UNIVERSIDADE LUSÍADA – PORTO

FACULDADE DE DIREITO
MESTRADO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

International Organization for Migration (IOM) and

its role in global migration policy

Ana Karseladze

Trabalho realizado para a unidade

curricular de Direito e Organização
Internacional pela Professora Doutora
Sofia Santos

Porto – 2023
IOM and its role in global migration policy

Abstract

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) wields growing influence in global
migration governance, but research on the organization's origins is limited. This article
provides an analysis of the discourse production of the IOM, an increasingly important
international actor in migration management.
This paper seeks to provide an overview of extant study on IOM and outline the various
sources of available information, its current structure, and activities, as well as its historical
growth and migration management concept. Human rights principles, state interests, and the
desire to outsource—whether to NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, or private actors—
goods and services that have previously been provided by states, such as protection,
emergency assistance, and reconstruction support, all influence IOM's work to varying
degrees.
Understanding the IOM's humanitarian activities is now critical to understanding the agency
and, increasingly, the regime itself, therefore I will briefly summarize the organizational
evolution of IOM, its increasing humanitarian engagement as well as the implications of its
activities for human rights and humanitarian protection.
IOM became a related organization in the United Nations system in 2016 and has rebranded
itself as the “UN Migration Agency.” I will discuss the importance of the IOM's new
partnership with the UN, as well as the evolution of the IOM-UN relationship. I will address
‘assisted voluntary return and reintegration’ program (AVRR) as a leading architect of it is
IOM. As a case study I will overview IOM intervention and its activities during the conflict
in Libya.

Keywords: migration policies; The International Organization for Migration; ‘assisted

voluntary return and reintegration’; human rights; United Nations.

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IOM and its role in global migration policy

Resumo

A Organização Internacional para as Migrações (OIM) exerce uma influência crescente na

governação global das migrações, mas a investigação sobre as origens da organização é
limitada. Este artigo apresenta uma análise da produção discursiva da OIM, um actor
internacional cada vez mais importante na gestão das migrações.
Este documento procura fornecer uma visão geral dos estudos existentes sobre a OIM e
delinear as várias fontes de informação disponíveis, a sua estrutura actual e actividades, bem
como o seu crescimento histórico e conceito de gestão das migrações. Os princípios dos
direitos humanos, os interesses do Estado e o desejo de subcontratar - seja a ONGs,
organizações intergovernamentais ou agentes privados - bens e serviços que anteriormente
eram fornecidos pelos Estados, como a protecção, a assistência de emergência e o apoio à
reconstrução, influenciam o trabalho da OIM em diferentes graus.
Compreender as actividades humanitárias da OIM é agora fundamental para compreender a
agência e, cada vez mais, o próprio regime, pelo que farei um breve resumo da evolução
organizacional da OIM, do seu crescente envolvimento humanitário, bem como das
implicações das suas actividades para os direitos humanos e a protecção humanitária.
A OIM tornou-se uma organização relacionada com o sistema das Nações Unidas em 2016 e
mudou a sua marca para "Agência das Nações Unidas para as Migrações". Discutirei a
importância da nova parceria da OIM com a ONU, bem como a evolução da relação OIM-
ONU. Abordarei o programa de "regresso voluntário assistido e reintegração" (AVRR), cujo
principal arquitecto é a OIM. Como estudo de caso, apresentarei a intervenção da OIM e as
suas actividades durante o conflito na Líbia.

Palavras-chave: políticas de migração; Organização Internacional para as Migrações;

"regresso voluntário assistido e reintegração"; direitos humanos; Nações Unidas.

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IOM and its role in global migration policy

Table of Contents

Introduction..............................................................................................................................4

What is IOM? History and background...................................................................................5

The evolution of IOM’s human rights discourse....................................................................8

'Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration' (AVRR)......................................................11

IOM-UN Relations..................................................................................................................13

IOM during the conflict in Libya...........................................................................................15

Conclusion..............................................................................................................................19

Bibliography............................................................................................................................20

Introduction

The IOM was established to assist in the resolution of displacement and the perceived
"surplus population" issue confronting post-WWII Europe. It was created outside the UN
with no Eastern bloc members due to the US, its main architect and donor, refusal to fund
operational work on refugees and migration by IOs with Communist members. The agency
struggled to remain afloat with a small membership base, almost no core financing, and a
weak formal mandate (Elie J. , 2010).
The nature of IOM appears to be challenging to capture at times. While it collaborates with
UN agencies and is frequently regarded as part of the UN structure, it is only a "related
agency." It is an intergovernmental organization, but it appears to operate at times like a
private company, competing with civil society organizations and NGOs. Its primary focus is
migration, but it also conducts tasks unrelated to migration (Like rebuilding regions affected
by natural disasters). It is called a migration organization, but it actively works against
migration, such as returning unwanted migrants to their home countries and stopping
unauthorized migration. The IOM is both a migration governance agent and a media actor
whose images and narratives influence public views of migration. This paper explores IOM's
history and present migration policies, as well as its current structure and activities.
IOM embraces human rights discourse more consistently and expresses dedication to human
rights standards and related humanitarian principles, including in a comprehensive set of new

