedstock but with an upper
limit restriction of 1.4 MMT per annum of Petcoke as the total allowable import limit,
and allowing Sun’s SEZ Unit to import additional quantum, will be a breach of such
limits
[X]
ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE RESTRICTION

LIMIT OF THE IMPORT OF PETCOKE BY CALCINERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE DGFT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE PETCOKE

QUOTA TO SUN’S SEZ UNIT?
[XI]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE
The petitioner, Sun, being a company, is entitled to claim the violation of Article 14 and seek relief
under Article 32 of the Constitution, which is a fundamental right. As a sentinel on the qui vive
and a guarantor of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court should maintain this petition. The mere
existence of alternative remedies is not a bar to approach the Court, as it is a fundamental right of
the petitioner to do so. Moreover, the relief provided under the SEZ Act is not an efficacious and
adequate alternative remedy, and there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice.
Therefore, the Court should maintain this writ and provide appropriate relief to the petitioner.
II. THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE RESTRICTION

LIMITS ON THE IMPORT OF PET COKE BY CALCINER WAS
UNCONSTITUITIONAL.
The imposition of quantitative restrictions on the import of petcoke only on the calciner industry
and not on other industries violates Article 14 of the petitioner and other calciners. The
government, with the objective of curbing sulphur emissions caused by petcoke utilizing
industries, imposed restrictions only on calciners and not on other industries. However, the issue
lies is that EPCA only states that the calcining industry is highly polluting, and there was no
rational nexus between the objective and the imposition of restrictions only on calciners.
Furthermore, the quantitative limit was calculated on the basis of existing production capacity of
the calciners, so while the pollution level may not increase, it won't abate either.
III. THE DGFT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE

PETCOKE QUOTA TO SUN’S SEZ UNIT.
The third issue pertains to the unjustified refusal of DGFT to allocate petcoke to Sun's SEZ unit.
There are two grounds on which this argument is based. Firstly, the rationale for enforcing the
quantitative restriction was to curb sulphur emissions in the country, and Sun's unit in the SEZ
[XII]
would be importing petcoke to re-export the finished product, which wouldn't cause any pollution
in the country. Hence, the refusal to allocate petcoke to Sun's unit doesn't pass the test of reasonable
classification as the intelligible differentia doesn't have a nexus with the rational objective. It is
arbitrary and violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The second ground is that the refusal to
allocate petcoke to Sun's unit is arbitrary on the face of it. The reason given by DGFT for the
refusal was that this unit was not in operation when the notification for the restriction came out.
However, this reason doesn't completely justify the refusal because Sun was deprived of its returns
on investment.
[2]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted that this petition is maintainable on three grounds. Firstly, this
petition should be maintained under Article 32 of Constitution of Tiquar as it is a
fundamental right {1.1}, Secondly, the mere existence of alternative remedy is no bar to
approach this Hon’ble Court under Article 32 {1.2}. Thirdly, Petitoner’s right to equality
enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of Tiquar has been violated by the
Respondent’s actions.
1.1 THIS PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR.
1. It is humbly submitted the State cannot make laws that take away or abridges the
Fundamental Rights, and a law contravening a Fundamental Right is, to the extent of
the contravention, void.2 It is pertinent to mention that Notifications also come under
the gambit of laws under this provision.3 The judiciary has been given the power to
declare unconstitutional and void, any law which comes in conflict with a Fundamental
Right. The Supreme Court has figuratively characterized this role of the courts as that
of a sentinel on the qui vive.4
2. In this case, the notification unfairly discriminated between calciners and other
industries for the imposition of quantitative restrictions on import. This discrimination
violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law
and the equal protection of laws to all persons. 5 The discrimination in the notification
is arbitrary and not based on any intelligible differentia, making it violative of Article
14.6 Therefore, the notification imposing quantitative restrictions on import of petcoke
by calciners is in violation of Article 14 and should be declared unconstitutional and
void by the Supreme Court.
3. It is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court has the power to provide appropriate
remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights.7 The Court has wide discretion in
2
INDIA CONST. art 13 cl. 2.
3
INDIA CONST. art. 13 cl. 3.
4
State of Madras vs. V.G.Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
5
INDIA CONST. art. 14
6
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
7
INDIA CONST. art. 32.
[1]
the matter of framing writs to suit the exigencies of particular cases. 8 In the present
case, the petitioner seeks to vindicate a fundamental right that has been allegedly
violated by the imposition of quantitative restrictions on import that unfairly
discriminate between calciners and other industries. It is the responsibility of the Court
to decide on the appropriate remedy to be given to the petitioner for the enforcement of
this fundamental right.9
4. Article 32 provides an expeditious and the protection of fundamental rights from
legislative and executive interference.10 As the Supreme Court is constituted as the
protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, it cannot refuse to entertain applications
seeking protection against infringement of such rights. 11 Therefore, it is imperative that
the Court takes cognizance of the present matter and provides an appropriate remedy to
the petitioner for the violation of their fundamental rights.
5. It is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court held that a corporation is a natural person
and has its own existence.12 Therefore, it possesses locus standi and can claim violation
of fundamental rights, including Article 14 which mentions "person".13 As Sun is a
company,14 it can claim violation of its fundamental right under Article 14. This has
been upheld in various cases15. Thus, Sun has the legal right to approach the court for
the violation of its fundamental right under Article 14.
6. The concept of a corporation being a "person" in the eyes of the law has been
established through various judicial pronouncements.16 This Hon’ble has held that a
corporation has a legal entity of its own and is equal to a natural person in the eyes of
the law.17 The petitioner company in this case is entitled to maintain the present writ
petition challenging the denial of allocation of petcoke by the DGFT. This is supported
by the decision of the Bombay High Court in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of
India,18 where the court held that when the nature of a right is such that it cannot be
confined to natural persons alone.
8
Chiranjeet Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41,53.
9
Kanu Sanyal v. Distt. Magistrate, (1973) 2 SCC 674.
10
Supra Note 4; K.K.Kochunni vs. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725; Kharak Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1963
SC 1295.
11
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 436
12
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 885
13
Supra Note 5
14
Moot Proposition ¶ 1
15
LIC v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264; LIC v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315
16
Supra Note 8.
17
TELCO Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 885
18
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India 1957 AIR 628.
[2]
7. A corporation is entitled to that right as much as an individual citizen. In Shree Sidhbali

Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P.,19 the Supreme Court further clarified that a company, being
a juristic person, can claim infringement of fundamental rights and maintain a petition.
Therefore, Sun, being a company, possesses locus standi to claim violation of Article
14 as the article explicitly mentions "person."20 The fact that it is a corporation and not
a natural person does not diminish its rights under the Constitution21
1.2 EXISTENCE OF AN EQUALLY EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IS NO BAR TO
APPROACHING THE SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION
8. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble Court has consistently held that the existence
of an alternative remedy is not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32.22
In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,23 it was upheld that "the existence of an alternative
remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the
Constitution where the violation of fundamental rights of a citizen is alleged."
9. The Supreme Court has also held that where a fundamental right is violated, it is the
duty of the court to provide a remedy, even if the petitioner has not exhausted all other
24
remedies available to him. Therefore, the petitioner in this case can approach the
Supreme Court directly under Article 32 for the enforcement of their fundamental right,
even if alternative remedies are available.25 The Supreme Court has the duty to provide
an appropriate remedy to the petitioner if their fundamental right is found to have been
violated.
10. It is humbly submitted that based on the precedent set by the Supreme Court, the mere
existence of an alternative legal remedy is not sufficient to bar a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution. As stated in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras26 and K.K.
Kochunni v. State of Madras,27 the Supreme Court is the protector and guarantor of
fundamental rights, and it cannot refuse to entertain applications seeking the protection
19
Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U. P., (2011) 3 SCC 217.
20
Supra Note 5.
21
Vol. 1, M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 1309 (Lexis Nexus 2018)
22
23
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak 1988 AIR 1531.
24
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 568.
25
Id.
26
Supra Note 11.
27
K.K. Kochunni v. State of Madras 1960 AIR 1080
[3]
of these rights, even if such applications are made to the Court in the first instance
without resort to a High Court having concurrent jurisdiction in the matter.
11. Moreover, the mere existence of an alternative legal remedy cannot be a sufficient
ground for dismissing a petition under Article 32 if the existence of a fundamental right
and a breach, actual or threatened, of such right is alleged and prima facie established
on the petition.28 While the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a factor that may
be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs, the powers given to the
Supreme Court under Article 32 are much wider and are not confined to issuing
prerogative writs only.29
12. In light of these principles, it is clear that the petitioner's claim should not be dismissed
solely on the basis that they have an equitable remedy available to them. The fact that
the petitioner is seeking protection of their fundamental rights under Part III of the
Constitution through appropriate proceedings is itself a guaranteed right, and the
Supreme Court has a duty to protect and enforce these rights.30
1.2.1. THE ACTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL

