Buddhism and War:

A Study of the Status of Violence in Early Buddhism

By James A. Stroble, University of Hawai’i at Manoa
December 17, 1991

There is something rather unsettling when one reads of Buddhist justifications

of violence. We can not but help thinking that the central ethical precepts of
Buddhism, ahimsa, karuna, and metta (non-harm, compassion and
loving-kindness) have somehow been lost. But, in spite of the initial shock, the
justifications we encounter are quite similar to those we find in the other world
religions. Why do they jar in the case of Buddhism?
We propose here to consider the possibility of Buddhist justifications of war,
and to investigate not how they came about, for that is all too obvious and not
specific to Buddhism, but rather why they should not have, which hopefully will
explain the particular unease many of us feel in the face of them.
Buddhism’s problems with the state begin with the conversion of rulers of
states to the teachings of the Buddha. Unfortunately, these rulers did not often
follow the Buddha’s own example and renounce their kingdoms. More often it
meant that Buddhism came to be under state protection. This situation entails
several problems for Buddhism, the first being how to accept kingship as not
being antithetical to Buddhist teaching and practice, and a second being the price
of such an accommodation which then places the political on par if not superior
to the religious. These problems are in no way specific to Buddhism, but attend
the political success of any historical religion, the greatest example in the West
being the acceptance of Christianity by the Roman Emperor Constantine.
What we are interested in here is how Buddhism does, or fails to, come to
terms with the eternal prerogative of states: war. For states often are modified by
the influence of religions, but rarely if ever to the point of surrendering the power
to make war. Therefore we should be cautious of cases where the religion comes
to sanction the use of violence by the state, especially where the religion
everywhere else holds to a position of non-violence. In the case of Buddhism, we
must understand the basis for the doctrine of non-violence or ahimsa in order to
see whether or not it can allow sanctioned state (or other) violence.
The doctrine of ahimsa is the distinctive feature of Indian moral thought. But
the basis for this precept can differ from one tradition to another. The resulting

1
interpretation and evaluations of action, then, admit of great diversity or even
contradiction, but almost no one ever explicitly denies ahimsa itself. The
arguments for the non-violent nature of explicitly violent actions such as war, or
the denial of human agency in the commission of such carnage, as in the
Bhagavadgita for example, do not challenge the moral principle of ahimsa, but
only quibble about the facts of the particular case.
We turn instead to the grounds for accepting ahimsa as the foremost moral
principle. Of these several are possible: a doctrine of unity with the universe
implies one ought not to hurt oneself; a doctrine of moral pollution suggests
abstention for purity; a doctrine of sympathy enjoins us to refrain from those
actions which we would not like to be the recipient of [The Golden Rule and
Kant’s Categorical Imperative].1
Buddhism has elements of all of these, but adds the further, and central,
doctrine of causality which ties the others together and gives us moral efficacy.2
As for violence, violence is caused, and causes more violence, depending on
conditions. This understanding of not just the morality of non-violence but also
of the world in general puts the question of morality on par with that of any other
phenomena. The causality of violence is not something that can be supervened or
suspended, is not to be put aside as mere window dressing in the face of “political
realities”. The fact that violence makes for suffering is not limited to the victim,
but also touches the perpetrator; thus the recognition of “sympathy” is not merely
an altruistic act. The analysis of violence in Buddhism is of a piece with the rest
of the dhamma.
The reality that the Buddha realized is to be found in the Four Noble Truths.
The first of these is that the world is suffering. Not surprisingly, then, the analysis
of violence belongs to the second Noble Truth: there is a cause of suffering. The
normative import of this analysis is found in the assertion that there is a way out
of suffering, the third Noble Truth. Even without going into the fourth Noble
Truth, the Eight- fold Path, we can see that if violence is truly a source of
suffering, and exclusively so, then it must be renounced in the Eight-fold Path.
This is to deny that violence can in some cases be the instrument of the cessation
of violence, that even as the means of a noble intent it produces instead more
suffering. And indeed this seems to be the Buddhist position. Even the
“successful” use of violence does not escape from the production of more
suffering:

2
 § 201 The victor begets enmity. The vanquished dwells in
sorrow. The tranquilled lives happily, abandoning both
victory and defeat.

