TORENVLIED AKKERMAN. Soft' Policy Implementation in

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Theory of ‘Soft’ Policy Implementation in Multilevel

Systems with an Application to Social Partnership in the
Netherlands
Article in Acta Politica · April 2004

DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500046
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Acta Politica, 2004, 39, (31–58)
r 2004 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 0001-6810/04 $25.00
www.palgrave-journals.com/ap
Theory of ‘Soft’ Policy Implementation in

Multilevel Systems with an Application to Social
Partnership in the Netherlands
René Torenvlieda and Agnes Akkermanb
a
Department of Sociology and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and
Methodology (ICS), Utrecht University, Netherlands. E-mail: R.Torenvlied@fss.uu.nl
b
Department of Public Administration, University of Nijmegen, Netherlands
This paper develops a theory of policy implementation in a specific category of

multilevel policy-making systems. In state centric policy systems, regulatory
agencies can drift away from ‘hard’ decisions. In multilevel systems, relatively
autonomous levels of decision-making sometimes implement voluntary, non-
binding recommendations and guidelines. In this paper, we adapt the ‘state of the
art model’ of policy implementation in order to analyse the implementation of ‘soft’
policies in these multilevel systems. We propose a new dependent variable of policy
implementation: cross-level policy coherence. To explain cross-level policy
coherence, a ratification hypothesis is derived from the theory of ‘two-level games’,
while two hypotheses regarding agenda coordination and outcome coordination
are derived from the concept of collective support for policies. We apply the
adapted model to the implementation of the 1997 national Dutch social pact
‘Agenda 2002’ in the sectoral collective bargaining agreement in the metal industry
in 1998. The empirical evidence rejects the ratification hypothesis and corroborates
the two coordination hypotheses, suggesting that the implementation of ‘soft’, non-
binding policies can be coordinated across autonomous levels.
Acta Politica (2004) 39, 31–58. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500046
Keywords: policy implementation; multilevel governance; soft policy; collective

bargaining
Introduction
Processes of policy implementation are highly relevant to political scientists.1
The implementation of public policies determines whether elected officials
deliver the policies they promised to their citizens. Policy implementation is the
domain of the executive branch of government but has an important impact on
the political survival of elected officials. If the executive drifts away from the
democratic decisions of elected officials, this could generate political
instability, and ultimately harm democracy.
René Torenvlied and Agnes Akkerman
‘Soft’ Policy Implementation in Multilevel Systems in the Netherlands
32
Policy implementation can be defined as the transformation of a collective

decision in the policy performance(s) of implementation agencies (Torenvlied,
2000). The analysis of policy implementation aims at explaining the ‘drift’ from
a public policy (McCubbins et al., 1989; Torenvlied and Thomson, 2003).
‘Policy drift’ refers to the difference between the policy intent of decision-
makers and the actual performance of implementation agencies. Today, the
conditions under which policy drift and compliance occur, are well
documented. Indeed, a ‘standard model’ has been developed to explain the
performance of the executive branch of government. This ‘standard model’
identifies three sets of variables that explain policy drift: first, characteristics of
the decision-making process; second, attributes of implementation agencies
and the tasks they need to perform; and third, administrative procedures for
monitoring, controlling, and sanctioning the implementation agencies.
The ‘standard’ model originally was developed to understand better
implementation in state-centric policy making systems, including federal and
non-federal, presidential and cabinet systems. Consequently, the standard
model point of departure is the familiar division between three branches of
government in ‘state-centric’ policy systems: lawmakers, the executive, and the
judiciary. Recently, however, a different type of policy-making system has
received a lot of attention. This is a specific class of multilevel policy making
systems, empirically characterized by the existence of relatively autonomous
layers of decision-making (Hooghe and Marks, 2003) that often produce non-
binding ‘soft policies’, such as recommendations, information campaigns, and
action plans rather than collectively binding decisions.
The challenge to implementation theory is to adapt the ‘state-of-the-art
model’ in order to be able to analyse implementation in these multilevel policy-
making systems. In this contribution, we take up that challenge in four steps.
The following section juxtaposes the central assumptions underlying the
‘standard model’ to three key features of ‘soft’ policy-making in multilevel
systems. We argue that two adaptations of the ‘standard model’ are required in
order to improve our understanding of implementation in multilevel policy-
making systems. The first involves the reformulation of the dependent variable
of the implementation model (‘compliance’ or ‘policy drift’) in terms of cross-
level policy coherence. Second, we need a reformulation of the causal
mechanisms behind implementation in order to be able to incorporate the
relative autonomy of multiple layers of collective decision-making. Next, a
theoretical elaboration of these two adaptations, followed by the formulation
of a number of hypotheses, is offered. Subsequently, the implementation of the
national 1997 Dutch social pact ‘Agenda 2002’ in the sectoral 1998 collective
bargaining agreement for the metal industry is described as an exemplifying
case of soft policy implementation in a multilevel policy-making system. The
section thereafter provides a first, preliminary test of the hypotheses for this
Acta Politica 2004 39
33
case. The final section discusses the results and puts them in a broader
perspective.
The Standard Model in a New Policy Context

After the resurgence of the study of policy implementation in the 1970s and
1980s, scholars in political economy developed a class of relatively
parsimonious implementation models. From ‘neo-classical models’ that
predicted an ever-expanding bureaucracy, these models developed into a series
of more realistic ‘neo-institutional’ models, capable of explaining variation in
the level of agency compliance with substantive political decisions (for an
overview, see Moe, 1997; Balla, 1999; Torenvlied, 2000).
Standard model of policy implementation

Although many different approaches to the problem of policy implementation
exist, the core of all implementation models is a postulated information
asymmetry between collective decision-makers and implementers. Theoreti-
cally, collective decision-makers never have available the means to monitor
fully and control the performances of implementers. Nevertheless, empirically
we observe that on the whole implementers comply with collective decisions. In
practice, policies are not fully drifting. For this reason, ‘state-of-the-art’ models
of policy implementation concentrate on the ‘paradox of compliance’ — the
question why politicians who are not fully informed about the behaviour of
implementation agencies, nevertheless, succeed in obtaining compliant policy
performances.
Five variables and causal mechanisms explain the level of policy drift
(Weingast, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1989; Balla, 1999; Torenvlied, 2000). In the
first place, implementation agencies may have an incentive to deviate from the
outcomes of collective decision-making. They do so for varying reasons: for
example, budget maximization, the avoidance of unattainable policy goals, or
encapsulation by interest groups (Downs, 1967). In the second place, all models
are based on some variant of principal-agent theory: the relation between
collective decision-makers and agencies is hierarchical, and characterized by
information asymmetry. As decision-makers are uncertain about an agency’s
performance, and the agency is uncertain about proper rewards and sanctions
attached to his (deviant) behaviour, agencies will not automatically comply
with each political decision. Therefore, implementation agencies are restricted
by administrative procedures for political control. These procedures enable
politicians to efficiently monitor, control, and sanction deviant behaviour of
implementation agencies (McCubbins et al., 1989). A third variable, the level of
34
consensus among decision-makers, influences the effectiveness of these

administrative procedures (Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992).
Administrative procedures positively affect a fourth explanatory variable:
the room for manoeuvre. The room for manoeuvre of an implementation
agency is a combination of: (a) the capacity of decision-makers to monitor its
behaviour and (b) the application of appropriate sanctions if the agency would
deviate. The room for manoeuvre depends upon organizational characteristics
of the implementation agency and task-specific characteristics. The fifth
variable affecting policy deviations is the level of salience the implementation
agency attaches to the policy to be implemented. In the model, an agency is
willing to take the risk of being sanctioned for an observed deviation, if it
attaches a high level of salience to the political decision (Torenvlied, 1996).
Basic assumptions of implementation models

