Modelo de Naciones Unidas de la

Universidad de Lima
ULIMAMUN 2023

Weaponization
of the outer
space
Disarmament and International Security
Committee of the United Nations
 Carta del Director
—
Hello everyone!
My name is Francisco Martínez Escudero, and I will be serving as the Director
of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). Alongside
Paula and Camila, we are incredibly excited to have you as part of this edition of
ULimaMUN-2023.
As for myself, I am a sixth-year law student at the Universidad de Lima. Currently, I
work as a legal intern at CrediScotia Financiera S.A. Throughout my years of study,
I have developed a deep interest in Public International Law and International
Relations. Undoubtedly, the presence of this kind of debate model will be of great
help for all of you to gain more knowledge about this world.
In terms of my experience with Model United Nations (MUN), I have been participating
in these conferences since 2016. However, it was not until 2019 that I joined the team
I still belong to today: Peruvian Universities. With P.U., I have had the opportunity
to debate at various national and international conferences such as HNMUN 2022,
WorldMUN 2021, and HNMUN-LA 2021.
Regarding the topic that will bring us together during the days of debate, I must say
it is a fascinating issue that encompasses many challenges for the international
community. We will address how outer space will be weaponized in the coming
decades. Within the committee, you will have the great challenge of establishing
the necessary parameters to ensure the safe and peaceful functionality of outer
space.
Without further ado, we look forward to hearing innovative and ingenious ideas
capable of addressing the questions and topics you will find in the Study Guide.
Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions. I am eagerly looking
forward to meeting all of you!

Best regards,
Francisco Martínez Escudero
Director, DISEC
20181128@aloe.ulima.edu.pe

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Carta de la Directora Adjunta
—
Dear delegates,
Welcome to the Disarmament & International Security Committee at Universidad de
Lima MUN 2023!
My name is Camila Arbe and I’ll be one of your Assistant Directors for this edition of
UlimaMUN!
I am really excited to meet you all! I’m currently in my 4th year of Law at Universidad
de Lima. I’ve been debating since 2017, in my school’s debate team, and in Peruvian
Universities. I had the opportunity to participate in the Harvard Model United Nations
Conference 2022 and 2023 in Boston! In those two conferences, I had the opportunity
to debate on the UNICEF committee.
I am expecting intensive research and understanding of the topic, in order to achieve
plausible solutions. During the committee, we are expecting the delegates to be
diplomatic and to create a pleasant environment for debate. We are looking forward
to seeing delegates with the ability to bring the whole committee together, despite the
differences that each country may have. We hope the study guide serves as a starting
point for further research. If you have any questions, feel free to email us.
We are looking forward to listening to your solutions!

See you soon!

Camila Arbe Andreu
Assistant Director, DISEC
20200142@aloe.ulima.edu.pe

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Carta de la Directora Adjunta
—
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to this edition of UlimaMUN! My name is Paula Armellini and I’m thrilled to
be your Assistant Director alongside Camila and Francisco for this DISEC committee.
Currently, I am a third-year law student at la Universidad de Lima, as well as a delegate
in my university debate team, Peruvian Universities. I have participated in MUN ever
since 2018 and throughout my career, I have had the opportunity to attend several
national and international conferences, including Harvard National Model United
Nations (HNMUN) and HNMUN-LA.
I have always been interested in both politics and technology, and I believe this topic is
a perfect mix of both. Therefore, I am very excited to listen to your solutions and ideas!
I encourage you to use this Study Guide as a starting point for your research and seek
information beyond what is provided to have a fun and exciting debate. What I look for
in a delegate is creativity in speeches, proposals, and in your overall performance.
Finally, I hope to meet you all soon! If you have any questions about the committee, feel
free to contact us. We will be more than happy to help you and answer your questions.

Kind regards,
Paula Armellini Paredes
Assistant Director, DISEC
20210178@aloe.ulima.edu.pe

