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BATTLE OF ATLANTIC

INTRODUCTION

1. The Battle of the Atlantic reveals the longest battle of World War II
(Sep 1939 to May 1945). The battle nearly strangled Britain's vital sea line
of communication to North America. The scheme of this battle was grown
in to the German’s mined just after the defeat of World War I.

2. In 01 Sep 1939, the German Army marched into Poland. Without any
delay, British and French declared war against Germany on 03 Sep 1939.
The Germans hoped to subdue the British by starving them out. They
simultaneously engaged in the sea (Atlantic) and land battle. Using
submarine warfare the Germans cut the British sea lines of communication
in the Battle of Atlantic. Germans launched an unrestricted U-boat attack
against the allied merchant shipping with an aim to starve them of the
necessary substance to continue the war. The Allies used escorting to
defend large numbers of merchant ships against German’s attack but
German naval leaders countered this defense by concentrated U-boat
attacks against Allied convoys. German decided their goal that, the rate of
destruction of allies’ merchant ship should be higher than the rate of their
construction.

3. During this prolong war, over 15 million tons of shipping were lost
and more then 28,000 U-boat crews died. The battle of Atlantic showed
how technology and tactics play an important role in the naval warfare.
Whenever one side adopted a new technology and tactics, there was a
counter measure on the other hand to neutralize the threat.

4. In this paper a critical analysis will be carried out on the Battle of

Atlantic to extract lessons, in terms of present context. Initially the genesis
of the battle will be studied in term of socio-political and strategic context.
As the Battle of Atlantic was fought over an extended period of time and at
many parts of the Atlantic, therefore only significant phases of this Battle
will be highlighted in this paper, which had greater contribution towards the
outcome and strategic consequences. Then the out come of battle,
implication of strategy and tactics, principles of war would be analyzed to
draw the lesson learnt along with its contemporary validity.

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AIM

5. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Battle of Atlantic and evaluate
the lessons learnt along with its contemporary validity.

GENESIS OF WAR

6. After the WW-I the “Treaty of Versailles” was signed between

German and the Allied. It is known one of the most controversial
international agreements. The objective of the treaty was to merge
Germany with its former war enemies and to integrate it into a lasting
peaceful postwar order, but the hidden idea was to weaken Germany so as
to make it impossible to become a great power again. Hitler could
appreciate it and within less than three years of treaty, construction
program of submarines took place under the cover of some commercial
organization. There after Germany voluntarily entered into a naval
agreement with Britain, this allowed Germany to possess a submarine
tonnage equal to that of Britain.

7. On 01 Sep 1939 Hitler had announced to his anxious people and the
world that German forces were in action against Polish troops on the
borders. The Great Britain on 03 Sep 1939 honored her treaty obligation to
Poland by declaring war against Germany and organized a naval blockade
against them. Hitler also declared a counter blockade by U-boats and
threatened every ship, irrespective of flag, in war zone around England and
France.

8. When the war broke out in Sep 1939 the Admiralty immediately set
up a system for convoying merchant ships. The essential strategic problem
had not changed since 1914, i.e. to prevent German warships from getting
out into the Atlantic and at the same time to get troops and supplies across
the Atlantic from the United State, Canada and the rest of the world.

9. At the end of Dec 1939, when German pocket battle ship GRAF
SPEE was sunk and the overall situation become in favor of the Allies,
while Germans were found static. The fall of France in Jun1940 overturned
this almost overnight and by Jul 1940 the France were out of the war and
the U-boats were establishing new bases on the Atlantic coast of France.

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10. On the very first day of the war, without any warning, one of the
German U-boat torpedoed the innocent Atlantic liner ATHENIA, which was
carrying 1418 passengers. This brutal act unleashed the subsequent U-
boat campaign.

OVERALL CAMPAIGN PLAN

German Plan

11. The Germans knew from the very start that the sea borne
commerce was vital to Britain’s survival and denoted it as the “centre of
gravity” of the war. The admirals of the German Navy had made plans to
use battleships and cruisers to sink merchant ships on the high seas. They
also planned to lay mines in and around Britain waters and employed
armed merchantmen disguised to look like innocent freighters to sneak up
on unwary ships and sink them.

British plan

12. British plan was to keep vital Sea Line of Communication (SLOC)
open by convoying and neutralized the German U-boat and surface threats
at any cost. Though the British was one of the largest sea power in the
world but at the beginning of war they were not well equipped to neutralize
U-boat threats.

13. Up to the end of May 1940, convoys had only been escorted out to
200 miles west of Ireland, but in Jul – Oct the line was extended to 19
degrees west. From that point the merchant ships of the convoy sailed in
company for another 24 hours and then dispersed, leaving the escort to
takeover an incoming convoy.