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IOM and its role in global migration policy

internal policies, frameworks, and guidelines. IOM's 2015a 'Humanitarian Policy - Principles
for Humanitarian Action' is a particularly salient example of IOM's internal policymaking
from the standpoint of (self)legitimation, as it reflects IOM's efforts to present its work as
compliant with prevailing humanitarian and human rights protection norms, while also
grappling with tensions arising from its various mandates (Bradley & Erdilmen, 2022).
It is difficult to make a clear distinction between voluntary and forced migration, and there is
an ongoing need to be mindful of the tensions between humanitarian and human rights
principles, as well as programs such as "assisted voluntary returns." There is some debate
about whether the IOM is truly a humanitarian organization. Although the IOM describes
itself as a humanitarian organization (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001), some argue that "this language
obscures the coercive practices inherent" in the IOM's participation in "movement ordering"
and activities such as detention (Ashutosh & Mountz, 2011). In this paper I try to address the
evolution of IOM’s human rights discourse and ‘assisted voluntary return and reintegration’
program (AVRR).
The IOM only joined the United Nations system in 2016, after 65 years of independent
operations carried out by nearly 500 field offices around the globe. When the IOM joined the
"U.N. family," its member states insisted on doing so only as a "related organization" and on
conditions that allowed the IOM to retain its operational independence and "non-normative"
status (UN. General Assembly, 2015-2016). I will discuss the importance of the IOM's new
partnership with the UN, as well as the evolution of the IOM-UN relationship.
As the case study, I intend to provide a detailed examination of the IOM's activities during
the 2011 Libyan war and with references to their activities question the purely humanitarian
nature of the IOM intervention.

What is IOM? History and background

IOM was established in 1951 as a European-centric international organization to aid in the
post-war emigration of jobless "over-populations" (for example, people displaced by war,
former prisoners of German concentration camps) out of Europe. Governments were worried
that dissatisfied, unemployed populations would endanger postwar order and wealth (Georgi,
2010). The UNHCR1, which was also established in 1951, was tasked with collaborating with
states to provide proper protections to refugees rather than immediately giving material aid.
1
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a United Nations agency mandated to aid
and protect refugees, forcibly displaced communities, and stateless people, and to assist in their voluntary
repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. It is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland,
with over 17,300 staff working in 135 countries.

5
IOM and its role in global migration policy

To manage activities on the ground and to treat non-refugee populations, a distinct institution
was required. To fill that position, the ILO2 suggested establishing a Migration
Administration within the ILO framework to carry out an operational migration program on
the size considered essential to address European migration problems as well as satisfy the
immigration requirements of other parts of the globe. However, the US objected to the plan,
claiming that migration policy was a domestic issue and that establishing such an
organization would strip states of control over refugee selection (PERRUCHOUD, 1989).
The US also saw UNHCR and the ILO as possibly unmanageable and communist-influenced
organizations. As a result, the United States pushed for the establishment of a distinct,
competing international organization, independent of the UN, with participation restricted to
member states that backed "free movement." This new body, known at the time as the
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for Migrant Movements from Europe (PICMME),
thus included "a homogeneous group of developed, 'white,' and capitalist Western states"
(Chuang, 2022).
IOM has long been ignored by researchers for a variety of factors, including the following.
(1) A tumultuous history: For the first 40 years of its existence, the IOM was a temporary
organization that fought to live; it only became permanent in 1989. (2) This corresponded to
the portrayal of IOM as a marginal actor, merely serving as a "travel agency" for migrants, in
contrast to the far-reaching and normative objectives of other organizations, such as the
UNHCR or ILO; up to this day, this gives the impression that IOM is nothing more than a
service provider to states, with little legal or political influence, and that it thus represents a
narrow and irrelevant (3) The IOM's lack of transparency and high informality make it
difficult for scholars to obtain information about its operations (Pécoud, 2018). Today,
however, the IOM is under growing scrutiny. Academics and civil society organizations are
increasingly conscious that, behind its seemingly mundane and technical activities, the IOM
plays a part in the transformations that impact global migration politics.
The growing Cold War competition favored the establishment of the IOM. Western states
saw 'overpopulation' as a barrier to the Marshall Plan3 and European reconstruction; it was
also believed to enable communist influence. As a result, the IOM's goal was to help
"eliminate potential social and political tensions in Europe... to contain the spread of
Communism" (Parsanoglou, 2015). The IOM thus gathered only like-minded governments:
2
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is devoted to promoting social justice and internationally
recognized human and labour rights, pursuing its founding mission that labour peace is essential to prosperity.
3
The Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, was a U.S. program providing aid to
Western Europe following the devastation of World War II.

