Cayetano v Monsod

G.R. 100113 September 3, 1991

FACTS:
On April 25, 1991, respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino
to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5,
1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman
of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUES: Whether or not, respondent Christian Monsod possesses the required qualification for the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC

HELD:
Yes. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions.

Olbes vs. Deciembre

A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005

Facts:
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the
Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700,
and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela
Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent
five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the
approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future.
After sometime, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan
plus surcharges, penalties and interests. Respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos.
0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of
maturity.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility

Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character.
"A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms
of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for
which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader."
By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice. 19 Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the
public's faith in the legal profession.
Respondent is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective
immediately. Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the
practice of law effective immediately.

Cheng vs. Agravante

A.C. No. 6183, March 23, 2004

FACTS:
Atty. Alexander M. Agravante, respondent, served as counsel for The Rogemson Co., Inc. in a
case filed against it before the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC) Regional Arbitration by its
former employee, a certain Beaver Martin B. Barril. On June 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho
rendered a decision in favor of the complainant Barril and ordered Rogemson to pay separation pay and
backwages. A copy of said decision was received by respondent’s law office on September 8, 1998.
However, respondent filed a Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC only on September 22, 1998.
Consequently, the NLRC dismissed Rogemsons appeal in a Resolution dated May 27, 1999, and made the
following incisive observation.
Atty. Agravante through counsel were duly served with a copy of the decision of Labor Arbiter
Sancho, dated 18 June 1998, declaring complainant illegally dismissed from employment and awarding
him with separation pay and backwages in the total sum of P130,000.00 on September 8, 1998, said
date being indicated in the mailed decisions registry return receipt which is attached to the records.
Consequently, respondents had ten (10) calendar days but not later than September 18, 1998,
Friday to perfect their appeal therefrom. However, the records similarly bear that this present appeal
was filed belatedly by way of mail on 22 September 1998. It is necessary to state these facts candidly
given the inaccurate certification by respondent’s counsel that he received the decision being assailed
on September 10, 1998.
The complainants terminated the services of Atty. Agravante. Through their new lawyers,
complainants wrote Atty. Agravante, demanding that they be compensated for the pecuniary damages
they had suffered as a result of his negligence.When it appeared that he had no intention of responding
to their letter, Edison G. Cheng, General Manager of Rogemson, filed an affidavit-complaint with the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Agravante is guilty in violating Rule 18.03 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Held: Yes. Atty. Alexander M. Agravante is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year and is fined in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) The fact that the Memorandum of
Appeal was filed four (4) days beyond the reglementary period for filing the same, which resulted in its
dismissal by the NLRC, shows that Agravante was guilty of negligence. His failure to perfect an appeal
within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provide that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Jimenez vs. Francisco,

A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014

Facts:

Mario Crespo, aka Mark Jimenez, filed a complaint for estafa against Caroline Jimenez, her sister
Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and
Isabel Gonzalez. Mark Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on Caroline’s alleged participation in the
fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with his money.
Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Mark Jimenez as the true and
beneficial owner. However, Caroline and her co-respondents, misappropriated and converted the funds
for their personal use and benefit. Caroline was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint
for estafa filed by Mark Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of
Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and
secretary of Clarion.
This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting
interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of
Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.
Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the
Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that
its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. Thus, she prayed
for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on privileged communication was violated.

Held: No. Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record
fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the “advice” regarding the sale of the Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in
confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a
recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed. All that complaint
alleged in her complainant was that “she sought legal advice from respondent in various occasions.”
Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as
to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is,
therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication.
 Garrido vs. Garrido
A.C. 6593, February 4, 2010

Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-
affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido
(Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P. Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his
“bad boy” image before she married him in 1962.
As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met
Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they
resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied
that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6)
children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who
finished a special secondary course. Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and
had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility

Held: Yes. As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would
set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the
lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege
from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the
watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct—both public
and private—fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly
penalized.

Figueroa vs. Barranco

SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997

Facts:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he
could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she
had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated promises to marry her.
 Respondent and complainant were townmates in Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in
their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime
in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It was after the child
was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the
bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or
thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s birthdays. Her trust in him
and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the act of Simeon Barranco, Jr. in engaging premarital relation with Patricia
Figueroa and making promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct

Held: No. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. The Court find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital
sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part
but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension
or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
The Court cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his
past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a
lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed,
albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.

