ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY IN UGANDA- KAMPALA CAMPUS

FACULTY OF LAW

LAW OF TORTS II

GROUP COURSE WORK

GROUP NAME ZULU

PROGRAMME BACHELOR OF LAWS(LLB) EVENING
PAPER LAW OF TORTS II

YEAR TWO
DATE SUBMITTED
STUDENT NAME REGISTRATION NUMBER SIGNATURE

SIKYOMU 222-053012-23366
BERNARD
MAYENDE 222-053012-23112
DERRICK ABBEY
AKIROR 222-053012-23937
EVERLINE
NANSUBUGA 222-053012-24090
KIRABO JUSTINE
KALEMA GEORGE 222-053012-24028

ABAHO SHEILLAH 222-053012-23347

KYOLABA 222-053012-23791
WINFRED
KATUMWESIGYE 222-053012-23184
DAVID
AINOMUGISHA 222-053012-23781
UMAR

QUESTION: RESCUE SITUATIONS IN NEGLIGENCE

ANSWER

RESCUE SITUATIONS

Introduction
A rescue situation happens when someone is injured by the negligence of another person and the
plaintiff comes to rescue the injured person. The issue arises whether the plaintiff can recover
damages from one who acted negligently. It has been established at common law that those who
attempt to rescue are owed a duty of care by those who create dangerous situations, in which it is
foreseeable rescuers may intervene. This duty can apply to professional rescuers-such as doctors
or life guards- as much as ordinary individuals and may even apply where the rescuer engages in
a careless or reckless rescue attempt.

Essential elements to be proven in Rescue situations

For a plaintiff to successfully recover damages in rescue situations, the following have to be
proven;

 The dangerous situation (Peril) was caused by the defendant’s negligence.

 The plaintiff was trying to rescue a person in that dangerous situation.
 While making the rescue attempt, the plaintiff was injured or killed.
 The plaintiff exercised reasonable care during the rescue attempt.

Basis of Liability in Rescue situations

The basis for this liability was the first recognized in Haynes V Harwood1. In Haynes v
Harwood, a child who threw a stone at a horse, causing it to bolt was liable to a police man who
attempted to stop it subsequently and was injured. The duty was confirmed in the later case of
Baker V T E Hopkins and Son Ltd2 where Wilmer LJ stated that, “Assuming the rescuer not
to have acted unreasonably, therefore, it seems to me that he must normally belong to the class of
persons who ought to be within the contemplation of the wrong doer as closely and directly
affected by the latter’s act”.

Duty of Care owed to the Rescuer Verses Duty of care owed to those being Rescued

The duty of care owed to a rescuer is separate from that owed to those he is rescuing. Where the
individuals trespassed onto a railway line, putting themselves in danger, they were not owed a
duty of care. However, the stationmaster who attempted rescue was fatally injured was owed a
duty of care as it was foreseeable he would attempt to rescue 3. Equally, a duty of care may arise

1
[1935] 1 KB 146
2
[1959] 1 WLR 966 at page 981
3
[1963] 2QB 650 at 651
where an individual imperils himself and a rescuer is injured despite the individual clearly owing
himself no duty of care. This is seen in the case of Brugh V Bigelow discussed later on.

Independence of the right of a rescuer

The right of a rescuer to maintain an action of negligence is an independent right as shall be seen
later in the case of Videan V British Transport Commission.

Limitations of the Rescue Doctrine

A volunteer who acts instinctively in an attempt to save a human life endangered by the
negligence of another can recover for injuries got during the rescue attempt. This is extended to
cases of volitional and even deliberate conduct so long as that conduct is not rash or reckless.
This has established the rescue doctrine; Danger Invites Rescue.