6
IOM and its role in global migration policy

this was formalized in the Constitution, which made membership available only to states that
backed 'free migration' (That is to say, that did not prevent their citizens from freely
emigrating, as did the U.S.S.R. and its allies). IOM, as a European-centric organization, also
excluded recently independent Asian and African nations. While initially confined to
technical duties, the IOM was always a politicized organization, closely linked with US
leadership and a homogeneous collection of developed, 'white,' and capitalist Western states
(Pécoud, 2018).
PICMME was founded in 1951, renamed the International Committee for European
Migration (ICEM) in 1952, the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration in 1980, and the
International Organization for Migration in 1989. During this time, the organization
transitioned from a locally focused transportation agency to a global organization operating in
a variety of voluntary and forced migration situations and dedicated—in principle, if not
always in practice—to managing migration "for the benefit of all." Migration management is
a broad concept that encompasses a wide range of activities, from refugee resettlement,
evacuations, camp management, policy development, and counter-trafficking training to the
implementation of detention programs and "assisted voluntary return" schemes for
unsuccessful asylum seekers. The organization divides its activity into four broad categories:
(1) migration and development; (2) migration facilitation; (3) migration regulation; and (4)
forced migration (Martin, 2014).
Given the IOM's analysis, the five main duties delineated in the organization's constitution
are of special interest. The first two are about 'transferring' migrants and refugees and
displaced people... for whom arrangements can be made between the Organizations and the
States involved.' The IOM's next two duties include a broad variety of "migration services,"
such as "medical examinations" and "similar services" for "voluntary return migration."
Finally, the IOM aims to "provide a forum for States, international and other organizations to
exchange views and experiences on migration" (IOM, 1989). The IOM works on a variety of
human migration initiatives, including 'managing migration,' 'counter-trafficking', 'migrant
movement and processing assistance', and 'migration study'. The IOM manages humanitarian
initiatives aimed at protecting refugees' human rights. The IOM was also instrumental in
constructing homes in tsunami-affected areas, and it has recently received recognition for its
collaboration with the UNHCR in Iraq4 to aid internally displaced people. In 2008, the IOM
gave 190,647 people with 'movement aid,' mostly through 'resettlement programs' and

4
The IOM Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) identified 3,171,606 internally displaced Iraqis (528,601
families) from January 2014 through 30 July 2015.

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IOM and its role in global migration policy

'refugee repatriations' (IOM, 2009). The IOM supports politicians' objectives of ‘managed
migration,' aiding nation-states in their desire for order over what many consider disorderly
flows. While much global migration is marked by chaos and relocation, the IOM provides
control services to its customers (member states), especially in the administration of custody
and expulsion regimes. Many of these initiatives involve transnational migrants'
accommodation and transportation. IOM successfully travels the globe through the effective
use of humanitarian discourses (Ashutosh & Mountz, 2011).
IOM and its predecessors were tasked with facilitating orderly migrant patterns in general,
including "refugee migration." Notably, the IOM lacks a specific mission to safeguard the
rights of migrants, including immigrants and internally Displaced Persons. Many IOM
member states regard the agency's absence of a formal protection mission as a crucial asset;
the agency's constitution requires member states to have a "demonstrated interest in the
principle of free movement of persons" (IOM, 1951). When the IOM Constitution was
approved in 1989, several of its goals closely related to the organization's work with forced
migration and the humanitarian sector in general, laying the groundwork for more recent
increased humanitarian involvement. According to Perruchoud, the goals that guided the
development of the IOM Constitution included strengthening the organization's "basic
humanitarian character and orientation" and emphasizing the importance of cooperation
among states and international agencies on refugee issues and migration in general
(PERRUCHOUD, 1989).
IOM continues to be a tool of Northern foreign policy, perhaps more so than other
international organizations, but institutional power in connection to IOM cannot be
completely understood apart from a study of UNHCR (Martin, 2014).