Implementation models have two points of departure. The first is deductive
modelling. Models are parsimonious, and contain explicit mechanisms from
which testable hypotheses are derived.2 The second point of departure is the
context of ‘state-centric’ systems. These are characterized by the institutional
separation of powers between the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.
In such systems, we find well-defined regulatory agencies, institutionally
embedded in an elaborated system of administrative procedures for political
control. Both points of departure require strong assumptions about the nature
of the implementation process. We distinguish between three ranges of
assumptions: (1) those defining the ‘policy space’, (2) those defining actors,
goals and behavioural options, and (3) those defining the structure of policy
implementation.
The first range of assumptions concerns the policy issues at stake. These
assumptions follow from the core of the ‘spatial theory of voting’ (Enelow and
Hinich, 1990). First of all, each policy issue is assumed to correspond to a one,
or multi-dimensional policy scale, which represents a range of possible
outcomes (policy alternatives) in some meaningful order. The distance between
policy alternatives on the scale indicates differences in their substance. Second,
crucial to most implementation models is the identical policy space assumption:
policy issues are assumed to be equivalent in both decision-making and
implementation phases. A function is assumed to exist that perfectly maps the
policy alternatives of decision-making to the policy alternatives of implemen-
tation. Because of the identical policy space assumption, direct and substantive
comparisons can be made between collective decision-making and policy
implementation.
The second range of assumptions concerns the actors involved: the goals and
behavioural options of decision-makers and implementation agencies. These
35
assumptions follow from the spatial theory of voting, as well as the state-
centric notion of policy-making. First, unitary actors rationally strive to realize
the substantive policy alternative they prefer most: their policy position. The
extent to which the realization of a policy position contributes to the actors’
organizational goals translates into the salience they attach to different policy
issues. Actors are fully informed about policy issues, alternatives, positions,
salience, and outcomes of collective decision-making. Second, decision-makers
and implementation agencies have single-peaked preference-loss functions,
defined over the policy scale, monotonically increasing with increasing distance
from the policy position. Additionally, implementation agencies have single
peaked reputation-loss functions monotonically increasing with increasing
distance from the outcome of collective decision-making: the political decision.
Third, decision-makers have the following behavioural option: they are
involved in influencing, apply coercion or political exchange in order to
change the (voting) position of other decision makers more closely towards
their own position. Their issue salience determines the level of effort a
negotiator will put in this process. The explanatory variable is (in)formal
bargaining power. Subsequently, decision-makers vote in order to arrive at a
political decision, explained by the formal voting power.3 Theoretically,
lobbying activities of implementation agencies could result in a political
decision that reflects the opinions of implementation agencies. However,
implementation models do not focus on these lobbying processes. Fourth,
implementation agencies have the behavioural option to comply with or
deviate from the political decision. If the policy position of an implementation
agency differs from the political decision, the agency has an incentive to deviate
from the outcome. The agency applies its discretion to realize a policy
performance, which is as close to their policy position as possible — given their
restrictions. Together with the incentive for deviation, agency discretion
determines the amount of deviation.
The third range of assumptions concerns the structure of the implementation
process, and the interaction mechanisms between decision-makers and
implementation agencies. These assumptions all follow from the state-centric
notion of the policy-making process. First, all models, implicitly or explicitly,
assume the existence of an implementation structure, which defines the
principal–agent relation between decision-makers and agencies. Second, the
outcome of collective decision-making is binding for all actors involved in
implementation. This restriction is absent in collective decision-making. Since
all actors are assumed to have full information about the outcome of collective
decision-making, any policy deviation is a voluntary defection.
Many of the above assumptions reflect the traditional ‘state-centric’ policy
making system. Below, we describe the features of yet another type of policy-
making system — one that has increasingly received attention over the last
36
decade. For a specific class of multilevel policy-making systems, the empirical

features so radically differ from the traditional ‘state-centric’ model, that we
need to reconsider the standard implementation model to understand policy
implementation in these systems better.
Multilevel policy-making systems

Research in multilevel governance is concerned with the empirical trend of an
increasing fragmentation of collective decision-making authority along
functional and territorial boundaries. The tradition has its roots in the study
of European Union policy-making, where multilevel governance is defined as ‘a
system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several
territorial tiers — supranational, national, regional and local’ (cf. Héritier,
2003). Many authors point at the complexity and uniqueness of European
multilevel policy-making — characterized by a combination of supranational
and intergovernmental interactions across different levels of decision-making
— as compared with federal policy-making systems, such as in the United
States (Marks et al., 1995; Scharpf, 1999). Other scholars apply the notion of
multilevel governance to phenomena much more general than European
policy-making and include a variety of international and federal systems. For
example, Hooghe and Marks (2003, 234) contend that the trend of
fragmentation and multilevel governance is also reported in many other fields
of political study, including international relations, federalism, local govern-
ment, and in studies of polycentric public policy-making.
Owing to the supposed complexity and uniqueness of multilevel policy-
making, research into these systems is very rich and much differentiated.
Nevertheless, one could somewhat boldly argue that three distinct features
distinguish multilevel systems from more traditional ‘state-centric’ systems.
The first feature is the existence of a system of nested cascades, or multiple
layers of collective decision-making. The multilevel design enhances flexibility
in collective decision-making because decision-making takes place at the
appropriate level, where social problems occur. However, the design could also
produce a lack of coherence between policies at different levels. This is a
problem when the outcomes of decision-making at one level produce spillover
effects to other levels. Hooghe and Marks (2003, 239–240) distinguish between
two different types of multilevel policy-making systems. The first type is rooted
in a communal, often territorial identity. It displays the more rigid
characteristics of federalism with a pyramidal structure (non-intersecting
memberships, cascading jurisdictional scale, general-purpose jurisdictions, and
systemwide hierarchical design). The second type is rooted in a functional
identity, which is problem or market related. It displays a more flexible
multilevel structure (functional specificity and a problem-oriented focus on a
37
specific policy). The second type is most different from the traditional ‘state-
centric’ system of policy-making, because in this type there is no hierarchical
relationship between the levels of collective decision-making. For example,
memberships of decision-makers at different levels are sometimes overlapping,
(representatives of) organizations meet again at the different levels. This type
of multilevel policy-making system concerns us here in the present paper.
The second feature of multilevel governance is the relative autonomy of the
different levels of collective decision-making. Collective decision-making at one
level does not necessarily restrict collective decision-making at another level.
For example, different administrative bodies in regional areas often operate
autonomously from each other and from the traditional counties or (national)
states. This feature clearly distinguishes multilevel policy-making from the
more ‘traditional’ state-centric system with its top-down framework of
regulatory decision-making.
A third feature, increasingly observed in multilevel policy-making systems of
the second type, is the presence of ‘soft’ policy instruments: non-binding policy
recommendations, guidelines, informational devices, or voluntary agreements.
Despite the autonomy of the different levels of decision-making, non-binding
soft policies are directed from one level towards another level in the system.
The emergence of soft policy instruments could be explained from increasing
needs for coordination — for example when ‘policies of one jurisdiction have
spillovers (y) for other jurisdictions’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, 239). In
multilevel policy-making, the costs of coordination are high because of the
large number of actors involved and interactions between them (Scharpf,
1997). For this reason, soft instruments may be an efficient means to
coordinate policies across different levels.
The literature on binding decisions is overwhelming compared with literature
on soft policies. Nevertheless, recently an increasing number of examples are
reported of ‘soft’ policy instruments to coordinate policies across different
autonomous levels of decision-making. A major example is European Union
policy-making. In the European Union, we find at one extreme treaty-based,
legally binding agreements that carry the threat of sanction, such as directives
and regulations. The effect of using these hard policy instruments in European
policy-making is to constrain effectively the choices available to policy makers
at the implementation phase in member states and at the regional level. At the
other end of the continuum, we increasingly observe the use of ‘soft’
instruments, associated with the ‘open method of coordination’ in the
European Union (European Commission, 2000a; Ahonen, 2001). This method
refers to a variety of instruments and procedures that cannot be enforced in a
legal sense and do not carry the threat of sanction. We find these instruments in
a variety of EU policy domains: the European Employment Strategy
formulates ‘Broad Economic Policy Guidelines’, EU environmental policy
38
stimulates the use of voluntary agreements between governments and

