Timalsena Thesis 2020

Reliability Assessment of Power Distribution Networks
Incorporating Circuit Breaker Failure Modes
A Thesis Submitted to the College of
Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science
In the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Canada
By
Kiran Raj Timalsena
@Copyright Kiran Raj Timalsena, March 2020. All rights reserved

PERMISSION TO USE
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree
from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in
whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who
supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the
College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying, publication, or use
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or part should be addressed to:
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OR
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i
ABSTRACT
Power supply interruptions incur significant financial losses to utilities and their customers.
Most of the interruptions arise from the failure of components in the power distribution system.
Circuit breakers (CB) are primarily used to protect the system against failure of components and
disturbances in the system. A CB can randomly fail in various failure modes, such as passive
failure, active failure, and stuck conditions. An active failure or a stuck condition of a CB triggers
the operation of circuit breakers in the backup protection zone and causes outages of a wider area
of the distribution network. An active failure or a stuck condition of a CB in a faulty feeder will
incite and extend unreliability events to several adjacent healthy feeders. Existing reliability
evaluation techniques to incorporate active failure and stuck conditions can be applied to simple
radial networks where the impacts of component failures can be easily identified. However, most
urban utility distribution systems and large industrial/commercial power distribution networks are
very complex with meshed configurations and a large number of components of various
characteristics. Most existing reliability assessment software tools only consider first-order
contingencies and may include active CB failure. Meshed distribution networks are designed with
inherent redundancies to meet their high-reliability needs, and therefore, it is necessary to
incorporate higher-order contingencies including active failure and stuck condition of CB in
reliability assessment in order to determine investment options to continuously meet the reliability
requirements of the customers. In this context, this thesis presents generalized analytical
methodologies to incorporate active failure and stuck breaker condition into reliability studies of
distribution systems which can be systematically implemented in a computer program. To consider
the active failure of the breaker, this thesis presents a methodology to identify an active breaker
incidence matrix that captures the active failure of the breaker leading to load point failures. The
methodology concatenates this incidence matrix with the existing incidence matrix created from
the paths between input power supplies and load point to form a modified incidence matrix. This
modified incidence matrix is used to identify all orders of contingencies involving the active failure
of the breaker. To consider the stuck condition of the breaker, the methodology identifies the set
of stuck breakers whose backup breakers are the breakers in the path between supply and load
point. If any of the breakers in the set utilize at least one breaker of all the paths as a backup
breaker, the breaker is supposed to cause the failure of the load point due to stuck condition. This
ii
thesis also presents the application of the proposed methodologies to compare several reliability
investment alternatives for reliability enhancement of a typical industrial and commercial
distribution network provided in the IEEE Std 493-2007. The methodologies presented in this
thesis offer the ability to conduct a range of alternative studies involving CB upgrades, protection
system upgrade, maintenance scheduling upgrade, installation of backup supply and uninterrupted
power supplies to make the reliability-based investment decision for power utilities and industrial
and commercial customers.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Rajesh Karki, for his
invaluable guidance, constructive feedback, and inspiration during my studies at the University of
Saskatchewan. His immense knowledge and experience, and keen interest and enthusiasm toward
my work were crucial to guide me in the right direction towards the completion of this work. I
could not have imagined having a better supervisor for my graduate study.
Besides my supervisor, I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Prasanna Piya. His
encouragement, guidance, and insightful feedback assisted me to enhance the quality of this work.
My sincere thanks go to my graduate study professor Dr. Nurul A. Chowdhury for
extending my expertise in the mathematical modeling of power systems.
I am also grateful to my colleagues: Mr. Safal Bhattarai, Mr. Bikash Poudel, Mr. Prajjwal
Gautam, Mr. Tej Krishna Shrestha, Mr. Asim Chaulagain, Mr. Binamra Adhikari for sharing their
knowledge and useful suggestions.
I thankfully acknowledge the financial assistance provided by the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
(NSERC) throughout my M.Sc. program.
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DEDICATION
To my wonderful brother, Uttam

To my beloved wife, Pujan
And
To my beloved parents, Shambhu and Damayanti,
Without whom none of my success would have been possible.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PERMISSION TO USE ................................................................................................................... i
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. iv
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ xi
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Power System Reliability ................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Power Distribution System .............................................................................................. 2
1.3 Protection of Component Failures in Distribution System .............................................. 5
1.3.1 Circuit Breaker Modeling in Reliability Assessment ............................................... 7
1.4 Distribution System Reliability Evaluation Techniques .................................................. 9
1.5 Reliability Indices in Distribution System ..................................................................... 15
1.6 Research motivation ....................................................................................................... 17
1.7 Thesis Organization........................................................................................................ 21
1.8 References ...................................................................................................................... 23
NEED-BASED RELIABILITY INVESTMENT IN

INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS ................................... 29
2.1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 29
2.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 29
2.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 31
2.4 Case Studies and Results ................................................................................................ 33
vi
2.4.1 Test System ............................................................................................................. 33
2.4.2 Effect of Backup System on the Reliability Indices ............................................... 35
2.4.3 Effect of Supply Redundancy on Reliability Indices .............................................. 37
3.4 Effect of Breaker Failures on Reliability Indices .......................................................... 39
2.5 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 44
A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO INCORPORATE CIRCUIT BREAKER

ACTIVE FAILURE IN RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION
NETWORKS ................................................................................................................................ 48
3.1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 48
3.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 48
3.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 52
3.4 Illustration of the Proposed Methodology on a Test Network ....................................... 59
3.5 Application in Reliability Studies for Investment Decisions ......................................... 64
3.6 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 68
3.7 References ...................................................................................................................... 69
A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO INCORPORATE STUCK CONDITION OF

CIRCUIT BREAKER IN RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION
NETWORKS ................................................................................................................................ 72
4.1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 72
4.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 72
4.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 76
4.4 Application of the Proposed Methodology .................................................................... 85
4.5 Reliability Improvement Alternatives Considering Stuck Breaker Condition............... 90
4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 93
4.7 References ...................................................................................................................... 94
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 97
vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1. Component reliability data........................................................................................... 11

Table 1.2. Evaluation of load point reliability indices using minimal cut-sets............................. 12
Table 1.3. Load point reliability indices considering active failure of breaker. ........................... 13
Table 1.4. Load point reliability indices considering active failure and stuck condition of circuit
breaker. ......................................................................................................................... 14
Table 2.1. Load point and estimated average demand. ................................................................. 34
Table 2.2. Equivalent reliability parameters for a backup generator system. ............................... 35
Table 3.1. Connection matrix of test distribution network. .......................................................... 54
Table 3.2. Load point and estimated average load demand. ......................................................... 62
Table 3.3. Failure rate and unavailability at different load points. ............................................... 63
Table 3.4. Customer damage function for an industrial customer. ............................................... 64
Table 4.1. Connection matrix of distribution system. ................................................................... 78
Table 4.2. Load point reliability indices. ...................................................................................... 87
Table 4.3. System indices. ............................................................................................................ 87
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 1.1.Hierarchical levels in reliability assessment [1]. ............................................................... 2

Fig. 1.2. A typical rural distribution system. .................................................................................. 3
Fig. 1.3. A typical urban distribution system. ................................................................................. 3
Fig. 1.4. The IEEE goldbook industrial and commercial distribution network. ............................. 5
Fig. 1.5. Distribution system protection.......................................................................................... 7
Fig. 1.6. Two-state Markov model of a component. ....................................................................... 8
Fig. 1.7. A distribution network to illustrate the minimal cut-set method. ................................... 11
Fig. 2.1. Reliability evaluation framework. .................................................................................. 31
Fig. 2.2. IEEE Goldbook network. ............................................................................................... 34
Fig. 2.3. EENS vs. service entrance failure rate in Scenarios (i), (ii) and (iii). ............................ 36
Fig. 2.4. Failure frequency vs. service entrance failure rate in Scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii). ......... 37
Fig. 2.5. EENS vs. % of the backup with and without UPS. ........................................................ 38
Fig. 2.6. Failure frequency at Load point A vs % of the backup with and without UPS.............. 39
Fig. 2.7. Impact of CB active failure rate on the load point failure frequency. ............................ 40
Fig. 2.8. Impact of CB active failure rate on the load point EENS. ............................................. 40
Fig. 2.9. Impact of stuck breaker probability on the load point failure frequency. ...................... 41
Fig. 2.10. Impact of stuck breaker probability on the load point EENS. ...................................... 42
Fig. 2.11. Comparing the relative impacts of CB active failure rate and stuck probability on the
load point failure frequency. ........................................................................................ 43
load point EENS. .......................................................................................................... 44
Fig. 3.3. Flowchart to identify breaker active failure set. ............................................................. 56
Fig. 3.4. IEEE Goldbook standard network. ................................................................................. 60
Fig. 4.1. Flowchart to evaluate the reliability considering stuck breaker condition. .................... 77
Fig. 4.2. Example distribution system used for methodology illustration. ................................... 77
Fig. 4.3. Flowchart to identify breaker stuck failure..................................................................... 80
Fig. 4.4. Algorithm to identify components protected by SBS. .................................................... 83
Fig. 4.5. Modified RBTS bus 3 distribution network. .................................................................. 86
Fig. 4.6. Change in feeder SAIFI vs. increase in stuck probabilities. ........................................... 88
ix
Fig. 4.7. Change in feeder SAIDI vs. increase in stuck probabilities. .......................................... 89
Fig. 4.8. A typical distribution network [6]. ................................................................................ 91
Fig. 4.9. Impact of different reliability upgrade options on the failure frequency index. ............. 92
Fig. 4.10. Impact of different reliability upgrade options on the unavailability index. ................ 92
x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABI Active Breaker Incidence Matrix

AENS Average Energy Not Supplied
ASAI The Average Service Availability Index (ASAI)
CAIDI The Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
CB Circuit Breaker
CI Customer Interruption
CIGRE The International Council on Large Electric Systems
DER Distributed Energy Resources
DS Distribution System
ECOST Expected Interruption Cost
EENS Expected Energy Not Supplied
FMCA Failure mode and Criticality Analysis
FOC First Order Cutset
HL Hierarchy Level
ICDS Industrial and Commercial Distribution System
ICQRIT The International Conference on Quality, Reliability, Infocom Technology
and Business Operations
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IJSAEM International Journal of Systems Assurance Engineering and Management
MAIFI The Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index
MU Merging Unit
NC Normally Closed
NO Normally Open
PBR Performance-Based Regulation
PE Protection Equipment
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
xi
RBTS Roy Billinton Test System
SAIDI The System Average Interruption Duration Index
SAIFI The System Average Interruption Frequency Index
SBS Stuck Breaker Set
UPS The Uninterrupted Power Supply
xii
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Power System Reliability
The function of the electric power system is to provide a reliable electricity supply to its
consumer complying with economic and environmental constraints. The electric power generated
at the generation plant is transmitted using transmission lines and delivered to consumer load
points through distribution lines. The overall system is called the power system. The ability of the
system to accomplish its intended function can be defined as the reliability of the system. The
reliability of supply to the customer can be improved by increasing investment in the system during
the planning phase or the operating phase or both. Over investment in the system can result in high
reliability of supply, but the economic constraints will be violated. An underinvestment can cause
poor reliability to customers. Therefore, the economic constraint and reliability of the system
should be well-adjusted, complying with environmental constraints in the modern context, in
making managerial decisions in both planning and operating phases of the system [1].
A power system can be divided into three subsystems of generation, transmission, and
distribution according to their functions [1]-[4] as shown in Fig. 1.1. The study of generation
reliability falls into hierarchical level 1 (HL-1) where the overall power generation is modeled
and compared with the system load model for a planned horizon to assess the system risk using
various load and energy-based indices [2][3]. At the hierarchical level 2 (HL-2), the transmission
constraints are also considered in the generation model, and this is also known as bulk system
reliability evaluation [4][5]. Predicted reliability assessment is not normally carried out at the
hierarchical level 3 (HL-3) that includes all three functional zones. The reliability evaluation of
distribution systems (DS) is carried out separately for investment and operation planning. Many
DS are owned by separate entities that purchase power from the bulk system.
Generation and bulk system reliability evaluation has received more attention than DS
reliability in the past. This is because the generation and transmission inadequacy can have
widespread catastrophic consequences for society and the environment whereas the effect of DS
inadequacy has a localized effect. However, studies show that approximately 80% of the
unreliability events originate from DS components [1][6][7]. This fact has drawn the attention of
utility planners and regulatory bodies to improve the reliability of DS to satisfactorily serve the
1
customers. The reliability assessment of DS has been driven by regulatory enforcement such as
reward/penalty structure in deregulated electricity markets.
Hierarchical Level I
Generation Facilities HL-I
Hierarchical Level II
HL-II
Transmission Facilities
Hierarchical Level III

HL-III
Distribution Facilities
Fig. 1.1.Hierarchical levels in reliability assessment [1].
1.2 Power Distribution System
A DS receives power from the bulk system through one or more transmission lines and
supplies the power to different categories of electricity customers. Fig. 1.2 shows a typical radial
DS that supplies power to rural customers. Fig. 1.3 shows a DS with a meshed network typically
serving urban customers [8]. Both of these DSs are known as utility DS, and they serve a wide
variety and a large number of customers. Usually, urban distribution feeders are short whereas the
rural distribution feeders are long and widely dispersed. The distribution feeders in the urban areas
often build with the facility to transfer load from neighboring feeders in the event of contingencies
or maintenance in any feeders. The selection of DS in an area is dependent on technical, economic,
environmental, geographical factors and guided by the nature of customers and types of load to be
supplied.
2
11 kV
CB1 Circuit Breaker
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fuse
CBinc Busbar
Line Section
LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 LP6 LP7 LP8 LP9

CB2
10 11 12
LP10 LP11 LP12
Fig. 1.2. A typical rural distribution system.
Fig. 1.3. A typical urban distribution system.
In the past, all the electrical power systems operated as vertically integrated systems, where
the generation, transmission, and distribution facilities were all owned by a single entity, usually
the government. Many electric systems around the world have since been deregulated and
restructured to operate in electricity markets. In the deregulated market, different facilities within
a power system are owned by separate entities. These DS are owned by private entities with an
objective to profit from the electricity market and these entities are reluctant to invest in
3
distribution infrastructures. The electricity regulator in these jurisdiction enforces different
regulations to protect customers from unreliable supply by attracting an adequate investment into
the DS.
The complexity in design configuration and operation sequences in a DS has been
increasing with the introduction of smart grids that promotes the utilization of distributed energy
resources (DER) and communication technology. These ongoing changes have invited different
strategies for operation, protection, and control of DS which directly affects the reliability and
quality of power supply. These changes are expected to bring high reliability and low operational
cost of DS. Due to the integration of the communication system into DS, greater situational
awareness, and better protection strategy, are expected to be utilized. The optimization among the
capital cost, operation cost, and maintenance cost and the reliability benefit of adopting new
technology is prime interest at utilities in modern DS. The ability to appropriately quantify the
economic and reliability benefits of adopting new technologies and processes is vital in decision
making regarding the deployment of smart technologies, construction of new lines, reinforcement
of existing lines, maintenance planning and investment on spare parts [1][9].
Many large industrial or commercial customers have their own power distribution network
which receives power either from a utility DS or the bulk power system. These types of DS are
known as the industrial and commercial distribution systems (ICDS). The test ICDS is shown in
Fig. 1.4, is taken from the IEEE Gold Book [10]. Power interruptions create severe consequences
for large industrial and commercial electricity customers. Therefore they are often supplied with
multiple utility feeders, backup generators, uninterrupted power supply (UPS) and battery storage.
In ICDS, the switching arrangement to transfer the load among the different utility
suppliers and the backup generation supply is equipped to ensure the minimum downtown due to
fault and disturbances. The IEEE 493 and the IEEE P3001.5 standards provide guidelines for the
design of a reliable ICDS [10][11] with examples on different configurations and apparatus. The
choice of a particular configuration in an ICDS depends on factors, such as the capital, operation,
and maintenance costs, customer reliability needs and outage costs, and the reliability of input
utility supply. In an ICDS, interruptions arise either from the input utility supply or the failure of
components or processes within the ICDS network. To minimize power outages, ICDS owners
consider the proper design, installation, maintenance and upgrades of their networks in addition to
the installations of alternate supply feeders and back-up generation systems.
4
Fig. 1.4. The IEEE gold book industrial and commercial distribution network.
1.3 Protection of Component Failures in Distribution System
Distribution systems are equipped with protection systems to detect faults within the
network arising from component failures, and to isolate the faulty section from the rest of the
network to minimize the consequences of fault. The main objective of the protection system in DS
is to protect people and equipment from the fault and disturbances. The protection system should
respond to event disturbances appropriately and secure the system in minimal possible time. With
proper utilization of the protection system, the duration of the fault and the number of consumers
affected by the fault can be minimized [12]-[14]. The operational philosophy of the protection
system, protection coordination between different zones of protection, and the self-failure of the
protection system components affect reliability of power supply to the consumers and should be
modeled appropriately in DS reliability evaluation. There are different types of equipment used in
a protection system, such as the circuit breaker (CB), fuse, recloser, sectionalizer, lightning
arrestor, etc. Among the various protection devices, the CB is of particular interest in reliability
modeling and evaluation because of the operational flexibility and the possibility to extend the
5
range of different protection functions using relays. The CB is the protection equipment that opens
the circuit in response to the protection relays and is closed by the operator to reinstate the circuit.
The CB can be opened or closed in a very short time. CBs are classified according to the arc
quenching mechanism. For DS, air CB, oil CB, and vacuum CB are utilized based on the
requirement and voltage level.
Each section of the distribution network is provided with protection equipment. A
protection device in the first line of protection is called the primary protection or the main
protection. The protection system should be capable of discriminating against the fault from
normal operating conditions, and only the faulty section should be isolated. If the primary
protection fails to respond, the backup protection will operate to isolate the fault. An illustration
of the primary and backup protection is shown in Fig. 1.5. From the figure, it can be observed that
the circuit breaker CB1 is primarily responsible for the protection of line sections 1-9 which is the
primary protection zone of CB1. The fault at the bus bar is designed to be protected by incoming
breaker CBinc which is the primary protection zone of the breaker CBinc .If a fault occurs at any of
the line section L1 to L9, and CB1 fails to operate, the back-up protection breaker CBinc will open
to isolate the fault. The backup protection only acts when the primary protection fails to protect
the fault in the primary protection zone, which is ensured by proper protection coordination. In
Fig. 1.5, all the load points are protected by the fuses. If any fault occurs in the downstream side
of the fuse, fuse-link will melt leading to the outage at the corresponding load point. The other
healthy load points are unaffected. To ensure such operation, the pickup current of the breaker
CB1 should be higher than the operating current of the fuse. Similarly, the pickup current of CB1
should be less than the pickup current of CBinc .
The consequences of different types of CB failure are illustrated with the help of Fig. 1.5.
For instance, if CB1 undergoes an open circuit failure or a failure due to inadvertent opening, the
load points LP1-LP9 are interrupted. However, this fault does not affect the load points LP10-
LP12. The supply at load points LP1-LP9 can be restored after the repair of CB1. Load points
LP1-LP9 experiences an outage until CB1 is repaired and reinstalled which is referred to as repair
time of CB1. If CB1 undergoes a short-circuit failure, CBinc will open to isolate the fault. The
opening of CBinc causes the outages to all the load points LP1-LP12. CBinc can be closed after
removing CB1 for repair, and therefore, load points LP10-LP12 only suffer an outage for this
duration, referred to as the switching time which is generally smaller than repair time of the CB1.
6
Backup Protection zone of CBinc
11 kV
Primary Protection zone of CB1
CB1 Circuit Breaker
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fuse
CBinc Line Section
Busbar
LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 LP6 LP7 LP8 LP9