The case of the vanquished is straightforward, no one likes to lose. In the case
of the victor, however, the connection is not as direct, but is just as inexorable.

§5 Not at any time, indeed, are enmities appeased through enmity.

However, they are appeased through non-enmity. This is an
ancient tradition.

The enmity that the conquer generates through his own enmity toward his
enemy, or even vice versa, results in the further production of enmity with the
victory. In the discussion of war in the Samyutta Nikaya,3 we find the evil king
Ajatasattu attacking the good king Pasenadi, with Pasenadi being defeated. And
here is stated what is quoted above from the Dhammapada (§201), with Pasenadi
being the one to suffer. When these kings again met on the battlefield, Pasenadi
captures Ajatasattu. But instead of executing him (partly due to a family relation,
Ajatasattu is his nephew), Pasenadi only confiscates his army. The Buddha’s
response to the news is informative:

A man may spoil another, just so far

As it may serve his ends, but when he’s spoiled
By others he, despoiled, spoils yet again.
So long as evil’s fruit is not matured,
The fool doth fancy `now’s the hour, the chance!’
But when the deed bears fruit, he fareth ill.
The slayer gets a slayer in his turn;
The conqueror gets one who conquers him;
Th’ abuser wins abuse, th’ annoyer, fret.
Thus by an evolution of the deed,
A man who spoils is spoiled in his turn.

It is to be noticed that this applies equally to both of the combatants, the point
being that Pasenadi’s largesse is not sufficient to put an end to the conflict, and

3
we can expect more war in the future. The only way to answer violence that does
not add to violence is with non- violence.4
At the opening of the Mahaparinibanna Sutta we find our same king
Ajatasattu sending a minister to seek an audience with the Buddha in order inquire
about a planned attack on the Vajji princes. Ajatasattu’s motivation for seeking
advice is not based solely on respect for the Enlightened One, but more because
“Tathagatas never speak what is untrue.”5 The Buddha, in accordance with the
moral teaching found in the Maha Sila sections of the Brahmajala and
Samannaphala Suttas,6 does not “make predictions about kings going to war;
about kings coming back from war; ...; and probabilities of victories and losses of
warring kings,” but instead inquires of Ananda as to the practices of the Vajji
princes, the seven factors of non-decline. Finding that the princes do indeed
possess the seven factors of non-decline, the Buddha says that so long as they
continue so, they will not decline.
Several points are to be made here. On the one hand, the `prediction’ as to how
the Vajji will fare does not concern itself with the relative strength of any other
state, most significantly that of Ajatasattu. On the other hand neither does it
concern the internal material disposition of the state, such as its defense readiness
and economic vitality. Rather the factors of non-decline are communication and
harmony with each other, and respect for tradition, elders, women, shrines, and
arahants. Immediately upon this follows several more sets of “seven factors of
non-decline”, but these pertain not to a state but to the community of monks, an
example of the way in which much of the discussion of war and violence in the
Suttas is primarily metaphorical.7
It is significant that the Buddha’s reply to Ajatasattu’s minister does not even
metaphorically involve violence. The maintenance of the state, as well as the
Sangha or the individual monk, is a matter of its own cultivation.8 It is not
necessary to respond in kind to threats from the outside, as foolish as that may
seem from the position of the political realist. If the Vajji princes were to be
concerned with the threat, already they would be suffering in anticipation and
uncertainty, on the path to decline. They would have entered upon the same
course of action as Ajatasattu and Pasenadi, where even if they succeed in a
defensive war, only “spoiling” their enemy so far as necessary for their own
security, nonetheless will most likely face the same prospect in the near future,
and will not necessarily always be the victor.

