ETHICS

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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES
John Oliver T. Real

SUBJECT CHAIR
SUBJECT MEMBERS
Julian Cyril Christian P. Reyes
Julia Iona I. Balanag
ASSISTANT SUBJECT CHAIR
Aljohanna S. Bandong
Jewel R. Inson Andrew James P. Carandang
SUBJECT ELECTRONIC DATA Christine Selina M. Carpio
PROCESSING Novielyn B. Ducusin
Marian Kristia Y. Lopez
SUBJECT HEADS Lourenz Melbert S. Mondares
Ramon Miguel B. Puentebella
Kristine Cheska D. Fabian
Noli Verne Jan A. Quiambao
Legal Ethics
Cheyenne Arville C. Roldan
Nelia R. Peñaflor Jose Abelardo P. Tecson
Judicial Ethics Diorja Ana L. Villarin
Jean Nickolai R. Ventura
Practical Exercises
EDITORS
Raya Villacorta
CHAIRPERSON FOR ACADEMICS
Roemma Kara G. Palo

VICE-CHAIRPERSON FOR ELECTRONIC
DATA PROCESSING
Lemuel Neil J. Abliter

ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING CORE
MEMBER
San Beda University College of Law

RGCT - Bar Operations Center 2023-2024
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES
CASE DOCTRINES 1
CASE DIGESTS 12
LEGAL ETHICS
MARILU TURLA V. ATTY. JOSE CARINGAL 12
A.C. No. 11641; March 12, 2019
EDITHA FRANCIA V. ATTY. QUIRINO SAGARIO 14
A.C. No. 10938; October 8, 2019
HERNANDO PETELO V. ATTY. SOCRATES RIVERA 16
A.C. No. 10408; October 16, 2019
FE EUFEMIA VALMONTE V. ATTY. JOSE QUESADA, JR. 18
A.C. No. 12487; December 4, 2019
VENSON ANG V. ATTY. SALVADOR BELARO, JR. 20
A.C. No. 12408; December 11, 2019
SPOUSES NOCUENCA VS. ATTY. ALFREDO BENSI 22
A.C. No. 12609, February 10, 2020
RUBEN ANDAYA V. ATTY. EMMANUEL ALADIN
TUMANDA 24
A.C. No. 12209; February 18, 2020
FRANCISCO PAGDANGANAN V. ATTY. ROMEO PLATA 25
A.C. No. 12701; February 26, 2020
CLARA ICK V. ATTY. ALLAN AMAZONA 27
A.C. No. 12375; February 26, 2020
SANTIAGO BURGOS V. ATTY. JOVENCIO JAMES
BEREBER 28
A.C. 12666; March 4, 2020
AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIEVERS,
INC., REPRESENTED BY LOYDA REYES V. ATTY. PATRICK
CARONAN 30
A.C. 12418; March 10, 2020
JONATHAN PARUNGAO V. ATTY. DEXTER LACUANAN 32
A.C. No. 12071; March 11, 2020
V. ATTY. BONIFACIO ALENTAJAN 34
A.C. No. 12161, June 8, 2020
ATTY. FERNANDO PERITO V. ATTY. BERTRAND
BATERINA 36
A.C. No. 12631, July 8, 2020
LOURDES ELANGA V. ATTY. RUTILLO PASOK 38
A.C. No. 12030; September 29, 2020
TEODORO CANSINO V. ATTY. VICTOR SEDERIOSA 39
A.C. No. 8522; October 6, 2020
RISIE BAYGAR V. ATTY. CLARO MANUEL RIVERA 40
A.C. No. 8959; October 7, 2020
MANUEL TABLIZO V. ATTY. JOYRICH GOLANGCO 41
A.C. NO. 10636; October 12, 2020
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ROGER DAP-OG V. ATTY. LUEL MENDEZ 43
A.C. NO. 12017; October 14, 2020
ATTY. ANTONIO MANZANO V. ATTY. CARLOS RIVERA 45
A.C. No. 12173; November 03, 2020
ATTY. JOSEPH VINCENT GO V. ATTY. VIRGILIO TERUEL 47
A.C. No. 11119, November 04, 2020
JOHN PAUL KIENER V. ATTY. RICARDO R. AMORES 49
A.C. No. 9417; November 18, 2020
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. ANINDING
ALAUYA 51
A.M. No. SCC-15-21-P; December 9, 2020
ADELITA VILLAMOR V ATTY. ELY GALLAND JUMAO-AS 53
A.C. No. 8111, 9 December 2020
PRUDENCIO PORTUGUESE, JR. V. ATTY. JERRY CENTRO 55
A.C. NO. 12875; January 26, 2021
ATTY. ROGELIO CONSTANTINO V ATTY. NEMESIO
ARANSAZO, JR. 56
A.C. No. 9701; February 10, 2021
SANNY GERODIAS V. ATTY. TOMAS RIVERAL 58
A.C. No. 12719; February 17, 2021
ATTY. ARISTOTLE DOMINGUEZ V. BANK OF
COMMERCE, AS PURPORTED TRANSFEREE OF
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AND SPOUSES CARMELO, JR. 60
G.R. No. 225207, 29 September 2021
TONY PETER PARTSCH V. ATTY. REYNALDO VITORILLO 62
A.C. No. 10897; January 04, 2022
HOME GUARANTY CORP. V. ATTY. LAMBERTO
TAGAYUNA 63
A.C. No. 13131; February 23, 2022
BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.
V. ATTY. ANTHONY JAY CONSUNJI 65
A.C. No. 11439; January 4, 2022
PELAGIO RICALDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 67
G.R. No. 253724; February 15, 2022
GERTRUDES MAHUNOT ANG V. ATTY. LORD MARAPAO 69
A.C. No. 10297; March 9, 2022
EDGARDO ARELLANO-SINGSON V. ATTY. EDGARDO
CORDEÑO 71
A.C. No. 12817; March 9, 2022
MARIA FELICISIMA GONZAGA V. ATTY. EDGARDO ABAD 72
A.C. No. 13163; March 15, 2022
FORTUNATO DIONISIO, JR. V. ATTYS. MIGUEL
PADERNAL AND DELFIN AGCAOILI, JR. 74
A.C. No. 12673; March 15, 2022
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND JOSEFA PERLA TAN V. ATTY.
MARIA JOHANNA VALLEJO 76
A.C. No. 11219; March 16, 2022
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES JUSTICE AND MRS.
SAMUEL F. REYES V. ATTY. RONALD L. BRILLANTES 77
A.C. No. 9594; April 05, 2022
TITA MANGAYAN V. ATTY. CIPRIANO ROBIELOS III 79
A.C. No. 11520; April 5, 2022
MONICA PONTIANO V. ATTY. FABIAN GAPPI 80
A.C. No. 13118; June 28, 2022
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JUDICIAL ETHICS
RE: INCIDENT REPORT OF THE SECURITY DIVISION AND
ALLEGED VARIOUS INFRACTIONS COMMITTED BY MR.
CLOYD D. GARRA, JUDICIAL STAFF EMPLOYEE II,
MEDIATION, PLANNING AND RESEARCH DIVISION,
PHILIPPINE MEDIATION CENTER OFFICE, PHILIPPINE
JUDICIAL ACADEMY 81
A.M. No. 2019-14-SC, February 10, 2020
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED
EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING JUDGE
GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL NORTE 83
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486; September 8, 2020
ZAHARA PEDATUN MAULANA V. JUDGE OSCAR P.
NOEL, JR. 85
A.M. No. RTJ-21-006; March 15, 2021
IN RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER DATED AUGUST 12, 2010,
COMPLAINING AGAINST JUDGE OFELIA T. PINTO, RTC,
BRANCH 60, ANGELES CITY, PAMPANGA 87
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2289; February 15, 2022
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. BERRYL
BERONDO 89
A.M. No. P-22-046; February 23, 2022
JOY ANN SESE V. JUDGE MANUEL STA. CRUZ, JR. 90
MARCELINO ESPEJON V. JUDGE JORGE EMMANUEL
LORREDO 91
A.M. No. MTJ-22-007; March 9, 2022
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING
JUDGE VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, RTC, BRANCH
10, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN 92
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183; March 15, 2022
CRISTHYN R. ABING V. PRESIDING JUDGE MARIO
MANAYON, MTCC, BRANCH 1, TALISAY CITY, CEBU 94
A.M. No. MTJ-22-006. April 26, 2022
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V.
CHRISTOPHER E. SALAO, CLERK III, BRANCH 32, RTC,
ILOILO CITY, ILOILO 95
A.M. No. P-22-056; June 22, 2022
ATTY. MARLOU L. VELASQUEZ V. HON. GILBERT
MOISES, PRESIDING JUDGE AND CONSTANCIO
ALIMURUNG, SHERIFF IV, OF BRANCH 18, RTC, CEBU
CITY 96
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2534; June 27, 2022
PRACTICAL EXERCISES
PASTORA GANANCIAL V. BETTY CABUGAO 98
G.R. No. 203348, July 06, 2020
ABNER MANGUBAT V. ATTY. REYNALDO HERRERA 100
A.C. No. 9457; April 5, 2022
ANGELES GAJUNERA V. ATTY. RICHARD ENOJO 101
A.C. No. 13211; April 6, 2022
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PIONEER INSURANCE & SURETY CORP. V. TIG
INSURANCE CO. 103
G.R. No. 256177; June 27, 2022 103
LEONARDO SARMIENTO V. ATTY. GREGORIO
FERNANDO, JR. 105
A.C. No. 11304; June 28, 2022 105
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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES
CASE DOCTRINES
A. LEGAL ETHICS
PAYMENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE FEES IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO EXEMPTION FROM
COMPLIANCE WITH MCLE REQUIREMENTS
The non-compliance fee is a mere penalty imposed on the lawyer who fails to comply with the MCLE
requirements within the compliance period and is in no way a grant of exemption from compliance to the
lawyer who thus paid. (Marilu Turla v. Atty. Jose Caringal, A.C. No. 11641; March 12, 2019).
ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY FROM A CLIENT ESTABLISHES AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT

RELATIONSHIP AND GIVES RISE TO THE DUTY OF FIDELITY TO THE CLIENT'S CAUSE
Once a lawyer agrees to represent a client, he/she is duty-bound to exert his/her best effort and to serve
the latter with utmost diligence and competence. A lawyer owes fidelity to his/her client's cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him/her. A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him/her by his/her client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he/she must be held
administratively liable. (Editha Francia v. Atty. Quirino Sagario, A.C. No. 10938; October 8, 2019).
THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT IS IN

THE NATURE OF A PRIVILEGE OR FRANCHISE
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions and is reserved only for those who meet the
twin standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is so delicately imbued with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of this Court to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. (Hernando Petelo v. Atty. Socrates Rivera, A.C. No. 10408; October 16, 2019).
THE COURT MAY STILL IMPOSE PENALTIES UPON THE DISBARRED LAWYER FOR THE SOLE
PURPOSE OF RECORDING
Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice
law. While the Court can no longer impose the penalty upon the disbarred lawyer, it can still give the
corresponding penalty only for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal file with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC), which should be taken into consideration in the event that the disbarred lawyer
subsequently files a petition to lift his disbarment. (Fe Eufemia Valmonte v. Atty. Jose Quesada, Jr., A.C.
No. 12487; December 4, 2019).
INACTIVITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW DOES NOT EXEMPT AN ERRING LAWYER FROM
LIABILITIES OR PENALTIES
To begin with, no law or statute provides that the penalties against an erring lawyer cannot be imposed if
said lawyer is inactive in the practice of law by any reason such as election in public office. Despite his
being inactive in the practice of law, the fact remains that he is still a member of the legal profession.
Hence, the Court is not precluded from conducting disciplinary investigations against him or imposing
disciplinary sanctions if so warranted. (Venson Ang v. Atty. Salvador Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408; December
11, 2019).
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LAWYERS WHILE WORKING IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION CAN STILL ACT UPON THEIR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
While lawyers are mandated to act with dignity and in a manner that inspires confidence in the legal
profession, their rights must still be protected just like every ordinary individual. The legal profession and
the threat of disbarment should not be used as a means to provoke lawyers who are acting well within
their rights. (Spouses Nocuenca v. Atty. Alfredo Bensi, A.C. No. 12609; February 10, 2020).
ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER IS A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer is a ground for disciplinary action. It indicates the lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed upon him and his lack of personal honesty and good moral
character rendering him unworthy of public confidence. (Ruben Andaya v. Atty. Emmanuel Aladin
Tumanda, A.C. No. 12209; February 18, 2020).
HARASSING TACTICS OF FILING MULTIPLE GROUNDLESS AND BASELESS SUITS

CONSTITUTE GROSS MISCONDUCT WHICH IS A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIO N
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the rights of
their clients, but also of their colleagues and their colleagues' clients, appropriate disciplinary measures
under the law, such as suspension and disbarment, must apply to rectify their wrongful acts. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Francisco Pagdanganan v. Atty.
Romeo Plata, A.C. No. 12701; February 26, 2020).
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE
Settled is the rule that in disbarment proceedings, the complainant must satisfactorily establish the
allegations of his or her complaint through substantial evidence. Mere allegations without proof are
disregarded considering the gravity of the penalty prayed for. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence. (Clara Ick v. Atty. Allan Amazona, A.C. No. 12375; February 26,
2020).
THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER REPRESENTS INCONSISTENT INTERESTS

OF TWO OR MORE OPPOSING PARTIES
In determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest, it is essential to
determine whether: (1) "a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at
the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;" (2) "the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty;" and (3) "a lawyer would
be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment. (Santiago Burgos v. Atty. Jovencio James Bereber, A.C.
No. 12666; March 4, 2020).
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IBP’S DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS ARE FOR THOSE BELONGING IN THE LEGAL

PROFESSION ONLY
Disciplinary proceedings conducted by the IBP are reserved only for those belonging in the legal
profession. Nonetheless, it is only fitting to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State only on those who possess and continue to possess the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. (AA Total Learning Center for Young Achievers, Inc.,
represented by Loyda Reyes v. Atty. Patrick Caronan, A.C. No. 12418; March 10, 2020).
MERE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT RAISE A PRESUMPTION OF

CONFIDENTIALITY, IT MUST BE SHOWN AND PROVEN THAT CONFIDENTIALITY IS
INTENDED BY THE CLIENT
Under Canon 21 of the CPR, "A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated." It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does
not raise a presumption of confidentiality. Proof must be presented that the client intended the
communication to be confidential. (Jonathan Parungao v. Atty. Dexter Lacuanan, A.C. No. 12071; March
11, 2020).
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE LAWS, PROMOTE RESPECT TO THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES, NOT DELAY ONE’S CAUSE NOR MISUSE JUDICIAL PROCESSES
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a
party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari.
(Guillermo Villanueva, representing United Coconut Planters Life Assurance Corporation v. Atty.
Bonifacio Alentajan, A.C. No. 12161; June 8, 2020).
A LAWYER REPRESENTING HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW DOES
NOT WARRANT DISBARMENT, IT BEING THE MOST SEVERE FORM OF DISCIPLINARY
SANCTION
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar. (Atty. Fernando Perito v. Atty. Bertrand Baterina, A.C. No. 12631; July, 8, 2020).
NOTARIZING A MORTGAGE DOCUMENT AND RECEIVING PART OF PROCEEDS FROM SUCH

MORTGAGE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF NOTARIAL PRACTICE
By notarizing the mortgage document and subsequently receiving part of the proceeds thereof, Atty.
Pasok violated Rule 4, Section 3 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice which states: SEC. 3.
Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he will receive, as a
direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law. (Lourdes Elanga v. Atty. Rutillo Pasok, A.C.
No. 12030; September 29, 2020).
PRACTICE OF LAW INCLUDES NOTARIAL PRACTICE

A lawyer who has been suspended from the practice of law by the Court must refrain from performing
all functions which would require the application of his legal knowledge within the period of suspension.
The practice of law includes any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
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procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It comprises the performance of acts which are
characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill. Guided by the foregoing on what constitutes a practice of law, it is beyond
cavil that notarizing documents constitutes a practice of law. (Teodoro Cansino v. Atty. Victor Sederiosa,
A.C. No. 8522; October 6, 2020).
A MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR’S DUTIES COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A VIOLATION OF

THE LAWYER’S OATH AND THE CPR
Atty. Rivera’s acts could not be considered as a violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR, as Municipal
Administrator, one of his duties is to "assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the local
government unit, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and for this
purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government unit." The
implementation of a closure order and the issuance of business permits may be considered well within
this function of a Municipal Administrator. (Risie Baygar v. Atty. Claro Manuel Rivera, A.C. No. 8959;
October 7, 2020).
MISCONDUCT IN THE DISCHARGE OF A LAWYER’S DUTIES AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL,

NOT A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY SANCTION AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR
A lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar. (Manuel Tablizo v. Atty. Joyrich Golangco, A.C. No. 10636; October 12, 2020).
LAWYERS SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL OR DECEITFUL

CONDUCT
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor, whether in his profession or private life because good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of
such privilege. (Roger Dap-og v. Atty. Luel Mendez, A.C. No. 12017; October 14, 2020).
NOTARIZATION IS INVESTED WITH SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC INTEREST, ONLY THOSE

QUALIFIED OR AUTHORIZED MAY ACT AS NOTARIES PUBLIC
Corollarily, Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is clear. Only a person who is commissioned
as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which
the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules
and the Rules of Court. Hence, a violation thereof should therefore not be dealt with lightly to preserve
the integrity of notarization. (Atty. Antonio Manzano v. Atty. Carlos Rivera, A.C. No. 12173; November 3,
2020).
FILING OF MULTIPLE COMPLAINTS WITH THE SAME CAUSES OF ACTION, PARTIES AND
RELIEFS CONSTITUTES FORUM SHOPPING
It is well-settled that the essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining
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its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to
claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. (Atty. Joseph Vincent
Go v. Atty. Virgilio Teruel, A.C. No. 11119; November 4, 2020).
NOTARY PUBLIC IS PROHIBITED FROM PERFORMING A NOTARIAL ACT IF SIGNATORY IS

NOT IN HIS PRESENCE AT THE TIME OF NOTARIZATION
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what
is stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question,
the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party
and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act or deed. (John Paul Kiener v. Atty. Ricardo
Amores, A.C. No. 9417; November 18, 2020).
A CLERK OF COURT IS THE DESIGNATED CUSTODIAN OF COURT PROPERTIES AND

RECORDS, THUS, HE IS PRIMARILY LIABLE FOR ANY LOSS, SHORTAGE OR IMPAIRMENT
THEREOF
Clerks of Court perform vital functions in the administration of justice. Their functions are imbued with
public interest that any act which would compromise, or tend to compromise, that degree of diligence
and competence expected of them in the exercise of their functions would destroy public accountability
and effectively weaken the faith of the people in the justice system. Clerks of Court are tasked with the
collections of court funds. As they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody, they are duty bound
to immediately deposit with authorized government depositories their collections on various funds.
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Aninding Alauya, A.M. No. SCC-15-21-P; December 9, 2020).
A LAWYER WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS THAT REPRESENTED ANOTHER WITHOUT

CONSENT IS LIABLE FOR HIS ACTS AS A DISREPUTE TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. He may have been forgiven by his complainant, but the disrepute to the legal
profession that he had caused cannot simply be repaired by a mere warning or serving a short-lived
suspension from law practice. (Adelita Villamor v. Atty. Ely Galland Jumao-as, A.C. No. 8111; December
9, 2020).
THE LAWYER’S OATH MANDATES EVERY LAWYER TO CONDUCT HIMSELF/HERSELF

ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF HIS/HER KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION, WITH ALL GOOD
FIDELITY AS WELL TO THE COURTS AS TO HIS/HER CLIENTS
Atty. Centro's unjustifiable negligence and abandonment of his client's cause violated the Lawyer's Oath
as well as the CPR. He was grossly negligent of his duty as counsel and was manifestly disinterested in
his client's cause. He must be reminded that as a lawyer, he is duty-bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion. This is because a lawyer
owes fidelity to his client's cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him. (Prudencio Portuguese, Jr. v. Atty. Jerry Centro, A.C. No. 12875; January 26, 2021).
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A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS EVEN WHEN A LAWYER DISPENSED A LEGAL

ADVICE AS A PERSONAL FAVOR; A LAWYER SHALL KEEP INVIOLATE PRIVILEGED
INFORMATION CONFIDED TO HIM BY HIS CLIENT; A LAWYER SHALL REFRAIN
REPRESENTING CONFLICTING INTEREST AGAINST HIS CLIENT
A "lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal
concern. The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer and preserve the confidential and trust relation
which exists between attorney and client. Meanwhile, a conflict of interest exists where a lawyer
represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs an act that will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any
knowledge, he previously acquired from his first client against the latter. (Atty. Rogelio Constantino v.
Atty. Nemesio Aransazo, Jr., A.C. No. 9701; February 10, 2021).
CONNIVING PROOF MUST BE PRESENTED FOR A CHARGE TO JUSTIFY A DISCIPLINARY

ACTION AGAINST A LAWYER
Settled is the rule that for a charge to justify a disciplinary action against a lawyer, the complainant must
present convincing proof to substantiate the charge. Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent. (Sanny
Gerodias v. Atty. Tomas Riveral, A.C. No. 12719; February 17, 2021).
A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT MAY BE BASIS OF DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF

ATTORNEY’S FEES BY A LAWYER
When a compromise agreement is entered into by the parties and as a consequence of which, the suit
did not result in a court's judgment on money claims, said compromise agreement may serve as a basis
in the award for attorney's fees. (Atty. Aristotle Dominguez v. Bank of Commerce, as purported transferee
of Traders Royal Bank, and Spouses Carmelo, Jr., G.R. No. 225207; September 29, 2021).
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PHILIPPINE PRIVATE LANDS IS TOO

BASIC A RULE FOR EVEN NON-ATTORNEYS TO BE UNAWARE OF
The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands is too basic a rule for even non-
attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorillo is presumed to know this. Despite being equipped
with such knowledge, Atty. Vitorillo still marketed the subject property for sale to Partsch, a Swiss
national. More telling of Atty. Vitorillo's ethical obliquity is his questionable instruction to Partsch to just
proceed with the fencing of the subject property without any acceptable guarantee of Atty. Vitorillo's title
thereto. (Tony Peter Partsch v. Atty. Reynaldo Vitorillo, A.C. No. 10897; January 4, 2022).
A LAWYER IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR PURPOSES OF SATISFYING THE LEGAL FEES AND
DISBURSEMENTS DUE TO HIM
It has been consistently held that any money or property collected for the client coming into the lawyer's
possession should be promptly declared and reported to the client. The Court, however, recognizes that
a lawyer is entitled to a lien over funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come
into his possession for purposes of satisfying the legal fees and disbursements due to him. (Home
Guaranty Corp. v. Atty. Lamberto Tagayuna, A.C. No. 13131; February 23, 2022).
LAWYERS MUST KEEP RECORDS OF TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS

It is incumbent upon a lawyer to keep records of his transactions with clients as a matter of prudence and
due diligence. Ethical and practical considerations require lawyers to issue receipts to their clients, even
6
if it was not demanded, and to keep copies of the said receipts for his own records. Thus, he cannot simply
claim that the records were already with the Finance Department of BASECO. (Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company, Inc. v. Atty. Anthony Jay Consunji, A.C. No. 11439; January 4, 2022)
PRIVATE LAWYERS CANNOT BE HIRED BY THE COA

Accordingly, public funds shall not be utilized for payment of the services of a private legal counsel or law
firm to represent government agencies in court or to render legal services for them. In the event that such
legal services cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, the
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as
the case may be, and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured before
the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. (Pelagio Ricalde v. Commission On Audit, G.R.
No. 253724; February 15, 2022)
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ARISES EITHER IN RELATED OR UNRELATED CASES

The first test of inconsistency refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in
the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party
against whom the attorney appears is his or her former client in a matter which is related, directly or
indirectly, to the present controversy. (Gertrudes Mahunot Ang v. Atty. Lord Marapao, A.C. No. 10297;
March 9, 2022)
FOR PURPOSES OF THE DISQUALIFICATION RULE, AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS A PRINCIPAL