ORBATS

German

14. When the war broke out, Donitz has only following assets:

a. Ocean going U-boat – 24

b. Small U-boats – 22 , which are not suitable for deep ocean.
c. Non Operational U-boat - 18

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15. Due to the limitation of U-boats, all 24 boats could not be deployed at
a time. One third of submarine force would always be in port for
replenishment, maintenance and crew rest. Later on German launched a
good number of U-boats to control the war.

Britain

16. Though Britain was in advantageous position in initial stage, however

after devastating action of U-boats, Britain faced tremendous problem to
survive. Later in Sep 1940, Britain received 50 over-aged destroyers from
America in return of base facilities in British possession in the west and
simultaneously improvement in technology was undertaken on priority
basis.

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE

The U-boat Peril

17. Germany had waged a similar campaign in World War-I, and in 1917
had come close to defeating Britain. But in spite of this experience neither
side was well prepared in 1939. Germany had underestimated the impact
of U-boats, and was fighting with only 46 vessels, using mostly surface
vessels, rather than submarines, to prowl the Atlantic. However, on the day
Britain declared war on Germany, 3rd September 1939, the British liner
Athenia was torpedoed by a U-boat. This marked the beginning of the
second Battle of the Atlantic.

The Menace Grows

18. In the early stages of World War-II, the Royal Navy placed much faith
in ASDIC (an early form of sonar) to detect submerged U-boats. The
British were largely able to master the surface threat posed by Germany,
sinking the pocket battleship GRAF SPEE in December 1939 and the
battleship BISMARCK in 1941, but from the summer of 1940 the U-boat
menace grew. Conquest by Germany of Norway and France gave the
Germans forward bases, which increased the range of the U-boats and
also allowed Focke-Wulf FW200 'Kondor' long-range aircraft to patrol over
the Atlantic, carrying out reconnaissance for the U-boats and attacking
Allied shipping.

19. The Royal Navy was critically short of escort vessels, although this
problem was eased somewhat by the arrival of 50 old American destroyers
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that President Roosevelt gave in return for bases in British territory in the
West Indies. Admiral Donitz, the commander of the U-boat, introduced the
'wolf pack' tactics at the end of 1940, whereby a group of submarines
would surface and attack at night, thus greatly reducing the effectiveness
of ASDIC. Not surprisingly, the German submariners called this phase of
the war the 'happy Time’.

The Crisis

20. The crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic came in early 1943. Donitz, by
this time commander of the German Navy, now had 200 operational U-
boats. British supplies, especially of oil, were running out, and it became a
question of whether Allied shipyards could build merchant ships fast
enough to replace the tonnage that was being sunk. Mass production of
Liberty Ships in US yards helped to ensure that the Allies would win this
race.

ANALYSIS OF THE WAR

Outcome of the Battle

21. Men and Material. Battle of Atlantic was the days of infamy for
mankind, where people suffered heavy casualties and material loss were
substantial. In all, the German submarines accounted for the loss of 2603
merchant and 175 naval vessels. Apart from this German aircraft, surface
raider and mine sank a total of 2101 allied ships. Total 1162 U-boats were
built, out of those 784 were lost. When the Battle of Atlantic was over,
more than 4600 merchant ships totaling more that 15 million tons were
lost. In human terms, the cost to both sides was shocking. More than
28,000 German U-boat sailors lost their lives. More than 30,000 men of
the British navy and merchant marine lost their lives with many more
thousands of merchant seamen from other countries. Lot of tactics and
technology were invented to suppress the U-boat but no one was fruitful
eventually. Therefore British-US allies could wipe out the losses by building
the ships faster than the U-boats could sink them. At the end of 1944
German launched new designed U-boats (type xxi and xxii), which were
fitted with effective homing torpedo system and were able to stay
submerged for longer period. They could not disrupt convoy system due to
their slow production. Before becoming handsome amount in number allied
brought the out come in favour of them and Germany surrendered in May
1945 in continental battle.

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IMPLICATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Germany

22. Adoption of the Strategy of Sea Denial. The Germans

correctly adopted the strategy of sea denial being a weaker navy. This
strategy was practiced by two complimentary methods those are the
tonnage strategy and the flow strategy:

a. The Tonnage Strategy. Donitz, the German Commander of

submarine force believed that in order to win the war, Germany had
to sink ships faster than the allies could build them. This was the
tonnage strategy.

b. The Flow Strategy. It was about attacking allied shipping

at dispersed locations, thereby increasing the turn round time. This
would prevent essential cargo from reaching in required time.

