Aviation Safety 800 Independence Ave

Washington, DC 20591

In the matter of the petition of

Merck & Co., Inc. Exemption No. 21408

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2021-0709
For an exemption from
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii) of Title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations

DENIAL OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated August 12, 2021, Andrew Eldringhoff, Chief Pilot, Merck & Co., Inc. (Merck),
100 Sam Weinroth Road, West Trenton, New Jersey, 08628, petitioned the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) on behalf of Merck for an exemption from
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii)of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed exemption
would relieve Merck from the requirement that at least one pilot crewmember wear and use an
oxygen mask while at flight altitudes above 41,000 feet (flight level or FL410). Relief is sought
for domestic and international 14 CFR Part 91 operations in Gulfstream G550 and G650 aircraft.

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

The petitioner states that it operates a Stage 3 IS-BAO certified, Part 91 corporate flight
department that owns and operates one Gulfstream G550 aircraft, two Gulfstream G650 aircraft,
and three helicopters. The corporate flight department is tasked with safely and efficiently
transporting executives, employees, and guests across the country and around the world in
furtherance of Merck’s business interests.

The petitioner states that the Gulfstream G550 and G650 aircraft are highly sophisticated
corporate jets that can transport up to 19 passengers on a twelve-hour, non-stop flight, and cruise
at 51,000 feet. According to Merck, the G550/650 aircraft outperform almost every other civilian
aircraft currently in operation and incorporate certain safety features and increased system
redundancy that are not common on other civilian jet aircraft.

The petitioner seeks relief from 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) to enable operations of the G550/650
above FL410 without a crewmember wearing an oxygen mask. The petitioner asserts that the
safety features of the G550/650 (e.g., dual pressure bulkheads and
Emergency Descent Mode) and the petitioner’s proposed conditions and limitations will achieve
the same or greater level of safety than complying with the current regulatory requirements of 14

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CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii). The petitioner also asserts that the requested relief would be in the public
interest. The petitioner’s supporting information is discussed in more detail below.

1. Gulfstream G550/650 Dual Pressure Bulkheads

The petitioner states that there are two types of cabin decompression events: Rapid
decompressions and non-rapid decompressions. On a Gulfstream G550/650 aircraft, a flight deck
annunciator illuminates to alert the pilots of a pressurization issue. Merck explains that during a
non-rapid decompression, the cabin altitude slowly climbs to the outside MSL. 1 Crewmembers
may have minutes or hours to respond to this kind of decompression. Merck claims that rapid
decompressions present the most dangerous decompression scenario for pilots and passengers. In
a rapid decompression, cabin altitude climbs to the outside MSL in seconds. 2 According to
Merck, the two most likely causes of rapid decompressions are: (1) a catastrophic engine failure
that punctures the fuselage or (2) the external baggage door opens, or its seal deflates. Merck
also notes that other than these two events, other rapid decompressions generally result from an
aircraft’s structural failure.

The petitioner states that 14 CFR § 91.23(b)(1), which was renumbered as 14 CFR
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii), addresses supplemental oxygen use during a loss of cabin pressure and
supplemental oxygen use by pilots in anticipation of a rapid decompression. The final rule
promulgated in 1970 afforded pilots the option of not wearing a mask below FL410, as long as
each crewmember at the controls had a quick donning mask available. Merck states that the FAA
went on to note in the preamble to the regulation that only sudden decompressions require pilots
to don oxygen masks rapidly. The longer, non-rapid decompression events provide pilots with
plenty of time to don oxygen masks and then troubleshoot the pressurization system or initiate an
aircraft descent.

According to petitioner the risk of a rapid decompression in a Gulfstream G550/650 is virtually

nonexistent because of the G550/650’s unique design and engineering. Gulfstream equipped the
G550/650 with a second pressure bulkhead. The first bulkhead is located at the entrance to the
baggage compartment. This bulkhead is positioned forward of the engine, which means it is
forward of the engine’s “blast area” in the event of a catastrophic engine failure. According to
Merck, the baggage compartment access door in this pressure bulkhead remains closed during
flight. 3 Second, Merck states that if the exterior baggage door opened during flight, the cabin
pressure would remain unchanged because the first pressure bulkhead remains sealed.

2. Gulfstream G550/650 Emergency Descent Mode

The petitioner states that Gulfstream included a unique feature on the G550/650 to reduce the
chance of human error in a high-altitude decompression. According to Merck, no human
1
Cabin altitude is the altitude to which the aircraft cabin is pressurized. Merck states that “cabin altitude slowly
climbs to the outside MSL.” The FAA notes that changes in cabin pressure are not typically referred to in terms of
changes to MSL. However, while the terminology Merck uses is not standard, they are correct in their explanation
that in a decompression event the cabin pressure will decrease, and the cabin altitude will increase.
2
See id.
3
The petitioner notes, however, that this door may be opened to access the baggage compartment during flight if the
conditions outlined in Exemption No. 17727 (enclosed) are met. See Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2017-1009.

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response is required to descend the aircraft after a depressurization occurs. Emergency Descent
Mode (EDM) will automatically execute an emergency descent to 15,000 feet mean sea level
(MSL). The petitioner asserts that because no human response is required, EDM provides at least
the same level of safety as one pilot continuously wearing an oxygen mask above FL410 as
prescribed in the rule.

The petitioner explains that the G550/650’s EDM is coupled with the autopilot. The autopilot’s
EDM mode arms automatically when the aircraft’s altitude is greater than 40,000 feet MSL with
the autopilot selected ON. According to Merck, if the cabin pressure exceeds 8,000 feet, the
following automatically occurs:

• The “Cabin Pressure Low” warning message illuminates on the Crew Alerting System
(CAS);
• The autopilot changes the speed target to 340 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS);
• The altitude is preselected to 15,000 feet;
• The autopilot commands a left turn with a 90 degree heading change;
• The autothrottle retards power to idle (if autothrottles are not engaged, they will
automatically engage);
• The airplane descends at maximum operating limit speed (Mmo /Vmo) to 15,000 feet;
and
• The aircraft levels at 15,000 feet, and the speed target changes to 250 KCAS.

According to Merck, with EDM installed, the pilots are not preoccupied by having to perform
the “automatic” emergency descent so their immediate attention can be focused on donning the
oxygen masks and evaluating why the aircraft is experiencing a rapid decompression. Merck
claims that the best use of the pilots’ attention and skill is to identify what caused the rapid
decompression and then evaluate how to respond to that occurrence. Once the pilots determine
what caused the decompression, they can evaluate whether they want to continue the emergency
descent via the EDM/autopilot or switch to hand flying. Merck points out that a pilot can always
quickly disengage the EDM procedure by clicking the autopilot disconnect button on the control
yoke. According to Merck, disconnecting the autopilot always disconnects the EDM function.

3. Merck’s Proposed Specific Conditions and Limitations

Merck proposes operating its Gulfstream G550/650 aircraft above FL410 without either pilot
wearing an oxygen mask pursuant to the conditions and limitations set forth below (or other such
similar conditions and limitations as the FAA may issue). Merck states that these conditions
exceed the current regulatory requirements of 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii):
a. Two pilots are seated at the controls and each pilot has a quick donning oxygen mask that
can be placed on the face with one hand from the ready position within 5 seconds,
supplying oxygen and properly secured and sealed;
b. Autopilot is engaged and functional in each axis;
c. EDM is engaged and functional and will prevent the aircraft from descending below the
minimum safe altitude or equivalent;

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d. The flight crew has successfully completed recurrent training on the G550/650 aircraft
from an approved Part 142 training facility within the last twelve calendar months;
e. The flight crew has successfully completed a physiological training course that covers the
following subject matters within the last twenty-four calendar months for items i-ix and
within the last five years for items x-xi:
i. Physics of the atmosphere;
ii. Respiration and circulation;
iii. Decompressions;
iv. Stress;
v. Hypoxia;
vi. Hyperventilation;
vii. Decompression sickness;
viii. Pressure equalization difficulties;
ix. General aviation oxygen equipment;
x. Altitude chamber, hypobaric chamber, or reduced oxygen training
environment “flight;” and
xi. Spatial disorientation demonstrator, gyro spatial disorientation demonstrator,
or virtual reality spatial disorientation demonstrator “flight.”

4. Merck’s Reasons Why Granting This Request Would be in the Public Interest

The petitioner claims that granting an exemption to 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) would serve the
public interest by encouraging crews to flight plan at higher altitudes, which would reduce fuel
consumption, carbon emissions, and traffic congestion in the National Airspace System (NAS),
at least in the airspace occupied by commercial airlines.

Merck also states that public interest would be served by granting the relief requested in the
petition because requiring the use of an oxygen mask above FL410 decreases the remaining
available oxygen for passengers and crew in the event of an emergency. The petitioner explains
that it travels to remote locations around the world where oxygen servicing is not reliably
available, which results in the crew potentially starting a return flight with partially depleted
oxygen tanks. The petitioner therefore believes that an exemption from 14 CFR §
91.211(b)(1)(ii) would increase safety by increasing the available oxygen on the aircraft for all
occupants during an emergency.

Additionally, Merck points out that a grant of the petition would reduce the likelihood of
transmitting contagions trapped in an oxygen mask, thereby reducing the spread of contagions in
the United States and internationally. Merck explains the challenges with properly cleaning the
masks, especially at international airports where Merck pilots may not have access to the facility
or supplies needed to clean the masks thoroughly without damaging them.

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Lastly, the petitioner explains that an exemption from 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) would benefit
the public by reducing pilot fatigue during long flights because pilots would be able to eat and
drink water without coordinating a mask-wearing transfer.

Federal Register Notice:

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on October 5, 2021 (86 FR
55105). The comment period closed on October 25, 2021. The FAA received 26 comments
during the comment period and an additional 23 comments shortly after the comment period
closed. The FAA has considered all comments.

All commenters expressed support for the granting of this petition, although one commenter
stated that the exemption “should be a prompt rule change if applicable.” Another commenter
focused on the advanced training aspect of level D simulators and training on the automatic
Emergency Descent Mode (EDM). The commenter also discussed a possible degradation of crew
performance when one pilot is using an oxygen mask above 41,000 feet. While the commenter’s
points were focused on using simulators to assess crewmember proficiency in EDM and cockpit
resource management, simulator training cannot address the most important consideration of
aircraft decompression at altitudes above 41,000 feet: the severe physiological effects on the
human body. These physiological effects are an important factor in determining the safety
implications of allowing an exemption to 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii). As explained more fully in
the FAA’s analysis, due to the effects of hypoxia, simulator training on the use of EDM may not
prevent a pilot from disabling EDM. In addition, the FAA is not convinced that there is an
overall degradation in crew performance when crewmembers are required to wear oxygen
masks.

Several commenters agreed with Merck’s assertions that the exemption would serve the public
interest by reducing fuel consumption and/or reducing pilot fatigue. The FAA analyzes these
public interest assertions below in the analysis. Other commenters agreed with Merck’s petition,
but did not provide any information on why they agreed with the request. Since additional
information was not provided, the commenters’ remarks will not be considered for the purposes
of evaluating the petitioner’s request.

One commenter, who chose to remain anonymous, supported the exemption because, “[r]egs that
are dated and no longer relevant harm safety culture in numerous ways.” He or she went on to
say, “…it opens the door for pilots, departments, and managers to pick and choose which
regulation to follow.” As evident from the FAA’s analysis below, 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) still
serves a safety purpose. Additionally, pilots and operators do not have the option to choose
which regulations to follow. As part of the regulated community, pilots and operators must
comply with the applicable regulations contained in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
including Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii).

Thirty-two commenters presented a letter titled “RE: NBAA Comments to Docket No. FAA-
2021-0709; Exemption to 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii)” as their comment to Merck’s petition. The
National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) submitted a letter similar to the one submitted
by the thirty-two commenters. Both letters stated wearing an oxygen mask decreases the total

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supply of aircraft oxygen, can transfer contagions, and increases flight crew fatigue. The FAA
addresses these commenters’ concerns in the analysis below.

These same commenters, along with eight other commenters, cited the safety features of dual
pressure bulkheads and an emergency descent system as support for granting the exemption. As
explained in the FAA’s analysis below, these features do not provide a level of safety at least
equal to that provided by 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii). Three more commenters, in addition to
citing the above safety features, also made claims that decompression events were “rare” or
“nearly non-existent.” In fact, Caris Air Services requested that the FAA “review the historical
data relating at altitude decompressions of modern corporate aircraft design.” A subsequent
search of available databases revealed that between 2006 and 2021, 33 pressurization events
occurred in Part 91 and 135 turbojet aircraft seating 19 or less passengers. 4 Of the 33 events, 29
required an emergency descent. While analyzing this exemption request, the FAA considered
whether the requested relief would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the
rule. For the reasons discussed below, the FAA has not made such a finding. 5 Rather, as stated in
Denials of Exemption Nos. 6817 and 11994 (enclosed), the FAA finds that despite the safety and
engineering features and structural integrity built into modern, technologically advanced aircraft
for operations at high altitudes, the possibility still exists that these aircraft could lose cabin
pressurization. Thus, consideration must be given to the physiological consequences of the flight
crewmembers in the event of a rapid decompression.

Dr. Paulo Alves, the Global Medical Director of MedAire Inc., submitted a letter in support of
Merck’s exemption. In addition to some of the same points made by other commenters (e.g., a
decrease in the total supply of aircraft oxygen available, a need to disinfect used oxygen masks,
and the possible increase of flight crew discomfort and fatigue), Dr. Alves provided a table
showing the Time of Useful Consciousness (TUC) of pilots at altitudes between 15,000 feet and
50,000 feet. The table, in pertinent part, agrees with “Figure 2-3. Times of Useful Consciousness
Versus Altitude” published in Advisory Circular 61-107B (2015). Dr. Alves concluded that “at
flight levels between FL400 and FL3450 [sic]… there is time for the pilots to apply a quick-
donning oxygen masks, a procedure which usually takes 5 seconds to complete.” Upon
consideration of the information provided by Dr. Alves, the FAA finds that this commenter
failed to consider that in a rapid decompression above 30,000 feet, the average time of useful
consciousness (TUC) will be reduced from 1/3 to 1/2 of its original value. 6 Factoring in the time
it takes for a pilot to recognize that a decompression event has taken place, it becomes apparent
that it may be impossible for the pilot to don the oxygen mask prior to losing useful
consciousness. Therefore, the FAA is not convinced that Dr. Alves’ conclusion is well-grounded.
It is also irrelevant because simply donning the oxygen mask in the event of a decompression
does not eliminate the physiological effects on the pilots.

4
The FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention reviewed data from the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) program, and FAA Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS)
database involving Part 91 and 135 turbojet aircraft with 19 seats or less to look for cabin pressure loss events,
uncontained engine rotor failures, and emergency descents.
5
Alternatively, the FAA may find that the requested relief would not adversely affect safety. 14 CFR § 11.81(e).
6
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (2021). Introduction to Aviation Physiology.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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The FAA analysis is as follows:

The FAA has reviewed the information presented by Merck in support of its petition for
exemption and has determined that a grant of exemption is not in the public interest and would
not provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii).

Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) prescribes, in pertinent part, that

[N]o person may operate a civil aircraft of U.S. registry with a pressurized cabin –
…
(ii) At flight altitudes above flight level 350 unless one pilot at the controls of the
airplane is wearing and using an oxygen mask that is secured and sealed and that
either supplies oxygen at all times or automatically supplies oxygen whenever the
cabin pressure altitude of the airplane exceeds 14,000 feet (MSL), except that the
one pilot need not wear and use an oxygen mask while at or below flight level 410
if there are two pilots at the controls and each pilot has a quick-donning type of
oxygen mask that can be placed on the face with one hand from the ready position
within 5 seconds, supplying oxygen and properly secured and sealed.

The type of operations proposed by Merck have previously been proposed and evaluated by the
FAA. 7 However, because of the specific features of the Gulfstream 650 and unique information
provided by the petitioner, the FAA will provide a full analysis of the petition for exemption. In
support of this analysis, the FAA carefully considered the hazards associated with permitting
operations of the G550 and G650 above FL410 without either pilot continuously wearing an
oxygen mask. The FAA determined the primary hazard to be pilot cognitive and motor-control
impairment and incapacitation due to hypoxia. In analyzing the mitigations proposed by the
petitioner, and additional mitigations considered by the FAA, it was determined that the hazard
severity of the operation proposed remains catastrophic and would not be reduced by any of the
mitigations. In contrast, if at least one pilot continuously wears an oxygen mask while above
FL410, the likelihood of that pilot experiencing impairment or incapacitation due to hypoxia that
leads to a catastrophic outcome is greatly reduced. Therefore, the FAA finds that the mitigations
would not reduce the likelihood to an acceptable level as provided by the current rule, and, for
the reasons discussed below, is denying Merck’s petition for an exemption from 14 CFR §
91.211(b)(1)(ii).

On August 12, 1982, the FAA published Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) No. 82-11,
Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements (47 FR 35146), which proposed amendments to pertinent
sections of 14 CFR Parts 91, 121, and 135 pertaining to flight crew oxygen mask requirements.
The proposed amendments would have allowed the operations of aircraft at higher altitudes than
presently specified in Title 14 of the CFR, —up to FL450—without requiring at least one pilot at
the controls to wear and use an oxygen mask. The concerns expressed by commenters opposed to
the amendments contained in NPRM No. 82-11 prompted the FAA to reconsider the FAA’s
proposed rulemaking and the rationale stated in previous grants of exemption. The FAA focused
particular attention to the potentially severe physiological consequences resulting from high
7
Exemption Nos. 4667, 6141, 6817, 8479, 8499, and 11994.

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altitude depressurization that could possibly incapacitate the flight crew and result in an accident.
The FAA determined that it should not issue further grants of exemption and withdrew NPRM
No. 82-11 on March 18, 1986 (51 FR 9432) (enclosed). 8 The FAA further determined that if it
found that it could grant relief from the current regulation, it would initiate a rulemaking action
rather than issue grants of exemption. 9 The FAA maintains this position. The oxygen mask
requirements of 14 CFR § 91.211 apply to all persons conducting operations under Part 91 and
petitioners have been seeking relief from these requirements since the 1980s. Based on numerous
petitions for exemption from 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii), the FAA finds that the petitioners are
similarly situated to one another and the hazards of operating above FL410 without either pilot
continuously wearing an oxygen mask apply to the entire regulated community. Thus, if the FAA
finds a way to safely enable operations above FL410 without either pilot continuously wearing
an oxygen mask, it would be most appropriate for the FAA to enable such operations through
notice-and-comment rulemaking so that the entire regulated community benefits as opposed to
only those individuals who petition for exemption. 10

To the extent the petitioner believes dual pressure bulkheads and the use of EDM would provide
a level of safety at least equivalent to that provided by the requirements of 14 CFR
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii), the FAA disagrees.

The petitioner states that dual pressure bulkheads protect the cabin in the event of the two most
common rapid decompression events: catastrophic engine failure and external door seal failure.
The FAA agrees with the petitioner that the dual pressure bulkhead feature may only protect the
cabin from those two specific failures, either of which could lead to a rapid decompression;
however, in most cases, dual pressure bulkheads do not protect the flight crew from a gradual
decompression. Although gradual decompressions are often viewed as less threatening
occurrences, they often result in catastrophic outcomes, as evidenced by the crash of Learjet -
N47BA in October 1999 (with golfer Payne Stewart aboard) 11 and the crash of Helios Airways
Flight 552, a Boeing 737 in Greece in 2005. 12 In each of the examples listed, although none of
the aircraft were flying at an altitude that required one pilot to wear and use an oxygen mask, it is
likely that if at least one pilot had been wearing a mask, an accident would not have occurred. In
each case, however, the presence of dual pressure bulkheads would not have changed the
outcome.

In addition, while the dual pressure bulkheads feature may reduce the likelihood of a rapid
decompression, it does not eliminate the possibility, nor does it reduce the severity of a rapid
8
See Denial of Exemption No. 4667 (enclosed) (1986) (stating that the FAA determined that further grants of
exemption should be discontinued and the notice withdrawn).
9
See Denial of Exemption No. 4667 (enclosed) (1986) (stating that “[s]hould the FAA determine that it could
confidently grant exemptions from the rule, it will instead take appropriate action to change the rules so that all
persons may benefit from such a change.”).
10
“Where an agency applies different standards to similarly situated entities and fails to support this disparate
treatment with a reasoned explanation and substantial evidence in the record, its action is arbitrary and capricious
and cannot be upheld.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd.¸403 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (citing Willis Shaw Frozen Express, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 587 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Ace Motor Freight, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 557 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
11
See NTSB Docket DCA00MA005.
12
“Aircraft Accident Report: Helios Airways Flight HCY522 at Grammatiko, Greece on 14, August 2005.” Air
Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board. 4 October 2006.

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decompression should the event occur. Consistent with similar denials of exemption from 14
CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii), 13 the FAA finds that a reduction in the likelihood that such an incident
might occur does not represent a level of safety equivalent to the rule from which the exemption
is sought, as is required by 14 CFR § 11.81(e). Additionally, because the current rule requires at
least one pilot to use oxygen above FL410, the auxiliary pressure bulkhead system has not been
evaluated as a critical system. Until the system is tested as such, it is inappropriate to assume that
it will function reliably in all safety critical situations.

In consideration of the petitioner’s use of the EDM, the FAA has determined that the EDM
would not reduce the likelihood and risk of decompression. 14 Rather, as explained in Exemption
No. 11994, an EDM is designed to assist the crew in managing a pressurization emergency. The
FAA has denied exemption requests from both the Cessna Aircraft Company (Exemption No.
6817, enclosed) and PMI Global Services, Inc (Exemption No. 11994, enclosed) requesting
consideration of an EDM. In those denials, the FAA considered the use of an EDM, but the
overriding factor was the physiological consequences of the flight crewmembers in the event of
decompression at altitudes above FL410. Additionally, like the dual pressure bulkheads feature
discussed above, the EDM is a supplementary system to the rule, which serves as the primary
mitigation to pilot incapacitation. During type certification of the G550 and G650, EDM was not
evaluated as a critical system, nor was it tested with the idea that no crewmember would be
wearing an oxygen mask above FL410. Therefore, the FAA finds that the use of supplementary
systems as the primary mitigation to pilot incapacitation is not currently appropriate and does not
provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule.

With respect to the petitioner relying on dual pressure bulkheads and the use of EDM to assure
safety, the FAA finds that the petitioner does not take the human physiological effects of a high-
altitude depressurization into account. At altitudes above 41,000 feet, it is probable that during a
rapid decompression, a pilot will not have sufficient time to don an oxygen mask prior to losing
useful consciousness. The FAA notes that for a gradual decompression, the average effective
performance time (EPT) for flight crewmembers at 35,000 feet is 30 to 60 seconds, and at 40,000
feet is 15 to 20 seconds. 15 However, in the event of a rapid decompression, those response times
are reduced; in some cases, by as much as 50 percent. In addition, when a decompression occurs,
the startle reflex and subsequent response time will expend some of the available EPT. In fact,
research has shown that even in a gradual decompression to 41,000 feet, subjects require an
average of 16 seconds from the start of the decompression until they are able to regain task
awareness. 16 The time required to complete the task increases as altitude increases; although,
conclusive studies in humans have not been conducted at altitudes above 45,000 feet because
such studies performed with animals have resulted in permanent physiological damage and
fatalities to the test animals. As a result, EPT at high altitudes (in humans) is largely variable and
unknown. It is probable that during a rapid decompression at 41,000 feet or above, neither pilot
will have sufficient time to don an oxygen mask prior to losing useful consciousness.
13
Exemption Nos. 4667, 6141, 6817, 8479, 8499, and 11994.
14
Exemption No. 11994.
15
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (2015). Advisory Circular 61-107B: Aircraft
Operations at Altitudes Above 25,000 Feet Mean Sea Level or Mach Numbers Greater than .75. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
16
O’Connor, W.F. & Pendergrass, G.E. (1966). Effects of Decompression on Operator Performance. (AM 66-10).
United States: Civil Aerospace Medical Institute.

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Additionally, as stated in the withdrawal of Notice No. 82-11, as well as the Denials of
Exemption Nos. 6141 and 6817 (enclosed), even if the pilot is able to don his or her mask
effectively, a loss of useful consciousness will most likely still occur. The FAA has determined
that the period of impairment, including cognitive performance, after hypoxic exposure may be
up to two to four hours. This period of impairment can vary with the physiological reserve of the
individual, altitude of the event, rapidness of descent and level off, and duration of exposure. 17
Whereas, a pilot who is wearing an oxygen mask when a decompression event occurs may
maintain the same level of cognitive function and motor skills as prior to the decompression.
These cognitive functions and motor control skills are necessary to safely land the airplane after
a decompression event. Accordingly, the FAA finds that relying on the EDM in this capacity
would not provide a level of safety equivalent to 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) because a pilot’s
reaction after hypoxic exposure is unknown. In the case of a G550/650, a hypoxic pilot could
easily disable the EDM by inadvertently pressing the autopilot disconnect button. Unfortunately,
due to the effects of hypoxia, training may not prevent or correct such behavior because a
hypoxic pilot may not be capable of acting rationally.

To the extent the petitioner believes a grant of exemption would be in the public interest because
it would reduce fuel consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, and traffic congestion in the
National Airspace System (NAS), the FAA disagrees. The FAA recognizes that Gulfstream
aircraft are designed for flight at high altitudes, which could allow for more direct routing for
both Gulfstream aircraft and air carriers. While more direct routing may reduce fuel consumption
and decrease carbon dioxide emissions, the FAA finds that these benefits are more directly
attributable to the petitioner rather than the public as a whole. Furthermore, the FAA notes that
the current rule does not prohibit flight at these altitudes, which Merck claims would benefit
them. Therefore, relief is not required for the claimed benefits to be realized. Additionally, while
the petitioner claims the public would benefit from reduced congestion in the NAS, the FAA
finds that maintaining the level of safety provided by 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) outweighs the
benefits of reduced congestion.

As previously discussed, the petitioner also cited the following public benefits that would result
from the FAA granting the requested relief from 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii): (1) an increase in
safety due to an increase in available oxygen on the aircraft for all occupants during an
emergency; (2) a reduction in oxygen mask usage thereby reducing the spread of contagions; and
(3) a reduction in pilot fatigue caused from wearing an oxygen mask for an extended period of
time. The FAA finds that it is unnecessary to permit the petitioner’s pilots to forgo wearing an
oxygen mask above FL410 for the purpose of increasing the available oxygen on the aircraft for
all occupants. The FAA’s regulations already require a sufficient supply of supplemental oxygen
for each occupant of the aircraft in the event that a descent is necessitated by loss of cabin
pressurization. 18 Additionally, it is in the public’s interest that the pilot maintains useful
consciousness in the event of a rapid decompression. To the extent the petitioner travels to
remote locations where oxygen servicing is not reliably available, the FAA notes that the
petitioner is nevertheless responsible for complying with the FAA’s regulations concerning

17
Shaw DM, Bloomfield PM, Benfell A, Hughes I, Gant N (2023) Recovery from acute hypoxia: A systematic
review of cognitive and physiological responses during the ‘hypoxia hangover’. PLoS ONE 18(8): e0289716.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289716
18
14 CFR §§ 91.211(a)(1) and 91.211(b)(1)(i).

AFS-22-00130-E
 11

oxygen supply. In response to the petitioner’s assertion that an exemption from 14 CFR
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii) may reduce the spread of contagions in the United States and internationally,
the FAA finds that this assertion is overstated. The FAA believes that oxygen masks may be
sufficiently sanitized to mitigate the contagion issue, and it is unlikely that any reduction in the
spread of contagions will be so significant as to benefit the public as a whole. Lastly, while the
pilot wearing the oxygen mask may experience increased fatigue during the flight, the FAA is
not convinced that there is an overall degradation in crew performance when crewmembers are
required to wear oxygen masks.
The FAA finds that any benefit to the public that would result from reducing the pilot’s fatigue is
outweighed by the public interest in maintaining at least the level of safety provided by 14 CFR
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii).

The FAA’s Decision:

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption would not be in the public
interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113, 44701
and 44807, delegated to me by the Administrator, the petition of Merck & Co., Inc. for an
exemption from 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) is hereby denied.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on October 13, 2023.

/s/
Robert M. Ruiz
Acting Deputy Executive Director, Flight Standards Service

Enclosures
Exemptions Nos. 4667, 6141, 6817, 8479, 8499, 11994, 17727, and withdrawal notice of NPRM
No. 82-11 (51 FR 9432).