PARTY
Rule II, Section 10 of the Rules on Notarial Practice states: SEC. 10. Principal. — "Principal" refers to a person
appearing before the notary public whose act is the subject of notarization. (Edgardo Arellano-Singson
v. Atty. Edgardo Cordeño, A.C. No. 12817; March 9, 2022)
FORGERY OF A COURT DECISION AND FALSIFICATION OF AN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

WARRANTS DISBARMENT OF THE ERRING LAWYER
The Court has time and again in several cited cases held that respondents committed falsification or
forgery and that such respondent-lawyers benefitted from the use of fake documents which shows gross
misconduct and is unfit to continue his membership in the bar. (Maria Felicisima Gonzaga v. Atty.
Edgardo Abad, A.C. No. 13163; March 15, 2022)
COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE IS NO LONGER A COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

A Community Tax Certificate is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity not
only because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Notarial Rules.
Moreover, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the persons appearing before notaries public
which the Notarial Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which notaries public
can ascertain the person's identity. Furthermore, reliance on community tax certificates alone is already
a punishable indiscretion by a notary public. (Fortunato Dionisio, Jr. v. Attys. Miguel Padernal and Delfin
Agcaoili, Jr., A.C. No. 12673; March 15, 2022)
NON-APPEARANCE OF SIGNATURE OF PARTY IN NOTARIZED DOCUMENT DOES NOT

PRECLUDE SUCH PARTY BEING A PRINCIPAL
Notarizing a document where one of the contracting parties was her relative within the fourth civil degree
is a clear circumvention of the Rules on Notarial Practice. Furthermore, it is immaterial that her uncle’s
signature did not appear on the sale documents since it does not alter the fact that respondent’s uncle is
7
a principal party to the sale. (Spouses Antonio and Josefa Perla Tan v. Atty. Maria Johanna Vallejo, A.C.
No. 11219; March 16, 2022)
CLIENT’S MISREPRESENTATIONS SHOULD NOT BE THE SOLE BASIS OF A LAWYER IN

HANDLING THE CASE
A lawyer who agrees to take up the cause of a client is expected to competently and diligently protect the
latter’s rights in accordance with his or her duties under the CPR. Failure to do so would render the lawyer
answerable not only to his or her client, but also to the legal profession, the courts, and society. (The Heirs
of the Late Spouses Justice and Mrs. Samuel Reyes v. Atty. Ronald Brillantes, A.C. No. 9594; April 05,
2022)
ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER WARRANTS DISCIPLINARY SANCTION

Nonpayment of just obligations coupled with issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless if the
issuance was made in a professional or private capacity warrants disciplinary sanction. Such acts are
indicative of the unfitness of the lawyer for the trust and confidence reposed on him/her, and
demonstrates a lack of personal honesty and good moral character. (Tita Mangayan v. Atty. Cipriano
Robielos Iii, A.C. No. 11520; April 5, 2022)
FAILURE TO ATTEND HEARINGS AND SUBMIT POSITION PAPERS IN THE CLIENT’S CASE
CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF THE CPR
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the rights of
their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice, appropriate disciplinary
measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify
their wrongful acts. (Monica Pontiano v. Atty. Fabian Gappi, A.C. No. 13118; June 28, 2022)
B. JUDICIAL ETHICS
A MAN HAVING AN ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP WITH A WOMAN NOT HIS WIFE IS WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF "DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL CONDUCT" UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAWS;
DELIBERATE OMISSION OF MATERIAL FACTS IN SALNS CONSTITUTES DISHONEST
This Court has held in a number of cases that a man having an illicit relationship with a woman not his
wife is within the purview of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Civil Service Laws. It is undisputed
even by Garra that he remains legally married to Osbual. Garra's deliberate omission of this fact in his
SALNs for several years constitutes dishonesty. "Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or
distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray and
an intent to violate the truth." (Re: Incident Report of the Security Division and Alleged Various Infractions
Committed by Mr. Cloyd D. Garra, Judicial Staff Employee II, Mediation, Planning and Research Division,
Philippine Mediation Center Office, Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No. 2019-14-SC; February 10,
2020).
RESPONDENT JUDGE'S DEATH DURING REVIEW OF HIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BY THE

SUPREME COURT IS A CAUSE FOR ITS DISMISSAL
The death of a respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution is a cause for its dismissal.
Otherwise stated, the non-dismissal of a pending administrative case in view of the death of the
respondent public servant is a transgression of his or her Constitutional rights to due process and
presumption of innocence. Simply put, upon the death of the respondent public servant awaiting final
8
judgment, the dismissal of the administrative case against him/her should necessarily follow. (Re:
Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding Judge Godofredo B. Abdul, Jr.,
Branch 4, Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486 (Resolution);
September 8, 2020).
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF COMPLAINANT'S

AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
Time and time again, this Court emphasized that a Judge is at all times duty bound to render just, correct,
and impartial decisions in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity.
(Zahara Pendatun Maulana v. Judge Oscar Noel, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-006; March 15, 2021).
PETITION FOR PARTIAL JUDICIAL CLEMENCY MAY BE GRANTED ON GROUND OF

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AMIDST PANDEMIC
In In Re: Ong, the Court held that other factors, such as the petitioner's advanced age, deteriorating health,
and economic difficulties, may be considered in granting judicial clemency, as were alleged in this case.
(In Re: Anonymous Letter Dated August 12, 2010, Complaining Against Judge Ofelia Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-
11-2289; February 15, 2022)
FAILURE TO FOLLOW OCA DIRECTIVE AMOUNTS TO INSUBORDINATION OF THE SUPREME

COURT ITSELF
All directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of this
Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be respected. These
directives are not mere requests but should be complied with promptly and completely. Indefensible
disregard of the orders of the OCA shows his disrespect for and contempt, not just for the OCA, but also
for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees
through the OCA. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Berryl Berondo, A.M. No. P-22-046; February 23,
2022)
JUDGES SHOULD NOT CAUSE UNDUE DELAY BUT ADMINISTER JUSTICE PROMPTLY
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. (Joy Ann
Sese v. Judge Manuel Sta. Cruz, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-20-2601; February 28, 2022)
UNNECESSARY RELIGIOUS REMARKS AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY UNRELATED TO THE

CASE CONSTITUTES IMPROPRIETY
While judges are not completely stripped of their freedom to express, exercise, or uphold their religious
beliefs and convictions, it goes without saying that in doing so, their foremost duty to obey the rule of law
should not stand to suffer. (Marcelino Espejon v. Judge Jorge Emmanuel Lorredo, A.M. No. MTJ-22-007;
March 9, 2022)
A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY MUST INCLUDE AN APOLOGY AND FULL

ACCEPTANCE OF WRONG COMMITTED
Clemency should be preceded by an apology, which must likewise be "preceded by a full and
unconditional acceptance of the wrong committed and the justness of the penalty imposed." To deserve
judicial clemency, evidence of remorse and potential must be shown. The claimant officers must convince
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"that the long period of dismissal moved the erring officers to reform themselves, exhibit remorse and
repentance, and develop a capacity to live up again to the standards demanded from court officers."
(Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Presiding Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183;
March 15, 2022)
PROPRIETY OF INHIBITION SHOULD BE RESOLVED JUDICIALLY

Orders of inhibition are judicial, not administrative in nature. Thus, questions regarding the competency
of the inhibiting judge should be determined in an appropriate judicial proceeding. (Cristhyn Abing v.
Presiding Judge Mario Manayon, A.M. No. MTJ-22-006. April 26, 2022)
RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT APPLIES TO CLERK OF COURTS

In A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC 18 dated October 2, 2018 and July 7, 2020, the Court amended Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court by extending its coverage to include administrative disciplinary cases against all officials,
employees, and personnel of the judiciary, among others. (Office of the Court Administrator v.
Christopher Salao, A.M. No. P-22-056; June 22, 2022)
UNDUE DELAY WITHOUT ORDER OF EXTENSION GRANTED BY THE SUPREME COURT

MERITS AN ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION
Case law instructs that when a judge, for some valid reason, cannot comply with the required deadline,
an extension of time should be requested from this Court to avoid administrative sanctions. Indeed, this
Court allows certain leeway to judges and grants them reasonable extensions of time to dispose cases
upon proper application and on meritorious grounds. (Atty. Marlou Velasquez v. Hon. Gilbert Moises,
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2534; June 27, 2022)
C. PRACTICAL EXERCISES
MERE FORMAL INFIRMITIES IN THE NOTARIZATION OF THE INSTRUMENT WILL NOT
INVALIDATE THE MORTGAGE
An irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private
document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence. The
irregular notarization — or, for that matter, the lack of notarization — does not thus necessarily affect the
validity of the contract reflected in the document. (Pastora Ganancial v. Betty Cabugao, G.R. No. 203348;
July 6, 2020).
UNDERTAKING OF CLIENT TO SECURE SPA AT A LATER TIME IS NOT SUFFICIENT

Rule 19.03 of the CPR commands that "[a] lawyer shall not allow his/her client to dictate the procedure in
handling the case." Being the counsel on record, Atty. Herrera is expected to be knowledgeable about
substantive law and procedural rules and should not merely accede to the instructions of his client. After
all, "a lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments" as mandated by Canon 5 of the CPR. (Abner
Mangubat v. Atty. Reynaldo Herrera, A.C. No. 9457; April 5, 2022)
DRAFTING OF SPA REQUIRED TO FILE A CASE IS AN OBLIGATION OF THE LAWYER

When a lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable degree of
care and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients'
interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor. Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling
his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact
10
formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due
his client is per se a violation. (Angeles Gajunera v. Atty. Richard Enojo, A.C. No. 13211; April 6, 2022)
AFFIDAVIT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE OR BOARD RESOLUTION IS

ALLOWED IN SPECIAL ADR RULES
Failure to attach a secretary’s certificate or special power of attorney authorizing the person who signed
the verification and certification is not fatal to cases covered by the Special ADR Rules. In other words, it
will not cause the dismissal of the petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.
(Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. v. TIG Insurance Co., G.R. No. 256177; June 27, 2022)
FALSIFIED SPA BEARING SIGNATURES OF DECEASED PRINCIPALS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON

THE GROUND THAT IT IS A MERE REPRODUCTION OF PRIOR SPAS
Even assuming the existence of previous SPAs in respondent's favor, the fact remains that the recent SPA
was still executed after the death of Gregorio Fernando in 1997 and bears the forged signature of Natividad
Fernando. (Leonardo Sarmiento v. Atty. Gregorio Fernando, Jr., A.C. No. 11304; June 28, 2022)
11
CASE DIGESTS
LEGAL ETHICS
PAYMENT OF NON-COMPLIANCE FEES IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO
EXEMPTION FROM COMPLIANCE WITH MCLE REQUIREMENTS
MARILU TURLA V. ATTY. JOSE CARINGAL

A.C. No. 11641; March 12, 2019
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative case arose from a verified Complaint filed by Marilu C. Turla (Turla) against the
respondent, Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal) before the CBD of the IBP. Turla is the
petitioner in a Special Proceedings case where Atty. Caringal is the counsel for the opposing side.
In July 2010, Turla discovered that Atty. Caringla has not attended the required MCLE seminars for
the MCLE II and MCLE III Compliance Periods from April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007 and April 25,
2007 to April 14, 2010, respectively. Despite such non-compliance with the MCLE requirements
for the MCLE II and MCLE III Compliance Periods, Atty. Caringal signed the pleadings and motions
in several cases which indicated his exemption from the MCLE requirements from the said
periods. However, as it turned out, the receipt for payment that Atty. Caringal referred to his
payment of the MCLE non-compliance fee and not for his MCLE exemption.
In her complaint, Turla charged Atty. Caringal with failure to take the MCLE seminars for the MCLE
II and III compliance periods as required under BM No. 850. Turla averred that under BM No. 850,
Atty. Caringal’s non-compliance resulted in his being listed as a delinquent member. Although
Turla admitted that Atty. Caringal belatedly complied with the MCLE requirement on March 10,
2011, she asserted that a gross infraction has already been committed and he should be
sanctioned accordingly.
In his Answer, Atty. Caringal averred that he had taken several units for the MCLE I Compliance
Period (from April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004), but was unable to complete the required units. He
contended that he supposedly completed the required units for MCLE II Compliance Period
however, the MCLE supervising officer erroneously applied said units to his MCLE I instead.
Thereafter, on January 7, 2009, he paid an “exemption fee” of PhP1,000.00 for his uncompleted
MCLE I. On January 19, 2009, a Certificate of Compliance was issued to Atty. Caringal for his
completion of MCLE I. Upon verification, Atty. Caringal was informed that he still has some units
left before his completion of his MCLE II so he then paid non-compliance fees in the amount of
PhP2,000.00 for his MCLE II and III.
ISSUE
Does the payment of the non-compliance fees for the non-compliance with the MCLE
requirements amount to exemption?
RULING
12
No, the payment of non-compliance fees for non-compliance with the MCLE requirements does
not amount to exemption.
Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing Rules which provides for the compliance procedures clearly
show that a non-compliant lawyer must pay a non-compliance fee of PhP1,000.00 and still
comply with the MCLE requirements within a 60-day period, otherwise, he/she will be listed as
a delinquent IBP member after investigation by the IBP-CBD and recommendation by the MCLE
Committee. The non-compliance fee is a mere penalty imposed on the lawyer who fails to
comply with the MCLE requirements within the compliance period and is in no way a grant of
exemption from compliance to the lawyer who thus paid.
In this case, there was no showing that Atty. Caringal was ever issued and that he actually
received a Non-Compliance Notice as required by the MCLE Implementing Rules. Moreover, by
March 11, 2011, he has already belatedly complied with the MCLE requirements for MCLE II and III
compliance period. Although Atty. Caringal could not be declared a delinquent member as the
60-day period because such period has not commenced to run, he is still being held liable for
knowingly and willfully misrepresenting in the pleadings that he had signed and submitted to the
courts that he was exempted from MCLE II and III.
Therefore, Atty. Caringal’s payment of the non-compliance fee merely served as his penalty for
non-compliance with the MCLE requirements for the MCLE II and III compliance period and such
payment cannot amount to exemption from the MCLE requirement.
13
ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY FROM A CLIENT ESTABLISHES AN ATTORNEY-

CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND GIVES RISE TO THE DUTY OF FIDELITY TO
THE CLIENT'S CAUSE
EDITHA FRANCIA V. ATTY. QUIRINO SAGARIO

A.C. No. 10938; October 8, 2019
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint filed by Editha M. Francia against the
respondent, Atty. Quirino Sagario, before the CBD of the IBP, for failing to file the petition for
annulment despite receiving his legal fees.
The complainant, Editha Francia, contracted the services of Atty. Sagario to handle the annulment
of her marriage to her husband, who then agreed to represent her for a total fee of PhP70,000.
After receipt of a total sum of PhP57,000 from the complainant, Atty. Sagario avoided the
complainant’s phone calls, limited his communication with the complainant through text
messages, and canceled their appointments. Despite several demands from the complainant,
Atty. Sagario did not file the petition. After six months had lapsed without Atty. Sagario having
filed anything in court in connection with the complainant's annulment case, complainant asked
him to return the total amount she had paid. In response, Atty. Sagario promised to return the
money he received from the complainant but failed to do so despite repeated demands. The
complainant filed a small claims case against Atty. Sagario before the MeTC of Quezon City, to
which it ordered Atty. Sagario to pay the complainant the amount of PhP50,000.00 with interest.
Notwithstanding the MeTC's Decision ordering him to return the amount he received from
complainant, Atty. Sagario has yet to pay the complainant the amount adjudged. Complainant
was compelled to bring the matter before the IBP. The IBP ruled to the suspension of Atty. Sagario
from the practice of law for two years for violation of Canon 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE
Was Atty. Sagario guilty of professional misconduct for violating Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Sagario was guilty of professional misconduct for violating Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the
Code.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently provides that a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Once a lawyer agrees to represent a client, he/she is duty-bound to exert
his/her best effort and to serve the latter with utmost diligence and competence. A lawyer owes
fidelity to his/her client's cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him/her. A lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him/her by his/her client
constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he/she must be held administratively liable.
14
In this case, Atty. Sagario breached his duties to his client when he failed to exercise due diligence
in handling the annulment case of complainant. In fact, to the detriment of the complainant, he
failed to render any legal service to her despite receipt of fees in the total amount of
PhP57,000.00. This clearly violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Atty. Sagario also violated Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 17 when he failed to return
the amount of PhP 57,000.00 upon the complainant's demand. The highly fiduciary nature of an
attorney-client relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money received
from his/her client. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the money he/she received from
his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she has appropriated the same for his/her
own use. An attorney-client relationship requires utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the
part of the lawyer. In this case, Atty. Sagario clearly fell short of the demands required of him as
a member of the Bar.
Therefore, Atty. Sagario was guilty of professional misconduct for violating Canons 16, 17 and 18
of the Code.
15
THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT BUT IS IN THE NATURE OF A PRIVILEGE OR FRANCHISE
HERNANDO PETELO V. ATTY. SOCRATES RIVERA

A.C. No. 10408; October 16, 2019
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative complaint stemmed from the alleged unauthorized filing by respondent Atty.
Socrates Rivera (Atty. Rivera) of a civil complaint before the RTC. Upon discovery of the pendency
of the Complaint, complainant Hernando Petelo (Petelo) filed a Petition before this Court praying
for the disbarment, suspension, or imposition of any disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Rivera for alleged commission of acts constituting malpractice of law, misconduct, and violation
of the CPR.
Petelo’s sister, Fe, designated him as Attorney-in-Fact to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement
with Red Dragon Builders Corporation (RDBC) for the construction of a townhouse on the lot
owned by Fe. The owners of RDBC, inveigled Petelo into surrendering to them the original copy
of TCT No. 455711 which they eventually used as collateral for the Php8 million loan they
contracted with World Partners Bank (WPB) without the knowledge and consent of Petelo.
Because of the failure to pay the monthly amortizations, WPB instituted foreclosure proceedings
against the mortgage which in return they emerged as the highest bidder. Upon securing a
certified true copy of TCT No. 455711, Petelo learned that an entry of lis pendens was annotated
at the back of the title which was filed by Atty. Rivera purportedly on Petelo's and Fe's behalf.
Petelo filed the instant administrative complaint charging Atty. Rivera with negligence in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer, because he did not verify the identity of the person he was
dealing with prior to the filing of the civil suit. Petelo asserted that Atty. Rivera engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct in violation of the CPR.
When Atty. Rivera submitted his Comments, he presented a different version each time he
submitted a comment. Atty. Rivera admitted authorship of the Complaint because a certain
person representing himself to be Hernando Petelo sought to engage his legal services regarding
the filing of the civil suit. In compliance with the Order of the Investigating Commissioner, Atty.
Rivera filed a Comment denying any participation in the preparation and the filing of the
complaint. He even disowned the signatures affixed therein and claimed that his signature was
forged. During one of the scheduled mandatory conferences before the Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Rivera made the following admission: "that he learned about the case thru a
disbarred lawyer with whom he had previous collaborations; that his details were still being used
by Tabalingcos' office because before, he allowed them to sign for him on 'minor' pleadings." In
his yet another Comment Atty. Rivera reversed himself and reverted to his earliest version
wherein he admitted that he was the one who filed the civil complaint.
ISSUE
Was respondent Atty. Rivera liable for allowing another person who has no license to practice
law, to sign pleadings and file a suit before the court using his signature and details?
16
RULING
Yes, respondent Atty. Rivera must be held liable for allowing another person who has no license
to practice law, to sign pleadings and file a suit before the court using his signature and details.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions and is reserved only for those who
meet the twin standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is so delicately imbued with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of this Court to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare." Atty. Rivera abused a privilege that is only personal to him. By
allowing a non-lawyer to sign and submit pleadings before the court, Atty. Rivera made a
mockery of the law practice which is deeply imbued with public interest.
By delegating to someone else the work that is reserved only for lawyers, Atty. Rivera violated
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, the actuation of Atty.
Rivera tended to mislead the Court. Indeed, the RTC of Makati City was misled into believing that
the complaint was filed by the real party-in-interest and that Atty. Rivera was duly authorized to
file the same. As it turned out, the RTC eventually dismissed the complaint after it was established
thru the Manifestation filed by Petelo that it was filed not by the real party-in-interest or by the
duly authorized representative. Atty. Rivera, thus, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10, committed
a falsehood, or consented to the doing of any in court; he not only misled the RTC but likewise
wasted its precious time and resources.
Hence, the foregoing acts of Atty. Rivera constituted violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 9.01, Canon 9, Rule 1.10, Canon 1, and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
17
THE COURT MAY STILL IMPOSE PENALTIES UPON THE DISBARRED

LAWYER FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF RECORDING
FE EUFEMIA VALMONTE V. ATTY. JOSE QUESADA, JR.

A.C. No. 12487; December 4, 2019
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
A Complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant Fe Eufemia Estalilla-Valmonte against

respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. for violation of the Supreme Court's directive suspending
him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year pursuant to its Resolution in Dagala v.
Atty. Quesada, Jr.
Complainant alleged that she is the wife of Marcelo A. Valmonte, Jr.; that her husband was charged
with the murder of her brother, Manolo Estalilla (Manolo); that in March 2014, respondent entered
his appearance in the said case as private prosecutor on behalf of the common-law wife of
Manolo; that respondent filed several pleadings in the said case; and that complainant later
learned that respondent entered his appearance and filed pleadings in court while he was serving
his suspension from the practice of law. Despite due notice, respondent failed to file a comment
and to appear during the mandatory conference before the CBD of the IBP. Respondent was
further meted with the penalty of another year from the practice of law for his unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent was imposed the ultimate penalty of disbarment by the Court in
Zarcilla v. Quesada, Jr.
ISSUE
Can the Court still penalize a disbarred lawyer?
RULING
Yes, the Court can still penalize a disbarred lawyer.
Considering that the Court had already imposed upon respondent the ultimate penalty of
disbarment for his gross misconduct and willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the court in
an earlier complaint for disbarment filed against him in Zarcilla v. Quesada, Jr., the penalty of
additional six months suspension from the practice of law can no longer be imposed upon him.
The reason is obvious: "once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed
regarding his privilege to practice law."
While the Court can no longer impose the penalty upon the disbarred lawyer, it can still give the
corresponding penalty only for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal file with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC), which should be taken into consideration in the event that the
disbarred lawyer subsequently files a petition to lift his disbarment.
In addition, the Court may also impose a fine upon a disbarred lawyer found to have committed
an offense prior to his/her disbarment as the Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over
other offenses committed by a disbarred lawyer while he/she was still a member of the Law
Profession. In fact, by imposing a fine, the Court is able "to assert its authority and competence to
discipline all acts and actuations committed by the members of the Legal Profession.”
18
All told, the Court finds respondent guilty of unauthorized practice of law. And although he has
already been disbarred, the Court, nevertheless, deems it proper to give the corresponding
penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law for the sole purpose of recording it in
his personal file in the OBC.
19
INACTIVITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW DOES NOT EXEMPT AN ERRING

LAWYER FROM LIABILITIES OR PENALTIES
VENSON ANG V. ATTY. SALVADOR BELARO, JR.