3|
 Introduction to the Committee
—
The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals exclusively with
disarmament issues and other matters related to international security. It was jointly
founded with the United Nations in 1945 following the outcomes of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki bombings and the end of World War II1. The United Nations Charter, in Article
11², defines the purpose of the General Assembly as one that ensures cooperation in the
maintenance of peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament
and regulation of armaments. It has the authority to make recommendations to member
countries or the Security Council on issues related to these principles and purposes.
The 193 members of the General Assembly are automatically members of the First
Committee. Each of them has the ability to vote on the resolutions issued by this
committee. It is important to clarify that the quality of this vote is individual and
independent, and there is no hierarchy in how these votes should be conducted. Some
states that do not have voting capabilities, such as Palestine and the Vatican, can also
attend sessions as guests. The duties of each committee within the General Assembly,
including those entrusted to the First Committee, range from reviewing and assisting
the Security Council to appointing the Secretary-General of the United Nations and
approving the United Nations budget, as well as acting as the primary forum for political
cooperation. It should be noted that, unlike United Nations bodies such as the Security
Council, the First Committee has two main limitations: firstly, the inability to directly
intervene in the issues it deals with (the nature of its resolutions is non-binding), and
secondly, the inability to issue sanctioning resolutions.
The First Committee works closely with the other five United Nations Committees,
particularly the Special Political and Decolonization Committee. In addition to its work
in the General Assembly and its various committees and with the Security Council,
the First Committee also serves as an institution of the Office for Disarmament
Affairs (UNODA)3. This institution focuses on promoting and advancing disarmament
efforts worldwide. UNODA plays a crucial role in supporting the implementation of
disarmament agreements, facilitating dialogue among member states, and providing
expertise and assistance in disarmament-related issues. The office is responsible
for coordinating and supporting various disarmament initiatives, including nuclear
disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms
control, and small arms and light weapons. UNODA works towards achieving a world
free from the threats posed by weapons and contributes to peace and security by
fostering international cooperation, promoting disarmament treaties, and providing
capacity-building assistance to member states in their disarmament efforts.
Since its establishment, the First Committee has convened on over 70 occasions to
discuss issues of great relevance to international peace and global stability, such as
terrorism and violence in the Middle East and Africa, the eradication of weapons of

4 | Introduction to the Committee

mass destruction, and illegal arms trafficking, among others. Additionally, it has been
responsible for issuing famous treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

Introduction to the Topic

—

Traveling to outer space is no longer just a dream; it is becoming a reality. Every day, we
witness the benefits of exploring this new frontier, from monitoring weather patterns
and utilizing telecommunications to relying on advanced navigation systems. To ensure
the responsible and orderly development of space, the international community has
established Space Law, consisting of treaties, agreements, and resolutions adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly. The five main treaties governing outer space
provide the framework of rules and principles that guide our activities in this domain.
However, as the quest for space exploration intensifies, important questions arise
regarding which countries are best suited to venture into outer space and how they
should proceed. The pursuit of peaceful and cooperative measures is essential to ensure
the sustainable and harmonious development of space. While the advancements in
outer space technology offer tremendous opportunities, they also present potential
risks, including the militarization of space.
Geopolitical tensions have been on the rise as countries not only aspire to colonize
outer space but also seek to assert their dominance and control over it. It is crucial
for the international community to engage in a collective dialogue and collaboration,
involving both nations with well-established space programs and those with limited
resources for space exploration.
Data can further enhance our understanding of the current landscape. For instance,
according to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), quoted by
Mohanta (2023), there are 8261 individual satellites orbiting the Earth; an increase of

5 | Introduction to the Topic

11.84% compared to April 2021⁴. This underscores the significance of international
cooperation and the need for effective governance to prevent conflicts and promote
the peaceful use of outer space. On the other hand, the Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS)5 announced that there are 6,542 satellites, out of which 3170 satellites are
inactive and 3372 are active, as recorded by 1st January 2021. According to UCS:
Table 1: Number of satellites by January 2021 according to the UCS.

Number of satellites Purpose

3135 Communications
1030 Earth Observation
Technology development/
385 demonstration

154 Navigation/Positioning
22 Earth science
18 Other purposes
Elaboration: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)

In summary, the exploration and development of outer space bring immense

opportunities but also pose significant challenges. It is imperative that we navigate
this new frontier responsibly, guided by international agreements, and with a shared
commitment to peaceful collaboration and the well-being of humanity.