However, the rescue doctrine has its qualifications. First of all the danger must appear
imminent and real and not merely imaginary or speculative. The appearance of reality and
imminence must exist at the time the rescuer takes action. In Highland V Wilsonian Inv. Co.4,
it was held that the apparent imminence of danger sufficient to induce a belief that action is
necessary and to impel an attempt to rescue the one supposedly in peril is to be measured by the
standard of reasonable care under the particular circumstances of the case or the manner in which
an ordinarily prudent person would act in the same or similar circumstances.

Secondly, the dangerous situation (peril) must not have been brought about by the rescuer.
This qualification is, of course, obvious for if one could recover for a rescue attempt in a perilous
situation created by his own negligence, he would be, in effect, making another pay for his own
wrong. It is essential, in order to permit a recovery upon the theory of rescue, to show that the
negligence of the defendant and not the rescuer was the proximate cause of the injury or death as
was stated in the case of Bacon V Payne5. The proximate cause mentioned here is proximate
cause of injury or death, and consequently the perilous position of the party the rescuer, who is
now the plaintiff, sought to aid. This further illustrates that that no duty was originally owed
to the rescuer, but the only duty owed to all was from the tortfeaser to the imperiled party
not to injure him. Once this duty is breached, it is a breach as to anyone who becomes the
rescuer.

4
171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631(1932)
5
330, Mich. 672, 190 N.W. 716 (1992)
Defenses in Rescue Situations

Assuming a situation in which the rescue doctrine applies and a rescuer acts within its limitations
or qualifications as earlier discussed, the next issue of concern is the manner in which the
rescuer acts. The rescuer must not act rashly or recklessly or with wanton disregard for
his/her own safety. Whether or not the attempt to rescue was so rash as to constitute a
contributory negligence was dealt with the Wagner case as shall be discussed below.

If the defendant has not been negligent, he or she is clearly and straight forward not liable
and there is no cause for action. If the defendant has been negligent, Contributory negligence,
Voluntary assumption of risk, and novus actus interveniens could be used as defenses by the
defendant against the plaintiff’s claim.

Contributory negligence

The rule that one who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through the negligence of
another cannot be charged with contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in risking his own
life or serious injury in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not rashly or
recklessly made, is supported by many cases, including Rovinski V Rowe6and Baker V. T.E
Hopkins. However, the risk of an attempted rescue may be so great or the chance of its
success so slight as to make it unreasonable to attempt it even though a human life is at
stake. It thus follows that the less the danger to the third party, the less the risk the plaintiff may
reasonably encounter. At some point the danger, and thus the risk, is too great for the plaintiff to
have reasonably encountered. In Cote V Palmer7the mere presence of danger creating a desire to
save a person from injury or death is not alone sufficient to justify application of the rescue
doctrine, for to venture life where there is no possibility of saving or where the danger is not
great or the possibility of loss serious may go beyond the limit of that which is legally
permissible.

In order to invoke the rescue doctrine successfully and establish freedom from contributory
negligence as a matter of law, it is only necessary for the rescuer to show that he or she
acted as a reasonable prudent person would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances. It is apparent that the law makes allowances for human instincts which prompt
people to attempt to aid others in danger; the law widens the permissible margin of error in
judgment. The law thus requires practically a certainty of death or injury to the rescuer in order
to render a rescuer guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. As such, if the rescuer
acts prudently and the situation he or she entered was not obviously inconsequential as to require
his or her being precluded from proceeding with the rescue, he or she is unlikely to be guilty of
contributory negligence and the same cannot be a defense to the defendant. In rescue situations,
contributory negligence is only a defense if the defendant can prove that the rescue’s

6
131, F. 2d 687(C.C.C. 6th 1943)
7
127 Conn.321, 16 A. 2d 595(1940)
attempt to rescue was rash and reckless. This is a matter of social policy and applies only if
the defendant’s act brought about the dangerous situation, there was imminent peril to life and
the plaintiff therefore acted. In the case of Brown v Columbia Amusement Co., the court stated
that the general rule is that a person who is injured in the rescue or attempted rescue of another
who has been placed in a perilous situation by the negligence of a third party may recover from
that negligent person as though the negligence constituted a breach of duty directly toward him ,
and that the presumption exists that the rescuer was impelled by the dictates of humanity, which
alone are sufficient to send the plaintiff’s case to the jury, unless it should appear that the
situation was so dangerous that he ought as a prudent man, to have known that he could not
escape injury or death.