AFS-22-00130-E
 Exemption No. 17727

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
RENTON, WASHINGTON 98057-3356

In the matter of the petition of

Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2017-1009

for an exemption from § 25.841(a)(2) of

title 14, Code of Federal Regulations

GRANT OF EXEMPTION

By letter no. G-ODA-17-0932 dated October 17, 2017, Mr. Emery Wiltse, Gulfstream Aerospace
Corporation (GAC), P.O. Box 2206, M/S R-03, Savannah, GA 31402-2206, petitioned the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption from the requirements of
§ 25.841(a)(2) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). This exemption, if granted,
would permit in-flight access to the baggage compartment up to, but not exceeding, an airplane
altitude of 45,000 feet for the Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants).
The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:
Section 25.841(a)(2), amendment 25-87, states that the airplane must be designed so
that occupants will not be exposed to a cabin pressure altitude that exceeds the following
after decompression from any failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable:
(i) Twenty-five thousand (25,000) feet for more than 2 minutes; or
(ii) Forty thousand (40,000) feet for any duration.
The petitioner supports the request with the following information:
This section quotes, in pertinent part, information from the petitioner’s request with minor edits
for clarity. The complete petition is available at the Department of Transportation’s Federal
Docket Management System, on the Internet at http://regulations.gov, in Docket No. FAA-2017-
1009.
Summary of Request
Per 14 CFR §11.81(c), GAC seeks exemption from the requirements of 14 CFR
§25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii), Amendment 25-87, for the model GVI (G650 and
variants) airplane, with regard to the effects of damage from an Uncontained Engine
Rotor Failure (UERF). This exemption is sought in accordance with FAA Policy
Memorandum ANM-03-112-16, “Interim Policy on High Altitude Cabin Decompression
(Reference Amendment 25-87)”, dated March 24, 2006.
14 CFR §25.841(a)(2) at Amendment 25-87 requires that the cabin altitude does not
exceed the limits specified in the sub-paragraphs following decompression from any
failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable, and 14 CFR §25.841(a)(3) at
Amendment 25-87 further requires that fuselage structure, engine, and systems failures
be considered. An UERF which punctures and/or tears the fuselage, creating a very large
hole, is one of the engine failure scenarios considered for compliance with these
regulations.
Reason Relief is Sought
While the model GVI is approved to operate at a maximum altitude of 51,000 feet
pressure altitude, this petition seeks exemption from 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2) for operating
at altitudes above 40,000 feet and up to and including 45,000 feet. Should an UERF occur
at an altitude of 45,000 feet, and if the engine debris were to strike the fuselage it could
potentially result with a hole in the fuselage. This hole size generated by engine debris
could potentially exceed the maximum hole size for which the airplane’s environmental
control systems are capable of maintaining allowable cabin altitudes resulting in
exceeding the limits of 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2), even when considering an emergency
descent maneuver being performed following an UERF event.
Recognizing the possibility that such an UERF could result in rapid cabin decompression,
Gulfstream has included a secondary pressure bulkhead in the model GVI design. This
bulkhead is installed forward of the area exposed to potential UERF fragment impact.
The area aft of this secondary pressure bulkhead is used as a baggage compartment.
The baggage compartment is accessible from the cabin through an internal baggage
compartment door. The baggage compartment can be intermittently accessed in flight.
When the aircraft is operating at or below the limiting altitude, the internal baggage
compartment door normally remains closed when the compartment is not being accessed.
The internal baggage door is required to remain closed at all times when operating above
the limiting altitude.
Exemption from 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(i) would allow the model GVI cabin pressure
altitude to exceed 25,000 feet for more than 2 minutes following a decompression due to
an UERF, should the event occur when the internal baggage compartment door is open.
This duration would not exceed 3 minutes (see [Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-16,
“Interim Policy on High Altitude Cabin Decompression (Reference Amendment 25-87),”
dated March 24, 2006) if an UERF event occurs while the aircraft is at an altitude of
45,000 feet or lower.
Exemption from 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(ii) would allow the model GVI cabin pressure
altitude to exceed 40,000 feet following a decompression due to an UERF, should the
event occur when the internal baggage compartment door is open. The time above 40,000
feet cabin altitude would not exceed 1 minute (see [Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-
16) if an UERF event occurs while the aircraft is at an altitude of 45,000 feet or lower.
Gulfstream is seeking removal of the baggage compartment access altitude limitation up
to 45,000 feet.

2
Benefit to the Public/Public Interest Aspects
Per 14 CFR §11.81(d), exempting the model GVI from the requirements of 14 CFR
§25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii), Amendment 25-87, would provide benefits to the general
public, the traveling public, and the economy, and is therefore in the public interest. The
following benefits would result from this exemption:
a) Reduced emissions
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would allow model GVI
operators full use of the baggage compartment at any approved flight altitude up to
45,000 feet. This would eliminate the need to remain below 40,000 feet or to descend to
40,000 feet when access to the baggage compartment is needed. This would allow
continued operation at more efficient altitudes, resulting in reduced overall emissions for
any given flight segment.
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would improve operability
of the model GVI and incentivize business jet operators to replace older aircraft with
model GVI airplanes. The model GVI is equipped with Rolls-Royce BR700-725A1-12
(BR725) engines. When compared under similar conditions to the previous generation
BR710 engine used on the GV-SP airplane, the BR725 engine reduces specific fuel
consumption by 4.0%, NOx emissions by 17%, and visible smoke by 50%.
Maintaining higher, more efficient altitudes would result in reduced emissions, a benefit
to the general public.
b) Reduced noise
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would incentivize
business jet operators to replace older aircraft with model GVI airplanes. For comparison,
the model GVI Rolls-Royce BR725 engines produce one third less noise when compared
to the previous generation BR710.
This would result in reduced noise pollution in airport areas and their surroundings, a
benefit to the general public.
c) Fostering a competitive national aviation industry
The current baggage compartment access altitude limitation adversely affects the ability
of the model GVI to compete with older aircraft and with current airplanes that do not
have a similar limitation due to differing cabin configurations. Most of these other
aircraft are produced by foreign manufacturers.
Modifying the model GVI baggage compartment access altitude limitation would
improve the competitiveness of the national aviation industry. This would result in a
positive effect on job creation and investment returns, a benefit to the general public.
d) Reduced air traffic congestion
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would eliminate the need
for model GVI operators to remain below 40,000 feet or to descend to 40,000 feet when
access to the baggage compartment is needed.

3
At maximum takeoff weight, the model GVI is capable of an initial cruise altitude of
41,000 feet. For the average flight profile, modifying the baggage compartment access
altitude limitation would obviate any requirement for the model GVI to operate in the
airspace below 40,000 feet, where most commercial transport aircraft operate. This would
result in lower air traffic congestion for the travelling public. Less congestion provides
more efficient routing of aircraft, which results globally in less fuel consumption and
emissions.
e) Lower air traffic management costs
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would eliminate the need
for model GVI operators to remain below 40,000 feet or to descend to 40,000 feet when
access to the baggage compartment is needed.
Greatly reducing the occurrences of altitude changes for the purpose of baggage access,
and the associated reduction in congestion at altitudes below 40,000 feet, in turn will
result in reduced ATC effort to maintain established air traffic vertical and horizontal
separation requirements. This would result in reduced air traffic management costs for
the travelling public.
f) Improved fuel economy and lower operating costs
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would eliminate the need
for model GVI operators to remain below 40,000 feet or to descend to 40,000 feet when
access to the baggage compartment is needed.
Modifying the baggage compartment access altitude limitation would incentivize
business jet operators to replace older aircraft with model GVI airplanes. The model GVI
Rolls-Royce BR725 engines have 4.0% improved specific fuel consumption compared to
the previous generation BR710.
These effects would result in improved overall fuel economy and an associated reduction
in operating costs for business jet operations. This is a benefit to the business travelling
public.
Safety Aspects
Per 14 CFR §11.81(e), GAC provides the following reasons why granting this exemption
would not adversely affect safety provided by 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii).
a) Flight crew protection
In order to ensure the flight crew will remain alert and be able to safely fly and land the
airplane in the event of a cabin decompression, the model GVI provides the flight crew
with quick donning crew oxygen masks and a number of additional features to mitigate a
possible cabin decompression.
1. The model GVI airplane flight manual (AFM) requires that crew masks be placed in
the quick donning position when operating above 25,000 feet, which allows them to
be donned within 5 seconds. Furthermore, at least one flight crew member must wear
an oxygen mask when operating at altitudes above 35,000 feet to comply with
§135.89(b)(3), and above 41,000 feet to comply with 14 CFR §91.211(b)(1)(ii).
Therefore, with proper adherence to operating requirements, at least one member of

4
 the crew will be available to safely fly the aircraft should a decompression occur with
the baggage compartment door open.
2. The model GVI airplane provides aural warning and a visual red “Cabin Pressure
Low” warning message via the crew alerting system (CAS) when cabin pressure
altitude exceeds 8,000 feet. When operating into or out of high elevation airports, the
warning message activation altitude is automatically adjusted to a higher altitude to
prevent nuisance alerting. When these warnings are present, the model GVI AFM
instructs the flight crew to don oxygen masks as a first and immediate step prior to
further procedural actions. Should a cabin decompression occur, the flight crew will
be immediately aware of the event and expected to take immediate corrective action.
These operating procedures and airplane design features (aural/visual alerting) ensure
the flight crew will be made aware of a cabin decompression and will be capable of
performing their duties to initiate an emergency descent to a flight altitude where
pressurization is not required.
3. As an additional protection against loss of aircraft control due to crew incapacitation,
the model GVI airplane’s autopilot includes an Emergency Descent Mode, which will
automatically initiate an emergency descent maneuver to a safe altitude (including a
90° heading change to exit the airway) when a high cabin pressure altitude is
detected. This added safety feature provides a means to survive a condition where
both flight crew members are incapacitated – though this should never occur per the
previously cited operating requirements.
4. Pilots attending GVI initial and recurrent training receive academic instruction on the
oxygen system and EROS® Crew Oxygen Masks installed in the airplane.
Additionally, simulator training for the pilots includes at least one in-flight
emergency scenario requiring the pilots to quickly don their oxygen mask and
perform an emergency descent.
In summary, these model GVI aural/visual alerting features and operating requirements
ensure protection for the crew and provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided
by full compliance with 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii).
b) Occupant survivability
Aircraft structural integrity has been demonstrated for cabin decompressions with the
internal baggage compartment door both open and closed. In order to protect the cabin
occupants from the effects of hypoxia, the model GVI airplane provides supplemental
oxygen via the passenger oxygen system. This system is compliant with the requirements
of 14 CFR §25.1447(c) and automatically deploys the passenger masks prior to the cabin
altitude reaching 15,000 feet. Additionally, Gulfstream has demonstrated the emergency
descent capability of the model GVI airplane by flight test, from the maximum certified
operating altitude of 51,000 feet to a safe altitude of 15,000 feet.
Occupant survivability in the event of a rapid cabin decompression at altitudes above
40,000 feet merits further consideration, particularly in the event that an occupant is
unable to make use of the supplemental oxygen provided by the passenger oxygen
system.

5
The FAA addressed this issue in [Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-16. This interim
policy was established to provide guidelines for granting exemption from the
requirements of 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) Amendment 25-87, with regard to
the effects of damage from an UERF.
The policy described in [Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-16 was originally intended
for application on airplanes with wing mounted engines, which due to their configuration
are unable to provide mitigating features such as the secondary pressure bulkhead on the
model GVI. For these airplanes, which are less protected from the effects of an UERF
than the model GVI, [Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-16 established the following
alternative limits to cabin pressure altitude exposure:
Cabin Pressure Altitude [feet] Maximum Total Exposure Time
Above 45,000 0
[minutes]
Above 40,000 1
Above 25,000 3
Above 10,000 6
[Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-16 explains these alternative limits were based on a
physiological model that approximates blood saturation level of oxygen and incorporates
known phenomenological relationships that describe the respiratory cycle, lung
mechanics, lung, venous and arterial blood flows and calculates trans-alveolar oxygen.
The intent of these limits is to ensure that permanent harm to occupants is unlikely in the
event of a cabin decompression, even if an occupant is unable to use supplemental
oxygen.

Figure 1: Emergency-Descent Profile

6
In addition, the FAA has found, as noted in the [Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC)] Mechanical Systems Harmonization Working Group (MSHWG)
final report on §25.841(a), that no fatalities from hypoxia were due to in-flight rapid
decompression events as envisioned by amendment 25-87. The data indicate that
decompression is not a significant cause of fatalities.
Gulfstream performed decompression analysis for an emergency descent after an UERF
at 45,000 feet. Gulfstream used a 17 second pilot reaction time, consistent with guidelines
established with [Advisory Circular] AC 20-128A [“Design Considerations for
Minimizing Hazards caused by Uncontained Turbine Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit
Rotor Failure”], section 8(d)(2). The emergency-descent profile is shown in Figure 1.
The analysis [in the previous table] shows that the cabin altitude is above 25,000 feet for
175 seconds, above 40,000 feet for 50 seconds, and reaches a maximum of 44,967 feet.
Therefore, this emergency descent from 45,000 feet meets the alternative limits
prescribed in [Policy Memorandum] ANM-03-112-16.
Gulfstream has also performed a Depressurization Exposure Integral (DEI) calculation,
and the resulting values for the model GVI are significantly below what the ARAC
MSHWG Report on 25.841(a)(2) & (3) which states as the maximum allowable values
of:
DEI 30 < 2160 mmHg-sec
DEI 60 < 12000 mmHg-sec
c) Probability of occurrence
The altitude exposure discussed in the preceding Occupant Survivability section can only
occur as a result of an extremely improbable series of events.
The model GVI aircraft is equipped with Rolls-Royce BR725 turbofan engines, the latest
and most advanced variant of the BR700 engine series. These engines incorporate
decades of accumulated knowledge in materials, design, manufacturing and maintenance
practices that minimize the probability of uncontained failures.
A broad study of uncontained engine rotor failures from 1969 to 2006 coordinated by the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) noted that up to 2006 there had been an
accumulated 39 million engine cycles of third generation engines such as the BR725 with
no recorded uncontained disk failures.
Based on the accumulated cycles with no recorded events, that study derived a failure
rate of 2.5E-8 disk failures per engine cycle for third generation engines.
Two such events have occurred since the study results were published. An uncontained
failure of a Rolls Royce Trent 900 series engine Intermediate Pressure Turbine on Qantas
Airbus A380, tail number VH-OQA, occurred near Changi Airport, Singapore on
November 4, 2010. An uncontained failure of an Engine Alliance GP7270 engine fan on
Air France A380, tail number F-HPJE, occurred near Nuuk, Greenland on September 30,
2017. The industry study originally assumed one event (though at the time there were
none) to derive a failure rate, so twice that failure rate will be used in this assessment.

7
Using the accepted UERF models and assessment methods described in FAA AC 20-
128A, GAC has determined that the model GVI baggage compartment pressure vessel
exposure to intermediate and large fragments is limited to the Fan, HPC1 and HPC2
stages of the engines. Only three (3) out of sixteen (16) engine stages on each engine,
therefore, have the potential to cause sufficient damage to result in a sudden
decompression.
Only a subset of the potential fragment trajectories from these engine stages can impact
the baggage compartment. Translational and spread angle extents of the vulnerable area
are shown in the following table.