industries and the use of eco-labels (Jordan et al., 2003). EU health-care
policy emphasizes cooperative exchange of information and examples of ‘best
practice’. In other policy domains, benchmarks are set that stretch from
unambiguous to vague. For example, EU research and development policy
calls for member states to spend at least three percent of their gross domestic
product on R&D activities (De la Porte et al., 2001; De la Porte and Pochet,
2002), while EU internet policy requires member states only to describe their
national policies (European Commission, 2000b).
Other empirical examples of multilevel policy-making systems that rely upon
‘soft’ policy instruments can be found in international relations and
international business. For example, global industries encourage multinational
enterprises to formulate policies on workers protection and environmental
protection. Broad recommendations and guidelines in that area are reflected in
corporate decisions (Haufler, 2001). Another example is the World Bank’s
anti-corruption programme, which relies upon ‘core courses’ (informational
devices) to train representatives from developing countries to advance a
‘National Action Plan’ for anti-corruption policy in their home country (http://
www.worldbank.org/gac; Klein Haarhuis and Leeuw, 2002).
A third example, which will be further elaborated in this paper, concerns the
determination of labour conditions in multilevel ‘social partnership’. In the
Netherlands, labour conditions are the joint responsibility of employers and
employees, while the government creates conditions under which ‘social
partnership’ between the two is viable. Labour policies are formulated at two
levels. In the central Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid), soft
recommendations are formulated that are aimed towards government, trade
unions, employer organizations, and enterprises. The second level is a
multitude of decentralized collective bargaining platforms (in industries and
enterprises) that produce ‘hard’ collective bargaining agreements. On both
levels, representatives from employers and employees meet. Although the two
levels are nested by inter-level membership of organizations, the levels operate
autonomously: policy recommendations from the Labour Foundation are not
binding.
The puzzle for implementation theory

The sets of assumptions concerning the actors involved, and the structure of the
implementation process in the standard model of policy implementation heavily
draw from the contextual point of departure of the standard model: the ‘state-
centric’ system of policy-making, in which a legislature politically controls
regulatory agencies. Since the phenomenon of soft policies in multilevel
systems differs so much from ‘state-centric’ policy-making with regulatory
39
agencies, we need to reconsider the contextual point of departure of the

standard model and the corresponding sets of assumptions.
The true puzzle for implementation theory is to maintain a deductive
modelling approach, and nevertheless adapt assumptions of the standard
model to fit the three features of multilevel policy-making. In the first place, the
assumption that both decision-outcomes and implementation-performances
can be represented in one policy space is at odds with the autonomy of the
different levels of collective decision-making. Collective decisions at one level
may entail different substantive issue dimensions, may contain different
alternatives, and may have different outcomes than collective decisions at
another level. If that is the case, the question becomes how to remain able to
compare the outcomes of decision-making with the outcomes of implementa-
tion? In the second place, the relative autonomy of the different levels of
collective decision-making suggests the existence of a radically different
coordination arrangement than the implementation structure in the standard
model — with its hierarchical principal–agent relations. How could agencies be
forced to comply with, or deviate from, a non-binding recommendation, a
guideline about the exchange of information and best practices, or a suggestion
to enter voluntary agreements? There simply exist no administrative
procedures for the exercise of political control in multilevel policy-making
systems. In the third place, we saw that the outcome of implementation is not a
performance by a single organization, but instead the result of collective
decision-making at a different level.
Explaining Policy Coherence in Multilevel Systems

In this section, we present a general theory of ‘soft’ policy implementation in
multilevel policy-making systems. We first provide a reformulation of the
dependent variable of the implementation model. Subsequently, we modify the
causal implementation mechanisms in the model.
Cross-level policy coherence in agendas and outcomes

The dependent variable of the standard model is ‘level of policy drift’. It is
defined as the distance on the policy scale between the outcome of collective
decision-making and the performance of an implementation agency. Above, we
argued that: (a) the convenient assumption of identical policy space; (b) and
the definition of policy drift must be abandoned; (c) the outcome of
implementation is not an agency performance but a collective decision at
another level. We need a new dependent variable that incorporates those three
features of multilevel policy-making.
40
We propose cross-level policy coherence as a new dependent variable. This

variable is defined as the extent to which a soft policy at one level (say, level-I)
is reflected by one or more collective decisions at another level (say, level-II).
The term policy coherence does not refer to compliance with a prescribed
outcome. The substantive content of a soft policy at level-I is mapped to
collective decisions at level-II through interpretation rather than distance in a
policy space. For this mapping, we must rely on expert judgements and
document analysis to connect collective decisions at level-II with specific soft
policies at level-I.
To assess cross-level policy coherence, we should take into account both
agenda setting and collective decision-making at level-II. The distinction is
important because the agenda and the outcomes of collective decision-making
at level-II are determined by different mechanisms. Policy coherence in the
level-II agenda exists if we can connect (elaborated) agenda proposals to a
level-I soft policy. Policy coherence in the level-II outcomes of collective
decision-making exist if these outcomes reflect a level-I soft policy. During
collective decision-making at level-II, agenda proposals may disappear in the
negotiations, reducing coherence.
Modification of the standard model