It is evident, therefore, that contributory negligence as a defense in in rescue situations is

difficult to prove because case law is to the effect that courts go to a great extent to give aid to
the rescuer. In effect, case law has almost wiped out contributory negligence as a defense
because of the mandatory requirement to prove rashness or recklessness on the side of the
plaintiff by the defendant. In the case of Lolli V Market St. Railway Co. 8 it was held that
though the general rule is that one who is aware of danger and neglects to take reasonable
precautions to avoid injury is not permitted to recover, there is a limitation, for example, where
one seeks to rescue another from imminent peril.

Voluntary Assumption of Risk by the Rescuer

In the Wagner case discussed below, it was stated that opportunity for deliberation before the
rescuer acts will not, as a matter of law, preclude recovery on the theory of assumption of risk.
Before this case, the position was that the rescuer should have acted spontaneously and without
chance to deliberate as to a course of action. The Wagner case thus caused a departure from what
was previously an important consideration (Spontaneity) and went further than the previous
cases. Voluntary assumption of risk is also evident in the case of Cutler V United Diaries
discussed later on

In the case of International & Gr Northern R.R. Co. V McVey9, it was declared that while it
is true that one assumes risk of injuries that might result from a voluntary exposure to known
dangers, the same rule that would excuse him from the charge of contributory negligence in an
effort to save life would relieve him from the application of the doctrine of voluntary assumption
of risk. Of course he assumes the risk in the sense that he voluntarily encounters peril, but if
there is any force or logic in the rule that would excuse one from contributory negligence in an
attempt to save life, we see no reason why the same would not apply in denying an application of
the doctrine of assumed risk. Neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk will defeat
recovery where the party injured or killed risks his life to save another under circumstances
showing that his conduct was not rush or reckless. This case was decided even before the
8
43 Calif. App. 2d 166, 110 p.2d 436(1941)
9
Tex. Civ, App. 81 S. W. 991(1904)
departure from the spontaneity test. This decision is still true to date so that even deliberation
does not set up assumption of risk as a preclusion of recovery as a matter of law.

It is thus evident that if the rescuer is in apprehension of real danger to the third party and
acts not rashly or recklessly, in other words, does not enter a hopeless situation, the chances
of a successful defense of a voluntary assumption of risk are almost none existent. It should
be noted that this rule is on social policy and tends to encourage persons to aid others in danger.
The truth is that no encouragement is needed where the act is spontaneous, for one does not stop
to think over the pros and cons of acting. It does, however, practically abrogate the assumption
of risk defense where one thinks over his act and then enters the situation to aid another. The law
thus offers aid to those who seek to effect a rescue.

Novus actus interveniens means new intervening act. Where there is a new intervening act, this
may break the chain of causation removing liability from the defendant. The legal test applicable
will depend upon whether the new act was that of a third party or an act of the claimant. See the
cases of Baker V. T.E Hopkins and Cutler V United Diaries discussed below.

Act of a third party

Where the new act is of a third party, the test is whether the act was foreseeable. If the act of a
third party was foreseeable, the defendant remains liable and the chain of causation remains
intact. See the cases of Baker V. T.E Hopkins and Cutler V United Diaries discussed below.
If the act of a third party is not foreseeable, this will break the chain of causation and the
defendant is not liable for the actions of the third party.

Case Law on Rescue Situations

There are a number of cases that establish case law on rescue situations. As earlier noted in
the case of Haynes V Harwood, the defendant left a horse-drawn van unattended in a crowded
street. The horses bolted when a boy threw a stone at them. A police officer tried to stop the
horses to save a woman and children who were in the path of the bolting horses. The police
officer got injured. The issue was whether the defendant was liable in negligence for the injury
caused to the police officer while he was acting to rescue the woman and children. It was held
that the defendant owed a duty of care as he had created a source of danger by leaving his horses
unattended in a busy street.