CB2
10 11 12
LP10 LP11 LP12

Primary Protection
zone of CBinc
Fig. 1.5. Distribution system protection.
But the load points LP1-LP9 will suffer the outages until CB1 is repaired and re-installed. If CB1
is stuck when there is a fault in any line sections 1-9, CBinc will operate to isolate the fault leading
to the outages of all the load points LP1-LP12. In this case, the supply to load points LP10-LP12
can be restored by closing CBinc after manually switching or removing the stuck breaker CB1.
Therefore, load points LP10-LP12 experience outage for the switching period. However, the
supply to the load points LP1-LP9 can be restored only after completing the repair of CB1 or the
protection system, based on the cause for the stuck breaker condition. So, load points LP1-LP9
experiences outage for repair time of CB1. Due to the different scales of consequences brought by
the different failure modes of circuit breakers, it is necessary to develop reliability models to
incorporate the different failure modes.
1.3.1 Circuit Breaker Modeling in Reliability Assessment
Power system components can fail due to open circuit or short circuit events. An open
circuit failure does not trigger the operation of the CB and is known as a passive failure. Short
circuit failures are active failures as they trigger the operation of the CB [1] [15]. A combination
of active failure and passive failure is called a total failure. Most of the power system components
can be represented by the two-state Markov model as shown in Fig. 1.5. The “Up” state represents
the normal operating state of the component, which transits to the “Down” state following a total
7
failure event.  is the total failure rate, and  is the repair rate of the component. The repair rate
is the reciprocal of the average repair time.
1 2
λ
Up µ Down
Fig. 1.6. Two-state Markov model of a component.
However, a CB cannot be adequately represented by a two-state Markov model as it can reside in

multiple states due to its various switching functions. A CB is designed to operate either in a
normally closed (NC) or a normally open (NO) mode. The NC and NO circuit breakers can be
represented by the following states [1][10] [15].
(a) Close successfully when requested.
(b) Open successfully when requested.
(c) Open when it should not.
(d) Failed to close when it should.
(e) Damaged while closing.
(f) Failed while in service (short circuit).
(g) Failed to open when requested.
(h) Failed while opening.
(i) Damaged while successfully opening.
(j) Failed during testing or maintenance.
(k) Damaged discovered during testing.
States (a) and (b) are successful states of the NO and the NC CB, respectively. These two states
are the designed tasks of the CB. However, the CB can transit to any of the states between (c) to
(k), all of which are failed states. Each failed state is unique and the impact of each state has a
different consequence on the DS operation. State (c) can occur to an NC breaker subjected to a
passive failure, and it affects the feeder or section of DS to which it is connected. From a reliability
point of view, State (c) failure affects only the load points connected to the feeder protected by the
faulty CB [10][15]. Similarly, states (d) and (e) occur with NO breaker and it affects the load points
8
which were designed to supply from this CB [1]. The state (f) of CB is the actively failed state and
can occur with both NO and NC breakers. This type of failure is protected by the operation of the
backup breaker(s) which causes the failure of multiple healthy protected by the backup breaker
[15]-[17]. In a practical situation, this is often the incoming CB of the substation. This type of
failure has a severe impact on the reliability of a greater number of load points. Collectively, failure
states (g)-(i) are called the stuck breaker conditions that occur with NC breakers. The reliability
consequences of the stuck breaker condition are also similar to the consequences of the active
failure of breakers when the fault occurs in the section of the network protected by the stuck
breaker. State (j) and (k) occur during the maintenance and testing phase, and therefore no
additional outages to the load point occur other than maintenance outages. The transition of states
from a successful state to any of the failure states interrupts the supply to the load point. It is
necessary to identify which of the states of a CB in the network contribute to a failure event at the
load points.
1.4 Distribution System Reliability Evaluation Techniques
Various evaluation techniques are available to conduct the reliability assessment of a DS.
These techniques can be categorized into analytical and simulation methods. Mostly, analytical
techniques are long-established to carry out the reliability studies of the DS. Some of the
established analytical approaches are the minimal cut-set method, state enumeration technique,
failure mode, and effect analysis techniques (FMEA), zone branch method, reliability block
diagram (RBD), Boolean algebra, spreadsheet, etc. which are also recognized by the IEEE Std
493[10].
Among the different reliability evaluation techniques, minimal cut-set is widely used
because this method can be readily implemented in a computer program [1]. Another advantage
of this method is that it directly gives the information of failure events and their probability of
occurrences and therefore can be used to rank the events based on their criticality.
A minimal cut-set is a set of system components, which when all failed, causes an outage
of the load point of interest. The order of the cut-set specifies the number of components in the set.
For example, a second-order minimal cut-set consists of two components, both must fail to result
9
in the load point outage. The reliability evaluation using the minimal cut-set method involves the
following steps.
(i) Find 1st order cut-sets.
(ii) Find 2nd order minimal cut-sets.
(iii) Find higher-order minimal cut-sets as required.
The occurrence of a higher-order minimal cut-set requires the failure of multiple
components simultaneously. As a result, the probability of simultaneous failure
decreases as the order of cut-set increases.
(iv) Find the probability of occurring each minimal cut-sets.
Frequency, duration and probability index of the load point can be evaluated from the
minimal cut-sets. For the 1st order cut-sets, the failure rate and unavailability of
components are taken as failure rate and unavailability to the load points. Components
in 2nd order and higher order are treated as components in parallel and the contribution
on reliability indices are evaluated by using parallel equivalent models [1]. If 𝜆1 and 𝜆2
be the failure rate and 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 be the repair time of components in 2nd order minimal
cut-set. The equivalent failure rate and average outage duration and unavailability due
to the minimal cut-set on the load point is evaluated as
𝜆𝑒𝑞 = 𝜆1 ∗ 𝜆2 (𝑟1 + 𝑟2 )(f/yr) (1.1)
𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟2
𝑟𝑒𝑞 = (hrs) (1.2)
𝑟1 + 𝑟2
𝑈𝑒𝑞 = 𝜆𝑒𝑞 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 𝜆1 ∗ 𝜆2 ∗ 𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟2 (1.3)
Similarly for third-order minimal cut-set,
f
𝜆𝑒𝑞 = 𝜆1 ∗ 𝜆2 ∗ 𝜆3 (𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟2 + 𝑟2 ∗ 𝑟3 + 𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟3 ) ( ) (1.4)
yr
𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟2 ∗ 𝑟3
𝑟𝑒𝑞 = (hrs), (1.5)
𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟2 + 𝑟2 ∗ 𝑟3 + 𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟3
hrs
𝑈𝑒𝑞 = 𝜆𝑒𝑞 ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 𝜆1 ∗ 𝜆2 ∗ 𝜆3 ∗ 𝑟1 ∗ 𝑟2 ∗ 𝑟3 ( ) (1.6)
yr
The equivalent reliability parameters due to higher-order minimal cut-sets can be
evaluated using the parallel equivalent approach.
(v) Finally, the failure frequency and unavailability of the load point can be evaluated by
the arithmetic sum of failure rate and unavailability of all minimal cut-sets.
10
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 (𝜆) = ∑ 𝜆𝑒𝑞 (1.7)
𝑐𝑢𝑡−𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑈) = ∑ 𝑈𝑒𝑞 (1.8)

𝑐𝑢𝑡−𝑠𝑒𝑡
The average outage duration at the load point is evaluated from unavailability and failure frequency
at the load point. i.e 𝑟 = 𝑈/𝜆 (hrs).
The minimal cut-set method is illustrated to evaluate the reliability of load point X in the
simple network shown in Fig. 1.7. Components reliability data given in Table 1.1 provided by the
IEEE Gold Book are considered for reliability evaluation [10].
S1 S2
1 4
T1 T2 Transformer
2 5
CB1 CB2 Circuit Breaker
3 6 B
7 10 Busbar
CB3 CB4 Cable
8 11
Z Overhead line
L1
9 12
X L2
13
Y
Fig. 1.7. A distribution network to illustrate the minimal cut-set method.
Table 1.1. Component reliability data.
Failure rate (𝝀) Repair time (r)

S.N Component
(f/yr) (hrs)
1 Supplies: S1, S2 1.956000 1.32
2 Transformer: T1, T2 0.001110 5.00
3 Circuit Breaker:CB1-CB4 0.009600 9.60
4 Cable: Z1 0.002010 11.22
5 Overhead Line:L1, L2 0.002820 2.50
6 Busbar: B 0.009490 7.29
11
For the load point X,
First order cut-sets (𝑂1 )= {B, CB3, L1}
Second order minimal cut-sets (𝑂2)= {(S1, S2), (S1, T2), (S1, CB2), (T1, S2), (T1, T2), (T1,
CB2), (CB1, S2), (CB1, T2), (CB1, CB2)}
Table 1.2. shows the evaluation of load point reliability indices from minimal cut-sets. The
failure frequency, unavailability and average outage duration of load point X evaluated using cut-
set methodology are 0.0231132 f/yr, 0.16921 hrs/yr and 7.32 hrs respectively.
Table 1.2. Evaluation of load point reliability indices using minimal cut-sets.
Minimal cut- Failure frequency (𝝀) Average repair time (r) Unavailability (U)
S.N
set (f/yr) (hrs) (hrs/yr)
1 B 0.00949000 7.29 0.069182
2 CB3 0.00960000 9.60 0.092160
3 L1 0.00282000 2.50 0.007050
4 (S1, S2) 0.00115302 0.66 0.000761
5 (S1,T2) 0.00000157 1.04 0.000002
6 (S1, CB2), 0.00002341 1.16 0.000027
7 (T1, S2), 0.00000157 1.04 0.000002
8 (T1, T2), 0.00000000 2.50 0.000000
9 (T1, CB2), 0.00000002 3.29 0.000000
10 (CB1, S2), 0.00002341 1.16 0.000027
11 (CB1, T2), 0.00000002 3.29 0.000000
12 (CB1, CB2) 0.00000020 4.80 0.000001
Total 0.0231132 7.32 0.16921
All minimal cut-sets are total failure events. From the visual inspection, it is found that the
active failures of breakers CB1, CB2, and CB4 are also the first order of minimal cut-sets. CB3 is
not considered as an extra failure event since the total failure of CB3 is already a 1st order cut-set.
The active failure of breaker CB4 triggers both incoming breakers CB1 and CB2 leading to the
failure of load point X. Also, the active failure of CB1 triggers the incoming breaker CB2 and
supply S1 leading to the failure of load point X. Similarly, active failure of CB2 triggers incoming
breaker CB1 and supply S2. Higher-order minimal cut-sets due to active failure of the breaker are
not present in the given example. Load point indices at X evaluated considering the active failure
of breakers are shown in Table 1.3. In this example, 50% of the CB failures are considered to be
active failures [10] for reliability evaluation. It is assumed that load point X will suffer an outage
12
equivalent to switching time due to these active failures. Symbol (A) in the CB is referred to the
active failure only. The failure frequency, unavailability and average outage duration of load point
X evaluated considering the active failure of breakers are 0.0375132 f/yr, 0.176412 hrs/yr and 4.70
hrs respectively. It can be observed that the failure frequency and unavailability evaluated
considering the active failure of CB are significantly higher as compared to evaluated without
considering the active failure of CB.
Table 1.3. Load point reliability indices considering active failure of breakers.
Minimal Failure frequency (𝝀) Average repair time (r) Unavailability (U)
S.N
cut-set (f/yr) (hrs) (hrs/yr)
From Table 1.2 0.02311321 7.32 0.169212
1 CB1(A) 0.00480000 0.50 0.0024000
2 CB2(A) 0.00480000 0.50 0.0024000
3 CB4(A) 0.00480000 0.50 0.0024000
Total 0.0375132 4.70 0.176412
In the same way, the stuck condition of breakers CB1, CB2 and CB4 can cause the failure
of load point X. For instance, (CB4(stuck)+Z2) and (CB4(stuck)+L2) triggers incoming CB1 and
CB2 leading to the failure of load point X. So, these are the failure events due to the stuck condition
of CB4. Also, (CB1(stuck)+T1) triggers S1 and incoming breaker CB2 leading to the failure of
load point X. Similarly, (CB2(stuck)+T2) causes the failure of load point X. Load point reliability
indices evaluated considering active failure and stuck condition of the breaker are shown in Table
1.4. A breaker stuck probability of 3% and the switching time to isolate or remove the stuck breaker
is considered as 0.5 hours for reliability evaluation. The failure frequency, unavailability and
average outage duration of load point X evaluated considering the active failure and stuck
condition of breakers are 0.0377247 f/yr, 0.17665175 hrs/yr and 4.68 hrs respectively. The values
of 𝜆 and U at load point X evaluated considering breaker failure modes are significantly higher
than evaluated without considering breaker failure modes.
From Table 1.3- Table 1.4, it can be observed that the active failure and stuck condition of
the breaker have a significant impact on the load point indices. Therefore, the reliability indices
evaluated without considering the breaker failure modes are erroneous. For the simple distribution
network, it is possible to identify the failure events due to active failure and stuck condition by
13
visual inspection or individual component simulations. However, for large complex distribution
networks, it is not possible to identify minimal cut-sets from visual inspection.
Table 1.4. Load point reliability indices considering active failure and stuck condition of circuit
breaker.
Minimal Failure frequency (𝝀) Average repair time (r) Unavailability (U)
S.N
cut-set (f/yr) (hrs) (hrs/yr)
From Table 1.3 0.03952321 5.03 0.19896400
1 CB4(stuck)+Z2 0.00006030 0.50 0.00003015
2 CB4(stuck)+L2 0.00008460 0.50 0.00004230
3 CB1(stuck)+T1 0.00003330 0.50 0.00001665
4 CB2(stuck)+T2 0.00003330 0.50 0.00001665
Total 0.0377247 4.68 0.1765175
For such systems, the minimal cut-set method can be implemented most conveniently using
minimal paths and connection matrix approach. A connection matrix can be created from the nodal
representation of the network. In computer programming, it is easier to store, retrieve and
manipulate the connection matrix. Using connection matrix, electrical paths between the power
supplies and the load point can be derived using matrix multiplication or search methods [18].
From the paths, an incidence matrix can be created that represents the network components in the
path. Minimal Cut-sets up to any order can be derived from the incidence matrix by comparing
elements in its column. If any column of the incidence matrix contains all non-zero elements, the
corresponding component is taken as first-order cut-set. If the combination of two-column of
incidence matrix gives all non-zero elements, the corresponding components form second-order
cut-set. Similarly, higher-order cut-sets can be derived from the combination of columns of the
incidence matrix. Only minimal cut-sets are considered for reliability studies. All the minimal cut-
sets derived from this method are total failure events which are directly related to the paths between
supplies and load point. The minimal cut-sets due to active failure and stuck conditions of breakers
cannot be identified using this technique. Therefore an appropriate methodology is required to
identify the active failure and stuck condition in reliability evaluation of complex ICDS and utility
DS.
Existing software tools such as DigSilent, PSS SINCAL, Easypower, Etap, etc. also have
the reliability evaluation module to evaluate the reliability of DS using analytical as well as
simulation approach [19]-[22]. These software tools also do not incorporate all failure events from
14
active failure and stuck condition of CB. Some of the software tools consider first order active
failure of the breaker as a failure event which is identified by simulating the failure of each
component in the network. These methodologies are limited to simple DS with a fewer number of
components. To identify the minimal cut-sets in large complex DS, failure simulation of each
component and numerous combination of components is required which is computationally
burdensome and is not practical. In order to find the higher-order minimal cut-sets involving
breaker failures, it’s not practical to simulate numerous multiple combinations in the complex
networks. Hence, an appropriate method that can be systematically programmed in computer
software is required to incorporate the breaker failure modes in the reliability evaluation software
tools.
Using the Monte-Carlo Simulation technique [1], the failure mode of components can be
simulated but it requires the simulation of numerous components failures and multiple
combinations of components failures which are computationally difficult for large complex DS.
Also, the Monte-Carlo simulation is a network tailored approach. A minor modification in the
network, which often happens with the practical network, requires different modeling each time,
which is also impracticable for the utilities and industries. Therefore, further consideration is
required to incorporate active failure and stuck condition into reliability analysis.
1.5 Reliability Indices in Distribution System
Frequency, duration and probability-based indices are used to evaluate the performance of
the distribution system. These indices are calculated for load point and for the entire distribution
system. To measure the reliability of a load point, failure frequency (λ), unavailability (U) and
average repair time (r) are used. Where 𝜆 is the frequency index, U is the probability index and r
is the duration index respectively. To measure the performance of distribution system, a frequency-
based index such as SAIFI, duration based index such as CAIDI, probability-based indices such
as SAIDI and ASAI and energy-based indices such as AENS, EENS, and ECOST are used.
Frequency, duration and probability-based system indices are derived from load point indices and
the number of customers at the load points. The evaluation of energy-based indices requires the
information of the average load at the load points. The minimal cut-sets can be utilized to evaluate
these indices. Since all the minimal cut-sets are load point failure events, in this thesis, the phrase
15
failure event is used interchangeably with the minimal cut-set. Load point reliability indices can
be evaluated as follows:
𝜆𝑖 = ∑ 𝜆𝑗 (1.9)
𝑈𝑖 = ∑ 𝜆𝑗 ∗ 𝑟𝑗 (ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠/𝑦𝑟) (1.10)
and
𝑈𝑖
𝑟𝑖 = (1.11)
𝜆𝑖
where 𝑈𝑖 is the unavailability of load point i,

𝜆𝑗 is the rate of occurrence of failure event j in failure/year, and
𝑟𝑗 is the average repair time of the failure event j.
∑ 𝜆𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑟) (1.12)
∑ 𝑁𝑖
Interruptions/year/customer
𝑁𝑖 is the number of customers connected to load point i.
∑ 𝑈𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑖
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 = (ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠/𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑟) (1.13)
∑ 𝑁𝑖
where, 𝑈𝑖 is the unavailability at load point i in hours/year.

𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼
𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 = (ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠/𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) (1.14)
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑗 ∗ 𝜆𝑗 ∗ 𝐿𝐶 𝑖 ($/𝑦𝑟) (1.15)
and
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 = ∑ 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 ($/𝑦𝑟) (1.16)
where 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑗 is the customer damage function due to failure event j for duration 𝑟𝑗 .
𝜆𝑗 is the failure rate of failure event j, and

𝐿𝐶 𝑖 is the average load curtailed at load point i due to failure event j, and
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the cost of energy not supplied at load point i.
16
∑ 𝑈𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝑖
𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑆 = (𝑘𝑊ℎ/𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑦𝑟) (1.17)
∑ 𝑁𝑖
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖 ∗ 𝑈𝑖 (𝑘𝑊ℎ/𝑦𝑟) (1.18)
kWh/year
where 𝐿𝑖 is the average load at load point i.
System indices represent the performance of the entire system so they are used in DS
planning as well as in performance-based regulation (PBR). The most common indices followed
by the regulating bodies are SAIFI, SAIDI, and EENS. It should be noted that different regulators
at different jurisdictions might use any of them or additional indices to better reflect the
performance of the distribution system.
1.6 Research motivation
Customer interruption in DS mostly occurs due to the bulk power supply failure or
component failure within the distribution feeders. In many developing countries, the bulk power
system is relatively less reliable and the customers will experience frequent power supply
interruption due to the failure of the bulk power system. In such jurisdiction, the intermittent power
outages can be minimized by installing a backup generator and UPS system. In highly developed
and industrialized nations, the bulk power supply is relatively reliable and most of the interruption
in DS comes from component failure within the DS. Most of the component failure is protected
by the breakers but the failure of breakers itself has a big impact on the operation of DS and hence
on the reliability of the system. Distribution feeders in urban areas are complex due to meshed
structures and equipped with many breakers to facilitate the reconfiguration and transfer of the
load among the feeders. ICDS is also complex due to supply from multiple utility feeders, backup
generators, interconnection with UPS and batteries and switching arrangements among them. The
analytical technique such as the minimal cut-set method can be used using the connection matrix
and the minimal path approach to evaluate the reliability of such complex networks. The minimal
cut-sets due to total failure of components or a combination of components are only identified
using the existing techniques. However, in the DS, the minimal cut-set due to active failure and
stuck condition of breaker might come from the breaker not present in the paths as well as breakers
17
in the paths whose total failure is not the 1st order minimal cut-set. Therefore, the existing minimal
cut-set method requires a further extension to incorporate active failure and stuck condition of the
breaker in reliability evaluation. Existing commercial software tools only consider first-order cut-
set from the breaker active failure as these events are identified by simulating each component
failure. The extension of the methodology adopted by the software tools requires a huge
computational time and effort to consider higher-order failure events from active failure and stuck
condition of the breaker. Therefore, both the analytical technique and the software tools require
further improvement in the methodology to incorporate the breaker failure modes. ICDS owners
with high-reliability need in the developed nation can achieve higher reliability by upgrading the
protection system instead of implementing standby backups which require a proper methodology
that can incorporate higher-order minimal cut-sets considering breaker failure modes. To address
such problems in reliability evaluation, there is a need to develop an analytical methodology to
extend the existing minimal cut-set method which can incorporate higher-order minimal cut-sets
involving breaker failure modes and that should be generalized and can be logically implemented
in the computer program.
Passive failure, active failure, and stuck condition are the major failures of CB. Among the
different failure mode, the passive failure modes of a CB or combination of the passive failure of
CBs or combinations of the passive failure of CB with the failure of other components are well
accounted by the existing techniques described in section 1.2.1 [1][10][23]-[25]. If passive failure
of CB alone or in combination with other component failure is a load point failure event,
corresponding active failure of CB is also a failure event [1]. Utilizing these methodologies, the
load point failure events can be derived from the knowledge of paths between supply and the load
point which doesn’t incorporate all the failure events due to active failure and stuck condition of
the breaker. The active failure can happen with NC as well as NO breaker, incase if the NO breaker
contacts are live, for instance, a tie-breaker connecting two bus bars. On the other hand, the stuck
breaker condition is an operational failure and can occur with only NC breaker. The existing
reliability evaluation techniques require further attention to incorporate the active failure and the
stuck condition of CBs into the reliability studies.
From the literature review of [26]-[29], it is found that the short circuit failure and the stuck
condition of CB lead to severe consequences on the power system operation including the
distribution system. The references [30]-[32] have realized the failure of CB can be dependent on
18
several factors and provided ways to identify the probabilistic reliability data of the circuit breaker.
Although current philosophies have emphasized the severity of CB failures such as active and
stuck conditions on distribution system operation, they lack to incorporate CB failures into
reliability studies systematically. Active failure and stuck condition of the breaker and their impact
on distribution system reliability are further explored in the current works of literature.
The statistical analysis of surveyed data for circuit breakers showed that the active failure
of a circuit breaker is one of the major failure [33]. From the literature review of [26]Error! R
eference source not found.-[36], it is found that the active failure of the breaker contributes a
major portion of distribution system failures. Reference [37] specified the need for considering the
active failure of a circuit breaker but doesn’t provide any generalized methodology to incorporate
them into reliability studies. The major reasons for such failure are insulation failures, bush
failures, breaker mechanism failures, and cyber/ cyber-physical attacks. [10][16][38]-[43] have
recognized the active failure of the breaker as one of the important causes of failure of DS and
these failures have to be considered in reliability studies but do not specify how these failure events
can be considered. In [1][43], the significance of the active failure of CB into reliability indices is
identified by simulating the failure of each component. [44] Identifies the active failure event by
analyzing the backup node in the graph representation of the network. [45], [19]-[22] uses state
enumeration, failure mode and criticality analysis (FMCA) .etc. to determine the failure events
due to the active failure of the breaker. [44][46][47] has incorporated some of the active failure
events using the approach given in [1]. Industrial distribution system design in [48] and the
reliability assessment considering momentary interruption [49] also do not incorporate the failure
of the protection system in their modeling. All of the techniques utilized by the literature are
applicable to a simple network with a limited number of components and are non-generic.
Therefore, the complexity and the computational burden rise as the size and complexity of the
network increases using these techniques.
Another important failure mode of CB, the stuck breaker condition, which is a rare event
in the CB but whenever it happens, it creates greater consequences to the operation of the
distribution system. Stuck breaker conditions can occur due to several reasons such as unrevealed
faults in relay protection systems, breaker operating mechanisms, energy storage systems, and
current interrupting media of CB, etc. [15][50]-[52]. Human errors, not resettled alarms, change
of functional characteristics such as operating times, communication malfunctions are also
19
primarily responsible for stuck breaker conditions [51][53]-[55]. In the modern distribution system
context, the number of electrical components used in the protection system is higher and the
operation of CB is guided by the exchange of information among IEDs, relays, MUs, PMUs,
operators, etc. The fault signal generated by any of the electrical equipment/component and the
communication failures (malfunction, in-operation, delays, capability breach, interference, cyber-
attack, human error, etc.) results into stuck condition of CB in the event of fault to be protected
by the CB [50][54]-[57]. The survey conducted by CIGRE finds that 18% of the failure of CB are
stuck breaker failures [58]. [10][57] have recognized the stuck breaker condition as one of the
major failure modes of CB but it doesn’t specify any technique to incorporate them into reliability
studies. [1] has proposed a simulation technique to identify failure events from all possible events
due to the stuck breaker condition by simulating the failure of each component overlapping with a
stuck breaker. [50][59] use state enumeration and FMEA technique to identify the failure events
including stuck breaker condition. [60] identifies the combination of non-boundary components
and breakers to constitute a failure event. The techniques utilized by the literature are applicable
to the simple radial distribution system. Software tools such as DigSilent, PSS@SINCAL, etap,
Easypower used by the utilities and industries to perform reliability studies do not incorporate all
failure events due to stuck breaker condition [19]-[22]. The computation burden for the simulation
or for conducting FMCA to every state in order to identify the failure state in the large complex
network with multiple switching arrangement is high and not practical.
In the modern complex distribution system, the number of breakers required to facilitate
the switching among the feeders and to feed on DER will rise. Most of these arrangements are
considered to improve supply reliability to the customers. The incremental reliability benefit of
the different schemes is only evaluated when the DS is systematically represented in the reliability
study. To carry out the systematic reliability study of the DS by the utilities or the customers, the
unique nature of the CB should be represented by the proper model. For some DS, the improvement
of a particular mode of CB failure rate might be one of the crucial areas of reliability improvement
which might create new options for the reliability investment. To the customer with high-reliability
needs, the improvement in CB quality can be one of the reliability investment alternatives. For the
utilities, a proper representation of CB into reliability studies helps to identify the better protection
design in order to protect the distribution assets and the personnel. Therefore, to address all of
these challenges in reliability studies, there is a need to develop the general methodologies to
20
incorporate the active failure and stuck condition of the breaker in a reliability assessment
framework and that can be systematically implemented in a computer program.
Based on the research motivation presented, the goal of this thesis is to develop the
methodology to identify the failure events for the load point which are originated from active
failure and the stuck condition of the CBs. In addition, the quantification of the impact of the
identified failure events and their application to the utilities and large industrial customers is also
the objective of this thesis. The following are the specific objectives of this research work:
 Develop a methodology to trace the network path identifying the failure impacts of the
various components and protection system coordination on the individual load points of a
complex DS.
 Develop an analytical methodology to incorporate the active failure of circuit breakers in
the reliability evaluation of a meshed DS.
 Develop an analytical methodology to incorporate the stuck condition of circuit breakers
in the reliability evaluation of a meshed DS.
 Integrate the methodologies into the existing minimal cut-set method to incorporate
multiple order failure events, and active failures and stuck conditions of CB.
 Illustrate the application of the developed methodology in reliability investment decisions
in maintenance, upgrade and planning of an ICDS and DS with high-reliability needs.
1.7 Thesis Organization
The manuscript style thesis is organized into 5 chapters. Except for the first and the last
chapters, all the chapters are papers submitted to technical journals and conferences. This section
briefly describes the organization of different chapters in this thesis.
Chapter 1 describes the background of the research, problem statement, research motivation and
objectives of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides different reliability improvement options for industrial
and commercial customers. This chapter discusses the implementation of different investment
options for these customers which depends on the utility supply reliability to these customers. This
study titled ‘Need-based Reliability Investment in Industrial/Commercial Power Distribution
Systems’ is submitted to the Springer Journal: International Journal of System Assurance
Engineering and Management (IJSAEM). Some findings of this research were presented at the 9th
21
International Conference on Quality, Reliability, Infocom Technology and Business Operations
(ICQRIT- 2018), Delhi. The main focus of this work was to identify the reliability effect of
replacing breaker by reduced active failure rate and reduced stuck probabilities. The reliability
impact of installing different levels of standby backup and UPS, replacing breakers by breakers
having lower active failure rate, reduced stuck probabilities at different supply entrance reliability
are quantified.
Chapter 3 is extracted from the paper titled ‘A Novel Methodology to Incorporate Circuit
Breaker Active Failure in Reliability Evaluation of Electrical Distribution Networks’. This
paper is submitted in a journal ‘IEEE Transaction on Power System’ for publication. In this paper,
a generalized analytical methodology is developed to identify circuit breaker active failure events
as a failure event of load point. The need of incorporating these failure events is quantified by
implementing in IEEE Gold Book standard network and the application of the methodology is
presented by comparing the reliability parameters at different reliability improvement options for
the customers with high-reliability needs.
Chapter 4 is a paper titled ‘A novel methodology to incorporate the stuck condition of
the circuit breaker in reliability evaluation of distribution system’. This paper is submitted to
a journal ‘IET Generation, Transmission and Distribution’ for the publication. In this paper, an
analytical generalized methodology to identify stuck breaker conditions as a failure event is
developed. The effectiveness of the methodology is shown by evaluating the reliability indices of
a distribution network. The methodology facilitates to explore additional reliability improvement
alternatives for large customers with high-reliability needs.
Chapter 5 summarizes and explains the conclusions of the thesis.
22
1.8 References
[1]. R. Billinton and R. N. Allan, Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems, vol. 2, New York,
NY, USA: Plenum Press, 1984.
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28
NEED-BASED RELIABILITY INVESTMENT IN
INDUSTRIAL/COMMERCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
2.1 Abstract
1
Power interruptions can cause significant financial losses to commercial and industrial
customers. Backup generators and multiple utility supply feeders are often employed to improve
the reliability and minimize such losses. The customer reliability depends not only on the service
entrance reliability and backup generator system but also on the reliability of the components, such
as circuit breakers, cables, bus bars, etc., used in the distribution facilities of the customers. This
paper investigates the reliability impacts of investing in the backup generation and high-quality
system components on industrial/commercial distribution systems supplied with different levels
of service entrance reliability. The effects of different levels of redundancy in the backup
generation and their start times are also examined. The IEEE Std 493-2007 Gold Book network is
used for the illustration using data provided by the US Army Corp (PREP). The case studies
presented can provide valuable insight into commercial/industrial customers for making efficient
decisions for reliability investment.
2.2 Introduction
Many industrial and commercial customers in industrialized nations require high reliability
of power supply to ensure the proper functioning of their sensitive types of equipment and
processes. Even a short duration of power interruption can cause significant financial losses and
safety issues to such customers as it can result in hours of downtime to resume the processes [1].
The level of supply reliability required by these customers depends on the type of manufacturing
process, unique business operating characteristics, availability of backup, and equipment used, etc.
[2]. Power utilities attempt to ensure a highly reliable supply to these customers by adopting
improved design and maintenance practices [3]. In addition, such customers employ standby
1
K. Timalsena, R. Karki, P.Piya, and S. Bhattarai, “Need-Based Reliability Investment in Industrial/Commercial
Power Distribution Systems,” submitted to International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and
Management (Under review)
29
generation, multiple utility feeders, high-quality equipment, etc. to meet reliability needs. These
customers rely on the reliability assessment results to make investment decisions for reliability
improvement of their distribution network. IEEE Std 493-2007 provides guidelines for the design
of reliable industrial and commercial power distribution systems (ICDS)[4]. Different
methodologies such as cut-set, GO software tool, reliability block diagram (RBD), zone-branch
methodologies, etc. are presented with illustrations to evaluate the reliability indices. The methods
illustrated in the IEEE Std 493-2007 need the further extension to incorporate parameters such as
load curtailment philosophy, switching coordination actions, component failure modes, backup
generator response time, level of backup redundancy, etc. that are important in practical reliability
assessment.
Reference [5] has considered different failure modes of circuit breakers in the reliability
assessment of an ICDS. The isolation and protection characteristics of protective devices are
accounted for in [6] using the zone branch method. Reference [7] uses a spreadsheet to implement
a simplified cut-set method that reduces the network size utilizing series and parallel equivalents
of the components in between protective devices to evaluate the reliability indices. Authors in [8]
used a Boolean algebra based GO software tool to evaluate the reliability indices of an industrial
or commercial network. Reference [9] compares the reliability indices evaluated using the
spreadsheet, cut-set and GO software tool. The RBD method in [10] utilizes operational analogies
into the reliability simulation. Authors in [11] have performed reliability worth analysis of the
backup generator system in an industrial distribution system. Each of these methodologies
accounts for the network configuration, equipment reliability parameters, switching procedure,
and reconfiguration process in a different way. A general approach is needed to incorporate the
important parameters in the reliability evaluation. A methodology applicable to any system,
irrespective of its network configuration, would be very useful to industrial/commercial customers.
ICDS generally utilize backup generators and/or multiple utility supply feeders to enhance
the reliability of their supply. The component failures within the distribution system can also have
significant impacts on the reliability indices of the system [12], [13]. The decision to employ
backup generation or improved system components for reliability improvement of an ICDS
requires investigative reliability analysis based on the distribution system design, the quality of its
components, their service entrance reliability and their reliability needs. This paper presents a
methodology to carry out a comprehensive reliability study of ICDS considering backup
30
generators, their response times, service entrance reliability, and failure modes of circuit breakers
(CB). The paper also investigates the impact of uninterrupted power supply (UPS) systems and
the level of backup redundancy for the reliability improvement of such systems.
2.3 Methodology
A cut-set based methodology considering minimal cut-sets up to the third-order

contingencies is utilized to obtain reliability indices with high accuracy in this paper. The backup
generator system is represented by a two-state Markov model [14]. The reliability indices used
for the analysis are the failure frequency (𝜆) and the expected energy not served (EENS). The
methodology consists of several tasks as outlined in the evaluation framework shown in Fig. 2.1.
Obtain Input data
Markov
model of Find all minimal paths
Backup between supplies and
generator load point.
system
Obtain the minimal cut-
sets using incidence
matrix model
Integrate the breaker active

failure and stuck breaker
condition into the minimal
cut-set
Evaluate failure frequency

and EENS
Fig. 2.1. Reliability evaluation framework.