In this section, we present some preliminary outlines of a modified model of
implementation. We must adapt some important assumptions. The assumption
about the behavioural options of implementers must be changed from the
choice to comply or drift, into producing collective decisions that reflect level-I
policies. The explanatory theory has to be changed from assuming a principal–
agent model into a model of multilevel collective decision-making. The
assumption about the enforcement of binding collective decisions has to be
changed from monitoring and control into coordination mechanisms among
autonomous levels of collective decision-making.
An important contribution is the theory of ‘two-level games’ (Putnam,
1988). The theory builds on theories of interdependent decision-making in the
international context (Schelling, 1960) and collective bargaining (Walton and
McKersie, 1965) and specifies the mechanisms that produce policy coherence
across different autonomous levels of collective decision-making. Putnam
(1988) tries to explain the viability and outcomes of international agreements
from the interaction between two interdependent processes: international
diplomacy (level-I) and domestic ratification (level-II). Putnam takes the
viability of an international agreement as the dependent variable. Instead, we
take the existence of an agreement for granted. From an implementation
perspective, we explore how the horizontal interactions within the group of
negotiators, and the vertical interactions between negotiators and their
41
constituency, have an interdependent effect on policy coherence. While the

horizontal interactions are characterized by collective decision-making, the
vertical interactions reflect policy implementation.
Logic of ratification
Domestic ratification of international treaties is an example of multilevel
policy-making. It displays two important features of such systems. First,
ratification of a treaty is not a performance by an agency, but a collective
decision made at another level in a two-level system with nested cascades of
collective decision-making. Second, the levels of diplomacy and domestic
ratification are autonomous because domestic constituencies need not
necessarily ratify an international treaty, and a non-ratified treaty is non-
binding.
The central actor in the theory of ‘two-level games’ is the level-I negotiator,
who bargains with other level-I negotiators. The agreement at level-I (as well as
its feasibility and attainability) depends upon the relative bargaining strength,
the distribution of policy positions of the level-I negotiators, as well as the
institutional voting rules.4 The relative bargaining strength and distribution of
policy positions of level-I negotiators furthermore depends upon the policy
positions of the level-II constituencies of the negotiators, who must ratify the
agreement at level-I.
The theory of ‘two-level games’ explains cross-level policy coherence
through the mechanism of strategic anticipation to the ‘logic of ratification’.
Negotiators play at two tables: the level-I table, and the level-II table.
Horizontal decision-making processes determine the level-I game with other
negotiators. Vertical coordination processes determine the level-II game with
the constituency. Dependent upon the interaction between these policies,
agreements succeed or fail. Some agreements fail because they will never
survive the ratification stage. This happens if the win-set of policy positions of
different constituencies is empty. Consequently, the theory of ‘two-level games’
predicts full policy coherence between a level-I agreement and the agenda of
level-II collective decision-making. The reason is that level-I negotiations take
place in the shadow of subsequent ratification. Negotiators strategically
anticipate on the chances of ratification and a projected rejection must be
credible in order to put pressure on the negotiations. In the theory of ‘two-level
games’, there simply would be no agreement to sign if this agreement is likely to
be rejected later. This leads to the ratification hypothesis:
Ratification hypothesis: There is full cross-level policy coherence between the
level-I agreements and the level-II agenda and the outcomes of level-II
collective decision-making.

42
A logic of multilevel coordination

Two important differences between the domestic ratification of international
treaties and the features of multilevel policy-making systems should be noted.
The first difference is that ratification automatically implies agenda setting at
level-II, while in multilevel policy systems actors at level-II are free to set their
own agenda: no ‘ratification structure’ is specified. Level-II representatives
need not even consider level-I agreements, recommendations, or communica-
tions. The second difference regards collective decision-making at level-II. The
logic of ratification implies that constituencies of each negotiator separately
decide about the level-I agreement. However, in multilevel policy-making
systems, the representatives of level-I negotiators often collectively meet in
joint decision-making at other levels.
From the autonomy in agenda setting and the reiteration of collective
decision-making at different levels, it follows that in multilevel policy-making
systems there would be no strict ‘logic of ratification.’ Strategic anticipation to
collective decision-making at the different levels will not warrant policy
coherence, and active coordination would be required. For the simple model of
a two-level game, we need to make assumptions about the ability of level-I
negotiators and their level-II representatives, first, to coordinate the agenda at
level-II, and, second, to affect collective decision-making at level-II. The
theoretical question here is how much pressure level-I negotiators and their
representatives can put on level-II agenda setting and decision-making, given
the autonomy of the levels and the ‘soft’, non-binding character of the level-I
agreements. We assume that the answer to this question, that is, the source of
this pressure, lies in the collective support that a level-I agreement receives from
its negotiators.
Level-I agreements vary in the extent to which powerful and salient
negotiators at level-I oppose the agreement. An agreement will be feasible
when supporters outweigh opponents, or when supporters and opponents are
in balance. Not all agreements will be fully supported by all negotiators and it
is likely that those agreements, which receive strong support, best serve the
common interest of negotiators at level-I. Agreements with weak collective
support (likely to benefit specific negotiators and their representatives) will be
supported only by their initiators.
Now, how does collective support for agreements at level-I affect the level-II
the agenda and outcomes of collective decision-making? The multilevel nature
of policy-making requires that level-I negotiators and their level-II representa-
tives must base their vertical pressure and coordination upon the anticipation
of joint collective decision-making at level-II. Agreements, recommendations,
or communications are not ratified by a single constituency, but need to be
renegotiated. With respect to level-II agenda setting, it is rational for level-I

43
negotiators and their level-II representatives to base this agenda upon strong
collective support at level-I. The reason is that agreements with weak collective
support would require difficult renegotiations at high costs at level-II. Weakly
supported agreements would be put on the agenda both by their proponents
(who strive for coherent implementation) and adversaries (who seek to
renegotiate the agreement). As the relative bargaining power of representatives
varies on level-II, it is uncertain to what extent the weakly supported
agreement will be reflected in all level-II outcomes. In other words, cross-level
policy coherence in the agenda is not guaranteed for agreements with weak
collective support. For level-I agreements with strong collective support, the
prospects for cross-level policy coherence in the agenda are far better than for
agreements with weak support. Unlike the case of the weakly supported
agreements, it is rational for only the representatives of supportive negotiators
to put the agreement on the level-II agenda. We now formulate the following
two hypotheses:
Agenda coordination hypotheses: (1) Representatives of the level-I negotiator
who initiated an agreement will put the agreements on the level-II agenda; (2)
Cross-level policy coherence in the level-II agenda is positively associated with
collective support for the level-I recommendation.
It makes little sense to put further pressure on level-II and coordinate the
process and outcomes of collective decision-making at this level, as, in the
context of multilevel policy-making, level-II decision-making is an autonomous
process. Consequently, we do not expect level-I negotiators to affect the
outcomes of level-II collective decision-making. In absence of ‘vertical’
coordination pressures, outcomes at level-II can only be explained by
characteristics of the ‘horizontal’ collective decision-making process. We can
apply existing collective decision-making models (Thomson et al., 2003) to
explain the level-II outcomes (and consequently cross-level policy coherence in
outcomes) from distributions of policy positions, issue salience, and relative
bargaining power. We formulate the following hypotheses:
Outcome coordination hypotheses: (1) Cross-level policy coherence in the
level-II outcomes is not associated with collective support for the level-I
recommendation. (2) Cross-level policy coherence in the level-II outcomes is
explained by a weighted5 distribution of policy positions of the level-II
representatives involved in collective decision-making.
Application to Dutch Social Partnership

In this section, we apply our theory to Dutch social partnership, and test the
hypotheses on the collective bargaining in the Dutch metal industry in 1998
that took place in the context of the 1997 social pact ‘Agenda 2002’ formulated