4
 That a nation should not take a serious interest in its own defense is as popular
proposition today as it was in Buddha’s time. A cursory glance at the Arthasastra
of Kautiliya will confirm that a very different approach to politics was available.
But the Buddhist approach is based not on sentimentality or soft-headedness, but
on the understanding of the dynamics of violence, of its causality. The
dependance on war or the threat of war to preserve one’s security is in the long
run bound to fail, due to the further violence that is produced by the inevitable
suffering resulting from such a policy.
A doctrine of sympathy, based on fellow-feeling for the defeated even where
oneself is the victor, could not produce a justification for ahimsa that entailed the
renunciation of violence; instead it would only recommend magnanimity in
victory (along the lines of the Marshall Plan?) such as that of Pasenadi above, in
hopes of putting an end to the circle of violence through victory. But this is
precisely what the Buddha does not allow. The awareness of how violence arises
entails a broader view of conflict than that which only involves one’s own narrow
self-interest. Thus the position of the enemy is to be taken into account. Not
responding with violence, far from being an act of altruism, is in one’s own
interest in the cessation of violence. Thus:

§166 One should not neglect one’s own welfare through

excessive altruism. Having understood one’s own welfare,
one should be devoted to true welfare.

The question that naturally arises is just how such an insight is to be put in
practice, especially when one is faced with an adversary who has no qualms about
the use of violence. In the Angulimala Sutta we find the Buddha purposely
encountering just such a case. The robber Angulimala is described in the most
fearsome terms, he wears a necklace of fingers, parties of 40 men are not safe in
traversing his domain, he has caused the depopulation of whole villages. Even
King Pasenadi is unable to bring this criminal to account. The Buddha, in spite of
profuse warnings, journeys through the robber’s territory alone. Predictably,
Angulimala sets upon the Buddha. Through his psychic powers, the Buddha made
Angulimala unable to overtake him. [the magic trick is problematic] When
Angulimala stops and says “Stand still, recluse,” the Buddha replies “I am
standing still Angulimala, you too stand still.” Puzzled by this response, since he

5
is not moving while the Buddha still is, Angulimala asks for an explanation.
Buddha responds:

“I, Angulimala, am standing still, having for all beings everywhere

laid aside the stick,
But you are unrestrained regarding creatures; therefore I am standing
still, you are not standing still.”9

This is enough to make Angulimala see the errors of his ways and immediately
become a monk. The motive of this conversion is not made explicit, but the
important point is that it is not effected by meeting his atrocious violence with
greater violence of punishment (danda), the Buddha having “laid aside the stick”
(danda?) even for Angulimala.
Of course, not all of us have the psychic power to get an attacker to stand still
long enough to discourse with him about “standing still”. But nonetheless, insofar
as we do not and instead meet violence with violence, we will be perpetuating
suffering rather than contributing to its cessation. Thus even where one cannot
eliminate violence by kindness, resort to violence is still to be avoided. In the
“Parable of the Saw” the Buddha says to the monks:

Monks, as low-down thieves might carve one limb from limb with a
double-handed saw, yet then whoever sets his mind at enmity, he, for
this reason, is not a doer of my teaching.
(Majjhima Nikaya, I.129)

Taking the matter to such extreme, while very much a part of our interest here,
is to a degree only illustrative in this Sutta. The first step in the cessation of
violence is usually not nearly so difficult as getting an elephant-overtaking
Angulimala to stand still. It is as difficult to stand still ourselves, not so much
when we are being carved by thieves but when we are being slandered by another.
Once we allow enmity to arise in our own mind, the escalation to physical
violence is only a matter of degree, not of kind. Thus the parable is followed by
the question,

If you, monks, were to attend repeatedly to this exhortation on the

6
 Parable of the Saw, would you, monks, see any way of speech, subtle
or gross, that you could not endure?

The concern with one’s own equanimity in the face of violent speech or action
does not seem to directly address our question about the practicalities of the
insight. But given an understanding of the causality of violence, we can see that
the first move in its eradication must be our own. Not entering into the circle of
violence is the only way to stay [get?] outside of it. This means that we must
concern ourselves with our own thought, speech and action rather than with those
of others,10 not only because this is what is most directly within our control, but
also because it is these that cause us to suffer.