The evolution of IOM’s human rights discourse

The IOM performs vital relief work, such as rebuilding homes after the tsunami in Sri Lanka
and reintegrating internally displaced people in Colombia, where the IOM spent the most
money in 2008 (IOM, 2009b). However, the IOM also conducts some ethically and
strategically dubious work on the outskirts of sovereign land and authority. With over 400
field locations worldwide as of October 2009 (IOM, 2009c), the IOM enters work where the
nation-state approaches its sovereign boundaries, finding itself constrained by international
law and directed – if not confined – by UN conventions. While anti-detention and anti-
deportation activists and human rights organizations are increasingly targeting the IOM and

8
IOM and its role in global migration policy

demanding responsibility, recent academic work on migration securitization appears to have

overlooked the IOM as a crucial actor in the process. Border enforcement tactics depend on
the IOM's capacity to act on behalf of, but outside of, the sovereign state. Nonetheless, in
recent research on overseas border control practices conducted by the authors, the IOM
appeared frequently in apparently improbable and unseemly locations between states. The
IOM was involved not only in border control but also in transportation and detention policies
that restricted rather than facilitated human movement (Ashutosh & Mountz, 2011).
For much of its existence, the IOM eschewed rights-based rhetoric, instead framing its work
in terms of managing and optimizing the advantages of migration. However, starting in the
mid-1990s, the IOM started to incorporate human rights into its discourse on a more regular
basis. The timing of these changes were influenced by a variety of factors, including the
IOM's expanded involvement in humanitarian operations in collaboration with the UN, the
approach of different directors general, and the broader rise of human rights norms and
service to individuals rather than just states as critical to IO legitimacy (Dingwerth, Witt,
Lehmann, Reichel, & Weise, 2019). Internal policies created by the IOM on important issues
such as migration governance, migration emergencies, humanitarian action, protection, data,
and accountability, as well as specific groups such as IDPs, migrant laborers, and kidnapped
migrants, show significant discursive shifts. In 2004, some senior officials argued that the
IOM was not obligated by international human rights law and associated standards
(Goodwin-Gill, 2019), a point of view that has been echoed in recent migration studies
literature. Many of these policies and frameworks recognize international human rights and
humanitarian standards and articulate organizational commitments to them, with varying
degrees of explicitness; some legal scholars argue that some of these standards represent
'internal rules' with binding obligations for IOM, based on principles of international
organization law (Chetail, 2022). As a result, these texts are important because they question
assumptions about the IOM's absence of normative duties and commitments.
One of the first significant IOM frameworks to integrate human rights rhetoric was the 1995
strategic plan. It acknowledged that "individual migrants' and refugees' rights must be
respected" and laid out nine objectives, including "working toward effective respect of
migrants' rights" (IOM, 1995). This wording was repeated in the 2002 IOM Policy on
Migrant Human Rights, the agency's first policy on the subject (IOM, 2002). The 2007 IOM
Strategy, the organization's next major planning framework, similarly stated the objectives of
improving "effective respect for the human rights of migrants in accordance with
international law" (IOM, 2007).
9
IOM and its role in global migration policy

In these early papers, the IOM refrains from recognizing its own obligations or making
promises in relation to human rights and humanitarian ideals. This is a move taken by more
modern frameworks. The IOM's most significant, member-state-approved papers in this
regard are the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) from 2012 and the
Migration Government Framework from 2015 (MiGOF). The MCOF seeks to clarify and
explain the links between the IOM's various initiatives in emergency situations; the MiGOF
outlines "the essential elements for facilitating orderly, safe, regular, and responsible
migration," offering a structure for IOM collaboration with governments (IOM, 2015b).
The policy development process was sparked by an important 2008 Sida evaluation of IOM's
humanitarian aid, which was presented to and officially accepted by the IOM Council in
2015. According to the evaluation, while the IOM "contributes to, endorses, and follows
generally accepted policy, principles, and standards" in the field, it lacked specific policies
tying it to humanitarian principles and standards, which could cause conflict with other areas
of IOM's work (Olin, Florin, & Bengtsson, 2008). The 2015 Humanitarian Policy seeks to
"ensure that when the Organization is engaged in humanitarian action, it acts on the basis of
strong principles and as part of the humanitarian response system" (IOM, 2015a).
The 2019-2023 IOM Strategic Vision reflects IOM's bridging of human rights and
management discourses, employing management terminology alongside prominent references
to human rights, including the opening statement that 'IOM remains committed to the core
values and principles that are at the heart of its work, including the principles enshrined in the
United Nations Charter, including upholding human rights for all. Respect for migrants'
rights, respect, and well-being stays essential' (IOM, 2019). The IOM argues that it is through
management methods that vulnerable migrants' rights can be best safeguarded.
The fundamental problem here is that the IOM lacks a "protection mandate." It is not bound
by international human rights legislation because it is not part of the UN framework.
Furthermore, given its project-based and donor-driven character, as well as its closeness to
Western recipient states, IOM is likely to be engaged in some of the most stringent anti-
illegal migration measures. The IOM argues that well-managed migration benefits human
rights: 'Although IOM has no legal protection mandate, the reality remains that its actions add
to safeguarding human rights, with the impact, or consequence, of protecting persons

engaged in migration' (Pécoud, 2018).