JUSTICE
13. It is humbly submitted that it is a well-established principle that there shouldn’t be

insistence on alternative remedies if there was a violation of principle of natural justice.
31
Furthermore, the principle of natural js In A.K. Kraipak v. India32, Hegde, J. observed
that “If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice,
one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to arbitrary procedure
which involve civil consequences to the parties.” Similarly, in the case of Lala Shri
Bhagwan v. Ram Chand33, it was held that if it appeared that an authority or a body had
the power to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, then the nature of such
power itself imposed a duty on the authority to act in conformity to the principles of
natural justice. Moreover, it is well established that the concept of fairness should be in
every action whether it is judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, or quasi-
28
Id.
29
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana : 1950 SCR 566 (Para 8)
30
Smt Chand Garg Bai v. State of UP
31
Satwati Deswal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 1 SCC 126
32
A.K. Kraipak v. India 1969 2 S.C.R. 807.
33
Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand 1965 AIR 1767
[4]
administrative. 34 The central government's discrimination between calciners dependent

upon imported and domestic petcoke raises questions about the principles of equality
and non-discrimination. Furthermore, it is now considered that non-compliance with
the rules of natural justice amounts to arbitrariness violating Art. 14.
14. It is contended that by denying the petitioner allocation on the ground that they were
not in operation at the time the notification came out, the DGFT has deprived them of
a fair opportunity to participate in the market and were not able to gain returns on their
investment.35 This action goes against the principles of natural justice, which require
that individuals be given a fair hearing and a chance to present their case.36
15. Furthermore, the Development Commissioner's denial of allocation on the incorrect
ground that it would be a breach of the limit37 is another example of how the petitioner's
rights have been violated. This incorrect decision was made without affording the
petitioner a chance to be heard or present evidence to rebut the Commissioner's
reasoning. Such arbitrary and capricious decisions are a violation of the petitioner's
fundamental right to a fair hearing and due process of law.38
16. The petitioner's case should be maintained as petitions under Article 32 are not
discretionary, and the Supreme Court has a duty to afford appropriate relief to citizens
whose fundamental rights have been violated.39Therefore, the actions of the central
government, the DGFT, and the Development Commissioner are in contravention of
the principles of natural justice, equality, and non-discrimination, and have caused
undue hardship to the petitioner.
1.2.2. STATUTORY RELIEF UNDER SEZ IS NOT AN EFFICACIOUS AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY
17. It is humbly submitted that it’s recognised that alternative remedy needs to be an
efficacious and adequate one for it to be a ground to dismiss the petition.40 While it is
true that Section 23 of the SEZ Act, 200541 provides for a statutory remedy for civil or
34
Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner 1978 AIR 851
35
Moot prop ¶ 9.
36
Harbans Lal v Commissioner AIR 1993 SC 2487, National Co-operative Bank v. Ajay Kumar AIR 1994 SC 39
; Fateh Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1995 Raj 15
37
Supra Note 35.
38
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597.
39
Smt Ujjam Bai vs State Of U.P 1962 AIR 1621.
40
Rakhaldas Mukherjee v. S P Ghose AIR 1952 Cal 171
41
Special Economic Zone Act, 2005, § 23, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India)
[5]
criminal matters arising from a unit in an SEZ, this remedy is not adequate or
efficacious in the present case. The present case involves not only the refusal of
allocation of petcoke to our unit in the SEZ,42 but also the imposition of a discriminatory
quantitative restriction on the import of petcoke, which affects all calciners, not just our
unit.
18. Moreover, the issue of quantitative restriction on import of petcoke is not specific to
the SEZ Act, but rather arises from a notification issued by the Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change.43 The SEZ Act does not provide for a
statutory remedy in relation to such matters. Therefore, the present case falls outside
the ambit of Section 23 of the SEZ Act.
19. In light of these considerations, we submit that the statutory remedy under Section 23
of the SEZ Act is not an adequate or efficacious alternate remedy in the present case,
and we are entitled to approach the Supreme Court for relief.
1.3 PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO EQUALITY UNDER ARTICLE 14 HAS BEEN VIOLATED.
20. It is contended that Sun’s fundamental right to equality has been violated on various
accounts. Firstly, the government's decision to impose quantitative restrictions on the
import of petcoke only on the calciner industry and not on other industries44 is arbitrary
and discriminatory, thus violating the right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution. Secondly, there is discrimination between calciners that import petcoke
and those that use domestic petcoke as no quantitative restriction was imposed on the
latter. This differential treatment between two similarly situated groups violates the
right to equality under Article 14.45 Lastly, the fact that Sun's SEZ unit was denied
allocation of petcoke, despite conforming to the rationale of the government, amounts
to arbitrary and discriminatory treatment, thus violating the right to equality under
Article 14.46 All of aforementioned arguments are going to be substantiated in
arguments advanced for Issue II & Issue III.
42
Moot Proposition ¶ 10.
43
Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Guidelines for regulation and monitoring of imported
Petcoke in India (Issued on September 10, 2018).
44
45
V.K. Vanaja v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 7788.
46
Moot Proposition ¶ 9 r/w ¶ 6.
[6]
21. In essence, the argument is that the government's actions have resulted in unfair and
discriminatory treatment towards the calciner industry, and specifically towards Sun,
which is in violation of their constitutional right to equality.
[7]
2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE RESTRICTION LIMITS