§165 Evil done by oneself does oneself defile. Evil left undone
by one does one oneself purify. Purity and impurity belong
individually to oneself; no one shall another purify.

This then belongs to the third Noble Truth, the cessation of violence, and gives
us an explanation of why the Vajji princes will not decline.
The second aspect of this understanding of the causality of violence involves
how one affects others. Again the basis for this is not sympathy per se, but the
causality of one’s actions which then not only affects another but reacts upon
oneself. We have already seen this expressed with regard to the battles of
Ajatasattu and Pasenadi, but it also applies as well on the everyday interpersonal
[interpsycho-physical?] level.

§133 Do not speak harsh to anyone. Those spoken to would

perhaps answer you back. Painful is quarrelsome talk, lest
retaliation affect you.

Having controlled one’s own reaction to violence, it is wise to be aware of

how one’s actions affect others,11 not just to minimize their suffering, but as well
to reduce the occasions on which we are tested in our control.
Needless to say, all this runs against the prevailing opinion, in Buddha’s time
as now, on how to control violence. The only effective counter to violence it taken
to be more violence, with the distinction being made between “good” violence

7
(just, licit, or sanctioned force, punishment) and “bad” violence (unjust, illicit
violence or crime, and more recently, terrorism). The question here, then, is the
proper, effective use of violence in overcoming violence. The popular renditions
of this come readily to mind: “the stick is all they understand”, “we must fight fire
with fire”, “the war to end all wars”, etc. The implication of this kind of thinking
is that violence itself is morally neutral, and that what matters is the ends to which
it is applied. Violence itself, in this interpretation, is not a source of problems,
only its application by those with the wrong views.
How far this is from the early Buddhist position should be apparent. Instead
of understanding the causality of violence, common opinion relies on the
instrumentality of it to vanquish unjust violence. The one takes as its first precept
the prohibition of the killing of any creature; the second requires the killing of
certain beings, as necessary for the protection of others. One advocates the control
of one’s own mind, where the other legislates the control of the other’s body. This
seems to suggest at first that the two are incompatible; but unfortunately, the usual
interpretation is that they belong to different spheres of life: the strict observance
of ahimsa for the monks and nuns, the moderate use of force by the householders
and the state.
V.P. Kothari, in his work, The Law of Non-Violence, seems to grasp the
underlying argument for ahimsa based on the causality of violence, but backs
away at the strict application of non-violence at the political and householder
level.
An analysis of religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism leads us to
recognize that they may make a distinction between the conduct of a layman, that
is a person involved in a worldly pursuit of any kind, and that of persons who
have entirely renounced all worldly pursuits and have become monks, ascetics or
adopted the discipline of a saint.12
The reasons that a householder cannot strictly pursue ahimsa is that “A layman
should be a good and successful citizen or ruler.” The duties of position and
profession may require one to do some harm, and in any case the necessity of
violence in the defence of self and property bears upon the householder. As long,
Kothari allows, as the execution of duty is not motivated by passion, it “cannot,
it may be argued, be deemed as Himsa or Violence. As the world consists of
wicked people and mischief-mongers as well as kind and peace-loving people,
there are occasions when non-violence may have to be tempered with the