44
by the Dutch Labour Foundation. The Dutch Labour Foundation is a

bargaining platform of Dutch peak organizations of employers and trade
union confederations. In the last few decades, the Dutch Labour Foundation
produced a limited number of ‘social pacts’ that were aimed at collective
bargaining in industries and enterprises — with the 1982 ‘Wassenaar
Agreement’ as the most famous one. These pacts contain sets of general,
non-binding recommendations for collective bargaining in industries and
enterprises. Since the Wassenaar Agreement, the Labour Foundation produced
three other social pacts ‘Een nieuwe koers’ (1993), ‘Agenda 2002’ (1997), and ‘Er
is meer nodig’ (2001).6 Additional to these social pacts, the Labour Foundation
produces many recommendations for specific topics on a yearly basis.
The metal industry comprises more than 1,200 medium-sized and large
companies in the metal, electronics and electrotechnical industry. The sectoral
bargaining agreement covers 197,000 employees. Smaller companies in the same
industry are covered by a different agreement, that of the ‘metallurgical industry,’
which is not taken into account in the present article (cf. Schilstra, 1998).
The combination of central (level-I) social pacts with industrywide, or
enterprise-wide (level-II) collective bargaining is an exemplifying case of a
multilevel policy-making system in which ‘soft policies’ are formulated. In the
earlier section, we argued that social partnership in the Netherlands displays all
three main features of such a system. First, at least7 two nested levels of
collective decision-making along functional lines exist: a central level and an
industry/enterprise level. Second, these two levels operate autonomously:
representatives from the level-I negotiators in the Labour Foundation bargain
at level-II in industries and enterprises. Third, the Labour Foundation
produces ‘soft’, non-binding recommendations rather than binding decisions.
A schematic overview of implementation in the Dutch multilevel system of
social partnership is presented in Figure 1.8 The figure displays the two types of
policy coherence we distinguish: on the one hand the appearance of level-I
recommendations from the Labour Foundation at the level-II agenda of
collective bargaining; on the other hand, reflection of level-I recommendations
in the level-II outcomes of collective bargaining.
The implementation of social pacts of the Dutch Labour Foundation is well
suited to test our hypotheses regarding soft policy implementation. Conflicts of
interest do not exist between labour and capital exclusively, but also within
peak organizations of employers and within trade union confederations. For
example, trade unions in one industry may demand higher wages than trade
unions in another industry, or than the trade union confederation agreed upon
in the social pact. Collective bargaining agreements in one industry or
enterprise can have spillover effects on other industries. This makes
coordination across industries and sectors far from trivial. Because of possible
spillover effects, level-I negotiators — that is, the peak organizations involved
45
Level I
Labour Foundation:
Negotiations
Central policy recommendation
Level II
Agenda setting
On the agenda Not onthe agenda
Level II
Collective bargaining
Coherence in No coherence in No coherence in

outcomes outcomes agenda
Figure 1 Schematic overview of implementation of central-level soft policy recommendations in

industry and enterprise level collective bargaining agreements.
in the Labour Foundation — have important incentives to coordinate their

representatives in the industries and enterprises. However, formal procedures
for monitoring and control are absent in the multilevel system of social
partnership. Moreover, despite the non-binding ‘soft’ policy recommendations
of the Labour Foundation, collective bargaining agreements appear to display
varying extents of policy coherence at the level of industries and enterprises.
Selection of social pact and collective bargaining agreement

Further selections were prompted by methodological considerations. From the
three social pacts after the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ we selected ‘Agenda 2002’
(Labour Foundation, 1997) for further analysis because it was the social pact
that was recent, yet in force long enough to measure possible effects. Analysing
the most recent social pact has the additional advantage of reducing potential
46
problems of retrospective bias in the data obtained from key informant

interviews (Bernard et al., 1984; Torenvlied, 2000). We selected recommenda-
tions that were new in the social pact as well as recommendations that
resurfaced from previous negotiations. We need to control for the recurrence of
recommendations, because previous coordination efforts make it more likely
that such recommendations obtain policy coherence. For example, recommen-
dations about ‘employability’ were first introduced in ‘Agenda 2002’. These
recommendations relate to training and human development during one’s
working career, and were formulated by negotiators in the Labour Foundation
in order to obtain leverage in negotiations about wage moderation. Other
recommendations recur in all social pacts, with recommendations on wage
moderation as a prominent example.
We compared the selected recommendations from the 1997 social pact
‘Agenda 2002’ with one collective bargaining agreement: the 1998 metal
industry agreement. We selected this agreement from a long list of all collective
bargaining agreements that expired within a year after December 1997, when
‘Agenda 2002’ was signed by the peak organizations of employees and
employers. The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment supplied the
list. This temporal criterion reduces retrospective bias in the data on collective
bargaining, and provides a connection between social pact and collective
bargaining agreement. From the long list, we selected a large industry with
heterogeneous composition, which makes a potential conflict of interests
between peak organizations and affiliated organizations more likely.9 A second
criterion was that the agreement is representative for Dutch collective
bargaining. An industry agreement rather than an enterprise agreement was
selected because 87% of Dutch employees are covered by an industry
agreement (Van den Toren, 1996, 73).
Data collection
In 2000, we retrospectively collected data about the negotiation process in the
Labour Foundation in 1997, and about the collective bargaining in the metal
industry in 1998. We interviewed the most important negotiators in the Labour
Foundation (one informant from employer peak organization VNO-NCW,
and the other from the largest trade union confederation FNV) and in the
metal industry (one informant from the organization of employers in the Dutch
metal industry FME-CWM, and the other from the trade union FNV-
Bondgenoten). The four negotiators provided information about themselves
and all other negotiators operating at their bargaining level. The data we
obtained from these highly structured interviews were supplemented by a
careful study of documents. Additional interviews were taken from officials of
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. From the data, we
47
made a reconstruction of the collective decision-making process at both levels

