CIEM 5790 Why bother about Slope Safety System?

Slope Engineering and Management

HKUST

Slope Engineering and Management

Hong Kong Slope Safety System
System Holistic landslide risk
(Part 1 - Evolution) management of a large
number of slopes
(vs only ONE slope)
Philip CHUNG
Deputy Head of Geotechnical Engineering Office
Honorary Professor, Dept of Earth Sci., HKU

Stability analysis 2

Slope engineering and landslide risk management Urban Development

Gentle Terrain (e.g. Beijing) Hilly Terrain (e.g. HK)
1900

not affected by landslides subject to landslide risk

2020
Slope safety is an integral part
essential to sustainable urban development on of infrastructure development
Hong Kong’s hilly terrain 3 4
 構成
Managing slope safety constitutes
Cost part of development cost

When to pay Who to pay Who to

the cost? the cost? regulate?
Slope Engineering
and Management • During • Developers • Government
development • Home-owners • Politicians 政治家
• In disasters • Government • Professionals
• Through • Landslide • Court
retrofitting victims (!)
加裝 受害人

Responsibility
6

How about responsibility?

Stakeholders 持份者 (責任相關)
Example: The 1994 Kwun Lung Lau Landslide, Hong Kong
(5 fatalities and 3 serious injuries)

Owner Private party (Hong Kong

Housing Society)
Designer An Architectural Company
Approval Authority Building Authority, HK
Government
Slope Assessment Agent Consultants appointed by
Owner
Slope Safety Geotechnical Engineering Office
Masonry Wall in 1991 Manager/Authority (GEO), HK Government
After landslide in 1994
before landslide
 天然山坡 人造斜坡
Under the topic of Hong Kong Slope Safety System
Natural Hillside vs Man-made Slope
What are we going to talk about in Lecture 1 ?

Part 1 Part 2
多管齊下 Natural
Multi-pronged hillside Man-made
Evolution : why the approach : what it is slope
system as it is and how it works
• Considerations • Components The use of the term
• Chronological 按時間順序 • Contributions “Slope” in broad sense
evolution

陡峭的地形
Site formation on steep terrain for urban development

Densely
developed Heavy rain
稠密城市發展 大雨
(7000 / km2) (2400 mm /yr)

Urban Landslide Risk Management

城市滑坡風險管理 resulting in buildings and roads close to steep slopes

Steep terrain Deep weathering

陡峭地形 熱帶深層風化土
(70% > 15°) (up to ~ 100 m)
 Rapid urban development after WWII
Many landslides in the old days
… part of Hong Kong people’s struggle for living

Extensive site formation Formation of substandard

(with inadequate control man-made slopes close to
and management) development
13 14

Evolution of Slope Engineering and

Serious Landslides in HK 嚴重山泥傾瀉事故
Landslide Risk Management in Hong Kong
Before 2010 , 3 major stages + focus on man-made slopes

1972 Po Shan 旭龢道 (67 fatalities) 1976 Sau Mau Ping 秀茂坪 (18 fatalities)

1977 1st period :

before 1977
Empirical
1972 Sau Mau Ping 秀茂坪 (72 fatalities) 1994 Kwun Lung Lau 觀龍樓 (5 fatalities) Slope Engineering 16
 Empirical Slope Engineering (Rule-of-thumb)
“The Building Authority Empirical design (rule-of-thumb)
will offer no objection to
an angle of slope
≤ 35° for filling and .. . although it works in some cases, it fails
≤ 50° for cutting”
where the ground is atypical and when heavy rain comes
“Deposited fill in 5 ft.
layer and compacted
subjected to approval by
the Engineer as a result of
compaction trials”

不足 Inadequate construction control

Cutting ≤ 50° steep

Filling ≤ 35°
Road or platform

1972 Po Shan landslides 1976 Sau Mau Ping landslides 18

18 June 1972 Landslide Disasters

Animation for the 1972 Po Shan Landslide
1972 Po Shan Landslide 1972 Sau Mau Ping Landslide
(Vol. = 20,000 m3 ; 67 fatalities) (Vol. = 6,000 m3 ; 71 fatalities)

19 20
 1972 Po Shan Landslide
(Vol. = 20,000 m3 ; 67 fatalities) Problem of uncontrolled
deep excavations in
marginally stable hillsides
Before