Japson vs. CSC

G.R. No. 189479, April 12, 2011
Facts:
Records show that Japson became the subject of a series of inquiries conducted by the SSS
linking him to a profiting venture involving the processing of claims for SSS death and funeral benefits
while he was assigned at SSS Baguio City from 1997 to May 1998. In response to the above complaints,
the SSS conducted a series of investigation on the official transactions of Japson and uncovered details
that raised its suspicion. A case for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service was filed against Japson before the SSS.
The SSS said that while there was nothing wrong per se with petitioner letting claimants use his
home address for their claims, a perception of material gain is nonetheless indubitable. It pointed out
that it was highly improbable for claimants from Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya, where there are also SSS
branches, to file their claims in Abra. The most logical conclusion, the SSS said, is that they made their
claims through the Spouses Abuan on the latter’s assurance that these would be processed at the
soonest possible time. Petitioner should have been wary of the number of claims brought to him by the
Spouses Abuan, the SSS said, and he should have avoided these claims or referred them to the proper
branch offices. The SSS held that it is not necessary to show concrete proof of receiving consideration
therefor, following the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
On February 4, 2003, the SSS promulgated a decision finding Japson guilty on all counts.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated May 12, 2003. He then appealed
to the CSC. In a resolution dated August 31, 2006, the CSC affirmed the SSS decision.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service

Held: Yes. Taken together, all the circumstances, as found by the SSS and the CSC, show that petitioner
committed acts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. Prejudice to the service is not only through wrongful disbursement of public funds or loss of
public property. Greater damage comes with the public’s perception of corruption and incompetence in
the government.
Petitioner is reminded that a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity. The Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They
should be taken as working standards by all in the public service.

Chua vs. Mesina

A.C. No. 4904, August 12, 2004

Facts:
On May 5, 1998, a verified complaint received by the Office of the Bar Confidant that Ana
Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively charged Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of
professional ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband Chua Yap An’s
legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a
building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City (Burgos property) owned by respondent’s family,
and another property containing an area of 854 sq. m., situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City
(Melencio property), also owned by respondent’s family whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their
house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondent’s mother Felicisima
Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she
obtained. But when the spouses were appraised for capital gains tax, respondent suggested to execute
another deed of sale—this time, the date of the transaction is 1979, which is before the effectivity of the
law imposing capital gains tax. Not long after the title was handed over to the spouses, another lessee of
the building—Tecson—questioned the transaction as he was, himself, interested in buying the property.
Tecson filed charges for falsification of documents. To avoid the falsification charge, respondent
proposed to simulate a deed of sale wherein the spouses would appear to resell the property to
Felicisima. A new title was issued to Felicisima by virtue of said deed but this was entrusted in the hands
of the spouses.
Tecson desisted from pursuing the charges. Meanwhile, respondent borrowed the title of the
property from the spouses and promised to transfer, yet again, title in the name of the spouses. But
respondent failed to effect such transfer and the spouses learned that the property is being offered
to a public sale. Hence the action. The case was investigated by the IBP and recommended that
respondent be suspended for gross misconduct.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty for gross misconduct

Held: Yes. The Court ruled that respondent violated his oath of office and Canons 1, 7, 15, and 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. When respondent convinced complainants to execute
another document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that
complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.
Moreover, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated to
1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal
processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he
did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.

Visbal vs. Buban

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1432, September 3, 2004

Facts:
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal charged with Violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and/or Failure to Decide a Case Within the Reglementary Period, Gross
Inefficiency, Misconduct, Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Cases which he failed to decide Criminal
Cases 20 within the 90-day period from submission of the parties’ memoranda. He further alleges that
respondent Judge displayed bias in favor of the accused in criminal cases by his tolerance of the
defense’s late filing of pleadings and failure to appear in court despite due notice. He claims that
respondent Judge harbored a grudge against him because his wife filed an administrative complaint
against the latter.
In his Comment, respondent Judge denied the allegations in the complaint. He alleged that the
subject cases were originally pending before the sala of Judge Paulino A. Cabello but were subsequently
transferred to him after Judge Cabello inhibited himself from hearing the cases. He explains that his
inability to dispose of the cases within the prescribed period was due to the failure of his staff to bring
the cases to him for proper action. It was only on December 1, 1999 that his attention was called
regarding these two cases which had been submitted for decision. However, after going over the
memoranda of the parties and other pleadings, he found that the only way to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused is through a full-blown trial. Thus, he scheduled the cases for trial. He admits
that he was unable to report the pendency of these two cases in his Certificate of Service because he
was unaware that the period to decide them had already lapsed.
Respondent further averred that the administrative case filed by complainant’s wife against him was
already dismissed by this Court in a Resolution dated August 11, 1997. He notes that complainant has
the propensity of filing administrative cases against judges and fellow prosecutors, and he even filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Cabello for inhibiting himself from hearing Criminal Cases

ISSUE: Whether or not complainant violated Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Rule 7.03

Held: Yes. Complainant is therefore guilty of misconduct, defined as the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. A lawyer owes to society and to the court the
duty not to stir up litigation. The Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not, for
any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or proceeding.” Thus, a lawyer is ordered “not to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator of concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and justice.” In fact, lawyers are called upon to resist the whims and
caprices of their clients and to temper the latter’s propensity to litigate because the Lawyer’s Oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his clients.