In another case of Wagner V International Railway Co10, the plaintiff and his cousin boarded a
car at a station. The conductor did not close the doors of the car. The train turned a curve at 6-8
mile/hour when a violent lurch threw the plaintiff’s cousin out of the car near the point where the
trestle changed to a bridge. The plaintiff walked until he arrived at the bridge where he thought
10
1921 232 NY 176
to find his cousin’s body. He lost his footing in the dark, fell from the structure and was injured.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for the injuries he sustained but the trial judge found for the
defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The issue, on appeal, was whether a rescue is a foreseeable act.
It was held that;

1. Yes rescue was a foreseeable act. The reasoning is that danger invites rescue and the law
does not ignore these realities in tracing conduct to its consequences. This became known
as the Rescue Doctrine.
2. The emergency begets a man. The wrong doer who will not have foreseen the coming of
the deliverer is accountable as if he had.
3. The rescuers reaction need not be immediate as distinguished on exercise of volition and
choice in order for him to recover. The exercise of choice and deliberation does not break
the sequence. The reasoning is that the fact that the plaintiff walked more than 445 feet
in going to his cousin’s rescue if of no consequence. Continuity in such circumstances is
not broken by exercise of volition.
4. All that is required is that the peril and rescue must be in substance, one transaction. One
must arouse the impulse of the other; there must be unbroken continuity between the
commission of the wrong and the effect to avert the consequence.

The legal principle here is a tortfeaser is liable to all those who are injured in a reasonable
rescue attempt. However, he will not be held liable for injuries suffered by the rescuer if the
rescue efforts were unreasonable.

In the case of Baker V. T.E Hopkins11, the appellant company had been engaged to undertake
the task of cleaning out a well at Tadsar Farm, Ticknell in the county of County which had been
contaminated. Mr Hopkins together with his employees Ward and Wileman went to the farm.
Their initial attempt at opening the well with a hand lamp failed. So Mr. Hopkins advised an
alternative method of pumping; a Pergson pump operated by a petrol engine. The exhaust from
the engine contained carbon monoxide which gradually built up a concentration of a lethal gas.
Mr. Hopkins went away leaving Ward and Wileman and before leaving he instructed them not to
go down the well the next day until all fumes had been cleared. The next day, Ward did go down
the well and Wileman, in an attempt to help him also went down the well and they were both
overcome by the fumes. Dr. Baker, who had been called arrived at the scene and moved by the
fact that the two men were in danger proceeded to go down the well to rescue them. He was also
overcome by the fumes and all three of them died. Dr. Baker’s executers brought an action for
damages against the company. The issues were;

i. Was the employees’ decision to ignore the manager’s warning a novus actus
interveniens?
ii. Was the Doctor’s decision to save the two men a novus actus interveniens?
iii. Did the defense of contributory negligence apply in relation to the doctor?
11
(1959) 3 All ER 225
It was held that;

i. The employees’ act did not constitute a novus actus interveniens

ii. The doctor’s act did not constitute a novus actus interveniens
iii. The defense of contributory negligence did not apply in relation to Dr. Baker.

The reasoning behind the above holding was that;

i. Where the defendant creates a very dangerous situation, warning people not to go there
may be insufficient to discharge his or her duty. Any warning should properly make the
other party understand why the situation is dangerous. If the warning is inadequate, then
the fact that the other party ignored it will not necessarily constitute a novus actus
interveniens.
ii. It is reasonably foreseeable that a person might be harmed trying to re4scue another
person in a dangerous situation that the defendant created, this will not create a novus
actus interveniens.
iii. The acts of a rescuer trying to save people from an emergency situation will not normally
constitute contributory negligence. Such acts will only be contributorily negligent if they
are so “foolhardy” as to amount to a wholly unreasonable disregard for their own safety.

