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Hedging With Options On Commodity
Hedging With Options On Commodity
by
VICTOR J. GASPAR
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
July 1994
(Signature)
Department of
Date -‘\. 4
ABSTRACT
This study evaluates how a decision-maker (such as a farmer) facing
output price risk might use futures contracts and or option contracts on those
futures to hedge against any potential financial risk attributed to volatile output
prices. Two behavioral models are assumed in this study. One where the
decision-maker behaves as an expected utility maximizer and one where the
decisions made are based upon safety-first rules. The expected utility model in
this study is based on the general utility function defined in an article by Lapan,
Moschini, and Hanson (1991). The safety-first model is essentially that of Telser
(1955), but enhanced to include option contracts as an additional hedging tool.
Both decision-making processes have a single-period time horizon. At the
beginning of the period an agent enters the futures and option markets and
places a hedge. At the end of the period, the agent offsets his/her futures
position and sells the commodity in the spot market. The single-period model is
formulated such that a hedger can speculate on the futures price bias, but not
the volatility of the option price.
Results from the two competing models were derived from parameters
calculated using a forecast error method on canola data spanning a ten year
period (1981-90) obtained from the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange. Optimal
hedging results for the two models were derived under varying levels of basis
risk, futures and spot price volatilities, and risk aversion.
In general, results from the expected utility model suggest that under
increased volatility, uncertainty, or aversion to risk leads to a reduced open
speculative position when a positive futures price bias exists. Most interestingly,
unlike the comparative static results derived by Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson
suggesting that if a speculative motive exists then options are used, the results
from this study’s simulations suggest that the use of options are negligible.
Results from assuming a safety-first decision-maker indicate that options
are always used when speculating on the direction of futures price bias. When
positive futures price biases increase in size, so do the futures and options
positions. The opposite occurs when the bias is decreased or downward. Two
major conclusions can be drawn from the safety-first results. Firstly, optimal
hedging positions seem quite sensitive to “small” variations in the parameters
levels. Secondly, due to the multitude of revenue distributions available from
combining futures and option (which were unobtainable from using only futures)
there is a possibility of very extreme outcomes even though the expected or
average outcome meets the decision-maker’s “safety” requirements.
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ii
List of Tables vi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Price Risk and Commodity Markets 1
1 .2 Options versus Futures 4
1.3 Problem Statement 6
1 .4 Study Objectives 8
1 .5 Thesis Outline 8
Chapter 2 The Hedging Contract 10
2.1 TheTheoryof Hedging 10
2.2.1 Hedgingwith Futures 10
2.1.2 Hedging with Options 14
iv
Chapter 6 Simulation Results and Implications 49
6.1 Expected Utility Model Results 49
6.2 Results from the Safety-first Model 51
6.2.1 Base Case 51
6.2.2 Sensitivity of the Probability Threshold 57
6.2.3 Variation of the Volatility 58
6.2.4 Variation of the Basis Risk 60
6.2.5 Alternating Strike Prices 62
6.3 Summary of Safety-first Results 63
Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusions 65
7.1 Summary 65
7.2 Conclusions 66
7.3 Restrictions and Further Research 67
References 69
Appendix 1 The Derivation of Unconstrained Optimal Hedge 73
Appendix 2 The Derivation of Equation Al .20 81
Appendix 3 Deriving the Value of a Single-period Option 84
v
LIST OF TABLES
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In addition, I would like to thank the staff, Kathy and Retha. A special
thanks go to Gwynne Sykes for her help with obtaining materials on my research
topic. I am also grateful to: Susie Latham for being my sounding board at
7:30am coffee breaks at the Ponderosa Cafeteria; my brother, Carlos for putting
up with my constant questioning of mathematical and statistical concepts; and
Victoria Watson for her immense help in preparing for my thesis defense.
Finally, cheers to all my fellow grad students of which I have had the
pleasure of interacting (or not interacting) with.
--Author unknown
viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Ii Price Risk and Commodity Markets
Historically agricultural commodity prices have displayed a more volatile
behavior than the prices of non-agricultural goods and services. This difference is
illustrated in the following graph which shows the spot price (per metric tonne) of
canola traded on the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange [WCE] during 1984. In the
period between May and July, the spot price was highly volatile. Indeed, prices
rose by approximately 70 percent within that brief period of time.
800
700.
aDo,
a)
C
= 500
a)
a)
C.
0
200.
100
0
Jan ‘ Feb ‘ Mar • Apr • May Jun • Jul • Aug • Sep ‘ Oct ‘ Nov • Dec
1
a major producing region of soybeans is flooded, then expected soybean
production will be lower. Producers, processors, speculators will have an
incentive to hold on to their current stocks longer since the future value of those
stocks will increase. Coupling these supply effects with a generally inelastic
demand for agricultural commodities can lead to very large price swings; thus,
exposing an agricultural firm (producer, processor) to potentially high levels of
financial risk.
The emergence of Chicago commodity markets during the 1800’s allowed
an agent to hedge against unfavorable price movements by locking in a price in
advance through a forward contract. However, these forward contracts were not
standardized according to quality or delivery time and agents did not always fulfill
the contract commitments. In 1865, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
alleviated this problem by making available futures contracts which, unlike the
forward contracts, were standardized according to quantity, quality, and time and
place of delivery (CBOT, 1989). In Canada, the main commodity exchange is the
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange [WCEJ. Following its inception in 1887 as “The
Winnipeg Grain and Produce Exchange”, the WCE introduced futures contracts on
wheat, oats, and flaxseed in 1904. Barley futures were offered in 1913, followed
by rye in 1917. In 1963, canola (CANadian Oil Low Acid; otherwise known as
rapeseed) futures with a Vancouver delivery were introduced (Hore, p.83).
A futures contract is simply a standardized legal agreement to make or take
a deferred delivery of a specified quantity and quality of particular commodity. The
settlement is to occur at a pre-determined time and location for a previously
agreed upon price. An individual entering the futures market with a buy position is
said to have a long position. Alternatively, if the agent enters the market in a sell
position, then she is said to have a short position. If the agent’s futures position is
short (long), then when the contract matures the holder can either make (take)
2
delivery of the commodity, or she can offset her position by buying (selling) back
the futures contract at the price which the contract is currently trading at. In
practise, the use of offsetting contracts is the most common occurence with actual
deliveries of the commodity occurring only a small percentage of the time. This
flexibility is the major advantage of a futures contract over a forward contract.
In recent years, commodity options have become available on the major
exchanges and have provided the producers and processors of these
commodities with an additional risk managing tool.
An option on a futures contract is a contractual agreement that is traded on
commodity exchanges through a trading system similar to that of futures.
However, unlike futures contracts, an option on a futures contract gives the holder
the right, but not the obligation, to enter the futures market under either a long or
short futures position at a pre-determined price. A call option requires the seller to
deliver a long futures position to the purchaser of the option. A put option requires
the seller to deliver a short futures position to the purchaser of the option.
Therefore the buyer of an option, known as having a long option position, has the
right to a sell (in the case of a put option) or buy (in the case of a call option) a
futures contract at a pre-specified price before the particular futures contract has
matured. The pre-specified price is known as the strike or exercise price of the
option contract. The futures positions assumed by the contract holder when the
option is exercised are summarized in Table 1 .1 below.
3
Both call and put options can be either European or American options.
European options only allow the holder to exercise the option when the futures
contract reaches maturity; whereas, the holder of an American option can exercise
it any time while the option is valid.
Figure 1.2 Payoff diagram for a short futures and a long put
‘t
per contract
::::t
premium {
0{ futures price
basis
4
The hedging scenario in Figure 1.2 is for the specific case of hedger who
wishes to lock in a future selling price (e.g., farmer, exporter) under the
assumption that the spot and futures price are perfectly correlated.
1 The diagram
displays three potential strategies undertaken by the agent. If the agent decides
not to hedge any of her spot position, then the price that she receives depends on
what the futures price is at the time of sale. This relationship is represented by the
45 degree line in Figure 1 .2. If the agent were to go short in the futures market,
and contract for the amount of stocks held, then she would lock in a net selling
price equal to the futures selling price less the basis. This is shown as the
horizontal line. In the third strategy, the agent holds a long put option. The long
put option provides the agent with the same upside potential as the unhedged
case (less the premium) once the futures price exceeds the strike (exercise) of the
option (K). Alternatively, when the futures price is below the strike price, then the
long put option locks in a net selling price equivalent to that of the short futures
position less the value of the premium.
An alternative method of differentiating the two hedging tools is compare
the probability density functions [PDF] of revenues for a particular hedging
strategy. This allows one to explicitly examine the effects of varying amounts of
basis risk on the distribution of revenues for the hedging agent. Figure 1.3,
illustrates the distribution of returns assuming joint normally distributed spot and
futures prices with a less than perfect correlation. Three cases are depicted: the
agent (i) remains unhedged, (ii) hedges with only short futures, and (iii) hedges
with only put options. The agent’s decision to use only futures contracts as a
hedging tool allows the agent to essentially lock in a price, thus bringing in the tails
1 The difference between the spot and futures price is known as the basis. It can be positive or
negative and represents the cost of storage, insurance, interest on invested capital, and
transportation costs. If the spot and futures price always move in tandem then the basis does
not change overtime meaning that there is no basis risk
5
of the revenue distribution, (i.e., implying a small variance of revenues). This
strategy is vastly different from the no hedge strategy which leaves the hedger
open to the full brunt of the potential price risk. As evidenced by the flatter and
more dispersed revenue distribution. If the agent decides to use only commodity
options then relative to the case of hedging with futures, the PDF skews to the
right and shifts to the left.
hec cn)y
Gpticns heccnIy
Revenues
6
one hedging tool will be chosen over another and when both will be used
simultaneously.
There exists substantial literature which determines optimal hedging
strategies using futures contracts. Conversely, relatively few studies have
evaluated the same problem by incorporating both futures and options. One
reason is that from a theoretical perspective, when futures are available options
are redundant (i.e., will not be used) under the standard assumptions of no price
biases, no output uncertainty and conventional expected utility maximization,
(Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson [LMH], 1991). Thus, when a futures price bias
(incentive for speculation) does not exist, an agent will chose the hedging tool
which is the most efficient at reducing the variability of the expected payoff. Given
the linear relationship between the spot and futures price and the linearity of the
payoff of a futures contract (as a function of its price), then a futures contract is
more effective at reducing the variance of expected returns than is an option
contract (which has a non-linear payoff--as is illustrated in Figure 1 .3).