8
defensive use of violence.” (p. 34) The same responsibility for defence falls to the
state, and is also justified “within the limits of Ahimsa, as long as the motive is
national defence.” Pure non-violence is restricted to the Saint (monk, ascetic), but
given the theory behind non-violence, the causality of violence, how can it be held
in abeyance for the householder, or the nation-state? Why is it that we should
perpetuate the realm of bondage by allowing the use of violence to be justified at
some level? This is puzzling, but all too common.
We turn to a Jain writer here because his statement of this position is quite
clear, accords well with the teaching of the Bhagavad Gita, and is completely
foreign to Buddhism. In order to make such a distinction, the whole theory of
dependent co-arising (paticcasamuppada) would have to be rejected or not taken
seriously. The householder’s right and duty to use violence cannot be separated
from the conditions which give rise to suffering.13 Thus we find U Nu, the former
prime minister of Burma, claiming “Unlike the theistic creeds [Buddhism] cannot
sanction (even) such acts of violence that are necessary for the preservation of
public order and society.”14 But U Nu goes too far, for he assumes that violence
is necessary for public order, which also denies the analysis of the causality of
violence given above.
On the one hand we have the requirement of the absence of passion in such
instrumental application of violence, ignoring the effect on its object. Related to
this is the requirement of last resort, which replaces passion with necessity.15 But
in spite of the assertions that such violence is not actually violence, this does not
evade the inexorable train of causality which attends violence, but at most limits
its range. This acknowledgement of the role of violence in the life of the
householder, which means strictly life outside the Sangha including such larger
social entities as the state, admits not that such violence is blameless, but rather
that it is a fact in the world such as it is, and that its eradication is not immediately
possible. But to say this is not to say that violence is necessary or desirable, only
that a reduction is to be accepted where total abstinence is not feasible.16
What is in question, then, is how Buddhism could go from recognizing the
actuality of violence without approving of it to a position where violence could
be advocated by Buddhists. To understand this we will need to be very clear about
the difference between a recognition of actual violence and the proposal of the use
of violence for some end.
Surveying the Buddha’s attitude toward violence in the Pali Nikayas, we find

9
many cases where violence and punishment are described as part of the life of the
householder or civil society. The fact that these are for the most part descriptions
rather than normative statements is to be stressed, however. When there is
occasion for the Buddha himself to deal with one who is deserving of punishment,
the method he uses is manifestly one of non-violence. The difference between the
descriptive portrayal of violence and the normative example of the Buddha then
establishes a distance between the world of the civil authorities and that of the
Sangha. Where the enlightened one is said to “have stopped moving,” “having
done what is to be done”, the king and ministers and householders are described
as having many things to do, being very busy.17 This then forms the basis of the
distinction between the political and religious spheres. The political authorities are
very busy, just as Angulimala was very busy plundering the countryside; both
stand in contrast to the Buddha, whose goal is to put an end to violence.
The Buddhist ideal that receives the most attention in regard to a Buddhist
politics is that of the Universal Monarch, the “Wheel-turner” or cakkavattin. We
will deal with it only so far as this ideal reinforces the case for Buddhism not
justifying the use of violence in securing social order. The Cakkavatti Sutta18
begins with an exhortation of the monks to be their own support, which as in
Plato’s Republic begets a initial ambiguity over whether the work is to be taken
as a serious political proposal or an analogy for self- understanding and discipline.
In any case, the distinguishing characteristic of the cakkavattin is that he rules
“the Earth to the extent of its ocean boundaries, having conquered territories not
by force of arms but by righteousness.” The noble duties of the cakkavattin are to
provide protection, shelter, and security for all, including the birds and beasts,
taking the Dhamma as his sole guide and support, enquiring of the proper teachers
as to the proper course of action. No specific policies are here mentioned, but
from the fact that the conquest by righteousness is contrasted with one by force,
we can surmise the same held for domestic policy.
This is further confirmed by the tale of decline that attends the first appointed
king who does not consult his predecessor about the duties of the cakkavattin.19
When, as a result of his ruling “in accordance with his own ideas,” inequities
appear in the country, the advisors seek to inform him of these duties (but notably
not the Dhamma). The appointed king then takes such measures, but neglects the
welfare of the poor. This leads to incidence of theft, which the king deals with
only in the individual case, providing the offender with money. This encourages