A.C. No. 12408; December 11, 2019
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Complainant Venson R. Ang (Venson) seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Salvado B. Belaro,
Jr. (Atty. Belaro) for violation of Notarial Rules and the CPR. Venson is the appointed administrator
of the subject property while Atty. Belaro notarized the Extrajudicial Settlement executed by the
heirs of the decedent of the subject property where Venson and his siblings purportedly
personally appeared and subscribed therein.
Venson and his siblings were surprised to learn that the title to the subject property was already
canceled by virtue of an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights
(Extrajudicial Settlement) executed by the heirs of the decedent. A perusal of the three versions
of the Extrajudicial Settlement showed several irregularities. They also discovered that Atty.
Belaro notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale and Acknowledgement Receipt of the consideration of
the sale of the subject property. As a result, Venson filed the instant letter-complaint.
Atty. Benson attempted to escape liability by arguing that the filing of the Joint Motion to Dismiss
and the execution of the Affidavit of Desistance by Venson should not be treated as a compromise
agreement between the parties but that the administrative complaint filed against him lacked
factual basis. Atty. Belaro then asserts that sanctions cannot be imposed upon him as he is not in
the active practice of law by reason of his election in the House of Representatives as a party-list
representative of 1-Ang Edukasyon Party-List in the 2016 National elections.
ISSUE
Can respondent Atty. Belaro escape liability on the ground that he is not in the active practice of
law?
RULING
No, respondent Atty. Belaro cannot escape liability on the ground that he is not in the practice of
law.
To begin with, no law or statute provides that the penalties against an erring lawyer cannot be
imposed if said lawyer is inactive in the practice of law by any reason such as election in public
office. Despite his being inactive in the practice of law, the fact remains that he is still a member
of the legal profession. Hence, the Court is not precluded from conducting disciplinary
investigations against him or imposing disciplinary sanctions if so warranted. It is in accordance
with the Court’s power to call upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court in order to preserve the purity of the legal profession and the proper honest
administration of justice.
In this case, the Court found that Atty. Belaro’s argument has been rendered moot and academic
because based on the 2019 mid-year election results, the 1-Ang Edukasyon Party-List failed to
win any seat in Congress. But assuming arguendo that respondent Atty. Belaro remains to be a
20
Representative, he still cannot escape liability on the ground that he is not in the active practice
of law.
Therefore, Atty. Belaro cannot escape liability by reason of his inactivity in the practice of law as
he is still a member of the legal profession.
21
LAWYERS WHILE WORKING IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION CAN STILL ACT

UPON THEIR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
SPOUSES NOCUENCA VS. ATTY. ALFREDO BENSI

A.C. No. 12609, February 10, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Spouses Nocuenca filed this complaint for disbarment against respondent, Atty. Alfredo T. Bensi
before the IBP. Complainants alleged that Atty. Bensi violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the CPR, as well as the Lawyer's Oath when he assaulted the complainants in an
effort to prevent them from entering a disputed property. The present case originated from an
action for Declaratory Relief, Reformation of Contract, Recovery of Possession of a Portion of a
Property, Cancellation of Tax Declaration, Damages, and Attorney's Fees, filed by plaintiffs-
spouses Restituto Bensi and Dominga F. Bensi (plaintiffs) against Atty. Bensi and other defendants
therein.
A Partial Summary Judgment declaring plaintiffs to be the lawful owners of a 428.8-square-meter

portion of Lot No. 1499-C. This portion of the disputed lot serves as a site for a Catholic chapel.
Complainants claimed that they inherited the said portion after the death of Lucille's parents.
Complainants alleged that on June 5, 2013, in the course of exercising their right of ownership
over the portion of the disputed lot, they went to the chapel to post a sign that reads, "PRIVATE
PROPERTY, NO TRESPASSING" but they were assaulted and clobbered by Atty. Bensi and his son.
Atty. Bensi, on the other hand, claimed that the bigger portion of Lot No. 1499-C is owned by his
late parents and that the same had not yet been partitioned by the heirs. Atty. Bensi claimed that
on June 5, 2013, complainant Darito brought a hammer and a flat bar which were used as a chisel
to forcibly open the padlocked gate of the chapel. As the caretaker of the property, Atty. Bensi
asked the complainants from whom did they ask permission to open the closed gate. This resulted
in a heated confrontation where Lucille rushed and attacked Atty. Bensi while shouting.
ISSUE
Should Atty. Bensi be disciplined for his involvement in the altercation with the complainants over
a disputed family property?
RULING
No, Atty. Bensi cannot be disciplined for his involvement in the altercation with the complainants.
Every person has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Considering the
gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer, the Court has
consistently ruled that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his/her complaint through
substantial evidence.
The IBP-BOG found that the complainants failed to prove their claim by preponderance of
evidence. Consequently, it upheld Atty. Bensi's presumption of innocence and dismissed the
complaint against him. While the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP-BOG to
dismiss the disbarment complaint, it bears stressing that the quantum of proof in administrative
cases is substantial evidence and not preponderance of evidence. The Court observes that Atty.
Bensi was in possession of the disputed property when the complainants tried to enter and take
22
it. Complainants were then equipped with a hammer and a flat bar to force their way inside a
locked gate of the chapel. Complainants believed that they were the lawful owners of the
property on the strength of a Partial Summary Judgment which awarded the property to Lucille's
now deceased parents. Nevertheless, even if the complainants are indeed the lawful owners of
the disputed property, they should not have taken the law into their own hands through force.
What the complainants should have done was to invoke the aid of the proper court in lawfully
taking possession of the property. While lawyers are mandated to act with dignity and in a
manner that inspires confidence to the legal profession, their rights must still be protected just
like every ordinary individual. The legal profession and the threat of disbarment should not be
used as a means to provoke lawyers who are acting well within their rights.
Therefore, Atty, Bensi should not be disciplined for his involvement in the altercation with the
complainants over the subject property.
23
ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER IS A GROUND FOR

DISCIPLINARY ACTION
RUBEN ANDAYA V. ATTY. EMMANUEL ALADIN TUMANDA

A.C. No. 12209; February 18, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Before the Court is a Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment filed by complainant Ruben A. Andaya
before the CBD of the IBP against respondent Atty. Emmanuel Aladin A. Tumanda for violation of
the CPR.
Respondent borrowed from the complainant the amount of Php 500,000.00. In exchange for
the said amount and in order to convince the complainant to part with his money, respondent
issued a post-dated check of the same amount. However, when complainant deposited the
check with the bank, it was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Thus, the
complainant, through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent. To appease complainant,
respondent offered as payment his Mercedes Benz, and accordingly, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the same in favor of complainant. Respondent, however, failed to give the complainant
the original copy of the Certificate of Registration of the car on the pretext that he forgot to bring
the same. Respondent likewise did not turn over the physical possession of the car because he
allegedly still needed it for his business ventures. Complainant, however, later found out that
respondent sold the same car to a certain John Edwin G. Felizardo. Thus, complainant sent another
demand letter to respondent, and thereafter, filed complaints for Estafa and violation of BP Blg.
22 against him.
ISSUE
Is Atty. Emmanuel Aladin A. Tumanda liable for gross misconduct for issuing a worthless check?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Emmanuel Tumanda is liable for gross misconduct for issuing a worthless check.
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, are mandated to obey and respect the laws of the land and to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. They should at all times, whether in their
public or private life, “conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Thus, they should not
engage in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent, obtained a loan from complainant in the amount of Php. 500,000.00
and in exchange thereof issued a worthless check to complainant. This fact alone is a ground for
disciplinary action as it constitutes gross misconduct. It indicates his unfitness for the trusts and
confidence reposed upon him for his lack of personal honesty and good moral character
rendering him unworthy of public confidence.
Hence, respondent Atty. Emmanuel Aladin A. Tumanda is liable for gross misconduct for issuing
a worthless check and for his deliberate failure to settle his obligation despite repeated demands.
24
HARASSING TACTICS OF FILING MULTIPLE GROUNDLESS AND BASELESS

SUITS CONSTITUTE GROSS MISCONDUCT WHICH IS A GROUND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
FRANCISCO PAGDANGANAN V. ATTY. ROMEO PLATA

A.C. No. 12701; February 26, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative case for disbarment arose from a verified Complaint filed by Francisco
Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan) against respondent, Atty. Romeo C. Plata (Atty. Plata) before the IBP.
Atty. Plata is the legal counsel of Eustaquio, the legitimate owner of a land while Pagdanganan is
a member of the Samahang Maralita ng Sitio Bato-Bato Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(SAMANAI).
SAMANAI, through its members and representatives, entered into a contract to sell with
Eustaquio to buy and occupy a portion of said land. When SAMANAI failed to pay the remaining
balance in monthly installments, Eustaquio filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
members of SAMANAI including Pagdanganan. The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of
Eustaquio ordering the representatives of SAMANAI to vacate the property, demolish the houses
built thereon, and to pay Eustaquio rent money until the land is completely vacated. Atty. Plata
admitted that various civil, criminal, and administrative cases were filed by his client, Eustaquio
against two of the members of SAMANAI namely Atty. Equila and Morales. Loyola, one of the
members signed her name above Pagdanganan’s printed name in the Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Thereafter, another case was filed by Atty. Plata for Perjury with Damages in the amount of PhP
10,000,000 as moral damages; PhP10,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
PhP500,000.00 as litigation expenses. Hence, Pagdanganan filed a Complaint with the CBD of
the IBP.
Pagdanganan alleged that he was not a signatory to the Sinumpaang Salysay, hence, his inclusion
as defendant in the perjury case was not candid nor fair. He also alleged that the staggering
amount of damages prayed for by Atty. Plata was a mockery of the legal system.
Atty. Plata on the other hand averred that the disbarment case filed by Pagdanganan is absolutely
a nuisance suit devoid of any merit that is designed to harass a reputable member of the legal
profession. He also justified the amount of damages prayed for stating that it is a necessary
consequence for tarnishing his good name and reputation.
ISSUE
Is Atty. Plata guilty of misconduct meriting his suspension from the practice of law for 2 years?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Plata is guilty of misconduct meriting his suspension from the practice of law for 2 years.
The Court held that gross misconduct has been defined as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrantly
unlawful conduct on the part of the person involved in the administration of justice, conduct that
is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct
is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, but does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
25
In this case, the Court found that Atty. Plata’s acts against Pagdanganan constitute gross
misconduct and a violation of the Lawyer’s Oath which are clear grounds for his suspension. It
was also held that Atty. Plata’s act of filing another case against Pagdanganan and reserving to file
a perjury case with damages also against Pagdanganan after admitting that there are already
various criminal and administrative cases pending against the latter and other members of
SAMANAI constitutes gross immoral conduct. Applying Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the ROC, the
aforementioned acts are inexcusable, shameful, and flagrantly unlawful which are clearly
motivated by an intentional purpose to harass and intimidate Pagdanganan. Clearly, Atty. Plata
abused his prerogatives as a lawyer to intimidate those who displease him. Atty. Plata’s harassing
tactics of filing multiple groundless and baseless suits are contrary to the CPR. The Attorney’s
Oath is clear that Atty. Plata must not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In this case, Atty. Plata did not deny that he
had filed several civil, criminal, and administrative cases against the opposing parties and their
counsels. However, the Court found that these suits were mere harassing tactics against
Pagdanganan, his co-respondents, and their counsel. Such act of filing groundless suits shows his
intent to repress the opposing counsel from exerting utmost effort in protecting his clients’
interest and reveals Atty. Plata’s gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal profession which is
a violation of his oath and duties as a lawyer.
Therefore, Atty. Plata is guilty of misconduct meriting his suspension from the practice of law for
acts committed against Pagdanganan which were clearly motivated by his intention to harass and
intimidate Pagdanganan.
26
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
CLARA ICK V. ATTY. ALLAN AMAZONA

A.C. No. 12375; February 26, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Complainants Clara R. Ick, Ruby Elinbergsson, and Teresita filed this Complaint-Affidavit against
the respondent, Atty. Allan S. Amazona (Amazona), before the IBP for notarizing an allegedly false
document.
Complainants alleged that respondent notarized a letter signed by a certain Michelle B. Lotho
(Lotho), Director and Auditor of South Forbes Phuket Mansions Homeowners Association, Inc.,
addressed to Louie A. Odiamar, Head of the Homeowners Association Franchising Unit, Dencris
Business Center. Complainants averred that the said letter falsely stated that most buyers of the
subdivision lots were out of the country and as such, it was highly improbable to secure their
signatures. Complainants claimed that respondent knew that such assertion was untrue because
he was in constant communication with the residents, including complainants.
ISSUE
Did the respondent violate the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the letter?
RULING
No, the respondent did not violate the rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
notarized the letter.
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complained act does not constitute any violation of the
Rules of Court, the Notarial Rules, nor the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Investigating
Commissioner opined that the mere act of notarizing the letter is not in itself a violation of the
Notarial Rules since the respondent merely attested to the fact that Lotho has personally
appeared before him and subscribed to the truth of the contents of the said letter.
Respondent merely performed his duty when he attested to the fact that Lotho personally
appeared and signed the said letter before him. The Court agrees with the IBP that the truth or
falsity of the contents of the letter is the sole responsibility of the affiant Lotho and does not extend
to the respondent as notary public, especially since no substantial evidence was presented to
prove that he knowingly notarized a false document.
Hence, the complainants failed to establish through substantial evidence a cause for disciplinary
action against the respondent.
27
THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER REPRESENTS

INCONSISTENT INTERESTS OF TWO OR MORE OPPOSING PARTIES
SANTIAGO BURGOS V. ATTY. JOVENCIO JAMES BEREBER

A.C. 12666; March 4, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
The case is a complaint filed by Santiago B. Burgos against Atty. Jovencio James G. Bereber for
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar. Burgos claimed that Bereber committed acts
constituting conflict of interest and lacking in “delicadeza.”
Burgos is a member-consumer of CAPELCO who, with two other member-consumers, filed an

administrative complaint against several CAPELCO management staff and members of the Board
of Directors. Burgos insisted that having been elected as director by the member-consumers,
Bereber failed to advance their interests and had no delicadeza when he represented the accused
members of the Board of Directors and management staff.
For his part, Bereber admitted that the accused consulted with him and that he drafted and signed
their answer to the complaint and appeared as counsel for them. However, Bereber insisted that
he did not represent conflicting interests and argued that there was no lawyer-client relationship
between him and Burgos who, at no instance, obtained his legal advice regarding the pending
complaint. He further argued that while he was elected as CAPELCO director, he does not
exclusively represent them in the board nor does he become the counsel of the member-
consumers because he is mandated to represent not only the member-consumers, but the entire
CAPELCO membership.
The IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit and opined that Burgos
failed to show that a lawyer-client relationship existed, and that delicadeza is not a ground for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the bar. The IBP Board of Governors adopted this.
ISSUE
Is Bereber guilty of representing conflicting interests when he appeared as counsel for the
accused CAPELCO Board members and staff in a case filed by CAPELCO member-consumers?
RULING
No, Bereber is not guilty of representing conflicting interest when he appeared as counsel for the
accused CAPELCO Board members and staff in a case filed by CAPELCO member-consumers.
In determining whether a lawyer is guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest, it is essential
to determine whether: (1) "a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;" (2) "the acceptance of a
new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty;" and (3) "a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
28
Hence, the Court agreed with the finding of the IBP that Bereber, as CAPELCO director, represents
the entire membership of CAPELCO and not just the member-consumers of District III. In any
case, Burgos failed to establish that Bereber was engaged as counsel by the member-consumers.
This Court is also not inclined to mete out disciplinary punishment on Bereber on the allegation
of his supposed lack of “delicadeza” or sense of decency in this case because it is not a legal
ground for administrative disciplinary action under the CPR. At best, Bereber can be said to have
merely exercised independence of judgment as a lawyer when he defended the interests of other
member-consumers of CAPELCO.
29
IBP’S DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS ARE FOR THOSE BELONGING IN THE

LEGAL PROFESSION ONLY
AA TOTAL LEARNING CENTER FOR YOUNG ACHIEVERS, INC., REPRESENTED BY

LOYDA REYES V. ATTY. PATRICK CARONAN
A.C. 12418; March 10, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the complainant AA Total Learning Center for Young
Achievers, Inc. (AA) against respondent Atty. Patrick A. Caronan.
Caronan and Solly Cruz offered to sell to Reyes a parcel of land in Taguig, claiming that they were
the representatives of the property’s registered owner, Maricel Atanacio. Interested, Reyes went
with Caronan for an ocular inspection, during which Caronan briefly introduced Reyes to
Atanacio. Caronan asked Reyes to meet him and Atanacio to finalize the final purchase price but
during the meeting, Caronan advised Reyes that Atanacio will no longer be joining them and that
he was authorized by Atanacio to finalize the purchase price on her behalf. Relying on Caronan’s
representations, Reyes agreed to a final purchase price of P15,650,000.00 and to pay
P250,000.00 as earnest money. Caronan set another meeting for the signing of the Deed of
Absolute sale and payment of the initial 50% of the purchase price but when Reyes arrived,
Caronan informed her that Atanacio will not be joining them and that the latter already signed the
deed. Caronan signed a MOA embodying the sale’s terms and conditions, which Reyes followed.
In the meantime, Caronan promised to deliver the title under AA’s name by the first week of June
2012 but by July 2012, Caronan could no longer be reached. Reyes then requested a meeting with
Atanacio regarding the delay, but the latter was shocked and categorically denied any
participation in the sale and authorizing Caronan to negotiate on her behalf. She also disowned
signing any Deed of Absolute Sale. Reyes sought legal advice and sent a demand letter, which
remained unheeded. Reyes also learned that Caronan employed fraudulent machinations and
discovered that Caronan assumed the identity of his brother, Patrick A. Caronan, and used his
school credentials to obtain a law degree. The real Patrick A. Caronan also filed a disbarment case
against the herein respondent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the complaint for being moot and
academic in light of the pronouncement in Patrick A. Caronan v. Richard A. Caronan a.k.a Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan, where “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” was disbarred and stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys, which the Board of Governors adopted.
ISSUE
Should Caronan be disbarred?
RULING
No, Caronan should not be disbarred.
The Court adopted the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint
for being moot. After all, disciplinary proceedings conducted by the IBP are reserved only for
those belonging in the legal profession.
30
The Investigating Commissioner properly recommended the dismissal of the complaint for being
moot and academic in light of the pronouncement in “Patrick A. Caronan v. Richard A. Caronan
a.k.a Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,” where “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” was disbarred and stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys.
Nonetheless, the Court stressed once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State only on those who possess and continue to possess the required
qualifications.
Therefore, the disbarment case was dismissed.
31
MERE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT RAISE A

PRESUMPTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY, IT MUST BE SHOWN AND
PROVEN THAT CONFIDENTIALITY IS INTENDED BY THE CLIENT
JONATHAN PARUNGAO V. ATTY. DEXTER LACUANAN

A.C. No. 12071; March 11, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
The present administrative case before the SC arose from a Disbarment Complaint initiated by
Jonathan C. Parungao against the respondent Atty. Dexter B. Lacuanan before the CBD of the IBP
for representing conflicting interests. The IBP Board of Governors held Atty. Lacuanan guilty.
Atty. Lacuanan formerly served as counsel in two transactions involving Jonathan’s business in
2011 namely to facilitate the sale of a lot from Metrobank to the Spouses Parungao and draft a
demand-letter concerning a defective vehicle sold to Jonathan. They came to know each other
back in 2007 through Mary Grace, the wife of Jonathan. Thereafter, in 2013, Atty. Lacuanan
represented Mary Grace as her legal counsel in the criminal and civil proceedings that the latter
instituted against her husband and herein complainant, Jonathan.
Jonathan contends that he had confided with Atty. Lacuanan details regarding his personal life,
family, and even about his marriage and that the latter has a duty to preserve the confidences of
his former client. Atty. Lacuanan, for his part, admitted that he had been friends with Mary Grace
since 2006 and that Mary Grace introduced him to Jonathan in 2007. He denied, though, that he
and Jonathan were close friends and that the latter confided or divulged to him anything about
his personal life and marital affairs.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Lacuanan acquire confidential information through his previous employment with
Jonathan?
RULING
No, Atty. Lacuanan did not acquire confidential information through his previous employment
with Jonathan.
Under Canon 21 of the CPR, "A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even
after the attorney-client relation is terminated." It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and
client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. Proof must be presented that the client
intended the communication to be confidential.
In the case at bar, Jonathan failed to establish that Atty. Lacuanan has confidential information
which the latter acquired through their connection or previous employment, and which can be
used against him in the pending civil and criminal proceedings instituted by Mary Grace. Jonathan
generally avers that during their professional and personal relations, he had shared with Atty.
Lacuanan confidential information as regards his marital and family life as well as his businesses
and properties. However, these are merely his bare allegations, unsubstantiated by any piece of
evidence, and disputed by Atty. Lacuanan. The SC has consistently held that an attorney enjoys
the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved.
32
Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
Therefore, Atty. Lacuanan did not acquire any confidential information through his previous
employment.
33
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE LAWS, PROMOTE RESPECT TO THE LAW

AND LEGAL PROCESSES, NOT DELAY ONE’S CAUSE NOR MISUSE
JUDICIAL PROCESSES
GUILLERMO VILLANUEVA representing UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION (COCOLIFE)
V. ATTY. BONIFACIO ALENTAJAN
A.C. No. 12161, June 8, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This disbarment case was filed by Villanueva, COCOLIFE’s representative, against Atty. Bonifacio
Alentajan. The IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner to suspend the latter from the practice of law for three months.
Atty. Alentajan, being the counsel of Erlinda Marquez, et.al., filed a complaint for annulment of
foreclosure proceedings, certificate of sale, and transfer certificate of title against COCOLIFE. The
said complaint was then dismissed by the RTC and subsequently, it attained finality. Thereafter,
another complaint was filed for reconveyance and annulment of title with application for
preliminary injunction and prayer for TRO against the same parties. In addendum, multiple
criminal complaints were filed by Erlinda against COCOLIFE, through her lawyer, Atty. Alentajan.
COCOLIFE argued that Atty. Alentajan filed multiple actions in different courts which is an
unlawful conduct as an officer of the court. Atty. Alentajan likewise violated his oath, Canon 1 of
the CPR.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Alentajan engage in forum shopping?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Alentajan engaged in forum shopping.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation
thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of reliefs sought.
In the case at hand, it is obvious that the reliefs sought by Erlinda, through Atty. Alentajan, as legal
counsel, were the same such that a ruling in one case would have resulted in the resolution of the
other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the validity of the foreclosure of real estate mortgage and
the sale of the subject real property be declared, there would be no need for another decision as
to the ownership and title of the subject property. Conversely, had the ownership and title of the
subject property been decided upon, a declaration of the validity of the sale and foreclosure
proceedings in another case would have been unnecessary. The reliefs prayed for, the facts upon
which both are based, and the parties are substantially similar in the two cases.
34
Given the circumstances, Atty. Alentajan violated the prohibition on forum shopping.
35
A LAWYER REPRESENTING HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE

BOUNDS OF THE LAW DOES NOT WARRANT DISBARMENT, IT BEING
THE MOST SEVERE FORM OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTION
ATTY. FERNANDO PERITO V. ATTY. BERTRAND BATERINA

A.C. No. 12631, July 8, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
A petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Fernando P. Perito (Atty. Perito) before the IBP against
respondents Atty. Bertrand A. Baterina (Atty. Baterina), et.al arose from the kidnapping case to
which the parties represented the accused and the victim, respectively. The IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline found that the respondents did not violate the CPR. The IBP-Board of Governors
(BOG) dismissed the disbarment complaints.
The said kidnapping case was dismissed by the RTC. The respondents in this case, as prosecutors,
then filed a motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, a petition for certiorari was filed before the
CA, which was done solely to advance their clients’ interest. Meanwhile, a disbarment case was
filed by the accused in the kidnapping case against Atty. Baterina and Atty. Besid. Suspecting that
Atty. Perito was behind the filing of said complaint, Atty. Baterina filed a countersuit for
disbarment against Atty. Perito. The two disbarment cases were dismissed by the IBP-BOG for
lack of merit. This is the third disbarment case involving the herein parties.
In the case at bench, Atty. Perito charged herein respondents with pursuing a losing and
dismissed case or endlessly persecuting his clients in the kidnapping case, and for filing a baseless
disbarment complaint against him grounded on suspicion. Conversely, respondents argued that
the petition for review and petition for certiorari which they filed in the kidnapping case were
remedies which can be availed of as a matter of law on behalf of their client and that resorting to
such remedies cannot be a ground for disbarment.
ISSUE
Did the respondents violate the CPR that would warrant their disbarment?
RULING
No, the respondents did not violate the CPR.
Canons 17 and 19 of the CPR state that lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and that
they represent their clients with zeal within the bounds of the law, respectively.
In the case at hand, the respondents pursued and exhausted remedies that were sanctioned by
the applicable rules and were intended solely to advance their clients' interest in the kidnapping
case. The filing of a certiorari petition before the CA to assail the issuances of the RTC is not in
violation of Canon 1, CPR. Their acts did not constitute gross misconduct or a violation of the
Lawyer's Oath or of the CPR. As a rule, the Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution.
It is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
Hence, the case was dismissed because the respondents’ act would not warrant their disbarment,
nor did the complainant present substantial evidence to show any violation to the CPR.
36
37
NOTARIZING A MORTGAGE DOCUMENT AND RECEIVING PART OF