This result is unusual given the evidence of a recent survey of Iowa farmers
suggesting that the number of producers hedging with options is equal to that of
futures (Sapp, 1990). A more recent study of Montana farmers found that 14% of
crop farmers use futures and 19% use options; alternatively, 6% of livestock
farmers used futures and 11% use options (Sakong et al, 1993).
One explanation as to the popularity of options over futures is that farmers
may not be behaving as expected utility maximizers. In fact, results from a recent
producer survey indicate that the use of safety-first decision rules may important to
agricultural firms.
2 The survey performed by Patrick et al. (as cited in Atwood et
2 Safety-first decision rules are part of the lexicographic family (sequential ordering of multiple
goals) of utility functions. A safety-first rule specifies that a decision maker will act in manner
such that a preference for safety is followed. Once this safety objective is met, the decision
maker’s goal involves a profit-oriented course of action.
7
al., 1988) involved 149 agricultural producers in twelve states and many producers
responses “indicated what could be interpreted as substantial ‘safety-first’
considerations in their decision making”. The emergence of safety-first decision
rules in economic literature is not a recent one. Telser (1 955) used a safety-first
approach to evaluate hedging strategies using futures contracts.
8
derived from the empirical models. Lastly, Chapter Seven summarizes the results,
provides conclusions and offers suggestions for further research and the potential
drawbacks of the study.
9
CHAPTER 2 THE HEDGING CONTRACT
This chapter begins with a description of the motivation for hedging using
futures and/or options via an analysis of a case farm. Following this, the
implications of basis risk for the effectiveness of the hedge is examined.
1Much of this section indirectly relies on material published in the Commodity Trading Manual
published by the Chicago Board of Trade.
10
STEP 1: The farmer must open an account with a Futures Commodity
Merchant. This involves the filling in and signing of: a new client
commodity application form, a margin form, a risk disclosure form, and in
the case of a hedger, a hedging agreement. The hedging agreement
confirms that all the trades made by the farmer will be for the sole
purpose of hedging. Speculative trades must be done through a different
account where they will be margined at the full speculative margin.
STEP 2: In July, the farmer places a hedge order for 50 twenty-tonne #1
canola futures contracts with a January delivery which are trading at $350
per tonne. The farmer expects the cash price at the time of delivery to the
local elevator to be $325 per tonne. The farmer has based this
expectation upon the expected value of the basis which she believes will
equal the current basis. Once the hedge order is placed, the farmer must
provide an initial margin. The initial margin required by the WCE in this
case would be (50 contracts @ $450) $22,500 or $22.50 per tonne.
Margins set by the Futures Commodity Merchant are sometimes more
stringent than those of the WCE.
STEP 3: In October, the farmer offsets her position by purchasing 50
twenty-tonne January canola futures contracts at $375 per tonne, and she
sells her canola to the local oilseed elevator for $350 per tonne.
Table 2.1 below summarizes the farmer’s transactions and derives her net
selling price for a single contract when the basis is constant. Notice that, by
entering the futures market the farmer has locked in a net selling price
equivalent to the cash price she suspected would exist in October at the time of
the delivery to the elevator. This is known as a “perfect hedge”. Had the farmer
not entered the futures market she would have received $325 per tonne, which
is an inferior strategy.
11
Table 2.1 Hedaina scenario under a constant basis
12
Table 2.2 Hedging scenario under a weaker-than-exgected basis
In Table 2.3 the futures price has increased unfavorably from $350 per
tonne to $375 per tonne. The farmer has lost $25 per tonne by entering into the
13
futures market. Fortunately, this loss is compensated by an equivalent gain in
the cash market. This ensures a net selling price equal to the price expected by
the farmer in July. However, in this scenario the farmer would have been better
oft not to have entered the futures market because he could have received a net
selling price of $350 per tonne. This returns us back to the discussion in
chapter one where it was said that one of the drawbacks of futures contracts was
that they “prohibit the possibility of gaining from a price rally.” In this case, the
flexibility of an option on the futures contract becomes beneficial.
14
Table 2.4 Hedging with a long put option
Jan. futures Actual Cash Put option Net selling
price in Oct. basis price gain/loss price
($/t) ($/t) ($/t) ($/t) ($/t)
One can see from the example in Table 2.4 that under a constant basis,
no matter how far the futures price is below the strike price, the farmer will
always lock in a floor price of $335 per tonne.
2 If the futures price exceeds the
strike price of $375, then the farmer can receive a net selling price equivalent to
the current cash price for canola less the option premium. In this respect, the
option contract is similar to conventional insurance.
The discussion above evaluated the effects of hedging under specific
strategies and under various basis relationships. Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 --which
are similar to Figure 1 .3-- provide an alternative means to illustrate hedging
scenarios under increasing levels of basis risk. As the basis risk increases, the
revenue PDF for each hedge type becomes flatter, more elongated, and closer to
the no hedge PDF. This implies that when the basis risk is high, the use of either
futures or options is not really as effective for hedging against price risk. With
relatively low basis risk, the futures and option contracts provide the hedger with
2 Notice that this floor price is lower than that established by entering the futures market, but this
strategy allows the farmer to gain if prices move upwards. Also, note how the scenarios of table
2.4 translate into the payoff diagram (figure 1.2) of chapter one.
15
very different outcomes. These differences disappear as the basis risk becomes
large.
Oia,s
no hece
R even ues
16
Figure 12 Moderate basis risk
nohec
Revenues
Futures hececnIy
cpncns heccnIy
no hedge
Revenues
17
CHAPTER 3 REVIEW OF HEDGING LITERATURE
3.1 Optimal Hedging with Futures and Options: Expected Utility Model
3.1.1 Futures Contracts
The original notion of an optimal hedge referred to the case where the
decision maker [DMJ would take an equal but opposite position in the futures
market as that taken in the cash or spot market. In other words, if you expected
to have (or held in a warehouse in the case of an exporter) Xtonnes of canola
then you would hedge an equal amount in the futures market. Johnson (1959-
60) and Stein (1961) were amongst the first studies to use modern portfolio
theory as a means of deriving optimal hedging strategies.
1 Their studies showed
that under certain situations the optimal hedge could be less than unity (i.e., the
‘traditional hedge’). More recently, studies by Rolfo (1980), Chavas and Pope
(1982), KahI (1983), Anderson and Danthine (1983), Meyer and Robinson
(1988), and others have continued the use of the mean-variance [MV] framework
of portfolio theory when determining the optimal hedging decisions using futures
contracts.
The results obtained by Johnson and Stein do not necessarily follow
those of expected utility maximization except under special conditions. This
1 Stein’s method of optimization was based on previous work done by Tobin (1958). In addition,
Markowitz (1959) had done research in the area of portfolio selection in a mean-variance
framework.
18
relationship can be shown by deriving the optimal hedge expected utility
framework. Under the assumption of either a quadratic utility function (Tobin,
1958), a normally distributed attribute (Samuelson, 1970), or a random attribute
which is an affine transformation of a single random variable (Meyer, 1987), then
the mean-variance objective function can be expessed as,
where ‘jt is the expected return from the portfolio of assets, and ? represents the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (a positive value denoting a risk
averse individual). For the case of two risky assets, the agent’s cash position
and the corresponding futures position, then the expected return from the
portfolio can be expressed as (where the superscripted bars denote expected
values),
E(t)=XS(
—
2sl)+XfCf—f) (3.2)
where X and X are the spot and futures positions respectively; 2’ 2 the end of
f
period spot and futures prices; s
1 , f1 are the spot and futures prices at the
beginning of the period. Similarily, the variance of returns is,
Var(t) = Xa + Xo. + 2
XXo (3.3)
variance of the end-of-period futures price, and the covariance of the end-of
period spot price and futures price.
19
Now substituting equations (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.1) and differentiating
with respect to X
1 (assuming that the spot position is given; hence, known by the
agent) then solving out for the futures positions one obtains the following
relationship,
(3.4)
X o 2Xa
20
an additional risk management tool. Ritchken (1985) investigated how single
period MV utility maximizers might respond when they include Black-Scholes
[BS] priced options in their investment opportunity set. What he found was that
portfolios which lie on the MV efficient set include primarily short rather than long
positions in the options market; thus, making the joint assumption of mean-
variance and Black-Scholes pricing theoretically inconsistent. One study which
incorporated the use of both hedging tools was undertaken by Wolf (1987). He
considered an optimal hedging strategy in the case of a linear MV model and a
logarithmic utility function. Within the MV framework Wolf derived comparative
static results both with and without basis risk. The logarithmic utility function was
used in his simulation analysis of optimal portfolios. Wolf’s initial assumptions
were that the DM has a fixed position in the physical commodity and that the
spot price was nonstochastic. The results under these assumptions were:
• A DM which has a long futures position and faces fairly priced options will sell
a call or purchase a put. The opposite was true for a short futures position.
• A DM will purchase a call (put) option to guard against any adverse price
movements when he holds a short (long) futures position. He will sell the call
(put) in order to generate income against an adverse price move for a long
(short) futures postion.
Once the initial assumptions are relaxed, Wolf concludes that:
• In the absence of basis risk and with fairly priced hedging instruments, the
DM uses only futures since options are redundant.
Although Wolf’s analysis provides useful insights, the validity of his results
are questionable because the MV model may be inappropriate in his context.
This is because the distribution of profits become truncated when options are
21
introduced into the portfolio.