In order to obtain a generalized approach to obtain the minimal cut-sets of a distribution
system, a connection matrix [15] is first created by tracing all the paths between the power supply
and the load points of the network [15]. A node removal technique is utilized to remove the
31
intermediate nodes of the network from the matrix and obtain the minimal paths between the supply
nodes and the load points of the system. The minimal paths are expressed in an incidence matrix,
and the minimal cut-sets are identified through the column operations of the incidence matrix [15].
The set of minimal cut-sets identified in this process do not include the cut-sets associated with
breaker operations in response to their active failures or stuck conditions. The minimal cut-sets
related to active breaker failures and stuck conditions are identified separately using the failure
mode and criticality analysis technique and then added to the total set of minimal cut-sets.
The outage duration associated with a CB failure depends on the availability of the pull-out
facility of the mounted breaker as well as the operation and maintenance practice to isolate or repair
the failed breaker. In this paper, the outage time due to active CB failure is taken as the repair time
associated with the corresponding breaker, whereas the switching time to restore service to healthy
branches of the network after isolating the stuck breaker is taken as 0.5 hours. Multiple-order CB
failure events due to active failures and stuck conditions are neglected in this study.
The failure frequency of a load point is obtained by aggregating the failure contributed by
all the minimal cut-sets including those contributed from active CB failures as given by (2.1). The
unavailability (U) index expressed as the total expected annual outage duration is the summation of
the product of the failure rate and average outage duration of all the minimal cut-sets including
those contributed from active CB failures and stuck breaker events as presented in (2.2).
Failure Frequency = ∑ 𝜆𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑘 𝜆𝑗 ∗ (𝑟𝑘 + 𝑟𝑗 )

𝑖∈𝐹 𝑘,𝑗∈𝑆
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑚 𝜆𝑛 𝜆𝑜 (𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑛 + 𝑟𝑛 𝑟𝑜 + 𝑟𝑜 𝑟𝑚 )
𝑚,𝑛,𝑜∈𝑇
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑎_𝑥 + ∑ 𝜆𝑠 (𝑜𝑐𝑐/𝑦𝑟) (2.1)

𝑎_𝑥∈𝐴 𝑠∈𝑆𝑇
Annual Outage Duration (U) = ∑ 𝜆𝑖 𝑟𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆𝑘 𝜆𝑗 𝑟𝑘 𝑟𝑗 + ∑ 𝜆𝑚 𝜆𝑛 𝜆𝑜 𝑟𝑚 𝑟𝑛 𝑟𝑜

𝑖∈𝐹 𝑘,𝑗∈𝑆 𝑚,𝑛,𝑜∈𝑇
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑎_𝑥 𝑟𝑥 + ∑ 𝜆𝑠 ∗ 𝑟𝑠 (ℎ𝑟𝑠/𝑦𝑟) (2.2)

𝑎_𝑥∈𝐴 𝑠∈𝑆𝑇
where F is the set of first-order cut-set, S is the set of second-order cut-set, T is the set of third-order
cut-set, A is the set of 1st order active failure of breakers, ST is the set of stuck breaker, 𝜆 is the
32
failure rate of the component in cut-set, and 𝑟 is the average repair time of the component in cut-
set.
The expected energy not supplied (EENS) at Load point k is determined by multiplying the
annual outage duration at the Load point k and its average load, Lk . The system EENS is the sum
of EENS of all the load points in the system as shown in (2.3).
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 = ∑ 𝑈𝑘 ∗ 𝐿𝑘 (2.3)
𝑘∈ 𝐿𝑃
Where LP is the number of load points in the system.
2.4 Case Studies and Results
A range of case studies is presented to compare the reliability indices of the network with
and without considering backup generation at different levels of service entrance reliability.
2.4.1 Test System
The Gold Book network, given in the IEEE Std. 493-2007 and shown in Fig. 2.2, is used as
a test network in the study. The reliability indices of this network are evaluated by implementing
the framework developed in Section 2. The service entrance reliability and component reliability
data collected by US Army Corp. PREP [16] is used in this paper. It is assumed that 50% of breaker
failures are active failures [4]. The stuck probability of breaker is considered 3%. The estimated
average load at the different load points of the test network is shown in Table 2-1. The cable
connecting a generator with its breaker and the passive failure mode of the breakers are represented
by an equivalent series model [15] in the analysis. The equivalent reliability parameters obtained
using a Markov model for the backup generator system is shown in Table 2-2.
33
Fig. 2.2. IEEE Goldbook network.
Table 2.1. Load point and estimated average demand.
S.N Load Point Average Load (kW)

1 A 810.0
2 B 810.0
3 Lighting Bus 202.5
4 Non-Critical Bus 202.5
5 Cooling Tower 135.0
6 Pump 135.0
7 Air Handler 135.0
34
Table 2.2. Equivalent reliability parameters for a backup generator system.
No of Backup Generators 2 3 4
Backup Redundancy 100% 150% 200%
λeq (f/yr) 0.25373600 0.00019709 0.0000001
req (hrs) 17.79 8.94 5.96
2.4.2 Effect of Backup System on the Reliability Indices
The failure frequency at Load point A and the overall system EENS is calculated for the test
network considering different service entrance reliability for the following three scenarios.
Scenario (i): without a backup generator system.

Scenario (ii): with a backup generator system shown within the dotted rectangle in Fig.2.2,
and considering a switch-over time of 6 minutes
Scenario (iii): with a backup generator system and UPS.
Fig. 2.3 shows the system EENS of the test distribution system for the three scenarios considering
different levels of service entrance reliability. It should be noted that a high entrance failure rate
indicates poor input supply reliability to the distribution system. Fig. 2.3 shows that the EENS
increases or the system become less reliable as the entrance failure rate is increased. When the
service entrance failure rate is high, the EENS of the system can be considerably reduced by
employing backup generation. The EENS can be further reduced by using a UPS system to supply
the load points during the start and switch-over time of the backup generator. Fig. 2.3 also shows
that the advantage of investment in backup generation decreases as the entrance reliability is
increased. For cases with high entrance reliability, where the service entrance failure rate is very
low, the system EENS is comparatively low even without the backup generators. The installation
of a backup generation system in such cases can yield adverse reliability impacts due to potential
active failures of additional CBs that need to be added to operate the backup system. It can be
attributed to the fact that the reliability degradation brought by the active failures of the breakers
associated with the backup generator outweighs the reliability contribution of the backup generator.
Fig. 2.4 shows the failure frequency at Load point A for Scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii)
considering different service entrance failure rates. This figure shows that the failure frequency of
35
the Load point A increases with the increase in service entrance failure rate. The failure frequency
further increases when the backup generator is implemented due to the failure of the backup
generator related components in addition to the existing failures in Scenario (i). A significant
improvement in failure frequency is obtained in Scenario (iii) by adding UPS with the backup
generators as compared to Scenarios (i) and (ii). The UPS supplies power to the load points during
the start-up and change-over-time of the backup generator and prevents the associated interruption
events. This advantage in failure frequency decreases as the service entrance failure rate decreases.
When the service entrance failure rate is low, the failure frequency of the Load point in Scenario (i)
is better than the two other Scenarios as shown in Fig. 2.4. It is also due to the fact that the failure
rate added by the active failure of breakers in the backup branch is more than the contribution from
the backup generator or the backup generator and the UPS.
Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4 suggest that a backup generator system and UPS are preferable to
improve both the failure frequency and the EENS of an industrial/commercial distribution network
in case of a high service entrance failure rate. However, in the case of a low service entrance failure
rate, the use of a backup generator system further degrades the reliability of the network.
425
Without backup
410
With backup
395
EENS (kWh/year)
With backup and UPS

380
365
350
335
320
2 4 6 8 10 12
Service entrance failure rate (f/year)
Fig. 2.3. EENS vs. service entrance failure rate in Scenarios (i), (ii) and (iii).
36
0.090
Without backup
0.080 With backup
Failure frequency (occ/year)
With backup and UPS

0.070
0.060
0.050
0.040
0.030
0.020
2 4 6 8 10 12
Service entrance failure rate (f/year)
Fig. 2.4. Failure frequency vs. service entrance failure rate in Scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii).
The effect of the active failure of the breakers on reliability indices is found to be more significant
than the contribution from backup generators on reliability indices at lower service entrance failure
rate. Section 3.4 provides further investigation on the impact of the different CB failure modes on
the system reliability indices.
2.4.3 Effect of Supply Redundancy on Reliability Indices
The study in the previous section showed that the reliability of an ICDS supplied by
relatively poor entrance reliability can be improved by investing in the backup generator. This study
illustrates the effect of varying the level of redundancy in the backup generator system. The
reliability indices calculated without backup generation are taken as the reference case. The
reliability indices are calculated for 100% redundancy using 2 generators, 150% redundancy using
3 generators, and 200% redundancy using 4 generators in the backup generator system. Fig. 2.5 and
Fig. 2.6 show the system EENS and failure frequency of Load point A respectively for the service
entrance failure rate of 9.78 f/yr at the different levels of redundancies in the backup system. Fig.
2.5 shows that a significant decrease in EENS is achieved over the base case with 100% back up.
37
It is due to the ability to supply power at the event of utility supply failures. In contrast, Fig. 2.6
shows a slight increase in the failure frequency with the backup. It is due to the additional failure
events originated from the active failure of breakers required to connect the backup supply to the
existing bus bar. Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6 also show respectively show the EENS and failure frequency
when UPS is used with backup generation. Fig. 2.6 shows that UPS is essential if it is required to
reduce the failure frequency of the supply network. Comparing the reliability improvement from
100% to 200% backup, it can be observed that the incremental reliability benefit is decreased.
Therefore, increasing backup redundancy can reduce EENS, but only up to a certain level, which is
about 344 kWh/yr in the example network. With UPS it can be further lowered to about 337 kWh/yr
as seen in Fig. 2.5. If this level of reliability is not acceptable to the ICDS, then other investment
options should be investigated.
390
380 0%
370 100%
EENS (kWh/yr)
150%
360 200%
350
340
330
320
With backup only With backup and UPS
Fig. 2.5. EENS vs. % of the backup with and without UPS.
38
0.060
0%
0.055
100%
0.050
Failure frequency (occ/yr)
150%
0.045 200%
0.040
0.035
0.030
0.025
0.020
0.015
With backup only With backup and UPS
Fig. 2.6. Failure frequency at Load point A vs % of the backup with and without UPS.
3.4 Effect of Breaker Failures on Reliability Indices
It was concluded in the previous section that the investment in the backup generation is not
justified in an ICDS supplied with high entrance reliability. The study in Section 3.2 showed that
the EENS and failure frequency at the load point, in fact, increased when backup generation was
added to the ICDS supplied with a low entrance failure rate of 2 failures/year. In such a case, both
these indices can be lowered by investing in CB with reduced active failure rates. A sensitivity
study was carried out by varying the CB active failure rates 30% above and below the original
values [4] used in the previous study. A stuck breaker probability of 3% was used in the previous
study. Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8 respectively show the impact of CB active failure rate on failure
frequency and EENS of Load Point A.
Figs. 2.7 and 2.8 respectively show that the failure frequency and EENS are notably
sensitive to the CB active failure rates, and therefore, both of these indices can be significantly
improved when investing in CB with reduced active failure rates. The above result implies that the
industrial/commercial customers supplied with high entrance reliability can invest in the better-
39
quality breakers for reliability improvement of their system when investment in the backup
generator does not further improve the reliability of their power supply.
0.030
0.029
0.028
0.027
0.026
30 20 10 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30
% change in active failure rate of breaker
Fig. 2.7. Impact of CB active failure rate on the load point failure frequency.
355
350
345
340
EENS (kWh/year)
335
330
325
320
315
310
305
300
30 20 10 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30
% change in active failure rate of breaker
Fig. 2.8. Impact of CB active failure rate on the load point EENS.
40
Another important CB failure event is the stuck breaker condition, which causes the
upstream CB to operate and thereby interrupting a larger number of load points. The impact of the
stuck breaker condition on the reliability of an ICDS was therefore also investigated in this work.
A sensitivity study was carried out by reducing the stuck probability from 3% to 0.5% for a system
with a service entrance failure rate of 2 failures/year. The CB active failure rates used in the
previous study [4] were used in this study to evaluate the EENS and failure frequency at Load
Point A.
Figs. 2.9 and 2.10 respectively show that the failure frequency and the EENS decrease
significantly when the stuck probability of the breaker is reduced. It can be concluded from these
results that the industrial/commercial customers supplied with high entrance reliability can obtain
significant reliability improvement by investing in reducing the stuck breaker probability. This can
be achieved by investing in proactive maintenance and testing of normally closed breakers and the
protection system as well as investing in the reliability upgrades of the protection system.
From the above studies, it is evident that the reliability of supply to the customer can be
improved by investing in CB with low active failure rates and low stuck probability. Another study
was carried out to investigate the relative reliability benefit from CB with low active failures and
low stuck breaker probability.
0.030
0.028
0.026
0.024
0.022
0.020
3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5%
Stuck breaker probability
Fig. 2.9. Impact of stuck breaker probability on the load point failure frequency.
41
332
330
EENS (kWh/year)
328
326
324
322
320
3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5%
Stuck breaker probability
Fig. 2.10. Impact of stuck breaker probability on the load point EENS.
The following cases were considered in this study:
Base Case: Considering the original CB active failure rates [4], and stuck breaker probability of
2%.
Case I: Reducing the CB active failure rate by 25% of their original values [4], and considering a
stuck breaker probability of 2% as in the Base Case.
Case II: Reducing the stuck probability by 25% from the Base Case, and considering original
values of CB active failure rates.
Case III: Reducing both the active failure rates and stuck probability by 25%.
Figs. 2.11 and 2.12 respectively show the failure frequency and the EENS at Load point A
for the four cases. The figures show that both the indices are reduced with a decrease in either the
active failure rate or the stuck breaker probability. A reduction in both the active failure rate and
stuck breaker probability simultaneously obviously yields in the highest reliability improvement as
shown by Figs. 2.11 and 2.12. It is interesting to note that the failure frequency is more sensitive
to the stuck breaker probability than to the active failure rate as shown in Fig. 2.11, and the EENS
is more sensitive to the active failure rate than to the stuck breaker probability as shown in Fig.
2.12. A stuck breaker condition causes interruptions of adjoining healthy branches and therefore
increases the frequency of outages at the load points. The failure frequency index is therefore very
42
sensitive to stuck breaker probability. This sensitivity is increased in meshed networks configured
with multiple branchings from a node. On the other hand, the EENS index increases proportionally
with the outage durations, and since the adjoining branches are only momentarily interrupted by the
stuck breaker condition, it is less sensitive to this index. In comparison, the outage durations due to
active breaker failures are relatively large, and therefore, EENS is more sensitive to active failures
than to stuck breaker probability. It should be noted that the results presented are specific to the
reliability data used, network configurations and assumptions made regarding backup generator,
switch-over time, breakers repair time and failure modes of the breaker. It can, however, be
concluded from this study that an ICDS customer with high-reliability needs can invest in the
protection systems and CBs to lower the stuck breaker probability, and also invest in CBs with low
active failure rates in order to meet acceptable system reliability. A reliability evaluation should be
done as illustrated with the examples in this section to determine the appropriate reliability upgrade
based on the particular network configuration, reliability needs, and the indices of importance to
the customer.
0.027
0.026
0.025
0.024
0.023
Base Case Case I Case II Case III
Cases
load point failure frequency.
43
335
330
EENS (kWh/yr)
325
320
315
310
Base Case Case I Case II Case III
Cases
load point EENS.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the reliability of an industrial/commercial distribution system to

provide useful inputs to reliability investment in such systems considering varying levels of
entrance service reliability. The paper presents an extension to established methodologies to
evaluate the load point and system reliability indices taking into account the distribution system
network design, the quality of its components, different levels of backup supply redundancy, and
the impact of using UPS to reduce standby supply startup times. The analysis from the case studies
using the IEEE Std 493-2007 test network suggests that the selection of reliability improvement
strategy in the industrial or commercial network is primarily dependent on the reliability of the
input supply to the customer network. The installation of backup generators in the network with
highly reliable service entrance is not justified due to the negative impact on the reliability added
by the active failure of breakers associated with the backup generator system. Further improvement
on the reliability of such a system can, however, be achieved by investing in high-quality circuit
breakers with reduced active failure rates and/or investment in a reliable protection system with
timely maintenance and testing to reduce the stuck probability. In a network supplied with poor
service entrance reliability, the investment on the backup generator system and UPS for reliability
44
improvement are preferred as this option results in significant reliability improvement. It should
be noted that the results presented in this paper are dependent on the input data. The methodology
and illustration presented in the paper should, however, help industrial/commercial distribution
customers to carry out similar studies using their own system data to make useful reliability
investment decisions. The insights from this paper can be valuable in evaluating reliability-based
upgrades in industrial and commercial distribution systems.
45
2.6 References
[1]. T. W. Diliberti, V. E. Wagner, J. P. Staniak, S. L. Sheppard and T. L. Orloff, "Power quality

requirements of a large industrial user: a case study," Conference on Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems, Detroit, MI, USA, 1990, pp. 1-4
[2]. M. J. Sullivan, T. Vardell and M. Johnson, "Power interruption costs to industrial and
commercial consumers of electricity," Proceedings of 1996 IAS Industrial and Commercial
Power Systems Technical Conference, New Orleans, LA, USA, 1996, pp. 23-35.
[3]. G. Dennis, "Electricity distribution systems in urban areas," in Power Engineering Journal,
vol. 2, no. 6, pp. 332-336, Nov. 1988.
[4]. IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power
Systems - Redline," in IEEE Std 493-2007 (Revision of IEEE Std 493-1997) - Redline ,
vol., no., pp.1-426, 25 June 2007
[5]. J. Dong, D. O. Koval and M. J. Zuo, "Impact of circuit breaker failure modes on the
reliability of the gold book standard network," in IEEE Transactions on Industry
Applications, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 1323-1328, Sept.-Oct. 2005.
[6]. D. O. Koval, Liang Jiao, R. G. Arno and P. S. Hale, "Zone-branch reliability methodology
applied to Gold Book standard network," in IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications,
vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 990-995, July-Aug. 2002.
[7]. J. E. Propst, D. O. Koval and Z. Dong, "An Update on the Spreadsheet Electrical Reliability
Model," in IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 1126-1138, May-
june 2009.
[8]. T. Coyle, R. G. Arno and P. S. Male, "GO-branch reliability methodology applied to gold
book standard network," IEEE Technical Conference Industrial and Commerical Power
Systems, Savannah, GA, USA, 2002, pp. 73-81.
[9]. D. O. Koval, Xinlie Zhang, J. Propst, T. Coyle, R. Arno and R. S. Hale, "Reliability
methods applied to The IEEE Gold Book Standard Network," in IEEE Industry Applications
Magazine, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 32-41, Jan.-Feb. 2003.
[10]. Wendai Wang, J. M. Loman, R. G. Arno, P. Vassiliou, E. R. Furlong and D. Ogden,
"Reliability block diagram simulation techniques applied to the IEEE Std. 493 standard
46
network," in IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 887-895, May-
June 2004.
[11]. S. Itakura, S. Niioka and R. Yokoyama, "On-site generator installation and maintenance
strategy for industrial plant electrical distribution circuit with reliability cost-worth
analysis," 2010 International Conference on Power System Technology, Hangzhou, 2010,
pp. 1-6.
[12]. R. Billinton and Hua Yang, "Incorporating maintenance outage effects in substation and
switching station reliability studies," Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer
Engineering, 2005., Saskatoon, Sask., 2005, pp. 599-602.
[13]. S. Babu, P. Hilber, E. Shayesteh and L. E. Enarsson, "Reliability Evaluation of Distribution
vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 2268-2275, May 2018.
[14]. R. Billinton and R. N. Allan, Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems,vol. 2, New York,
NY, USA: Plenum Press, 1984.
[15]. R. Billinton and R. N. Allan, Reliability evaluation of engineering systems: Concepts and
[16]. C. C. Thompson, P. S. Hale and R. G. Arno, "Decanting the Data: The Gold Book Presents
Equipment Reliability Refreshment," in IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, vol.
48, no. 2, pp. 772-776, March-April 2012.
47
A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO INCORPORATE CIRCUIT
BREAKER ACTIVE FAILURE IN RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
3.1 Abstract
The random failure of components in a distribution network leads to power supply

interruptions to electricity customers. Among different failure modes in the distribution network
components, active failure is more frequent and requires the circuit breaker operations to isolate
faulty segments. Active failure of a breaker causes the operation of a backup breaker, thus,
exposing the larger segment of the network to outages. This paper proposes a new analytical
methodology to identify breaker active failure events involving different order of contingencies.
This methodology introduces an active breaker incidence (ABI) matrix to capture the active failure
of breakers leading to load point failures. The ABI matrix is concatenated to the incidence matrix
of the minimal path to form a new incidence matrix which reflects the information of all failure
events including active failure of circuit 2breakers. These failure events are then utilized to evaluate
the reliability indices. The proposed methodology is illustrated in a test distribution network. A
study conducted on the IEEE Gold Book Standard Network shows that that the methodology
effectively identifies and includes breaker failure events to evaluate the reliability performance,
and that the proposed methodology can be utilized to make investment decisions in modern
industrial distribution systems.
3.2 Introduction
HE interruption of electric power supply incurs significant financial losses to commercial