The legal principles behind the above reasoning are

i. Where a plaintiff is injured in going to the rescue of a third party put in peril by the
defendant’s wrong doing, the questions that have to be answered are; Did the wrong
doer owe any duty to the rescuer in the circumstances of the particular case? If so,
did the rescuers injury result from a breach of such a duty or did his act in going to
rescue amount to a novus actus interveniens? Did the rescuer, knowing the danger.
Voluntarily accept the risk of injury so as to be defeated by the maxim volenti non
fit injuria?
ii. It is important to note that knowledge of the danger is not enough. There has to be
consent to the danger. For the defense to apply, it has to be shown that the plaintiff freely
and voluntarily, with the full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk he ran,
implicitly agreed to incur it.

In the case of Videan V British Transport Commission, there was a small boy, Richard Videan
and his father, Dennis. The tragic event took place at a rail way station. The station Master,
Dennis was preparing to take his family when he suddenly realized that his two year old son was
missing. He spotted him sitting on the railway line and at the same time a motorized trolley,
driven by a railway employee was approaching. He didn’t see the child until he was almost near
him, and in an effort to save his son, Dennis threw himself in front of the trolley and was killed.
The son was saved but injured. The window sued the employer of the driver of the trolley for the
losses suffered as a result of her husbands’ death. It was held that as Richard was a trespasser,
the driver of the trolley could not reasonably have foreseen that he would be on the railway line
and that the widow therefore had no case. The widow appealed. On appeal, it was held that the
right of a rescuer is an independent right and is not derived from that of the victim. The victim
may have been guilty of contributory negligence, but the rescuer can still sue.

The issues in this case were;

i. Whether or not the infant in the line was a trespasser

ii. Whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the infant would be on the line
iii. Whether or not the father was a trespasser
iv. Whether or not it was reasonably foreseeable that the father would be on the line.

In line with the above issues, it was held that;

i. The infant on the line was a trespasser.

ii. It was not reasonably foreseeable that the infant would be on the line.
iii. The father, as a stationmaster was not a trespasser on the line.
iv. The father, as a station master was within the ‘zone of contemplation’ and as such was
reasonably foreseeable that he would be on the line in dealing with an emergency that
might arise at the station.

The reasoning here was that;

i. It would have been possible to hold that the son might was law fully on the line if there
was evidence of the son having gotten there through the booking hall with permission or
invitation to cross the line but no trace of such permission or invitation was found.
ii. The driver had no reason to suppose that the infant would be there and as such owed him
no duty of care because his presence there was not reasonably foreseeable.
iii. The trolley drivers must approach stations with care. The inference from this is that they
must take care that there are no persons on the line, most especially railway servants
engaged in the maintenance and the like duties. One of these servants was the dead
station master. He was a person whose presence at the station was well within the
contemplation of the driver. The station master could not be said to be trespasser. It is
immaterial that he acted as a father; the infant could as well have been that of a
passenger. It would clearly be within the scope of the stationmaster’s employment to take
all steps to rescue such a child. It is not necessary that the exact event should be
foreseeable. It is enough that the presence of the stationmaster, for any reason, was
foreseeable. The presence of the station master was within the sphere of contemplation of
the trolley driver.

The legal principles in this reasoning are that the right of the rescuer is an independent right
and is not derived from that of the victim. The victim might have been guilty of contributory
negligence or his right might be excluded by contractual stipulation but the rescuer can sue.
Secondly, the rescuer might act instinctively out of humanity or deliberately out of courage
 but whichever is the case, so long as it is not wanton interference, if he is killed or injured in
the attempt, he can recover damages from the one whose fault has been the cause of it.