3 Realizing this weakness in the standard MV
model, Ladd and Hanson, (1991) provide an alternative method that is based on
the generalized expected utility analysis. Their model assumes that there are no
transaction costs, basis risk, margin calls, and that the DM has an exponential
utility function which displays constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Firstly,
they derive an income density function which is the sum of two truncated normal
distributions. This is to account for the truncation which occurs when options are
included in the hedging process. Secondly, Ladd and Hanson build a factorial
model which is used to determine the input variable levels required for use as
substitutes for market factors in their income density function. Finally, they
numerically integrate and optimize their generalized expected utility model for
each set of estimated market factors. The following are a few of Ladd and
Hanson’s major results:
• If either the futures or options markets are considered to be biased then the
DM will speculate by increasing their position in the options market and
decreasing (increasing) their position in short (long) futures.
• The availability of an options market in addition to a cash and futures market
has no or little value when the markets are unbiased or biased --within a
$0.04 deviation.
Ladd and Hanson conclude by saying:
Including options in a DM’s portfolio can violate any three sufficiency conditions of a MV
representation of expected utility maximization: (i) a DM exhibiting a concave utility function with
a normally distributed random variable; (ii) the utility attribute is an affine transformation of a
single random variable; (iii) the DM has a quadratic utility function, (Ladd and Hanson, 1991).
22
Following Ladd and Hanson, is an article by Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson
(LMH, 1991). They use an expected utility maximization approach and
through comparitive statics determine a number of results under the
presence and absence of price biases. In addition, their single-period model
allows for basis risk and assumes that the DM has an exponential utility
function exhibiting CARA characteristics. Some of their more relevant results
were:
• If both futures and options prices are unbiased and spot and futures prices
are correlated, then the DM will hedge a proportion () of their output in the
futures market, and no options will be used.
4
• If futures prices are unbiased, and the relationship between the spot and
futures prices is linear, then a futures contract provides a superior hedge to
an option because of the futures linear payoff versus the options non-linear
payoff. Thus, in this case, the use of options is redundant.
• If there are perceived biases in the futures prices and/or options premiums
and it is also assumed that there is no basis risk and that the hedger is fully
hedged, then options are used in combination with futures to speculate on
the perceived biases.
Bullock and Hayes (1992) modify Wolf’s original model by endogenating
the variance-covariance matrix of portfolio returns. In their model, they
examined both scenarios, with and without basis risk. Unlike Wolf, they do not
allow for the use of both call and put options since a call option can be created
synthetically via a combination of a futures contract and a put 5
option. From
their model without basis risk, they derived the following observations:
Where the proportion () is equal to Cov[b,p]Nar(p) where b is the spot price and p is the
futures price at the end of the period.
For more information on this combination and other strategies, see Cox and Rubinstein (1985).
23
• The futures contract is the preferred instrument for hedging a fixed inventory
or spot position and the option is the preferred instrument when speculating.
• The futures contract is always the main speculative instrument when
speculating on the mean spot price.
• The put option is the main speculative tool for information on the variance.
With the introduction of basis risk, Bullock and Hayes found that the above
results still hold. In addition, they found that increases in the mean basis level
would induce a DM to hold shorter inventory positions and increases in the
variance of the basis impel the DM to reduce his/her inventory position. Bullock
and Hayes also found that the basis information had no impact on the optimal
option use level and that the futures contract is still the most ideal tool to use
when hedging.
6
6
A lternatively, Hauser and Eales (1987) use a target-deviation model to evaluate the risk and
return associated with nine most “commonly” used option strategies when the hedger holds a
short futures position. They find that a put option when the hedger is risk averse over outcomes
which fall below the expected hedge price, and risk preferring with outcomes above the expected
hedge price. Two other articles include: Hauser and Andersen, Hauser and Eales, 1986.
24
Telser’s Figure 1 is re-created below (Figure 3.1). Telser states that when gains
are expected from holding both a short hedge and an unhedged stock then the
expected net income will have a negative slope like line (A)and the optimal
combination of hedged and unhedged stocks is given by the tangency of line A
to the elliptic-shaped constraint --point (A’). Also, if a gain is expected from a
short hedge, but not from the unhedged position, then the income line is (B) and
the optimal point becomes (B’). As a third alternative, when gains are expected
from a long hedge position, and losses are expected from holding unhedged
stocks then (C) represents the income line and (C’) is the optimal point. In all of
the cases the expected net income lines increase in the direction of the arrows.
2
X Unhedged Stocks
A
—v
C
B
X 1 Hedged Stocks
25
Safety-first models are part of the lexicographic family of utility models
which, unlike the expected utility model, have no theoretical base or set of
axioms. Instead, as the word lexicographic suggests, the utility functions of these
can be thought of as a representation of sequential goals. The goal of highest
priority must be met first before a decision maker is allowed to consider the
second goal. The main concept is that a decision maker is first concerned with
satisfying some safety measure, and then once having attained that measure he
can follow a profit maximization objective.
Three main forms of safety-first rules exist according to Pyle and
Turnovsky (1970). However, Anderson (1979) provides an alternative
catagorization which is adopted in this discussion. In the first catagory,
Anderson defines what he calls a safety principle. One of the more familiar
safety principles is that of Roy (1952) which states that a decision maker’s
objective is choosing an action which minimizes the probability of some attribute,
usually profits(it), falling below some specified “disaster” level (d*). In other
words,
MinPr(1u.<d*) (3.5)
The second category is that of safety first rule. This rule was put forth by Telser
(1955-56) and assumes that a decision maker maximizes expected returns E(it),
usually profits, subject to a constraint of the probability of returns not falling
below some crucial probability (y).
26
Anderson defines the third category as that of a safety fixed rule. Initially
introduced by Kataoka (1963), it involves the maximization of some minimum
return (d*) such that the probability of returns falling below this minimum level is
lower than some crucial value (y).
Unlike the expected utility model where risk is commonly (in the simple
two moment case) represented by a distribution’s second moment, either
variance or standard deviation, decisions made using safety-first rules can differ
greatly from variance-based decisions. Figure 3.2 is a good example of how the
two methods will have two different outcomes depending on which the decision
maker is using.
In the first graph of Figure 3.2 there are two distributions of revenue, A
and B. Distribution A has a lower mean revenue (Pa) than distribution B (tb);
27
Figure 3.2 Measuring risk by probability of loss versus variance
7
Figure 3.2.a: Ya >Tb, a<o, d = “disaster” level of revenue
Distnbution A
I
I / \/
Distribution B
2’ I /
Ii -.
&
0
I, \
\ ,‘ :
\
A :
/1
/ I --
-5-.-- -
d Jib
Revenue
I \S
\S
2 Distribution X /
Distribution Z
.0
0
0.
/
/ 5:
\ S
/ S
d =
Revenues
28
negatively skewed ([J3]< 0) and distribution Z is positively skewed ([l’3]> 0). It
is useful to once again make a comparison on how a decision maker may
evaluate the riskiness of either action based upon behaving in either a safety
first fashion or an expected utility manner. One would expect that a safety-first
agent would rank the action responsible for distribution X as riskier venture
> y. whereas the risk or variance minimizer would be indifferent between the
two actions.
29
CHAPTER 4 MODEL SPECIFICATION
In this chapter a model of a hedger who wishes to lock in a futures
position then offsets that position at a later date is developed. This is followed
by a discussion of the behavior of two hedging agents who follow two different
decision making rules. One agent decides his optimal hedging strategy by the
maximizing the expected utility of the revenues derived from the futures and/or
options position. The other agent bases his decision upon the maximization of a
safety-first rule.
30
Figure 4.1 Creating a synthetic long call option
Long
+ - Long call
Profit per
contract
0
Futures price
Long put
where:
t — end-of-period revenue
b end-of-period cash price
y end-of-period output (exogenous)
f — futures price at the beginning of the period
p — futures price at the end of the period
x proportion of output hedged in futures (x >0 buying x<0 selling)
,
31
(K). The second-state occurs when the futures price exceeds the strike or
exercise price.
There are a number of assumptions made regarding the general
representation of the above end-of-period revenue:
1. There are no costs of production (or profits are stated as net of production
costs), and production (y) is exogenous and equals one.
1
2. The premium of the put option (r), is assumed to be the compounded value
(using the market or riskless rate of interest) of the premium forgone at the
time the hedge is placed 0
(t
) .
3. There are of no transaction/brokerage costs, no transportation costs, and no
margins required.
4. There is no constraint on the agent’s ability to borrow to finance the cost of
the futures and options contract(s), and he does not face any borrowing
costs.
5. The exercise price of the option is exogenous.
6. The agent produces a single output.
7. The futures and option contract units are perfectly divisible.
32
4.2.1 Generalized Expected Utility Model
If an agent has a revenue function similar to equation (4.1), and he/she is
an expected utility maximizer, then the agent will choose his/her futures and/or
options position so as to satisfy the following objective:
max E[U(t)] = 2
)]+E[UOt
1
E[U(t
) ]
K (4.2)
=JJU(7tV..K...p) f(b,p)dpdb + S )f(b,p)dpdb
0
5U(rc..
where
the utiltiy of revenue when the option has value (v),(i.e., the
futures price is below the strike price.
U(ico) the utility of revenue when the option has no value (v), (i.e., the
33
value of the option (as perceived by the agent) depends on the agent’s
expectation of the end of period futures price (fl), then, as in Lapan, Moschini,
and Hanson, we can express the value of a single-period put option as follows:
where g(p) and h(p) are the respective marginal distributions of the futures price
with a mean of and a variance of °‘.
Inkeeping with LMH, note that both
distributions share the same variance, thus any speculative motive based on
differing perceptions of expected volatility or variance is precluded.
The agent maximizes his expected revenue via his futures and option contract
position but is subject to a probability constraint. The constraint states that the
probability of an agent’s revenue falling below a predetermined level (‘L) cannot
exceed a preset probability denoted above as y. This model is essentially
Telser’s safety-first model, except that it has been enhanced by introducing
options in the decision making process.
34
As in (4.2), equation (4.3) represents the expected revenue depending on
whether futures prices fall above or below the exercise price of the put option.
Also similar to the expected utility model above, futures price biases are
incorporated into the model.
2For an indepth discussion of various levels of stochastic dominance see either Anderson (1979,
pp. 51-53) or King and Robison (1984, pp.69-72).