Rotor Translational Angles Spread Angles Vulnerabili

ty Fraction
LH Fan 209° to 287° (78° of 360°) -5° to +5° (10° of 10°) 21.67%
LH HPC1 218° to 284° (66° of 360°) -5° to -1° (4° of 10°) 7.33%
LH HPC2 218° to 284° (66° of 360°) -5° to -3° (2° of 10°) 3.67%
RH Fan 63° to 140° (77° of 360°) -5° to +5° (10° of 10°) 21.39%
RH HPC1 71° to 138° (67° of 360°) -5° to -1° (4° of 10°) 7.44%
RH HPC2 71° to 138° (67° of 360°) -5° to -3° (2° of 10°) 3.72%
All other None None 0%
stages (26)
Aircraft vulnerability fraction: 2.04%
Should an UERF occur on a model GVI releasing an intermediate or large disk fragment,
there is only a 2.04% chance that the fragment will be released on a trajectory that
impacts the pressure vessel.
Though access to the baggage area in flight is necessary to allow full use of the cabin
volume, the area is only intermittently accessed for placement or retrieval of items. The
door is kept closed at all times when the baggage compartment is not being accessed.
This is enforced by specific indications in the Crew Alerting System and related
operating limitations in the Airplane Flight Manual, and incentivized by the fact that
keeping the door open detracts from passenger comfort, as it increases cabin noise levels.
Currently the model GVI Crew Alerting System (CAS) presents a Caution (Amber)
message to the flight crew whenever the baggage compartment door is not closed and the
airplane is above 40,000 feet altitude. The associated crew action is to close the door.
Should this exemption be granted, GAC will increase the FAA AFM limitation in Section
01-52-50 for baggage compartment access in Section from 40,000 feet to 45,000 feet.
The current model GVI CAS (Amber) message to the flight crew would be changed to
activate if the baggage compartment door is not closed at altitudes above 45,000 feet.
The baggage compartment door remains closed for the vast majority of the flight
duration. If an UERF were to occur and cause significant damage to the baggage
compartment, depressurizing it, this would most likely occur while the door is closed and
would therefore not result in decompression of the main area of the cabin. GAC

8
conservatively estimates that the baggage compartment will be occupied for no more than
10% of the flight duration at altitude.
These factors can be brought together to estimate the probability that an UERF would
actually result in rapid cabin decompression:
Probability of UERF disk failure (intermediate or large fragment):
5E-8 per engine cycle * 2 engines = 1.0E-7 per aircraft cycle
1.0E-7 per aircraft cycle / 2.5 Flight Hours (FH) average per flight = 4.0E -8 per FH
Probability UERF disk debris strikes the baggage compartment:
4.0E-8 per FH * 2.04% aircraft vulnerability fraction = 8.16E-10 per FH
Probability UERF disk debris strike occurs during Climb or Cruise phase:
8.16E-10 per FH * 36% (per AC 20-128A) = 2.94E-10 per FH
Probability of UERF disk debris strike during Climb or Cruise with baggage door open:
2.94E-10 per FH * 10% flight time with baggage door open = 2.94E-11 per FH
The probability of a sudden decompression due to an UERF on the model GVI airplane is
extremely improbable on the order of 2.94E-11 per Flight Hour. This is over thirty times
less likely than the accepted failure rate for catastrophic system failure conditions of 1E -9
per FH. Note that the probability of debris impact to the pressure vessel alone, regardless
of flight phase and baggage door status, is also extremely improbable.
d) Other aspects of 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii)
The model GVI fully complies with 14 CFR §25.841(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) for all
applicable conditions other than an UERF. Exemption is sought for an UERF only.
e) Other airworthiness approvals
For information only, Gulfstream notes that the subject model GVI has received a
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) major change approval (reference 10056314
Rev. 2) issued in accordance with Regulation [European Community] (EC) No. 216/2008
on behalf of the European Community permitting operation of the aircraft with no
baggage compartment access altitude limitation. There is a difference in 14 CFR § 25.841
Amendment 25-87 and EASA CS 25.841, Amendment 2. EASA issued a special
condition for the model GVI. The EASA special condition policy was essentially based
on business jets Special Condition as applied by the FAA prior to 14 CFR § 25.841
Amendment 25-87 with reference to the appropriate [EASA Certification Specification]
CS standards. Gulfstream demonstrated compliance to that special condition by in part,
conducting a particular risk assessment for UERF scenarios, demonstrating pressure
vessel integrity, adequate ventilation for failure scenarios, adequate pressurization for
other failures, sufficient environmental control systems for other failures as well as
adequate oxygen equipment for failure scenarios.
Gulfstream minimized the model GVI UERF risk in accordance to [Advisory Circular]
AC 20-128A. In providing the approval, EASA found that the model GVI is safe to

9
 operate at all altitudes within the flight envelope without baggage compartment access
limitation.
Exercise of Exemption Privileges Outside the United States
Per 14 CFR §11.81(h), GAC requests that the privileges of this exemption be extended
outside the United States, as the model GVI aircraft is operated in countries possessing
bilateral agreements with the United States and which adopt 14 CFR Part 25 as their
airworthiness standards for transport category aircraft.
Federal Register publication
The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving the requirement for Federal Register
publication for public comment because the request is identical in all material respects to
previously granted exemptions; the exemption, if granted, would not set a precedent; and any
delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to the petitioner. The FAA therefore finds it
unnecessary to publish the petition for public comment.
The FAA’s analysis
The FAA’s analysis of this petition is based on both the GAC petition and additional proprietary
information that accompanied their petition.
GAC requests relief from § 25.841(a)(2), which specifies that cabin pressure altitude may not
exceed 25,000 feet for more than 2 minutes, nor exceed 40,000 feet for any time, after
decompression from any failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable. A grant of
exemption from these regulations for certain engine failures would allow passengers and crew to
access the baggage compartment at airplane altitudes above 40,000 feet, up to a maximum
altitude of 45,000 feet; improve performance; and avoid airspace congestion.
Removing the current baggage-compartment-access altitude limitation (40,000 feet) could
improve operability of the Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) and avoid airspace
congestion. To access the baggage compartment according to the regulations, an operator must
first descend to 40,000 feet. After the baggage compartment access is completed, the airplane
can climb back to a more efficient altitude. This maneuver increases fuel usage and engine
emissions, and adds to airspace congestion.
GAC states that the baggage-compartment-access altitude limitation adversely affects the ability
of the Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) to compete with older airplanes, and with current
airplanes that do not have a similar limitation due to differing cabin configurations. Most of these
other airplanes are produced by foreign manufacturers.
Conformance with applicable FAA policy
The FAA reviewed this petition in the context of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) Mechanical Systems Harmonization Working Group (MSHWG) final report on
§ 25.841(a)(2) and (3), dated August 2003; and FAA Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16,
“Interim Policy on High Altitude Cabin Decompression (Reference Amendment 25-87),” dated
March 24, 2006. The interim policy applies only to those decompression events that are due to
UERF. The interim policy is based on data from research on the response of humans and other
primates to changes in ambient pressure. Evaluation of this data indicates a direct correlation

10
between the alveolar pressure of oxygen time integral and the likelihood of fatalities or
permanent physiological damage to those exposed to such pressure changes. That is, as the value
of the integral increases, the likelihood of fatalities or permanent physiological damage also
increases. However, to simplify, the FAA accepted “pass/fail criteria,” and Policy Memorandum
ANM-03-112-16 uses a table of altitudes and cumulative exposure times in lieu of the pressure-
time integral. It is important to note that the values of altitude and time in the table, and the
results of the pressure-time integral method, are in agreement.
Accordingly, Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16 focuses on minimizing the likelihood that,
if a person is exposed to high-altitude cabin pressure from any failure not shown to be extremely
improbable, they will suffer permanent physiological damage. To analyze petitions for
exemption from § 25.841(a)(2), the FAA requires information about emergency descent rates,
design features that increase such rates, other design features that offset the inherent increased
risk of exposure to high-altitude cabin pressure, and operational procedures.
As stated in Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16, the FAA acknowledges a lack of relevant
data on the effects of exposure to high-altitude cabin pressure following decompression and,
particularly, those effects on people of various ages, and on people with circulatory or respiratory
diseases or certain other medical conditions.
GAC provided data per the guidance contained in Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16, which
the FAA has relied upon for all previous petitions for exemption to the associated regulations.
This data indicates that the Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) is able to meet all of the
exposure limits provided in the policy (i.e., cabin pressure altitude does not exceed 45,000 feet;
cabin pressure at and above 40,000 feet pressure altitude exposure of no more than 1 minute;
and, cabin pressure above 25,000 feet for no more than 3 minutes) when cruising at 45,000 feet.
Review of historical data and research
The FAA reviewed databases from the National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center (now
called the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) database), containing data
gathered from 1959 to 2006. Within that time, the data reveals approximately 3,000 instances of
cabin-pressure loss. System failures (e.g., cabin-pressurization-controller failures, valve failures,
etc.) and structural failures (e.g., door-seal failures) have caused the vast majority of these
instances, typically recognized at low altitude within a few minutes after takeoff. Pilot error also
contributed to the number of events. The majority of these events have not subjected the
occupants to exposures above 25,000 feet (an altitude considered physiologically significant).
The cabin pressure altitude in most events did not exceed 15,000 feet (the cabin pressure altitude
at which passenger oxygen masks are deployed).
Similarly, UERF events are very rare. A simple calculation shows that grouping all engines and
transport airplanes together yields an average probability of a UERF at cruise altitude of
approximately 1x10-7 per engine hour. New engine designs appear to reduce this probability by
an order of magnitude. The FAA found, as noted in the MSHWG report on § 25.841(a), that no
fatalities from hypoxia were due to in-flight rapid decompression events as envisioned by
amendment 25-87. The data indicates that decompression is not a significant cause of fatalities. It
is because these events are so rare that the FAA considers the risk of flight above 40,000 feet
pressure altitude to be acceptable.

11
Holes from UERF
GAC evaluated the size of holes in the fuselage and wing in this scenario, and provided the
results in their petition and in proprietary supplemental material. The FAA evaluated GAC’s
approach for determining the size of holes in the fuselage and wings caused by UERF. GAC’s
approach followed FAA regulatory guidance contained in AC 25-20, “Pressurization,
Ventilation, and Oxygen Systems Assessment for Subsonic Flight Including High Altitude
Operation,” dated September 10, 1996; and AC 20-128A, “Design Considerations for
Minimizing Hazards caused by Uncontained Turbine Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit Rotor
Failure,” dated March 25, 1997.
Use of supplemental oxygen
As discussed in further detail below, the FAA analyzed the GAC petition in the context of the
MSHWG recommendations, the part 25 requirements pertaining to supplemental oxygen, and
certain technical standards for supplemental-oxygen equipment.
Section 25.1441(d) requires approval of oxygen equipment for airplanes that are approved to
operate above 40,000 feet altitude. Section 25.1443 specifies the minimum mass flow of
supplemental oxygen for flightcrew and passenger oxygen systems up to a cabin altitude of
40,000 feet. Part 25 does not contain standards for oxygen systems above 40,000 feet. However,
FAA technical standard orders (TSO) provide requirements for diluter demand pressure-
breathing regulators (TSO-C89a) and demand oxygen masks (TSO-C78a) up to 45,000 feet. In
addition, SAE International Aerospace Standard AS8027 provides specifications for diluter
demand pressure-breathing regulators up to 45,000 feet.
Oxygen-system protection above 40,000 feet requires pressure-breathing equipment. Flightcrew
pressure-breathing equipment requires training to ensure effective use. Pressure breathing
requires physical effort to exhale and minimum effort to inhale. This reversal of the normal
breathing cycle can lead to hyperventilation. Training of passengers to use pressure-breathing
equipment safely is considered impractical. The FAA determined that an acceptable means of
compliance for the fixed- and portable-oxygen systems used by flight attendants and passengers
would be to install oxygen equipment that is certificated to 40,000 feet, and limit exposure to the
reduced pressure environment above 40,000 feet via airplane-descent performance. Ultimately,
occupant survival during a decompression event depends upon a swift descent to a lower altitude
and GAC followed the guidelines explained in FAA Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16 to
minimize the exposure to high altitude.
Conclusion of FAA analysis
Permitting airplanes to fly above 40,000 feet does offer real and tangible benefits to the
aerospace industry, the travelling public, and the United States economy by reducing congestion,
improving fuel economy, and reducing pollution. If compliance with § 25.841, amendment 25-
87, were to limit airplane operations to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet, it would impose a
significant disadvantage on newly designed airplanes that have many safety advantages over
older airplanes currently allowed to operate at higher altitudes. This would delay the introduction
of these airplanes and the benefits of their advanced technology. The Model GVI airplane (G650
and variants) is approved for flight to a maximum altitude of 51,000 feet, but access to the
baggage compartment is currently restricted to 40,000 feet altitude and below. GAC’s request is

12
to allow access to the baggage compartment up to a flight altitude of 45,000 feet for a short
period of time. The necessity to descend from 51,000 feet to 40,000 feet, to access the baggage
compartment and then climb back to cruise altitude, incurs additional fuel consumption and
engine emissions, and represents an inconvenience to the air traffic system.
The Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) design includes an “Emergency Descent” mode,
which will automatically initiate an emergency descent maneuver to a safe altitude (including a
90 heading change to exit the airway) when a high cabin pressure altitude is detected. This
added safety feature provides a means to survive a condition where both flightcrew members
could be initially incapacitated.
The FAA finds that the effects of the decompression exposure, as requested by GAC, follows the
exposure duration guidelines explained in FAA Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16 and
accepted on previous grants of exemption. This is consistent with the goal of FAA Policy
Memorandum ANM-03-112-16, which is to ensure that the decompression exposure does not
result in permanent physiological harm to healthy individuals.
Based upon an evaluation of the data and analysis GAC provided, the FAA determined that the
petitioner does have sufficient justification for a grant of exemption from § 25.841(a)(2) for
certain engine failures up to an operating altitude of 45,000 feet. This permits GAC access to the
baggage compartment up to an operating altitude of 45,000 feet. The petitioner met all of the
criteria in FAA Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16 when operating at an altitude of 45,000
feet. A grant of exemption from § 25.841(a)(2)(ii) will permit cabin pressure altitude to exceed
40,000 feet for 1 minute (but not to exceed 45,000 feet for any duration), after decompression
from any UERF condition not shown to be extremely improbable, during the time that the
baggage compartment is being accessed up to an operating altitude of 45,000 feet. A grant of
exemption from § 25.841(a)(2)(i) permits cabin pressure altitude to exceed 25,000 feet for more
than 2 minutes (but not more than 3 minutes), after decompression from any UERF condition not
shown to be extremely improbable, allowing time for the airplane to descend from an altitude of
45,000 feet to 25,000 feet.
A grant of exemption is predicated on the requirement that GAC successfully demonstrates
compliance to §§ 25.1441, 25.1443, 25.1445, 25.1447, and 25.1449 for all supplemental oxygen
systems used on the Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants).
The FAA’s decision
In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption is in the public interest. The
petitioner has shown that limiting access to the baggage compartment at altitudes up to 45,000
feet pressure altitude would meet the criteria in FAA Policy Memorandum ANM-03-112-16 and
is in the public interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and
44701(f), delegated to me by the Administrator, I grant Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation
(GAC) an exemption from 14 CFR 25.841(a)(2) to the extent necessary to allow occupants of the
Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) access to the baggage compartment at altitudes up to
45,000 feet pressure altitude.
This exemption is subject to the following conditions:

13
 1. The Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) AFM must specify that the cruise
maximum indicated operating pressure altitude for passenger access to the Class B cargo
compartment is 45,000 feet.
2. The Model GVI airplane (G650 and variants) AFM must contain applicable flightcrew
procedures for a rapid decompression event. The section of the AFM that pertains to
actions in the event of a decompression must state that the flightcrew should initiate a
descent at the maximum rate of descent and safe descent speed, which is typically the
maximum operating speed (VMO/MMO), assuming structural integrity of the airplane.
3. GAC must submit certification flight-test data for the Model GVI airplane (G650 and
variants) that corroborates the descent profiles used in the analysis to show that, after
decompression at an airplane indicated operating pressure altitude of 45,000 feet and with
the Class B cargo compartment door open, the cabin pressure altitude will not exceed
25,000 feet for more than 3 minutes, nor 40,000 feet for more than 1 minute.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 6, 2018.