IOM's increased humanitarian involvement has served to fill gaps in the forced migration
regime, especially for displaced persons who do not qualify for refugee status. Increasing

10
IOM and its role in global migration policy

coherence in the agency's work, and thus greater power and influence in the forced migration
regime, is hampered by competition between IOM's operational departments, as well as
competing pressures from different branches of IOM's member states, which may encourage
the development of IOM as a principled humanitarian actor while continuing to press it to
undertake work that conflicts with humanitarian and human rights standards.

'Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration' (AVRR)

The IOM and its member countries first considered AVRR ('Assisted Voluntary Return and
Reintegration') in the 1970s; its first initiative began in Germany in 1979. While AVRR
activities were originally enacted in the EU, these programs have recently expanded,
especially to countries recognized as "transit" routes for migration to Europe, such as Libya,
Niger, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. The IOM releases annual reports that detail the scope
and impact of its return interventions. In the early 2000s, the IOM repatriated approximately
30,000 refugees per year on average. This figure has risen over the last decade, culminating at
nearly 100,000 refugees during the EU's so-called migration crisis5 in 2016 (IOM, 2016). The
IOM's AVRR mission is to repatriate refugees "in a humane and dignified manner". This
portrayal of return is part of the IOM's projected self-image as a humanitarian player in
migrant administration over the last two decades (Frowd, 2017). Whereas the IOM's stated
humanitarianism has been criticized as a depoliticizing move, in the case of AVRR, the IOM
has taken language associated with social movements, casting its activities as combative and
openly political. The 'returnee' is portrayed as exhibiting ‘resilience' and becoming
'empowered' by refusing the draw of emigration or turning back from its deceptive promise
(IOM, Reintegration Handbook, 2019). It is now a matter of individual responsibility, in
which the (potential) migrant must be encouraged to make the 'right' decision or be prepared
to publicly show remorse for having made the wrong decision.
The migrant's voice is used as a kind of marketing tool throughout the IOM's AVRR sites to
support the wisdom of going home by contrasting it with their unsuccessful migratory
experience. AVRR replaces the migrant's desire to depart home with the desire to return
home to reunite with family and society. Whereas common and critical pictures of
repatriation depict banishment, the breaking of community bonds, and the shattering of lives,
AVRR is depicted in IOM visualizations as a theme of homecoming, return, reunification,
5
The 2015 European migrant crisis, also known internationally as the Syrian refugee crisis, was a period of
significantly increased movement of refugees and migrants into Europe in 2015, the most in a single year since
World War II.

11
IOM and its role in global migration policy

and self-reinvention. Under IOM, AVRR recounts a narrative through the texts, videos, and
audio it posts on its public website. This is a marketing engine, not the cloak of secret that
surrounds the prevailing imaginary of enforced AVRR. But it is the pictures and stories
mobilized by IOM through the staging of the migrant voice that we find compelling. IOM has
changed activism, which was previously linked with resistance, to that of an AVRR endorser.
Deportation is a type of recovery in the hands of the IOM. Returnees are created by
eliminating the unproductive group of undocumented migrants. The virtuous migrant,
characterized by a desire to return home, populates the emerging political imaginary of
deportation (Fine & Walters, 2022).
AVRR programs are also frequently criticized for putting excessive pressure on asylum
applicants to choose repatriation—essentially, pressing people to comply with their own
expulsion—rather than remaining in indeterminate custody. Critics have even claimed that
the IOM's stated humanitarian worries are merely a smokescreen for its true purposes, which
include supporting (Western/Northern) states' interests in border controls and flexible labor,
as well as serving as a strategic vehicle for collecting funds (Chuang, 2022).
AVRR's programs could undoubtedly be considered part of the 'deportation turn' (Gibney,
2008), which indicates a dramatic increase in the use of deportation by Western countries as a
means of dealing with failed asylum seekers, illegal migrants, criminals, and suspected
terrorists over the last decade. Nonetheless, whereas removal has traditionally been viewed
and practiced as a forcible and sometimes violent transfer of people, the IOM's actions in this
area indicate to a new paradigm, which we refer to as neoliberal expulsion. In this context,
the term "voluntary" refers to the organizational mode of the AVRR programs rather than
whether a migrant was removed voluntarily or not. AVRRs do not involve forcible removal;
rather, they investigate and test methods of enlisting migrants' help in their own expulsion
through the provision of information, assistance, and financial incentives. Of course, the past
of deportation shows that AVRR is not the first-time migrants have been 'encouraged' to
leave a state's territory through both positive and negative methods (Walters & Andrijasevic,
2010).
If we consider post-deportation studies to be an emergent imaginary that emphasizes many of
the negative aspects of deportation, whether coerced or consensual, we can see how the
IOM's information efforts surrounding its AVRR programs can also be considered an
emergent imaginary. Indeed, because these campaigns record elements of the migrant's life
"after" return, they could be deemed an intervention in the post-deportation area. However,
while much of the academic and human rights focus on post-deportation articulates a
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IOM and its role in global migration policy

criticism of the practice of deportation, the IOM's version seeks a new kind of legitimacy for
this practice.