PROCEEDS FROM SUCH MORTGAGE IS A VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF
NOTARIAL PRACTICE
LOURDES ELANGA V. ATTY. RUTILLO PASOK

A.C. No. 12030; September 29, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a disbarment case filed by Complainant Lourdes Elanga against Respondent Atty. Pasok.
Respondent is the legal counsel of plaintiffs in a civil case against Lourdes Elanga. Complainant is
the eldest sister of plaintiffs and Nilo is her son.
Clients of respondent argued that Elangas failed to deliver the copy of title of subject lot to them.
Lourdes and Nilo redeemed the lot from the DBP and argued that plaintiffs did not reimburse
them. RTC ordered plaintiffs to reimburse Lourdes. Despite the pendency of the case, respondent
notarized the real estate mortgage without knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent
further received attorney’s fees and the amount for redemption that was paid by complainant.
Complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent and argued that respondent entered into
transactions involving the lot without notice and consent of complainants and trial court,
specifically the notarization of the proceeds of mortgage and his receipt of the proceeds thereof.
Respondent argued that the proceeds he received were reimbursement for his travel expenses.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Pasok violate the Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the real estate mortgage?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Pasok violated the Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the real estate mortgage.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a notary public is disqualified from performing a
notarial act if he will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right,
title, interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by
law.
Here, Atty. Pasok violated the rules in notarizing the real estate mortgage and receiving a portion
of the proceeds thereof. It is clear that he benefited from the said transaction
Therefore, Atty. Pasok violated the Rules on Notarial Practice.
38
PRACTICE OF LAW INCLUDES NOTARIAL PRACTICE
TEODORO CANSINO V. ATTY. VICTOR SEDERIOSA

A.C. No. 8522; October 6, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Complainants Teodoro Cansino and Emilio Cansino filed a disbarment case against respondent
Atty. Victor D. Sederiosa. Complainants alleged that respondent notarized the spurious
documents despite the death of their parents and/or the non-personal appearance of the affiants
such as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate purportedly executed by their father on Jan 3, 1995 but
was already deceased since Aug. 1, 1991, and others.
The Supreme Court in 2015 suspended respondent from the practice of law for 1 year and was
further disqualified as a notary public. However, complainant Emilio informed the Supreme Court
that despite the suspension, respondent continued serving as a notary public for 2016-2017.
Respondent denied the claims and argued that he did not receive a copy of the 2015 resolution
of the Supreme Court but a mere resolution of the IBP.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Sederiosa engage in the practice of law despite his suspension?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Sederiosa engaged in the practice of law despite his suspension.
The practice of law includes any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It comprises the performance of acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Notarizing documents constitutes practice of
law and a notary public must be a member of the bar in good standing.
In this case, Atty. Sederiosa engaged in the practice of law despite the suspension order. He
remained as a notary public despite the release of the 2015 resolution suspending him.
Therefore, Atty. Sederiosa engaged in the practice of law despite his suspension.
39
A MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR’S DUTIES COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED

AS A VIOLATION OF THE LAWYER’S OATH AND THE CPR
RISIE BAYGAR V. ATTY. CLARO MANUEL RIVERA

A.C. No. 8959; October 7, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative case arose from a Petition for Disbarment filed by complainant Risie G. Baygar
(petitioner) against respondent Atty. Claro Manuel M. Rivera (complainant) before the OBC to
which the matter was referred to the CBD-IBP for constituting a Violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and for gross violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
At the time of the complaint, Rivera was the Municipal Administrator of Binangonan, Rizal. As his
role demands, he implemented the No Permit Notice to his constituents. Baygar’s father owned
a sari-sari store with a videoke and billiard table that does not have permits. For failure to comply
with the municipal ordinance despite repeated demands, Rivera filed a criminal complaint against
them for Violation of Municipal Ordinance for operating a business without securing a business
permit. This prompted Risie Baygar and her father to file various cases against Atty. Rivera, aside
from this complaint for disbarment.
Risie claims that the officers should have merely locked the establishment without seizing the
items as the closure order did not give them authority to do so. Moreover, the billiard table was
not initially included in the scope of the closure order and was added only during the operation.
For this, a disbarment complaint was filed against Rivera.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Rivera violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
RULING
No, Atty. Rivera's acts could not be considered as violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.
According to Rule 6.02, a lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Atty. Rivera's acts could not be considered as violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR. He
was merely performing his official duties as Municipal Administrator of Binangonan, particularly
the implementation of the Closure Order against the businesses operated by the Baygar family
and matters related thereto.
As Municipal Administrator, one of his duties is to assist in the coordination of the work of all the
officials of the LGU, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor, and
for this purpose, he may convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local government
unit. The implementation of a closure order and the issuance of business permits may be
considered well within this function of a Municipal Administrator.
Significantly, the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that in the performance of
his functions, Atty. Rivera committed acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.
40
MISCONDUCT IN THE DISCHARGE OF A LAWYER’S DUTIES AS A

GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL NOT A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY SANCTION
AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR
MANUEL TABLIZO V. ATTY. JOYRICH GOLANGCO

A.C. NO. 10636; October 12, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is an administrative case initiated by complainant Manuel Bajaro Tablizo (petitioner) against
respondents, namely, Atty. Elbert L. Bunagan (Bunagan), Atty. Joaquin F. Salazar (Salazar), Atty.
Joyrich M. Golangco (Golangco), and Atty. Adoracion A. Agbada (Agbada), all officials of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon before the IBP for maliciously failing to follow/observe the
standards of personal conduct provided under R.A. Nos. 6713 and 6770 in the discharge and
execution of their official duties for failing and/or refusing to investigate in the real sense of the
word, the charges against Alberto and Zafe.
Complainant averred that Santos V. Zafe (Zafe) and Jose U. Alberto II (Alberto), then former and
incumbent Mayors, respectively, of the Virac, Catanduanes, violated R.A. Nos. 3019 and 6713
when they failed to sign every page of certain municipal tax ordinances as required by Sec. 54 of
the LGC and for still implementing them, despite their defect and nullity. The complaints were
then raffled to Atty. Bunagan and Atty. Salazar (respondents).
Consequently, respondents dismissed the cases for lack of merit. Although the petitioner filed for
a reconsideration, it was still dismissed, the same as the case filed before the OCA. The case was
then referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP dismissed the
case for it was not sufficiently shown that respondents have violated any of their professional
duties as a lawyer.
ISSUE
Did the respondent violate the Lawyer’s Oath and committed gross misconduct in relation to the
performance of their official duties as officers of the Office of the Ombudsman?
RULING
No, the respondent did not violate the Lawyer’s Oath and committed gross misconduct in relation
to the performance of their official duties as officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP. In Vitriolo v. Dasig, the Court laid down
that as a general rule, "a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. Gross misconduct is
punishable by either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, as provided under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the ROC. It has been defined as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The
motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. In Rico
v. Madrazo, Jr., the Court ruled that in disbarment and suspension proceedings against lawyers
in this jurisdiction, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Thus, the Court has held that
41
in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member

of the bar, we have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his complaint
through substantial evidence.
Here, there is an absolute dearth of evidence of the respondents' alleged Gross Misconduct. In
contrast, respondents enjoy, absent any evidence to the contrary, the presumption that they had
regularly performed their official duties as GIPOs and Directors of the EIO, Office of the
Ombudsman, when they resolved the OMB Cases.
Therefore, the present administrative case for Grave Misconduct against Atty. Elbert L. Bunagan,
Atty. Joaquin F. Salazar, Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco, and Atty. Adoracion A. Agbada, in their
respective capacities as officials of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, is dismissed
for lack of merit.
42
LAWYERS SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL

OR DECEITFUL CONDUCT
ROGER DAP-OG V. ATTY. LUEL MENDEZ

A.C. NO. 12017; October 14, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Roger B. Dap-og (Roger) against respondent Atty. Luel
C. Mendez (Atty. Mendez) for allegedly mauling Roger and hurling invectives at him. The IBP
resolved to increase the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to one year.
According to Roger, it was after the hearing that he attended where his wife was one of the
respondents when Atty. Mendez approached their table and asked for his name. An altercation
then ensued. During the commotion, the group of Atty. Mendez hurled invectives and accusations
at him. Roger then went to the police station for blotter, he sustained several physical injuries.
Consequently, Roger filed a complaint for Less Serious Physical Injuries, Grave Slander and Grave
Threat against Atty. Mendez.
Atty. Mendez denied the petitioner's allegations. He alleged that he was at the CENRO canteen at
that time to discuss case-related matters with his clients, including Rodolfo, but the discussion
was interrupted upon the arrival of Roger. The tension between his client and Roger escalated
into a shouting match. He claimed that Roger was never threatened or physically harmed. The IBP
recommended Atty. Mendez be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Mendez exhibit Gross Misconduct unbecoming of an officer of the court?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Mendez exhibited Gross Misconduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
The court affirmed the findings of the IBP. According to Section 27, Rule 138 of the ROC, a member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice. Relevantly, Rule 1.01, Canon 1, of the CPR
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The records of this case show without a shadow of doubt that Atty. Mendez exhibited Gross
Misconduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. The Court finds the petitioner’s version to be
more credible as the same is supported by substantial evidence. In Soriano v. Dizon, the purpose
of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. Here, respondents clearly did not meet the lofty
standards reposed on lawyers. There is no excuse for the respondent's unlawful and
dishonorable behavior. Even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent's allegations
against petitioner were true, that the latter swindled the former's clients, no person should take
the law into his own hands.
43
Thus, the Court cannot countenance respondent's pugilistic behavior and brand of vigilante
justice, as it is this Court's duty to uphold the rule of law and not the rule of men.
44
NOTARIZATION IS INVESTED WITH SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC INTEREST,

ONLY THOSE QUALIFIED OR AUTHORIZED MAY ACT AS NOTARIES
PUBLIC
ATTY. ANTONIO MANZANO V. ATTY. CARLOS RIVERA

A.C. No. 12173; November 03, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a Petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Antonio B. Manzano (Atty. Manzano) against
respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) for falsification of public documents, and allegedly
notarizing the Answer without the personal appearance of the affiants, and worse, without a
notarial commission.
A case was filed against defendants who were represented by Atty. Rivera. Not all of the
defendants, however, received a copy of the complaint because the Sheriff failed to deliver it to
two of them who were in Manila and abroad, respectively. Nevertheless, an Answer to the
complaint was filed which appeared to be signed by all of the parties. It was prepared and
notarized on the same date by Atty. Rivera. However, upon inquiry, Atty. Rivera was not
commissioned as a notary public for and in the Province of Cagayan at the time he notarized the
Answer. Thereafter, a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Use of Falsified
Documents was filed against Atty. Rivera, Pando and Bloza. Atty. Rivera admitted that he prepared
the Answer for the defendants but denied having knowledge of the forged signature of the two
defendants. He professed, however, that it was only Pando and Bloza who personally appeared
before him and that his notarial commission had already expired in 2014.
Atty. Manzano filed the instant Petition for disbarment against Atty. Rivera for Malpractice,
Dishonesty, and Falsification of Public Document on the grounds that Atty. Rivera admitted in his
Counter-Affidavit that he prepared the Answer and notarized its Verification without the presence
of Bayaca and Urata.
ISSUE
Did respondent violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Rivera violated the 2004 Rule on Notarial Practice.
Corollarily, Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is clear. Only a person who is
commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
In the case at the bar, it was sufficiently proven that Atty. Rivera was not commissioned as a
notary public at the time he notarized the Answer that was filed by the defendants. The
Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
duly showed that Atty. Rivera was not commissioned as a notary public for and in the Province
of Cagayan in 2014. Thus, Atty. Rivera is indubitably liable for gross violation of the notarial rules
which should not be dealt with lightly by the Court. Atty. Rivera's act of making it appear that he
45
was a duly commissioned notary public is in blatant disregard of the Lawyer's Oath to obey the
laws, i.e., the Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. It likewise constitutes a transgression of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which states that: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
Therefore, Atty. Rivera is perpetually disqualified from being commissioned as a Notary Public
due to the violation of 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
46
FILING OF MULTIPLE COMPLAINTS WITH THE SAME CAUSES OF

ACTION, PARTIES AND RELIEFS CONSTITUTES FORUM SHOPPING
ATTY. JOSEPH VINCENT GO V. ATTY. VIRGILIO TERUEL

A.C. No. 11119, November 04, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a Complaint for disbarment for violation of Rules 12.02 and 12.04 as well as Canon 8 of the
CPR filed by Atty. Joseph Vincent T. Go (Atty. Go) against Atty. Virgilio T. Teruel (Atty. Teruel).
There were complaints and counter-complaints filed by each party against each other. Atty. Go
in separate motions prayed that Atty. Teruel and Fr. Reyes be cited for contempt and that both of
their complaints be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping. Atty. Go alleged that Atty. Teruel's
Counter-Complaint and Fr. Reyes' Complaints were substantially the same except for the
complainants, and both pleadings were prepared by Atty. Teruel. Atty. Go further alleged that Atty.
Teruel violated Rules 12.02 and 12.04 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR for filing multiple actions
arising from the same cause, a violation of the rule against forum shopping.
Atty. Teruel, in his Answer countered that he did not commit forum shopping since his Counter-
Complaint, being undocketed, had yet to be acted upon and thus could not be treated as a
complaint for the purpose of applying the rule against forum shopping. Additionally, Atty. Teruel
argued that he expressly stated in the Verification and Certification portion of his Rejoinder to
Reply and Counter-Complaint the existence of Fr. Reyes' Complaint against Atty. Go (in CBD Case
No. 11-3105).
Atty. Go contended that it is not the admission or docketing of Atty. Teruel's Counter-Complaint
which should be considered in determining whether there was forum shopping, but the act of
filing multiple actions involving the same or identical cause/s of action, which Atty. Teruel clearly
committed when he prepared and filed Fr. Reyes' Complaint and subsequently his own Counter-
Complaint.
ISSUE
Did the respondent commit forum shopping?
RULING
Yes. Atty. Teruel committed forum shopping.
It is well-settled that "the essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum,
a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and
the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another."
47
Evidently, Atty. Teruel willfully committed forum shopping when he instituted two actions
grounded on the same cause, even if strictly speaking, he was not included as a "complainant" in
Fr. Reyes' Complaint. This is because he prepared and filed both administrative actions with full
knowledge that they have the same cause of action and contained nearly exactly the same
allegations. Simply put, the outcome in one case would necessarily have an effect in the other
since both cases share the same cause of action and involve the same parties.
Therefore, Atty. Teruel is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violation of a
rule against forum shopping.
48
NOTARY PUBLIC IS PROHIBITED FROM PERFORMING A NOTARIAL ACT IF

SIGNATORY IS NOT IN HIS PRESENCE AT THE TIME OF NOTARIZATION
JOHN PAUL KIENER V. ATTY. RICARDO R. AMORES

A.C. No. 9417; November 18, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative case arose from two identical Complaints filed by complainant John Paul
Kiener (John Paul) before the OBC and the OCA praying for the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions against respondent Atty. Ricardo R. Amores (Atty. Amores). The OCA referred the
Complaint filed before it to the OBC.
John Paul was the accused in a criminal case for Estafa pending before the MTC. Atty. Amores
was the private prosecutor on behalf of private complainant Pado's Divecamp Resort
Corporation. He was also a commissioned notary public at that time. Irene Medalla (Irene), the
Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, executed a Secretary's Certificate. The Secretary's
Certificate authorized Cho Chang Je, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation,
to file a criminal case on behalf of the Corporation against John Paul. Atty. Amores was the one
who notarized the Secretary's Certificate.
John Paul claims that the Secretary's Certificate was defective and improperly notarized. He
alleges that Atty. Amores as notary public failed to indicate the serial number of his notarial
commission in the notarial certificate, and that Irene's signature appears to have been printed or
scanned (digital copy) into the document. He asserts that because of the use of a printed
signature, Irene could not have been physically present before Atty. Amores when the document
was signed and notarized. John Paul claims that this act constitutes a violation of the requirement
of physical presence of the signatory in the performance of a notarial act as provided in Rule IV,
Section 2 of the Rules on Notarial Practice. Further, he claims that this act likewise constitutes a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 19.01, Canon 19, of the CPR.
Atty. Amores claims that Irene signed the Secretary's Certificate in his presence. He counters that
the use of a printed or scanned signature does not in itself constitute a violation of the Rules on
Notarial Practice. He further claims that it is common practice for the signatory to sign only one
copy and to reproduce the originally signed copy to the desired number of copies before
notarization.
ISSUE
Should Atty. Amores be held administratively liable for violating the Rules on Notarial Practice?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Amores should be held administratively liable for violating the Rules on Notarial
Practice when he notarized a document without the presence of the signatory and failed to
indicate his commission number in the notarial certificate.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, one of which is a jurat. Atty.
Amores performed a jurat when he notarized the Secretary's Certificate with Irene signing as the
Corporate Secretary. Rule II, Section 6 of the Rules on Notarial Practice defines a jurat. This
provision requires that the signatory, or the affiant in some cases, physically appears before the
49
notary public and signs the document in his presence. Rule IV, Section 2 of the same rules bolsters
the requirement of physical appearance as it prohibits the notary public from performing a
notarial act if the signatory is not in his/her presence at the time of the notarization.
Atty. Amores failed to observe the requirement of physical presence when he notarized the
Secretary's Certificate. Upon examination of the document, and as admitted by Atty. Amores
himself, Irene's signature in the Secretary's Certificate attached to the complaint-affidavit in the
criminal case was merely printed. In short, it was not an actual handwritten signature of Irene.
Atty. Amores's defense that Irene physically signed one copy that was subsequently reproduced
then notarized, does not convince this Court. Atty. Amores did not present any proof that Irene
was indeed physically in his presence upon the signing and notarization of the document. It goes
without saying that Irene had signed the document elsewhere, scanned it, and then sent it
electronically to Atty. Amores for the latter to print, reproduce, notarize, and use for the
designated purpose. If indeed Irene had personally appeared before him, he should have asked
her right then and there to affix her signature to each and every copy of the document, not just to
one copy. Atty. Amores also failed to indicate the serial number of his notarial commission in the
concluding part of the notarial certificate of the Secretary's Certificate as required by the rules.
Based on the foregoing, Atty. Amores violated the Rules on Notarial Practice. For having
committed such violations, he also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the CPR, which requires every
lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law
and legal processes, and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct.
50
A CLERK OF COURT IS THE DESIGNATED CUSTODIAN OF COURT

PROPERTIES AND RECORDS, THUS, HE IS PRIMARILY LIABLE FOR ANY
LOSS, SHORTAGE, OR IMPAIRMENT THEREOF
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. ANINDING ALAUYA

A.M. No. SCC-15-21-P; December 9, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This administrative matter stemmed from a financial audit report of the OCA, on the books of
accounts of respondent Aninding M. Alauya, Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Molundo-
Maguing-Ramain-Buadiposo-Bubong, Lanao del Sur, for the period from January 1, 2008 to
February 28, 2014.
The audit team of the OCA found that Alauya removed office records, financial records, and case
records from the office and keeping them in their residence; failed to transfer some of the court
case records in the office premises despite the audit team's instructions and the memorandum,
from the presiding judge; skipped 4 pages of Official Receipts for Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) and Special Allowance for Judiciary Fund (SAJF); detached 3 copies of official receipts from
the booklet; failed to report and remit the collections; antedated official receipts; and failed to
submit monthly financial reports.
Some of the defenses raised by Alauya were: that he brought home case records for completion
and that this was with the consent of Presiding Judge Abdulhalim L. Saumay; that he instructed
one of the court personnel to deliver the official receipt booklets for the JDF and SAJF to the office
at Molundo, Lanao del Sur; and that he was forced to antedate the receipts in order to complete
the Legal Research Fund (LRF) issuances considering that the use of official receipts issued by the
Supreme Court for the LRF is prohibited.
The OCA found Alauya guilty of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct and
recommended his suspension from office for 1 year without pay with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE
Did Alauya’s acts constitute gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct in violation
of his duties as a Clerk of Court?
RULING
Yes, Alauya failed to perform his duties with the degree of diligence and competence expected
of a Clerk of Court.
As the designated custodian of the court's properties, it was incumbent on Alauya to ensure that
relevant rules are followed for their proper safekeeping and organization. Section 14, Rule 136 of
the Rules of Court provides that "no record shall be taken from the clerk's office without an order
of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules." Also, Article 226 of the Revised Penal
Code punishes any public officer who removes, conceals, or destroys documents or papers
officially entrusted to him or her.
51
Alauya was charged with the proper safekeeping and management of all court records under his
custody. He displayed neglect of duty when he removed financial and case records from the court
without proper authority. He was equally remiss in skipping 4 pieces of official receipts for the
JDF and SAJF, and removing 3 copies of an official receipt. Moreover, he was remiss in his duties
in remitting the court collections on time, and regularly submitting his monthly reports. Even
when he has restituted the funds, his unwarranted failure to fulfill his responsibilities deserve
administrative sanction by the SC, and not even payment, as in this case, of the collection of the
shortages will exempt him from liability.
However, in determining the penalty to be imposed, the SC noted Alauya’s length of service in
the judiciary for 19 years and that he has been preventively suspended since 2015. Thus, the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for a period of 1 year is proper.
52
A LAWYER WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS THAT REPRESENTED

ANOTHER WITHOUT CONSENT IS LIABLE FOR HIS ACTS AS A DISREPUTE
TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
ADELITA VILLAMOR V ATTY. ELY GALLAND JUMAO-AS

A.C. No. 8111, 9 December 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This case is a Motion to Reduce Penalty filed by respondent Atty. Ely Galland A. Jumao-as in a
Decision by the SC which suspended him from the practice of law for 2 years for violating Canon
15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
Atty. Jumao-as was guilty of representing conflicting interests. He facilitated the incorporation of
complainant Adelita S. Villamor’s lending company AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. Then, he convinced
Villamor to borrow money from Debbie Yu to use for AEV's capital. However, he left AEV to join
3 E's Debt Equity Grant Co. which is a lending company owned by Yu. Moreover, he persuaded
AEV's collectors to join 3 E's and told them to remit their collections to 3 E's since Villamor owed
Yu. He even sent a demand letter to Villamor, for and in behalf of Yu, demanding that Villamor pay
the amount she owed Yu.
Atty. Jumao-as moved to reduce his penalty, either to a stern warning or a two-month suspension
with reasons, among others, that he was a new lawyer and fell short of his professional judgment,
and that he realized his mistake during the mediation stage of the case and paid Villamor’s debt
to Yu.
ISSUE
Was there a conflict of interest on the part of Atty. Jumao-as?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Jumao-as was found to have represented conflicting interests by committing the
following acts: he facilitated the incorporation of AEV Villamor Credit, Inc. (AEV), complainant
Adelita S. Villamor (Villamor)'s lending company; he persuaded Villamor to borrow money from
one Debbie Yu (Yu) to beef up AEV's capital; he left AEV to join 3 E's Debt Equity Grant Co. (3 E's),
a lending company owned by Yu; he incited a diaspora of AEV's collectors to join 3 E's; he told
AEV's collectors to remit their collections to 3 E's since Villamor owed Yu; and he even sent a
demand letter to Villamor, for and in behalf of Yu, demanding that Villamor pay the amount she
owed Yu.
The Court treats Atty. Jumao-as' Motion to Reduce Penalty as a motion for reconsideration, and
grants the same and accordingly reduces the penalty originally meted to Atty. Jumao-as. These
acts of contrition, however, will not reduce Atty. Jumao-as' administrative liability to the full extent
that he desires. As he says in his Motion to Reduce Penalty, Atty. Jumao-as may truly have been
incapable of spotting the beginnings of attorney-client relationships and conflicting interests.
However, lawyers such as he can never effectively claim legal ignorance. That he violated his oath
as a lawyer is already a permanent dent on his record. His misdeeds towards Villamar must have
put the image of the Bar and its members in some degree of embarrassment. He may have been
forgiven by his complainant, but the disrepute to the legal profession that he had caused cannot
simply be repaired by a mere warning or serving a short-lived suspension from law practice.
53
Therefore, Atty. Jumao-as represented conflicting interests.
54
THE LAWYER’S OATH MANDATES EVERY LAWYER TO CONDUCT

HIMSELF/HERSELF ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF HIS/HER KNOWLEDGE
AND DISCRETION, WITH ALL GOOD FIDELITY AS WELL TO THE COURTS
AS TO HIS/HER CLIENTS
PRUDENCIO PORTUGUESE, JR. V. ATTY. JERRY CENTRO

A.C. NO. 12875; January 26, 2021
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a Complaint against Atty. Jerry R. Centro (Atty. Centro), for gross negligence, abandonment,
and dereliction of duty.
Respondent Atty. Centro was complainant Prudencio B. Portuguese, Jr. 's (Portuguese) counsel in
a Civil Case pending before the RTC. Atty. Centro drafted and filed the Answer to the Complaint.
Portuguese alleged that at the termination of the proceedings, the parties were required to file
their memoranda. After several follow-ups, the respondent informed Portuguese that the
memorandum was already filed in court. However, to his and his family's shock, Portuguese was
served a copy of a Notice by a sheriff, giving them three days to comply with the Writ of Execution
in connection with the civil case. Apparently, this was the first time that Portuguese learned of the
rendition of a judgment in the said case.
Portuguese claimed that Atty. Centro received a copy of the RTC's July 10, 2017 Decision on August
10, 2017 but the latter never advised him about it. Moreover, Atty. Centro did not file any pleading
to appeal or question the RTC's Decision. Worse, Portuguese discovered that Atty. Centro did not
actually file a Memorandum contrary to the latter's representation.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Centro fulfill his duties under the Lawyer’s Oath?
RULING
No, Atty. Centro did not fulfill his duties under the Lawyer’s Oath.
The lawyer’s oath mandates every lawyer to conduct himself/herself according to the best of
his/her knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his/her clients.
Atty. Centro's unjustifiable negligence and abandonment of his client's cause violated the
Lawyer's Oath as well as the CPR. He casually set aside a legal matter that was entrusted to him
and which deserved his full attention and diligence. He was grossly negligent of his duty as
counsel and was manifestly disinterested in his client's cause. He must be reminded that as a
lawyer, he is duty-bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client's cause
with diligence, care and devotion. This is because a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
Therefore, Atty. Centro failed to fulfill his duties under the Lawyer’s Oath.
55
A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS EVEN WHEN A LAWYER

DISPENSED A LEGAL ADVICE AS A PERSONAL FAVOR; A LAWYER SHALL
KEEP INVIOLATE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION CONFIDED TO HIM BY HIS
CLIENT; A LAWYER SHALL REFRAIN REPRESENTING CONFLICTING
INTEREST AGAINST HIS CLIENT
ATTY. ROGELIO CONSTANTINO V ATTY. NEMESIO ARANSAZO, JR.