Origin of the problem

This dispute begins with the Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s first artificial Earth
satellite, Sputnik 16. This event marked a new era of development and technological
advancement. After this launch, a greater number of satellites were launched into
higher orbits with more complex technologies, leading to competition over who had
the most functional satellite. The Cold War rivalry between the United States and the
USSR began with the construction of the USSR’s intercontinental ballistic missile, the
R-7, which was intended to be used as a spacecraft launcher for sending the first
spaceship to the moon7. However, this endeavor required significant human and
economic resources. During the Cold War, space centers focused on three main
activities: the development of reconnaissance satellites, global positioning systems
(GPS), and military communication systems.
It was not until 1967 that the Treaty on Outer Space was published. This international
agreement serves as the foundation of space law. It was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly and entered into force on October 10, 1967. The treaty has been
ratified by most spacefaring nations and currently has 110 state parties. This Treaty
establishes a legal framework for the exploration and use of outer space. Its key
principles include⁸:

6 | Introduction to the Topic

• Peaceful Use of Outer Space: Outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes and
shall not be weaponized. The treaty prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons
or any other weapons of mass destruction in space. (Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Art. IV)
• Non-Appropriation: Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation. No country can claim sovereignty over any
part of outer space. (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Art. II).
• Freedom of Exploration: All nations have the freedom to explore and conduct
scientific research in outer space. Cooperation among countries is encouraged for
the benefit of all humanity. (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Art. I).
• Liability: Regarding the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, States are responsible for their activities in outer space, including
any damage caused by their space objects. They are also liable for objects launched
into space by non-governmental entities within their jurisdiction.
• International Cooperation: Regarding Article 2 of the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, States are urged to
cooperate in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Information should be
shared, and assistance should be provided to countries in need.
• Rescue and Return: Regarding the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Astronauts from one country must be rendered all possible assistance in the event
of an accident, and they should be promptly returned to their home country.
The Outer Space Treaty has played a crucial role in promoting the peaceful and
cooperative use of outer space. It has laid the foundation for subsequent agreements,
such as the Moon Agreement of 1979, which deals specifically with the Moon and other
celestial bodies’ exploration and exploitation.
However, it is important to note that the treaty does not address issues of (i) commercial
exploitation or the regulation of activities conducted by non-governmental entities in
space, (ii) space debris, (iii) and other types of weapons threatening peace in the outer
space such as ground-based weapons, direct ascent, and anti-satellite systems.
As it was mentioned in the previous paragraph, this treaty does not specifically address
or delve into the issue of weapons in outer space or its militarization, apart from the

7 | Introduction to the Topic

prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. Due to the associated risks, the international
community has reaffirmed the importance of creating a solid framework dedicated to
regulating and delimiting the militarization of space and the use of technology deployed
in it. The lack of this different topic is due to the presence of the Partial Test Ban
Treaty (PTBT)⁹. This treaty was signed on August 5, 1963. And it entered into force on
October 10, 1963, to prohibit, prevent, and refrain from carrying out nuclear weapons
tests and any other activity involving nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer
space, underwater, or in any other environment where such explosions would cause
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the nation conducting
the explosion. This treaty not only marked a new era of potential cooperation in space
but also represented an important step in the demilitarization of space by limiting
nuclear detonations outside the atmosphere.
The subsequent moments of space policy unfolded amidst the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT)10. These talks, the first of which began in 1969 and concluded in 1972, and
the second of which lasted from 1972 to 1979, resulted in a series of crucial pieces
of legislation, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and paved the way for
future treaties like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. The ABM Treaty, signed in
1972, allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain two anti-ballistic
missile launch facilities.
In this way, the military aspect of space development began to be seen as a policy field.
One example is the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which according to
Agustin (2023)¹¹, is also known as “Star Wars,” a strategic defense mechanism designed
to intercept missiles and projectiles, especially those of a nuclear nature. A key part of
this plan involved the use of orbital stations to intercept missiles before.