IOM-UN Relations

The UN-IOM relationship is multifaceted, covering IOM's connections to actors such as the
Secretariat and UNHCR, as well as its general place in the UN system. A continuous refrain
in IOM-UN ties is rapprochement amid rivalry and tension. In the face of mistrust and
rivalry, the IOM and UNHCR have collaborated closely, including on returns (Elie J. , 2010).
By 2016, IOM employees were already working under UN salary scales, pension plans,
security systems, and the UN Staff Rules and Regulations; IOM had memorandums of
understanding and cooperation agreements with dozens of UN bodies, was a de facto member
of many UN humanitarian country teams and had access to various UN funding mechanisms.
In many places, this gave the idea that IOM was a "quasi-UN," a status with advantages for
both the UN and IOM (Bradley, 2021).
There was little visible or open debate on the topic within or between UN entities during the
2016 negotiations. Instead, while the world's attention was concentrated on the global
migration and refugee catastrophe, a relatively small group of high-level players worked out
the specifics, adhering to the general parameters established by states. Long-standing
experiences working with IOM in aid missions offered some reassurance for some but raised
concerns for others. Senior officials from the UN Office for the OCHA6 generally supported
IOM's admission to the UN system, partly because IOM was already operating as a "full UN
agency" in various humanitarian contexts, making the process largely a "formality". Some
UN officials, however, were deeply concerned about the decision. There were "traditional
concerns," particularly within UNHCR and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), about "IOM's protection bloodstream," its lack of a formal
protection mandate, and its willingness to question protection-related categories and
definitions, such as UNHCR's distinction between refugees and migrants. Some remained
concerned about IOM's protection record but argued that excluding IOM because it lacks an
official protection mission undervalues IOM's progress in incorporating protection standards
into its policies and programming, while underplaying UNHCR's own repeated protection
failures. Despite some "backdoor opposition," the action received high-level support within
6
OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) is the part of the United Nations Secretariat
responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also
ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort.

13
IOM and its role in global migration policy

the UN, especially from the Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Refugees, and
OCHA leadership (Bradley, 2021). These players acknowledged the shifting intentions of
strong states, particularly the United States, regarding the IOM's position, the need for the
UN system to have devoted, practical capacity on migration, including the Global Compact
on Migration, and funders' reluctance to finance a new organization. Some officials
reportedly expressed hope that by bringing IOM into the UN system, it would be easier to
persuade it to embrace and adhere to UN standards. This high-level backing and political
impetus for a quick repositioning of the IOM as a linked agency in time for the New York
meeting outweighed resistance from some UN places (Bradley, 2021).
The UN and IOM agreed to a 'closer connection' in 2016, and IOM became ´related entity' to
the UN; while it has been presenting itself as 'the UN migration agency' since then, IOM does
not have complete membership standing. When the IOM joined the “U.N. family,” the IOM’s
member states insisted that it do so only as a “related organization” and under terms

permitting the IOM to maintain its operational independence and its “non-normative” status.
The IOM is thus neither subject to U.N. oversight mechanisms nor required to prioritize

migrants’ rights under its institutional mandate, unlike U.N. agencies working in the
migration field—e.g., UNHCR or ILO (Chuang, 2022).
Notably, the IOM's efforts to legitimize its rights precede its admission to the UN system and
cannot be explained solely as a plan to facilitate this development. Nonetheless, IOM's
embrace of rights rhetoric has increased since its admission to the UN system in 2016.
Human rights advocates working for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International7 also applaud changes to the IOM's rights
discourse and policies, recognizing that, while some aspects of the IOM's operations remain
serious concerns, the organization has grown significantly since the "bad old days" (Bradley
& Erdilmen, 2022).

IOM during the conflict in Libya

The conflict in Libya8 in 2011 drove 1.5 million people to flee the country. The International
Organization for Migration assisted many of them from Sub-Saharan Africa in returning to

7
Human right watch has held an observer status for IOM Governing Council meetings since 2002.
8
The Libyan Crisis refers to the present humanitarian crisis and political-military instability in Libya, which
began with the Arab Spring demonstrations of 2011, resulting in a civil war, foreign military intervention, and
Muammar Gaddafi's removal and death. The legacy of the civil war and the expansion of armed organizations
caused widespread bloodshed and instability, culminating in a second civil war in 2014.