(see Rojer, 1999; Torenvlied, 2000; Achterkamp and Akkerman, 2003).
First, we reconstructed the 1997 negotiations in the Dutch Labour
Foundation. The informants specified all recommendations in terms of one-
dimensional scales, using document analysis and the structured interviews (cf.
Rojer, 1999; Torenvlied, 2000; Achterkamp and Akkerman, 2003). Next, 11
recommendations were selected: four on wages, four on training and human
development (‘employability’), and four recommendations regarding the
combination of paid jobs with care. All negotiators in the Labour Foundation
were assigned a value on each recommendation corresponding to their policy
positions on the scales: ‘1’ if the member opposed the recommendation and
‘ þ 1’ if the member supported the recommendation. The informant also
indicated which party initiated which recommendation. Subsequently, using
highly structured questionnaires, we asked informants to provide information
about the relative salience of all these recommendations for all negotiators.
Salience varied between ‘0’ (not important at all) to ‘100’ (extremely
important).
With respect to bargaining power, the Labour Foundation has a fixed
distribution of seats: Trade unions confederations comprise FNV (four seats),
CNV (two seats), and MHP (two seats); Employer peak organizations
comprise VNO-NCW (four seats), MKB-Nederland (two seats), and LTO
(two seats). However, the institutional distribution of seats does not reflect
informal bargaining power in the Labour Foundation and does not
incorporate fluctuations in bargaining power over time. Differences in
competence and personality traits could be more important at the negotiation
table and should be included in the measurement of relative bargaining power.
For these reasons, the informants made an assessment of the relative
bargaining power of all negotiators in the Labour Foundation in 1997.
Relative bargaining power varied between ‘0’ (powerless) to ‘1’ (very powerful).
For each recommendation, its collective support was calculated as the
salience-power weighted sum of the policy positions of all negotiators in the
Labour Foundation, where a proponent of an agreement has a position of þ 1
and an opponent of an agreement has a position of 1. Analytically, collective
support could vary between 600 (six, very powerful negotiators opposed to
an extremely salient recommendation) and þ 600 (six, very powerful
negotiators in favour of an extremely salient recommendation). Recommenda-
tions with very low values of collective support are not expected because is it
highly unlikely that those recommendations will be formulated. The data about
the negotiations on ‘Agenda 2002’ in the Labour Foundation, and the
calculation of collective support are presented in the appendix. Indeed, we find
that for the selected recommendations, the collective support has no extreme
values: proponents and opponents in the Labour Foundation are in balance.
48
Subsequently, interviews were held with the two most important negotiators
in the metal industry. These negotiators provided information on the substance
of all bargaining issues in their sector in 1998. They indicated that 12 issues lay
on the bargaining table: three concerning wages, four regarding training and
human development, two on saving time for sabbatical or parental leave, and
three about child care. In order to map the policy positions of all the
negotiators involved in collective bargaining on one-dimensional issue scales,
we used the same highly structured questionnaires as in the previous interviews
(Rojer, 1999; Torenvlied, 2000; Achterkamp and Akkerman, 2003). The
informants also provided information about which of the issues resulted in
what final agreement. Just like during the interviews conducted on decision-
making within the Dutch Labour Foundation, the informants also estimated
the salience, that is, the relative importance of the bargaining issues for the
different negotiators. Informal power resources often play a role, not only
within the Labour Foundation, but also behind the scenes of industry-wide
negotiations. Hence, formal indicators for bargaining power do not adequately
reflect the actual distribution of power. Therefore, the negotiators were asked
to assess also the informal bargaining power of all the negotiators in the metal
industry. Finally, the informants in the metal industry provided the mapping of
collective bargaining issues with the recommendations in the Labour
Foundation.
Results
Degree of cross-level policy coherence
To what extent do central policy recommendations in ‘Agenda 2002’ reappear
in the agenda of the 1998 collective bargaining in the metal industry? Table 1
provides an answer to this question from the perspective of the two largest
organizations involved in the bargaining processes. The first column lists the 11
selected policy recommendations that were subject to negotiations in the
Labour Foundation. The second column provides information about the
organization that took the initiative in formulating the recommendation.
Together, the first two columns provide information about the central
negotiations in the Labour Foundation. Five recommendations were initiated
by the employers’ peak organization VNO-NCW, while seven were initiated by
the trade union confederation FNV. In one case, both negotiators initiated a
recommendation (about wage moderation).
Coherence in the agenda

The third column presents information about the agenda of collective
bargaining in the metal industry. It shows that seven out of 11 recommenda-
Table 1 Comparison of the selected policy recommendations from the social pact ‘Agenda 2002’ with the agenda proposals and outcomes in the 1998
collective bargaining agreement in the Dutch metal industry
Level I. Labor Foundation: ‘Agenda 2002’ Level II. Collective bargaining in metal industry
Recommendation in ‘Agenda 2002’ Initiator of recommendation Initiator of agenda proposal Collective agreement
1. Responsible wage growth Employer peak organization Employer organization Arrangement in

VNO-NCW, trade union FME-CWM and FNV trade collective bargaining
confederation FNV union ‘Bondgenoten’ agreement

2. Stimulate flexible wage components Employer peak organization No proposal No settlement
VNO-NCW
3. Stimulate incentive-driven Employer peak organization No proposal No settlement
wage policies VNO-NCW
4. Revise juvenile wages Trade union confederation FNV No proposal No settlement
5. Draft enterprise training plans Trade union confederation FNV Employer organization Arrangement in
FME-CWM and FNV trade collective bargaining
union ‘Bondgenoten’ agreement
6. Set up savings programmes Employer peak organization FNV trade union ‘Bondgenoten’ No settlement
for educational leave VNO-NCW

7. Stimulate support for career Trade union confederation FNV FNV trade union ‘Bondgenoten’ No settlement
development
8. Differentiate patterns of Employer peak organization Employer organization Arrangement in
labour duration and encourage VNO-NCW FME-CWM collective bargaining
flexible working hours agreement
9. Stimulate part-time labour Trade union confederation FNV No proposal No settlement
10. Encourage parental leave Trade union confederation FNV FNV trade union ‘Bondgenoten’ No settlement
11. Stimulate provisions for child-care Trade union confederation FNV FNV trade union ‘Bondgenoten’ Arrangement in
collective bargaining
agreement
49
50
tions reappear in the 1998 metal industry collective bargaining agenda, a score
of 64%. That is, more than one-third of the central policy recommendations
disappears in the ‘vertical’ process between recommendation and agenda
proposal. The third column also lists which of the two key organizations is
responsible for the agenda proposal, if any proposal is made: the employers’
organization in the metal industry FME-CWM, or trade union FNV-
Bondgenoten. FNV Bondgenoten puts more recommendations (six) on the
agenda of collective bargaining than the employer organization FME-CWM
(three).
Coherence in the outcomes

To what extent do the central policy recommendations in ‘Agenda 2002’
reappear in the 1998 collective bargaining agreement in the metal industry? The
fourth column of Table 1 provides an answer to this question. Only four of the
11 policy recommendations reflect a central policy recommendation from the
social pact ‘Agenda 2002’. The collective bargaining process accounts for a
drop of the score of 64% of recommendations on the agenda to only 36% in
the final agreement. This reduction is caused by the disappearance of three
collective bargaining proposals in the final agreement. These ‘lost’ proposals
were all put on the agenda in the metal industry by trade union FNV
Bondgenoten (the proposals on a savings programme for educational leave,
support for career development, and parental leave).
Test of hypotheses
We formulated two sets of hypotheses, each reflecting a different mechanism
behind cross-level policy coherence in multilevel policy-making systems: (1) the
ratification hypothesis and (2) the multilevel coordination hypotheses.
The ratification hypothesis states that full cross-level policy coherence can be
expected between the level-II agenda and the level-II outcomes of collective
decision-making. Table 1 demonstrates that hypothesis 1 must be rejected for
the data in our case study. Neither the agenda of collective bargaining (64%),
nor the final agreement (36%) in the metal industry displays full coherence
with the recommendations from the Labour Foundation.
The agenda coordination hypothesis consists of two parts: (1) representatives
of the level-I negotiator who initiated an agreement put the agreements on the
level-II agenda; and (2) cross-level policy coherence in the level-II agenda is
positively associated with collective support for the level-I recommendation.
Table 1 provides the necessary data for a test of the first part of the agenda
coordination hypothesis. It only partly corroborates the first part of the agenda
coordination hypothesis. It shows that from the three recommendations that
51
reached the agenda of collective bargaining and were initiated by employers’

