ASSIGNMENT

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

Topic : TPK Nair v. Union of India
Submitted by
Treesa babichan
3s4llb
Introduction
T.P.K. Nair filed a suit against the Union of India and others, which was dismissed on the ground of
limitation. The case was related to the Marine Products Export Development Authority and the
applicability of Section 80 of the Civil procedure code. The court found that the suit was within time
and remanded it for decision afresh after allowing the parties to adduce further evidence. The court
also stated that there is a statutory prohibition against suing the Union of India under Section 80 of
the Civil P.C., without issuing a notice and waiting for two months. However, this provision is not
applicable to the Marine Products Export Development Authority. The court also noted that the
section is mandatory and its terms are imperative and admit of no exceptions or implications. The
suit was filed only after the expiration of two months after the notice was delivered, and if that
period is excluded, the suit is within time. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the
decree and judgment, and remanded the case for decision afresh.

Facts
He was selected by the Government of India for appointment to a post having the pay scale of
Rs. 2,500-3,000, but appointed in another post, as Chairman of the Marine products Export
Development Authority in the scale of pay of Rs. 2,000-2,500 fixing his pay at the maximum
of Rs. 2,500.00. He says that the Minister concerned offered to appoint him on a pay of Rs.
3,000.00. He worked from 24-1-1973 up to 16-2-1977 and then resigned. While in service, he
subscribed to the provident fund, which he claims to be contributory. His claims are Rs.
500.00 per month as salary for the period in service, Contributory provident fund amount;
and Gratuity.Contributory nature of the provident fund and entitlement to gratuity are denied
on the basis of the Central Government Rules. The alleged offer for Rs. 3,000/- was also
denied. Main contention was that the suit is barred by limitation.
3. All the claims were found against and the suit dismissed mainly on the ground of
limitation. Therefore, the other questions were not gone into in depth on the merits. Hence the
prayer was for a remand. I think that the prayer is justified, if the suit is found within time.
Therefore, I do not wish to consider anything other than the question of limitation.

Issues

- Whether the suit was filed within the limitation period or not.

- Whether the statutory prohibition against suing the Union of India under Section 80 of the
Civil P.C. is applicable to the Marine Products Export Development Authority or not.

- Whether the notice was validly issued against the Union of India and whether the suit was
filed after the expiration of two months after it was delivered or not.

- Whether the suit complied with the provisions of Section 80 of the Civil P.C. or not.
- Whether the suit can be entertained or not if it does not comply with the provisions of
Section 80 of the Civil P.C.
Arguments
Defendants are the Union of India and the Marine Products Exports Development Authority.
There is a statutory prohibition against suing the Union of India under Section 80 of the Civil
P.C., without issuing a notice and waiting for two months. But that provision is not applicable
to the Marine Products Export Development Authority. The section deals with suits against
the Government and against public officers. The first category requires notice in all cases
while in the second, notice is necessary only when the suit is in respect of any act purporting
to be done by such public officer in his official capacity. The section is mandatory. Its terms
are imperative and admit of no exceptions or implications. A suit not complying with the
provisions cannot be entertained and will have to be rejected under O. VII, Rule 11. In this
case, such a notice was validly issued as against the Union of India and the suit was filed only
after the expiration of two months after it was delivered. If that period is excluded, the suit is
within time. When statutory notice, previous consent or sanction is a condition precedent to
the institution of a suit, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for
obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation.
That is the mandate of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act. The date of application and the
date of order shall both be counted for exclusion in cases of consent or sanction. If there is
prohibition, as in the case of Section 80, in the institution of the suit before the expiry of a
particular period, the entire period has to be excluded. That is because the plaintiff is
prohibited from instituting the suit during that period. This provision was not brought to the
notice of the trial Court. That is the sole reason why limitation was found and the suit
dismissed. It is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit.

Judgment
In order to claim exemption under Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, it is not necessary that
the requirement of statutory notice is there against all the defendants. When a suit is jointly
filed against several defendants, in order to get the exclusion of the period under Section
15(2) for the entire suit, it is enough that the statutory notice is required as against any one of
the defendants. But in a case where the State or the public officer is an unnecessary or
improper party and there is no cause of action against them and they were impleaded without
bona fides or by mistaken feeling regarding existence of cause of action, the exclusion is not
available. In this case, all the defendants are necessary parties and hence these questions do
not arise. Therefore, the exclusion is available for the entire suit. I find that the suit is within
time.
The appeal is allowed and the decree and judgment are set aside. The suit is found to be
within time. It is remanded for decision afresh after allowing the parties to adduce further
evidence. No costs. Office will transmit the records forthwith and the parties will appear
before the trial Court on 20-8-1990. Court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal will be
refunded to the appellant. In these circumstances, I am not adverting to the merits of the
arguments on the claims.

Conclusion
The conclusion of the case is that the court found the suit to be within time and remanded it
for decision afresh after allowing the parties to adduce further evidence. The court also noted
that there is a statutory prohibition against suing the Union of India under Section 80 of the
Civil P.C., without issuing a notice and waiting for two months, but this provision is not
applicable to the Marine Products Export Development Authority. The court allowed the
appeal, set aside the decree and judgment, and remanded the case for decision afresh