14
IOM and its role in global migration policy

their home nations.

The IOM was the first response on the scene (IOM, 2011b). On the day the conflict broke
out, its field office in Tunisia, which handled most of the emergency reaction, had only 2-3
workers. IOM had dispatched approximately 1000 personnel to the Tunisian country mission,
who were operating on the ground at the Libyan border, within a week. Soon after the crisis
began, IOM collaborated with UNHCR to establish the "Humanitarian Evacuation Cell"
(HEC), a contact entity between the two organizations at the headquarters level (Kreuder-
Sonnen & Tantow, 2021). It worked with the Libyan government to acquire necessary
permits and entry to areas impacted by ongoing conflict, as well as with NATO to fly
migrants out through the no-fly zone (Aghazarm, Quesada, & Tishler, 2012). Furthermore,
the IOM worked with aid groups to establish temporary camps, conduct required health
checks, and transfer large numbers of refugees out of Libya.
Most the IOM's operational actions during the early stages of the 2011 Libyan migrant crisis
can be classified as part of the organization's main crisis portfolio. At the time, the IOM was
used to negotiate with warring groups to obtain entry to conflict zones, and its skills as a mass
transportation facilitator were well known. However, two elements of the IOM's disaster
reaction in Libya were unprecedented. One was that, in addition to evacuation, IOM began
developing capabilities to assist migrants once they departed their means of conveyance
outside the war zone. IOM took on normal development agency duties by establishing
transition centers, integration programs, and community initiatives. The second was the
IOM's central role as a coordination center for all parties concerned. During the Libyan crisis
it rose to the position of major organizer, ultimately co-leading the Refugee and Migrant
Platform and creating a Joint Operational Framework for Humanitarian Response in Libya
(Brachet, 2016).
The IOM was one of the most active groups engaged in this "management," participating in
the evacuation of approximately 250,000 foreign citizens from Libya over the course of the
year, financed by their usual sponsors, particularly the EU and its member states. The IOM,
like all international organizations, knew how to stage and value its activities in the eyes of
international public opinion by distributing regular reports, photos, and Press Briefing Notes.
The IOM's assistance to people escaping the conflict in difficult circumstances was
universally hailed abroad, and its humanitarian focus might lead one to think that the IOM
had explicitly acted to rectify a crisis. Even though the organization has been active in the
country for several years, changes in their policies on the ground appear to have been minor,
aside from publicly redefining them in humanitarian terms. Humanitarian rhetoric, such as
15
IOM and its role in global migration policy

that used by IOM to legitimize their activities during the 2011 war in Libya, contributes to
this broader push toward migration management, which, despite its inevitable failure,
transforms local and regional patterns of exchange and territorial ordering, with often
disastrous consequences on the ground (Brachet, 2016).
The IOM and its actions in war-torn Libya provide a lens through which we can understand
"crisis management" and even "humanitarian intervention" as part of broader international
control projects of undesirable people, both spatially and politically. Saharan Africa serves as
a test case for a much broader tendency of basic spatial restructuring brought about by a shift
in the character of international politics and humanitarian action (Brachet, 2016).
After the acute period of the Libyan migrant crisis in 2011 had passed, the IOM turned such
lessons into prescriptions for dealing with future crises. First, it used the Libyan model to sell
its member states on the concept of a new funding method. In December 2011, the IOM
Council established the "Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism,"9 a stable fund to
support the IOM's expanded set of humanitarian evacuation efforts in future comparable
circumstances (Aghazarm, Quesada, & Tishler, 2012). Second, the complex and multi-
layered crisis in Libya may have acted as a wake-up call, showing the need for a structured
and coordinated strategy to migrant crisis governance. Thus, the Libyan experience sparked
the creation of the "Migration Crisis Operational Framework" (MCOF), which was
authorized by the IOM Council in 2012 (IOM, 2012). MCOF has since become a focal point
of the IOM's emergency reaction efforts. The document outlines several actions that IOM
personnel on the ground will carry out in crisis circumstances. While the paper justifies job
expansion beyond simple migration issues, it was justified as allowing the organization to
react to such circumstances even better in the future (Betts, 2014). Third, the IOM's better
rapport with UNHCR, as well as the overall effective inter-agency cooperation during the
Libya conflict, sparked long-term structural change. The HEC which was initially "thought to
be time-limited," became a permanent system guaranteeing ongoing collaboration with
UNHCR. Furthermore, the IOM became a related entity to the UN in 2016, formalizing the
IOM's ever-closer embedding within the UN structure and enabling the IOM to take the
position of central administrator in future emergencies (Kreuder-Sonnen & Tantow, 2021).
The different programs that the IOM executed in Libya had two aims: the propagation of a
"management" strategy to international migration, and the organization of movement and
border control. They included education initiatives (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010), staff training in

9
IOM's Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism (MFEM) is a predictable and flexible internal funding
mechanism to facilitate quick access to funding in order to provide rapid assistance during emergencies.