After

Morning 18.6.1972

21 22
17.6.1972 Evening 18.6.1972

 Problem of uncontrolled deep excavations in marginally stable hillsides

分離
Mode of slope movement and detachment
Animation for the 1972 Sau Mau Ping Landslide
 Cracks and movements were
observed two days before the
rapid collapse on 18 June 1972
碎屑
 Under-estimation of debris
mobility in decision-making on
precautionary / emergency
building evacuations before
the landslide
 Uncertainties in estimating the scale of
failure

23 24

1972 Sau Mau Ping Landslide
(Vol. = 6,000 m3 ; 71 fatalities)
Before Fill slope mobile failure
► 1972 Sau Mau Ping Landslide
Concluded by the Commission of Inquiry :
塌方
The landslip was “due primarily to softening
浸潤
of fill material caused by infiltration of rain-
water … as a result of exceptional long and
intense rainstorm”
激烈

After 感受性
Susceptibility of loose fill to
undrained collapse leading to mobile
failure was not addressed
The 1966 Aberfan flow slide in Wales killed 144
people, most of whom were school children
25
( Report of the Tribunal, 1967 ) 26

液化
Static liquefaction of loose fill slope
1976
1976 Sau Mau Ping Landslide landslide
(Vol = 5,000 m3 ; 18 fatalities) site

1972
landslide
site

1960's Construction Practice

≈2m “deposited in 5 ft. layer
and compacted
Flow slide of subjected to approval by
end-tipped, the Engineer as a result of
27 loose sandy fill compaction trials” 28
壓實試驗
 Evolution of Slope Engineering and
Landslide Risk Management in Hong Kong
Before 2010 , 3 major periods + focus on man-made slopes

More details on systematic landslide

investigation will be given in Lecture 2
(by Ir Prof Ken Ho) 2nd period :
1977-mid 90s
Geotechnical
Slope Engineering
Set up of
Geotechnical
1977 1st period : Engineering Office
before 1977 (GEO)
Empirical
29
Slope Engineering 30

Set up of Geotechnical Engineering Office in 1977 Aerial Geological and

photograph Engineering groundwater
• On the recommendation of an independent review interpretation models
geological
panel, GEO was established in 1977 to regulate slope mapping
safety in Hong Kong.
• Geotechnology applied to slope engineering
Limit
Ground Undisturbed equilibrium
investigation sampling analysis

Numerical
Soil & rock Laboratory testing modeling
logging
31 32
 Evolution of Slope Engineering and
Landslide Risk Management in Hong Kong
Before 2010 , 3 major periods + focus on man-made slopes
Remark:
3rd period :
mid 90s - 2010
Under part 1 of the lecture, I’ll focus mainly on the Enhanced Landslide Risk
“evolution” of the HK Slope Safety System. Management
Notable landslides:
Kwun Lung Lau 1994
Mid-1990s Fei Tsui Rd 1995
The major components of the HK Slope Safety Sham Wan Rd 1995

System and other Slope management strategies will Geotechnical

be covered under Part 2 of the Lecture. Slope Engineering
Set up of
Geotechnical
1977 1st period : Engineering Office
before 1977 (GEO)
Empirical
33
Slope Engineering 34

1994 Kwun Lung Lau Landslide Great outcry from the

( Vol. = 1,000 m3 ; 5 fatalities & 3 injuries )
public, politicians and Administration
Annual landslide fatalities
• Reduced awareness of
GEO set up potential landslide risk after
many uneventful years

1994 • Increased expectation

• Aversion to multiple-fatality

• Geotechnical process not

• Collapse of an >100-yr old masonry wall
100% robust (technological
• Affect a footpath (temporal users) limitations and human
• Smaller in scale of failure, occurred during landslip warning errors)
signal was issued 35 36
 加裝
Enhancement Landslide Risk Management Increased expenditure on retrofitting
(under the Landslip Preventive Measures Programme,
Slope maintenance LPMP, 1995-2010)

Risk assessment Annual Expenditure (Million HK $)

and management 1200
993
1000 966 932 940
889921882 868 894 890
1994 Kwun Lung Lau landslide 831
800 772
Systematic landslide investigation 681

600

400 393

200 195
107
71 69 81 72 75 69 62 64 69
37 63 37 46 56 62 63 63
0
1979/80 1989/90 1999/2000 2009/10
Public education 37
Financial Year 38