35
Figure 4.2 Cummulative density functions under an upward price bias
0.9
0.8
Shorttilures cnd Long Put Combnaflon
0.7
. 0.6
0.5
2
O_ 0.4
0.3
1t
dt =—dx+—dz= 0
az
0=(f—p)dx+(7—r)dz where Y=K—7
Re-arranging terms
dx (V—r)
slope=—=— (4.6)
dz (f—p)
Figure 4.3 is similar to that of Telser (1955) Figure 1 except that he plots out hedged and
unhedged stocks.
36
To maximize expected revenue, the agent would choose combinations of X and
Z that push the iso-revenue line in the direction of the two arrows illustrated in
Figure 4.3. However, the agent must remain within the feasible region of the iso-
probability frontier; therefore, the optimal hedging combination is at a point
where the two are tangent to each other.
F utures (short)
line
lso-Probcbllhiy F roner
(i.e.,scteiyconslrdn1
Options (long)
In Figure 4.4 the relationship between the size of the feasible region and
the size of the price bias is illustrated. One can observe two major effects.
Firstly, as the size of the bias increases (not in absolute terms) the feasible
region increases in size, and therefore the number of option and futures
combinations satisfying the iso-probability frontier also increase. Secondly, as
the price bias increases, the absolute value of the slope decreases. An increase
in the price bias causes the denominator (f—fl) to increase at a quicker rate
than the numerator (—r). Therefore, if the slope diminishes as the bias
37
becomes larger, the optimal strategy may vary from option/futures combinations
A, B, C, or D. In other words, the agent will normally take a short futures
position, but may alternate between a long or short option position depending on
the price bias.
(shal
LcrPi1veBi
S rrdl
cpms (shatpiD
38
maximizes expected revenue subject to the constraint that the revenue does not
fall below a pre-specified level of revenue with more than a given likelihood.
Both of the models allow for upward (positive) and downward (negative) futures
price biases. This means that the agents can speculate on the expected value
of the futures price, but not the volatility.
Max E (it)
subject to safety-first probability
constraint
Pr (2t ) ‘Y
39
CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL MODELS
In this chapter, the theoretical models of Chapter 4 are re-specified for the
case where the cash and futures prices are joint normally distributed.
Expressions are derived for: the probability constraint; the expected utility
expression (for both the exponential and linear utility functions); and the value of
a single period option contract. Also, the parameter requirements of the models
are discussed and several methods of obtaining them are analyzed.
*
EK—+A(pya,,a—(x+z)a)
— expt—A[ — rz]
[
*exp{A(x_yb)+4i[y2a —2pyxa,,a +x2a]}
* 1— ( K —
+ A(pya,,o
op
— xo)
)
(5.1)
In (5.1) p, is the mean futures price and 1 is the mean spot price, and are
40
aversion and I(.) is the cumulative density function (CD F) of a standard normal
distribution.
K-p K—p
E(;x,z)=by+(f—)x+z (K_)*
G) O)
-z (K_f)*1K_+p1Kap (5.2)
apJ aj
where cp(.) denotes the PDF of the standard normal distribution.
41
purpose is the cumulative-distribution-function 1
technique. Using this method
one can perform the conversion of the cummulative function of revenue (FJI[ltL])
as follows:
°°
1k—P
However, for the specific case of this paper’s two-state revenue function,
it is necessary to incorporate the fact that the upper limit of integration (the value
of b) is dependent upon whether the futures price p is above or below the strike
price of the put option K. Therefore equation (5.3) can be redefined as:
Pr(7uTUL)=
$ $ f(b,p)dbdp+J $f(p)dbdp (5.4)
13
=
1fx—rz for pK
an expression for (5.4) can be derived and written as (see Appendix 4):
1For a detailed exposition of this technique, please refer to Mood, Graybill, and Boes, pp. 181-
188. A more basic analysis is provided by Freund and Wapole, pp. 226-230.
42
f
(
1it) is the pdf of a univariate normal distribution with mean ,
and variance a,
a
=
1 X÷Z, and a
=X respectively.
2
commodity specific analysis; in the case of this paper, canola trading at the
Winnipeg Commodity Exchange.
of the first to use an ordinary least squares technique to estimate the optimal
hedge in the case of Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) and T
bill futures contracts. He suggested that one could derive H* through the simple
regression of spot price levels (B) on futures price levels (P) as follows,
B=a+bP÷e (5.6)
Where the b (the slope coefficient) is defined in classical linear regression to be
equal to or in this case, the risk minimizing hedge ratio.
43
With the advent of this estimation method there later evolved a myriad of
questions and debate over such issues as: should equation (5.6) be estimated
using price levels, price changes, or the ratio of spot market returns to futures
market returns; should the data be daily, weekly, monthly etc.; should the data
be corrected for heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation?
Myers and Thompson (1989) suggest that the simple regression is just a
special case of a more generalized linear, reduced form, equilibrium model
which they define as follows:
b.=X.
a
1 +u, (5.7)
p, .=X
1
.j1+v, (5.8)
where is a vector of variables at time (t-1), which can be used to forecast the
spot price (b )and the futures price (Pt.) Possible variables to be included are
spot and futures prices, production, storage, exports, consumer income, and
other factors. The a and f3 are vectors of unkown parameters, and u and v are
random shocks with a mean of zero and serially uncorrelated.
By estimating equations (5.7) and (5.8) and collecting their respective
error term vectors (u and vi), one can create the necessary variance-covariance
matrix. Unfortunately, due to the lack of data available on factors other than spot
and futures prices, this method was not used in this study.
44
difference between realized and forecast prices divided by the forecast price.”
This differs slightly from Peck, who does not divide the forecasting error by the
forecast price. Rolfo suggests that by doing this one allows for differential rates
of historical inflation. Hence, using Rolfo’s method one can define the
forecast errors for the spot price and the futures price as follows,
8
P f
Eb=, (59)
What equation (5.9) suggests is that the best one-step ahead predictor of both
spot prices 1
] ) and futures prices ]
(E[b+ o+
1
(E) are the current values of each
variable.
= Var(Eb)
(5.10)
a =Var(,,)
where 8 b’ and 8 represent the forecast errors of spot and futures prices
respectively. Assuming that the forecast price is an unbiased predictor of the
realized price
, then the variance of the forecast errors is simply equal to the
2
sum of the squared forecast errors and the covariance is the sum of the
dot-products of the forecast errors (8,, .) divided by the number of
observations less one (N-i) for correction purposes.
2 By assuming that the forecast price is an unbiased predictor of the realized price, it is implied
that, on average, the forecast error will have a mean of zero.
45
In this study, the necessary forecast errors are calculated for canola
trading at the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange [WCE]. The data span a ten year
period during the years 1981-1990. The spot price data are the daily closing
cash prices of Number One Canada canola with the basis in-store Vancouver.
The futures price data are the daily futures pices as recorded at the WOE for
Number One Canada canola.
As described in chapter 2, it is assumed that in July, the farmer enters the
futures market with a contract which matures in January. After harvest in
September, the farmer offsets his position in the futures market and sells his
crop to the local elevator. Hence, following the Rolfo model, one can re-define
equation 5.9 for this particular scenario as,
— bsept — 1
f — Psept —
b,sept
8 — p ‘ Ep,sept
— p
Jjul JjuI
46
Table 5.1 Forecast error statistics for Seotember and October (1981 -90)
September October
Year 2
E
b
p
8 P€ p
5 P€
81 0.0051 0.0139 0.0082 0.9737 0.0057 0.0084 0.0069 0.9992
82 0.0022 0.0204 0.0062 0.9191 0.0054 0.0241 0.0113 0.9909
83 0.11760.0911 0.1035 0.9991 0.1024 0.0776 0.0890 0.9985
84 0.0008 0.0033 0.0014 0.8252 0.0006 0.0008 0.0004 0.6375
85 0.0075 0.0097 0.0083 0.9785 0.0235 0.0249 0.0242 0.9995
86 0.0090 0.0182 0.0128 0.9973 0.0055 0.0106 0.0076 0.9967
87 0.0037 0.0077 0.0051 0.9549 0.0017 0.0016 0.0012 0.7665
88 0.0066 0.0110 0.0082 0.9616 0.0205 0.0283 0.0240 0.9982
89 0.0028 0.0090 0.0049 0.9695 0.0054 0.0114 0.0078 0.9939
90 0.0036 0.0109 0.0061 0.9761 0.0035 0.0088 0.0055 0.9921
81-85 0.0267 0.0277 0.0255 0.9391 0.0275 0.0272 0.0264 0.9251
86-90 0.0052 0.0114 0.0074 0.9719 0.0073 0.0121 0.0092 0.9495
81-90 0.0151 0.0157 0.0186 0.9346 0.0166 0.017 0.0187 0.9626
To obtain the standard deviation of the spot and futures prices one first
finds the variance of each price as a function of its forecast error. Thus re
arranging equation (5.9),
b = f(1 +eb), and p = f(1 + e) (5.12)
Treating b, p, e,, and e as random variables, one can derive the variances of
the expressions in (5.12) as,
var(b) = f
*v(e)
2
var(p) = f
*v(e)
2 (5.13)
If f the mean price in July, is assumed to equal 5.0 then the standard deviations
as displayed in table 5.2 can be calculated.
3 It would seem that the price data
from the period 1981 to 1985 is responsible for a greater proportion of the
volatility for the entire time series spanning 1981-90.
Due to stability problems when models with exponential functions have ‘large’ exponents, f was
assigned a value of 5.
47
Table 5.2 The standard deviations for September and October.
As a simplification, this study will, in the base case, assume that the
standard deviation of the futures and spot prices are equal and that they both
equal a value of 0.8. Although this is a higher value than that derived for the
period 1981-90, and lower than 1981 -85, it is felt that the value of 0.8 provides a
sufficient balance of the two periods, and that any further analysis can involve an
investigation of the sensitivity of the models to values around the base value.
48
CHAPTER 6 SIMULATION RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
This base case implies a small futures price bias of 4 percent and a fairly low
level of basis risk (p=O.95). The level of risk aversion is obtained via sensitivity
analysis of the model to varying levels of A, and roughly represents a median
point.