10
theft rather than dissuading it, a fact the king soon catches onto, and the third
offender loses the lottery, as well as his head. The imposition of the death penalty
does not dissuade theft either, pointing to the initial failure of policy, but makes
the thieves more desperate and hence more violent. The process of disintegration
continues on from this point.
What the Cakkavatti Sutta seems to tell us, then, is not that the application of
violence is a necessary component of maintaining social order, but rather is the
first sign of its disintegration, and leads only to more violence and further
disorder. This is in accordance with the understanding of the causality of violence
presented above. We must exempt Buddhism from the company of Hinduism and
Jainism in allowing a separate standard of conduct for the householder and the
king, and correct U Nu’s assumption that some violence is necessary for social
order with the assertion that quite the opposite is the case.
The early Buddhist attitude toward political authority, then, cannot be one of
approval in the form in which it exists. No doubt this does not mean that
Buddhists should engage in invective and harsh words toward political authority,
which would result in a further increase in violence--directed at them. But this
does call into question the close relation Buddhism has had in later times with
political authority. John Strong, in his study of the Asokavadana, questions why
terrible acts of the first Buddhist king, Asoka, are preserved in the Buddhist texts.
The answer is rather complex, but, at least initially, I would suggest that the
inclusion of these acts reflects an underlying Buddhist apprehension toward the
institution of kingship as inherently, perhaps inevitably, prone to such actions.20
He also notes that Gokhale has pointed out in many Buddhist texts “a distinct
attitude toward kingship of `disquiet bordering on fear’.”21 And Uma Chakravarti
pushes the question further.
Did Buddhism envisage a close relation between the two, even if it is granted
that the spheres of the king and the sangha were separate? Tambiah and Ling have
argued that there was an intimate relationship between the king and the sangha,
and that Buddhist civilization is a triangular relationship between the king, the
sangha, and the people. However, we suggest that, while this close relationship
may have developed over time, it is not reflected in early Buddhist literature. The
Buddha respected the power of the king, and therefore maintained good relations
with all the prominent kings that came into his orbit, but there is no indication that
the king had any crucial role to play in the propagation of the nibb nic goals of

11
Buddhism. The king was nothing more than the highest member of the laity,
whose patronage as the head of the social world was significant.22
Early Buddhism, then, did not approve of the use of violence by kings,
anymore than by anyone else, but merely accepted it as the fact, and did what was
proper to the circumstances. As Chakravarti concludes, even though the Buddha
did not propound the theory of the cakkavattin to any actual kings, “the Buddhists
... developed the idea of the cakkavatti dhammiko dhammaraga who, by a just
exercise of power would play a pivotal role in transforming society,” as a counter
to the excesses of actual kings.23
It must be noted that the intent of the Buddhist egalitarianism was not to
replace one caste with another, a constant struggle within the caste system itself,
but to allow everyone to attain to liberation. One implication of this is the
dissolution of the subordination of the ksatriya class to the class of
liberation-seekers, for to require the military class to engage in activities which
do not conduce to their own liberation is to sacrifice their well-being, which
contradicts the notion of equality of sentient beings. Thus Buddhism would have
to deny the instrumental use of violence to defend even itself, and would have to
pursue another method for the overcoming of violence. This, as we find in the
Dhammapada, is the understanding of the causes of violence and the non- violent
solution to it. At some level the intricate mechanism of the state for maintaining
social order becomes unnecessary or even counter-productive. But faced with the
actual existence of kings and armies, the Buddhists put forward a model of
kingship that rules without punishment, legislates without enforcement. The
problem is that with the preeminence of the king preserved, it is all too easy for
the old methods to be put in service of the new goal without the separation of
powers between the political and religious communities. Thus the king not only
defends the Dharma from external threats, but also from internal dissension within
the Sangha itself, so we have an absolute monarch whose use of force is justified
only by himself. Thus we find the reversal of priorities which gives us the idea of
violence, and indeed war, that is sanctioned by Buddhism, but in fact ignores the
teaching of Buddhism concerning violence and suffering.
Could it not be, however, that a fully enlightened one could commit an act of
violence without entering into the causality of violence (sans karma)? What this
would mean is that the actor (not victor in any sense) would have no thought of
enmity, no concern over victory or loss, no attachment to the outcome. but further

12
it would mean that the victim would suffer no pain, no resulting hatred or enmity,
would also have no attachment to the outcome. And further that no other being
would be affected by the sight, report, recounting or knowledge, or any other
effects of the violent act.
Can there be such a non-causal act of violence? Such a question belongs to the
same class of unhelpful speculation which the Buddha himself refused to answer