A.C. No. 9701; February 10, 2021
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Atty. Rogelio S. Constantino against
respondent Atty. Nemesio A. Aransazo, Jr. for the alleged violation of Canons 17 and 21 of the CPR,
and Rule 138, Sections 20 (e) and 27 of the Rules of Court for disclosing confidential information
acquired in the course of their lawyer-client relationship.
Atty. Constantino engaged the services of Atty. Aransazo, Jr. as counsel in a case for the Annulment
of Extra-Judicial Proceedings entitled "Hope Claire Aldaba vs. Eduardo Tongco, Atty. Rogelio B.
Constantino, Atty. Nemesio Aransazo, Jr." Aldaba obtained a loan from Tongco and executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over a property which she owns, and a promissory note and irrevocable
special power of attorney in favor of Tongco. As Aldaba failed to pay the loan, Tongco executed a
Deed of Assignment in favor of Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo, Jr., for a consideration of
P2,200,000.00. During the pre-trial, Aldaba’s counsel manifested that Atty. Aransazo, Jr.
executed a sworn statement which narrated that the Deed of Assignment executed by Tongco in
favor of Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo, Jr. was without consideration, which therefore
rendered the Deed of Assignment null and void.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against Atty. Aransazo, Jr. However, Atty. Aransazo, Jr.
insisted that Atty. Constantino did not confide the facts to him in the course of their lawyer-client
relationship but due to their personal relationship as friends.
ISSUE
1. Was a lawyer-client relationship formed when Atty. Constantino consulted Atty. Aransazo, Jr.
about the Deed of Assignment?
2. Did Atty. Aransazo, Jr. violate the CPR when he executed the subject sworn statement containing
information confided to him by Atty. Constantino?
RULING
1. Yes, a lawyer-client relationship was established between them.
If an individual consults a lawyer in respect to his business affairs or legal troubles of any
kind with a view towards obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the lawyer, by
virtue thereof, permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then a lawyer-client relationship
is established.
The moment Atty. Constantino approached Atty. Aransazo, Jr. to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship
56
exists notwithstanding the personal relationship between Atty. Constantino and Atty.
Aransazo, Jr. Notably, notwithstanding the fact that Atty. Aransazo, Jr. may have initially
dispensed legal advice to Atty. Constantino as a personal favor, he was still duty-bound to
preserve and protect the personal, confidential and fiduciary relation established between
them.
2. Yes, Atty. Aransazo, Jr. violated the CPR regarding the rule on privileged communication and the
prohibition against representing conflicting interests.
Under Canon 21 of the CPR, “A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.” The contents of Atty. Aransazo, Jr.’s
sworn statement contained information revealed to him in confidence by Atty. Constantino
during a lawyer-client relationship. By executing the sworn statement alone, Atty. Aransazo,
Jr. breached his obligation to maintain inviolate the confidence reposed on him and to
preserve the secrets of Atty. Constantino.
Furthermore, Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.” In this case, as counsel for Atty. Constantino, Atty. Aransazo, Jr. advocated the
validity and due execution of the Deed of Assignment upon which Atty. Constantino's
interest over the real estate mortgage is based. On the other hand, the sworn statement of
Atty. Aransazo, Jr. refuted Atty. Constantino's claim that the Deed of Assignment was
executed with a valid consideration, which necessarily jeopardized and prejudiced the
latter's interest in the civil case.
57
CONNIVING PROOF MUST BE PRESENTED FOR A CHARGE TO JUSTIFY A

DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST A LAWYER
SANNY GERODIAS V. ATTY. TOMAS RIVERAL

A.C. No. 12719; February 17, 2021
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Sanny L. Gerodias filed a disbarment complaint before the IBP against Attorneys Tomas A. Riveral,
Annabel G. Pulvera-Page, and Lorena M. Supatan.
Gerodias was a former employee of Oriental Port and Allied Service Corporation (OPASCOR).
During his employment, he underwent several disciplinary investigations for various reasons
such as heated altercations with co-employees, damage to company property, and
abandonment of work. The last disciplinary investigation which led to his voluntary retirement
from OPASCOR was the incident of him stealing a box of perfumes owned by OPASCOR's clients.
Instead of terminating Gerodias, OPASCOR offered him the option of voluntary resignation with
payment of separation pay.
Gerodias, on the other hand, demanded to avail of the early retirement option. Despite the fact
that he was short of two years to avail of the company's early retirement program, Gerodias'
request was approved by Riveral, the President and General Manager of OPASCOR. However, a
month after Gerodias received his retirement pay, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
OPASCOR. On the other hand, OPASCOR filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against
Gerodias.
A disbarment case was filed by Gerodias against Riveral as the President and General Manager of
OPASCOR; Pulvera-Page, as the Corporate Secretary of OPASCOR and one of the lawyers in the
firm of Riveral, Pulvera & Associates; and Supatan, as a lawyer in Riveral, Pulvera & Associates
who received Gerodias' Position Paper during the proceedings of the labor case. Gerodias averred
that Rivenil, Pulvera-Page and Supatan violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 of the CPR when
they, together with Jessielou Cadungog, the Labor Union President of OPASCOR, connived and
conspired to dismiss him from his employment.
ISSUE
Should the disbarment case filed against Riveral, Pulvera-Page, and Supatan be dismissed?
RULING
Yes, the disbarment case filed against Riveral, Pulvera-Pagge, and Supatan should be dismissed.
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the IBP and approves the recommendation to dismiss the
complaint against respondents Riveral, Pulvera-Page, and Supatan. Settled is the rule that for a
charge to justify a disciplinary action against a lawyer, the complainant must present convincing
proof to substantiate the charge. Otherwise, the lawyer is presumed innocent.
In this case, the IBP properly found that Riveral, as the President and General Manager of
OPASCOR, did not act in bad faith in approving the early retirement of Gerodias instead of
criminally charging him and terminating his employment under which he would have received a
considerably lesser separation pay than the retirement package. As President and General
58
Manager, he approved Gerodias' request to avail of the early retirement program even when he
was short of two years in service as per the company policy. We find no violation of the CPR or
the Lawyer's Oath in Riveral's benevolent act of accommodating Gerodias' request. No evidence
was presented to show that Riveral acted with bad faith, malice, or ill will. Hence, the
presumption of good faith in his favor stands.
Therefore, the disbarment case filed against respondents should be dismissed.
59
A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT MAY BE BASIS OF DETERMINING THE

AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES BY A LAWYER
ATTY. ARISTOTLE DOMINGUEZ V. BANK OF COMMERCE, AS PURPORTED

TRANSFEREE OF TRADERS ROYAL BANK, AND SPOUSES CARMELO, JR.
G.R. No. 225207, 29 September 2021
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
In 2007, respondent Carmelo Africa Jr. (Carmelo), together with his brothers Carlos and Chito,
engaged the legal services of Atty, Dominguez in order to prevent the Bank of Commerce (BOC)
from taking possession of their family homes in Marikina City, Antipolo City and Quezon City with
a total redemption price of P25 million, Atty. Dominguez charged P250,000.00 or one percent
(1%) of the redemption price as his acceptance fee. Additionally, Carmelo and his brothers
promised him a success fee corresponding to twenty percent (20%) of the amount reduced from
the original redemption price. Meanwhile, it came to the knowledge of Atty, Dominguez that the
initial redemption price set by the BOC was P100 million. He averred that he failed to charge the
proper acceptance fee due to the misrepresentation of Carmelo and his brothers as to the
redemption price of the properties.
In 2009, they sought again the services of Atty. Dominguez. The lawyer who previously handled
the case emerged victorious up to the appellate court. However, his services were terminated
and was substituted by Aitv. Domiguez then initiated execution proceedings against Hanjin.
Notwithstanding his efforts, Atty. Dominguez's legal services were likewise terminated.
Meanwhile, BOC filed a petition for cancellation of the adverse claim, on Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 473882 and 473883. This petition was opposed by the spouses Carmelo and
Elizabeth Africa (spouses Africa) through Atty. Dominguez. During the hearing, BOC manifested
that there might be a settlement between the parties to which the spouses Africa did not
interpose any objections. In October 2012, Atty. Dominguez filed before the trial court a Request
for Admission of the aforesaid allegations. A month later, Atty, Dominguez manifested that he was
no longer representing the spouses Africa as oppositors in the petition for cancellation of adverse
claim.
ISSUE
May attorney's fees in a compromise agreement serve as a basis of the award?
RULING
Yes, the attorney’s fees in a compromise agreement should serve as a basis of the award.
A Compromise Agreement between the counsel's client and the adverse party is one of the
factors determining the counsel's lawful fees for the legal services he rendered. Granting that a
compromise agreement had been reached by the parties, the same may be used to determine
the counsel's lawful fees provided it is produced and admitted before the trial court for proper
scrutiny and consideration. In Gubat v. National Power Corporation, it was held that a client may
enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the lawyer, but the terms of the
agreement should not deprive the counsel of his compensation for the professional services he
had rendered. If so, the compromise shall be subjected to said fees.
60
Thus, when a compromise agreement is entered into by the patties and as a consequence of
which, the suit did not result in a court's judgment on money claims, said compromise agreement
may serve as a basis in the award for attorney's fees. Furthermore, quantum meruit, which means
as much as he deserves, is likewise a basis especially when the attorney-client relationship was
severed prior to the finality of the case.
Since Atty. Domiguez rendered his legal services in the petition for cancellation of adverse claim
for the spouses Africa, he is then entitled to his attorney's fees. In the usual course, when the
lawyer has established his entitlement to attorney's fees, the case will then be remanded to the
trial court for the proper determination of the amount on the basis of quantum meruit. In other
instances, this Court found it prudent to fix the attorney's fees to finally put an end to the issue.
Therefore, attorney's fees in a compromise agreement may serve as a basis of the award.
61
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PHILIPPINE

PRIVATE LANDS IS TOO BASIC A RULE FOR EVEN NON-ATTORNEYS TO
BE UNAWARE OF
TONY PETER PARTSCH V. ATTY. REYNALDO VITORILLO

A.C. No. 10897; January 04, 2022
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Before this Court is complainant Tony Peter Partsch's (Partsch) administrative complaint seeking
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Vitorillo (Atty. Vitorillo).
Partsch, a Swiss national, desired to purchase a piece of beachfront real property located in
Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro. Upon information of the adjacent land owners, Partsch sought Atty.
Vitorillo in the latter's law office in Cagayan de Oro City. Atty. Vitorillo claimed ownership over
800 square meters of the said beachfront lot (subject property). Atty. Vitorillo offered to sell to
Partsch the 800 square-meter subject property for the total amount of PhP2,500,000.00; 10%
of which shall constitute down payment and the balance shall be paid upon delivery of the two
titles within three months. Partsch tendered a check in the amount of PhP230,000.00 and
PhP20,000.00 in cash to Atty. Vitorillo as partial payment for the subject property. Atty. Vitorillo
informed Partsch that he is no longer selling the subject property. As an alternative, Atty. Vitorillo
proposed for sale another lot located in the highlands. Partsch rejected the offer and demanded
instead the reimbursement of his down payment plus interests. Atty Vitorillo refused.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Vitorillo fraudulently sell the subject property?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Vitorillo fraudulently sold his property.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.02, a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or lessening confidence in the legal system.
The prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine private lands is too basic a rule for even
non-attorneys to be unaware of. As a lawyer, Atty. Vitorilllo is presumed to know this. Despite
being equipped with such knowledge, Atty. Vitorillo still marketed the subject property for sale
to Partsch, a Swiss national. More telling of Atty. Vitorillo's ethical obliquity is his questionable
instruction to Partsch to just proceed with the fencing of the subject property without any
acceptable guarantee of Atty. Vitorillo's title thereto. Again, Atty. Vitorillo had not refuted this
serious allegation. He is deemed to have acted in contravention of Canon 1, Rule 1.02 - CPR's
proscription against counseling activities aimed at defiance of the law.
Therefore, Atty. Vitorillo fraudulently sold the subject property.
62
VIOLATION OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST RULE CAN BE DETERMINED

USING THREE TESTS; A LAWYER IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR PURPOSES
OF SATISFYING THE LEGAL FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS DUE TO HIM
HOME GUARANTY CORP. V. ATTY. LAMBERTO TAGAYUNA

A.C. No. 13131; February 23, 2022
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) filed a complaint for disbarment before the IBP,
alleging that respondents Atty. Tagayuna and Atty. Panopio violated the conflict of interest rule
under Canon 15, as well as for failure and refusal to account for the funds and properties of their
client HGC when due or upon demand under Canon 16.
HGC, a government-owned and controlled corporation, engaged the services of E.S.P. Collection
Agency (ESP), represented by Atty. Panopio jointly with the Law Firm. HGC and ESP jointly with
the Law Firm entered into a Collection Retainership Agreement. HGC provided ESP and the Law
Firm the necessary documents for collection and litigation purposes. HGC claimed that
respondents refused to return the documents, specifically 53 owner's duplicate copies of TCTs
and other various documents, endorsed to the Law Firm in view of the termination of the
Collection Retainership Agreement. On the allegation of conflict of interest, HGC claimed that Atty.
Tagayuna, one of the partners of ESP and the Law Firm, was also the president of Blue Star
Construction and Development Corporation (BSCDC). HGC averred that BSCDC, through Atty.
Tagayuna, initiated an arbitration case against it while the Collection Retainership Agreement with
ESP was still subsisting.
ISSUE
1. Did the respondents violate the conflict-of-interest rule?
2. Did the respondents fail and refuse to return the documents when due and upon demand?
RULING
1. No, respondents did not violate the conflict-of-interest rule under the CPR based on the
three tests laid down by the Court.
Under the first test, respondents did not represent conflicting interests. As found by the IBP,
the Law Firm did not represent BSCDC as counsel in the arbitration case. The arbitration
complaint was signed by Atty. Almadro as BSCDC's counsel, who was not part of nor related
to the Law Firm. On the other hand, Atty. Tagayuna merely signed as president to verify the
complaint. Further, evidence shows that the Law Firm and ESP were engaged by HGC for
collection purposes only; as determined by the IBP, there is no proof that the Law Firm
handled matters that were related to the arbitration case. Also, it was established that the
Law Firm was no longer retained as counsel at the time of the filing of the arbitration case.
The second test is not relevant to the instant case; the factual circumstances did not include
allegations of respondents' acceptance of a new relation while being counsel of HGC that
63
prevented them from faithfully performing their duties to it. There is no showing that BSCDC
is a new client of the Law Firm. As for the third test, the professional relationship between
the Law Firm and HGC already expired. The subject of arbitration are matters not handled
by the Law Firm; the Law Firm was engaged for collection purposes only– this is clear in the
Collection Retainership Agreement as adduced in evidence. In any event, there is no new
relation to speak of as BSCDC is not a client of the Law Firm.
Therefore, respondents did not violate the conflict-of-interest rule.
2. The Court finds the charge of unlawful withholding of documents to be partly meritorious.
Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows this upon prompt notice to the client, as well as Section 37, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. The Court has long held that a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate his client's money, as well as properties and documents, for himself by the mere
fact that he is owed legal fees. It is essential that the client consent to the application of his
property or funds to the legal fees. Absent the client's consent, the lawyer must return the
funds to the client, without prejudice to the filing of a case to recover the unpaid fees.
Records show that respondents are no longer in possession of the documents that HGC
claims to be unlawfully withheld. As found by the IBP, the titles were already returned by the
Law Firm to HGC as evidenced by turnover letters as attached to respondents' position
paper. Assuming there are still unaccounted titles as stated by respondents, it does not mean
that respondents are in possession of these absent any contrary proof. As to the claim that
respondents were merely exercising their right to withhold to exercise retaining lien for
unpaid fees, the Court finds that the requisites to exercise lien were not met. There is no
proof that HGC consented to the respondents' withholding of the titles to satisfy the unpaid
legal fees.
Thus, the Court finds that respondents improperly exercised its right to retain HGC's
documents as lien.
64
LAWYERS MUST KEEP RECORDS OF TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS
BATAAN SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC. V. ATTY. ANTHONY

JAY CONSUNJI
A.C. No. 11439; January 4, 2022
PER CURIAM
FACTS
The case resolved the resolution and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors dismissing
the complaint against Atty. Anthony Jay B. Consunji (Atty. Consunji) filed by Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Company, Inc. (BASECO) for receiving excessive cash advances and professional fees
from BASECO and failing to render an accounting and liquidation of the said moneys in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Atty. Consunji was the legal counsel of BASECO from 2005-2011. According to the complaint,
Atty. Consunji received several cash advances purportedly as payment for professional fees and
taxes due to the government from BASECO in the total amount of P20,593,781.
BASECO avers that Atty. Consunji failed to liquidate or account for the advanced professional fees
and taxes he received and failed to render the professional services he was supposed to provide
which include the titling of unregistered lands and reconstitution of lost titles in the Engineering
Island. Likewise, Atty. Consunji failed to submit the Official Receipts of the several taxes he paid
to the Province of Bataan and the BIR. Further, he did not issue Official Receipts to BASECO with
respect to the professional fees paid to him. Moreover, BASECO contends that it was able to
successfully secure the re-issuance or reconstitution of the subject titles with the help of other
lawyers, instead of Atty. Consunji, only for the amount of P200,000.
Atty. Consunji argues that all the cash advances he received were liquidated and well accounted
for and that all the funds that were released to him were duly approved by the Board of Directors
and with the knowledge of the PCGG Comptroller. He also argues that he issued
acknowledgement receipts and turned it over to the Finance Branch.
ISSUE
Was Atty. Consunji able to discharge his duties to render an account and impose reasonable fees?
RULING
No, Atty. Consunji failed to render an account of the fees he received which were of an
unreasonable amount.
Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is accountable for the money
entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability is by issuing
and keeping receipts. It is incumbent upon a lawyer to keep records of his transactions with
clients as a matter of prudence and due diligence. Ethical and practical considerations require
lawyers to issue receipts to their clients, even if it was not demanded, and to keep copies of the
said receipts for his own records.
65
Atty. Consunji merely stated that the receipts were turned over to the Finance Department of
BASECO without specifying the OR Nos. per transaction, the dates that these were turned over
and the officers who received the same. Further, in the receipt of payment for his professional
fees, he merely issued acknowledgement receipts instead of official receipts as required by the
law. He did not retain copies of these receipts for his record. This leads the Court to believe that
no actual accounting and liquidation was done. Thus, he cannot simply claim that the records
were already with the Finance Department of BASECO. As a dutiful and prudent lawyer, he should
have kept copies of these receipts and records of transactions he had with BASECO. He has not
submitted any copies of the receipts he issued nor copies of Official Receipts issued by the
Province of Bataan and BIR with respect to the payment of transfer taxes, capital gains taxes,
documentary stamp taxes and registration fees made by BASECO.
Since Atty. Consunji received millions of pesos from his client as his legal compensation but failed
to fulfill his obligation, and likewise received money in trust as payment for his client's taxes but
he did not render an accounting and liquidation of the moneys he received, he was disbarred.
66
PRIVATE LAWYERS CANNOT BE HIRED BY THE COA
PELAGIO RICALDE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 253724; February 15, 2022
M.V. LOPEZ, J.
FACTS
A petition for certiorari was filed under Rule 64 by petitioner Pelagio Recalde to assail the
Commission on Audit (COA) decision disallowing the disbursements of the payments for the
services of Atty. Dennis R. Gascon (Atty. Gascon), Atty. Francesca R. Custodio-Manzano (Atty.
Manzano), and Atty. Madonna N. Clarino (Atty. Clarino).
The Bureau of Investments (BOI) entered into service agreements with the aforementioned
lawyers, tasked to perform various tasks such as reviewing documents papers and any proposed
rules and regulations of the Board of Governors, prepare draft schemes of the legal steps or
requirements for proposing an investment incentives to investors and entrepreneurs, render legal
opinion, provide technical and logistical support to the Committee, draft measures for legislative
action, represent the BOI-DTI before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, among others. Upon
post-audit, Notice of Disallowances (ND) were issued covering the salaries paid to the 3 lawyers,
and the said lawyers and petitioner were made liable under it.
Petitioners argued that the lawyers were hired not as legal counsels, but as technical assistants.
They also claimed that Atty. Clarino does not fall within the ambit of a private law practitioner as
she had never rendered legal services for compensation before her engagement with the BOI.
Respondents posit that since the service agreements required performance of legal services, and
the required OSG written conformity and acquiescence and COA written concurrence were not
obtained, the disallowance of the salaries paid to the 3 lawyers must be upheld.
ISSUE
Did the private lawyers in this case perform legal services in violation to the prohibition on
engagement of private lawyers by the government instrumentalities?
RULING
Yes, the engagement of the private lawyers by the BOI was unlawful.
The long-standing rule in our jurisdiction restricts government agencies and instrumentalities in
hiring private lawyers to render legal services for them and handle their cases. The regulation was
primarily aimed to curtail unnecessary expenditures of public funds on legal services of private
lawyers since the law has already designated the OSG to discharge such functions. The rule,
however, recognizes exceptional situations which unavoidably call for the services of private
lawyers. For one, pursuant to its constitutional mandate to be the guardian of public funds, the
COA issued Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986 to regulate the government's hiring of private
counsels, which was amended/modified by Circular No. 95-011 43 dated December 4, 1995 as
follows: Where a government agency is provided by law with a legal officer or office who or
which can handle its legal requirements or cases in courts, it (agency) may not be allowed to hire
the services of private lawyers for a fee, chargeable against public funds, unless exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances obtain. Accordingly, public funds shall not be utilized for payment
of the services of a private legal counsel or law firm to represent government agencies in court
or to render legal services for them. In the event that such legal services cannot be avoided or is
67
justified under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, the written conformity and

acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be,
and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured before the hiring
or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. Recently, COA Circular No. 2021-003 dated July
16, 2021, further amended COA Circular No. 86-255 by exempting national government agencies
and instrumentalities from the requirement of the COA's prior written concurrence subject to
specific conditions, the existence of which is to be determined by the COA. The dispensation was
brought about by the COA's recognition that the purpose of the COA's written concurrence, i.e.,
to ensure the reasonableness of the amount of legal fees may be guaranteed by safeguards other
than the requisite COA's written concurrence. On the other hand, the written conformity and
acquiescence of the OSG remains to be an indispensable requirement under the new guidelines
for purposes of validating the necessity of procuring services of a private lawyer before actually
engaging one.
Furthermore, the prohibition under COA Circular No. 86-255, as amended, does not only cover
the engagement of private lawyers on retainer fees for actual case litigations. The amended
guidelines in the hiring of private lawyers made no qualification as to what legal service the lawyer
is to perform, nor was there any specification as to how his or her services were to be paid.
Thus, it is clearly prohibited that government agencies and instrumentalities hire the services of
private lawyers for a fee, chargeable against public funds, unless exceptional or extraordinary
circumstances obtain.
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CONFLICT OF INTEREST ARISES EITHER IN RELATED OR UNRELATED