ON THE IMPORT OF PETCOKE BY CALCINERS IS CONSTITUTIONAL?
It is humbly submitted that the decision to impose restrictions on import of Petcoke is

unconstitutional on because its violative of Article 14 of Constitution of Tiquar {2.1}
This violation is established primarily by using the test of reasonable
classification;{2.1.1} how the intelligible differentia {A.} has no rational nexus with the
object sought to be achieved by the Government’s actions {B.}. Further this restriction
is also arbitrary {2.1.2}.
2.1 THE QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON IMPORT OF PETCOKE BY CLACINERS

VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR.
22. It is humbly submitted that it is a well-established principle that Article 14 of the
Constitution bars discrimination and prohibits discriminatory law.47 Furthermore, a
basic and obvious test to be applied in cases where administrative action is attacked as
arbitrary is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the
impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness. 48 It is now
considered that non-compliance with the rules of natural justice amounts to arbitrariness
violating Art. 14.49
23. It is humbly submitted that for any legislation to be reasonable, it should follow the
following two points:
“(1) It should not be arbitrary, artificial, or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible
differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things
grouped together in the class from others left out of it.
(2) The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or
reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.”50
47
48
Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437
49
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2009) 4 SCC 299, 317
50
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 2 SCC 600
[8]
2.1.1 FAILURE TO PASS THE TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.

24. It is argued that the decision of the central government to impose restrictions on
calciners on the basis of their classification as a highly polluting industry is arbitrary
and lacking in a rational basis. The EPCA report, which was the basis for the
government's decision, did not suggest that calciners were more polluting than other
industries that were not subjected to similar restrictions.51 The report merely stated that
52
calciners were a highly polluting industry, which does not justify the differential
treatment meted out to them.
A. THERE IS NO INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA

25. It is humbly submitted that to attract article 14 , it is necessary to show that the selection
or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does not rest on any rational basis
having regard to the object which the Legislature has in view in making the law in
question. 53 The classification between the claciners and the rest of the industries was
done because of EPCA’s concerns pertaining to pollution caused 54
submitted that
calciner industry is highly polluting,55 it was however, nowhere stated that it is more
polluting than the rest of the industries. Moreover the rationale for the quantitative
restrictions so imposed is vague.
26. Furthermore, it is a well-established principle that likes should be treated alike and the
56
state can only classify for legitimate purposes. In this case, the classification of
calciners as a highly polluting industry fails to meet this condition. There is no
intelligible differentia that distinguishes calciners from other industries that were not
subjected to similar restrictions.
27. Therefore, the government's decision to impose restrictions on calciners on the basis of
their classification as a highly polluting industry is arbitrary and unconstitutional, and
violates the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the
Constitution.57
51
52
Supra Note 44.
53
Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1436 : (1976) 1 SCC 682
54
Supra Note 44.
55
Id.
56
Gauri Shanker v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 55
57
National Legal Ser.Auth vs Union Of India & Ors AIR 2014 SC 1863
[9]
B. THERE IS NO RATIONAL NEXUS WITH THE OBJECT SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED

28. It is humbly submitted that not only there should be an intellible diffrentia, there should
be a rational nexus sought to be achieved by such classification, which shouldn’t be
violative of Article 14.58 It is necessary to take into account the objective for such
classification. 59 The rational given by the government for imposing such a ban found
its basis in the EPCA report dated that mentioned that calciner industry is highly
polluting.60
29. The imposition of a quantitative restriction on the calciner industry, limiting their
61
consumption of petcoke to a total of 1.4 million metric tonnes per year, appears to
lack a rational nexus with the objective of reducing pollution. This is because the limit
was calculated on the basis of the production capacity of existing calciners, 62 without
regard for the fact that they would continue to operate at their current levels, and without
taking into account any potential improvements in pollution control technology. As
such, the limit fails to address the underlying problem of high pollution levels
associated with the calciner industry.
30. Furthermore, the classification of the calciner industry as highly polluting, without any
indication that they are more polluting than other industries that were not subjected to
such restrictions, further undermines the rational nexus between the restriction and the
objective of reducing pollution. In the absence of any evidence that calciners are more
polluting than other industries, the imposition of a quantitative restriction on calciners
alone appears arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unconstitutional under Article 14
of the Indian Constitution.63
31. In conclusion, the imposition of a quantitative restriction on the calciner industry, based
solely on their production capacity, 64 fails to address the problem of pollution caused
by the industry, and lacks a rational nexus with the objective of reducing pollution. As
such, it is an arbitrary and discriminatory measure, and should be struck down as
unconstitutional.
58
Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan, AIR 1999 SC 2526.
59
Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University 1989 AIR 903
60
Supra Note 44.
61
Id.
62
Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority for NCR (EPCA), Report 91 (October 6, 2018)
63
Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1631.
64
Rain CII Carbon (Vizag) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7301
[10]
2.1.2 THE DECISION TO IMPOSE QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS IS ARBITRARY

32. It is humbly submitted that it’s a well-established principle that any legislative or
executive action must not be arbitrary and must ensure fairness and equality of
treatment for all.65 Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness in state action,
and any arbitrary actions must necessarily involve a negation of equality.66 Moreover,
a basic a test to be applied in cases where administrative action is attacked as arbitrary
is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action
and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.67 This Hon’ble court has
interfered when the state decision is viated by arbitrariness, unfairness, illegality,
irrationality or unreasonableness.68
33. Furthermore, as per the Shayara Bano judgment,69 it has been held that even legislative
provisions can be struck down if they are found to be discriminatory, with their
operation being whimsical, excessive, unreasonable or disproportionate. In this case,
subjecting only the calciner industry to quantitative restrictions without any substantial
justification can be seen as discriminatory and disproportionate, as other highly
polluting industries were not subjected to similar restrictions. This again violates the
principles of non-arbitrariness and fairness established by the Constitution. 70
34. In the present case, it is argued that the decision to subject only the calciner industry to
quantitative restrictions without any substantial justification is arbitrary and violates the
principles of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. The fact that the EPCA report only
stated that the calciner industry is highly polluting 71 and not more polluting than other
industries that were not subjected to such restrictions indicates that there was no real
and substantial distinction between the calciner industry and other industries left out of
the restrictions. This lack of intelligible differentia renders the classification arbitrary
and violates the principles of non-arbitrariness established by the Constitution.72
65
Vol. 1, M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexus 2018)
66
E.P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 1974 AIR 555 ; Supra Note 38. ; R.D Shetty v. International Airport
Authority 1979 AIR 1628.
67
Abhimanyu Sharda Son Of Narayan vs The State Of Rajasthan 1971 (3) SCC 153.
68
Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1996 AIR 11
69
Shayaro bano vs Union of India 2017) 9 SCC 1
70
Supra Note 66.
71
Supra Note 44.
72
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212
[11]
3. WHETHER DGFT WAS JUSTIFIED

