Stop or Go 160813

Airbus Flight Instructor Seminar – Madrid 04 & 05 May 2010
Presented by:
Cpt. Christian NORDEN

TRE Training Policy
Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Rejected Takeoff Procedure & Training
Content
y Background
y Operational Standards
y Factors involved in the decision-making
y Prevention Strategies
© AIRBUS 2009 S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 2

Background
y Improvement of the rate of RTO overrun accidents/incidents:

Implementation of policies,
training practices and
operational guidelines
developed by the Industry

Background
High speed and Low speed RTO
92% Low Speed

(<100 kt)
8% High Speed
(>100 kt)
Potential runway
overrun
accidents/incidents
Source: IATA Steades 2002

Background
Analysis of 94 RTO overrun accidents/incidents over 40 years revealed that

more than half of RTO overruns occurred at speeds greater than V1.
Unknown < V1
20% 54%
≥ V1 26%
Importance of
• making the STOP or GO decision prior to reaching V1 and
• an accurate V1 callout

Background
Rejected takeoffs at higher speeds,

on a balanced field runway can be
hazardous even if the performance is correctly calculated!

WHY?

Background
Several Risks …
y Error in aircraft TOW determination (Loadsheet…)

y Error in T/O data calculation (V1, VR, V2, FLEX TEMP…)
yWrong or late decision to stop

y Tire damage
y Brake worn or not working properly
y Too high residual brake temperature
y Incorrect runway line-up technique

y Wrong or late decision to stop during T/O roll
y Runway friction coefficient lower than expected

Content
y Background

Operational Standards - Decision
STOP or GO = Captain’s decision
Split into low and high speed regime: 100 kt
Below 100 kt as a general rule any indication of system

malfunction should result in a STOP decision
THRUST
PNF callout SET 100
STOP or GO
Low
Speed
Airspeed 0 80 100
The 100 kts call has (besides to check the coherence of Captain’s and F/O airspeed
indication) to indicate that the aircraft is entering the
High speed takeoff roll segment - Above 100 kt
STOP! Only major failures justify a STOP decision e.g.
GO!
8 Engine or APU fire warning 9 Nose gear vibrations
8 Sudden loss of thrust 9 “Bang” without thrust loss
8 ECAM alerts (refer to FCOM) 9 Open sliding windows
8 Indications that the aircraft will 9 EGT over limit
not fly safely
STOP or GO
… STOP or GO … STOP or GO … STOP …
Low High
Speed Speed
Airspeed 0 80 100 V1
At V1
– CAPT must remove his hand from the Thrust Levers
– The V1 call has priority over any other call out.
Above V1
– Takeoff must be continued
STOP or GO …GO
… STOP or GO … STOP or GO … STOP
Low High V1 PNF callout

Speed Speed or auto-callout
Airspeed 0 80 100 V1 VR V2
The PNF has an important role for a correct and timely decision:
y Monitoring the flight instruments (esp. the Speed Trend Vector)

y Monitoring the Engine instruments and the ECAM

Operational Standards - Stop Procedure
Review of the procedure
1
2
CAPT F/O
Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "STOP" 1 Calls . . . . "REVERSE GREEN"
1
Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE 2 "DECEL"
Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL 1
ATS . . . . . . . . . DISCONNECT
A300 Family
A320/A330/A340
“DECEL”: the deceleration is felt by the crew, and

confirmed by the speed trend on PFD.
It can also be confirmed by DECEL light
Operational Standards - Stop Procedure
AUTO BRK does not activate below:
4 72 kts (GS) for A320-A330-A340
4 80 kts (GS) for A300 Family
1
2
4 3
CAPT F/O
Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "STOP" 1 Calls . . . . "REVERSE GREEN"
1
Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE 2 "DECEL"
Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL 1 3 "70 kts" ("80 kts" for A300 Family)
3 Cancels any audio warning

Aircraft stopped Aircraft stopped
Reverse thrust . . . . STOWED Advises ATC
2 2
Parking brake . . . . . . . APPLY
3
Locates EMERGENCY
PA call . . "ATTENTION CREW EVACUATION C/L
AT STATION" ex: A320
4 Calls for . . . . "ECAM ACTION" Completes ECAM ACTIONS

Operational Standards - Stop procedure
y Background

Factors Involved in the Decision Making
Examples that led to STOP decisions:

y Atmospheric conditions (e.g. wind)
y Discrepancy of indicated airspeed observed
y Pitch up tendency of aircraft
y Loss or difficulty to maintain lateral control
y Malfunction of engine system
y Unusual noise and/or vibration (e.g.: nose gear vibration, tire burst, engine stall,
suspected bomb explosion …)
y System failure(s) triggering ECAM warnings/cautions and/or cockpit
indications
y Broken crew-seat latch

y Bird strike
y Traffic conflict / Runway Incursion (particularly on congested airports)
y Open windows, doors
y Any type of indication that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly
y Lack of proper communication between flight crew (e.g. untimely speed callout)

Many reasons but a simple decision:
STOP or GO
This decision is based on

y Severity of the malfunction
y Aircraft speed
y Runway characteristics and condition

y Atmospheric conditions
y Aircraft condition (e.g. MEL-item)