8 | Introduction to the Topic

 Study Cases
—
Case Study I: China’s 2007 Anti-Satellite Missile
Test
In January 2007, the People’s Republic of China successfully conducted a ballistic
anti-satellite test, resulting in the destruction of one of their own inactive polar orbit
weather satellites. According to Zissis (2007)¹², this achievement positioned them as
the third country, after the USA and Soviet Union, to carry out such a test successfully.
While all three nations were arguably in violation of the 1967 UN treaty that prohibited
such activities, the last test before China’s 2007 detonation had occurred in 1985. The
Chinese ballistic missile reached an altitude exceeding 530 miles, approximately the
same as that of U.S. and Japanese imagery intelligence satellites. The test generated
hundreds of fragments of debris in space, causing international concerns about
the potential for an arms race in space. This action highlighted the Chinese space
program as a genuine threat and demonstrated its capacity to defend against satellite
surveillance and potentially engage in offensive military actions in space during times
of conflict.
The action was not publicly confirmed by the Chinese government until January 23,
prompting questions about the intent behind the anti-satellite weapons test. Some
speculated that because the successful test was preceded by three failed attempts,
they may have been taken off guard when the January 11 test worked. Others, like
Council of Foreign Relations Fellows, believe that China’s reasons for the test were
diplomatic in nature, perhaps hoping to motivate the international community to ban
space weapons, fearing that a U.S. missile defense system in space could neutralize
Chinese nuclear weapons. This is a reasonable position considering China had already
partnered with Russia in its effort to convince the United States to engage in a treaty
to ban the deployment of weapons in space, including co-drafting and presenting a
resolution in Geneva in 2002 with little to no progress.
The test also received intense backlash for the amount of space debris that it left
behind as a result of the impact of the missile and satellite. The collision increased the
amount of waste in orbit by approximately ten percent, and that extra debris will take
more than two decades to burn.
Furthermore, the test showcases China’s military strength in space on a global scale
and positions China as one of the select nations with the financial and technological
capacity to compete in this domain. Countries that this test impacted the most were
the United States, Japan, India, and Russia. The conflict between China and Taiwan
stands out as the most likely dispute on Earth with the potential to draw the U.S. into a
confrontation with China, as the U.S. is positioned to defend Taiwan. In the event of space

9 | Study Cases
warfare erupting between China and the U.S. over this conflict, with both countries
utilizing anti-satellite technology to disable each other’s satellites, the U.S. would face
significant disadvantages due to its heavy reliance on satellites. This demonstration
of the vulnerability of a satellite-dependent military system has prompted the U.S. to
recognize weaknesses in its defense system. It has spurred a greater motivation to
enhance satellite-defense technology. Additionally, both Japan and India have long-
standing rivalries with China based on border disputes and economic competition,
which have been further exacerbated by the space test.
In more recent years, the People’s Republic of China has also conducted tests involving
ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons, although none have made direct contact
with spacecraft. The Chinese space program’s objective is not to strike targets but rather
to demonstrate their anti-satellite capabilities by intentionally missing. For instance,
a test in 2013 reached an altitude of 19,000 miles above the Earth’s surface, which
corresponds to the region where the U.S.’s strategically positioned geosynchronous
satellites are located.

Case Study II: Russia’s Object 2014-028E

In May 2014, Russia launched a satellite known as Object 2014-028E. According to
Listner and Johnson-Freese (2014)¹3, the aftermath of the launch was riddled with
speculation: because the satellite was detected to be maneuvering in orbit, navigating
horizontally as well as vertically, it was thought to be an attack satellite with the
capabilities of threatening space technologies. Based on its movements, many thought
they were testing the spacecraft’s ability to approach and sabotage other satellites
in the same orbit. In August 2018, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms
Control Verification described its behavior as “inconsistent with anything seen before
from on-orbit inspection or space situational awareness capabilities” and implied the
possibility that it is part of a new space weapon development program. This may not
be unreasonable considering that during the space race, the USSR performed many
co-orbital anti-satellite technology tests that led to the deployment of the “Istrebitel
Sputnikov,” or “the Satellite Killer,” anti-satellite system. Other possibilities include a
satellite maintenance vehicle or a collector of space debris.
However, it is within the realm of possibility that Object 2014-028E serves both benign
space technology purposes and national security interests. Space technology inherently
possesses dual-use capabilities, as it can be adapted for both civilian and military
applications. Satellites serve as a prime example, being utilized in civilian-grade
GPS systems as well as for military espionage. Object 2014-028E could plausibly be a
maneuverable satellite designed for various functions, including proximity operations
such as satellite inspection and military operations such as disabling co-orbital
satellites. The United States has also employed similar dual-use technologies, such as
the two Microsatellite Technology Experiment (MiTex) satellites, making it challenging
to determine the precise purpose of such technologies and regulate them effectively
through international treaties and space law.
10 | Study Cases
While the intentions behind Object 2014-028E remain unclear, it was undoubtedly
perceived as an offensive military weapon. This perception could have adverse
implications for Russia’s efforts to rally support for a treaty banning weapons in space.
As a co-sponsor of the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects in the Conference
on Disarmament, Russia might be viewed as hypocritical and undermining its own
proposed treaty, thus potentially struggling to gain support. On the other hand, the
media attention and public anxiety surrounding the spacecraft could serve Russia’s
interests in re-establishing itself as a dominant power in space. At present, the purpose
of Object 2014-028E remains undisclosed.