peak organization VNO-NCW, two are put on the agenda by the employers’
organization in the metal industry, FME-CWM (66%). The trade union in the
metal industry, FNV Bondgenoten, put six recommendations from ‘Agenda
2002’ on the agenda of collective bargaining, five of which were initiated by
their confederation FNV (83%). The larger number of recommendations put
on the agenda by the trade union might explain this stronger relationship for
the trade union than for the employer organization.
Figure 2 allows for a test of the second part of the agenda coordination
hypothesis. It shows the association between collective support of a
recommendation in ‘Agenda 2002’ and the elaboration of related bargaining
proposals on the level-II agenda in the metal industry. In Figure 2, the
horizontal axis represents the elaboration of these recommendations in
proposal(s) for the agenda of collective bargaining in the metal industry. The
vertical axis represents the level of collective support. Figure 2 shows a positive
association between collective support and elaboration on the agenda of
collective bargaining. A one-tailed test shows that the association is on the
brink of significance (Kendall’s t ¼ 0.38; P ¼ 0.067). Recommendations with
weak collective support did not appear on the agenda of collective bargaining
in the metal industry — with one exception: the recommendation about wage
moderation. This recommendation was only weakly supported, but was
nevertheless included in the agenda of collective bargaining. Another exception
is the recommendation about juvenile wages, which received strong collective
60
50
40
Collective Support (S)
30
20
10
0
−10
−20
−30
0 1 2
Elaboration on Agenda
Note. 0 = No proposal; 1 = Simple proposal; 2 = Elaborate proposal.
Figure 2 Association between collective support of policy recommendations in ‘Agenda 2002’ and
their elaboration on the agenda in the Dutch metal industry. Note: 0 ¼ No proposal; 1 ¼ Simple
proposal; 2 ¼ Elaborate proposal.

52
support in the Labour Foundation, but did not appear on the agenda of
collective bargaining in the metal industry.
Table 2 provides further clues. It shows the average level of collective
support for three different ‘categories’ of recommendations: first all
recommendations in ‘Agenda 2002’; second, those on the agenda in the
metal industry, and those that were left out of it; third, those reflected in
the final agreement, and those that were lost in collective bargaining in the
metal industry. Table 2 makes clear that the level of collective support for
recommendations that disappeared from the agenda of bargaining in the
metal industry were the recommendations with on average weakest
collective support. A t-test is the standard test to compare differences
in average between two groups. However, because we have only few
cases that have not been selected on the basis of a random sample, a non-
parametric Mann–Whitney U-test is more appropriate. This test compares rank
orders rather than interval scores. The one-tailed test reveals that the difference
is not significant (Z ¼ 0.945; P ¼ 0.12), and that we must reject the second
part of the agenda coordination hypothesis on the basis of this, rougher
comparison.
The outcome coordination hypothesis states that cross-level policy coherence
in the level-II outcomes is not associated with collective support for level-I
recommendation and that, alternatively, the distribution of policy positions,
issue salience, and relative bargaining power of the level-II representatives
better explain the outcomes. Table 2 shows no difference in average collective
support between the recommendations that were lost during bargaining and
those that reached the final agreement. The average collective support for
recommendations reflected in the bargaining agreement of the metal industry is
23.5 (SD ¼ 24.9). We can compare this average with the average collective
support for recommendations that were not reflected in the agreement (either
not put on the agenda or disappeared during bargaining). The collective
support for these recommendations is 15.7 (SD ¼ 27.9). A one-tailed non-
parametric Mann–Whitney U-test shows that no significant differences exist in
Table 2 Average collective support for recommendations in different stages of implementation

(standard deviation between brackets)
Central recommendations (n ¼ 11) 18.6 (25.8)
Disappeared in agenda setting (n ¼ 4) 6.3 (29.8)

On collective bargaining agenda (n ¼ 7) 25.7 (22.4)
Disappeared during collective bargaining (n ¼ 3) 28.5 (23.9)

In collective bargaining agreement (n ¼ 4) 23.5 (24.9)

53
collective support between these two groups (Z ¼ 0.189; P ¼ 0.43). We

therefore cannot reject the outcome coordination hypothesis.
Alternatively, the outcome coordination hypothesis states that cross-level
policy coherence in the level-II outcomes is better explained by the distribution
of policy positions, issue salience, and relative bargaining power of the level-II
representatives involved in collective decision-making, that is, the horizontal
process of collective bargaining. To test this expectation, we applied a simple
exchange model of collective decision-making (Van Assen et al., 2003). These
models were earlier introduced under assumption 3 of the standard
implementation model. A discussion at length or a test of these models is
beyond the scope of the present paper.10 An exchange model of collective
decision-making correctly predicts nine out of 12 outcomes of collective
bargaining on the basis of the distribution of policy positions, salience, and
relative bargaining power of negotiators in the metal industry (a score of 75%
correct predictions is the usual score for these models, see: Thomson et al.,
2003). The exchange model correctly predicted that savings programmes for
educational leave and parental leave would not appear in the final agreement.
The exchange model incorrectly predicted that support for career development
would be part of the final agreement.
‘Soft’ policy recommendations: only a paper matter?

The subject of this paper was the puzzle for implementation theory that arises
when empirically the policy-making context is characterized by multilevel,
autonomous decision-making and ‘soft,’ non-binding policies — rather than
the ‘traditional’ state-centric context of policy-making. In the present paper, we
offered two solutions. First, we modified the independent variable ‘policy drift
by agencies’ from the standard model into two new dependent variables: cross-
level policy coherence in the level-II agenda, and cross-level policy coherence in
the outcomes of level-II decision-making.
Second, we suggested a number of alternative mechanisms to explain policy
coherence across autonomous levels of decision-making. Our analysis shows
that these modifications of model assumptions generate informative and
alternative hypotheses about implementation in multilevel policy-making
systems. One mechanism is the ‘logic of ratification’. The ‘logic of ratification’
assumes that decision-makers at level-I anticipate on the subsequent
implementation of their policies at level-II. In equilibrium, a level-I agreement
is finalized if its subsequent ratification is expected. Conditional upon the
existence of a level-I agreement, we would expect full cross-level policy
coherence in the agenda and outcomes of level-II decisions.
An alternative mechanism is the logic of ‘multilevel coordination.’ We
changed core assumptions in the standard model about the hierarchical
54
relation between ‘principals and agents,’ characterized by information

asymmetry, into new assumptions about the coordination of the level-II
decision-making agenda. In the logic of multilevel coordination, the relation
between negotiators at level-I and their level-II representatives is characterized
by a joint responsibility to reduce spillover effects between level-II policies.
This requires negotiators and their representatives to be responsive to ‘soft’
policies at level-I: for example, recommendations or communications.
Consequently, we expect limited policy coherence in the agenda — level-I
agreements with strong collective support reach the agenda. To explain policy
coherence in the outcomes of level-II decision-making, variables of collective
decision-making are the best candidate.
For matters of available space and expositional clarity, we focused on
one, exemplifying application: a comparison of the 1997 social pact
‘Agenda 2002’ with the 1998 collective bargaining agreement in the metal
industry. The comparison shows that measurement of cross-level policy
coherence in agenda and outcomes is feasible and informative. The rejection of
the ratification hypothesis suggests that recommendations in the Labour
Foundation are not based upon a rational anticipation to cross-level policy
coherence. Rather, policy coherence in the agenda of collective bargaining in
the metal industry is explained by multilevel coordination. Primacy lies with
the recommendations from ‘Agenda 2002’ with strongest collective support in
the Labour Foundation arrived at the bargaining agenda in the metal industry.
This supports the view that level-I negotiators and level-II representatives in
this industry have taken their joint responsibility to contribute to a successful
implementation of ‘Agenda 2002’. The study has two additional theoretical
implications. First, a lack of ‘hard’ policy instruments and the use of ‘soft’
recommendations do not automatically imply that the system of collective
bargaining lacks cross-level policy coherence. Second, the use of ‘soft’
recommendations in a policy system with autonomous levels of decision-
making does not preclude an active coordination of the agenda of level-II
decision-making.
This is only a preliminary test of the adapted implementation model.
The adapted implementation model is only a first step towards a tool
for a systematic, comparative analysis of substantively differing multilevel
policy systems. The design we used is limited for some obvious reasons.
First, more data are needed for further refinement and testing. These data
can be found in the examples suggested above, for example, international
affairs or European Union policy. Moreover, we must explain variance
policy coherence across different social pacts and collective bargaining
agreements in different industries or enterprises. Second, we could refine the
study design to also include effects of previous level-II decision-making on
level-I negotiations. This effect is analogous to lobbying by implementation
55
agencies in the ‘traditional’ state-centric approach (although not studied

with implementation models but with models of collective decision-making).
Such a refinement would require longitudinal data, which are very difficult to
obtain, further theoretical elaboration, and the application a new research
design.
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Appendix A
The data on negotiations in the Labour Foundation are summarized in
Table A1.