CASES
GERTRUDES MAHUNOT ANG V. ATTY. LORD MARAPAO

A.C. No. 10297; March 9, 2022
DIMAAMPAO, J.
FACTS
This administrative disciplinary case is the Verified Letter-Complaint filed by private respondent
Gertrudes Mahumot Ang (Gertrudes) against petitioner Atty. Lord M. Marapao (Atty. Marapao) for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Atty. Marapao represented Gertrudes' husband, Venancio Ang (Venancio), in the various criminal
cases filed by Venancio against Gertrudes. The cases were eventually dismissed as Gertrudes and
Venancio reconciled, paving the way for Gertrudes to hire Atty. Marapao as her lawyer in the two
cases which she filed against Rosita Mawili (Rosita) and Genera Legetimas (Genera). Eight years
later, Gertrudes was entangled in another court litigation. This time, she was sued by Eufronia
Estaca Guitan (Eufronia) and Victoria Huan (Victoria). Gertrudes discovered that Atty. Marapao
appeared as counsel for Eufronia and Victoria in the said civil case. Additionally, Atty. Marapao
had assisted Eufronia and her niece Rosario in lodging more than thirty (30) criminal cases against
Gertrudes for various crimes involving falsification of public and private documents, perjury,
violation of the "Anti-Alias Law," and violation of the National Building Code.
Gertrudes denounced Atty. Marapao's propensity of filing frivolous suits. She accused him of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, decrying that his act of representing Eufronia, Victoria, and Rosario
in the cases filed against her transgressed the ethical injunction which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in any conflict of interest given that she was a former client of Atty. Marapao. Gertrudes
bemoaned Atty. Marapao's failure to preserve the confidence and secrets of a client when he
used privileged information to file cases against her eight years later.
Atty. Marapao filed his Verified Comment where he countered that the cases filed by Eufronia,
Rosario, and Victoria against Gertrudes from 2009 to 2011 were clearly separate and distinct from
the earlier cases filed by Gertrudes against Rosita and Genera in 2001, and different as well from
the old cases filed by Venancio against Gertrudes in 1998 and 1999. Thus, any privileged
communication reposed upon Atty. Marapao by Gertrudes was not used, utilized, or availed of
by him in acting as lawyer for Eufronia, Rosario, and Victoria in the later cases.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Marapao violate Rule 15.03, Canon 15 for allegedly engaging in conflict of interest?
RULING
No, Atty. Marapao did not represent conflicting interests.
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is rooted on principles of public policy
and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice. In broad terms, there is a conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
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acceptance of a new relation will prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Another test is whether the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he or she represents him or her, and also whether he or she will be called upon in his or her new
relation to use against his or her first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. The
first test of inconsistency refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either
in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the
adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his or her former client in a matter which is
related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.
The present controversy involves Atty. Marapao's representation of new clients (Eufronia,
Victoria, and Rosario) against Gertrudes, who was his former client. Thus, the second rule as
explained above is applicable. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client
against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he or she appeared for the
former client. Conversely, he or she may properly act as counsel for a new client, with full
disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous
employment, there being in that instance no conflict of interests. The suits filed by Gertrudes
against Rosita and Genera in 2001 (Estafa and/or Violation of B.P. No. 22), where Gertrudes was
Atty. Marapao's client, are distinct, separate, and independent from the civil case filed by Eufronia
and Victoria against Gertrudes in 2009 (Declaration of Nullity of a Public and Private Document)
and to 30 criminal cases filed by Rosario and Eufronia against Gertrudes in the years 2009 to 2011,
where Atty. Marapao represented Eufronia, Victoria, and Rosario.
Hence, based on the foregoing acts, Atty. Marapao cannot be held liable for representing
conflicting interests.
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FOR PURPOSES OF THE DISQUALIFICATION RULE, AN ATTORNEY-IN-

FACT IS A PRINCIPAL PARTY
EDGARDO ARELLANO-SINGSON V. ATTY. EDGARDO CORDEÑO

A.C. No. 12817; March 9, 2022
FACTS
The Court resolved the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors suspending Atty. Edgardo
C. Cordeño (Atty. Cordeño) from the practice of law for 3 months, disqualification from being
commissioned as Notary Public for 2 years, and revocation of notarial commission, for violations
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Rules on Notarial Practice).
Edgardo Arellano-Singson alleged that he and her mother, Rufina Arellano-Singson (Rufina), live
on a portion of a parcel of land owned by Bienvenido Arellano (Bienvenido). A complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed against them. One of the complaint's annexes is an Extrajudicial
Settlement/Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. This document was
notarized by Atty. Cordeño where his wife, Marylin A. Cordeño (Marylin), was one of the principal
parties in the document.
Atty. Cordeño argues that "an attorney-in-fact is not a principal but merely an agent whose
powers are defined by the instrument granting such authority and the provisions of the Civil Code
on Agency. A principal is one who has direct interest on the subject matter while an agent is
merely an alter ego of the principal. Atty. Cordeño argues that the work of the notary public is
merely to put an imprimatur that there was no fraud, nor illegal or immoral arrangement and that
the acts of the signatories were voluntarily entered into with full knowledge of the consequences
of the act. He submits that this purpose was fulfilled in the present case.
ISSUE
Is Atty. Cordeño liable for violating the rules on disqualification of a notary public?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Cordeño is liable and should be administratively sanctioned.
Rule IV, Section 3 of the Notarial Practice Rules states that a notary public is disqualified from
performing a notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative
by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the 4th civil degree. Rule II, Section 10 of the
Rules on Notarial Practice states: SEC. 10. Principal. — "Principal" refers to a person appearing
before the notary public whose act is the subject of notarization.
In the present case, it is Marylin who personally appeared before the notary public who happens
to be her husband, Atty. Cordeño. Likewise, it is Marylin's act which is the subject of notarization,
being properly authorized to represent someone else. Thus, we hold that Marylin is a principal in
so far as the Rules on Notarial Practice are concerned.
In view of this, Atty. Cordeño's act of notarizing the subject document, despite his wife being one
of the principals, constitutes a violation of the above-cited provision.
71
FORGERY OF A COURT DECISION AND FALSIFICATION OF AN ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT WARRANTS DISBARMENT OF THE ERRING LAWYER
MARIA FELICISIMA GONZAGA V. ATTY. EDGARDO ABAD

A.C. No. 13163; March 15, 2022
GESMUNDO, A., J.
FACTS
Complainant Gonzaga in this case seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Abad for the
fraudulent scheme of acquiring a fake decision and passing it off as authentic to the concerned
parties for respondent Atty. Abad’s personal interest.
Complainant Gonzaga and respondent Atty. Abad were colleagues in the AFP. Gonzaga engaged
the services of Atty. Abad as counsel and the latter’s wife as a clinical psychologist to nullify
Gonzaga’s marriage. Atty. Abad even received money from Gonzaga representing the professional
and filing fees as well as the expenses for psychological evaluation. Atty. Abad also assured that
there would be no hearings and maliciously suggested that he can influence the RTC judge who
will hand the case. Thereafter, Atty. Abad informed Gonzaga through text messages that the RTC
judge declared void her marriage and that the decree of nullity must be recorded. The text
messages were sent months before the purported RTC decision which reveals that Atty. Abad
had firsthand information regarding the source of the decision. Moreover, Atty. Abad furnished
Gonzaga with a copy of the decision that adopted the psychological report prepared by his wife
the clinical psychologist. Later, Atty. Abad recommended that a similar case be filed in another
province where it is easier to record a decree of nullity of marriage and this alerted Gonzaga to
investigate the regularity of the proceedings. Upon inquiry with another lawyer, Gonzaga
discovered that the RTC decision and its entry of judgment were spurious and that the petition
for nullity of marriage was non-existent. The signature of the judge was forged because such
judge was already promoted to the Court of Appeals before the supposed decision was rendered
and the clerk of court who certified the purported entry of judgment was not assigned to the RTC
but to the MeTC. Atty. Abad defrauded Gonzaga into believing that he won the legal battle in her
favor and disrespected the concerned members of the judiciary by wrongfully involving their
names in the fraudulent scheme, both in exchange for monetary consideration.
As a defense, Atty. Abad merely offered a blanket denial that he did not fabricate any decision or
its entry of judgment.
IBP Board of Governors adopted the Commission’s findings imposing the penalty of disbarment
upon respondent Atty. Abad and that his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
ISSUE
Did the falsification and forgery of court decisions by Atty. Abad violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires the lawyer to maintain good moral character at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar until their requirement from the practice of law?
RULING
Yes, the falsification and forgery of court decisions by Atty. Abad violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
72
Atty. Abad fell below the standards of morality, integrity, and honesty required of a lawyer. Canon
1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandate all lawyers
to possess good moral character at the time of their application for admission to the Bar and
require them to maintain such character until their retirement from the practice of law. The Court
has time and again in several cited cases held that respondents committed falsification or forgery
and that such respondent-lawyers benefitted from the use of fake documents which shows gross
misconduct and is unfit to continue his membership in the bar.
In the present case, Atty. Abad possessed a forged decision and entry of judgment. Atty. Abad
made use and benefitted from these simulated court documents. Circumstantial evidence exists
that Atty. Abad was involved in the falsification. Lastly, Atty. Abad failed to explain his possession
of the bogus court decision. Hence, Atty. Abad is guilty of gross misconduct and is unfit to
continue his membership in the bar when he deceived his client and the court. The acts of Atty.
Abad reveal his moral flaws that bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. The Court
reiterates that lawyers are duty-bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity
not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their career in order to safeguard the
reputation of the legal profession. It must be noted that the practice of law is not a right but a
mere privilege subject to the inherent regulatory power of the Court.
73
COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE IS NO LONGER A COMPETENT EVIDENCE

OF IDENTITY
FORTUNATO DIONISIO, JR. V. ATTYS. MIGUEL PADERNAL AND DELFIN

AGCAOILI, JR.
A.C. No. 12673; March 15, 2022
DIMAAMPAO, J.
FACTS
This case involved disciplinary proceedings in determining the administrative liability of

Respondents Atty. Padernal and Atty. Agcaoili, Jr. for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Fortunato and Franklin Dionisio filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP. The complaint stated that Atty. Padernal notarized a Real Estate Mortgage executed by
FCDionisio General Merchandising Company, a partnership where complainants were partners,
and Union Bank involving a parcel of land registered under the name of said partnership. The said
land was offered as a security for a loan taken out by Sunyang Mining Corporation. Atty. Agcaoili,
Jr. notarized a partner’s certificate which authorized the said mortgage. Later on, it was discovered
that the lot was foreclosed and sold at a public auction with Union Bank emerging as the winning
bidder.
Complainants aver that they did not personally appear before the respondents and that the
presentation of community tax certificates should not be used in determining whether they had
personally appeared. Meanwhile, Atty. Padernal counters that he was introduced to the
complainants and their sister by people from the Business Line Department of Union Bank. IBP
recommended that respondents’ be disqualified from being commissioned as notaries public for
2 years and suspending the respondents from the practice of law for 1 year for violating Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to the Notarial Rules.
ISSUE
Did respondents violate Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to the
Notarial Rules?
RULING
Yes, respondents violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to the
Notarial Rules when they did not confirm the identities of the persons claiming to be
complainants.
Section 2(b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules provides that a notary public is enjoined from
performing a notarial act such as an acknowledgment if the person involved as a signatory to the
instrument or document is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization
and is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that a community tax certificate is no longer considered as
a valid and competent evidence of identity not only because it is not included in the list of
competent evidence of identity under the Notarial Rules. Moreover, it does not bear the
photograph and signature of the persons appearing before notaries public which the Notarial
74
Rules deem as the more appropriate and competent means by which notaries public can
ascertain the person's identity. Furthermore, reliance on community tax certificates alone is
already a punishable indiscretion by a notary public.
Thus, an erring lawyer who is found to be remiss in his functions as a notary public is also
considered to have violated their oath as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
75
NON-APPEARANCE OF SIGNATURE OF PARTY IN NOTARIZED

DOCUMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE SUCH PARTY BEING A PRINCIPAL
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND JOSEFA PERLA TAN V. ATTY. MARIA JOHANNA

VALLEJO
A.C. No. 11219; March 16, 2022
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.
FACTS
Complainants Spouses Tan charged respondent Atty. Vallejo for the alleged violation of Sec. 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Complainants averred that on Sept. 21, 2012, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale which
transferred ownership of their property to respondent’s paternal uncle and an Affidavit
confirming the said sale. They also averred that under said Rules on Notarial Practice, respondent
was disqualified from notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale because the vendee in the sale is a
relative of respondent within the fourth civil degree. Moreover, they never appeared nor signed
the documents before the respondent since it was the uncle of respondent who prepared the
documents and persuaded them to sign it under the pretense that they would use the documents
to facilitate his loan application.
Respondent countered by saying that the complainants presented to her a signed Deed of
Absolute Sale and the Affidavit confirming the sale without the signature of her uncle which does
not constitute a violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice.
The IBP recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit since the Deed only
contained the signature of the complainants, respondent cannot be deemed to have violated the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
ISSUE
Did respondent violate Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice?
RULING
Yes, respondent violated Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provide that a notary public is
disqualified from performing the notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that notarizing a document where one of the contracting
parties was her relative within the fourth civil degree is a clear circumvention of the Rules on
Notarial Practice. Furthermore, it is immaterial that her uncle’s signature did not appear on the
sale documents since it does not alter the fact that respondent’s uncle is a principal party to the
sale.
Thus, respondent is liable for violation of Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
76
CLIENT’S MISREPRESENTATIONS SHOULD NOT BE THE SOLE BASIS OF A

LAWYER IN HANDLING THE CASE
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES JUSTICE AND MRS. SAMUEL F. REYES V. ATTY.
RONALD L. BRILLANTES
A.C. No. 9594; April 05, 2022
INTING, J.
FACTS
A disbarment case was filed by the Heirs of Justice Samuel F. Reyes and Mrs. Antonia C. Reyes
(complainants), represented by one of the heirs, Judge Antonio C. Reyes (Judge Reyes) against
respondent Atty. Ronald L. Brillantes (Atty. Brillantes) for alleged violation of the rule on forum
shopping, the Lawyer’s Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The estate of the complainants, through its administrator, Dr. Samuel C. Reyes Jr., filed a complaint
for quieting of title against the Spouses Florencio and Felicitas Divina (Spouses Divina) before the
RTC of Cauayan City, Isabela. Instead of filing an answer, Spouses Divina filed a Motion to Dismiss,
however, the RTC denied such motion for lack of merit. Despite the denial of their motion,
Spouses Divina still failed to file their answer to the complaint within the period allowed by the
Rules of Court. This prompted the Estate to file a motion to declare Spouses Divina in default for
their failure to file an answer to the Complaint within the reglementary period.
Thus, the RTC denied Spouses Divina’s motion for reconsideration and declared them in default.
Undeterred, Spouses Divina sought a recourse from the CA by filing a certiorari petition that
assailed the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint and prayed for the issuance of injunctive
relief in their favor. However, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit as the decision of the
RTC has already become final and executory.
The Spouses Divina then engaged the services of Atty. Brillantes and file a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment with the CA that prayed for the RTC Decision to be set aside on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In the Annulment Petition, Atty. Brillantes argued that his
clients’ belated receipt of the RTC Decision prevented them from filing a timely appeal thereof
with the CA. The CA denied the petition and dismissed the case for being effectively barred by
the Rules. In the disbarment complaint, Judge Reyes alleged that by filing the Annulment Petition
with the CA, Atty. Brillantes had grossly and deliberately violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR
for committing a falsehood and for abusing and misusing procedural rules and the rule on forum
shopping.
ISSUE
Did Atty. Brillantes violate the Lawyer’s Oath when he filed the Annulment Petition with the CA?
RULING
Yes, Atty. Brillantes violated the Lawyer’s Oath when he filed the Annulment Petition with the CA.
A lawyer who agrees to take up the cause of a client is expected to competently and diligently
protect the latter’s rights in accordance with his or her duties under the CPR. Failure to do so
would render the lawyer answerable not only to his or her client, but also to the legal profession,
the courts, and society.
77
In this case, Atty. Brillantes’ acts of preparing and filing the Annulment Petition with the CA on the
sole basis of his clients’ misrepresentations as to the actual status of the civil case shows just
exactly how far he fell short of his obligations as an officer of the Court. The fact that the civil case
had been transferred from one lawyer to another does not excuse Atty. Brillantes from diligently
studying the case, which obviously included reviewing the court records himself to determine,
among, others, the proper recourse to undertake to protect his clients’ cause. Moreover, it
appears that Atty. Brillantes had the relevant court records in the civil case in his possession when
he prepared the Annulment Petition. By fully relying on the inaccurate information divulged by his
clients during their interview, he allowed himself to be deceived into filing the Annulment Petition.
Therefore, Atty. Brillantes violated his oath when he committed a falsehood before the CA.
78
ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER WARRANTS

DISCIPLINARY SANCTION
TITA MANGAYAN V. ATTY. CIPRIANO ROBIELOS III

A.C. No. 11520; April 5, 2022
GAERLAN, J.
FACTS
A Verified Disbarment Complaint with Prayer for Immediate Suspension of the Respondent in the
Practice of Law was filed by complainant Mangayan against respondent Atty. Robielos III for
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent contracted a loan from the complainant and as payment for the obligation,
respondent issued 4 postdated checks. When complainant presented the checks when the
obligation fell due, they were all subsequently dishonored. Complainant informed respondent but
the latter never replaced the bouncing checks despite the commitment to do so. This prompted
respondent to file a criminal complaint for the violation of BP 22. Moreover, respondent was also
liable to the cousin of the complainant and issued 2 postdated checks which were later on
dishonored. This prompted the cousin of the complainant to institute another criminal case
against respondent.
Respondent avers that he merely acted as an accommodation party for one Danilo Valenzona
and that he is not personally indebted to the complainant. The IBP recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE
May a lawyer be administratively sanctioned by this Court for having failed to pay debts as they
fall due and for having issued worthless checks as payment for such debts?
RULING
Yes, a lawyer may be administratively sanctioned for having failed to pay debts as they fall and
for issuing worthless checks as payment for such debts.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that nonpayment of just obligations coupled with issuance
of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless if the issuance was made in a professional or private
capacity warrants disciplinary sanction. Such acts are indicative of the unfitness of the lawyer for
the trust and confidence reposed on him/her, and demonstrates a lack of personal honesty and
good moral character.
Therefore, respondent may be administratively sanctioned for failing to pay the debts when they
fell due and issuing worthless checks as payment for such debts since this constitutes a violation
to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
79
FAILURE TO ATTEND HEARINGS AND SUBMIT POSITION PAPERS IN THE

CLIENT’S CASE CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF THE CPR
MONICA PONTIANO V. ATTY. FABIAN GAPPI

A.C. No. 13118; June 28, 2022
ROSARIO, J.
FACTS
This case resolves the complaint filed before the IBP by complainants against respondent Atty.
Gappi for gross negligence, gross inefficiency in the performance of duties and responsibilities.
Complainants aver that respondent, who was the counsel of the complainants in an illegal
dismissal case, failed to attend a single scheduled hearing of the illegal dismissal case and did not
submit any position paper which led to the dismissal of the illegal dismissal complaint filed by the
complainants.
Respondent failed to file an answer to the administrative complaint. IBP recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 3 years and to pay the recommended fine
for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
ISSUE
Did respondent violate the said Rules of Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING
Yes, respondent violated the aforementioned Rules under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence and that his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The same law also provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
In this case, by failing to attend the scheduled hearing of his clients, respondent failed to employ
his best efforts in the protection of his clients' interests. Due to respondent's lack of diligence in
the performance of his duties as legal counsel, his clients gravely suffered and his actions resulted
in the dismissal of their case. Respondent fell short of such standard when he committed the acts
of deception against complainants. Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and
dishonorable to the legal profession but that they reveal basic moral flaws that make him unfit to
practice law.
Thus, when lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only
the rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice,
appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand, suspension
or even disbarment to rectify their wrongful acts.
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JUDICIAL ETHICS
A MAN HAVING AN ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP WITH A WOMAN NOT HIS
WIFE IS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF "DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL
CONDUCT" UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAWS; DELIBERATE OMISSION OF
MATERIAL FACTS IN SALNS CONSTITUTES DISHONESTY
RE: INCIDENT REPORT OF THE SECURITY DIVISION AND ALLEGED VARIOUS