and industrial customers served by a power distribution system. The power interruption originates
2
K. Timalsena, P. Piya, and R. Karki, “A Novel Methodology To Incorporate Circuit Breaker Active Failure In
Reliability Evaluation Of Electrical Distribution Networks,” submitted to IEEE Trans. on Power System (Under
review)
48
mainly due to random failures of different system components such as line section, protection
equipment, transformer, etc. The reliability assessment is done in the planning phase by the utilities
to make investment decisions to reduce financial losses and improve the reliability of the
distribution network. Industrial and commercial customers and critical load points such as military
facilities, health care facilities, and emergency services often invest in multiple feeder access,
standby backup, and uninterrupted power supply system to achieve a high degree of supply
reliability. Such reliability investment decisions require a precise assessment of reliability
parameters.
The failure of a component in an electrical system is broadly categorized as active (short
circuit) failure and passive (open circuit) failure. Both failures constitute the total failure of the
component. The active failures are more frequent in the case of electric distribution system
components [1], [2]. Moreover, a significant portion of failures in the power distribution system
arises from the failure of protection systems [2]. The mal-functioning of circuit breakers (CB) due
to cyber-physical and automation related component failures are modeled in [3]. The failure of the
protective devices can cause the isolation of a healthy section in addition to the faulty section,
leading to multiple feeder outages [4]. The statistical analysis of the surveyed data on circuit
breakers (CB) conducted in [5] shows that the active failure of CB is one of the major causes of
power interruptions. Authors in [6] explain the relationship between operating time, equipment
age, and maintenance with CB failure rates. Reference [7] proposed a methodology to identify the
reliability-life and failure probability of CB considering the subcomponent failure probabilities.
In [8], the reliability model of CB is developed by integrating the models of different parts of CB
derived from the statistical analysis of surveyed data. These recent works analyze reliability data
and models at the component level but do consider the impact of the CB failures on the overall
distribution system. Reference [9] provides an optimized medium voltage distribution system
design technique considering CB short circuit interrupting capabilities. References [10] quantify
the sustained and momentary interruptions in a distribution network considering breaker
operations. Reference [11] evaluates momentary outages and voltage sag considering breaker
events in active distribution systems equipped with intermittent renewable resources, energy
storage, and different protection settings and switching schemes. Different scenarios of distributed
energy resource ownership, market structures, micro-grid/islanding, and switching schemes are
considered in [12] to evaluate distribution system reliability. The breaker failure model developed
49
in [2] considers smart grid distribution architecture. The formulation for optimal placement of
protective devices including CB is considered in [13] to maximize the reliability and quality
benefits. A framework to incorporate different failure modes of ICT components in the IEC 61850
based next-generation protection system on the reliability performance of the modern distribution
grid is developed in [14]. With growing complexity in distribution system structure and high-
reliability needs, protective device related component failures are more pronounced in smart grid
and modern distribution systems [2][3][14]. These recent works consider circuit breakers in
reliability assessment of distribution systems with various objectives in modern distribution
systems but do not incorporate wide-spread reliability events originated from the active failure of
the breakers.
Reference [15] concludes that the selection of industrial circuit design should be based on
the reliability assessment considering the effect of breaker failures but doesn’t provide a
methodology to incorporate them in reliability studies. Reference [16] considers active breaker
failure in distribution system reliability using component failure simulation along with load flow
analysis. In fact, the reliability assessment modules of existing power system simulation software
tools such as PSSE, PSSINCAL, DigSilent, ETAP, etc. utilize state enumeration and simulation
techniques to evaluate reliability indices [17]-[20]. Most of these tools simulate the failure of each
component and carry out a load flow to determine if it results in a load-point outage, and only
consider first order active failures of breakers that lie in the minimal path. Simulating all the
combinations of higher-order contingencies in a practical system adds a huge computational
burden. Modern industrial/commercial customers demand high reliability in their supply and often
invest in adding system redundancies, such as multiple supply feeders, backup generator, and
alternate paths for load transfer. The purpose of investing in redundancy is to negate the effect of
the first-order contingencies. The reliability benefit of adopting these redundancies can only be
quantified by incorporating higher-order contingencies in the reliability evaluation techniques and
tools.
The IEEE Std 493-2007 provides guidelines for the design of reliable industrial and
commercial power distribution systems [21] and presents benchmark reliability studies on a test
system using various analytical techniques such as minimal cut-set, zone-branch methodology,
reliability block diagram, event tree, and spreadsheet methodology. The minimal cut-set approach
is widely preferred in distribution system reliability evaluation as it helps to identify vulnerable
50
parts of the system and is computationally efficient. Identifying the desired order of all the minimal
cut-sets is the main challenge in this method. They are identified using visual inspection in [22].
This approach is not possible in large distribution networks employing multiple switching/routing
paths for load transfers. A generalized connection/incidence matrix method was developed in [23]
that can efficiently identify the desired order of minimal cut-sets of a large network. A node tracing
method is used in [24] to identify the breaker active failure events. These methods, however, do
not incorporate active failures of CB that lie outside the minimal path between the supply node
and the load point. All breaker active failures should be incorporated in the evaluation method as
they cause wide-spread outages and significant impact on the system reliability indices.
This paper develops a generalized methodology to identify all the minimal cut-sets
associated with active breaker failures. The proposed algorithm recognizes the relative position of
all the breakers that lie outside the minimal paths between the input and output nodes and identifies
the ones that will impact the output node in the event of their active failures. This methodology
introduces a new incidence matrix, designated as the active breaker incidence (ABI) matrix, to
represent the active failure of CB located outside the minimal paths. The active failure of the set
of breakers in the ABI matrix causes load point interruptions due to the tripping of backup breakers
that lie in the minimal path. The information related to protection coordination is embedded in the
connection matrix which is used to determine the sequence of operation of protection devices in
response to a contingency. The ABI matrix is concatenated to the incidence matrix obtained from
the minimal cut-set method [23] to form a new incidence matrix designated as modified incidence
matrix. The failure events including breaker active failures are identified from the modified
incidence matrix. Using these failure events, the reliability indices such as failure frequency (λ),
unavailability (U), and customer interruption cost (ECOST) can be evaluated. The developed
methodology is readily applicable to any type of industrial/commercial distribution system and
utility distribution system networks and can be easily implemented in existing power system
software that already uses the graphical representation of power networks. This feature of the
proposed algorithm has significant importance in the development of the IEEE 493-2007-
compliant reliability evaluation tools. The major contributions of the paper are summarized as:
 To develop a generalized methodology to identify the active failures of CB in large
distribution networks using a graphical search algorithm in a matrix method
 To integrate the new method into an existing matrix method to obtain the desired order of
51
minimal cut-sets including those from active CB failures
 To illustrate the application of the extended minimal cut-set method to assess the impact
of active breaker failures on the reliability indices of an industrial distribution system
 To illustrate the utility of the developed methodology in making reliability investment
decisions presenting case studies on a test system
3.3 Methodology
The proposed methodology uses the minimal cut-set method in a generalized analytical
algorithm employing matrix operations that can be systematically programmed in a computer to
obtain the load point interruption events. The methodology is shown in Fig. 3.1. The details of
each step are explained with the help of a small test distribution network shown in Fig. 3.2. The
nomenclature C, Z, B, F, L and T in Fig. 3.2 represent circuit breaker, line section, bus-bar, fuse,
line supply, and transformer respectively.
Fig. 3.1. Flowchart to evaluate the reliability considering active failure events.
52
Step 1- Create the nodal diagram and connection matrix: An electrical network can be
represented by a nodal diagram as shown in Fig. 3.2. Each component is placed between two
nodes, except for the bus bar, which can be placed between multiple nodes depending on the
number of branches connected to the bus bar. A connection matrix [23] is created from the nodal
diagram of the network to recognize the power flow through a component between adjacent nodes.
It is a square matrix, and its order is equal to the number of components in the network. Table 3.1
shows the connection matrix of the test distribution system. Each element (x,y) of the matrix is a
component that transfers power from Node x to Node y. For example, (8,22) in Table 1 indicates
that power flows from Node 8 to Node 22 through Busbar B3. The direction of power flow is also
considered. Since there is no power flow from Node 22 to Node 8, the element (22,8) is zero. An
element between nodes that are not connected by a power flow is equal to 0. A diagonal element
represents the same node and is equal to 1.
1 14
L1 L2
2 15
C3
C1 C2
3 12 13 16
B1 B2
9 17
4
F1 C5 C6
10 5 18
C4
Z1 Z2
6 19
11 T2
T1
20
7
C7 C8
8 21
B3
22
C9
23
Fig.3.2. A test distribution network.
53
Table 3.1. Connection matrix of test distribution network.
Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 1 L1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 C1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 B1 0 0 0 0 B1 0 0 B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 C5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 Z1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B3 B3 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 B1 0 0 0 0 B1 0 0 1 C3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 B2 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 L2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B2 0 0 1 B2 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C6 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Z2 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 T2 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C8 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 B3 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C9
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Step 2- Create a path matrix corresponding to each minimal path: All the minimal paths
between input supply nodes and the output load-point node of interest are determined based on the
path tracing methodology described in [25]. In this method, each element of the connection matrix
is assigned a unique branch number, and stored in an array. The destination information of each
branch is used to identify its parent branch. The search for consecutive parent branch starts from
the output node until the input supply node is encountered to obtain the minimal paths. For the
given test network, input nodes are 1 and 14 and the load point of interest is Node 23.
The minimal paths identified for the test network are:
Path1 = {L1,C1,B1,C5,Z1,T1,C7,B3,C9}
Path2 = {L1,C1,B1,C3,B2,C6,Z2,T2,C8,B3,C9}
Path3 = {L2,C2,B2,C3,B1,C5,Z1,T1,C7,B3,C9}
Path4 = {L2,C2,B2,C6,Z2,T2,C7,B3,C9}
The components in each path along with their row and column position in the connection matrix
are then stored in a path matrix, P_M. The first two rows represent the row position and the column
position in the connection matrix respectively of the component in the third row.
The path matrix associated with Path1 is given by 𝑃𝑀1 .
54
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22
𝑃𝑀1 = [ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22 23]
L1 C1 B1 C5 Z1 T1 𝐶7 B3 C9
Step 3- Create breaker active failure set: A set of circuit breakers, whose active failure cause the
failure of a minimal path, is identified for each minimal path. This set of circuit breakers is named
as a breaker active failure set, 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝐹 . At first, a path matrix corresponding to a minimal path is
selected. For each component of the path matrix, the location of the component in the connection
matrix is retrieved as a row position 𝒙 and a column position 𝒚. Then, all components present in
𝒙𝒕𝒉 and 𝒚th row and 𝒙𝒕𝒉 and 𝒚th column of the connection matrix along with their position is
stored in a temporary matrix, 𝑪𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐩 . If the component of 𝑪𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐩 is a circuit breaker, it is added to
the breaker active failure set because the active failure of this circuit breaker will cause the failure
of the selected minimal path. If the component of 𝐶temp is not present in the path matrix, then the
component is appended to the path matrix to check for a presence of a circuit breaker connected
to this component. This process is repeated for all minimal paths and a breaker active failure set
corresponding to each minimal path is obtained. The method to identify the breaker active failure
set is shown in Fig. 3.3.
𝑃𝑀1 associated with Path1 is selected. For the first component of 𝑃𝑀1 , 𝐿1, 𝑥 = 1 (row
position of L1 in connection matrix) and 𝑦 = 2 (column position of L1 in the connection matrix).
Then,
1 2
𝑪𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑 = [ 2 3]
𝐿1 𝐶1
Since, [1 2 𝐿1]𝑇 ∈ 𝑃𝑀1 , it is neglected. The second component of 𝑪𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑 , 𝐶1 is a breaker
and is added to the breaker active failure set. i.e CBAF (Path1) = {𝐶1}. Similarly, for the second
component of 𝑃𝑀1 , 𝐶1, 𝑥 = 2 and 𝑦 = 3. Thus, the temporary matrix for the second component
of 𝑃𝑀1 can be as:
2 3 3 3
𝑪𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒑 =[3 4 9 12 ]
𝐶1 𝐵1 𝐵1 𝐵1
55
Fig. 3.1. Flowchart to identify breaker active failure set.
56
Among four components in 𝐶𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 , 𝐶1 is already in breaker active failure set. [3 4 𝐵1]𝑇 ∈ 𝑃𝑀1 , so
it can be neglected. 𝐵1 at position (3,9), and (3,12) are unique to 𝑃𝑀1 so they are appended to
𝑃𝑀1 . The new path matrix 𝑃𝑀1 is:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22 𝟑 𝟑
𝑃𝑀1 =[2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22 23 𝟗 𝟏𝟐 ]
L1 C1 B1 C5 Z1 T1 𝐶7 B3 C9 𝐁𝟏 𝐁𝟏
This process is repeated for all components of the 𝑃𝑀1 including all the appended components.
The breaker active failure set
obtained for the selected minimal path is
CBAF (Path1) = {𝐶1, 𝐶5, 𝐶7, 𝐶9, 𝐶3, 𝐶8}
Among the breakers in CB_AF (Path 1), C1, C5, C7, and C9 are in the minimal Path 1. The
active or passive failure of these breakers cause the failure of the minimal path. Breakers C3, and
C8 do not lie in the minimal Path 1, and only the active failure of these breakers cause the failure
of the minimal path.
Similarly, breaker active failure set is identified for other minimal paths which are given as
CBAF (Path2) = {𝐶1, 𝐶3, 𝐶6, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶5, 𝐶2, 𝐶7}
CBAF (Path3) = {𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶5, 𝐶7, 𝐶9, 𝐶6, 𝐶1, 𝐶8}
CBAF (Path4) = {𝐶2, 𝐶6, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶3, 𝐶7}
Step 4- Create the modified incidence matrix: An incidence matrix (𝐼𝐴 ) that identifies all the
components of the minimal paths is formed. ABI matrix (𝐼𝐵 ) that identifies all breakers in breaker
active failure set, 𝐶𝐵𝐴𝐹 corresponding to each minimal path is constructed. Then these two
incidence matrices are concatenated to form a new modified incidence matrix (𝐼𝑀 = [𝐼𝐴 𝐼𝐵 ]). In
𝐼𝑀 , Cx(P) and Cx(A) represents the passive and active failure of circuit breaker Cx. For the given
test network, 𝐼𝐴 , 𝐼𝐵 , and 𝐼𝑀 are given as
L1 C1 B1 C5 Z1 T1 C7 B3 C9 C3 L2 C2 B2 C6 Z2 T2 C8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝐼𝐴 = 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
57
C1 (A) C2 (A) C3 (A) C5 (A) C6 (A) C7 (A) C8 (A) C9 (A)
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
𝐼𝐵 = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
L1 C1 B1 C5 Z1 T1 C7 B3 C9 C3 L2 C2 B2 C6 Z2 T2 C8 C1 C2 C3 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
(P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (A) (A) (A) (A) (A) (A) (A) (A)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
=
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Step 5- Find all failure events including breaker active failure events: All the failure events
are identified based on the modified incidence matrix, 𝐼𝑀 . Only passive failure (𝑃) is considered
for circuit breakers present in the minimal path since active failure (𝐴) is considered with a breaker
active failure set.
If any column of the modified incidence matrix has all non-zero elements, then the
corresponding component is a first-order failure event. If the logical “OR” combination of any two
columns of the modified incidence matrix has all non-zero elements, then the set of corresponding
components is second-order failure events. Similarly, higher-order failure events can be evaluated
from the modified incidence matrix. Only minimal failure events are considered. The failure events
obtained include all the failure events given by the cut-set methodology of [1], Error! Reference
source not found., Error! Reference source not found. as well as the breaker active failure
events.
Based on the modified incidence matrix, column B3, C9(P), C3(A), C7(A), C8(A) and
C9(A) of 𝐼𝑀 have all non-zero elements. The component B3, active failure of breakers C3, C7, C8,
and total failure of breaker C9 contribute to the first order failure events for the load point at node
21. First-order cut-sets, 𝑂1 , identified from 𝐼𝑀 are
𝑂1 = {B2, C9(A + P), C3(A), C7(A), C8(A)}.
C3(A), C7(A) and C8(A) are the additional first-order failure events which are breaker active
failure events identified from the proposed methodology.
58
The second-order failure events identified from 𝐼𝑀 are:
𝑂2 ={(L1,B2), (L1,L2), (L1,C2), (C1,B2), (C1,L2), (C1,C2), (B1,B2), (B1,C6), (B1,Z2), (B1,T2),
(B1,L2), (B1,C2), (B1,C8(P)), (C5,B2), (C5,C6), (C5,Z2), (C5,T2), (C5,C8(P)), (Z1,B2),(Z1,C6),
(Z1,Z2), (Z1,T2), (Z1,C8(P)), (T1,B2), (T1,C6), (T1,Z2), (T1,T2), (T1,C8(P)), (C7(P),C8(P)),
(C1(A),C6), (C1(A),Z2), (C1(A),T2), (C1(A),C8(P)), (C5(A),L2), (C5(A),C2), (C5(A),B2),
(C5(A),C8(P)), (C2(A),C5), (C2(A),Z1), (C2(A),T1), (C1(A),C7(P)), (C6(A),L1), (C6(A),C1),
(C6(A),B1), (C6(A),C7(P))}
The second-order failure events consisting of at least one active failure of breaker are the
additional failure events identified from the proposed methodology. Similarly, higher-order failure
events can be identified from 𝐼𝑀 using the proposed methodology.
Step 6- Evaluate reliability indices: The reliability indices such as failure rate (λ), and customer
interruption cost (ECOST) are evaluated using (3.1) - (3.3) based on the failure events identified
from the modified incidence matrix.
𝜆𝑖 = (∑𝑓 𝜆𝑓 + ∑𝑠 𝜆𝑠 + ∑𝑡 𝜆𝑡 + ⋯ )(𝑓/𝑦𝑟) (3.1)
where 𝑓 ∈ 𝑂1 , 𝑠 ∈ 𝑂2 , 𝑡 ∈ 𝑂3 … and 𝑂𝑥 is the set of failure events of order 𝑥 for a load

point i. 𝜆𝑥 is the failure rate due to 𝑥 th order failure event which is evaluated using approximate
equations [1].
𝑈𝑖 = (∑𝑓 𝜆𝑓 ∗ 𝑟𝑓 + ∑𝑠 𝜆𝑠 ∗ 𝑟𝑠 + ∑𝑡 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝑟𝑡 + ⋯ )(ℎ𝑟𝑠/𝑦𝑟) (3.2)
ECOST = (∑𝑓 𝜆𝑓 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑓 ∗ 𝑙𝑖 + ∑𝑠 𝜆𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑠 ∗ 𝑙𝑖