THE IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE PETCOKE
QUOTA TO SUN’S SEZ UNIT?
It is humbly submitted that DGFT’s refusal for petcoke allocation to Sun’s unit in SEZ
is unjustified on three major grounds. Firstly, DGFT’s refusal for petcoke allocation
violated Article 14 as it fails the test of reasonable classification and is arbitrary{3.1.}.
Secondly, the Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) is not applicable to Sun’s Unit. {3.2.}
Thirdly, Sun’s unit location in SEZ should be taken in consideration by the DGFT for
allocation of petcoke. {3.3.} Lastly, Sun’s SEZ unit is in line with principle of
sustainable development the government strives for {3.4}.
3.1 DGFT’S REFUSAL TO ALLOCATE PETCOKE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14

35. It is humbly submitted that the allocation of Petcoke to Sun’s unit was at the discretion
of DGFT as he is empowered by law to interpret the FTP and implement it.73
Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that this Hon’ble court has recognised that
wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness, which is antithesis to Article
1474 It is argued that the refusal of DGFT to allocate Sun’s SEZ unit pet coke violates
Sun’s fundamental right to equality and equal protection of law.
36. The Government placed quantitative restriction on Calciners on the basis of EPCA’s
concern pertaining to pollution level of Calciners75, this formed the rationale behind
imposing the quantitative restriction on the import. The petitioner is a very
environmentally friendly Calciner with a high scrubbing efficiency for sulfur dioxide,
which indicates their commitment to reducing pollution levels.76Additionally, the SEZ
unit of the petitioner is planning to re-export the final product, which means that there
won't be any pollution caused by the Aluminum industry in the country.77
37. This directly connects to the object sought to be achieved by the government, which is
to control the pollution caused by Calciners in Tiquar. Since the petitioner's operations
won't cause any pollution in the country, imposing quantitative restrictions on their
import of petcoke is not rational and serves no purpose in achieving the object sought.
73
Foreign Trade Policy 2015-20, ¶ 2.57, Acts of Parliament (India)
74
Vol. 1, M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexus 2018)
75
Supra Note 44.
76
77
Supra Note 35.
[12]
38. Moreover, the EPCA report on which the government relied to impose the quantitative
restrictions does not specifically state that calciner industry is more polluting than other
industries. Therefore, the differential treatment meted out to calciners cannot be
justified as there is no intelligible differentia or rational nexus between the object sought
and the restrictions imposed.
39. In light of the above, the government's decision to impose quantitative restrictions on
the import of petcoke by calciners must be struck down as unconstitutional, and the
petitioner's SEZ unit should be allowed to import petcoke without any restrictions.
40. It is humbly submitted that government's decision to impose a quantitative restriction
on the import of pet coke by calciners is not constitutional as the figure of 1.4 MMT
was calculated on the basis of the production capacity of eligible calciners.78 This
decision is discriminatory towards the petitioners, who are a part of the calciner industry
but are environmentally friendly and have a scrubbing efficiency of more than 98% for
sulfur dioxide. 79
41. Furthermore, the SEZ unit of the petitioners is planning to re-export the final product,
which means there will not be any pollution caused by the aluminum industry in the
country.80 By denying the allocation of pet coke to the SEZ unit, DGFT has acted
arbitrarily and has deprived the petitioners of their legitimate right to conduct their
business. Therefore, it is argued that the decision of the government and DGFT is not
reasonable or rational.
42. The refusal by the DGFT to allocate petcoke to the petitioner's unit in the SEZ, solely
on the ground that the unit was not in operation when the notification for the restriction
came out,81 is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because there is
no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Abirtary nature of DGFT’s
refusal
43. It is humbly submitted that this Hon’ble court has struck down rules that were held to
be unreasonable and arbitrary.82It has been observed that "absence of arbitrary power
is the first essential of the rule of law." Similarly, in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., it
was observed that "equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies" and that "where an
78
Supra Note 44.
79
80
Supra Note 35.
81
Id.
82
S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India 1967 AIR 1427.
[13]
act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and
constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14."83
44. The arbitrary nature of DGFT's refusal to allocate petcoke to Sun's unit is evident in
their reasoning that the unit was not in operation when the notification first came out.84
This is insufficient and arbitrary grounds to refuse allocation, especially given the fact
that the government placed the ban to curb sulphur emissions in the country. 85 As the
Sun's unit will be exporting the calcined petcoke, there would be no sulphur emissions
caused by the industry.86
45. The concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional
scheme and is a golden thread that runs through the whole fabric of the Constitution.
87
Therefore, arbitrariness in legislation is a facet of unreasonableness in Articles 19(2)-
(6), as laid down in several judgments of the Supreme Court. Thus, there is no reason
why arbitrariness cannot be used in the same sense to strike down legislation under
Article 14 as well. 88 DGFT's refusal to allocate petcoke to Sun's unit on such arbitrary
grounds violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
3.2 THE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SUN’S UNIT IN SEZ
46. It is humbly submitted that as per Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and
Regulation) Act (FTDR),89 the Central Government has the power to formulate and
announce the foreign trade policy and also to amend it from time to time. However, the
proviso to Section 5 states that the foreign trade policy may apply to SEZs with such
exceptions, modifications, and adaptations as may be specified by the Central
Government through a notification in the Official Gazette.90
47. In this case, the notification amending the FTP did not mention the applicability of the
policy to SEZ units, so the petitioner's unit is not subject to the policy. Paragraph 2.04
of the FTP91 empowers the DGFT to specify the procedures to be followed by
importers, exporters, or any other authorities for implementing the provisions of the
83
Supra Note 66.
84
Moot proposition ¶ 8.
85
86
Supra Note 84.
87
Ajay Hasia Etc vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. 1981 AIR 48.
88
Dr. N. Surender Kumar, And Another vs The Union Of India.
89
Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. § 5, No. 22, Acts of Parliament, 1992 (India).
90
Id.
91
Foreign Trade Policy 2015-20, ¶ 2.04, Acts of Parliament (India).
[14]
Act, rules, orders made thereunder, and the FTP. However, it the notification amending
the FTP did not mention the applicability of the policy to SEZ units.92
48. In conclusion, while the petitioner argue that their unit located in the SEZ will not be
subject to FTP or any notification passed in furthernace of the same, as there was no
exceptions, modifications, and adaptations specified by the Central Government in the
notification. Hence this refusal of allocation was done unjustly by the DGFT as he is
only allowed to interpret the FTP but in this case the FTP is not applicable to the
petitioner’s unit.
3.3 LOCATION OF SUN’S UNIT IN SEZ IS A RELEVANT CONSIDERATION.