INFRACTIONS COMMITTED BY MR. CLOYD D. GARRA, JUDICIAL STAFF
EMPLOYEE II, MEDIATION, PLANNING AND RESEARCH DIVISION, PHILIPPINE
MEDIATION CENTER OFFICE, PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY
A.M. No. 2019-14-SC, February 10, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
In an Information Report (Report), Eddie B. Macapanas and Archie J. Comilan, Shift-In-Charge

and CCTV Operator, respectively, of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) Training Center,
stated that respondent Mr. Cloyd D. Garra (Garra), Judicial Staff Employee II, Mediation, Planning
and Research Division, PHILJA and Staff Driver, violated the PHILJA Training Center House Rules
(House Rules) concerning the reception of visitors.
In particular, the Report stated that at approximately in the afternoon, Household Attendant II
Emilyn Janaban (Janaban) was heading to a room of the Training Center to assist a guest. It was at
this time that Janaban observed that a woman proceeded inside a nearby room, and was closely
followed by Garra. The woman was later identified as Maria Edwina V. Sampaga (Sampaga),
Mediation Aide of the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC), a participant of a seminar being held in
the Training Center, and the solo occupant of such room. CCTV footage revealed that both
Sampaga and Garra entered the Room and remained therein for approximately 22 minutes, after
which both Sampaga and Garra left the Room and went their separate ways.
Upon investigation, it was discovered that Garra's personal record (201 file) includes an April 17,
1998 Certificate of Marriage, which indicates that Garra is legally married to a certain Melissa M.
Osbual Garra (Osbual). The same information, however, was omitted in Garra's 2007 to 2011
SALNs, including his SALNs beginning 2013.
Garra, submitted that while he and Osbual had two children together, they have not cohabited
with each other since 2003. As Osbual allegedly abandoned Garra for another man, Garra was
constrained to carry out his responsibilities as both father and mother to their children on top of
fulfilling his duties as staff driver. It was in 2005 that Garra met Sampaga who remained his
common-law wife and who assisted him in the rearing and care of their children and his children
with Osbual. By way of defense to the charge of dishonesty, Garra contended that he did not
intend to provide false information in his Pag-IBIG Membership form and SALNs for years 2007
to 2011, including his SALNs beginning 2013. Considering his strained relationship with Osbual,
and his current relationship with Sampaga, Garra was confounded with his marital status, and by
reason of which, Garra simply placed "N/A" on the documents.
ISSUE
1. Did Mr. Garra’s act of having an illicit affair constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct?
2. Did Mr. Garra’s act of not declaring his lawful marriage in his SALN constitute dishonesty?
81
RULING
1. Yes, Mr. Garra’s conduct constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct. Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct as defined under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular
No. 15, Series of 2010, refers to an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and
decorum abhorred and condemned by the society.
This Court has held in a number of cases that a man having an illicit relationship with a woman
not his wife is within the purview of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Civil Service
Laws. Here, Garra admitted in his Letters that he has cohabited, and continues to cohabit with
Sampaga, a woman who is not his wife, with whom he begot two children.
Therefore, Mr. Garra’s conduct constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct.
2. Yes, it amounts to dishonesty.
Dishonesty has been defined as the concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of
integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray and an intent to violate the truth.
It is undisputed even by Garra that he remains legally married to Osbual. Here, Garra's lack of
honesty is evident when, on several occasions, he deliberately placed "N/A" in his SALNs from
2007 to 2011, including his SALNs beginning 2013, despite knowledge that he is still legally
married to Osbual. The fact that Garra omitted such information in his SALNs on different and
various occasions is a clear manifestation of his propensity to lie and to distort the truth just
to suit his personal interest and purpose.
Therefore, Mr. Garra’s conduct constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct, and dishonesty.
82
RESPONDENT JUDGE'S DEATH DURING REVIEW OF HIS

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BY THE SUPREME COURT IS A CAUSE FOR ITS
DISMISSAL
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF

PRESIDING JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL NORTE
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486; September 8, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by the aggrieved surviving spouse of
respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul (Judge Abul), Jr., Bernadita C. Abul (Bernadita) assailing the
Decision of the SC, which declared that the death of the respondent judge during the pendency
of his administrative case shall not terminate the proceedings against him.
A complaint was filed against Judge Abul, then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, RTC of Butuan City,
Agusan Del Norte, for alleged extortion in criminal cases pending before his sala. The OCA found
that Judge Abul engaged in extortion activities, which is a grave misconduct in violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. However, while the case was pending review by the SC, Judge Abul
died in an ambush. Nonetheless, the SC held Judge Abul administratively liable for misconduct
and noted that notwithstanding Judge Abul's death before the resolution of his administrative
case, the complaint against him should not be dismissed because he was fully afforded due
process during the investigation stage and that the Court's jurisdiction over the case survives his
death. Bernadita filed a motion for reconsideration on the aspect of survivorship benefits and
given the fact that Judge Abul is no longer in the position to assail the Decision of the SC finding
him guilty of gross misconduct, and imposing on him the penalty of forfeiture of all his benefits
including retirement gratuity, to plead his innocence or to express his remorse.
Bernadita filed a MR on the aspect of survivorship benefits and given the fact that Judge Abul is
no longer in the position to assail the Decision of the SC finding him guilty of gross misconduct,
and imposing on him the penalty of forfeiture of all his benefits including retirement gratuity, to
plead his innocence or to express his remorse.
ISSUE
Should the administrative case pending review by the SC be dismissed because of the untimely death
of the respondent judge?
RULING
Yes, the administrative case against Judge Abul should be dismissed in view of the individual's
rights to presumption of innocence and due process.
Under the Constitution, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. Considering that only substantial evidence is required in administrative
cases, a respondent therein should likewise be presumed innocent if his/her death preceded the
finality of a judgment, as in the case of Judge Abul who can no longer submit additional evidence
to support his position due to his passing. The presumption of innocence in his favor should stand
precisely because his death preceded the promulgation of final judgment.
83
Moreover, the complaint should be dismissed in view of the Constitutional principle of due
process, which is one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that the death of the
respondent does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. The SC noted that had death
not supervened, Judge Abul could have exerted efforts to protect his rights in keeping with the
principle of due process.
Therefore, the SC granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the administrative
complaint against Judge Abul.
84
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF

COMPLAINANT'S AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
ZAHARA PEDATUN MAULANA V. JUDGE OSCAR P. NOEL, JR.

A.M. No. RTJ-21-006; March 15, 2021
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
This is a complaint filed by Zahara Pendatun Maulana (complainant) against respondent Judge
Oscar P. Noel, Jr. (respondent) of the RTC, General Santos City, South Cotabato. The Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) then found that respondent breached the norms and standards of the
court, and committed gross ignorance of the rules, making him liable for gross ignorance of the
law.
Complainant alleged that she is one of the respondents in the case, where she was charged with
violation of the Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunition (RA 10591). The firearms
involved in the case were seized by virtue of Search Warrant Nos. 17-98 and 17-99. While
searching the house of complainant, several firearms and magazines were seized. Consequently,
the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) dismissed the complaint for violation of RA 10591 against
complainant for Lack of Evidence and/or Probable Cause citing the certificate from the Firearms
and Explosive Office (FEO). In addition, said firearm was covered by Acknowledgment Receipt of
Equipment (ARE) although said firearm was not included in the search warrant. Complainant's
counsel thus filed a Motion to Release Seized Items for the release of the seized firearms.
Prior to the scheduled hearing of the said motion, respondent Judge allegedly directed
complainant to proceed to his chambers and asked her to shoulder the amount of P300,000.00
representing the expenses that will be incurred which he, his court personnel, and the
government prosecutor will incur when they travel to Camp Crame to personally verify licenses
for the subject firearms. However, respondent Judge allegedly made it appear that it was the
complainant who moved for respondent Judge and his court personnel to have the licenses
personally verified, and offered to shoulder their travel expenses
The OCA received an Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by complainant where she
manifested that she completely and absolutely exonerated respondent of any liability.The OCA
then referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further investigation to which. The CA
recommended the dismissal of the administrative charge against the respondent after having
found that the complainant attested to the veracity of the contents of her affidavit.The OCA
disagreed and found respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law explaining that that the
desistance of the complainant did not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondent.
ISSUE
Did respondent Judge commit gross ignorance of the law?
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law.
This Court finds merit in the administrative complaint filed against respondent notwithstanding
the subsequent desistance of complainant. There is no question at this point that despite
85
complainant's submission of the ARE and Certification dated September 14, 2017 from the FEO
certifying that complainant and Brahim are the licensed/registered holders of the seized firearms
herein respondent did not grant complainant's Motion to Release Seized Items. Respondent,
instead, issued the November 16, 2017 Order, thereby authorizing himself, the court personnel
and the government prosecutor to personally verify the authenticity of the firearm licenses at
Camp Crame at the expense of the complainant.
In Del Rosario vs. People, provides that certifications issued by the FEO Records Section are
sufficient proof of the fact of possession or non-possession of a valid license to own or possess
firearms or explosives in the offense of Illegal Possession of Firearms. That personal appearances
of FEO records personnel are not required in order to establish the authenticity of certificates.
Accordingly, it is not the duty of respondent to personally verify the authenticity of the September
14, 2017 Certification of the FEO, or the firearm licenses of complainant and Brahim. Neither is
respondent enjoined by the rules to travel from General Santos City to Camp Crame, Quezon City
to do the same. It was thus highly irregular, if not anomalous, for respondent to issue the
November 16, 2017 Order. Respondent could have simply required the complainant to submit
another and/or original FEO certification for the seized firearms if respondent found the ARE
inadequate, or doubted the authenticity of certificates. Time and time again, this Court
emphasized that a Judge is at all times duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions
in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
Hence, the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law for dismissing the complaint
solely on the basis of the affidavit of desistance of the complainant.
86
PETITION FOR PARTIAL JUDICIAL CLEMENCY MAY BE GRANTED ON

GROUND OF FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AMIDST PANDEMIC
IN RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER DATED AUGUST 12, 2010, COMPLAINING AGAINST

JUDGE OFELIA T. PINTO, RTC, BRANCH 60, ANGELES CITY, PAMPANGA
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS
A Plea for Partial Judicial Clemency was filed by former Presiding Judge of the RTC of Angeles City,
Pampanga, Branch 60 (RTC), Ofelia T. Pinto (petitioner), seeking the restoration or reinstatement
of her retirement benefits, considering her financial situation and the difficulty of surviving in the
pandemic.
Petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Gross Misconduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment based on her act of granting the motion to reopen Criminal Case No. 91-937 filed by the
convicted accused (at large) despite the finality of the decision in said case. She was found guilty
of Gross Ignorance of the Law and was dismissed since the SC noted that it was not the first time
that petitioner was found administratively liable.
Petitioner prays that she be allowed to receive her retirement benefits in the interest of justice
and for compassionate and humanitarian reasons, considering her financial situation and the
difficulty of surviving in the pandemic. Among others, she cites the recent Decision In Re:
Allegations Made under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September
26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan (Re: Ong), wherein the Court
granted partial judicial clemency to former Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong, seeking that
the Court exercise the same compassion since she and her husband are without proper resources
from buying medicines to address their medical conditions. In particular, petitioner claims that
she is suffering from Type II Diabetes Mellitus and Hypertension, while her husband has been
dependent on his wheelchair from a cerebrovascular accident. Furthermore, petitioner claims
that she has displayed remorse, and has been active in social and religious activities in her
community, through her various positions in different organizations, and by providing free legal
services to its members. Petitioner submitted various certifications and testimonials to that effect.
ISSUE
Should the dismissed judge be granted partial judicial clemency in the form of grant of retirement
benefits?
RULING
Yes, grant of judicial clemency is proper.
In the 2007 case of Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency (Re: Diaz), the SC laid down the following guidelines
in resolving requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges’ associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of
87
non-reformation. (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reformation. (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he
still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
redeem himself. (4) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning
or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. (5) There must be
other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Here, there is a prima facie showing of genuine remorse and repentance by petitioner. She
averred that she has been humbled by her dismissal from service and has expressed regret of
how her past actions has affected the conditions of her family. Petitioner also attached supporting
documents to reinforce her claims of repentance and renewal through her socio-civic activities.
Furthermore, petitioner alleged that: (a) she is already 75 years old; (b) she is suffering from Type
II Diabetes Mellitus and Hypertension and could not afford her medications due to lack of source
of income; (c) she could not rely on her husband to support her due to his own medical condition;
and (d) she could not obtain financial support from her relatives and friends due to the financial
constraints caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. In In Re: Ong, the Court held that other factors,
such as the petitioner's advanced age, deteriorating health, and economic difficulties, may be
considered in granting judicial clemency, as were alleged in this case. Hence, the Court may
consider these averments — should the same be established — during the fact-finding process.
Thus, the petition for partial judicial clemency may be considered.
88
FAILURE TO FOLLOW OCA DIRECTIVE AMOUNTS TO INSUBORDINATION

OF THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. BERRYL BERONDO

A.M. No. P-22-046; February 23, 2022
FACTS
The Court resolved the administrative charge against Berryl I. Berondo (Berondo), Court
Stenographer III, Branch 58, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, for
habitual tardiness.
The Officer-in-Charge, Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), submitted a report, stating that Berondo incurred tardiness in
July 2019, 10 times and August 2019, 10 times. Upon referral to the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB), it
recommended that Berondo be found guilty of Habitual Tardiness and Insubordination for her
failure to submit her comment despite receipt of the OCA's directive. It stated that while the
penalty of reprimand should have been sufficient as it is Berondo's first offense and there was no
showing that the operations of the court were prejudiced, her failure to file her comment is
tantamount to insubordination to the Court itself, thus she should be fined and sternly warned.
ISSUE
Should Berondo be found guilty of habitual tardiness and insubordination?
RULING
Yes, Berondo is guilty of both habitual tardiness and insubordination.
The CSC Rules provide that employees shall be considered habitually tardy if they incur tardiness,
regardless of the number of minutes, 10 times a month for at least 2 months. On the other hand,
insubordination is defined as the refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled
to give. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable
instructions of the employer. In Clemente v. Bautista, the Court held that: [A]ll directives coming
from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of this Court's
administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be respected. These
directives are not mere requests but should be complied with promptly and completely. Clearly,
respondent's indefensible disregard of the orders of the OCA, as well as of the complainant and
Judge Manodon, for him to comment on the complaint and to explain his infractions, shows his
disrespect for and contempt, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct
administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the OCA. His
indifference to, and disregard of, the directives issued to him clearly constituted insubordination.
In this case, Berondo's failure to submit her comment despite receipt of the 1st Indorsement and
Tracer constitutes clear and willful disrespect, not just to the OCA, but also to the Court, which
exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the
OCA.
Hence, Berondo's non-compliance with the OCA's directives is tantamount to insubordination to

the Court itself.
89
JUDGES SHOULD NOT CAUSE UNDUE DELAY BUT ADMINISTER JUSTICE

PROMPTLY
JOY ANN SESE V. JUDGE MANUEL STA. CRUZ, JR.

FACTS
This is about the Complaint filed against Judge Sta. Cruz for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross,
Dereliction of Duty, and Evident Bias.
The complainants aver that the judge, instead of acting on their motions to resolve the unlawful
detainer case, issued rather an order noting the motions and referring the case to the same court
for pretrial after the judicial dispute resolution (JDR) failed and thus, complainants filed a Motion
to Refer Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffling.
For his part, respondent contended that in several cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the
necessity to suspend unlawful detainer proceedings in whatever stage these may be found to
await the final judgment in a more substantive case involving possession or ownership. He
admitted the delay and took full responsibility for it. He explained that he is a paraplegic, and with
the condition of his office being in the Annex Building, he is having a very difficult time to roam
around his office.
The Office of Court Administrator found that the judge should be sanctioned for delay, as it took
him twelve (12) months to rule on the motion for reconsideration and around ten (10) months to
issue his order submitting said pending incident for resolution. His excuses (i.e. discovery of the
pleadings only on semestral inventory, equally important administrative and judicial obligations,
and sheer volume of work) cannot be used as justifications to avoid liability.
ISSUE
Whether Judge Sta. Cruz should be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a
decision or order?
RULING
Yes, he is administratively liable for the delay in rendering a decision.
Under Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shall dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The same is echoed in Section
5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that
judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
Judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their
obligation to administer justice promptly. As explained by the Court in Dulang v. Judge Regencia,
prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of the litigants.
Hence, Judge Sta. Cruz guilty of Gross Inefficiency and Delay in the Administration of Justice, and
is thus meted with a fine of P9,000.00.
90
UNNECESSARY RELIGIOUS REMARKS AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY

UNRELATED TO THE CASE CONSTITUTES IMPROPRIETY
MARCELINO ESPEJON V. JUDGE JORGE EMMANUEL LORREDO

A.M. No. MTJ-22-007; March 9, 2022
CAGUIOA, J.
FACTS
The case is a complaint filed by Marcelino Espejon and Erickson Cabonita against Jorge Emmanuel
M. Lorredo, Presiding Judge of Branch 26 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
The complainants alleged that during the preliminary conference, Judge Lorredo made remarks
showing his prejudgment of the case and obvious bias and partiality against them and their sexual
orientation. They also averred that Judge Lorredo's treatment and conduct of the unlawful
detainer case was heavily influenced by his religious beliefs and impressions about
homosexuality which he irrelevantly tried to relate to the case.
Judge Lorredo denied that he prejudged the civil case, but he maintained that as a Christian, he
merely tries his best to guide lawyers and litigants who appear before his court to arrive at a
settlement with the help of the Bible. He claimed further that he had, so far, settled all cases using
the Bible.
ISSUE
Whether Judge Lorredo should be held administratively liable for showing impropriety?
RULING
Yes, Judge Lorredo is administratively liable for his improper remarks and overbearing demeanor
and unwarranted acts during the preliminary conference in the civil case he decided in his sala
and for allowing his religious beliefs to impair his judicial functions. All of which are in violation of
Sections 1 and 6 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, those
offenses were not for grave misconduct, but only for conduct unbecoming and simple
misconduct.
Given the inappropriate remarks of Judge Lorredo calling the complainants ‘bading’ and his
inclination to use Biblical passages and teachings to the case telling the complainants that God
hates homosexuality, the Court cannot blame complainants if they became suspicious of Judge
Lorredo's impartiality. Consequently, he fell short of the Court's repeated and consistent
admonition to judges to not only act impartially but to also appear impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
Thus, Supreme Court once again finds it imperative to remind members of the bench that while
not every error or mistake in the performance in their official duties may render them
administratively liable, absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, or conscious and deliberate
intent to cause an injustice, they are still obliged, at all times, to observe propriety, discreetness
and due care in the performance of their official functions. While judges are not completely
stripped of their freedom to express, exercise, or uphold their religious beliefs and convictions, it
goes without saying that in doing so, their foremost duty to obey the rule of law should not stand
to suffer.
91
A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY MUST INCLUDE AN APOLOGY

AND FULL ACCEPTANCE OF WRONG COMMITTED
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE VICTORIA

VILLALON-PORNILLOS, RTC, BRANCH 10, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183; March 15, 2022
PER CURIAM
FACTS
A Petition for Judicial Clemency was filed by Victoria Villalon-Pornillos (respondent), former
Presiding Judge of Branch 10, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan.
Respondent was dismissed for Gross Misconduct, i.e., borrowing money from a lawyer in a case
pending before her court, aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions or orders, and
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. It arose from an anonymous
administrative complaint charging respondent of "fixing" cases and "selling" decisions or orders
for millions, that she is maintaining amorous relationships with her driver and bodyguards,
borrowing money from her staff and other court officers to cover up her corruption, vindictively
detailing almost all of her staff to other offices, and bragging about her associations with former
classmates now working in the judiciary. She has also ostentatiously displayed ill-gotten wealth
and reports to court only twice a week. While the OCA found that the allegations of corruption,
extortion, and respondent's illicit amorous relationships with her driver and bodyguards were
based on hearsay and rumors, it confirmed that she obtained loans from court personnel and
lawyers and that she reported to court only for 20 days for September 1, 2005 to October 11,
2005, which covered 29 working days. Further, respondent notably arrived late in court and
departed therefrom almost always earlier than 4:30 p.m. The Court found her guilty of Gross
Misconduct and dismissed her.
In her petition for clemency, respondent avers that she had endured almost eight years of what
she characterized as an unfounded punishment from charges and findings based on mere gossip.
She maintains that she was illegally dismissed from the service as she was summarily dismissed
from service and barred from government work.
ISSUE
Should the respondent be granted judicial clemency?
RULING
No, the petition for judicial clemency should be denied.
In In Re: Ong, the Court underscored that clemency should be preceded by an apology, which
must likewise be "preceded by a full and unconditional acceptance of the wrong committed and
the justness of the penalty imposed." To deserve judicial clemency, evidence of remorse and
potential must be shown. The claimant officers must convince "that the long period of dismissal
moved the erring officers to reform themselves, exhibit remorse and repentance, and develop a
capacity to live up again to the standards demanded from court officers."
Respondent still fails to exhibit remorse for her past misdeeds. Respondent insists that she was
summarily dismissed and even characterizes the Court's Decision which dismissed her from the
92
service, as null and void on the grounds that she was not given the opportunity to be heard,
denied the right to a fair trial, and denied the right to cross-examine the complainants.
In fine, respondent's lack of remorse and persistent demonstration of impenitence, self-

righteousness, and even, vindictiveness, renders her undeserving of judicial clemency.
93
PROPRIETY OF INHIBITION SHOULD BE RESOLVED JUDICIALLY
CRISTHYN R. ABING V. PRESIDING JUDGE MARIO MANAYON, MTCC, BRANCH 1,

TALISAY CITY, CEBU
A.M. No. MTJ-22-006. April 26, 2022
CAGUIOA, J.
FACTS
The Court resolved the disbarment complaint filed against Judge Mario Manayon (respondent
Judge) of Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Talisay City, Cebu relative to the criminal
case entitled "People of the Philippines v. Christine Racaza," for Obstruction of Justice.
Complainant accused in the criminal case alleged that: (1) respondent Judge should have inhibited
himself from the case because the witness, Julius Bacacao Gabasa (Gabasa), a job order employee
of the Talisay City Hall, was detailed in his court and (2) respondent Judge manifested partiality
during the hearings of the case as he, at times, had either explained the question to Gabasa or
answered it for him. He further alleged that she filed a Motion to Subject Video for Forensic
Examination and for Enhancement but to date, respondent Judge had not acted on it.
Respondent Judge denied having manifested signs of partiality towards Gabasa and asserted that
he had to intervene during Gabasa's cross-examination because there were questions that were
either vague or misleading. He pointed out that complainant filed the instant complaint after he
denied the latter's motions for inhibition based on the comment filed by the State which
contained a Certification that Gabasa is a job order employee assigned at the Office of the
Prosecutor. As such, he found no reason to inhibit. Anent the pending motion, respondent Judge
alleged that complainant's counsel agreed and manifested that they would just return to the NBI
and explain to the personnel how the court wanted the previous order to be complied with, such
as the enhancement of the video could be done in a duplicate copy, without touching the original
video, and the technician concerned could testify in court to explain the procedure he followed.
Complainant's counsel did not make the necessary follow-through with the NBI.
ISSUE
Should the judge be held liable for failing to inhibit in the criminal case where the witness is an
employee detailed in his court?
RULING
No, the Judge should not be faulted for his refusal to inhibit and for his active participation in the
proceedings before him.
First, orders of inhibition are judicial, not administrative in nature. Thus, questions regarding the
competency of the inhibiting judge should be determined in an appropriate judicial proceeding.
Second, it is well settled that while judges should as much as possible refrain from showing
partiality to one party and hostility to another, it does not mean that a trial judge should keep
mum throughout the trial and allow parties to ask the questions that they desire, on issues which
they think are the important issues, when the former are improper and the latter, immaterial, as
in the case.
Thus, the respondent judge should not be disciplined for failure to inhibit, however, he must be
disciplined for undue delay in rendering an order for his inaction on the pending motion.
94
RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT APPLIES TO CLERK OF COURTS
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. CHRISTOPHER E. SALAO, CLERK III,

BRANCH 32, RTC, ILOILO CITY, ILOILO
A.M. No. P-22-056; June 22, 2022
INTING, J.
FACTS
The Court resolves a complaint filed against Christopher E. Salao (respondent), Clerk III of Branch
32, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Iloilo City.
A report of the Officer-in-Charge, Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services,

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), showed that respondent was tardy 10 times in January
2019 and 11 times in March 2019. The OCA required respondent to comment however he did not
do so. failed to file his comment. The OCA sent a tracer reiterating its directive in its 1st
Indorsement; however, the OCA did not receive any response. The Judicial Integrity Board (JIB)
meted a penalty, applying A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC, or the Internal Rules of the JIB, where less grave
offenses under the Civil Service Law and Rules, i.e., 2017 RACCS, are classified as less serious
charges.
ISSUE
Should the Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service apply to clerk of courts?
RULING
No, the RACCS should not apply.
In A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC 18 dated October 2, 2018 and July 7, 2020, the Court amended Rule 140
of the Rules of Court by extending its coverage to include administrative disciplinary cases against
all officials, employees, and personnel of the judiciary, among others. Thereafter, in A.M. No. 21-
08-09-SC, Rule 140 was further amended considering that A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC was silent on
the retroactive application of the amendments which resulted in the inconsistent appreciation of
modifying circumstances, as well as the uneven imposition of aggravated or mitigated penalties
in previous cases. Thus, the Court declared in Section 24 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC that Rule 140,
as amended, "shall be applied to all pending and future administrative cases involving the
discipline of Members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary, without prejudice to
the internal rules of the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Supreme Court insofar
as complaints against Members of the Supreme Court are concerned." In fine, Rule 140, as
amended, shall be "uniformly applicable to all cases, regardless of when the infractions are
committed." 21 Further, the fines for serious, less serious, and light charges were adjusted on the
basis of A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC.
From the foregoing, the Revised Rule 140 should be applicable in respondent's case.
95
UNDUE DELAY WITHOUT ORDER OF EXTENSION GRANTED BY THE