16
IOM and its role in global migration policy

immigration offices, and guidance on border management or migrant policy development.

The IOM's current strategic vision for Libya is to work to ensure that migrants, internally
displaced people (IDPs), and other mobile populations, including those affected by conflict in
Libya, coexist peacefully with local communities in an environment where human rights,
dignity, and well-being are respected and promoted by a migration governance system that
promotes resilience and development.
According to Libya Crisis Response Plan 2022 (IOM, 2022) IOM has had a substantial field
presence in Libya since 2006, with workers presently working from two offices in Tripoli,
one sub-office in Benghazi, and field offices in Gatroun, Zwara, Bani Waleed, and Sabha,
with programs undertaken throughout the south, east, and west of the country. IOM
administers a wide range of programs aimed at addressing immediate humanitarian needs of
impacted communities, as well as programs aimed at strengthening resilience and increasing
the country's capacity to address fundamental causes of instability. IOM's key programs
include: 1) mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS); 2) water, sanitation and
hygiene (WASH); (3) direct assistance to migrants, IDPs, returnees and host communities; 4)
migrant resource and response mechanism (MRRM); 5) migration health; 6) protection
support for migrants; 7) search and rescue and technical cooperation; 8) community
stabilization; 9) voluntary humanitarian return (VHR); 10) labor mobility and human
development (LHD); 11) immigration and border management (IBM); 12) Displacement
Tracking Matrix (DTM).
IOM Libya assists the Libyan government in developing inclusive migration policies that
account for the needs of migrants in accordance with best international practices, as well as in
realizing national priorities in migration, displacement, and human mobility while meeting
international commitments and obligations under international law, international
humanitarian law, and global goals such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(IOM, 2022).
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to mention IOM Libya's strategic framework 2021-2024 (IOM,
2022) which will thus be aligned with the Middle East and North Africa Strategy 2020-
202410, reflecting the critical role that IOM plays in the field of human mobility: protecting,
assisting, and supporting migrants worldwide, developing effective responses to shifting

10
The MENA Regional Strategy 2020–2024 was launched to complement IOM’s comprehensive efforts
towards enhancing an inclusive and equitable environment, guided by evidence-based policy and programming,
and targeting migrants, displaced populations and host communities alike. The strategy was formulated in
accordance with regional priorities and Member States’ efforts to improve migration governance and protect
vulnerable populations at all times.

17
IOM and its role in global migration policy

migration dynamics, and serving as a key source of advice on migration policy, research,
data, and practice. Structural changes include shifting from short-term humanitarian
interventions to more long-term, resilience-focused, and development-oriented methods.
Such strategies should target both vulnerable mobility groups and host/affected communities.

Conclusion

The IOM represents a novel form of neoliberal governance and is suggestive of sovereignty
changes that stretch beyond capital movements to include migrant body management. Federal
governments contract with the IOM to provide a variety of migration-related services that
governments are unable or reluctant to provide for legal and political reasons. This problem
in categorizing serves the IOM well, as it is able to place itself in novel ways to carry out the
transnational job of states while making a profit and employing the vocabulary of rights. As a

18
IOM and its role in global migration policy

result of these factors, the IOM sits at the crossroads of the nation-state, international human
rights frameworks, and neoliberal administration.
The IOM has also established itself as a trustworthy intermediary between states and
migrants, legitimizing their actions and shaping public opinion through research, World
Migration Reports, journals, information sheets, handbooks, and flyers, actively framing what
migration is and how it should be managed. For decades, the IOM has helped the European
Union (EU) and its member states, which are crucial donors to the IOM, legitimize and
execute their immigration policies as part of the securitization of migration (Bigo, 2002).
Since the IOM only recently became a 'Related Organization' of the UN, it has had to defend
its authority by drawing on the debate on the increasing need for global migration
management. The IOM, unlike the UNHCR, does not have a formal protection mandate, but
it wishes to be recognized as an organization that safeguards and supports migrants and
refugees. As a result, the IOM appears to be constantly and effectively constructing this
picture.
That is, the IOM's work is influenced to varying degrees by human rights principles, state
interests, and the desire to outsource—whether to NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, or
private actors—goods and services that were previously provided by states, such as
protection, emergency assistance, and reconstruction assistance.

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