Table 6.1 below provides a summary of the results of the EU model under
alternative scenarios. Beginning with the standard no futures price bias case
(i.e., no speculative motive) the farmer will hedge a proportion of production
equal to the ratio of the co-variance between the spot and futures price divided
by the variance of the futures price. Using values from the base case, the
optimal hedge involves using 0.95 futures and no options 1
contracts. This result
is the standard hedging rule as discussed by Johnson (1959-60) and Stein
(1961), where the optimal hedge is equal to the ratio of the covariance of the
spot and futures prices and the variance of the futures price.
1 Note that the optimal futures X*=O.95 is equivalent to the basis risk (p=O.95). This is due to the
fact that the standard deviation of the futures price and spot price are equivalent.
49
Now, if an upward futures price bias of 4 percent is introduced, the
expected utility maximizer will “overhedge” , (i.e., hedge more than his cash
position), in the futures market, hence X*=1 .58. As one would expect, when the
parameters of the model are varied, the optimal futures positions also change.
Increasing the base cases’standard deviation (volatility) of the spot and futures
prices from 0.8 to 1 .25 ceteris paribus induces a fall in the optimal futures
position from 1.58 to 1.21. This reflects the added risk involved holding a
greater unhedged position (i.e., speculating with an the open position), when the
joint distribution of prices has a greater volatility or variance.
Table 6.1 Optimal futures and option positions under various scenarios.
50
in the spot price over time as the futures price changes. Recalling chapter one,
as the basis risk increased (lower p) then the resulting revenue distributions
were more volatile.
An increase in A (Arrow-Pratt risk aversion) from 0.5 to 1.0 means that the
agent is more averse to risk and derives a both lower and negative marginal
utility (U”(it)<0). Alternatively, if A is lowered to 0.1 or if p is raised to 0.99, the
agents optimal futures position increases. However, note that all the optimal
hedge postions in Table 6.1 share one characteristic. That is, all the optimal
option positions are approximately equal to zero, (actual values are very small
positive and negative values). This result is in contrast to the comparative static
results derived by Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson (LMH, 1991), where they found
that:
The optimal hedging strategy involves using only futures, and the amount
of futures is determined by the covariance of cash and futures prices.
However, if futures prices and/or options premiums are perceived as
biased, options are typically used along with futures. Thus, in this model
options are appealing more as speculative tools to exploit private
information on the price distribution, and less so as an alternative hedging
instrument. (p.74.)
Thus, the LMH results are not very significant or valuable in this particular case.
equal to 4.0, and a probability threshold (y) of 0.15. That is, the farmer wants the
assurance that his revenue does not fall below the limiting revenue (e.g., a
51
mortgage payment on the farm, the cost of production) of 4.0 more than 15
percent of the time.
Figure 6.1 is an illustration of the two-dimensional analysis technique
described in Chapter 4, where the iso-probability frontiers are de-lineated in a
futures (X) and options (Z) space (i.e., points on this curve show combinations of
futures and options positions that give rise to an equal probability of falling below
the revenue threshold). An initial observation is that as the magnitude of the
positive futures price bias increases, then the potential combinations of X and Z
which satisfy the feasible region also increase. As discussed in Chapter 3 and
illustrated in that chapter’s Figure 3.1, this study’s interpretation of the
relationship between the safety-first’s objective function and its constraint is
similar to that of Telser (1955) except that he examines the behavior of a hedger
who has a choice between or a combination of hedged (futures) and unhedged
(spot) stocks.
A second, important observation is that the bottom loci of the iso
probability frontiers tend to share the same (X, Z) co-ordinates. This can be
explained by examining the expected revenue relationship as the futures position
(X) approaches zero. As X approaches zero, the expected revenue is
dependent primarily on expected spot prices as small changes in the futures
price f has little impact on it.
52
Figure 6.1 Feasible regions: base case and alternate futures price biases
Futures (short)
5
Base Case
Bias +0.4%
(0.91,2.91)
-o -4 -2 a
Options Options
(short put) (iong put)
-2
-3 Bias -4%
(-1.55. 2.12)
53
when a 4% downward bias exists is where the optimal position is a long futures
of 1 .55 contracts and 2.12 long put option position.
In Figure 6.2 , the payoff of the optimal X, Z combination for the base
case scenario of Figure 6.1 is contrasted with other combinations which,
although are not the optimal points, do comprise points on the base cases iso-
probability frontier. Of the three strategies, the short futures and short put option
position of (3.62, -2.2) is the least desirable. Even though the strategy gives the
agent the largest net selling price for a futures price realization of 5 (point A), it
fails to provide the agent with higher payoffs than the other two when the futures
price realizations are below or above their expected value. Also, if the futures
price was to rise to a value above 7.5 then the net selling price would be
negative and the agent potentially could suffer infinite losses. It is for this reason
that an implicit constraint is included along with the safety-first model’s
constraints. The additional implicity constraint is one which precludes the desire
of the agent to choose an infinite combination of futures and options that will on
average satisfy the probability constraint and maximize expected revenue, but
potentially make the hedger susceptable to potentially infinite losses.
54
Figure 6.2 Payoff of the base case and alternatives
30
Futures only
25 (2.11,0)
Average Net
Selling Pric
0 Base Case
(1.31,3,83)
15
10
0
0.5 4.5 5 5,5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
In contrast, the optimal base case strategy of X=1.31 and Z=3.83, which
has the lowest average net selling price when the futures price realization equals
5, enables the agent to have very high net selling price when the futures price
falls below 5.0 into the “low risk” region.
2 In addition, this strategy provides the
agent with protection against any potentially low net selling price realizations in
the “high risk” regions. In other words, the base case scenario is the ideal tactic
whether the realized futures prices are above or below the expected value.
2 difference between the net selling price of the base case strategy and the futures only
strategy when the futures price equals 5 is the amount of the option premium which shifts the
payoff downward.
55
Figure 6.3 Optimal hedge payoffs for varied biases
30
25
Average
Sng Bose Case
Price 20 (1.31,3,83)
Figure 6.3, illustrates the payoffs for the optimal hedges under the base
case scenario, an upward bias of 0.4% and a downward price bias of 4%. As
shown, the base case of (1.31, 3.83) involves the use of a larger quantity of both
futures and put options as compared to the case of the upward bias of 0.4%.
However, the base case also comprises a greater proportion of options than the
0.4% upward bias case. This is exemplified by the increased slope of the base
case s payoff function for futures price realizations below 5.0. The increase in
the use of options relative to futures as the size of the upward bias increases,
suggests that an option is a more efficient tool to use when both “safety” and
speculative gains are a concern of the agent. Notice how the payoff function for
the case where there is a downward bias of 4% is essentially a mirrored image
of the base case. This is because with a downward price bias of 4% the agent
feels that the price of the futures contract is under valued; thereby, the agent is
56
wishing to capitalize on the instance that the futures price rises before the
futures contract is offset.
4
Bias ÷4%
Base Case
-6 -4 -2 6
Put Options
(short) —1
- ‘Put Options
-2
(long)
57
upward bias is superior to the strategy of (1.23, 3.6) which involves the use of
fewer futures and options contracts, yet satisfies the probability constraint. Once
again, the payoff for the (1.05, 4.04) hedge gives a higher payoff when futures
price realizations are below 5.0 and creates a superior floor price to that of the
alternative (1.23, 3.6) strategy when prices are above 5.0. As before in figure
6.3, the optimal strategy under a downward price bias of 4 percent (-1.50,2.33),
involves a payoff which is a mirrored image of the upward bias case.
25
Bias +4%
(1.05.4.04)
20 /
Average N t
Selling Piic
:“:N. / B’‘as 4°!
-
Bias +4%
(1.23,36)
5. —— —
0 I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
Realized Futures Price
58
smaller feasible region, the optimal hedge of X* and Z* is also reduced.
However, note that the relative point on the iso-probability frontier has not
changed from the base case. This is because the slope of iso-revenue line has
not changed with the increased volatility of prices. Also, unlike Figure 6.1, the
iso-probability frontiers do not share the same lower locus of points.
5
Futures (short)
Bias +4%
4 (1.17, 1.92)
Base Case
(1.31, 3.83)
-I
-6 -4 -2 4 6
Put Option (short)
Put Options
(long)
-2
When a downward bias of 4 percent exists, the result contrasts the results
of the previous scenarios. Instead of purchasing put options, the agent sells
them. In other words, with an increased volatility of futures and spot prices the
agent feels that there is less risk involved in speculating with options (short
position) than with futures (long position). However, this result is obtained by
implicitly constraining the X and Z to combinations which do not give rise to
payoffs which fall below zero. This can be seen in the payoff diagram of Figure
59
6.7. The payoff line for the bias -4% case remains above zero for all futures
price realizations.
30 Base Case
Bias +4% (1,31,3.83)
25 (1,17, 1.93)
Average Bias -4%
Net 20
-
.. (1,73,-1.89)
Selling
Price 15
o
I 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
‘-5
60
the safety-first model’s probability constraint decrease under increased levels of
basis risk, but the optimal strategy is to use fewer long puts and more short
futures contracts.
Futures (short)
5
-6 -4 -2 6
Put Options (short)
Figure 6.9 below shows how the agent will choose a strategy which
sacrifices higher net selling prices at low futures price realizations (reflected in
the reduced slope of the payoff in this region) in order to obtain overall higher net
selling prices when futures prices exceed 5.0. This is a necessary tactic
because the distribution of the net selling price is more disperse when the basis
risk is higher; thus, an increased probability of the net selling price dipping below
zero exists.
61
Figure 6.9 Payoff diagram for high and low levels of basis risk
30
10
5 (1.31,3.83)
0
0 0,5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4,5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
Reaized Futures Price
62
Figure 6.10 Feasible region under higher and lower strike prices
6
Futures (short)
5 strike price =5.2
(1.74, 2.02) Base Case
strike price=4.8
(1.31,3.83)
(1,24,5.71)
I’
/
-8 -6 -4 -2 8
Put Options -1
(short) Put Options
(long)
-2
-3
63
base case. In closing, the extreme behavior of the safety-first model under
varying parameter values prevents one from making any general
recommendations for an agent such as a farmer.