Why enhanced landslide risk management ?
Advances in methodology and
application of Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA)
Likelihood of
Risk = failure
Slope engineering aims
to prevent failure,
thereby reduce risk
Techniques for landslide
consequence assessment
developed in HK
Consequence of
* failure
Risk can be reduced by
minimizing the
consequence of failure
Why enhanced landslide risk management ?
Likelihood of Consequence of
Risk = failure * failure
• Failure cannot be totally prevented, despite use of
state-of-the-art slope engineering
最先進的
明確地
• Risk has to be explicitly assessed for establishing the
scale of problem, formulating strategy, allocating
resources, etc.
• Slope stabilization not always the best solution
• Need for effective risk communication
40
 Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, China
1995 Fei Tsui Road Landslide, HK
1.00E-01
1.00E-03

UNACCEPTABLE 1.00E-02
1.00E-04

Frequency (F) of N or more fatalities per year

HK
ALARP 1.00E-03
1.00E-05

UNACCEPTABLE
1.00E-04
1.00E-06

ALARP
1.00E-05
1.00E-07

REGION
INTENSE
SCRUTINY
BROADLY
ACCEPTABLE
1.00E-06
1.00E-08

1.00E-07
1.00E-09

REGION
INTENSE
SCRUTINY
1 10 100 1000 10000 BROADLY
ACCEPTABLE

“The risk of the health of people in Hong Kong being affected 1.00E-08

by the plant is very much lower than the risks to

health currently encountered in everyday life” 1.00E-09
1 10 100 1000 10000
41
(UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1990) Number (N) of Fatalities

Catalogue of man-made slopes Risk-based slope ranking system

Landslide preventive measure
(~ 57,000 nos. in mid-1990s ) to determine the priority of slopes for LPM action
High
改造
18,000 nos. Retrofitted by yr 2010
18,000 nos.
engineered engineered
(post-1977) (post-1977)
39,000 nos. Priority
39,000 nos. un-engineered
un-engineered (pre-1977)
(pre-1977)
The Big question is : Catalogue of Slopes
Which slope to fix first ? (total 57,000 nos. in
mid-1990s)
43 Low 44
 Quantitative Risk assessment (QRA) of
New Priority Ranking System - Risk Based Systems
Un-engineered Man-made Slopes

reflects likelihood of
R. Walls failure
Fill
Cut Slopes Slopes
Instability Score (IS) ╳
Total Score (TS) =
Consequence Score (CS)
39,000 nos. Pre-1977 reflects likely risk
Man-made Slopes of landslide reflects likely consequence
of failure
Result of the QRA exercise:
ranking of all the registered
features (i.e. cut slopes, fill
slopes, retaining walls etc) 46

Soil fill slopes

Instability Score (Soil Cut Slopes) Retaining walls Consequence Score (CS)
Rock slopes

Actual CS accounts for:

Instability ╳
IS = Performance (AP) type and proximity of facilities affected
Potential (IP) 

 scale of failure
= A1 ╳ A2 ╳ A3 ╳ A4 ╳ A5 ╳ B1 ╳B2  topography adjacent to slope
Crest
Distance
 Age of slope (A1)  Signs of Distress (B1)
 Level of Geotechnical  Instability after Facility
(A2) (B2)
Engineering Input Formation/Treatment
 Slope Geometry (A3) Shadow
Angle
 Surface Cover/Drainage (A4) This is the original equation based Height
on GEO Report 284. The current Facility
 Site Characteristics (A5)
equation in use is slightly different
47 48
 Risk Distribution
Is this the end of the story ?
Risk reduction targets
(1) By year 2000, reduce By upgrading the top
10% high risk old
the landslide risk arising slopes will drastically
from pre-77 man-made reduce the overall
risk to life by 43%
slopes to less than 50%
of the risk that existed in
1977

(2) By Year 2010, further

reduce the risk to less
than 25% of that in 1977 100% 50% 25%

More details on QRA will be given

in Lecture 9 (by Ir Prof Ken Ho) 1977 2000 2010 50

 Evolution of Slope Engineering and

Slope
degradation and Landslide Risk Management in Hong Kong
Aging of man-
made slopes requiring Before 2010 , 3 major periods + focus on man-made slopes
improvement /
repair
Continuous Improvements to the
Slope Safety System in HK
 Study and
Development
close to mitigation of
hillsides natural terrain 地形
landslide risk

 Effect to both
Climate change man-made
(Extreme rainfall) slopes and
natural terrain
52
 n = 22 years (slope constructed around 1972-74)
r = 1 (occurrence of the event once in 22 years)
End of Part 1 T = 0.01 (from QRA for 1 fatality in a year)

Hence, Probability of killing one people in 22 years is

approximately
1/5

53 54

55 56