SUPREME COURT MERITS AN ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION
ATTY. MARLOU L. VELASQUEZ V. HON. GILBERT MOISES, PRESIDING JUDGE AND

CONSTANCIO ALIMURUNG, SHERIFF IV, OF BRANCH 18, RTC, CEBU CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2534; June 27, 2022
FACTS
The Court resolves the complaint filed by Atty. Marlou L. Velasquez (Atty. Velasquez) against
respondents Presiding Judge Gilbert P. Moises (Judge Moises) and Sheriff IV Constancio V.
Alimurung (Sheriff Alimurung), both from the RTC, Branch 18 of Cebu City for gross ignorance of
the law, dereliction of duty, grave abuse of authority, bias, and partiality and violation of R.A. No.
3019 in relation to their actuations in a civil case entitled Jovel Tan Entote vs. Suzuki Yasufumi.
The civil case is a complaint for sum of money filed by Jovel Tan Entote (Entote) against Suzuki
Yasufumi (Yasufumi), which was raffled to Branch 18. A writ of preliminary attachment was
granted in favor of Entote. Sheriff Alimurung seized a Mercedes Benz. Subsequently, Michi
Miyahara (Miyahara), as third party claimant, filed an Urgent Motion to Return Erroneously
Levied/Seized Property. Judge Moises issued an Order which directed Sheriff Alimurung to
explain why the possession and custody of the subject motor vehicle was with Entote and not
with the court in accordance with the rules. Sheriff Alimurung claimed that Entote offered his own
parking lot so he placed it thereon. He also explained that at the time of the taking, the ignition
key of the motor vehicle was not available, hence, the same could not be driven and maneuvered.
Miyahara, through his counsel, Atty. Velasquez, filed several motions relative to the recovery of
the Benz since the vehicle was turned over to Yasufumi instead of Miyahara. More than 2 years
have passed, but no action had been made by Judge Moises, prompting the filing of the present
administrative complaint against Judge Moises and Sheriff Alimurung.
According to Atty. Velasquez, Judge Moises acted with grave abuse of discretion and committed
gross ignorance of the law when he hastily granted the prayer for writ of preliminary attachment
despite the clear lack of cause of action of Entote against Yasufumi, as alleged in the complaint
for sum of money. Judge Moises also committed undue delay in resolving the motions concerning
the issue of ownership, as well as the return or delivery of the motor vehicle to its rightful owner.
As to Sheriff Alimurung, he is administratively liable for gross dereliction of duty as an officer of
court since: (1) he wrongfully attached and seized the motor vehicle belonging to Miyahara; (2) he
failed to safely keep the possession and custody of the subject motor vehicle, when he allowed
Entote to take its possession; and (3) he failed to promptly return the motor vehicle despite the
Order. Atty. Velasquez insisted that Judge Moises and Sheriff Alimurung connived to divest
Miyahara of his ownership, use, and possession of the motor vehicle, the whereabouts of which
are no longer known and allegedly beyond the control and custody of the court.
Judge Moises ascribed the delay to a myriad of reasons, such as: (1) his designation as then Vice
Executive Judge, which required him to entertain more applications for search warrants; (2) his
earnest efforts to keep his court docket below 400; (3) the designation of his court as one of the
assisting courts of Lapu-Lapu City RTCs; (4) lack of court personnel; and (5) other pressing matters
that he needed to attend to. Sheriff Alimurung asserted that he merely performed his ministerial
duty as a sheriff since at the time of the taking, the subject motor vehicle was registered in the
name of Yasufumi.
ISSUE
Should the judge and sheriff be held administratively liable
96
RULING
Yes, they should be administratively liable.
As to Judge Moises, case law instructs that when a judge, for some valid reason, cannot comply
with the required deadline, an extension of time should be requested from this Court to avoid
administrative sanctions. Indeed, this Court allows certain leeway to judges and grants them
reasonable extensions of time to dispose cases upon proper application and on meritorious
grounds. Notably, Judge Moises admitted that he was not able to dispose the pending incidents
in due time but attempted to attribute the delay to various reasons, such as his other functions in
the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, disrupted court operations, heavy case load, lack of court personnel,
and other matters that required his immediate attention.
However, even if these reasons were true and reasonable, the same are not sufficient to excuse
him from administrative liability. Judge Moises committed simple neglect of duty.
As to Sheriff Alimurung, he fell short of his obligation to comply with the Order of the court, as
well as to safely keep and account for the attached property. As a sheriff, he is ought to be
reminded that he is called upon to discharge his duties with due care and utmost diligence for he
performs a very sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. In serving court writs and
processes and implementing court orders, he cannot afford to err lest he undermine the integrity
of his office and the efficient administration of justice. Thus, for his acts or omissions, Sheriff
Alimurung was correctly held liable for simple neglect of duty.
97
PRACTICAL EXERCISES
MERE FORMAL INFIRMITIES IN THE NOTARIZATION OF THE
INSTRUMENT WILL NOT INVALIDATE THE MORTGAGE
PASTORA GANANCIAL V. BETTY CABUGAO

G.R. No. 203348, July 06, 2020
HERNANDO, J.
FACTS
Pastora Ganancial owed Betty Cabugao the amount of P130,000.00, agreed to be payable within
three years. To guarantee her indebtedness, Ganancial entrusted to Cabugao TCT No. 168803 and
Tax Declaration No. 641, both covering a 397-square-meter parcel of land, which Ganancial owns
in her name. The transaction later turned sour and ended in the parties' respective lawsuits against
each other before the RTC.
Cabugao alleged that Ganancial executed a Deed of Mortgage over the subject property as
collateral for her loan. Despite the lapse of three years from the date of the mortgage and repeated
demands, Ganancial failed and refused to pay the amount she owed Cabugao. A final demand
having proved futile, Cabugao sought the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, plus
interest, and the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Ganancial then assailed the authenticity of the Deed of Mortgage. While she entrusted TCT No.
168803 with Cabugao, Ganancial averred that she never executed the supposed Deed of
Mortgage nor appeared for its notarization. Cabugao allegedly required Ganancial and her
children to affix their signatures on a blank bond paper, which Cabugao filled out only later.
Ganancial learned of the existence of the Deed of Mortgage for the first time during her
confrontation with Cabugao before the barangay captain regarding her unpaid debt and where
Cabugao threatened to foreclose the subject property. Ganancial thus prayed for the declaration
of the Deed of Mortgage as null and void and claimed moral damages, exemplary damages,
litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
ISSUE
Does the glaring irregularity of the Deed of Mortgage make it null and void?
RULING
No, the glaring irregularity of the Deed of Mortgage did not make it null and void. The CA was
already on-point in citing Camcam v. Court of Appeals as regards the issue on the notarization of
the Deed of Mortgage, which the Court echoes: Errors in, or even absence of, notarization on a
deed of mortgage will not invalidate an already perfected mortgage agreement. If anything, these
would only depreciate the evidentiary value of the said written deed, as the same would be
demoted from a public document to a private one.
It bears noting that Ganancial had alleged that fraud invalidated her consent to the mortgage.
While she had worded her arguments as an attack on the existence of the mortgage, vitiation of
consent by means of fraud is a ground for the annulment of a voidable contract, and not for the
nullification of a void contract. Even if the present case is one for annulment of contract, the fraud
alleged to have vitiated Ganancial's consent to the mortgage must still be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. In the instant case, the appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden.
98
Apart from the testimonies of the appellant and her children, which we found to be self-serving,
there is nothing on record which bolsters her stance. It must be stressed that the deed in question
is a notarized document. Jurisprudential rule dictates that to successfully impugn a notarized
document, the party concerned must present a strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its
falsity, lest the validity thereof must be sustained in full force and effect. Sadly, in this case, the
appellant failed to support her claim.
The totality of the circumstances negates the contention that the Deed of Mortgage was
absolutely simulated. Ganancial, having absolute ownership and full disposal of the property in
issue, admittedly conveyed TCT No. 168803 to secure her indebtedness to Cabugao. Their
agreement was reduced into writing as a Deed of Mortgage, and Ganancial's stand that the
signatures thereon were manipulated does not convince. There is also the undisputed
presumption of regularity enjoyed by notarized contracts, and the mere fact that two public
documents are covered by the same notarial entry neither identifies with sufficient definiteness
which one of them was fake, nor does it determine if any of them was spurious in the first place.
It is also a settled fact that the mortgage in issue was properly registered and annotated on TCT
No. 168803.
Unfortunately for Ganancial, her contract of mortgage with Cabugao is already fully compliant
with the foregoing provisions, as earlier discussed. The notarization issues are rendered
irrelevant. All of the foregoing leads to the inevitable conclusion that their mortgage contract was
perfected, valid, and effective, and Ganancial and Cabugao were far from having absolutely no
intention to be bound thereunder. Hence, the glaring irregularity of the Deed of Mortgage did not
make it null and void.
99
UNDERTAKING OF CLIENT TO SECURE SPA AT A LATER TIME IS NOT

SUFFICIENT
ABNER MANGUBAT V. ATTY. REYNALDO HERRERA

A.C. No. 9457; April 5, 2022
PER CURIAM
FACTS
The court resolves an administrative complaint filed against Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty.
Herrera).
Complainant, Abner Mangubat (Abner), is one of the heirs of Aurelia Rellora Mangubat (Aurelia),
who predeceased her husband, Gaudencio Mangubat (Gaudencio). The other heirs of Aurelia are
Elizabeth M. Bragais (Elizabeth), Ruth M. Pacia (Ruth), Josue Mangubat (Josue), Ester M. Agna
(Ester); Job Mangubat (Job); and Raquel M. Azada (Raquel). Gaudencio engaged Atty. Herrera to
institute a complaint for revival of judgment involving a parcel of land against Orlando Seva
(Orlando) and Belen Morga-Seva (Belen) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
Gaudencio was identified as the complainant together with the "Heirs of Aurelia represented by
Raquel Adaza." Atty. Herrera admitted that the engagement was only at the instance of Gaudencio,
in the form of a verbal agreement, and that the latter undertook to secure the SPA from his
children. However, no SPA was presented to the trial court. It became one of the bases of the IBP
in finding that Atty. Herrera committed falsehood.
On the part of Atty. Herrera, he claimed that Abner filed a complaint against him, as a form of
retaliation.
ISSUE
Can a representation be considered in the pleadings on the basis of an undertaking to secure an

SPA?
RULING
No, Rule 19.03 of the CPR commands that "a lawyer shall not allow his/her client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case."
Being the counsel on record, Atty. Herrera is expected to be knowledgeable about substantive
law and procedural rules and should not merely accede to the instructions of his client. After all,
"a lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments" as mandated by Canon 5 of the CPR.
Atty. Herrera failed to secure the consent and authority of all the heirs of Aurelia and committed
falsehood by indicating in the pleadings that Raquel represented them when, in truth, she did not.
He did not attach the corresponding SPA to substantiate the capacity of Raquel as a representative
and merely relied on Gaudencio's purported commitment to provide him one at a later time. Atty.
Herrera cannot simply rely on Gaudencio's promise to secure the requisite SPA from the other
heirs at a later time. As a lawyer, he should have known the required documents to be attached
in the pleadings to be submitted to the trial court.
Thus, Atty. Herrera misled the trial court by stating in his pleadings "Heirs of Aurelia Rellora
Mangubat represented by Raquel Azada" when no such SPA accompanied the complaint, more
so, with Raquel denying the purported representation.
100
DRAFTING OF SPA REQUIRED TO FILE A CASE IS AN OBLIGATION OF THE

LAWYER
ANGELES GAJUNERA V. ATTY. RICHARD ENOJO

A.C. No. 13211; April 6, 2022
FACTS
The Court resolved an administrative complaint filed by Angeles Gajunera (complainant) against
Atty. Richard Enojo (respondent) for his alleged neglect in the legal matter for which his services
was contracted to regain possession of a property inherited by complainant, her siblings, and the
children of her deceased brother.
Complainant alleged that she is one of the 9 children of Hilario P. Gajunera (Hilario), who died
intestate and owned a parcel of land. Since the property was occupied by informal settlers,
complainant secured the legal services of respondent to regain possession of the property that
she and her co-heirs inherited from their father, Hilario. Due to the slow progress of the case, they
learned that there was no pending case involving the subject property.
Respondent averred that he accepted complainant's engagement subject to her submission of

the documents necessary for the preparation of the complaints, and that he informed
complainant that all the heirs of the deceased Hilario should join the petition. However,
complainant failed to secure the needed SPA of all co-heirs.
Complainant averred that as the lawyer, it was respondent's duty to draft a complete SPA for all
the co-heirs to sign. He could easily draft a complete SPA considering that he had in his
possession a copy of the title which states thereof all the names and addresses of the Gajunera
family who are entitled to the property. Unfortunately, respondent only made an SPA for her and
her siblings. Had respondent given her a complete SPA, she would have no problem in securing
the signatures of all her co-heirs since they all want to receive their share. Moreover, she belatedly
learned that the SPA prepared by respondent was also incomplete since it did not include the
name of her brother, Jose Genes Gajunera, as the representative of all the siblings and for him to
sign as the Attorney-in-Fact.
ISSUE
Is the procurement of an SPA for a co-heir client to represent his/her co-heirs, an obligation of
the lawyer?
RULING
Yes, drafting an SPA necessary for the case is part of the performance of respondent’s duties as
complainant's counsel.
When a lawyer agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable
degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect
the clients' interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor. Conversely, a lawyer's
negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's
mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.
101
Respondent's attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant deserves

scant consideration. It was respondent's duty to prepare a complete SPA before instructing
complainant to secure the necessary signature of the co-heirs. The records reveal that
respondent drafted an incomplete and defective SPA. As complainant emphatically stated, had
respondent drafted a complete SPA, she could have easily secured the signatures of all her co-
heirs since they all want to receive their share of the property.
Thus, having failed to do so, respondent should be administratively liable for neglecting his client's
cause and failing to file the appropriate case.
102
AFFIDAVIT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE OR BOARD

RESOLUTION IS ALLOWED IN SPECIAL ADR RULES
PIONEER INSURANCE & SURETY CORP. V. TIG INSURANCE CO.

G.R. No. 256177; June 27, 2022
LOPEZ, M., J.
FACTS
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari of Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. from
the CA decision in upholding the decision of the RTC which enforced the final award of the US
Board of Arbitrators.
Clearwater Insurance Company filed a verified petition for enforcement of the arbitral award
before the RTC. In its petition, Clearwater alleged that it entered into a First Surplus Share
Capacity. Clearwater ceded to retrocessionaires its participation in all Pro Rata and Excess of Loss
Underlying Agreements. Pioneer agreed to assume Clearwater’s 1% share of the interests and
liabilities in the SK 100 Agreement. Pioneer failed to pay Clearwater the outstanding balance
which prompted Clearwater to initiate the arbitration proceedings in New York. Despite the
arbitral award, Pioneer avers that the arbitral award is contrary to public policy since Clearwater’s
claim was not supported by sufficient evidence and that Clearwater failed to attach a Secretary’s
Certificate or Board Resolution proving the authority of its legal counsel to sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping. The RTC ruled in favor of Clearwater which the CA
affirmed.
Pioneer argues that the RTC and CA should have dismissed the case for its failure to attach a
secretary’s certificate or board resolution authorizing its legal counsel to act on its behalf in
violation of the Special ADR Rules. TIG Insurance, Clearwater’s successor-in-interest, counters
that the petition was properly verified and the certification against forum shopping was duly
executed since the affidavit of Clearwater’s Senior Vice President attached to the Petition is
sufficient under the US Law to confer authority to the legal counsel to sign the petition.
ISSUE
Did Clearwater’s verification and certification against forum shopping comply with the Special
ADR Rules?
RULING
Yes, Clearwater’s verification and certification against forum shopping comply with the Special
ADR Rules.
The Special ADR Rules do not include the requirement of attaching the authorization of the person
who signed the verification and certification in the form of a secretary’s certificate or special
power of attorney under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the effect of its noncompliance.
Moreover, the Special ADR Rules do not provide that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily, unlike
in other special rules.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that failure to attach a secretary’s certificate or special power
of attorney authorizing the person who signed the verification and certification is not fatal to cases
covered by the Special ADR Rules. In other words, it will not cause the dismissal of the petition
for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award.
103
Thus, Clearwater’s verification and certification against forum shopping complied with the
Special ADR Rules since the Rules of Court cannot be applied suppletorily.
104
FALSIFIED SPA BEARING SIGNATURE OF DECEASED PRINCIPALS

CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS A MERE
REPRODUCTION OF PRIOR SPAs
LEONARDO SARMIENTO V. ATTY. GREGORIO FERNANDO, JR.

A.C. No. 11304; June 28, 2022
PER CURIAM
FACTS
This resolves the petition for disbarment filed by complainants Leonardo L. Sarmiento and
Richard G. Halili against respondent Atty. Fernando, Jr.
Complainants are business associates engaged in buying, developing and selling real estate.
Eventually, they came to know of the respondent during a meet-up set up by one of their broker
friends. Respondent proposed the sale to the complainants of a 374-square meter parcel of land
located in Parañaque City covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title. Respondent also made the
representations that he is the absolute owner of the land, despite the fact that the TCT is named
after his parents. Moreover, he avers that his parents are still alive and conveyed the said land to
him as the sole heir, by virtue of a genuine SPA. This persuaded the complainants to purchase the
land and eventually the TCT was named after the wife of one of the complainants. Later on, a
complaint seeking the annulment of the SPA and Deed of Sale and TCT was brought before the
RTC. The complainants then learned of the falsity of respondent’s representations which
prejudiced them to enter into a settlement. This prompted them to ask for reimbursement to the
respondent but they were ignored. The complainants then filed a criminal complaint for estafa
before the Office of the City Prosecutor and an instant disbarment petition before the IBP.
Respondent counters that the SPA was not a falsification but rather, it is merely a reiteration of a
previous SPA which is in the possession of his brother. IBP recommended the disbarment of the
respondent for the reason that the SPA allegedly executed was a forgery.
ISSUE
Will a prior SPA justify in respondent’s favor the SPA bearing the signatures of deceased
principals?
RULING
No, a prior SPA cannot justify in respondent’s favor the SPA bearing the signatures of deceased
principals.
The Supreme Court held in this case that respondent was unable to repudiate the evidence
against him. The Court failed to see how the existence of a prior SPA can prove that the SPA he
used to convince the complainants to push through with the purchase of the subject land was
genuine. Even assuming the existence of previous SPAs in respondent's favor, the fact remains
that the recent SPA was still executed after the death of Gregorio Fernando in 1997 and bears the
forged signature of Natividad Fernando.
Hence, the argument of respondent that the SPA was not falsified cannot be given merit.
105

ETHICS

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ETHICS

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1

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS WITH PRACTICAL EXERCISES

John Oliver T. Real

Roemma Kara G. Palo

Lemuel Neil J. Abliter

San Beda University College of Law

ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY FROM A CLIENT ESTABLISHES AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT

THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT IS IN

ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER IS A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

HARASSING TACTICS OF FILING MULTIPLE GROUNDLESS AND BASELESS SUITS

SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL

THERE IS CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN A LAWYER REPRESENTS INCONSISTENT INTERESTS

IBP’S DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS ARE FOR THOSE BELONGING IN THE LEGAL

MERE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT RAISE A PRESUMPTION OF

NOTARIZING A MORTGAGE DOCUMENT AND RECEIVING PART OF PROCEEDS FROM SUCH

PRACTICE OF LAW INCLUDES NOTARIAL PRACTICE

A MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR’S DUTIES COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A VIOLATION OF

MISCONDUCT IN THE DISCHARGE OF A LAWYER’S DUTIES AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL,

LAWYERS SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL OR DECEITFUL

NOTARIZATION IS INVESTED WITH SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC INTEREST, ONLY THOSE

NOTARY PUBLIC IS PROHIBITED FROM PERFORMING A NOTARIAL ACT IF SIGNATORY IS

A CLERK OF COURT IS THE DESIGNATED CUSTODIAN OF COURT PROPERTIES AND

A LAWYER WITH CONFLICTING INTERESTS THAT REPRESENTED ANOTHER WITHOUT

THE LAWYER’S OATH MANDATES EVERY LAWYER TO CONDUCT HIMSELF/HERSELF

A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS EVEN WHEN A LAWYER DISPENSED A LEGAL

CONNIVING PROOF MUST BE PRESENTED FOR A CHARGE TO JUSTIFY A DISCIPLINARY

A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT MAY BE BASIS OF DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF

THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF PHILIPPINE PRIVATE LANDS IS TOO

LAWYERS MUST KEEP RECORDS OF TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS

PRIVATE LAWYERS CANNOT BE HIRED BY THE COA

CONFLICT OF INTEREST ARISES EITHER IN RELATED OR UNRELATED CASES

FOR PURPOSES OF THE DISQUALIFICATION RULE, AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS A PRINCIPAL

FORGERY OF A COURT DECISION AND FALSIFICATION OF AN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE IS NO LONGER A COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

NON-APPEARANCE OF SIGNATURE OF PARTY IN NOTARIZED DOCUMENT DOES NOT

CLIENT’S MISREPRESENTATIONS SHOULD NOT BE THE SOLE BASIS OF A LAWYER IN

ISSUANCE OF WORTHLESS CHECKS BY A LAWYER WARRANTS DISCIPLINARY SANCTION

RESPONDENT JUDGE'S DEATH DURING REVIEW OF HIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BY THE

THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF COMPLAINANT'S

PETITION FOR PARTIAL JUDICIAL CLEMENCY MAY BE GRANTED ON GROUND OF

FAILURE TO FOLLOW OCA DIRECTIVE AMOUNTS TO INSUBORDINATION OF THE SUPREME

UNNECESSARY RELIGIOUS REMARKS AGAINST HOMOSEXUALITY UNRELATED TO THE

A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY MUST INCLUDE AN APOLOGY AND FULL

PROPRIETY OF INHIBITION SHOULD BE RESOLVED JUDICIALLY

RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT APPLIES TO CLERK OF COURTS

UNDUE DELAY WITHOUT ORDER OF EXTENSION GRANTED BY THE SUPREME COURT

UNDERTAKING OF CLIENT TO SECURE SPA AT A LATER TIME IS NOT SUFFICIENT

DRAFTING OF SPA REQUIRED TO FILE A CASE IS AN OBLIGATION OF THE LAWYER

AFFIDAVIT AS SUBSTITUTE FOR SECRETARY’S CERTIFICATE OR BOARD RESOLUTION IS

FALSIFIED SPA BEARING SIGNATURES OF DECEASED PRINCIPALS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON

MARILU TURLA V. ATTY. JOSE CARINGAL

ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY FROM A CLIENT ESTABLISHES AN ATTORNEY-

EDITHA FRANCIA V. ATTY. QUIRINO SAGARIO

THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL

HERNANDO PETELO V. ATTY. SOCRATES RIVERA

THE COURT MAY STILL IMPOSE PENALTIES UPON THE DISBARRED

FE EUFEMIA VALMONTE V. ATTY. JOSE QUESADA, JR.

A Complaint for disbarment was ﬁled by complainant Fe Eufemia Estalilla-Valmonte against

Can the Court still penalize a disbarred lawyer?

Yes, the Court can still penalize a disbarred lawyer.

INACTIVITY IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW DOES NOT EXEMPT AN ERRING

VENSON ANG V. ATTY. SALVADOR BELARO, JR.

LAWYERS WHILE WORKING IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION CAN STILL ACT