Case Study III: The United States Space Force

On June 18, 2018, former President Donald Trump unveiled plans for the creation of
Space Force, a proposed sixth branch of the military dedicated to operations in space.
This initiative marked the first proposal for a new branch in over 70 years. According
to Harrison (2018)¹⁴, speaking to U.S. Marines at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar,
Trump emphasized that his new national strategy for space acknowledged space as
a war-fighting domain, comparable to land, air, and sea. The ambitious plan aimed
to establish Space Force fully by 2020, with significant financial investment and the
establishment of a new combatant command known as the U.S. Space Command. It
was intended that Space Force would operate under the Department of the Air Force,
within the larger framework of the Department of Defense.
In December 2019, the United States Space Force (USSF) was officially founded as the
space service branch of the US Armed Forces. It is led by the Secretary of the Air Force
and is currently the smallest US armed service (8,600 military personnel). The United
States Space Force Act states that the USSF is organized, trained, and equipped to: “(1)
Provide freedom of operation for the United States in, from, and to space, (2) Conduct
space operations, (3) Protect the interests of the US in space, and (4) Deter aggression
in, from and to space”. The creation of the Space Force was a clear response to the
growing threat posed by competitors in space and the need for the United States to
establish superiority in the space domain.
Other countries have followed suit in establishing programs or have already established
space-related military branches. In July 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron
announced that the country’s air force would include a space command for the
purposes of defending their satellites. This plan includes equipping satellites with
threat-identifying cameras, machine guns, and lasers and launching the weapons into
orbit by 2030. The Russian Space Force existed unaffiliated with the government on
and off between 1992 and 2011, then was re-established as part of the official Russian
Aerospace Forces. Other space forces include China’s People’s Liberation Army
Strategic Support Force, India’s Integrated Space Cell, and the United Kingdom’s Royal
Air Force.

11 | Study Cases
 Bloc Positions
—
This section of the background guide outlines several realistic interest groups that
can serve as guidance for partnerships during the initial unmoderated caucuses. The
committee topic divides dominant space powers into blocs based on their historical
political actions and alliances, as discussed in previous sections. Countries with limited
or no space programs have more freedom in determining their positions. These blocs
are intended as general guidelines or starting points rather than strict classifications.
Delegates have complete autonomy in choosing which countries to ally with and form
blocs.

United States
The United States’ position on the topic will likely find alignment within the group of
countries. While certain aspects of the US stance have become evident through past
political actions, such as responses to draft treaties, others remain less defined and
require speculation. The fundamental principles of this bloc’s proposed resolution are
expected to include advocating for minimal regulation of space weapons and military
operations. This inclination arises from the fact that the US possesses the largest
number of military assets in space and stands to face significant consequences from
extensive regulation or a complete ban on space weaponization, as proposed in China
and India’s draft treaties from 2008 and 2014. Additionally, this bloc aims to hinder the
progress of other prominent space programs that could potentially overshadow the US
program.

China and Russia

Other countries may align more with the interests of China and Russia, the other
superpowers that have demonstrated their alliance based on a shared interest in
banning the weaponization of space. Both China and Russia perceive the United States
as their primary rival and aim to diminish American influence and dominance in space
while opposing the US perspective on the militarization of space.
Also, this position may include those countries with moderately developed space
programs. Therefore, we recommend those countries read the resolutions from
2008 and 2014 regarding the topic, so they can determine the motivations of the
parties involved. While the two draft resolutions advocate for a complete ban on the
weaponization of space, countries within this faction should investigate what China
and Russia truly mean by this. In those resolutions, various terms were left vague or
undefined.

12 | Study Cases
The European Union
Despite not having much power or influence in space generally, EU member states
participate actively in global decision-making because they recognize the possible
economic and military repercussions of a space weapons race. A draft of a proposed
International Code of Conduct for space was recently sponsored by the EU, as was
mentioned in the section prior. This document uses trust and a common goal for
world peace to decrease allegations, accusations, and rivalry in space. These countries
would probably support the United States over other blocs because they are allies.

Nations without space programs

Some nations without established space programs may decide to lean heavily in favor
of controlling all aspects of space activities. This bloc’s resolution may demand full
demilitarization and deweaponization of space, stronger supervision of space program
activity, or more measures to govern space development with the aim of encouraging
its strictly peaceful use in order to level the playing field. Since the majority of the
developing world, today lacks the space technologies that the previous blocs did, they
are more likely to be worried about the possible harm that the militarization of space
could cause to Earth and to request stricter limits or complete prohibitions. To protect
against threats to global security, governments in this bloc prioritize preventing a space
weapons race.