57
Table A1 ‘Agenda 2002’: data on negotiations in the Labour Foundation
Employer peak organization Trade union confederation
VNO MKB LTO FNV CNV MHP

Negotiator Bargaining power 0.70 0.30 0.05 1.00 0.20 0.10 S
Recommendations
1 50 50 50 50 50 50 13
2 100 100 100 100 100 100 25
3 100 100 100 100 100 70 8
4 60 80 80 100 60 20 44
5 80 100 100 100 100 100 39
6 80 80 80 40 40 40 32
7 80 50 50 100 80 80 50.5
8 100 100 100 50 50 50 40
9 80 80 80 80 60 60 14
10 100 100 100 80 100 80 3
11 60 60 60 70 70 70 28
Salience-weighted positions, relative bargaining power of the six negotiating peak organizations,
and collective support (S).
Notes
1 We benefited from discussions with several Dutch policy makers and negotiators in industrial
relations. We thank two anonymous reviewers for their detailed comments on an earlier draft.
Torenvlied acknowledges the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment for financial
support.
2 We will not reiterate the discussion about relative strengths and weaknesses of a rational choice
approach here. We refer to the debate Green and Shapiro (1994) evoked in the American
political science community.
3 The outcome of collective decision-making on each policy issue is a weight of the (shifted) policy
positions — for example, the median or average position (cf. Thomson et al., 2003). The
weighting procedure and the shifts in positions reflect different modes of decision-making, such
as conflict, logrolling, or social influence. Differences in opinion among decision-makers (their
distance in positions on the policy scale) are assumed to affect positively agency discretion, and
consequently trigger policy deviations. The presumed mechanism is that a difference in opinion
reduces the collective support for a political decision, which results in a political decision open to
a broader interpretation. In such situations, decision-makers have less capacity for monitoring
and sanctioning.
4 A series of further extensions of the model were proposed, for example focusing on effects of
side payments (Mayer, 1992; Friman, 1993) or effects of incomplete information (Mo, 1995).
5 Where the weights refer to issue salience, and relative bargaining power.
6 During the time that lapsed between these social pacts, the Labour Foundation produced a few
‘affirmations’ of existing social pacts, sometimes because a new social pact appeared to be
unattainable.
7 More levels in the system can be observed. From bottom to the top-level of negotiations we
distinguish: (a) meetings between trade union members and their representatives, or between

58
managers and their interest organization, (b) collective bargaining between employer and
employee representatives in industries and enterprises, (c) national platforms for negotiation: the
‘Labour Foundation’ comprises representatives of the peak organizations of employers and
employees, the ‘Socio-Economic Council’ comprises negotiators in the Labour Foundation and
representatives from government, during spring and fall there is consultation with the Dutch
cabinet. Negotiations are diverse, fragmented, sometimes general and sometimes very specific.
8 The figure is quite simplified. For example, policy-making within peak organizations is not
conceived of as a sub-process of the process of implementation of central recommendations of
the Labour Foundation. This does not deny the importance of co-ordination and decision-
making within peak organizations.
9 The selection of a large industry makes it also more likely that the social pact is built upon
previous collective bargaining in the large industry, thus resulting in policy coherence.
Mechanisms of previous negotiations or previous lobbying are strictly kept outside the
implementation models, and are not the subject of the present study. However, effects of these
mechanisms can be tested in a more elaborated, longitudinal design. Such a design would require
more data that are difficult to obtain.
10 For details, we refer to Rojer (1999), who reports an average model accuracy of 65% of the
outcomes of a large number of collective bargaining agreements (for a more general
introduction, see Thomson et al., 2003; Van Assen et al., 2003).
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Theory of ‘Soft’ Policy Implementation in Multilevel

Article in Acta Politica · April 2004

Rene Torenvlied A. Akkerman

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Theory of ‘Soft’ Policy Implementation in

This paper develops a theory of policy implementation in a specific category of

Keywords: policy implementation; multilevel governance; soft policy; collective

Policy implementation can be defined as the transformation of a collective

The Standard Model in a New Policy Context

Standard model of policy implementation

consensus among decision-makers, influences the effectiveness of these

Basic assumptions of implementation models

decade. For a specific class of multilevel policy-making systems, the empirical

Multilevel policy-making systems

stimulates the use of voluntary agreements between governments and

The puzzle for implementation theory

agencies, we need to reconsider the contextual point of departure of the

Explaining Policy Coherence in Multilevel Systems

Cross-level policy coherence in agendas and outcomes

We propose cross-level policy coherence as a new dependent variable. This

Modification of the standard model

constituency, have an interdependent effect on policy coherence. While the

Acta Politica 2004 39

A logic of multilevel coordination

Acta Politica 2004 39

Application to Dutch Social Partnership

Acta Politica 2004 39

by the Dutch Labour Foundation. The Dutch Labour Foundation is a

Central policy recommendation

On the agenda Not onthe agenda

Coherence in No coherence in No coherence in

Figure 1 Schematic overview of implementation of central-level soft policy recommendations in

in the Labour Foundation — have important incentives to coordinate their

Selection of social pact and collective bargaining agreement

problems of retrospective bias in the data obtained from key informant

made a reconstruction of the collective decision-making process at both levels

Coherence in the agenda

1. Responsible wage growth Employer peak organization Employer organization Arrangement in

‘Soft’ Policy Implementation in Multilevel Systems in the Netherlands

René Torenvlied and Agnes Akkerman

Coherence in the outcomes

reached the agenda of collective bargaining and were initiated by employers’

Acta Politica 2004 39

Table 2 Average collective support for recommendations in different stages of implementation

Central recommendations (n ¼ 11) 18.6 (25.8)

Disappeared in agenda setting (n ¼ 4) 6.3 (29.8)

Disappeared during collective bargaining (n ¼ 3) 28.5 (23.9)

Acta Politica 2004 39

collective support between these two groups (Z ¼ 0.189; P ¼ 0.43). We

‘Soft’ policy recommendations: only a paper matter?

relation between ‘principals and agents,’ characterized by information

agencies in the ‘traditional’ state-centric approach (although not studied

Achterkamp, M. and Akkerman, A. (2003) ‘Identifying latent conflict in collective bargaining’,

Acta Politica 2004 39

Acta Politica 2004 39