A Selected Bibliography for Buddhism and War

Burma Pitaka Association, Ten Suttas from the Digha Nikaya: Long discourses of the Buddha. Rangoon,
Burma, 1984. Reprinted in the Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series, No. XII, Sarnath, Varanasi, 1987.
Chakravarti, Uma. The social dimensions of early Buddhism, Delhi; New York: Oxford University Press,
1987.
Chandel, Bhuvan, ed. Nature of Violence. Publication Bureau, Panjab University, Chandigarh; 1980
Demieville, Paul “Le Bouddhisme et la guerre” Melanges, 1:347-385. Paris, Institut des Hautes Etudes
Chinoises, 1957.
Dharmasiri, Gunapala. Fundamentals of Buddhist ethics. Antioch, Calif.: Golden Leaves, 1989.
Dikshitar, V.R. Ramachandra. War in ancient India 2nd ed. Madras: Macmillan, 1948.
Ghosh, Indu Mala. Ahimsa, Buddhist and Gandhian. Delhi, India : Indian Bibliographies Bureau : Balaji
Enterprises, 1988.
Gonda, J. (Jan), 1905- Ancient Indian kingship from the religious point of view, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1966.
Kalupahana, David J., 1975, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. University of Hawaii
Press, Honolulu.
Kalupahana, David J., A path of righteousness: Dhammapada: an introductory essay, together with the
Pali text, English translation, and commentary. Lanham MD : University Press of America, 1986.
Kautalya. Arthasastra. English and Sanskrit. [by] R. P. Kangle. 2d ed. [Bombay] University of Bombay,
1969. University of Bombay studies: Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Pali, no. 1-2
Kothari, Valchand P., The law of non-violence (ahimsa) and its relevance for all times, extensively edited
by Donald H. Bishop. 1st ed. Sholapur: Jaina Samskrti Samrakshaka Sangha, 1975.
Ling, Trevor Oswald. Buddhism and the mythology of evil; a study in Theravada Buddhism. London,
Allen and Unwin [1962].
Ling, Trevor Oswald. Buddhism, imperialism and war : Burma and Thailand in modern history. London;
Boston: G. Allen & Unwin, 1979.
Obeyesekere, Gananath, Frank Reynolds [and] Bardwell L. Smith, editor. The two wheels of dhamma;
essays on the Theravada tradition in India and Ceylon, Chambersburg, Pa., American Academy of Religion,
1972. AAR studies in religion; no. 3
Pali Text Society, 1954-1959, The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima Nikaya). trans, I.B. Horner,
London: Luzac & Co.
Pali Text Society, 1932- The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara-Nikaya). Translated by F.L.
Woodward, London: Oxford University Press.
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Notes

1. The Dhammapada,
§ 130 “All tremble at punishment; to everyone life is dear. Taking oneself as an example,
one should neither strike nor kill.”
(All references or quotes introduced with “§” are from the Dhammapada, translated by David
Kalupahana.)

2. See Dharmasiri, Gunapala. Fundamentals of Buddhist ethics, “Objective Justification of Moral Actions”, p.
32-3.

3. Pali Text Society, vol. 7, part 1, p. 109.

4. § 223 One should conquer anger with kindness, the wicked with goodness, the niggardly man with
liberality and the liar with truth

5. Digha Nikaya, 132; (Burma Pitaka Association, p. 187)

6. Brahmajala sutta, 23, (Burma p. 13) ; and Samannaphala sutta, 207. (Burma p. 100).

7. Where the Buddhist texts seem to advocate conquest or killing, more likely the intent is along the lines of the following:
Dhammapada:

§103 Whosoever were to conquer in battle a thousand times thousand men, and another were to
conquer one, that is, oneself, he indeed is the greatest victor in battle.
§104 The conquest of oneself is indeed better than the conquest of these other people. Of a person
who has tamed himself and who is always restrained in conduct,
§105 the victory of such a being, not even a deity, nor a gandhabba, nor Mara along with Brahmä
can turn into defeat.