/s/

Suzanne Masterson
Acting Manager, Transport Standards Branch
Policy and Innovation Division
Aircraft Certification Service

14
 Exemption No. 11994

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20591

In the matter of the petition of

PMI GLOBAL SERVICES, INC Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2014- 0331

for an exemption from § 91.211(b)(1)(ii)

of Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations

DENIAL OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated May 21, 2014, Mr. John Dillman, Chief Pilot, PMI Global Services, Inc.
(PMI), 180 Airport Road, Hangar D-2, Westchester County, Airport White Plains, NY 10604
petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of PMI for an exemption
from § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed
exemption, if granted, would relieve PMI from the requirement that one pilot crewmember
wear and use an oxygen mask while at flight altitudes above flight level 410. Relief is sought
for domestic and international 14 CFR part 91 operations for company aircraft equipped with
quick donning oxygen masks and Automatic Emergency Descent Mode technology.

The petitioner requires relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil
aircraft of U.S. registry with a pressurized cabin at flight altitudes above flight level 350
unless one pilot at the controls of the airplane is wearing and using an oxygen mask that
is secured and sealed and that either supplies oxygen at all times or automatically
supplies oxygen whenever the cabin pressure altitude of the airplane exceeds 14,000
feet (MSL), except that the one pilot need not wear and use an oxygen mask while at or
below flight level 410 if there are two pilots at the controls and each pilot has a quick-
donning type of oxygen mask that can be placed on the face with one hand from the
ready position within 5 seconds, supplying oxygen and properly secured and sealed.

AFS-14-295-E
 2

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

The petitioner states that it is a corporate flight department operating the majority of its
scheduled trips with two Gulfstream 550 airplanes on long flights to international destinations
throughout the world. The petitioner explains that it employs ten fulltime, fully trained, pilots
as crew members on company aircraft. PMI states that each company pilot is sent to Flight
Safety International every 6-8 months for recurrent ground school and simulator training, to
include demonstrating manual emergency descents.

PMI states the Gulfstream 550 airplane is capable of cruising up to an altitude of flight level
510. PMI claims that the FAA type certification of the airframe and systems results in a very
“highly improbable” decompression failure rate up to and including its service ceiling. PMI
names four ‘mitigators’ that the airplane is equipped with to reduce the likelihood and risk of
decompression. PMI lists the ‘mitigators’ as follows:
1. Automatic Emergency Descent Mode (EDM) – EDM is armed any time the airplane
altitude is greater than 40,000 feet with the autopilot selected ON. When the “Cabin
Pressure Low” warning message illuminates on the Crew Alerting System (CAS)
(usually 8,000 feet cabin pressure), with the airplane above 40,000 feet and autopilot
ON, the following occurs:
1) Speed target changes to 340 KCAS in manual mode.
2) The altitude is preselected to 15,000 feet.
3) The autopilot commands a left turn with a 90 degree heading change.
4) The auto throttle retards power to idle. (If auto throttles are not engaged, they
will automatically be engaged).
5) The airplane descends at Mmo / Vmo to 15,000 feet.
6) At 15,000 feet, the speed target changes to 250 KCAS.
According to PMI, with EDM installed, the pilots are not preoccupied by having to
perform this “automatic” emergency descent so their immediate attention can be
focused on donning the oxygen mask.
2. Quick-don Oxygen Masks. PMI asserts that each crewmember is trained and
evaluated at Flight Safety International every 6-8 months to don their mask within 5
seconds.
3. Aft Bulkhead Door. The airplane is equipped with an Aft Bulkhead Door which PMI
claims creates a dual hull, protecting the cabin from the two most likely causes of
decompression (a catastrophic engine failure resulting in a puncture of the aft baggage
area, or the external baggage door/seal failure).
4. Cabin Pressure Low warning system. A red message light will illuminate and three
chimes sound when the cabin pressure exceeds a predetermined value (usually 8,000
feet cabin altitude).
 3
PMI asserts that the Gulfstream 550 pressurization system components are highly redundant,
making a failure of the system very unlikely. As examples of redundancy, PMI explains
various functionality built into the Thrust Recovery Outflow Valve (TROV) and Cabin
Pressure Controller (CPC).
PMI makes additional safety arguments related to oxygen systems and human factors to
demonstrate no degradation of safety if the exemption were granted. PMI claims that oxygen
masks and associated systems were designed primarily to be used in the event of an
emergency – not for prolonged use.
PMI also asserts that operations at flight level (FL) 450 without one pilot on oxygen is not
accepting a higher level of risk than operations at flight level 410 because EDM and the Cabin
Pressure Low warning system make the pilot’s reaction time quicker and pilot actions fewer
than in other aircraft. As an example, PMI states that the time of useful consciousness (TUC)
is documented by the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute to be 9 to 12 seconds at altitudes from
flight level FL410 up to FL450. PMI states that a PMI pilot need only don the oxygen mask
within the TUC while the aircraft begins the emergency descent. PMI claims to train for this
scenario. Even if both pilots, along with the flight technician, were to experience a brief loss
of useful consciousness, PMI states that the Gulfstream 550 will still initiate an emergency
descent to a safe altitude.
PMI believes it is unique within the aviation community for two reasons:

1) Flight Technician. PMI states that on every passenger carrying flight, that there
are four crewmembers (2 pilots, 1 flight technician, and 1 flight attendant). According
to PMI, the presence of the flight technician is an added safety factor because the
technician occupies the jump seat on every flight. The jump seat (located behind and
directly between the pilot seats) is equipped with its own quick donning oxygen mask
that can be donned and supplying oxygen within 5 seconds. PMI claims that in the
event that a pressurization emergency was to occur, the flight technician is fully
trained and capable of not only donning his own oxygen mask, but he can assist either
pilot in donning their mask if required. The third flight deck crewmember, in PMI’s
view, is an added safety benefit on every flight by offering a third pair of eyes,
situational awareness, and maintenance technician skills to assist in decision making.

2) Flight Planning. PMI states that it does not flight plan their Gulfstream 550
airplanes above FL410. The petitioner asserts that it only flies above FL410 when
conditions dictate (e.g. weather, turbulence, and fuel range considerations) and, once
clear of these conditions, its airplanes will descend to FL410 or below. The petitioner
states that it has identified negative effects on the pilot’s ability to perform due to
long-term wear and use of oxygen masks. According to PMI, difficulties such as
communication, fatigue, eating, drinking water, inability to properly scan and
difficulty reaching certain cockpit items when wearing oxygen masks for long periods
have been identified in the petitioner’s Safety Management System (SMS).
 4
PMI claims that the public interest would be served by increased fuel efficiency, increased
fuel economy, decreased fuel consumption, and decreased harmful atmospheric gases, all as a
result of higher altitude flight. PMI also believes that airspace will be less congested because
operators will be encouraged to fly at higher altitudes.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving the requirement for Federal
Register publication because the exemption, if granted, would not set a precedent, and any
delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to PMI.

The FAA’s analysis is as follows:

The FAA has reviewed the information presented by PMI Global Inc. in support of its petition
for exemption and has determined that a grant of exemption would not provide an equal level
of safety or be in the public interest. The type of operations proposed by PMI have previously
been proposed and evaluated by the FAA. However, because of the specific features of the
Gulfstream 550 and unique information provided by the petitioner, the FAA will provide a
full analysis of the petition.

In Denial of Exemption No. 4667 (copy enclosed), the FAA stated that in Notice No. 82-11,
Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (47 FR 35146,
August 12, 1982) it proposed amendments that would allow the operation of aircraft at higher
altitudes than presently specified in the regulations without requiring at least one pilot at the
controls to wear and use an oxygen mask. Because of concerns expressed by commenters
opposed to the proposed amendments, the FAA reconsidered the NPRM and the supporting
rationale included therein and in previous grants of exemption. The FAA determined that it
should not issue further grants of exemption and withdrew Notice No. 82-11 (51 FR 9432,
March 18, 1986). The FAA further determined that if it found that it could grant relief from
the current regulation, it would initiate a rulemaking action rather than issue grants of
exemption. The FAA maintains this policy position.

PMI explains the safety and engineering features of the Gulfstream 550. However, in Denial
of Exemption No. 6817 (copy enclosed), the FAA found that despite the safety and
engineering features and structural integrity built into technologically advanced aircraft for
operations at high altitudes, the possibility still exists that these aircraft could lose cabin
pressurization. The FAA stated that consideration must be given to the physiological
consequences of the flight crewmembers in the event of a rapid decompression. Therefore,
notwithstanding PMI’s assertion that the pressurization system components are redundant and
that the FAA type certification of the airframe and systems make a failure of the system very
unlikely, the FAA considers that a reduction in the likelihood that such an incident might
occur does not maintain a level of safety equivalent to the rule from which the exemption is
sought. Additionally, the FAA does not concur with the petitioner’s claim that the airplane’s
four ‘mitigators’ (EDM, oxygen masks, aft bulkhead door, and cabin pressure low warning
system) reduce the likelihood and risk of decompression. Only one ‘mitigator’ (aft bulkhead
 5
door) is designed to reduce the likelihood and risk of decompression. The other ‘mitigator’s’
are designed to assist the crew in managing the pressurization emergency.

The FAA does not agree with PMI’s assertion that the presence of a Flight Technician aboard
the airplane on every passenger carrying flight is an added safety factor. It cannot be
presumed that additional crewmembers equipped with their own quick donning oxygen mask,
even if they are fully trained and capable of donning it, will be immune from the effects of
rapid loss of pressurization and therefore able to assist either pilot in donning their oxygen
mask. In cases of high altitude depressurization, a third pair of eyes, situational awareness,
and maintenance technician skills to assist in decision making do not provide an equivalent
level of safety or no degradation in safety to the rule from which the exemption is sought.

The FAA does not agree that flight planning PMI Gulfstream 550 airplanes below FL410
provides adequate justification for an exemption. The petitioner asserts that it only flies above
FL410 when conditions dictate (e.g. weather, turbulence, and fuel range considerations) and
once clear of these conditions its airplanes will descend to FL410 or below. Although PMI
would benefit from increased fuel efficiency, increased fuel economy, and decreased fuel
consumption because of higher altitude flight, this does not support the public interest. In
Denial of Exemption No. 6817, the FAA stated that should it determine that it is appropriate
to allow the relief requested, the FAA would take appropriate action to amend the rules rather
than issue an exemption. The rulemaking process provides the FAA an opportunity to obtain
comments from a much larger segment of the aviation industry, the public, other government
agencies, thereby presenting issues to a much broader audience.

The FAA’s Decision:

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption would not be in the
public interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113
and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, the petition of PMI Global Services Inc. for
an exemption from 14 CFR § 91.211(b)(1)(ii) to the extent necessary to relieve PMI from the
requirement that one pilot crewmember wear and use an oxygen mask while at flight altitudes
above flight level 410, for domestic and international 14 CFR part 91 operations for company
aircraft equipped with quick donning oxygen masks and Automatic Emergency Descent Mode
technology, is hereby denied.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on June 24, 2015.