In the case of Brugh V Bigelow12, the driver of an automobile, through his own careless or
negligent driving placed himself in peril. The plaintiff attempted to aid upon hearing the driver’s
plea for help. The plaintiff was injured while affecting the rescue. The issue was whether there
was negligence at all( and hence a dangerous situation/Peril) since the driver owed himself no
duty of care not to injure himself. It was held that the defendant’s claim that he owed himself and
hence his rescue ( the plaintiff) no duty of care is without merit.

In Rovinski V Rowe, the Appellant while driving a car knocked the car of another person, Mrs.
Mike Elais, a nurse creating a dangerous situation that put the nurse in Peril. The Respondent,
while trying to rescue the nurse, got injured when another car hit the back of the nurse’ scar
crushing him between his car and the nurse’s car. The respondent had sued for damages due to
injuries he sustained while rescuing the nurse from the peril into which she had been put by the
appellant. The issue was whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence so that he
could not recover damages from the appellant. It was held that since the respondent had not acted
in rash and recklessly, he was not guilty of contributory negligence and was entitled to damages
from the applicant.

In Cutler V United Diaries13, the United Dairies (London) Ltd who carried on the business of
supplying milk over a large area, did so, as usual with Milk Companies, by means of a morning
round with their horses and carts and a milk man who delivered the milk at various houses. On
25th August, 1930, the Plaintiff who had no contractual relations with the company was staying at
a house in Shepperton where there was a road between the house and the river. His children were
playing at the time in the back garden and there passed him, as he saw from a verandah a horse
and van galloping or going past rather quickly, without a driver. He became apprehensive about
his children for he did not know where they were. He went through the house into the back
garden, where he found them playing in safety quite close to the house. The driver called out,
“Help, help!” from a field at the back of the garden where the horse and the van then were and
the plaintiff went to the hedge dividing the garden from the field. The plaintiff went over the
fence into the field to hold the horse’s head. The horse plunged and knocked him down, and his
head was injured.

The issues were;

i. Did the Plaintiff, freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature of the risk he
ran, impliedly agree to incur it?
ii. Were the defendants guilty of negligence in employing the horse to draw the van?
iii. Was such negligence the cause of the injury?

12
310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W 2d 668(1944)
13
(1933) 2 K.B. 297
It was held that there was no evidence on which the jury could answer the first and third question
in favour of the plaintiff. The reasoning for this holding was that it does not in the least follow
that the negligence of the owner in employing an improper horse must make him liable for
everything that happens afterwards. If, therefore, that which happens is the result of a new cause
intervening, such as the plaintiff himself intervening when he had no duty to act, you cannot say
in a point of law, that the negligence of the owners was the cause of the accident. The legal
principle here is voluntary assumption of risk (Volenti non fit Injuria). No injury is done to a
willing person. In order for this defense to succeed, the plaintiff must show that;

i. The Plaintiff knew of the nature and extent of the risk.

ii. Voluntarily (In a rash and recklessly) agreed to the risk of being injured by the defendant.

In another case of Chadwick V British Transport Commission14 Mr. Chadwick had been
successfully engaged in a window cleaning business and taking an interest in social and
charitable activities in his community. In 1941 when he was 21 years, he had suffered some
psycho-neurotic symptoms, but he had not suffered from them for 16 years thereafter and he
wasn’t someone (so the court found) who would be likely to relapse under the ordinary stresses
of life. On 4th December, 1957, immediately following a collision between two railway trains on
a line a short distance from his home, he voluntarily took an active part throughout the entire
night in the rescue operation at the scene of the accident in which 90 persons had been killed and
many others were trapped and injured. As a result of the horror of his experience at the scene of
the accident, he suffered a prolonged and disabling anxiety neurosis necessitating hospital
treatment. There was need to determine whether the defendants were liable to the plaintiff for the
damages. The issues were;

i. Are damages recoverable for injury by shock where the injured man’s shock is not caused
by fear for his own safety or safety of his own children?
ii. Is foreseeability of injury of shock necessary?
iii. Did the defendants owe a duty to Mr. Chadwick who was not their servant but had come
to their aid?
iv. Would the fact that the risk run by the rescuer was not precisely that run by the passenger
deprive the rescuer of his remedy?
v. Was Mr. Chadwick of such extraordinary susceptibility that he ought not to have been in
the contemplation of a reasonable man?