People vs. Estebia

G.R. No. L-26868, December 27, 1972

Facts:
Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance in Samar and was
sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. On December, Lope Adriano was appointed as Estebia’s
counsel de oficio when his case came up before the Supreme Court on review. Adriano was required to
prepare and file his brief within 30 days from notice. On January 19,1967, Adriano sought a 30-day
extension to file appellant’s brief in mimeograph form. On February 18, Adriano again moved for a 20-
day extension. A third extension was filed on March 8 for 15days.On March 27 Adriano filed for another
15-day extension and on April 11 he moved for a “last” extension of ten days. On April 21 he sought a
special extension of five days. All of these motions for extension were granted by the Court and the brief
was due on April 26, 1967.However, no brief was filed. For failing to comply, the Supreme Court
resolved to impose upon Adriano a fine of P500 with a warning that a more drastic disciplinary action
will be taken against him upon further non-compliance. On December 5, 1968, Adriano was ordered to
show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation
of his oath of office as attorney. A resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968
however Adriano ignored the said resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of Atty Lope E. Adriano as member of the bar deserve disciplinary
action.

Held: Yes. This Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a
criminal case who is unable to employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer
so assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent
prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best efforts" in the
indigent's behalf. No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet,
between December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his appointment, and December 5, 1968,
when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was afforded
counsel to prepare and file his brief de oficio. In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed,
counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone down to the level of empty and
meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.
Lawyers, of course, as members of a learned profession, are expected to display a greater
degree of objectivity, not to say analytical skill. Nonetheless, between an inaccurate appreciation of the
real tenor of a court resolution and an attitude of defiance, there is quite a gap. The conduct of
respondent then, all things considered, cannot fairly be said to manifest the latter.
 Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot
A.C. No. 1117, March 20, 1944
FACTS:

The respondent, Estanislao R. Bayot, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for
having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, Bayot advertised in a
newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and
publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and
that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued
Bayot for Malpractice. Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted
the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again. In further
mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he
never had any case at law by reason thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his marketable skills. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best
advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not
earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

Ulep vs. Legal Aid, Inc.

B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993
FACTS:

This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.The
said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and
divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam
Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication
of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal
support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based
on certain US cases decided.

ISSUE: Whether or not Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law and violated Code of Professional
Responsibility

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be
pending in a court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in
and out of court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the
“practice of law”.
Moreover, Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s
position, and all other like self-laudation.

Lisangan vs. Atty. Tolentino

A.C. No. 6672, September 7, 1979

FACTS:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious
collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached
“respondent’s” calling card in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and other
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning
that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Atty. Tolentino violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and should
be reprimanded

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that respondent violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby
SUSPENDE from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, found
that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and
other canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule
against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s
professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Pangan vs. Atty. Ramos

A.M. No. 1053, September 7, 1979
FACTS:

Santa Pangan, complainant, has reference to the motion to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in
this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent’s motions for postponement. These
motions were predicated on respondent’s allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing
before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila. Upon verification, the attorney of record of the
accused in said case is one “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Doña Salud Bldg., Dasmariñas, Manila.”
Respondent admits that he used the name of “Pedro D.D. Ramos” before said court in connection with
Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex
“A”), his name is “Pedro Dionisio Ramos”, and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and
that the “D.D.” in “Pedro D.D. Ramos” is but an abbreviation of “Dionisio Dayaw”, his other given name
and maternal surname.
The name appearing in the “Roll of Attorneys” is “Dionisio D. Ramos”. The attorney’s roll or register
is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A
lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his
practice of law.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ramos has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be
cited for contempt for using a name other than that registered in the roll of attorneys
Held: Yes. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of
those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one
inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to
swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D.
Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to
deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar
infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he “will do no falsehood”. As an
officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of “truthfulness, candor and
frankness”. Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage.
This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth.

In the Matter of IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Edillon,

A.C. No. 1928, December 19, 1980

Facts:
Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of
Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in
the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of
this, compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership fee to
the IBP.

Held: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of a
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court
disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
 Garcia vs. De Vera, A.C. 6052, December 11, 2003
FACTS:

Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a petition seeking the
disqualification of respondent lawyer Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern
Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Barof the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections. Petitioner
Garcia is the Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past
president and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners
contended that respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter
to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile
rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied that there is no lawyer from the
region qualified and willing to serve the IBP. Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks
the requisite moral aptitude for the position. According to petitioners, respondent De Vera was
previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices
during the deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that respondent De Vera could have
been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his
California license to practice law.
Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy
contending that the election of the officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of
those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-
Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred that an IBP
member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter membership under
Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed that the right to
transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the
same as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws. On the moral integrity question,
respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its
deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed
against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him
to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Court has no jurisdiction over the IBP
2. Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected Governor in the IBP

RULING: 1. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear and decide the present
controversy. Section 5,Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court the power
to promulgate rules affecting the IBP and implicit in the constitutional grant is the power to supervise all
the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers. The power of supervision over the IBP has
been demonstrated in the past when it looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections
of the IBP National Officers. The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws.

2. The Court upheld respondent De Vera in his contention that a member of the IBP is entitled to select,
change or transfer his chapter membership. Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws allows a member to change
his chapter membership, subject only to the condition that the transfer must be made not less than
three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. In
the case at bar, respondent De Vera's transfer to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was done
more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.