Also Samyutta Nikaya, I,8, §8:

Wrath must ye slay, if ye would happy live,

Wrath must ye slay, if ye would weep no more.
Of anger, deva, with its poisoned source
And fevered climax, murderously sweet,
That is the slaughter by the Ariyans praised;
That must ye slay in sooth, to weep no more.
(PTS, v.7, p.58)

But being metaphorical is not protection against misplaced literalism, as in the case reported by Ling, where the Buddhist
Patriarch at the coronation of King Rama VI of Thailand quoted the words of Buddha ‘As a town situated on the frontier
must be prepared internally and externally, so too should you be prepared’ in support of his assertion that ‘Wars must be

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prepared for even in time of peace’. (Ling, Buddhism, imperialism and war, p. 137)

8. The notion of “being one’s own support” (Cakkavatti Sutta, 80) can be seen to apply to more than the life of the monk.
The necessities of interstate politics, the maintenance of social order, the categorical right to self-defense, all depend on
subordinating relations in which the cause of the action (war, punishment, violence) lies outside of the actor.

9. Majjhima-Nikaya, PTS no. 30, p. 285-6.

10. Cf. Dhammapada:

§161 Evil done by oneself, born of oneself, arising from oneself crushes an imprudent man, as a
diamond destroys a gem of (inferior) stone.

§125 Whosoever bears ill-will towards a man who hates not, a person who is pure and without
blemish, evil follows such an ignorant one himself, like fine dust thrown against the wind.

11. We would have to say, unintentionally, since ex hypothesi one’s action do not spring from enmity or hatred.

12. Kothari, Valchand P., The law of non-violence (ahimsa) and its relevance for all times. 1st ed. Sholapur: Jaina Samskrti
Samrakshaka Sangha, 1975, p. 32.

13. Cf. Mahanidana Sutta:

§104. Ananda, I have said that because of watchful guarding (of possessions) there arise many
wicked demeritorious acts, such as hitting with sticks, wounding with weapons, fighting,
quarrelling, contentiously disputing, using unbearable expressions, backbiting and telling lies.
... Suppose, Ananda, there is no watchful guarding at all... Digha Nikaya, Burma Pitaka Assoc,
p. 165.

14. As quoted in Ling, Trevor Oswald, Buddhism, imperialism and war, p. 135.

15. Of course, this necessity is only relative.

§6 Some do not know that we must die here. Should there be others who know it to be so, then
conflicts come to be appeased.

16. The recognition of the “false labeling” is stated clearly in the Dhammapada:
§318 Beings, as a result of adopting wrong views, think of what is not blameworthy as blameworthy,
and of what is blameworthy as blameless, and go to an evil bourn.

§319 Beings, as a result of adopting right views, knowing what is blameworthy as blameworthy, and
what is blameless as blameless, go to a good bourn.

17. After meeting in person Angulimala the monk, King Pasenadi says to the Buddha: “Him, revered sir, that I was unable
to tame with stick and sword, the Lord has tamed without stick and sword. Well, I am going now, revered sir, I am very
busy, there is much to be done.” Majjhima Nikaya II.102, PTS no. 30, p. 288.

Vassakaara, Chief Minister of Magadha, says, “Now we shall depart. We have many affairs (to attend to), much to do.”
Digha Nikaya, Mahaparinibbana Sutta, 135; Burma Pitaka Assoc., p. 191.

18. Digha Nikaya, Burma Pitaka Assoc., pp. 347-70.

19. The emphasis on consulting the tradition and the elders, or governing consensually, seems to be the main political
message of Buddhism, as it is here with the Vajji princes.

20. Strong, John, The legend of King Asoka: a study and translation of the Asokavadana, p. 42.

21. Gokhale, “Early Buddhist Kingship,” Journal of Asian Studies, 26(1966):15.

22. Chakravarti, Uma. The Social Dimensions of Early Buddhism, p. 171-2.

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23. Chakravarti, Uma. The Social Dimensions of Early Buddhism, p. 176.

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