It was held that;

i. Shock other than fear for one’s self or children causing injury may be the subject of a
claim for damages.
ii. Yes, foreseeability of injury by shock is necessary.

14
[1967]1 WLR2; All ER 945
 iii. The defendants owed a duty of care to Mr. Chadwick who was with in the area of
contemplation.
iv. Once the possibility of rescue occurs, the precise manner of rescue is immaterial.
v. There was nothing in Mr. Chadwick’s personality to put him outside the ambit of
contemplation.

The reasoning for this holding is that;

i. The distinction between mental shock and bodily injury was never a scientific one,
for mental shock is presumably in all cases the result of or at least accompanied by
some physical disturbance in the sufferer’s system and a mental shock may have
consequences more than those resulting from the physical impact. In the case of
mental shock however, there are elements of greater subtlety than in the case of an
ordinary physical injury and those elements may give rise to debate as to the exact
scope of legal liability.
ii. The test for liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock. In the instant case,
the scene could properly be described as gruesome. The answer to a hypothetical
question asked, “If we run one question into another in such circumstances that a
large number of people are killed, may some people who are physically unhurt suffer
injury from shock?” would be “yes”.
iii. The test is “What ought the defendants to have foreseen?” The first stage in the proof
of the claim involves the proof that the defendant company were negligent towards
their employees, the second is that such negligence caused such employees to be in
peril, the third is that this ought to have been reasonably foreseen, fourth is that it
could also be reasonably foreseen that someone would be likely to rescue them from
their peril and might either suffer injury or lose his life.
iv. The very fact of rescue must involve unexpected things happening. It is not necessary
that the defendants should be able to foresee every step that leads to the injury.
v. The community is not formed of normal citizens but with all those who are more or
less susceptible to stress to be regarded as extraordinary. Mr. Chadwick was a man
who had lived a normal busy life in the community with no mental illness for 16
years. The doctor said he was not likely to relapse under normal stresses of life.
vi. It was therefore concluded that the defendants were in breach of duty they owed to
Mr. Chadwick and the illness he suffered as a result of the breach was one for which
he was entitled to recover damages.

In the case Lolli V Market St. Railway Co, the plaintiff was hit by a car as he stood on a
dangerous side of the road that was excavated and undergoing repair is an attempt to rescue the
occupants of another car that had been involved in an accident. The defendant maintained street
car tracks running north and south on the street that was the scene of the accident and although
repair works involving excavation were going on at the accident scene, the excavation was well
illuminated by about thirty lanterns and twenty flares and there was sufficient space left for
vehicular traffic despite the excavation. This was enough warning for any prudent driver. In
addition, the driver of the accident car which the plaintiff was rescuing was intoxicated and the
accident car was positioned in such a way that walking around to its other side in an attempt to
rescue its other passenger would be an extremely risky thing to be done by any reasonable
rescuer, since there were fast running street car tracks maintained by the defendant. The issue
was whether the defendant was liable for damages due to injuries incurred by the plaintiff while
affecting the rescue attempt. It was held that the plaintiff had acted rashly and recklessly and as
such, due to contributory negligence, he could not recover damages from the defendants.

REFERENCES

1. Winfield and Jolowicz 12th Edition

2. Lunney & Oliphant’s Tort Law: Text and Materials, 7 th Edition Donal Nolan, Ken
Oliphant. Request an Inspection Copy.

3. Tort Law: Text, Cases and Materials. 5th Edition. Jenny Steele

4. Case Book on Tort Law Seventh Edition. Kirsty Horsey, Erika Rakcley

5. Tort Law. 8th Edition. Kirsty Horsey, Erika Rackley

6. Case law as cited herein