+ ∑𝑡 𝜆𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑖 + ⋯ ) ($/𝑦𝑟) (3.3)
where 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑥 is the customer damage function for the average outage duration 𝑟𝑥 . 𝑟𝑥 is the
average outage duration due to a failure event for a load point i of order 𝑥 which is evaluated using
approximate equations [2], and 𝑙𝑖 is the average load at the load point 𝑖.
3.4 Illustration of the Proposed Methodology on a Test Network
The application of the proposed methodology is illustrated on the IEEE Gold Book
Network [21], which is a typical distribution network of an industrial customer. The network
contains two independent utility supplies, a standby back up system, and multiple switching
59
arrangements. The network is shown in Fig. 3.4, and its details are available in [21]. In Fig. 3.4,
U1 and U2 are identical independent utility supplies and U3 is an equivalent model of standby
backup generators. The loads include major load points at A and B, lighting bus, non-critical bus
and auxiliaries such as cooling tower, pump and air handler. The average load assumed at different
load points of the network is shown in Table 3.2.
Utility supply Utility supply

U1 Standby Backup with UPS U2
A2 B2
M U3
A4 B4
F8
A5 B5
C10
C2 D2
A7 E8 B7
D8
A26 A6 B6 B26
A8
A9 B9
B8 C8
A10 B10
A11 C9 D9
E9
A15 F9 B11
A16 A14 B15
A12 B12 B16
C16 D10 E10
A13 D16 B13
C13 D13 E13 F13 G13 H13
Lighting A Cooling Air Pump Cooling B Non Critical
tower Air Pump
Bus tower Handler Handler Bus
Fig. 3.2. IEEE Goldbook standard network.
All the minimal paths were identified for the load points using the developed methodology.
For example, the following 10 minimal paths were identified for the auxiliary loads connected to
Bus 10:
60
Path1 = {U1,A2,A4, A5, C2, A7, A26, A9, A10, A8, B10, E9, B15, B12, E10, A14, D10, E13}
Path2 = {U1, A2, A4, A5, C2, A7, A26, A9, A10, D9, A15, A12, D10, E13}
Path3 = {U1, A2, A4, A5, C2, A7, A26, A9, A10, B8, A6, D8, C10, E8, B6, C8, B10, E9, B15,
B12, E10, A14, D10, E13}
Path4 = {U2, B2, B4, B5, D2, B7, B26, B9, B10, A8, A10, D9, A15, A12, D10, E13}
Path5 = {U2, B2, B4, B5, D2, B7, B26, B9, B10, E9, B15, B12, E10, A14, D10, E13}
Path6 = {U2, B2, B4, B5, D2, B7, B26, B9, B10, C8, B6, E8, C10, D8, A6, B8, A10, D9, A15,
A12, D10, E13}
Path7 = {U3, F8, C10, D8, A6, B8, A10, A8, B10, E9, B15, B12, E10, A14, D10, E13}
Path8 = {U3, F8, C10, D8, A6, B8, A10, D9, A15, A12, D10, E13}
Path9 = {U3, F8, C10, E8, B6, C8, B10, A8, A10, D9, A15, A12, D10, E13}
Path10 = {U3, F8, C10, E8, B6, C8, B10, E9, B15, B12, E10, A14, D10, E13}
The breaker active failure sets corresponding to each path are identified using the proposed
methodology and are given as:
CBAF (Path1) = {A9, A8, E9, B12, A14, E13, A11, C9, D9, B8, B11, F9, B9, C8, F13,
G13, H13, C13, D13, A12}
CBAF (Path2) = {A9, D9, A12, E13, A8, A11, C9, B8, A14, C13, D13}
CBAF (Path3) = {A9, B8, D8, E8, C8, E9, B12, A14, E13, A8, A11, C9, D9, F8, B9, B11,
F9, F13, G13, H13, C13, D13, A12}
CBAF (Path4) = {B9, A8, D9, A12, E13, B11, F9, E9, C8, A11, C9, A9, B8, A14, C13,
D13}
CBAF (Path5) = {B9, E9, B12, A14, E13, A8, B11, F9, C8, F13, G13, H13, C13, D13,
A12}
CBAF (Path6) = {B9, C8, E8, D8, B8, D9, A12, E13, A8, F9, B11, E9, F8, A11, C9, A9,
A14, C13, D13}
CBAF (Path7) = {F8, D8, B8, A8, E9, B12, A14, E13, E8, A11, C9, D9, A9, B11, F9, B9,
C8, F13, G13, H13, C13, D13, A12}
CBAF (Path8) = {F8, D8, B8, D9, A12, E13, E8, A8, A11, C9, A9, A14, C13, D13}
61
CBAF (Path9) = {F8, E8, C8, A8, D9, A12, E13, D8, B9, F9, B11, E9, A11, C9, A9, B8,
A14, C13, D13}
CBAF (Path10) = {F8, E8, C8, E9, B12, A14, E13, D8, B9, A8, B11, F9, F13, G13, H13,
C13, D13, A12}
Table 3.2. Load point and estimated average load demand.
S.N Load Point Average Load (kW)

1 A 810.0
2 B 810.0
3 Lighting Bus 202.5
4 Non-Critical Bus 202.5
5 Cooling Tower 135.0
6 Pump 135.0
7 Air Handler 135.0
The modified incidence matrix, 𝐼𝑀 is then formed, and the failure events identified. The
first-order active failure of CB located outside the minimal paths that were identified by the
proposed method are {A8(A), A12(A), C13(A), D13(A), A14(A)}. The total set of first-order
minimal cut-sets is {D10, E13(A+P), A8(A), A12(A), C13(A), D13(A), A14(A)}. Higher order
minimal cut-sets are not shown here, but there are 90 second-order minimal cut-sets out of which
60 are the additional events from active breaker failures derived from the modified incidence
matrix.
Similarly, the minimal cut-sets are identified for all the load points and used to evaluate
the reliability indices using the component and failure data provided by IEEE Std 493-2007 [21]
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Power Reliability Enhancement Program (PREP)[26]. A
switching time of 30 minutes is assumed to isolate the faulty breaker and reinstate service from
alternate paths. It should be noted that such switching time is dependent on the maintenance
practice, availability of resources, availability of circuit breaker switching facility, etc. The failure
events up to third order were considered in the evaluation to capture all the failure events in the
test network. It should be noted that increasing the order of the minimal cut-sets will increase the
62
accuracy in the results, but will significantly increase the computation time. The failure frequency
(λ) and unavailability (U) at the different load points were evaluated using (3.1) -(3.3).
The reliability results in Table 3-27 of the Gold Book [21] can be used as the benchmark
to compare the output of the proposed method. The failure frequency of the major load points at
A and B in [21] is 0.021640 f/yr. This is very close to 0.021645 f/yr obtained from the proposed
method. A comparison of the unavailability index with the IEEE Gold Book was not feasible due
to the lack of information regarding the average outage duration for the different failure events.
Table 3.3 shows that reliability results from the proposed method, and the results obtained
from the conventional minimal cut-set method that does not incorporate the active failure of
breakers located outside the minimal path.
Table 3.3. Failure rate and unavailability at different load points.
Conventional Proposed Monte-Carlo

Load Point 𝝀 U 𝝀 U 𝝀 U
(𝐟/𝐲𝐫) (𝒉𝒓/𝒚𝒓) (𝐟/𝐲𝐫) (𝒉𝒓/𝒚𝒓) (𝐟/𝐲𝐫) (𝒉𝒓/𝒚𝒓)
A and B 0.0142 0.0997 0.0216 0.1035 0.0211 0.1007
Lighting 0.0163 0.1154 0.0246 0.1196 0.0240 0.1157
Auxiliary 0.0147 0.0993 0.0292 0.1066 0.0291 0.1152
A comparison of the two results shows that the active failures of circuit breakers, which
are not considered in the conventional cut-set methodology, have a significant impact on the
reliability indices. The failure frequency of the major load points (A & B) of the distribution
facility evaluated from the proposed methodology is 0.0216 which is 53% higher than that
evaluated from the conventional cut-set methodology. The failure frequency and unavailability of
other load points evaluated using the proposed methodology are higher than those evaluated from
the conventional methodology. Since the active failures of circuit failures have a significant impact
on the reliability indices, specifically the frequency indices, they should be included in the
reliability evaluation of distribution systems. A sequential Monte-Carlo simulation program was
developed for the test network to validate the results obtained from the proposed method. The
simulation was run for 1,000,000 sample years. A DC load flow was run to determine if each
component(s) failure event resulted in load point interruptions. The failure frequency and
unavailability indices from the Monte-Carlo simulation are compared with those obtained from
63
the proposed analytical techniques in Table 3.3. It can be seen that the results are very close for all
the load points.
The circuit breaker active failure events identified from the proposed methodology
originate from the breaker connected to other load points, redundant paths, and circuit branches. It
can be concluded that the reliability indices evaluated without considering the active failure events
of the breaker gives an inaccurate representation of the reliability of the system.
3.5 Application in Reliability Studies for Investment Decisions
This section illustrates the application of the proposed methodology to compare different
reliability investment options in a modern industrial and commercial distribution network. A
typical industrial distribution network is shown in Fig. 3.5 is used as a base case study. The
component reliability data provided by the IEEE Gold book [21] are used for the reliability analysis
of the chosen network. Three different options are considered to improve the supply reliability of
the network.
The installation of backup generation is a common investment option, and is considered as
Option 2 in the case study. Since modern industrial/commercial distribution systems employ a
large number of circuit breakers to allow redundant paths for load transfer, investment in highly
reliable circuit breakers may be a promising investment option. Option 1 considers replacing all
the circuit breakers with new ones that have 50% less active failure rate. Option 3 considers
combining Options 1 and 2.
The λ and U indices for load point A, and the system ECOST index were evaluated for
the above cases using (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) respectively. The customer damage function values for
the industrial customers obtained from a Canadian survey [1] are utilized in obtaining the ECOST
index as shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4. Customer damage function for an industrial customer.
Outage Time 1 min 20 min 1 hr 4 hr 8 hr
$/kW 1.625 3.868 9.085 25.163 55.808
64
U1 U2
A2 B2
A4 B4
A5 B5
C2 D2
A7 B7
A26 B26
A8
A9 B9
A10 B10
A11 C9 D9
E9
A15 F9 B11
A16 A14 B15
A12 B12 B16
C16 D10 E10
A13 D16 B13
C13 D13 E13 F13 G13 H13
Air Pump
tower Handler
Bus tower Handler Bus
Fig. 3.5. A typical modern industrial and commercial distribution network.
Fig. 3.6 and 3.7 respectively show λ and U for load point A. Fig. 3.8 shows the system
ECOST values. The values for λ , U and ECOST are significantly lower for Option 1 than for the
Base Case. This indicates that the system reliability, in terms of frequency and unavailability
indices, is improved by upgrading the breakers and results in reduced outage costs. Investment in
backup generation in Option 2, however results in increased failure frequency compared to the
Base case, even though the unavailability index is reduced.
65
0.022
0.021
0.020
Failure rate (f/yr)
0.019
0.018
0.017
0.016
0.015
Base Case Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Fig. 3.6. The failure rate of load point ‘A’ for different options.
0.1050
0.1045
0.1040
Unavailability (hrs/yr)
0.1035
0.1030
0.1025
0.1020
0.1015
0.1010
0.1005
0.1000
Fig. 3.7. The unavailability of load point ‘A’ for different options.
66
2250
Customer Interruption Cost ($/yr)
2200
2150
2100
2050
2000
1950
Fig. 3.8. The customer interruption cost for different options.
Fig. 3.6 shows that investing in circuit breakers with reduced failure rates is the better
option than that the other two if the customer operation is sensitive to failure frequency. Certain
industrial processes are highly sensitive to the frequency index, and even short outage duration can
interrupt their processes and lead to long downtimes. Investing in the backup generation will
further degrade the frequency index due to the addition of breakers to facilitate switching and load
transfer actions. But the cost of investment should be compared against the incremental benefit in
reliability to make the investment decision. Fig. 3.8 shows that Option 3 results in the lowest
outage costs followed by Option 1. The investment cost should be compared with the outage cost
to make a value-based reliability investment. However, the annual outage costs in this example are
very low since the total power demand of the test system is only 2.8 MW, whereas, typical
industrial customers can have much higher demand, and therefore, result in a very high annual
outage costs. The detailed cost analysis for the different options is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the objective of the studies presented in this section is to illustrate how the proposed
method can be used to analyze different options for reliability-based investment decisions in
industrial and commercial distribution system upgrades. Moreover, the studies presented also
provide a new opportunity for breaker manufacturers to improve the reliability of their products
for distribution systems with high-reliability needs.
67
3.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a generalized analytical methodology using a graphical search

algorithm and a new matrix approach to identify breaker active failure events in power distribution
networks. The active breaker incidence matrix is first developed and concatenated with the
incidence matrix of minimal paths to create a modified incidence matrix which accounts for all the
active failures of circuit breakers in the system. The proposed methodology is computationally
efficient and can identify all the minimal cut-sets to any desired order in large distribution networks
employing numerous circuit breakers and redundant paths. The proposed methodology is applied
to the IEEE Gold Book network to identify the failure events and evaluate the reliability indices at
the load points. The results show that active failures of circuit breakers have a considerable impact
on the indices, specifically the frequency index is observed to increase significantly. The paper
also presents different case studies to illustrate the utility of the proposed methodology in
reliability investment decisions. The study shows that industrial and commercial distribution
systems with reliable and redundant input supplies enjoy significant reliability benefits from
investment in high-quality circuit breakers with reduced active failure rates. The results show that
the investment in backup generation in these systems can result in increased failure frequency at
the load points, and can be counter-productive in industrial processes sensitive to failure frequency.
The proposed method can also be used to quantify the impact of breaker active failures on the
customer outage costs as illustrated, and then be used in value-based reliability planning. The
methodology and case studies presented in this paper offer valuable inputs for industries to conduct
the reliability studies and make a reliability-based investment decision regarding
replacement/maintenance of breakers, protection system upgrades, and addition of supply
redundancy.
68
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71
A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO INCORPORATE STUCK
CONDITION OF CIRCUIT BREAKER IN RELIABILITY EVALUATION
OF ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
4.1 Abstract3
The random failure of a circuit breaker (CB) in a power distribution network adversely
impacts its ability to maintain supply continuity to its electricity customers. Among different CB
failure modes, the failure to open or the stuck condition, of a normally closed CB causes the
operation of its backup breaker(s) leading to outages of multiple healthy feeders. Stuck condition
is a low probability failure event, but has wide-spread consequences when it occurs. This paper
proposes a generalized analytical methodology to identify the failure events due to the stuck
breaker condition. The complexity of the reliability evaluation of a modern distribution system
involving multiple switching arrangement is achieved through a search algorithm and repeated
matrix operations that can readily be implemented in a computer program. The methodology is
illustrated using a test distribution network. The usefulness of the methodology is demonstrated
by quantifying the impact of the stuck breaker condition on load point and system reliability
indices. The developed methodology can be a useful tool for industrial/commercial customers and
utilities to incorporate the impact of breaker failures, including stuck breaker conditions, and make
wise investment decisions in the upgrade and maintenance of the distribution network components
and the protection system.
4.2 Introduction
Many commercial and industrial customers such as hospitals, malls, militaries, data-
centers, mining industries, etc. require high reliability of power supply to ensure the proper
3
K. Timalsena, R. Karki, S. Bhattarai,”A Novel Methodology to Incorporate Stuck Condition of Circuit Breaker in
Reliability Evaluation of Electrical Distribution Networks,” submitted to IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution
(Under Review)
72
functioning of their sensitive equipment and processes. Even a short interruption of power supply
to these customers can result in significant economic losses. A highly reliable generation and
transmission system are still not sufficient to avoid customer outages because most of the customer
interruptions arise from the failure of the distribution system. Therefore, power utilities, as well as
customers, have been exploring several alternatives to ensure that the reliability of the power
distribution system is adequate. The reliability of a distribution system depends on several factors
such as distribution network structure, switching arrangements and the reliability of its components
and accessory equipment. The evaluation of system reliability requires adequate recognition of
the failure events and a quantitative assessment of the failure impacts. The failure events in the
power distribution system generally originate from the failure of components or failure of
processes, or supply inadequacy from the upstream network. Reliability studies of distribution
systems require accurate modeling of all the components and processes involved.
A circuit breaker (CB) is a widely used protection device in a power distribution system,
which contains several sub-components such as control circuit, interrupter, drive mechanism,
insulation, and ancillary equipment [1]. The operation mechanism and the failure and repair
process of CB need to be accurately modeled in reliability studies. Unlike other power system
components, CB cannot be adequately represented by a simple 2-state Markov model consisting
of the operating (up) state and the failure (down) state [2]. The relatively complex switching
behavior of a CB is generally represented by the following states [2]:
i. Operates successfully in the closed state
ii. Opens successfully when required to do so
iii. Fails to close when required
iv. Opens when not requested or required
v. Suffers an open circuit
vi. Suffers a short circuit and
vii. Fails to open when required (stuck breaker condition)
States (i) and (ii) are the successfully operating states, whereas States (iii)-(vii) are the
failure states. The failure mechanism of each failure state can be unique, and the repair process to
bring the CB back to a successful state can also be different. States (iii) - (v) only affect the feeder
or line section at which the breaker is connected to but the States (vi) and (vii) may activate the
73
backup breaker which results in the outage of additional healthy feeder and sections. Therefore,
the CB operating states and their effects need to be accurately modeled in reliability studies.
Established methodologies are available to model the failure States (iii)-(vi) in reliability
studies [2]-[8]. However, the generalized methodology to incorporate the effect of State (vii), i.e
the stuck breaker condition is not available. If a CB is stuck during a short-circuit failure of a
component in its protection zone, the backup breaker(s) operate to isolate the fault which can cause
the outage of a greater portion of the system [2]. In addition, the stuck breaker condition can
increase the fault clearing time due to the delay time of the back-up breaker operation. This will
result in increased duration and frequency of power outages in a wider portion of the distribution
network. The survey [9] conducted by the Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) in various
electric utilities shows that the stuck breaker condition constitutes a major portion of breaker
failure conditions.
A CB employed in a distribution system can be in a normally closed or normally open
position according to their designed function. The stuck breaker condition is an operational failure
that only occurs in normally closed breakers. Due to the complex combination of components and
signals for the successful operation of a normally closed breaker, it might be stuck due to a number
of reasons. Parameters such as a change in functional characteristics (opening and closing time of
CB contacts, lockout pressure, automatic function, and pole discrepancies), leakage in oil or gas
from the operating mechanism, etc. are major causes for stuck breaker condition [3]. Stuck
breakers can be either failure to trip or failure to clear [10]. Mechanical failures and issues with
trip coils are mostly responsible for failure to trip whereas loss of dielectric media and issues with
breaker arms are mostly responsible for failure to clear [10]. Unrevealed faults due to any failure
in a dormant state which do not evident itself until the operating request is also responsible for
breaker stuck condition [11]. Similarly, incorrect manipulation from the control equipment,
missing communication, lack of situational awareness of human operations and other reasons are
also responsible for stuck breaker conditions that may be unaccounted during the design process
[13]. Any unrevealed fault with the current interruption media such as oil, air, SF6, etc. or
operating mechanisms such as energy storage devices and system or monitoring equipment can
also cause the stuck breaker condition [1],[14]. The breaker might stay at a stuck condition due to
the lack of some critical parameters or alarm activated to warn of impending the lack of basic
function [10], [15].
74
A smart protection system employed in a modern distribution system has an increased
number of electrical components due to addition of merging unit, ethernet switch, smart terminals,
communicative media, protection relays, time source, etc. and the unavailability of one or more
component can cause the failure of the entire protection system [3]. The protection components in
modern smart substations are subjected to the information flow fluctuations, increasing data
transmission delays, degraded network throughput, etc., and therefore, the different component
used in a protection system must be represented by a unique representative state depending upon
the status of communication facility [4]. Unrevealed fault in smart substation components such as
MU, process bus, IED at a process level, bay level or station level is responsible for mal-operation
or non-operation of CB [5]. The failure of the communication system/component can cause the
CB to fail to trip conditions [4]. The false signal developed by a protection system is normally
responsible for Inadvertent opening state and Fails to open when required state [14] [15].
The effect of the stuck breaker condition on distribution system reliability evolution is
considered in a few works of literature [2]-[8]. IEEE standard 493-2007 [6] has recognized the
stuck condition as one of the failure modes of a CB but does not provide a methodology to
incorporate them in reliability evaluation. The impact of different modes of CB failure is illustrated
in [7]. The load point failure events arising from the stuck breaker condition are identified by
simulating the network with active failure of each individual component along with the stuck
failure of a breaker in [2]. Reference [8] converts the electrical network into protection zones, and
the stuck breaker condition is identified by combining the failure of non-boundary components
with the breaker designed to protect the failed segment.
Existing software tools available for reliability evaluation of distribution systems, such as
PSS®SINCAL, DIgSILENT, etap, Easypower do not consider all the failure events due to stuck
breaker conditions [16]-[19]. The established reliability assessment techniques utilized in software
tools, and methods proposed in the existing literature, such as the state enumeration, Markov
model, Monte-Carlo simulation, and failure mode and effect analysis cannot easily incorporate the
stuck breaker conditions and their effects due to an increase in computational burden and size of
analysis space. Therefore, there is a need to develop a general analytical methodology that can
incorporate failure events due to stuck breaker conditions in the reliability assessment framework
and that can be systematically implemented in a computer program.
75
In this regard, this paper presents a generalized analytical methodology to identify failure
events due to stuck breaker conditions. This methodology introduces a stuck breaker set for each
load point such that the stuck condition of any one member of the set following the short circuit
failure of the component protected by the respective breaker cause the outage of a load point. The
proposed methodology identifies failure events incorporating the stuck breaker using a search
algorithm and repeated matrix operations within a generic evaluation framework that can be
readily implemented in computer programs. The developed methodology and the results presented
can be valuable for industrial and commercial customers as well as power utilities to carry-out the
reliability assessment of their distribution systems.
4.3 Methodology
The overall framework of the proposed methodology is shown in Fig. 4.1. A simple
distribution network is shown in Fig. 4.2 is used as an example to illustrate each step of the
methodology. The nomenclature C, Z, B, F, L and T in Fig. 4.2 represent CB, line section, bus-
bar, fuse, line supply, and transformer respectively. A normally open CB is represented with a
circle around its symbol.
Step 1- Each component of the network is represented by placing it between at least two nodes,
and a nodal diagram is created for the electrical network [20]. The connection among the different
components, the direction of power flow, and the information regarding protection coordination
identifying the sequence of operation of the CB(s) in the event of a fault in any section of the
network is embedded in the nodal diagram and the connection matrix. Fig. 4.2 shows the nodal
diagram and Table 4-1 shows the connection matrix of the example distribution network.
Step 2- The connection matrix is used to obtain the minimal paths between the supply points and
the load points in the network as described in Error! Reference source not found.. For each m
inimal path, a path matrix 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀 is created by incorporating the components of the minimal path
and their position in the connection matrix. The supply nodes are 1 and 14 and the load point node
is 23 in the Fig. 4.2 network. The identified minimal paths are:
Path1 = {L1, C1, B1, C5, Z1, T1, C7, B3, C9}
Path2 = {L2, C2, B2, C6, Z2, T2, C7, B3, C9}
76
Step 1. Make Nodal diagram and a connection
matrix for given electrical network
Step 2. Create path matrix for each minimal path