64
CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary
Agricultural commodity prices have through history behaved in a
potentially highly volatile manner; thus, leading to the placement of high levels of
financial risk on producers, processors, exporters, and other agents involved in
the procurement and/or sale of these commodities.
For some time, the availability of futures contracts has provided these
agents with a risk management tool. Basically, by entering the futures market
via a futures contract the agent is able to substitute price risk for basis risk The
argument being that basis risk is generally less than price risk. In the early
1980’s option contracts on commodity futures were made available on some the
U.S. commodity exchanges. Options provided an agent with an additional risk
management tool. Options can be used with futures or on their own. The
advantage of using option contracts is that an option allows for a variety of
revenue distributions not previouly available with only futures. This is because
the option is like insurance coverage, the holder of the contract can either
exercise the option or not. The drawback of this arrangement is, like insurance
coverage, that the holder of the option must forego a premium even if he does
exercise the option.
This study has attempted to evaluate how a decision maker, such as a
farmer, might use futures contracts and options on those contracts as a means
of managing price risk. Two contrasting models were used for this purpose. An
expected utility model and a safety-first model. The safety-first model was that of
Telser, except enhanced to include not only futures but options as well. Both
models are based upon a single-period framework where at the beginning of the
period the agent enters the futures and option markets and places a hedge. At
65
the end of the period the agent offsets his futures position and sells his
commodity in the spot market. The single-period model was formulated such
that the agent could speculate on the futures price bias and not the volatility of
the option price.
Once the empirical models were defined, then the parameters were
derived for the models using canola data obtained from the Winnipeg
Commodity Exchange. A technique utilized by Rolfo (1980) was used to obtain
the necessary parameters from the data. The data series spanned a ten year
period froml98l to 1990. Optimal hedging results from the two models were
derived under alternative parameter scenarios which involved varying levels of
basis risk, futures and spot price volatilities, and risk aversion.
7.2 Conclusions
The results from the maximization of the expected utility model suggests
that an agent will (when futures or option price biases exist) hedge an amount
equal to that of the co-variance of the spot and futures prices divided by the
variance of the futures price. If a price bias exists in the futures market, then the
agent takes the same futures position as the no bias case and then speculates
on the bias by either taking an additional position or reducing his existing one;
this depends on the direction of the bias.
In general, increased volatility, uncertainty, or aversion to risk leads to a
reduced open speculative position when in the presence of a positive futures
price bias. Of course, the opposite occurs when these factors are lower than the
base case. The most interesting result of this model is that unlike the
comparative static result of Lapan, Moschini, and Hanson (1991), put options do
not figure into the optimal hedge even when there is a speculative component to
the hedge.
66
An opposite result is obtained under the safety-first model. With this
model, options are always used as a means of speculating on the upward and
downward future price biases. Other results are similiar to the expected utility
model’s.
In general, as the price bias increases, so do the overall futures and put
option positions. When the price bias is reduced or is in the downward direction,
then the short futures is reduced as is the long put option position. In some
cases, the short futures positions may change to a long positions. When the risk
level is reduced (in the safety-first model this is represented by the level of the
probability threshold) the hedging agent increases his long put position and
lowers his optimal futures position. When the volatility or standard deviation of
futures prices is increased, the agent’s response is to reduce his futures and
options positions. However, when the bias is negative, the agent increases his
futures position and writes put options instead of purchasing them. This
illustrates the rather sensitive nature of the safety-first model to parameter
changes. As the amount of basis risk increases (decreases) the agent takes a
larger (smaller) futures position and lowers (raises) his put option position.
One weakness of the safety-first approach is that even though the “safety”
requirement is being met, the return of a given hedging combination may have
on occasion a very extreme outcome which could involve a large financial loss.
67
requirements may be a strong deterant for agents, since this may involve the
need for capital of which they do not have. Certainly, if borrowing is required
then it is not obtained at a free rate. In the safety-first model there was an
instance where the hedger choose to write put options instead of purchase them.
When writing the option the seller is required to place a margin same as the
hedger in the futures market. Another drawback of the study involves the perfect
divisibility of the contracts. Of course, in the real world this is not the case and
the lumpiness of the contract sizes may lead to increased vulnerability to the
hedger if the amount he desires to hedge is in-between the two contract sizes.
By relaxing the assumption of no output uncertainty for the case of a farmer
could modify the results because of the farmer’s hesitation to hedge Xof his crop
in case producer fell below X and the farmer would have to payout the
deficiency. This uncertainty could lead to an increased use of options because
of its contingent exercise aspect.
Further enhancements to the methods used here could include the
allowance for a multi-period model (perhaps a stochastic dynamic programming
model) and further research on the expected utility model to identify why the
results of this study contradict those given by Lapan, Moshini, and Hanson
(1991).
68
REFERENCES
Atwood, J.A., M.J. Watts, G.A. Helmers, and L.J. Held, (1988): “Incorporating
Safety-First Constraints in Linear Programming Production Models.”
Western Journal Agricultural Economics, 13(1): 29-36.
Benninga, S., R. Eldor, and I. Zilcha, (1984): “The Optimal Hedge Ratio in
Unbiased Futures Markets.” Journal of Futures Markets, 4: 1 55-59.
Bollerslev, T., R.Y. Chou, and K.F. Kroner, (1992): “ARCH modelling in finance:
a review of the theory and empirical evidence.” Journal of Econometrics,
52: 5-59.
Chavas, J.P. and R. Pope, (1982): “Hedging and Production Decisions Under a
Li near Mean-Variance Preference Function.” Western Journal Agricultural
Economics, 7: 99-110.
Cox, J., and M. Rubinstein, (1985): Options Markets. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Ederington, Louis H., (1979): “The Hedging Performance of the New Futures
Markets.” Journal of Finance, 34: 157-70.
69
Grant, D., (1985): “Theory of the Firm with Joint Price and Output Risk and a
Forward Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67: 630-
35.
Hauser, Robert J., and James S. Eales, (1987): “Option Hedging Strategies.”
North Central Journal of Agricultural Economics, 9(1), 123-134.
Hauser, Robert J., and James S. Eales, (1986): “On Marketing Strategies with
Options: A Technique to Measure Risk and Return.” Journal of Futures
Markets, 6: 273-88.
Hauser Robert J., and Dane K. Anderson, (1987): “Hedging with Options under
Variance Uncertainty: An Illustration of Pricing New-Crop Soybeans.”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67: 38-45.
Herbst, A.F., D.D. Kare, and S.C. Caples, (1989): “Hedging Effectiveness and
Minimum Risk Hedge Ratios in the Presence of Autocorrelation: Foreign
Currency Futures.” Journal of Futures Markets, 9(3): 185-197.
King, Robert P. and Lindon J. Robison (1984): “Risk Efficiency Models,” In Risk
Management in Agriculture, Peter J. Barry, ed. Iowa: Iowa State
University.
70
Markowitz, H., (1959): Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments.
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Mood, A., F.A. Graybill, and D.C. Boes, (1974): Introduction to the Theory of
Statistics, 3rd ed., Toronto: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.
Patrick, G.R., P.N. Wilson, P.J. Barry, W.G. Boggess, and D.L. Young (1985):
“Risk Perceptions and Management Responses: Producer-Generated
Hypothesis for Risk Modelling.” Southern Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 2: 231 -38.
Peck, A., (1975): “Hedging and Income Stability: Concepts, Implications, and an
Example.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 57(3): 410-19.
Rolfo, J., (1980): “Optimal Hedging under Price and Quantity Uncertainty: The
Case of a Cocoa Producer.” Journal of Political Economy, 88: 100-116.
Roy, A.D., (1952): “Safety-First and the Holding of Assets.” Econometrica, 20:
431-449.
Sakong, Yong, D.J. Hayes, and Arne Hallam, (1993): “Hedging Production Risk
with Options.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75: 408-415.
71
Sephton, Peter S., (1993): “Optimal Hedge Ratios at the Winnipeg Commodity
Exchange.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 1: 175-193.
Shafer, Carl E., (1993): “Hedge Ratios and Basis Behaviour: An Intuitive
Insight?” Journal of Futures Markets, 13(8): 837-847.
Witt, Harvey J., Ted C. Schroeder, and Marvin L. Hayenga, (1987): “Comparison
of Analytical Approaches for Estimating Hedge Ratios for Agricultural
Commodities.” Journal of Futures Markets, 7(2): 135-146.
Wolf, A., (1987): “Optimal Hedging with Futures Options.” Journal of Economics
and Business, 39: 141-58.
Young, Douglas L., (1984): “Risk Concepts and Measures for Decision Analysis.”
In Risk Management in Agriculture. Peter J. Barry, ed., Iowa: Iowa State
University Press.
72
APPENDIX 1 THE DERIVATION OF THE UNCONSTRAINED OPTIMAL
HEDGE
Case I:
Assume that the cash and futures prices are perfectly correlated (i.e.,
b=p). From before we know that the general representation of a decision maker’s
profits are defined as follows.
1K-i fp<K
It = py + (f - p)x + (v r)z
- where v
= K
Alternatively,
1 =
It (y-x-z)p + fx + (K-r)z
= (y-x)p + fx -rz
Equivalently,
t + N
p
1 1 =
2 = t
it p + N
2 2
wheret (y-x-z)
=
1 =(y-x)
2
t
N= fx+(K-r)z 2
N = fx-rz
73
Given the information above, one can derive an expression which denotes a
decision maker’s expected utility of profit as a function of his/her position in both
the futures and options markets.
E[U]=E{_e} (A1.1)
Equation (Al .2) is equal to the sum of the expected utilty of profits when
the futures price lies below its strike price 1
(E[U
1 ) and the expected utility of
profits when the futures price lies above its strike price (E[U
]. From this point
2
onward we will work with the E[U
] portion of equation (Al .2) since analogous
1
statements can be made for the later half, 2
(E[U
] .