Decision-making performance may be negatively affected by:
y Limited recognition time of unexpected conditions (i.e. unusual

or unique situations)
y Limited decision time
y Lack of understanding of cues associated to problems that
may occur during takeoff roll
y Non-adherence to published callouts (e.g. “Thrust set”,
“100 kts”, “V1”…)
y Weak crew coordination

y Complacency
y Inadequate/Incomplete pre-flight briefing

Content
y Background

Prevention Strategies
Decision making process:
Education and training should discuss in depth the

y Decision making function of the Captain
y The various reasons that can challenge his decision
y The factors that weight STOP or GO against each other:
Severity/Speed/State of Runway/Surounding ambient conditions
Stopping process
Contrary to the decision making process, the STOP process has to be

y Almost automatic and
y Actions have to follow a schematic and repetitive SOP pattern

Prepare and anticipate:
Pre-flight preparation
• Takeoff data (Independent calculation by two CM …),

• Aircraft’s technical status (Awarness of effect of MEL item, …)
• Runway conditions
• Bird activity
• Likelihood of windshear conditions
Exterior inspection
• Tire conditions, brake wear…

Take Off briefing:
Should cover the Decision making process …

Emphasis on decision making considering all essentials for to the T/O
Runway characteristics (length, overrun area …)
Runway conditions
Ambient conditions (birds, wind)
Aircraft state (heavy, light) and condition (MEL?)
… and the Stopping process

P/F and PNF role during take off roll
Review of SOP actions

Standard callouts are an important element to develop the

proper STOP or GO mindset:
STOP or GO … STOP or GO…STOP or GO … STOP GO

low speed / high speed
Airspeeds 0 80 100 V1 VR V2
« Thrust set » High Timely V1

speed callout
regime!

Ground training
• Understanding of takeoff performance calculation,

• Incidents in TO roll and reasons for RTO,
• Influence of Line-up and Power Setting techniques,
• Meaning of V1, STOP mindness/GO mindness
• Runway condition and contamination
• Reverse thrust, flap selection and reduced V1,

Session Briefing suggestions for Recurrent Training:
• Engine failure very close to V1: what are the consequences in case of a
go decision? …
• Advantage of a go decision and immediate return/ potential problems …
• Mention reasons that should not lead to a stop decision above 100 kt
(e.g. Nose gear vibration, opening sliding windows)
• Tire burst within the 20kts range from V1: stop or go? …
• Birdstrike at high speed …

• Windshear or uneven aircraft acceleration during T/O roll …

Simulator sessions
• Handling of the rejected Take Off including low speed STOPS

• Consider simulator excercises, where the crew have to recognize
situations that are not the result of a clear and distinct loss of thrust:
• Engine stall accompanied with loud bang (without loss of thrust)
• Tire burst
• Traffic conflicts (“Abort”)

• Engine oil low pressure close to V1

Line training, Line checks
• Enhance the mindset and task-sharing, during the Take Off Briefing
based on the present conditions and on potential abnormal situations
• Discourage repetitive, automatic and schematic briefings


Stop or Go 160813

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Airbus Flight Instructor Seminar – Madrid 04 & 05 May 2010

Cpt. Christian NORDEN

Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

y Factors involved in the decision-making

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 2

y Improvement of the rate of RTO overrun accidents/incidents:

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 3

High speed and Low speed RTO

92% Low Speed

Source: IATA Steades 2002

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 4

Analysis of 94 RTO overrun accidents/incidents over 40 years revealed that

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 5

Rejected takeoffs at higher speeds,

hazardous even if the performance is correctly calculated!

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 6

y Error in aircraft TOW determination (Loadsheet…)

yWrong or late decision to stop

y Incorrect runway line-up technique

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 7

y Factors involved in the decision-making

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 8

STOP or GO = Captain’s decision

Split into low and high speed regime: 100 kt

Below 100 kt as a general rule any indication of system

… STOP or GO … STOP or GO … STOP …

… STOP or GO … STOP or GO … STOP

Low High V1 PNF callout

y Monitoring the flight instruments (esp. the Speed Trend Vector)

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 12

Review of the procedure

“DECEL”: the deceleration is felt by the crew, and

3 Cancels any audio warning

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 14

y Factors involved in the decision-making

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 15

Examples that led to STOP decisions:

y Broken crew-seat latch

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 16

Many reasons but a simple decision:

This decision is based on

y Runway characteristics and condition

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 17

Decision-making performance may be negatively affected by:

y Limited recognition time of unexpected conditions (i.e. unusual

y Weak crew coordination

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 18

y Factors involved in the decision-making

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 19

Decision making process:

Education and training should discuss in depth the

Contrary to the decision making process, the STOP process has to be

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 20

Prepare and anticipate:

• Takeoff data (Independent calculation by two CM …),

• Likelihood of windshear conditions

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 21

Take Off briefing:

Should cover the Decision making process …

… and the Stopping process

STOD/ Flight Instructor Seminar 2010 22

Standard callouts are an important element to develop the