between input and load point through NC breakers
Step 3. Create stuck breaker path failure set

(𝑪 𝑺𝑭 ) corresponding each minimal path
Step 4. Create stuck breaker set (𝑺 𝑺) and Stuck

breaker position matrix for the load point
Step 5. Find the set of components to be

protected by member of SBS and identify failure
events
Step 6. Identify failure events due to stuck breakers

conditions
Step 7. Evaluate the impact of SB on reliability

indices
Fig. 4.1. Flowchart to evaluate the reliability considering stuck breaker condition.
1 14
L1 L2
2 15
C3
C1 C2
3 12 13 16
B1 B2
9 17
4
F1 C5 C6
10 5 18
C4
Z1 Z2
6 19
11 T2
T1
20
7
C7 C8
8 21
B3
22
C9
23
Fig. 4.2. Example distribution system used for methodology illustration.
77
Two more paths are possible through the NO breaker C3. These paths are not required for
identifying the effect of stuck breakers to the load points because the stuck breaker condition is
observed only in the case of NC breakers.
The path matrices associated with these two minimal paths are:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 = [ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22 23]
L1 C1 B1 C5 Z1 T1 𝐶7 B3 C9
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀2 = [15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23]
L2 C2 B2 C6 Z2 T2 𝐶8 B3 C9
The third row of the path matrix contains the path element. It’s first and the second row
respectively contains upstream and downstream nodes of each component represented as the x and
y position respectively of the component in the connection matrix. For example, the component
L1 in the Path M1 lies between upstream node 1 and downstream node 2. 1 and 2 are the Row and
Column y position respectively of L1 in the connection matrix in Table 4-1.
Table 4.1. Connection matrix of distribution system.

Node 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 1 L1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 1 C1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 1 B1 0 0 0 0 B1 0 0 B1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 C5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 1 Z1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 T1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B3 B3 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 B1 0 0 0 0 B1 0 0 1 C3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 B2 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 L2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B2 0 0 1 B2 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C6 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Z2 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 T2 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C8 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 B3 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 C9
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
78
Step 3- The set of stuck breakers, 𝐶𝐵𝑆𝐹 , is identified for each minimal path using the flowchart
shown in Fig. 4.3. The process is repeated for all the path matrices one at a time. The upstream
and downstream location nodes (x,y) for each component in a path matrix are used as pointers in
the connection matrix to identify all the components in the 𝑥 𝑡ℎ and 𝑦 𝑡ℎ row and 𝑥 𝑡ℎ and 𝑦 𝑡ℎ
column, and store them in a temporary matrix 𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 . The normally open breakers in 𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 are
discarded, but the normally closed breakers are added to the stuck breaker path failure set (𝐶𝐵𝑆𝐹 )
because the failure to open any one of these when required will cause the failure of the selected
minimal path.
The other components in 𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 that are not a subset of the path matrix is appended to the
path matrix to check for the presence of an adjoining normally closed CB and treated similarly to
the component in the path matrix.
This step is illustrated for Path1 of the example network. L1(1,2) is the first component
of 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 . The components linked to rows and columns 1 and 2 in the connection matrix are L1
and C1, which are stored in the temporary matrix 𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 .
1 2
𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝1 = [ 2 3]
𝐿1 𝐶1
Since, [1 2 𝐿1]𝑇 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 , it is neglected. The second component of 𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 , 𝐶1 is an NC breaker
and is added to the stuck breaker set.
CBSF (Path1) = {𝐶1}
Similarly, the temporary matrix for the second component, C1(2,3) of 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 is obtained and
shown below.
2 3 3 3
𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝2 = [ 3 4 9 12 ]
𝐶1 𝐵1 𝐵1 𝐵1
𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝2 has two components, C1 and B1, where C1 is already in the stuck breaker failure set,
CBSF . [3 4 𝐵1]𝑇 ∈ 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 , so it can be neglected. 𝐵1 at position (3,9), and (3,12) are appended
to 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 to create a new path matrix 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐴𝑀1 .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22 𝟑 𝟑
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐴𝑀1 =[2 3 4 5 6 7 8 22 23 𝟗 𝟏𝟐 ]
L1 C1 B1 C5 Z1 T1 𝐶7 B3 C9 𝐁𝟏 𝐁𝟏
79
Fig. 4.3. Flowchart to identify breaker stuck failure.
This algorithm is repeated for each column of 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑀1 , including the appended columns.
The stuck breaker failure set obtained for the selected minimal path is
CBSF (Path1) = {𝐶1, 𝐶5, 𝐶7, 𝐶9, 𝐶8}
Similarly, the stuck breaker failure set for the second minimal path, Path2 is shown below.
CBSF (Path2) = {𝐶2, 𝐶6, 𝐶8, 𝐶9, 𝐶7}
80
Step 4- The incidence matrix [20] of the breakers in the stuck breaker failure set is shown below.
𝐶1(𝑠) 𝐶2(𝑠) 𝐶5(𝑠) 𝐶6(𝑠) 𝐶7(𝑠) 𝐶8(𝑠) 𝐶9(𝑠) .
𝐼𝑀 = [ 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 ] 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ1
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ2
If all the elements of a column are non-zero, the corresponding breaker stuck causes the
outage of the load point. Therefore,𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑒𝑡(𝑆𝐵𝑆) = [𝐶7, 𝐶8, 𝐶9]. The stuck breaker
position matrix (𝑆𝐵𝑆(𝑥,𝑦) ) is created by the upstream and downstream node of the member of SBS
which can be retrieved from the connection matrix. Failure events result when any member of 𝑆𝐵𝑆
fails to open in the event of a short circuit of the component(s) protected by the corresponding
member.
Step 5- The set of components (E{CBst}) protected by CBst, a member of 𝑆𝐵𝑆 is determined using
the algorithm shown in Fig. 4.4. These components are determined by searching the adjoining
components at the upstream and downstream nodes of each breaker. If the component found is a
member of the first order cut-set for the load point, it is discarded since the failure of the component
alone causes the outage of the load point. If the component found is a protection equipment, it is
taken as a member of E{CBst} and no further search is carried out because the failure of the further
adjoining component will be protected by the identified protection equipment. All other
components are added as members of E{CBst}, and further search is carried out to find adjoining
components since the SBS breaker should trip if the failure of a component and adjoining
component takes place.
This approach is illustrated in the following steps with the help of the breaker C7, which is the first
member of 𝑆𝐵𝑆 .
 Initialize the following matrices:
Visited node (𝑁𝑣 ) = [ ].
Node to be visited (𝑁𝑡𝑣 ) = [ ].
Temporary element matrix(𝐶𝑡 ) = [ ].
First-order cut-set for the load point determined using incidence matrix method(𝐹𝑂𝐶) =
[ 𝐵3, 𝐶9].
Protection equipment in the network (𝑃𝐸) = [𝐶1. . 𝐶9, 𝐹1]
Element protected by a breaker C7 in 𝑆𝑀 , 𝐸(𝐶7) = [ ]. The corresponding column of C7 (first
column) from the 𝑆𝐵𝑆𝑥,𝑦 is copied to the search matrix, 𝑆𝑀. 𝑆𝑀 = [7 8 𝐶7]𝑇 .
81
 Assign x=7 (1st row of 𝑆𝑀 ) and y=8 (2nd row of 𝑆𝑀 )
If, 𝑥 ∉ 𝑁𝑣 → 𝑁𝑡𝑣 = [𝑁𝑡𝑣 , 𝑥] and
If 𝑦 ∉ 𝑁𝑣 → 𝑁𝑡𝑣 = [𝑁𝑡𝑣 , 𝑦].
Here 7 ∉ 𝑁𝑣 → 𝑁𝑡𝑣 = [7] and 8 ∉ 𝑁𝑣 → 𝑁𝑡𝑣 = [7,8].
 Find the components other than the member of SBS in row and column of connection matrix
at each node to be visited, 𝑁𝑡𝑣 , and store in 𝐶𝑡 . i.e. components other than C7 in 7th row and
column, and 8th row and column in connection matrix. Store the result in 𝐶𝑡 .
6 8 8 21
𝐶𝑡 = [ 7 21 22 8 ]
𝑇1 𝐵3 𝐵3 𝐵3
 Append the elements of 𝑁𝑡𝑣 into 𝑁𝑣 and set 𝑁𝑡𝑣 = [ ], and 𝑆𝑀 = [ ]. Therefore 𝑁𝑣 = [7, 8].
The components in the third row of 𝐶𝑡 are checked if these are a member of FOC or E{C7}.
If these are not a member of FOC or E{C7}., they are checked if a member of PE. If the
component is a member of PE, the component is added to E{C7} set. If the component is not
a member of PE, it is added to both E{C7} and 𝑆𝑀 matrix.
Here, the first component in 𝐶𝑡 is T1.
T1∉ FOC or T1∉𝐸{𝐶7}. Then
 T1∉PE
 𝐸{𝐶7}= [T1] and 𝑆𝑀 = [6 7 𝑇1]𝑇 .
 2nd, 3rd and 4th components in 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐵3 ∈ 𝐹𝑂𝐶
So, they are not taken for the further adjoining component search of stuck breaker condition failure
event. At the end of this step, set 𝐶𝑡 = [ ].
 Check the updated 𝑆𝑀 , if it is not a null matrix, repeat the above steps with the updated initial
condition. If the 𝑆𝑀 is null, the process is completed for a breaker. Here, 𝑆𝑀 = [6 7 𝑇1]𝑇 ,
hence the process continues until the 𝑆𝑀 becomes null at this step.
At the end of this process, 𝐸{𝐶7} = [𝑇1, 𝑍1, 𝐶5] is obtained.
The above steps are repeated for all the members of the SBS. The following sets of elements are
obtained that causes load point failure for each stuck breaker.
𝐸{𝐶8} = [𝑇2, 𝑍2, 𝐶6]
𝐸{𝐶9} = [ ].
82
Fig. 4.4. Algorithm to identify components protected by SBS.
83
Step 6 - The failure events can be deduced from the combination of the SBS and the corresponding
component set for each member of the SBS. For a given load point, the active failure of the
component overlapping with the stuck condition of the breaker constitutes a failure event. (a) and
(s) represent active failure and stuck condition of the component and breaker respectively.
𝑂𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 (𝐿𝑃) =[T1(a)+C7(s), Z1(a)+C7(s), C5(a)+C7(s), T2(a)+C8(s), Z2(a)+C8(s), C6(a)+C8(s)].
There are no additional failure events due to the stuck condition of breaker C9 since it
constitutes a first-order cut-set for the load point, and all the components protected by this
breaker are also first-order cut-sets, the failure of anyone results in the outage of the load point.
Step 7-The load point indices due to the failure events originated from a stuck breaker condition
can be evaluated for a load point using the Equation (4.1)-(4.6). The failure rate of the faulty
feeder due to the stuck breaker condition is obtained by (4.1).
𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑎 (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃𝑐 (𝐶𝐵𝑠𝑡 ) (𝑓/𝑦𝑟) (4.1)

𝑆𝐵𝑆 𝐸
Where 𝜆𝑎 is the active failure rate of the component and 𝑃𝑐 is the average stuck probability of
breaker 𝐶𝐵𝑠𝑡 expressed in percentage and given by (4.2) [2].
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑

𝑃𝑐 = (4.2)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑆𝐵𝑆 is the set of stuck breakers and E is the set of the components corresponding to each member
of SBS. The failure frequency of the load point (𝜆) is given by (4.3)
𝜆 = 𝜆𝑃𝐶 =0% + 𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 (𝑓/𝑦𝑟) (4.3)
The average outage duration due to the failure from the stuck breaker condition is the time required
to switch out the faulty breaker and is obtained using (4.4).
𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 = 𝑠 (ℎ𝑟𝑠) (4.4)
Where. 𝑠 is the average switching time to isolate the faulty feeder.
The unavailability of the faulty feeder due to the stuck breaker condition is obtained by (4.5).
𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 = ∑ ∑ 𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 ∗ 𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 (ℎ𝑟𝑠/𝑦𝑟) (4.5)

𝑆𝐵𝑆 𝐸
And the unavailability of load point (U) is given by (4.6).
84
𝑈 = 𝑈𝑃𝑐=0% + 𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 (ℎ𝑟𝑠/𝑦𝑟) (4.6)
The system indices considering stuck breaker condition can be evaluated using the equation (4.7)-
(4.8).
∑𝑖(𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝜆𝑖 )
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = (𝑖𝑛𝑡/𝑦𝑟 − 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡) (4.7)
∑ 𝑁𝑖
Here, 𝑁𝑖 is the number of the customer at load point i, 𝜆𝑖 is the failure rate of load point i and
𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑖 is the impact of stuck breaker condition on failure rate at load point i respectively.
∑𝑖(𝑁𝑖 ∗𝑈𝑖 )
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 = (ℎ𝑟𝑠/𝑦𝑟 − 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡) (4.8)
∑ 𝑁𝑖
Where, 𝑁𝑖 is the number of customers at Load point i, 𝜆𝑖 and Ui are the failure rate and
unavailability respectively of Load point i, and 𝜆𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑖 and 𝑈𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑖 are the failure rate and
unavailability contributions respectively from the stuck breaker conditions.
4.4 Application of the Proposed Methodology
The proposed methodology is applied to a test distribution system in order to evaluate the
impact of the stuck breaker condition on load point and system reliability indices. The distribution
network connected to Bus 3 of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) [23] is modified as shown
in Fig. 4.5. The size of incoming 11kV breaker and 33kV/11kV transformer is increased in the
modified network to meet the load. The network has eight feeders (F1-F8) supplying power to 44
load points. Feeders F1, F3, F4, F5, and F6 supply power to the residential, governmental
institution, commercial, and small user customers. Similarly, feeder F2 supplies power to small
industries whereas feeders F7 and F8 supply power to the large industrial customers.
The reliability data given in [23] are used in the study. A stuck breaker probability of 3%
is considered in the evaluation. The load point indices were evaluated for 4 selected load points,
LP1, LP8, LP11, and LP39, and are shown in Table 4-2. These were selected as representative
load points for each feeder group in the network. Table 4-3 shows the system indices. Tables 4-2
and 4-3 compare the reliability indices obtained with and without considering the stuck breaker
condition.
The results show that both the load point and system indices increase noticeably when the
stuck breaker events are included in the evaluation. A stuck breaker event causes an upstream
85
breaker to operate, causing additional outages in otherwise healthy neighboring feeders. It can be
observed that the frequency index is more sensitive than the unavailability index to the stuck
breaker events. The additional feeders are only momentarily interrupted and can be restored
quickly. The short restoration time causes the unavailability index to be less sensitive.
The results in Table 4-2 show that the increase in load point reliability indices due to stuck
probability is highest for LP11 when compared to other load points. LP11 lies in Feeder F3, which
shares a common 11 kV bus bar with feeders F4, F5, and F6. When a fault occurs on any of these
feeders and the corresponding feeder breaker is stuck, it will trigger the operation of incoming
breakers to the 11 kV busbar. This will result in a wide-area outage including an outage of LP11.
Fig. 4.5. Modified RBTS bus 3 distribution network.
86
Table 4.2. Load point reliability indices.
Failure frequency (𝜆) Unavailability (U)

Load (occ/yr) (hrs/year)
Points Without Stuck With Stuck Without Stuck With Stuck
Δ𝝀 ΔU
Breaker Breaker Breaker Breaker
LP1 0.5013 0.5171 0.0158 4.5000 4.5079 0.0079
LP8 0.4213 0.4394 0.0181 1.4900 1.4990 0.009
LP11 0.4763 0.5080 0.0317 4.5520 4.5679 0.0159
LP39 0.3123 0.3179 0.0056 1.4000 1.4028 0.0028
Table 4.3. System indices.