1
E[U J = C f
1 e’ f(p) dp where 1 = — e’
(A1.3)
13 =—Ati
1 2a)
Since f(p)= e
‘2ita
then one can one can restate (Al .3) in the following manner,
K
]=C
1
E[U fe 2
d p (AlA)
J27to -
Similarly,
74
K
1
J=C
1
E[U fe 2
’ ’dp (Al.5)
v -
1 i(P—P)——i —i—
1=C
1
E[U e”Je dp (Al.6)
2ta
_J[(_)2
_2a13
(
1 p_)] (Al.7)
)2
‘[(p —2o13 (p— )÷o —a] (Al .8)
1(.2)2122
(Al.9)
1 K
1
J’2’°’
1
E[U
e =C
Jq2ita e “
dp (Al.lO)
Note that the integrand is the probability density function (p.d.f.) of a normally
distributed random variable with a mean of -i-3 a and a variance of a.
1
Therefore,
75
]=C e1
1
E[U 1K0 Op
(A1.1 1)
Where I(.) is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
Analogously,
c3
]=C
2
E[U
$
K
2
e ‘
dp
—c
— 2
e2P2P* 2
(
1
a p_(+
)”i
(A1.12)
where C
2 = — e2 and 12 = — 2
At
Case II: When the spot price and futures price are not perfectly correlated.
Once again we can define the profit function for the two possible states (exercise
option versus not exercising) as follows:
it 1
p-i-N
12
b+t
11
=t
2
it ’+t
2
t
2
p+N
221
where 11
t =y t =—(x+z) 1 =fx-i-(K—r)z
N
121 =3’ 22
t = —x 2
N = ft — rz
Now we can define the decision maker’s expected utility of profits in the following
manner,
E[U] = —
J $ e f(b,p)dp db —$ $ K-°
e2f(b, p)dp db
(A1.13)
= 2
]
1
E[U
] -i-E[U
76
Working with E[U
] we have,
1
]=C
1
E[U 1 J Jeh1b12P
f(b,p)dpdb
where C
1 = —e -Aj’
13 1
=—At
(A1.14)
1312 = 12
—At
2
exP{13iib+1
P _ 3i [2
h_2PhbhP+h]}dPdb
2
2ltabaP..SJ1—p ( P
= b—b =
where hb and h (A1.15)
subtracting f3
b and
11 1312 we have,
13llab(a13llb+131PP[a]+1312P_ )[hP+2PhbhP
1
(
2 2 +hP] (A1.16)
= 13 ii
1 + 13Hli + 13
oh + 1312k
12
— 2(1
2
[ hp + 2phbhP + h] (Al .17)
27ObOg1 2
eh1b412P
aboPJ SexP{13llabhb + 13
oh
12
2(1 P
[h — 2phbhP +
—
—
2
(Al.18)
77
b-b
Since we defined h,, = and h = then by differentiating we have
dhb=-’-db, dh=-i-dp
ap
Now we can substitute the above differentials into equation (Al.18) and re
express it as,
ePhh12PobaPf$ exP{llabhb ah
1
+ 2 — 12 [h —2phbhP dhPdhb
(Al.19)
Re-working the exponent of the integrand in (Al .19)
— 2phbhP + h — 2(1 p
— )llabhP
2 — 2(1 — p2)i
a
2 php] (Al .20)
— 2(1 —
2 —
—Kb!) 2 )+(h _Kpi)2J+(ia
p(hb Kbj)(hP —K
1 P11l2Gbap
2
+ a)
12
-i-
where
Kbl llGb+PI
I
3 2GP
1
K = Gb
1
3
PI1 a
12
+l3
(A1.21)
By replacing the exponent of the integrand in (Al .19) with (Al .21) we arrive at
3
P
+
a
2
l llf +a)
baP
]=C
1
E[U 2
*
exP{ [(hb —KbI)
2 2 —2p(hb Kbl)(hP —K
)
1 +(h _K
)2]}dpdb
1
2(i_p2)
78
(Al .22)
Note that the integrand in (Al .22) is the p.d.f. of a bivariate joint normal
distribution with the means Kbl , K and variances of one. Therefore we are
1I
E[U = C *ex{
1 }*
(K—(-i-plloboP l2Gp
where is a special case of Pl
(Al .23)
Analogously,
—
221
b P+13
21
13 ‘
—
2
+
l
2 ab
23P
2
+
2
2 2GGp
1I
l +1
220p
3
]=C
E[U
*
2exp * 1
where C
2 = —e
121 = 21
At
122 =
(Al .24)
Therefore,
[K_
]]
2
K
2 *exp{
c i + 22
2 P+ + +
(Al .25)
79
Now substituting back in for the 1
C
s
T , 1s and the K
s.
1
* l_1K_(_PAYabap+Axa
) (A1.26)
Gathering the A’s
1• /
*expAj(x+ — —\ A2r2 2 22
z)p —yb)+---[y 0
b — 2py(x+z)oboP +(x+ z) a
* —
+ A(pyaba —(x
+ z)a)1 exp{_A[fr —rz]}
L ]
*exp{A(x_y)÷i[y2a —
pyxabaP +x2a]}
2
* l1K(pyab.px0
a” ) (A1.27)
80
APPENDIX 2 THE DERIVATION OF EQUATION A1.20
Beginning with (Al .20) and then completing the square on both hb, lz (see Mood
et al, p.165).
+ 2pI3Ill
abaP +
2
(A2.1)
Now we can re-arrange the term in square brackets into the form of
—2puv+v First let,
2
u
.
ii = Jib + Kb
v = h +K
uv = hbhP + hbKP + hPKb + KbKP
= h h1b’<b + K
+2
= + 2hK + K
(A2.2)
Then placing the above expressions into the u 2 form we have,
2 —2puv-i-v
h, hbKb + K, +
+2 + 2hK + K — 2phh — 2phbKP — 2phPKb — 2pKbKP (A2.3)
Re-arranging (A2.3),
— 2
b
1
P ”p + + f2[h,K,, + hK — phbKP — phpKbj + K + K — 2
p KbKP } (A2.4)
Using equation’s (A2.5) format, we can make a similar arrangement using the [.]
term in (A2.l).
_2[(1 —
2 )13 lab/lb +
p 2 )13
(1—p oh
12 J (A2.6)
From the relationship described in (A2.5) and applying it to (A2.6) we can state
the following,
81
Kb —pK = 2 )I
—(1—p 110b
3
(A2.7)
K —pKb =
Taking the above system of equations in (A2.7) we can solve for Kb, K.
Kb 2
=pKP—(1—
) f3llab p
(A2.8)
K = pKb —(1— 12
)13
2
p
a
through substitution we can solve the equations in (A2.8) such that,
Kb = (1 P
)
2 I3llab + — 12
)
2
p
a f3 +pKb]
= —(llab
(A2.9)
K = —(12oP +p11Ob)
Given (A2.9) we can define the rest of the terms in {.} of equation (A2.4).
K = p
2
+
1
3
1 12
2ab0P
1f f3
+p
a
= 1i2°p 3
p1 l2ObOp
2
+
1 Pi1b
(A2.1O)
= 131112abaP + 13
+P
2 lll2aboP + PIl
2
Substituting the terms in (A2.1O) into the remaining terms in the {.} of (A2.4)
then,
K, +K —2pKbKP = 13° 3
p
2
+
l
jpbap
lI
f2 r3 1
+p
o f3 3
2
+p
a P
2
i
i PzPp
i1
I ÷1
iP
3
o +P
1
_2p[pf3 120b0p + pI3
131113120b0p + 11I
2 3 aJ
2
(A2.11)
Gathering the similar terms,
f
l
3 lab —P
I
23lab 3
j
p
2
i if +1
ppp 3 13 2
1Pp 2
—p
a 13ll13l
3
—2p
abaP (A2.12)
Factoring out the term (1-p
) we have
2
2 )13lab + (1—p
(1—p 2 )132° + (1—p
2) 1 l1l
3
P
2 abap
2
82
Note that (A2.13) is essentially the term added to [.] in (A2.l). Therefore we
have now derived an expression which is equivalent to (Al .20) in a quadratic
form.
83
APPENDIX 3 DERIVING THE VALUE OF A SINGLE-PERIOD OPTION
First we let
G=Jpf(p)dp
(A3.1)
where f(p) is the probability density function for a normally distributed random
variable p (price). We can re-write equation (A3.1) in the following manner,
G=ff(p)dp $P K dp
$f(p)dp
-
K
(A3.2)
where
$ f(p) dp is the CDF of the normal distribution evaluated at k.
According to Mood et al. (p.124), the expression (.) in equation (A3.2) is
the probability density function (p.d.f.) of a truncated normal distribution with p
restricted between -oo and K. Therefore, the term [.] becomes the expected
value of the random variable p when p’s distribution is a truncated normal
distribution.
Johnson and Kotz (p.81) describe how one can transform the expected
value of a random value --whose distribution is a truncated normal distribution-
into an expression which is a function of the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of a standard normal
distribution. The expected value of p is given by
84
E(p)=p. + 0
-
a) \a
where P(.) c.d.f. of the standard normal
cp p.d.f. of the standard normal (A3.3)
A, B the lower and upper limits of the integral
Substituting the upper and lower limits from equation (A3.2) into (A3.3), and
noting that the lower bound --equalling infinity-- reduces (A3.3) to
(K-u)
E(p) =
—
(A3A)
Therefore,
G=
(A3.5)
G (A3.6)
We can define the value of a single period option as the difference between the
strike price (k) and the price of the underlying asset summed over all potential
prices. Alternatively,
E()= J(K-p)f(p)dp
(A3.7)
wherep-’ N(i.i, 02)
Equivalently,
85
v= K Jf(p)dp
- Sf() dp (A3.8)
Given that the first integral in equation (A3.8) is equal to F(.) -- the c.d.f. of the
standard normal distribution-- we can then substitute both F(.) and equation
(A3.6) into (A3.8) resulting in,
K t)
v =
KF(K)_
a
(A3.9)
where F(K)
Therefore,
=
+ cp(1<Ja
v (K_)4(”J (A3.1O)
is the value of a single period option as a function of the mean futures price, its
variance and the strike price.
86
APPENDIX 4 DERIVATION OF THE SAFETY-FIRST PROBABILITY
CONSTRAI NT
(i) Consider the following profit function for when the price (p) of an underlying
asset is below and then above the strike price (K).