49. It is humbly submitted that Article 14 mandates that equals should be treated alike and
the like circumstances should be treated equally.93 However, the petitioner's unit in the
SEZ has been treated in the same manner as other units, without any exception being
made, despite the fact that the SEZs have a different policy framework and regulations.
Therefore, to treat the petitioner's unit in the SEZ in the same manner as other units
would itself result in inequality and violation of Article 14.
50. The fact that the petitioner's unit was located in a Special ,Economic Zone (SEZ) should
be taken into account as the entire objective of SEZ is to provide trade facilitation.94
The SEZ Act clearly states that one of its main objectives is the promotion of exports
of goods and services, and the creation of employment opportunities.95 The Foreign
Trade Policy (FTP) also recognizes trade facilitation as a priority and the DGFT has a
commitment to function as a facilitator of exports and imports.96 Therefore, it is
imperative that the petitioner's unit, which was established in the SEZ, should not be
subjected to arbitrary restrictions and should be allowed to carry out its trade activities
without hindrance.
51. Moreover, the arbitrary refusal to allocate petcoke has caused financial harm to the
petitioner as they were not able to claim returns on their investment.97 This further
strengthens the argument that the DGFT's decision was arbitrary and violative of Article
14. The petitioner's unit in the SEZ should have been treated differently, considering
92
93
Vol. 1, M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Lexis Nexus 2018).
94
INTRODUCTION; SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA http://sezindia.nic.in/cms/introduction.php (last
visited Mar 9, 2023).
95
Id.
96
Foreign Trade Policy 2015-20, ¶ 1.07.
97
[15]
the policy framework and objectives of the SEZ Act, 2005, which aims to foster exports
and attract FDI inflows into India.98 Hence, the refusal to allocate petcoke to the
petitioner's unit in the SEZ is arbitrary, unjustified and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution
52. It should be taken into account the fact that the unit that was in SEZ was treated alike
the unit and no exception moreover it should be taken into account the fact the petitioner
was not able to claim returns on their investment
3.4 SUN’S SEZ UNIT PRODUCTION VIS-À-VIS PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
53. It is humbly submitted that the petitioner's unit is environmentally friendly and has a
flue gas desulphurization system with a scrubbing efficiency of over 98 percent for
sulphur dioxide emissions.99 This highlights the petitioner's commitment towards
sustainable development, which is a balancing concept between environment and
development.
54. It has been upheld that sustainable development is the answer and a just balance must
be struck between development and environment by proper tapping of natural
resources.100 Failure to do so would result in a violation of Articles 14, 21, 48-A, and
51A (g) of the Constitution.101 Therefore, it is imperative that the government takes into
account the petitioner's commitment towards sustainable development and weighs it
against the need to curb petcoke usage.
55. Furthermore, this Hon’ble Court has emphasized the need for a proper balance between
protection of the environment and development activities essential for progress.
102
Hence, it is essential that the government takes into account the environmental
performance of the petitioner's unit and the fact that it has a flue gas desulphurization
system with a scrubbing efficiency of over 98 percent for sulphur dioxide emissions.
The government should, therefore, consider allowing the petitioner to use petcoke as a
fuel as long as it can be done in an environmentally sustainable manner.
98
Special Economic Zone Act, 2005, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India).
99
100
Kinkri Devi And Anr. vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors. AIR 1988 HP 4.
101
Supra Note 83.
102
Citizen, consumer and Civic Action Group v. Union of India (1994) 1 MLJ 481.
[16]
PRAYER
The Petitoner humbly requests the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Tiquar, based on prior and
foregoing written submissions to DECLARE that:
1) Respondents' action of imposing the said ban on the import of petcoke by way of an
executive order without any basis and without following the due process of law is
violative of petitioner's fundamental rights
2) Government's imposition of quantitative restrictions on the import of petcoke only on
the calciner industry and not on other industries is discriminatory is unconstitutional.
3) The DGFT's refusal to allocate petcoke to the petitioner's unit in the SEZ is arbitrary
and violative of the petitioner's fundamental rights, and direct the respondents to
allocate the required quantity of petcoke to the petitioner's unit in the SEZ.
Or any other order and/or declaration that the High Court may deem fit in the
light of justice,equity and good conscience.
____________________________________________
Sd/-
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
[17]