/s/
John S. Duncan
Director, Flight Standards Service
6
9432 Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 52 / Tuesday, March 18, 198Q / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 91,121, and 135
[Docket No. 23243; Ref. Notice No. 82-11]
Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
a c t i o n : Withdrawal of Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. ■
summar y: This notice withdraws a
notice of proposed rulemaking which
proposed amendments to the pilot
oxygen mask requirements applicable to
operations under certain Federal
Aviation Regulations. The proposal, if
adopted, would have allowed the
operation of airplanes to higher altitudes
without requiring at least one pilot at
the controls to wear and use an oxygen
mask.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Larry Bedore, Project Development
Branch (AFS-240), Office of Flight
Standards, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, D.G. 20591;
telephone (202) 472-4621.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On August 12,1982, the FAA
published Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) No. 82-11, Pilot
Oxygen Mask Requirements (47 FR
35146), which proposed amendments to
certain sections of Parts 91,121, and 135
of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR). The pertinent sections of those
Parts specify maximum altitudes to
which a pressurized aircraft may be
operated without requiring at least one
pilot to wear and use an oxygen mask.
The availability of an approved quick-
donning type of oxygen mask at each
flight crewmember’s station permits
operation to another, higher maximum
altitude above which at least one pilot
must wear and use that mask. In
operations conducted under Part 135 of
the FAR, at least one pilot at the
controls must wear and use an oxygen
mask when conducting operations
above 35,000 feet mean sea level,
commonly referred to as flight level (FL
350). Under Parts 91 and 121 of the FAR,
one pilot at the controls must wear and
use an oxygen mask when conducting
operations above FL 410.
Notice 82-11 proposed to allow an
aircraft whose total pressure volume is
20,000 cubic feet or more to be operated
up to and including FL 450 or the
maximum certificated altitude of the
aircraft, whichever is lower, without one
pilot at the controls having to wear and
use an oxygen mask. Aircraft whose
total pressure volume is less than 20,000
cubic feet would not be allowed to
operate above FL 410 without one pilot
at the controls having to wear and use
an oxygen mask.
Discussion of Comments
Sixteen public comments were
received in response to Notice 82-11. In
summary, thirteen commenters agree
with the proposals, three disagree. The
thirteen concurrences are from the Air
Transport Association of America
(ATA), Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), National Business Aircraft
Association, Inc. (NBAA), one air
carrier, and various consultant, sales
and service, corporate, charter, and air
taxi organizations. Those not concurring
are an aeronautical consultant, the
Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Inc. (AIA), and the United
States Air Force (USAF).
ALPA comments that § 135.89(b)(2)
should be amended to further describe
an approved quick-donning type oxygen
mask as one “. . . that can be placed on
the face from the ready position within 5
seconds, supplying oxygen and properly
secured and sealed.” ALPA stated that
this change would bring § 135.89 in line
with mask requirements as essentially
stated in current §§91.32 and 121.333 of
the FAR.
The three commenters opposed to the
proposed amendments raise the
question of potentially severe
physiological consequences resulting
from high altitude decompression that
possibly would incapacitate the flight
crew and result in an accident. AIA
states that despite the structural
integrity of modern technology aircraft,
rapid decompressions do occur. The
theoretical 168 square-inch fuselage
skin-panel rupture considered in Notice
82-11 does not consider a rupture in or
near the vicinity of the cockpit nor
bigger ruptures (e.g., door failure) that
can and have occurred. AIA states that
at 45,000 feet the pressure demand
regulatory and quick-donning mask
combination provide only marginal
respiratory protection for the flight crew;
the aerage time of useful consciousness
at 45,000 feet is only 10-12 seconds.
The aeronautical consultant
comments that should a penetration of
the aircraft fuselage or windshield
occur, and the crew compartment door
is closed or closes, the crew
compartment will decompress in a very
short time, resulting in decreased flight
crew performance capability or loss of
consciousness.
The USAF states that its regulations
for pressurized aircraft stipulate that
above 41,000 feet through 45,000 feet,
oxygen is required to be used by the
pilot and must be immediately available
to all other crewmembers at their duty
stations. These requirements are based
on physiological needs to preclude
hypoxia and decompression effects. The
USAF statqs that if depressurized, the
time of useful consciousness at 35,000
feet is 30-60 seconds, 15-20 seconds at
40,000 feet, and 9-12 seconds at 43,000
feet. To avoid decompression sickness
and loss of consciousness in the event of
depressurizations resulting in aircraft
ambient cabin altitudes of 41,000
through 45,000 feet, it is desirable for the
pilot to prebreathe 100 percent oxygen
for a minimum of 20 to 30 minutes to
denitrogenate the body. The aircraft
cabin volume and the quick-donning
oxygen mask will not preclude adverse
physiological effects in the altitude
range 41,000 feet to 45,000 feet. USAF
requirements make it clear that
prebreathing 100 percent oxygen at
ambient cabin altitude above 41,000 feet
through 45,000 feet is essential to meet
the minimum physiological requirements
of the pilot in all USAF aircraft
regardless of the volume of the
Pressurized cabin and the quick-donning
oxygen equipment provided.
Physiological and Operational
Considerations
The FAA is concerned regarding the
effects on crewmember performance in
the event a rapid decompression occurs
above FL 350. The technological
advances in aircraft engines and
airframe design has facilitated increased
flight operations of modern turbojets in
the high altitude stratum.
Notwithstanding the technological
accomplishments of the aviation
industry, the aircraft is only one element
to consider in the total operational
environment. An equally important and
esential element that must be
considered is the finite physiological
limit of the human body.
The body has a great capacity to
adjust to its surroundings. It constantly
makes adjustments for changes in
external temperature; acclimates to
barometric pressure variations from one
habitat to another; and compensates for
motion in space and postural changes in
relation to gravity. The body performs
all of these adjustments while meeting
changing energy requirements for
varying amounts of physical and mental
activity.
In aviation, the demands upon the
compensatory mechanisms of the body
are numerous and of considerable
magnitude. One of the environmental
changes of greatest physiological
 Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 52 / Tuesday, March 18, 1986 / Proposed Rules
significance related to flight is a marked
change in atmospheric pressure. In
unpressurized aircraft, as altitude
increases, the atmospheric pressure
decreases and the body enters a
physiological deficient zone where
oxygen deficiency becomes an ever
increasing problem. To overcome this
deficiency and allow aircraft operations
to be conducted at higher flight
altitudes, aircraft cabins are pressurized
to a cabin altitude lower than the
aircraft flight altitude with the cabin
altitude gradually increasing as the
aircraft climbs to its cruise altitude, but
generally not exceeding a cabin altitude
of 8,000 feet. In the event a cabin
depressurization occurs while flying at
today’s high operating altitudes, other
methods are necessary to provide for a
person’s physiological needs. Supplying
supplemental oxygen to the user at
sufficient pressure to maintain the
partial pressure of oxygen in the blood,
due to the rapid reduction of pressure on
the body, is one method. As ambient
altitude increases, a greater positive
oxygen pressure is required to enable
the user’s lungs to be pressurized with
oxygen.
Ultimately, the increased oxygen
pressure must be countered by some
form of external body pressure garment
which, counters the increased internal
body pressure. There is no alternative.
Studies show that persons lacking
oxygen under pressure at ambient
altitudes above approximately 41,000
feet (tests at significantly higher
altitudes pose an unacceptable risk and
have not been performed), and lacking
pressure garments at ambient altitudes
above 45,000 feet, will become hypoxic
and a lower ambient altitude must be
attained or eventual loss of
consciousness or death will result.
Hypoxia is the lack of adequate
oxygen in the tissues of the body. When
the state of oxygen deficiency is
sufficient to impair functions of the
brain and other organs, hypoxia
becomes a definite threat to pilot
performance and aviation safety. In
pressurized aircraft, the exposure to
higher altitudes as a result of loss of
pressurization is of great concern. The
period of time between an individual’s
sudden deprivation of oxygen at a given
altitude (assuming that supplemental
oxygen is not being used) and the onset
of physical or mental impairment which
prohibits rational action is considered
thé effective performance time (EPT) or
is sometimes referred to as the time of
useful consciousness. This period
represents the time during which the
individual can recognize the problem,
establish a supplemental oxygen supply
(don his/her oxygen mask) and/or
initiate a descent to lower altitude. The
EPT is primarily related to the aircraft’s
pressurized cabin altitude and the length
of time for the cabin altitude to equal
the flight altitude of the aircraft
following depressurization, but is also
influenced by individual tolerance and
physical activity.
Tests conducted without the use of an
oxygen mask (i.e., a “shirtsleeve”
environment) show that, in sudden
depressurizations to altitudes below
30.000 feet, the EPT may differ
considerably from the time to
unconscrousnes. Above 35,000 feet, the
period between the EPT and time to
unconsciousness becomes shorter and
eventually coincides with the time it
takes for the blood to circulate from the
lungs to the brain. In a pressurized
aircraft, the cabin altitude at the time of
depressurization represents the
“environmental condition” prior to
exposure. In a rapid depressurization to
30.000 feet actual (flight) altitude, the
average EPT would be about 1 minute.
At 35,000 feet the average EPT is about
30 to 40 seconds. EPT in a
depressurization at altitudes near 41,000
feet is reduced to 10 to 20 seconds. In
studies using data obtained in altitude
chamber tests conducted at ambient
altitudes of about 41,000 feet or below,
the expectations are that at 45,000 feet
and above, the time of consciousness is
about 10 seconds or less, and even if the
pilot is able to don a mask successfully,
a loss of useful consciousness will most
likely occur. Consciousness may not be
recovered for 2-3 minutes or more,
depending upon rate of descent initiated
by the conscious pilot. In
depressurizations to altitudes between
approximately 41,000 feet and 45,000
feet, if the pilot has not been breathing
100 percent oxygen for several minutes
beforehand, the 80 percent nitrogen
which exists in the lungs during
pressurized flight will cause
consciousness to be lost in about 10
seconds for most flight crewmembers
even if an oxygen mask with 100 percent
oxygen is donned at the instant of
depressurization. Assuming that the
oxygen mask was donned promptly in
such a depressurization, this loss of
consciousness will last briefly—perhaps
10 or 20 seconds for most individuals.
Even such a brief loss of consciousness
could be expected to be intolerable in
most situations involving a
depressurization, and recovery of
control of the aircraft is questionable.
These assumptions are based upon
worst case scenarios where the pilot
was not prebreathing 100 percent
oxygen and may not necessarily reflect
9433
what has actually occurred during flight
operations.
Reasons for Withdrawal
It was stated in Notice 82-11 that
because of its large-volume cabin, a
wide-body airplane (defined here as
those airplanes whose total pressure
volume is 20,000 cubic feet or more) can
operate safely up to and including FL
450 or its maximum certificated altitude,
whichever is lower, without requiring at
least one pilot, seated at the controls, to
wear and use an oxygen mask at all
times above FL 450. The example cited
to support this statement is based on an
analysis of a hyhothetical, 168-square-
inch pressure vessel rupture resulting in
depressurization in approximately 3
minutes that allows the crew sufficient
time to realize that an emergency has
occurred, don their masks, and initiate
an emergency descent that ensures the
safety of the crew and passengers.
The assumption that any structural
failure will not exceed the hypothetical
example and that cabin volumes of
20,000 cubic feet or more ensure safety
cannot be supported. As noted by AIA,
rapid depressurization may be caused
by other than a fuselage skin-panel
rupture of 168 square inches, For
example, a rapid depressurization of a
DC-10 at 39,000 feet over New Mexico in
1973 as reported by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
indicates that when an engine fan
assembly disintegrated, fragments of the
fan caused the loss of a 160 square-inch
cabin window, as well as puncturing the
lower fuselage skin in six areas, each
area ranging between 170 and 540
square inches.
The NTSB accident report concerning
the DC-10 aircraft depressurization over
New Mexico in 1973 stated that the
aircraft was at 39,000 feet, well below its
maximum certificated altitude of 43,000
feet or the 45,000 feet maximum altitude
proposed for wide-body aircraft in
Notice 82-11. The first officer was in the
passenger cabin; therefore, the captain
was already wearing an oxygen mask.
An emergency descent was initiated
immediately following the engine fan
assembly failure and yet the NTSB
calculated a decompression profile
which indicated thatdhe aircraft
depressurized to about 34,000 feet in 26
seconds. The loss of a passenger through
the cabin window opening indicates the
extent and immediacy of the -
depressurization. Calculations further
indicate that aircraft occupants were
exposed to altitudes above 30,000 feet
for about 1 minute and to altitudes
above 25,000 feet for more than 2
minutes. Five persons reported that they
9434 Federal Register / Vo! 51, No. 52 / Tuesday, March 18, 1986 / Proposed Rules
became unconscious, two of which were
flight attendants seated in the lower
galley area.
The NTSB stated that there was
evidence indicating that a significant
pressure differential existed between
the passenger cabin and the lower
galley. The depressurization profile for
the lower galley could have been
significantly steeper and thus would
have exposed the two galley occupants
to an altitude above 35,000 feet. Overall,
the extensive compartmentalization of
the aircraft and its intricate
interconnections may account, in part,
for the disparity between the expected
physiological effects on the aircraft
occupants and those actually
encountered.
This accident occurred under
relatively fortuitous circumstances; the
flight altitude of 39,000 feet was 4,000
feet below the maximum certificated
altitude, and the captain was already
wearing an oxygen mask. However, as
noted above, the potential adverse
physiological consequences become
increasingly severe as altitude
increases. Large cabin volume aircraft
may appear to offer a relative degree of
safety because of size alone, but it is not
possible to quantify a cabin volume that
ensures safety on that basis alone. A
rapid depressurization above 41,000 feet,
such as that cited above, could result in
the incapacitation of both pilots with
subsequent disastrous results.
Since 1977, more than 700 incidents
involving pressurization problems have
been reported to the FAA. It is probable
that additional incidents have occurred
and have not been reported. In 50 of the
more than 700 incidents, emergency
action was imperative to ensure the
survival of the aircraft’s occupants.
Unfortunately, the reports of these more
serious incidents are highly subjective
and do not provide adequate data to
substantiate a rule change to permit
operations above FL 410 without at least
one pilot at the controls wearing and
using an oxygen mask secured, sealed,
and supplying oxygen. Data regarding
sudden or rapid depressurizations
normally fail to show pilot reaction time,
time until start of emergency descent,
rate of increase in cabin altitude,
maximum cabin altitude attained, and
time required to reach an altitude at
which supplemental oxygen was no
longer required by the occupants. These
data inadequacies thwart any rational
assessment of regulatory options which
would eliminate the need for at least
one pilot at the controls to wear and use
an oxygen mask at altitudes above FL
410 while providing, in the event of a
rapid or explosive depressurization, the
minimum safety standards necessary in
the public interest for the operation of
an air carrier.
It was also stated in Notice No. 82-11
that while it would take approximately 3
minutes for the cabin of a B-747 airplane
to depressurize in the event of a 168-
square-inch skin-panel rupture, many
"business jet” airplanes have small,
pressurized cabins of perhaps Vso the
volume of a wide-body airplane. The
failure of even a small (3 or 4-square-
inch) fuselage skin area of a “business
jet” could result in a rapid
decompression to flight altitude in less
than 10 seconds. Thus, the Part 135
requirement that at least one pilot at the
controls wear and use an oxygen mask
when operating above FL 350 should be
retained in the interest of public safety.
The question of potentially severe
physiological consequences resulting
from high altitude depressurization in
both large and small cabin volume
aircraft warrants further consideration.
The concerns expressed by those
opposed to the proposals contained in
Notice No. 82-11 prompted the FAA to
reconsider the proposed amendments
and-supporting rationale. That
reconsideration has led the FAA to
conclusions different from those
expressed in Notice No. 82-11. Clearly,
sound technical and medical data and
valid operational data are lacking to
support any rulemaking which
establishes cabin volume as the sole
criterion which governs at which
altitudes an oxygen mask should be
worn, used, and supplying oxygen to at
least one pilot at the controls.
Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
Accordingly, Notice No. 82-11 is
withdrawn. This action does not
preclude the FAA from considering
rulemaking in the future or commit it to
any future course of action on this
subject.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1301(7), 1303,1344,
1348,1352 through 1355,1401,1421 through
1431,1471,1472,1502,1510,1522, and 2121
through 2125; Articles 12, 29, 31, and 32(a) of
the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180); 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.;
E .0 .11514; 49 U.S.C. 106(g) (Revised Pub. L.
97-449, January 21,1983).
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1354(a), 1355,1356,
1357,1401,1421-1430,1472,1485, and 1502; 49
U.S.C. 106(g) (Revised Pub. L. 97-449, January
12,1983).
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1354(A), 1355(A), 1421
through 1431, and 1502; 49 U.S.C. 106(g)
(Revised Pub. L. 97-449, January 12,1983).
Issued in Washington, D.C. on February 3,
1986.
William T. Brennan,
A ctin g D irector o f F lig ht Standards.
[FR Doc. 86-5841 Filed 3-17-86 8:45 am)
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
February 24, 2005

Exemption No. 8499

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2004-19303

Mr. David Gross

Director of Operations
Bombardier Flexjet
3400 Waterview Parkway, Suite 102
Richardson, TX 75080-1476

Dear Mr. Gross:

This letter is to inform you that we have denied your petition for exemption. It transmits our
decision and explains the basis for it.

Our Decision and Its Basis

By letter dated October 4, 2004, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on
behalf of Bombardier Flexjet (Flexjet) for an exemption from §§ 91.211(b)(ii) and (b)(2), and
135.89(b)(3) and (4) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). Please be advised
that there is no § 91.211(b)(ii). Rather the FAA believes that the section from which you
request relief is § 91.211(b)(1)(ii), and relief will be evaluated concerning § 91.211(b)(1)(ii).

The proposed exemption, if granted, would permit Flexjet to operate pressurized aircraft
above flight level 410 without at least one pilot wearing and using an oxygen mask, and to
operate above flight level 350 when one pilot leaves his or her duty station.

The FAA previously evaluated the type of operations that you propose. In Denial of
Exemption No. 4667 (copy enclosed), the FAA stated that it published Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) No. 82-11, Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements (47 FR 35146). That
notice proposed amendments to allow the operation of aircraft at higher altitudes than
presently specified in the regulations without requiring at least one pilot at the controls to
wear and use an oxygen mask. Because of concerns expressed by commenters opposed to the
proposed amendments, the FAA reconsidered the NPRM, the supporting rationale, and
previous grants of exemption. The FAA determined that it should not issue further grants of
exemption and withdrew Notice No. 82-11 (51 FR 9432, March 18, 1986). The FAA further

AFS-05-006
 2

determined that if it found that it could grant relief from the current regulation, it would
initiate a rulemaking action rather than issue grants of exemption.

I find that a grant of exemption would not be in the public interest. Therefore, under the
authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has
delegated to me, the petition of Bombardier Flexjet for an exemption from
14 CFR §§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2), and 135.89(b)(3) and (b)(4) is hereby denied.

Sincerely,

/s/
John M. Allen
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service
February 2, 2005

Exemption No. 8479

Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2004-19304

Mr. David Gross

Director of Operations
Jet Solutions, LLC
3400 Waterview Parkway, Suite 102
Richardson, TX 75080-1476

Dear Mr. Gross:

This letter is to inform you that we have denied your petition for exemption. It transmits our
decision and explains the basis for it.

Our Decision and Its Basis

By letter dated October 4, 2004, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on
behalf of Jet Solutions, LLC (Jet Solutions) for an exemption from §§ 91.211(b)(ii) and
(b)(2), and 135.89(b)(3) and (4) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). Please be
advised that there is no § 91.211(b)(ii). Rather the FAA believes that the section from which
you request relief is § 91.211(b)(1)(ii), and relief will be evaluated concerning
§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii).