SAIFI SAIDI
(int/cust-yr) (hrs/cust-yr)
Without With Without With
Stuck Stuck ΔSAIFI Stuck Stuck ΔSAIDI
Breaker Breaker Breaker Breaker
0.4746 0.5025 0.0279 4.4928 4.5068 0.0140
It can be concluded that when a high number of feeders share a common bus-bar, the effect
of stuck breaker condition to the reliability of all the load points supplied from that bus-bar will be
highly pronounced. On the other hand, LP39 in Feeder F7, which is directly connected to the 138
kV bus-bar, is the least affected by the stuck breaker condition The failures in the 11 kV feeders
and the stuck condition of the corresponding feeder breakers can be isolated by the incoming 33
kV breakers, thereby ensuring supply continuity to LP39. This indicates that the effect of the stuck
breaker condition is least pronounced for the load points connected to a bus-bar in which
downstream failures can be isolated. It is also interesting to note in Table 4-2 that LP8 is more
sensitive to stuck breaker events than LP1 despite both load points being supplied from the same
bus bar. LP1 is connected to Feeder F1 which has a higher number of segments and therefore has
higher failure probability. The failure of this feeder and the stuck condition of the feeder breaker
will trigger the operation of incoming breakers resulting in an outage to LP8. Whereas, LP8 is
connected to Feeder F2 which has fewer number segments and therefore has lower failure
probability. There is a low chance that the effect of the stuck probability of the feeder F2 breaker
is transferred to LP1. It can be concluded that the impact of the stuck breaker condition on the
reliability increases with the number of components to be protected by the feeder breaker.
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It should be noted that a stuck probability of 3% was considered to obtain the above results.
However, the stuck breaker condition of a circuit breaker depends on several factors such as
breaker mechanism, breaker control system, relays and timely maintenance of these components
and systems. Also, different breakers in the network can have diverse control circuits and breaker
operating mechanism so they can have different stuck probabilities. However, the developed
methodology is generic and can incorporate every failure event due to a stuck breaker condition.
A precise data collection and engineering analysis are required to obtain the actual value of stuck
probabilities for circuit breakers. A sensitivity study was performed to show the variation of
reliability indices by varying the stuck probabilities from 0.5% to 5%. The feeder SAIFI and SAIDI
evaluated for the stuck probability of 0.5% are taken as reference and the increase in SAIFI and
SAIDI are evaluated for each 0.5% step increase in stuck probability.
0.050
0.045
F1 F2 F3 F7
0.040
ΔSAIFI (int/cust-yr)
0.035
0.030
0.025
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
ΔStuck probability
Fig. 4.6. Change in feeder SAIFI vs. increase in stuck probabilities.
88
0.025
F1 F2 F3 F7
0.020
ΔSAIDI (hr/cust-yr)
0.015
0.010
0.005
0.000
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
ΔStuck probability
Fig. 4.7. Change in feeder SAIDI vs. increase in stuck probabilities.
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 show the change in feeder SAIFI and SAIDI respectively with the
change in stuck probability. It can be observed that the SAIFI and SAIDI of each feeder increase
proportionally with the stuck breaker probability. However, the varying slopes show that the
degree of impact on each feeder is different depending on the feeder configuration relative to the
network. Feeder F3 is connected to a common bus bar that also connects feeders F4, F5, and F6,
and is, therefore, more vulnerable to stuck breaker events than the other feeders. On the other hand,
Feeder F7 is sharing its bus-bar only with F8 which has fewer components, and therefore, is least
sensitive to stuck breaker events.
The above results illustrate that the stuck breaker conditions have significant impacts on
the load point and system reliability indices, and therefore, should be included in reliability studies.
The existing software tools for reliability studies of distribution systems do not have the capability
to incorporate the stuck conditions of breakers, and therefore, the results obtained from these tools
cannot provide an accurate reliability assessment. This limitation in reliability studies can be
overcome by utilizing the proposed methodology, which is generalized and easy to implement in
a computer program and simulation software. The incorporation of breaker failure modes in
reliability studies can help to identify actual reliability levels and explore several reliability
improvement alternatives for utilities as well as industrial/commercial customers.
89
4.5 Reliability Improvement Alternatives Considering Stuck Breaker Condition
Many commercial and industrial customers in industrialized nations have high reliability
needs to ensure the proper functioning of sensitive equipment and processes. Usually, the utility
supply to these customers is highly reliable. In addition, these customers usually adopt multiple
feeder supply and standby backups in their electrical distribution system design to fulfill their high-
reliability needs. However, the breaker failures events such as stuck conditions, active failures are
random events and will result in customer interruption despite having standby backups and
multiple switching arrangements. These types of reliability analyses considering the different CB
failure modes are not available in the existing software tools. However, with the proposed
generalized methodology that can be easily implemented in software tools, several alternatives for
reliability improvements considering the breaker failure modes, protection system upgrade, and/or
backup deployment can be easily analyzed to make a judicious decision.
The IEEE Gold book [6] distribution network shown in Fig. 4.8 is considered in this study
to represent a distribution network with high-reliability needs. This network has two independent
utility supplies, two major load points A and B, lighting bus, non-critical bus and auxiliary supplies
such as pump, air handler, and cooling tower. The component reliability data are obtained from
[6] and [22]. A study is conducted to illustrate several alternatives that can enhance the reliability
of the distribution system.
The network shown in Fig. 4.8 without the standby backup system is considered as the base
case study. The CBs are assumed to have a stuck probability of 3%. The failure frequency and the
total outage time for the base case system ware evaluated and found to be 0.0285 occurrences/year
and 0.1082 hours/year respectively.
90
U1 Standby Backup with UPS U2
A2 B2
M U3
A4 B4
F8
A5 B5
C10
C2 D2
A7 E8 B7
D8
A26 A6 B6 B26
A8
A9 B9
B8 C8
A10 B10
A11 C9 D9
E9
A15 F9 B11
A16 A14 B15
A12 B12 B16
C16 D10 E10
A13 D16 B13
C13 D13 E13 F13 G13 H13
Air Pump
tower Handler
Bus tower Handler Bus
Fig. 4.8. A typical distribution network [6].

The following four options are considered to enhance the supply reliability of the network:
Option 1: Installing standby backup as shown in the dotted part of Fig. 4.8.
Option 2: Reducing the stuck probability of all breakers from 3% to 0.5%.
Option 3: Replacing all breakers with breakers having a 50% less active failure rate and the
stuck probability of 0.5%.
Option 4: Combining Options 1 and 3.
Fig. 4.9 and Fig. 4.10 show the failure frequency and unavailability respectively at the
Load point A for the four different upgrade options. Fig. 4.9 shows that all the upgrade options
except Option 1 cause a reduction in the failure frequency. Option 1 causes the failure frequency
to increase over the base case due to the active failures of the additional breakers installed to
connect the standby backup system. The results for Options 2 and 3 shows that the failure
frequency is significantly reduced over the Base case by investing in breakers with low active
failure rates and stuck probabilities. In this particular study Option 3 results in the lowest failure
91
frequency. The improvement in failure frequency in Option 4 is less than that in Options 2 and 3.
This is again due to the active failures of the additional breakers installed to connect the standby
backup system.
0.030
0.028
0.025
0.023
0.020
0.018
0.015
Base Case Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Reliability improvement alternatives
Fig. 4.9. Impact of different reliability upgrade options on the failure frequency index.
0.109
0.108
Unavailability (hrs/yr)
0.107
0.106
0.105
0.104
0.103
0.102
0.101
Base Case Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Reliability improvement alternatives
Fig. 4.10. Impact of different reliability upgrade options on the unavailability index.
Fig. 4.10 shows that all four upgrade options reduce the unavailability index. Although
investing in backup generation in Option 1 degrades the frequency index, it improves the
availability index. However, investing in CB with lower active failure rates and stuck probabilities
92
provides higher reliability benefits in terms of both the frequency and availability indices. Option
4 yields the highest reduction in the unavailability index among the four options. This option
includes the cumulative benefit of reduced stuck probability and the active failure rate of CB and
the installation of the standby backup generator system. An industrial/commercial customer with
high-reliability needs can use the proposed methodology to investigate potential upgrade
alternatives to improve network reliability as illustrated in this paper. Specific studies can be
carried out to achieve acceptable reliability in terms of the index of importance to the customer. It
is important that the customer analyze their actual reliability needs, available upgrade alternatives,
and the associated costs to make judicious reliability investment decisions.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper presents a new generalized analytical methodology that can be easily
implemented in a computer program to identify the failure events originated from the stuck
condition of circuit breakers in a power distribution network. A wide range of factors, such as the
protection system reliability, the breaker hardware mechanism, and routine maintenance practices
can affect the stuck breaker probability. The presented study results show that stuck breaker
probability significantly affects the distribution system reliability indices with high-reliability
needs. The studies show that the impact is more pronounced in urban systems with meshed
configurations with multiple branchings from a node in the network. The proposed methodology
enables software tools to easily incorporate stuck breaker events in the reliability evaluation of
modern distribution systems with meshed networks and complex protection functions, and make
appropriate investment decisions. An example using the IEEE Gold Book was also presented to
illustrate the application of the proposed methodology in analyzing several reliability upgrade
options, including the investment in breakers with reduced active failure rates and stuck breaker
probabilities. The methodology and case studies presented in this paper offer valuable inputs for
utilities and industries to conduct the reliability studies and make a reliability-based investment
decision regarding replacement/ maintenance of breakers, selection of protection system and
protection system upgrades.
93
4.7 References
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96
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The prime objective of the power distribution system is to deliver a reliable power supply
at the affordable cost by with complying environmental limits. The power outages incur a
substantial cost to customers and utilities. Several random failure events in distribution
components and the bulk power supply cause the power interruption to its customer. The majority
of load point interruption events originated from the failures in the distribution system
components. For utilities, loss of revenue, cost of maintenance and financial penalties, etc. are the
financial losses due to power interruption. Electricity utilities are often trying to improve the
reliability of supply by utilizing reliable components, improving maintenance practice, using
automation technology and smart devices, adequate planning and operation, etc. The distribution
system reliability enhancement is getting attention due to regulatory measures from the
government, direct impact on the tariff, competition among the utilities due to deregulation of the
electricity markets, etc. Despite the reliable utility supply, many commercial customers in the
highly populated areas, the large commercial customer with the critical process, healthcare
facilities, military facilities, etc. are investing in additional facilities to avoid all types of power
interruptions. These customers often utilize multiple utility feeders, standby backup generators and
UPS systems and multiple switching arrangement in their facility.
The majority of interruption arises from the failure of components in DS. Protection
equipment is used to isolate the fault and minimize the consequences to components and personnel
from the fault. The ability to implement a range of protection functions using relays and operational
flexibility, circuit breakers are widely used protection devices. CBs are also used in switching
function. CBs are installed in the distribution network by defining different protection zone and
the protection coordination among the zones is carried out. As designed, the CBs are expected to
isolate the fault in their primary zone. The faults in CBs themselves are unique from the fault in
component due to several modes of failure of CBs and different consequences caused by the
failure. CB failure can trigger backup breakers resulting in wide-area outages in the DS and
therefore they need to be adequately addressed in reliability evaluation.
CB failures are responsible for the majority of the power interruption. Active failure,
inadvertent opening and stuck breaker condition are the major types of failures in CB. Current
reliability evaluation analytical methodologies and software tools do not adequately incorporate
97
the active failure and stuck condition of the breaker in reliability evaluation. From the literature
review, it is found that some of the researchers have identified the need of considering active
failure and stuck condition into reliability study and incorporated them in their evaluation,
however, the methodologies followed are not generalized and cannot be applied to the complex
distribution system.
For industrial and commercial customers with high-reliability needs, it is found that the
implementation of standby backup generation is beneficial where the utility or bulk supply
reliability is poor. For these customers, if supplied from a relatively high reliable utility supply,
the up-gradation of the protection system, and replacement of breakers with a lower active failure
rate and reducing the stuck probability are highly beneficial as compared to installing the standby
backup system. To quantify the incremental reliability by investing in standby backup, protection
up-gradation and proactive maintenance practices require the consideration of different breaker
failure modes. In this context, this thesis proposed a generalized analytical methodology to
incorporate active failure and stuck breaker conditions in the reliability evaluation of DS.
Using the existing techniques such as minimal cut-set, total failure events of multiple
orders of contingencies are identified. The methodologies presented in this thesis extend the
existing cut-set reliability evaluation technique to incorporate active failure and stuck condition of
the breaker in reliability evaluation of DS. The thesis presents a methodology to identify a set of
breakers for each path in such a way that any member of the set uses at least one breaker of the
path as a backup breaker. A new incidence matrix (ABI) is created from the set of breakers and
concatenated with the incidence matrix created from the existing cut-set method to form a new
incidence matrix called modified incidence matrix. All cut-sets including the cut-sets due to active
failure of breakers up to any order can be identified from the modified incidence matrix. The thesis
also presents a methodology to identify the set of NC breakers which uses at least one breaker of
each path as a backup breaker. The breaker set is named the stuck breaker set (SBS). A
methodology is presented to identify each component in the primary protection zone of the
breakers in SBS. The failure of components in the primary protection zone overlapping with the
breaker in SBS is identified as a cut-set due to the stuck breaker condition. These methodologies
are validated by implementing in IEEE Goldbook network and RBTS test distribution networks.
This thesis has presented the generalized methodologies to incorporate the active failure
and stuck condition of the CB to address the incapability of existing reliability technique and
98
reliability evaluation software. The developed methodologies are integrated into the existing
minimal cut-set method and these methodologies are verified by implementing standard test
networks. The methodology presented in this thesis is useful for the utilities and ICDS owners to
carry out the precise reliability studies for their distribution networks.
In conclusion, generalized analytical methodologies using a graphical search algorithm to
identify breaker active failure events and stuck breaker failure events in power distribution
networks are proposed. The proposed methodology is computationally efficient and can identify
all the minimal cut-sets to any desired order in large distribution networks employing numerous
circuit breakers and redundant paths. The results show that different failure modes of circuit
breakers have a considerable impact on the reliability indices, specifically the frequency index is
observed to increase significantly. Different case studies are performed in the thesis to illustrate
the utility of the proposed methodologies in reliability investment decisions. The study shows that
industrial and commercial distribution systems with reliable and redundant input supplies enjoy
significant reliability benefits from investment in high-quality circuit breakers with reduced active
failure rates. The study also shows that these systems get additional benefits from investment in
proactive maintenance and testing of protection systems to reduce the stuck breaker probability.
The results show that the investment in backup generation in these systems can result in increased
failure frequency at the load points, and can be counter-productive in industrial processes sensitive
to failure frequency. The proposed method can also be used to quantify the impact of breaker active
failures and stuck condition on the customer outage costs as illustrated, and then be used in value-
based reliability planning. The methodology and case studies presented in this thesis offer valuable
inputs for industries to conduct the reliability studies and make a reliability-based investment
decision regarding replacement/maintenance of breakers, protection system upgrades, and addition
of supply redundancy.
99

Timalsena Thesis 2020

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Reliability Assessment of Power Distribution Networks

Incorporating Circuit Breaker Failure Modes

A Thesis Submitted to the College of

Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Science

In the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Kiran Raj Timalsena

@Copyright Kiran Raj Timalsena, March 2020. All rights reserved

Head of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

To my wonderful brother, Uttam

PERMISSION TO USE ................................................................................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................... vi

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ xi

1.1 Power System Reliability ................................................................................................. 1

1.2 Power Distribution System .............................................................................................. 2

1.3 Protection of Component Failures in Distribution System .............................................. 5

1.3.1 Circuit Breaker Modeling in Reliability Assessment ............................................... 7

1.4 Distribution System Reliability Evaluation Techniques .................................................. 9

1.5 Reliability Indices in Distribution System ..................................................................... 15

1.6 Research motivation ....................................................................................................... 17

1.7 Thesis Organization........................................................................................................ 21

1.8 References ...................................................................................................................... 23

NEED-BASED RELIABILITY INVESTMENT IN

2.1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 29

2.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 29

2.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 31

2.4 Case Studies and Results ................................................................................................ 33

2.4.2 Effect of Backup System on the Reliability Indices ............................................... 35

2.4.3 Effect of Supply Redundancy on Reliability Indices .............................................. 37

3.4 Effect of Breaker Failures on Reliability Indices .......................................................... 39

A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO INCORPORATE CIRCUIT BREAKER

3.1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 48

3.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 48

3.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 52

3.4 Illustration of the Proposed Methodology on a Test Network ....................................... 59

3.5 Application in Reliability Studies for Investment Decisions ......................................... 64

3.7 References ...................................................................................................................... 69

A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO INCORPORATE STUCK CONDITION OF

4.1 Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 72

4.2 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 72

4.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 76

4.4 Application of the Proposed Methodology .................................................................... 85

4.5 Reliability Improvement Alternatives Considering Stuck Breaker Condition............... 90

4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 93

4.7 References ...................................................................................................................... 94

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 97

Table 1.1. Component reliability data........................................................................................... 11

Fig. 1.1.Hierarchical levels in reliability assessment [1]. ............................................................... 2

ABI Active Breaker Incidence Matrix

1.1 Power System Reliability

Hierarchical Level III

Fig. 1.1.Hierarchical levels in reliability assessment [1].

1.2 Power Distribution System

LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 LP6 LP7 LP8 LP9

LP10 LP11 LP12

Fig. 1.2. A typical rural distribution system.

Fig. 1.3. A typical urban distribution system.

1.3 Protection of Component Failures in Distribution System

LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 LP5 LP6 LP7 LP8 LP9