Jâ 3
p-i-&
2
+&
b p<K
3
+
1
‘j3
p
2
b+13
13 pK
(ii) Therefore, for a given and p, we can define the following expression,
where t’ =
3
=W
1
a =
l3 =131/133
(A4.2)
2
a = 3
/
2
a cc 132 132/133
= 1 +a
(a p+b)—b
2
define U(b) and dU = (A4.3)
ab a,,
The substitution of (A4.3) into equation (A4.1) requires a change in the limits of
integration; as follows,
1 ÷a
a 1
p
2 +(n_a 2
—a
p )—
1_
U[b]=U[(_& P)r]U{ —a
2 1
(A45)
= ( -)/a,, when p<K
87
Analogously,
U[bj = —
—
= — 5)/a (when p K) (A4.6)
b-
= U(b) - (A4.7)
q=PP , dq=
ap
= K-
where the limit of integration is c(K) (A4.8)
ap
Re-arranging (A4.8) with q as the argument and p as the value of the function
and then substituting into equation (A4.7) we can define the following
relation ships,
b—b +c
(
2 qap
=U(b)_[1
1
-
0
=U-ã
qã
1 °2-
where = — + —
p
b
0 °b
a
°1 2
Substituting (A4.8), (A4.5) into (A4.1) we have the following expression for when
(p.K)
—1 , [(u_ao_ajq)2_2p(u_ao_a
q
1 )q+q2]
1
$ $ 2icl—p 2
’
2
e dUab dqo (A4.1O)
88
—1 2
i -2 (u_o_.iq)q+q2]
dUob dqa (A41 1)
I 2n1 —
2 abap
p
K— **
Letting k= , — , 1
t = and substituting them into (A4.1O)
1 1
expl 2 {(u_&
02 0 _aiq)q÷q2]}dudq
q) —2p(U—&
1
—&
2(1—p)
1 +q2]}dudq
+ exp 1
2
{
[
2(U
1 — — 2p(U — 1
q)q
2 — —
(A4.1 2)
Expanding the expression within the exponent fo the first half of (A4.12) we can
re-define it as follows:
—1 U2
1
2(1_p2)[
0 +0
u(a q)+(& + 2
1
à 0 + aiq)q+q2J
q) —2pUq+2p(&
1
& (A4.1 3)
q 21—2
—
[(U2 0
2Uc( cx + 1
p& + i) 2q(Uã
2
—
—
+ 2)
— —
—
— pã + pU)l
)
2
2(1p (A4.14)
-2
where U
2 — 0+
2Uä = (U —
(U—a
2
)
0 U—ã
2
)
0 1 _(1_p2)l
[i+a +2p&
+ 2
p
(l+a+
) (UO)
al_p (A4.15)
2
1—p = 1
1+ä+2pà
1+ + 2p&
1 ) = (&
2
—(1—p + p)
2
and (A4.16)
(Ià —
— pà + pU = (U —
& )(ã + p)
89
—(U—&
2
)
0 —1 r(, 0
(U-&
+p)
2
)
+(1+& 2
)q —2(&
1
+2pà
)2(1_p2)[
1
2(1+&÷2p& 1
1+&÷2p&
(A4.17)
Re-arranging (A4.17) into the form of a perfect square in the bracketed [.] term:
2
)
0
-(U-a -(1÷&+2p&
)
1 E 2 2(&
+
1 p)
+ [q (U- ã
)q+I
0 0)2]
pã
2
(l+&+
)
1 J
1
[1+a+2pa
(A4.1 8)
We can simplify (A4.18):
—(U—a
2
)
0
+
)
1
—(1+&+2pä r 0
+
1
(&
) p)U—&
l
2
(A419)
)
1
2(1+&+2pã )
2
2(1—p )
1
(1+ã+2pã j
Alternatively,
-(U—a
2
)
0
1
Lq- (&(1+ä+2p&
) j
1
)1
0
÷p)(U-&
2
)
1
2(1-i-ä-i-2pä (1—p
)
2
(A4.20)
(1+& -i-2p&
)
1
Substituting (A4.20) for the exponent in the first half of (A4.12) then we can re
write --due to the second half being analogous-- then entire expression of
(A4.12) as follows:
itr k —1 2
)
0
(U—a
L1[ 2
-i-p)(U—ä
1
(ä
)
0 1
1+?+2Pj
1 1
Pr( e
(
2 121) * dqdU
= ll2(1 + + 2p&) I 2(1p)
)
1
(1+a+2pd
_
[
1Fq
1
—1 2
)
0
(U-
1
)
1
(1++2p j
+
JJ g2t(1÷r3 +2pf3
)
1
e2(121) *
I 2n(1p2)
(1-i.+2p)
e2(1_p
1
2 21) dqdU
(A4.21)
where
90
-1 (U-a
2
)
0
1 2(1+&+2p&,)
e
/2t(1+ä +2pà
)
1 (A4.22)
—1 2
)
0
(U-
1 2(1++2p)
e
/it(1+13 +2p13
)
1 (A4.23)
are the p.d.f.’s of the normal distribution with means a 13 and variances
) and (1÷f3 +2pf3
1
(1+&÷2p& ) respectively. Also,
1
I 0
+p)(U—ä
1
(ä
) t
1
(1+ã+2pa)
T(1_p2)/(1+a?÷2pa
)
1
]
e
2n(1_p2) (A4.24)
I )
1
(1+ã+2pã
I (÷p)(U4
)
0 1
1
—IL’ (1?÷2pi) j
2(1_p
)
2 /(1++2p,)
e
)
2
2n(1—p
I (1.i-+2p) (A4.25)
)
0
+p)(U—& )
0
+p)(U—3
are the p.d.f.’s of a normal with means (& and (13k and
)
1
(1+ã+2pä (1-i-f3+2p13
)
1
(1—p
)
2 (1—p
)
2
variances of respectively.
)
1
(1+&+2p& ‘ )
1
(1-i-3+2p3
0 **
&)
2
+
1
=—(a
,
a 1 = (A4.26)
0,
where a = = 3
/
2
a a , = .
3
7t/c( Aggregating these terms through
substitution, we have:
(& + ** — b
3
a -
cx2ap
ao
—
— , 1
It —
—
, 1
a = (A4.27)
3
a a
0
3 J, cx
a
3 b
3
+
1
It—(cX
p
2
b -I-cX
cL)
—
0
a-
= (A4.28)
a
a
3 b
91
Substituting & from (A4.27) into the constant term of (A4.22),then:
427t(1 + + 2pã) + 2p =
+ +2
P
a Pbap
a
= +2
cYb
3
a cL
a
3 b
= 1 = cxc
427t(&cY +âa +2pâ
abaP)
3
à
2 g2it(ac +âcY +2p&
&pbcYP)
2
(A4.29)
Making the appropriate substitutions from (A4.27) into the exponent of the
natural exponential of (A4.22):
r ,-,.
lu—Ij 2
+
1
cx
p cx apbU—(cl ÷a
p
2)
1 2
)
0
(U-& L a3a
)] [
2 1+ã +
1
P
2 & — 21 — 2 &o +&o +2p&2&3aboP
X
G
3b cc
a
3 b
-I-cL
p
2 )}
“2222 (A4.30)
2 +3
X
G b +
Now if we define:
tht=&
o
3 bdU (A4.31)
If we substitute it into the integral, we need to change the limits of integration in
(A4.21) to the following:
=
÷b] = = (A432)
(**)
= ]+b]= 3it2 = (A4.33)
u=r_-—i_-=
L3 Jab a
a
3 b
ab
then substituting (A4.34) into (A4.30) and combining it with (A4.29) we have:
92
bu—(al÷a
3
[a
p
2 ]
2&4+2pâ
à
2 3baP
e
j2t(&a +
(A4.35)
+ 2pâ
abaP)
3
&
2
Now, making similar sets of substitutions for (A4.24) as with (A4.22) then:
2
P
(&
G
3
÷
2
) b)(—(ala
+pa
)a
22 22
—1 a
o
p
2
o
3
a +a
,,o
+
a
2 )&a
2
(1-.p
1
e
I ‘2 2
2it(1—p
)
2
a -I-a
2
cx o3
3
&a
p
+
c
2
O x
cx
POb
(A4.36)
re-write the expression (A4.21) --when making analogous statements for when p
K-- as:
(2
k
2
Pr(t e *
dqtht
= o
T
LL2 1
JM
2
( a
2
(
a
3
)b)—t
p+p
Iq—— I
ii
M2
+ff e
_{it
2 afl2
* e —j dqdit
= [(1_ Pa
ab]
3 = [(1_
where 1
M , 2
M (A4.37)
93
K—15 — (&2aP +PG(
Ob)(t
3
n
Pr(t)=JJt) dic
M
K— (2aP+P3ob)(it—i2)
+ff
(
2 ) M
d
Substituting for the cx’s, 13’s, and Ms, we obtain the following:
= a +Y
2
(X+Z) a +2p(X+Z)Yoa
2 F(1_p2)Y2al2
a +Y
2
X a + 2pXY aPab
2
=
[ 2
j
94
APPENDIX 5 DERIVATION OF THE SAFETY-FIRST MODEL OBJECTIVE
FUNCTION
Ibv÷(f—p)x+(K—p—r)z if p<K
7C
by+(f—p)x—rz if pK
one can define the expected profits as the expectation of the two states as is
shown in equation (A5.1) below.
E(n)=$f[by+(f—p)x+(K_p)z—,]g(b,p)dbdp
+JJ[by+(f—p)x_rz]g(b,p)dbdp
(A5.1)
where g(b, p) is the joint normal density function
E()=Jyh(p)dp+J[(f—p)x+(K—p)z—rz]h(p)dp
1 According to Mood, Graybill and Boes (p.167), if (X,Y) has a bivariate normal distribution, then
their marginal distributions X and Y are univariate normal distributions.
95
Since J(f—p)x h(p)dp-i-f (f—p)x h(p)dp is equivalent to f(f—p)x h(p)dp which
Using the derivation from Appendix 3, (equation (A3.1O)) one can redefine
equation (A5.4) as,
E()=y+(f-)x+z (K_1K+p1Kap
k\a’) a}
-z (K_f)1K_+p(Kap
i%\a) apj
96