The proposed exemption, if granted, would permit Jet Solutions to operate pressurized aircraft
above flight level 410 without at least one pilot wearing and using an oxygen mask, and to
operate above flight level 350 when one pilot leaves his or her duty station.

The type of operations that you propose have previously been proposed and evaluated by the
FAA. In Denial of Exemption No. 4667 (copy enclosed), the FAA stated that in Notice
No. 82-11, Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
(47 FR 35146, August 12, 1982) it proposed amendments that would allow the operation of
aircraft at higher altitudes than presently specified in the regulations without requiring at least
one pilot at the controls to wear and use an oxygen mask. Because of concerns expressed by
commenters opposed to the proposed amendments, the FAA reconsidered the NPRM and the

AFS-05-007
 2

supporting rationale included therein and in previous grants of exemption. The FAA
determined that it should not issue further grants of exemption and withdrew Notice No. 82-
11 (51 FR 9432, March 18, 1986). The FAA further determined that if it found that it could
grant relief from the current regulation, it would initiate a rulemaking action rather than issue
grants of exemption.

I find that a grant of exemption would not be in the public interest. Therefore, under the
authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator has
delegated to me, the petition of Jet Solutions, LLC for an exemption from
14 CFR §§ 91.211(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2), and 135.89(b)(3) and (b)(4) is hereby denied.

Sincerely,

/s/
John M. Allen
Acting Director, Flight Standards Service
 Exemption No. 6817

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20591

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
In the matter of the petition of *
*
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY * Regulatory Docket
* No. 28921
for an exemption from Section *
91.211(b)(1)(ii) of Title 14, *
Code of Federal Regulations *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DENIAL OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated May 9, 1997, Mr. Donald W. Mallonee,

Executive Engineer, Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna), One Cessna
Boulevard, P.O. Box 7704, Wichita, Kansas 67277-7704, petitioned
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Cessna for
an exemption from Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) of Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed exemption, if
granted, would permit the operation of Cessna Model 750 Citation
X (Citation X) aircraft at altitudes between flight level (FL)
350 and FL 510 without requiring at least one pilot at the
controls of the airplane to wear and use an FAA-approved oxygen
mask.

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) prescribes that no person may

operate a civil aircraft of U.S. registry with a pressurized
cabin at flight altitudes above FL 350 unless one pilot at
the controls of the airplane is wearing and using an oxygen
mask that is secured and sealed and that either supplies
oxygen at all times or automatically supplies oxygen
whenever the cabin pressure altitude of the airplane exceeds
14,000 feet mean sea level, except that the one pilot need
not wear and use an oxygen mask while at or below FL 410 if
there are two pilots at the controls and each pilot has a
quick donning type of oxygen mask that can be placed on the
face with one hand from the ready position within 5 seconds,
supplying oxygen and properly secured and sealed.

The petitioner supports its request with the following

information:

AFS-97-322-E
The petitioner states that the Citation X is a two-engine
turbofan airplane with an FAA-approved takeoff weight of
35,700 pounds and a maximum passenger capacity of 12
passengers and 2 flight crewmembers. The petitioner
explains that the aircraft is approved under Type
Certificate No. T00007WI and may be operated at altitudes up
to FL 510 by complying with the provisions of 14 CFR part 25
as augmented by the provisions of Special Condition
No. 25-ANM-80, High Altitude Operation (special condition).
According to the petitioner, the criteria in the special
condition contains FL 510 pressurization system safety
features that were not present in part 25 before Amendment
No. 25-87, "Standards for Approval for High Altitude
Operation of Subsonic Transport Airplanes" (61 FR 28684,
June 5, 1996), was issued. For example, this special
condition now requires the airplane's pressure vessel to
withstand 1.67 times the operating pressure differential
instead of the previously required factor of 1.33, ensuring
an operating stress level in pressure vessel components at
least 20 percent lower than previously required. The
petitioner states that such a stress-level reduction has a
profound effect on fatigue-resistance characteristics and
provides a significant increase in pressurization system
reliability.

The petitioner also states that the fuel capacity of the

Citation X enables it to be operated in transcontinental or
transoceanic flights lasting several hours while maintaining
a high cruising speed. The petitioner explains that the
Citation X is powered by Allison AE3007C high-bypass
turbofan engines, which are most fuel efficient when
operating at or near maximum altitudes.

The petitioner states that the Citation X is one of several

Cessna products whose type certification permits operation
above FL 410. The petitioner states that Amendment
No. 91-75, "Installation and Operating Requirements for
Oxygen Equipment and Supply," which amended Section 91.32
(Section 91.32 was later recodified as Section 91.211), was
published on April 21, 1970 (35 FR 6385). According to the
petitioner, that amendment was issued when few aircraft
operated above FL 410 and some types of aircraft in use at
that time were approved to altitudes as high as 45,100 feet;
however, other factors limited their operations at those
altitudes for extended periods of time. The petitioner
further states that none of the aircraft in use at the time
Amendment No. 91-75 was promulgated met the pressurization
safety criteria for the Citation X established in the
special condition and later included in part 25 as Amendment
No. 25-87.

The petitioner states that the special condition also

changed the ventilation air requirements from 10 cubic feet
per minute (CFM) per occupant for normal operations to 10
CFM per occupant after any probable failure. The petitioner
notes that Amendment No. 25-87 allows this value to be 0.55
pounds per per minute per occupant or approximately 9.14 CFM
at a cabin altitude of 8,000 feet.

The petitioner adds that two emergency descent criteria were

specified in the special condition, both using a 17-second
delay for crew recognition and reaction, timed from cabin
altitude warning activation before initiating descent.
According to the petitioner, the first criteria restricts
the aircraft's cabin altitude from exceeding 30,000 feet for
pressurization system malfunctions or failures not
considered to be "extremely improbable." The petitioner
states that the second criteria restricts the aircraft's
cabin altitude from exceeding 40,000 feet for damage
resulting in decompression (for example, tire bursts, engine
rotor burst, loss of antennas) not considered to be
"extremely improbable." The petitioner asserts that during
certification of the Citation X, the aircraft demonstrated
maximum cabin altitudes of 29,636 feet and 30,601 feet,
respectively, for these two criteria. Additionally, the
petitioner states that the cabin altitude must not be
allowed to exceed 25,000 feet for more than 2 minutes for
either condition. According to the petitioner, during
certification demonstrations, the amount of time the cabin
altitude exceeded 25,000 feet was 1.34 minutes under the
first criteria and 1.52 minutes under the second criteria.
The petitioner states that FAA personnel at the Directorate
Office have informed Cessna that criteria in the special
condition are intended to provide a level of pressurization
system reliability equivalent to a primary structure, such
as the wing.

The petitioner asserts that compliance with the special

condition for operation at or above FL 510 compels a more
comprehensive evaluation of the pressurization system and
its potential malfunctions and failures than was considered
in Amendment No. 91-75. The petitioner believes that
decompressions in aircraft not complying with the special
condition or Amendment No. 25-87 have the potential at
FL 410 to expose occupants to an environment more severe
than the Citation X has demonstrated at FL 510.

The petitioner further explains that the Citation X

incorporates an emergency descent feature that, at altitudes
above FL 350, causes the autopilot to react to a loss of
cabin pressurization by initiating a "pitch-down" attitude
and accelerating the airplane to its maximum cruise airspeed
while making a timed left turn. According to the
petitioner, the airplane already will have initiated a
descent during the 17-second delay allowed for crew
recognition and reaction and will continue to maintain
maximum cruise airspeed until the airplane levels off at
 15,000 feet. The petitioner states that if power is reduced
to idle and the speed brakes are deployed, the resulting
descent is similar to the demonstrated emergency descent.

If the petitioner's request is granted, the petitioner

proposes to incorporate a limitation in Cessna's Aircraft
Flight Manual stating that the autopilot must be operational
and engaged when the aircraft is operated at altitudes above
FL 350 and at least one flight crewmember is not wearing an
oxygen mask with oxygen flowing to the mask.

The petitioner states that the level of safety afforded by

the certification of the Citation X under part 25, as
augmented by the special condition and the provision of the
autopilot's emergency descent mode, would be significantly
higher at FL 510 than the level of safety provided by
Amendment No. 91-75 for operations conducted at FL 410.
Additionally, the petitioner believes that the excessive
crew fatigue associated with wearing and using a sealed
oxygen mask for an extended period of time would be
diminished, allowing the crew to maintain a higher level of
alertness.

The petitioner believes the requested exemption is in the

public interest because it would encourage Citation X
operators to fly at altitudes where greater fuel economy is
achieved, thus reducing the pressure on petroleum reserves
and the demand on imported oil. According to the
petitioner, passenger anxiety would be reduced for those
occupants who have observed a crewmember using oxygen while
passengers are not. Finally, the petitioner states that
consumption of oxygen during normal operations imposes
economic costs not commensurate with increases in safety.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving
the requirement for Federal Register publication because the
exemption, if granted, would not set a precedent, and any delay
in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Cessna.

The FAA's analysis/summary is as follows:

The FAA has reviewed the information presented by the

petitioner in support of its petition for exemption and has
determined that a grant of exemption would not be in the
public interest.

On August 12, 1982, the FAA published Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM) No. 82-11, Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements
(47 FR 35146), which proposed amendments to pertinent
sections of 14 CFR parts 91, 121, and 135 pertaining to
flightcrew oxygen mask use requirements. The proposed
amendments would allow the operation of aircraft at higher
altitudes than presently specified in 14 CFR, without
requiring at least one pilot at the controls to wear and use
an oxygen mask. NPRM No. 82-11 was based on several
considerations: (1) the capabilities and limitations of
oxygen equipment, (2) pressure vessel size and probabilities
of depressurization, (3) operational limitations at the
maximum altitudes of modern aircraft, and (4) perceived
inequity in the applicability of oxygen requirements in part
135 compared to part 91. It was noted in the NPRM that the
proposed amendments, if adopted, would be responsive to
industry petitions for exemption and alleviate, to some
extent, certain burdens on airplane operators that restrict
the ease and flexibility of flight operations. The FAA also
would be relieved of the administrative burden of processing
exemptions from the provisions of such rules.

The concerns expressed by certain commenters opposed to the

proposed amendments contained in Notice No. 82-11 prompted
the FAA to reconsider the proposed amendments, supporting
information, and rationale stated in previous grants of
exemption. The FAA paid particular attention to the
potentially severe physiological consequences resulting from
high altitude depressurization in large- and small-cabin
volume aircraft that possibly would incapacitate the flight
crewmembers and result in an accident. The FAA further
reviewed the studies that have been conducted to determine
the time of useful consciousness available to pilots above
and below 41,000 feet and altitudes of up to 65,000 feet.
These studies concluded that if cabin pressurization is lost
at 51,000 feet, there would be a certain time of useful
consciousness in which a pilot would have to don an oxygen
mask and open another valve, or otherwise attempt to
compensate for the lost pressurization. At an altitude of
43,000 feet, the time of useful consciousness is
approximately 9 to 12 seconds. At an altitude of 51,000
feet, the time of useful consciousness would be reduced.
Even the use of a quick-donning type of oxygen mask will not
prevent adverse physiological effects at 51,000 feet. To
avoid loss of consciousness or decompression sickness, it is
desirable to breathe 100 percent oxygen for 20 to 30 minutes
to denitrify the body.

Consequently, the FAA reached conclusions that differed from

those expressed in Notice No. 82-11 and previous grants of
exemption. The FAA determined that further grants of
exemption should be discontinued and the notice withdrawn.
As a result, Notice No. 82-11 was withdrawn on March 18,
1986 (51 FR 9432) (copy enclosed).

Furthermore, the FAA finds that despite the safety and

engineering features and structural integrity the petitioner
has built into the Citation X aircraft for operations at
these altitudes, the possibility still exists that a
Citation X aircraft could lose cabin pressurization.
Therefore, consideration must be given to the physiological
consequences of the flight crewmembers in the event of a
 rapid decompression. The FAA has determined that a
reduction in the likelihood that such an incident might
occur does not represent a level of safety equivalent to the
rule from which the exemption is sought.

As stated in Notice No. 82-11, the question of potentially

severe physiological consequences resulting from high
altitude depressurization in both large- and small-cabin
volume aircraft warrants further research and consideration.
However, the FAA has determined that granting further
exemptions from the current rule is not appropriate. Should
the FAA determine that it is appropriate to allow the relief
requested, it will take appropriate action to change the
rules rather than issue an exemption so that all persons may
benefit from such a change.

The rulemaking process provides the FAA an opportunity to

obtain comments from a much larger segment of the aviation
industry, the public, other Government agencies, as well as
from within the FAA, thereby presenting issues to a much
broader audience.

Permitting this aircraft to operate at altitudes between

FL 350 and FL 510 without requiring at least one pilot at
the controls of the airplane to wear and use an FAA-approved
oxygen mask is a question of safety and must be addressed
with the thoroughness provided by rulemaking.

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of

exemption would not be in the public interest. Therefore,
pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. Sections 40113
and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator (14 CFR Section
11.53), the petition of Cessna Aircraft Company for an exemption
from 14 CFR Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) is hereby denied.

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 30, 1998.

/s/ Richard O. Gordon

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service

Enclosure
 Exemption No. 6141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20591

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
In the matter of the petition of *
*
BOMBARDIER, INC., CANADAIR * Regulatory Docket
* No. 28068
for an exemption from *
Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) of Title 14, *
Code of Federal Regulations *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DENIAL OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated November 16, 1994, and supplemental

information dated March 16, 1995, Mr. W.B. Remington, Chief
Airworthiness Engineer, Bombardier, Inc., Canadair (Canadair),
P.O. Box 6087, Station Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9,
Canada, petitioned for an exemption from Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii)
of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). This
exemption, if granted, would allow operation of Canadair Global
Express (GX) aircraft at altitudes above 41,000 feet mean sea
level (MSL) without requiring that at least one pilot at the
controls of the airplane wear an oxygen mask.

The petitioner requests relief from the following:

Section 91.211(b)(1)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, that

no person may operate a civil aircraft of U.S. registry with
a pressurized cabin at flight altitudes above flight level
350 unless one pilot at the controls of the airplane is
wearing and using an oxygen mask that is secured and sealed
and that either supplies oxygen at all times or
automatically supplies oxygen whenever the cabin pressure
altitude of the airplane exceeds 14,000 feet (MSL), except
that the one pilot need not wear and use an oxygen mask
while at or below flight level 410 if there are two pilots
at the controls and each pilot has a quick-donning type of
oxygen mask that can be placed on the face with one hand
from the ready position within 5 seconds, supplying oxygen
and properly secured and sealed.

The petitioner supports its request with the following

information:

AFS-95-184-E
The petitioner states that a level of safety equivalent to
that provided by the rules from which an exemption is
requested would be maintained by several design features
that will make it extremely improbable for the GX's cabin
pressure altitude to exceed 34,000 feet.