13 | Study Cases
 Questions a Resolution Must Answer
(QARMAs)
I. How should the resolution consider important terms? Should there be a specific
definition for various weapons in space? Should we conceptualize technology that
is still in development?
II. To what extent should the regulation of the militarization of outer space go? How can
countries with diverse space programs reach an agreement on a uniform regulatory
framework?
III. Should there be space weapons for the purpose of self-defense? How do we
differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons or situations?
IV. Is private sector involvement on the right track? Can commercial space travel coexist
with space military activity?
V. How can we limit the creation of more Space Debris? What is the status of treaties
regulating this issue, and how can we improve it?
VI. Should new treaties and agreements be drafted, or can the existing framework be
expanded and updated?

Final remarks
The militarization of Outer Space is a topic that encompasses multiple facets. Do not
be afraid to embrace one of these various dilemmas as your main card for debate.
However, it is also a committee that requires technical knowledge, as it involves
many specific terms and legal documents that every delegate should be familiar
with. Therefore, the Chair recommends that you have a superficial understanding of
the treaties related to this topic. This means that you don’t have to read them all,
but you must grasp and comprehend the general concepts promoted by each treaty.
Keep in mind that space technology is constantly evolving. This doesn’t mean you can
propose unrealistic ideas; always consider the current context and the decisions your
delegations would make in a real-world scenario.
The success of this committee depends on your ability to master as many aspects of
this problem as possible. Please be aware that your Chair has debated and chaired
similar committees, so we will quickly notice any decision that goes against the policies
of your countries, as well as the kind of proposals you bring to the committee.

14 | Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMAs)

 Position Papers
A position paper is a political statement in which each country presents its opinion
on the topic being discussed, focusing on past national and international actions to
propose innovative yet viable solutions. Additionally, a position paper generally consists
of three paragraphs:
The first paragraph should include a brief introduction to the topic, always connecting
the issue to your country. Try to include essential statistics and data to support your
explanation.
The second paragraph should provide a brief overview of past UN actions. Focus on
specific actions that have had an impact on your country.
The final paragraph consists of solutions according to your country’s policy. The
proposals should be creative and original, while still considering their credibility and
applicability.

Please note that this study guide serves as an informative basis on the topic, and
delegates are expected to conduct further in-depth research to demonstrate during
the debate. Try to keep the Position Paper as short and concise as possible (600-900
words). Remember, it is not about quantity but quality.
Finally, remember that you must send your document until Sunday, August 13 to the
following emails:
20210178@aloe.ulima.edu.pe
20200142@aloe.ulima.edu.pe
20181128@aloe.ulima.edu.pe

15 | Position Papers
Bibliography
1. United Nations. (n.d.). Disarmament and International Security (First Committee).
Obtained from: General Assembly of the United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/
first/index.shtm.
2. United Nations (n.d.). United Nations Charter. Obtained from: United Nations -
Peace, dignity and equality on a healthy planet https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-
charter
3. United Nations (n.d.) United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs. Obtained
from: The United Nations Office at Geneva https://www.ungeneva.org/en/about/
organizations/unoda
4. Mohanta, Nibedita (2023). How Many Satellites are Orbiting Around Earth in 2022?
Obtained from: Geospatial World https://www.geospatialworld.net/prime/business-
and-industry-trends/how-many-satellites-orbiting-earth/#:~:text=According%20
to%20the%20Index%20of,11.84%25%20compared%20to%20April%202021.
5. Union of Concerned Scientists (2023). UCS Satellite Database. Obtained from:
Union of Concerned Scientists https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database
6. Milo, Alberto (2023). Sputnik 1, el primer satélite artificial y el parteaguas de
la carrera espacial. Obtained from: National Geographic en Español https://www.
ngenespanol.com/el-espacio/sputnik-1-su-importancia-para-la-exploracion-del-
espacio-primer-satelite-artificial/
7. Martin, Daniel (2009). Medio Siglo del Semyorka (parte II). Obtained from: GTD
System & Software Engineering https://www.gtd.eu/es/blog/medio-siglo-del-
semyorka-parte-ii
8. United Nations Outer Space Treaty, October 10, 1967.
9. United Nations Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). October 10, 1963.
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