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PC 46

VIth NOVICE INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023

VITH NOVICE INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022

W.P. (Civil) NO. XX OF 2023

M/S SUN CARBON LTD. PETITIONER

UNION OF TIQUAR RESPONDENT 1

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF TIQUAR.

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR.

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... V

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... VIII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................. XII

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE? ..................................................... 1

2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE

2.1 THE QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON IMPORT OF PETCOKE BY CLACINERS VIOLATES

3. WHETHER THE DGFT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE

3.1 DGFT’S REFUSAL TO ALLOCATE PETCOKE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 ........................ 12

S. No. Abbreviation Expansion

3. AIR All India Reporter

6. CPC Calcined Petroleum Coke

9. DGFT Director General of Foreign Trade

10. Ed. Edition

11. EPCA Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control)

12. FGD Flue Gas Desulphurizer

13. FT(D&R) Act Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act,

14. FTP Foreign Trade Policy

15. GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tarriff

16. Ltd Limited

17. M/s Messrs

18. Mr. Mister

19. NDC Nationally Determined Contributions

20. No. Number

21. NO2 Nitrogen

22. Ors. Others

23. Prop. Proposition

24. Publ Public

25. Pvt. Private

26. R/W Read with

27. RPC Raw Petroleum Coke

28. SC Supreme Court

29. SCC Supreme Court Cases

30. SEZ Special Economic Zone

31. SO2 Sulphur Dioxide

32. UNCCC Union Nation Climate Change Conference

33. W.P. WRIT PETITION

34. WTO World Trade Organisation

TABLE OF CASES REFERRED:

28. R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority .................................................................. 11

IV. OTHER AUTHORITIES

3. On 10.04.2017, the Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority (hereafter

5. On 9.10.2018, Union of Tiquar via an amended notification based on the representations

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE RESTRICTION

WHETHER THE DGFT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE PETCOKE

I. THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE

II. THE DECISION OF THE UNION OF TIQUAR TO IMPOSE RESTRICTION

III. THE DGFT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO ALLOCATE THE

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

1.1 THIS PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF CONSTITUTION OF TIQUAR.

7. A corporation is entitled to that right as much as an individual citizen. In Shree Sidhbali