The petitioner states that the current regulations were

developed primarily to address 14 CFR part 23 aircraft at a
time when design standards for oxygen-system and cabin-
pressure-system reliability for such aircraft were not as
comprehensive as today. Also, increasing numbers of small
aircraft that have high altitude capability, which resulted
in a higher probability of incidents involving excessive
cabin altitudes and the risk of crew loss of consciousness,
were factors in the development of the current requirements.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reviewed this
potential problem and initially proposed a threshold of
35,000 feet as the altitude at which the wearing of oxygen
masks by crewmembers would be required.

The petitioner further states that while this proposed

35,000 feet threshold was later increased to 41,000 feet,
many of the features incorporated in the design of the GX
aircraft ensure high reliability of the cabin pressure
system and structure, and achieve compliance with the latest
14 CFR part 25 standards and the proposed High Altitude
Special Conditions (HASC). These features are listed as
follows:

1. Main engines are located further aft, which reduces the

probability that cabin pressurization would be affected
by a rotorburst.

2. The GX design includes higher pressure vessel structure

load factors, as proposed in HASC (1.67 instead of
1.33).

3. Cabin pressurization on the GX is designed to maintain

a cabin pressure altitude that complies with the HASC;
this design takes into account the maximum pressure
vessel opening.

4. Multiple redundancy will be built into the cabin

pressure control system. Dual automatic pressure
controllers with manual reversion capability, driving
two triple actuated outflow valves, provide primary
pressurization control. Two independent safety valves
provide additional positive and negative pressure
relief. Further, dual independent electric altitude
limiters are designed to prevent cabin pressure
altitudes from exceeding 15,000 feet. Each outflow
valve also has an independent pneumatic that will
prevent the valves from achieving a full open position
 in the event of pressurization failures.

5. An emergency pressurization system will provide

precooled, ozone and bleed-filtered air to the cabin if
both packs and the heat exchanger mode are lost. In
this area, the HASC requires that the cabin altitude
not exceed 30,000 feet.

6. Similar redundancies in the supporting electrical power

system.

The petitioner states that if its interpretation of Section

91.211(b)(1)(ii) were correct, the crew oxygen system of the
GX would require considerable airframe redesign to
accommodate the large oxygen quantity demanded. The values
for these modifications would be based on providing three
cylinders containing 115 cubic feet of oxygen, with a
combined weight of 100 pounds. The petitioner contends that
it could be argued that storing such a large quantity of
oxygen on board the aircraft would have a negative impact on
safety.

The petitioner further states that the public interest would

be served by granting the requested petition in that it
would encourage operations above 41,000 feet, which would
provide for better fuel economy as a result of the greater
fuel efficiency available at higher altitudes, i.e., reduced
fuel burn.

The FAA published the petition in the Federal Register on

April 27, 1995, (60 FR 20792). No comments were received.

The FAA's analysis/summary is as follows:

The FAA has reviewed the petition and notes that the
petitioner does not take human physiology into account.
Studies have been conducted to determine the amount of
relative consciousness and useful-consciousness time
available to pilots above and below 41,000 feet, and up to
altitudes of 65,000 feet. These studies determined that if
cabin pressurization is lost at 51,000 feet, there will be a
certain amount of useful-consciousness time in which a pilot
will have to don an oxygen mask, open another valve,
descend, or otherwise attempt to compensate for the lost
pressurization. The information we have indicates that at
altitudes of 45,000 feet and above, the time of relative
consciousness is approximately 10 seconds. Even if the
pilot is able to don his mask effectively, a loss of useful
consciousness will probably still occur.

In spite of all the safety features the petitioner has built

into its design of the GX, the possibility still exists that
a GX aircraft could lose cabin pressurization. Thus, a
reduction in the likelihood that such an incident might
 occur does not represent a level of safety equivalent to the
rule from which the exemption is sought.

The FAA does not agree that compliance with Section

91.211(b)(1)(ii) would require unforeseen airframe weight
and volume design factors to accommodate the large quantity
of oxygen demanded. The designers of the GX could not have
assumed the FAA would grant an exemption from the rule.
Thus, it cannot be argued that a denial of this exemption
would impose unforeseen weight and volume design factors on
the GX.

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of

exemption would not provide an equivalent level of safety and is
not in the public interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority
contained in 49 U.S.C. Sections 40113 and 44701, delegated to me
by the Administrator (14 CFR Section 11.53), the request of
Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, for an exemption from 14 CFR Section
91.211(b)(1)(ii) is hereby denied.

Issued in Washington, DC, on August 3, 1995.

/s/ William J. White

Acting Director, Flight Standards Service, AFS-1
 Exemption No. 4667

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20591

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
*
In the matter of the petition of *
*
PRESTIGE JET et al *
* Regulatory Docket
for an exemption from Section * No. 22569 et al
91.32(b)(1)(ii) and/or Section *
135.89(b)(3) of the Federal *
Aviation Regulations *
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DENIALS OF EXEMPTION

By various letters between January 21, 1982, and September

24, 1985, Prestige Jet, 988 Woodcock Road, Suite 176, Orlando,
Florida 32803, and other persons listed in the Appendix
(Petitioners) petitioned for an exemption, or extension of an
exemption, from Section 91.32(b)(1)(ii) and/or Section
135.89(b)(3) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) to the
extent necessary to permit the operation of their respective
turbojet aircraft to a higher altitude than allowed by the FAR
without at least one pilot at the controls wearing, secured and
sealed, an oxygen mask that either supplies oxygen at all times
or automatically supplies oxygen whenever the cabin pressure
altitude exceeds 12,000 feet mean sea level.

Sections of the FAR affected:

Sections 91.32(b)(1)(ii) and 135.89(b)(3) specify maximum

altitudes to which a pressurized aircraft may be operated
without requiring at least one pilot at the controls to wear
and use an oxygen mask. The availability of an approved,
quick-donning type of oxygen mask at each flight
crewmember's station permits operation to another, higher
maximum altitude above which at least one pilot must wear
and use that mask. In operations conducted under Part 135
or Part 91 of the FAR, at least one pilot at the controls
must wear and use an oxygen mask when operating above 35,000
feet or 41,000 feet, respectively.

VS-82-181-E
The petitioners' supportive information is as follows:

Petitioners have stated individually numerous diverse

reasons why an exemption from the applicable section of the
FAR should be granted. Many of the Petitioners cite
identical reasons in support of their petitions.
Consequently, each individual reason is not repeated.
However, the pertinent comments are grouped by theme and
summarized as follows.

Petitioners state that the aircraft they operate have met

stringent airworthiness standards that permit flight
operations higher than 35 or 41 thousand feet, up to 45 or
51 thousand feet in some aircraft types. Operational
experience at those higher altitudes has not resulted in a
known pressure-vessel failure. Most aircraft have
progressive and redundant warning systems that give ample
warning of a pressurization anomaly that allows the
flightcrew sufficient time to put on oxygen masks and
descend to a lower altitude without difficulty. Therefore,
Petitioners reason that flightcrews should be permitted to
conduct flight operations above 35 or 41 thousand feet
without at least one pilot at the flight controls wearing an
oxygen mask.

Petitioners maintain that wearing an oxygen mask is

uncomfortable, restricts vision and freedom of movement, and
causes fatigue. Further, the continual use of oxygen tends
to cause drying of the throat and nasal passages of the
flight crewmembers that, coupled with the distraction and
aggravation of wearing a mask, derogates rather than
enhances safety. As a result of these factors, Petitioners
state that many pilots choose to either ignore the oxygen
mask usage rules when operating at higher altitudes or
remain at lower altitudes, sacrificing fuel economy and
range, as well as incurring greater traffic congestion and
encountering adverse weather.

Petitioners contend that the design features of quick-

donning oxygen masks when used by a knowledgeable and
trained flightcrew provide adequate protection in the event
that aircraft cabin pressurization is lost and emergency
descent is required. Quick-donning oxygen masks are
designed so that they may be removed from the ready
position, placed on the flight crewmember's face, and
properly sealed, secured, and supplying oxygen, all within 5
seconds. Petitioners believe that, in the event of an
aircraft depressurization, the time of useful consciousness
of flight crewmembers at the higher altitudes is of
sufficient length, that 5 seconds affords an adequate margin
of safety to preclude flightcrew incapacitation.
 A summary of the Prestige Jet petition was published in the
Federal Register on March 25, 1982 (47 FR 12909). Summaries of
the other petitions were published in the Federal Register on
various dates between March 16, 1982, and January 13, 1986. No
comments were received.

The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) analysis/summary is

as follows:

On August 12, 1982, the FAA published Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking (NPRM) No. 82-11, Pilot Oxygen Mask Requirements
(47 FR 35146), which proposed amendments to pertinent
sections of Parts 91, 121 and 135 of the FAR pertaining to
flightcrew oxygen mask use requirements. The proposed
amendments would allow the operation of aircraft to higher
altitudes than presently specified in the FAR without
requiring at least one pilot at the controls to wear and use
an oxygen mask. The NPRM was premised on several
considerations: (1) the capabilities and limitations of
oxygen equipment; (2) pressure vessel size and probabilities
of depressurization; (3) operational limitations at the
maximum altitudes of modern aircraft; and (4) perceived
inequity in the applicability of oxygen requirements in Part
135 vis-a-vis Part 91. It was noted in the NPRM that the
proposed amendments, if adopted, would be responsive to
industry petitions for exemption and alleviate, to some
extent, certain burdens perceived by airplane operators that
restrict the ease and flexibility of flight operations.
Coincidentally, the FAA would be relieved from the
administrative burden of granting exemptions to the FAR.

The concerns expressed by certain commenters opposed to the

Proposed amendments contained in Notice No. 82-11 prompted
the FAA to reconsider the proposed amendments and the
supporting rationale included therein and also stated in
previous grants of exemption. Particular attention was
directed at the potentially severe physiological
consequences resulting from high altitude depressurization
in both large and small cabin volume aircraft that possibly
would incapacitate the flightcrew and result in an accident.
That reconsideration led the FAA to conclusions different
from those expressed in Notice No. 82-11 and previous grants
of exemption. The FAA determined that further grants of
exemption should be discontinued and the notice withdrawn.
Notice No. 82-11 was withdrawn March 18, 1986 (51 FR 9432),
copy attached hereto, and incorporated by reference in this
analysis/summary.
 As stated in Notice No. 82-11, the question of potentially
severe physiological consequences resulting from high
altitude depressurization in both large and small cabin
volume aircraft warrants further consideration. Granting
further exemptions from the current rules is not
appropriate. Should the FAA determine that it could
confidently grant exemptions from the rule, it will instead
take appropriate action to change the rules so that all
persons may benefit from such a change.

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of

exemption is not in the public interest. Therefore, pursuant to
the authority contained in Sections 313(a) and 601(c) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, delegated to me by the
Administrator (14 CFR 11.53), the petitions of Prestige Jet et
al, as listed in the Appendix, for an exemption from Section
91.32(b)(1)(ii) and/or Section 135.89(b)(3) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations is denied.

/s/ William T. Brennan

Acting Director of
Flight Standards

Issued in Washington, D.C., on

June 11, 1986.
 APPENDIX

Petitioner Docket Number Date(s) of Petition

ACM Aviation, Inc. 22356 June 30, 1985

1475 Airport Boulevard
San Jose, California 95110

Air Continental, Inc. 23481 December 16, 1982

44050 Russia Road
Elyria, Ohio 44035

Aircraft At Your Call 22960 April 21, 1982

P.O. Box 849
Hillsboro, Oregon 97123

American Cyanamid Co. 22768 February 25, 1982

455 Industrial Avenue September 24, 1985
Teterboro, New Jersey 07608

American Flight 24092 May 11, 1984

8459 Baltimore National Pike
Ellicott City, Maryland 21043

Arizona Jet Charter

Services, Inc. 23135 June 8, 1982
Sky Harbor International Airport
2635 Air Lane
Phoenix, Arizona 85034

Avjet Corporation 23739 August 12, 1983

4409 Empire Avenue
Burbank, California 91505

Barken International, Inc. 24175 May 17, 1984

Box 22269 AMF July 19, 1984
Salt Lake City International Airport
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122

BeckAir Company, Inc. 24308 October 18, 1984

28705 LaRue Street
P.O. Box 8
Elkhart, Indiana 46515

California Businessjets, Inc. 23683 June 29, 1982

Fidelity Plaza, Suite 1495
180 Grand Avenue
Oakland, California 94612

Clay Lacy Aviation, Inc. 21730 June 10, 1983

7435 Valjeen Avenue
Van Nuys, California 91406
 APPENDIX

Petitioner Docket Number Date(s) of Petition

Combined Aviation Company 22898 April 14, 1982

2402 E. Arizona Biltmore Circle
Phoenix, Arizona 85016

Conner Aviation 24199 August 6, 1984

1144 Coleman Avenue
San Jose Airport
San Jose, California 95110

Continental Aviation Services 24646 May 9, 1985

2406 Armstrong Street June 18, 1985
Livermore, California 94550

Corporate Flight, Inc. 23654 May 17, 1983

Middlebelt Road June 30, 1983
Detroit Metropolitan Airport
Detroit, Michigan 48242

Executive Air Fleet Corporation 20336 September 13, 1982

90 Moonachie Avenue December 2, 1985
Teterboro, New Jersey 07608

Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. 19165 July 21, 1983

P.O. Box 19707
Columbus, Ohio 43219

Falconair 24039 March 5, 1984

4531 Empire Avenue
Hanger 3
Burbank, California 91505

Gelco Air 23060 April 29, 1982

One Gelco Drive
Eden Prairie, Minnesota 55344

Georgia Jet Airways, Inc. 23637 May 2, 1983

717 North Avenue June 7, 1983
Macon, Georgia 31211

Kaiser Air, Inc. 23662 May 12, 1983

P.O. Box 2626
Airport Station
Oakland, California 94614

Louisiana-Pacific Corp. 22821 March 30, 1982

Aviation Division
2210 N.E. 25th Street
Hillsboro, Oregon 97123
 APPENDIX

Petitioner Docket Number Date(s) of Petition

Midway Southwest Airlines 20774 February 24, 1983

4553 Keller Springs Road March 14, 1983
Dallas, Texas 75248

Mitchell Aero, Inc. 23391 October 5, 1982

Mitchell Field November 3, 1982
923 E. Layton Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53207

Olympian Aviation, Inc. 23636 May 13, 1983

11029 Tenacious Drive January 18, 1984
Indianapolis, Indiana 46236

Page Airways, Inc. 23586 March 22, 1983

Washington National Airport
Washington, DC 20001

Skybird Aviation 22636 February 1, 1982

7355 Hayvenhurst Place March 24, 1982
Van Nuys, California 91406 June 14, 1982

Sky Flite, Inc. 20354 June 21, 1982

Tulsa International Airport July 30, 1982
P.O. Box 51368
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74151

Starwood Air Service, Inc. 23153 June 14, 1982

7835 So. Peoria
Englewood, Colorado 80112

Steelcase, Inc. 24064 April 17, 1984

Grand Rapids, Michigan 49501

Wendy's International, Inc. 23539 February 16, 1983

2160 West Case Road March 16, 1983
Hanger 4 April 11, 1983
Columbus, Ohio 43220

West Coast Air Charter, Inc. 23398 October 13, 1982

Ontario Jet Center
Ontario International Airport
Ontario, California 91761