23. Unrestricted U-boat Warfare. In mid November 1939, the

Germans adopted the ‘unrestricted U-boat warfare’, which allowed U-boats
to attack all vessels including Liners without warning if identified as hostile.
They also declared prohibited zones around British Isles, embracing the
English Channel, western sector of the North Sea and extending up to 20°
west into the Atlantic.

24. Wolf Pack Tactics. Due to limitation of air effort, Donitz devised
this as the best tactics for his submarine. The first U-boat to sight a convoy
did not attack but instead sent a signal to nearest headquarter giving
convoy courses, speed and numbers as well as her own position. The first
U-boat then continued to track the convoy and only when a number of U-
boats had been moved into the position, then U-boat head quarter used to
gave the order to attack under cover of darkness. This wolf pack tactics
made the British ASDIC ineffective and useless.

25. Breach of Cryptographic Security. After capturing one

British ship, German had a major breakthrough in breaking the British
naval cipher no 3, which was used by allied forces for their entire
communication of north Atlantic convoy.

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British and Allied

26. When war broke out in September 1939 the British immediately set
up a system for convoying merchant ship. Despite the initial dilemma of
adopting this concept by Allied powers, it was the main method of their
success or existence in the Battle of Atlantic. This concept was perfect
during this war and still effective today. The essential strategic problem for
convoying had not been changed since 1914. Therefore British strategic
aim was:

a. To prevent German warships from getting out into the Atlantic

sea.

b. Ensure logistics and troops supply across the Atlantic from

United States, Canada and rest of the world.

27. To fulfill their aim, they have adopted following tactics:

a. Escort of Convoy. Up to the end of may 1940 convoys had

only been escorted out to 200 miles west of Ireland, but in July
October the limit was extended to 19 degrees west. From that point
the merchant ships of the convoy sailed in company for another 24
hours and then dispersed, living the escort to take over the incoming
convoy.

b. ASDIC. To make their convoy effective they have invented

ASDIC system, which was the genesis of present sonar system. The
British tactics on combination of convoy and ASDIC was as a means
of detecting and destroying U-boat. But ASDIC could not detect the
surfaced submarine. Therefore, threat and use of ASDIC soon
proved ineffective.

c. Radar. The effective answer of Wolf Pack was efficient

surface radar when ASDIC proved ineffective. British invented radar
type 271 but that did not install on board British ships before May
1941.

d. Huff Duff. Another important sensor was a high frequency

radio direction finder known as Huff Duff, which was derived from
initial letters of high frequency. Huff Duff could pinpoint the source of
radio transmission. The U-boat could be detected while they were
still shadowing the convoy. Therefore it forced the shadower to
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submerged to frustrate their planned attack. Moreover U-boats were

unable to communicate with their headquarter to provide the
positions to other submarine and convoy.

e. The Hunter Killer Concept. This Allied concept was based

on an ASW group with an escort carrier to maintain control of the sea
against the U-boat. This strategy was unsuccessful as it wasted the
scarce assets in searching areas not the immediately relevant one.
After the losses of Ark Royal and Courageous, the Admiralty
abandoned the Hunter-Killer concept. This concept of achieving sea
control of an area using escort carrier group is still not feasible today.

f. Arming Merchant Fleet. Guns were fitted on the forecastle

of few British merchant ships to neutralize German aircraft operating
against British convoy.

g. Merchant Aircraft Carrier (MAC). The next step was

providing mercantile hull and wooden flight deck to permit fighters to
land as well to takeoff. With the directives of US, British made little
number of MAC ships or merchant aircraft carriers, which used to
carry cargo as well as act as platform for aircraft. But latter on it
found not as an economic viable and its growth was controlled.

h. Integral /Shore Aircraft. It was revealed that sinking of

allied ships was reduced considerably with the introduction of radar
equipped medium range aircraft. The aircraft could detect
submarines on radar and attacked using depth charges. Apart from
destruction the aircraft forced the U-boats to spend more time
underwater thereby decreased their effectiveness.

j. Ultra Operation. From 1943 the Royal Navy also began

intermittently to enjoy the invisible benefits of the Ultra Operation.
They could decipher Germany famous Enigma ciphered
communication system. They were able to do it by capturing one
German U-boat (U-110) and they analyzed enigma’s operating
system.

k. Concept of Support Ships. US provided enormous numbers

of warships particularly 50 destroyers, frigate and escort aircraft
carriers, under lend lese act. With these extra ships RN could begin
to take offensive actions by building up support groups to go for
support of hard pressed convoys or to pursue contacts for
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destruction. From September 1942 there were a number of these

groups operating in western approaches, to fight against U-boats
rather than waiting for them to attacks.

28. American Strategy and Tactics. Throughout 1940-41 the United

States was steadily moving towards over support of Britain. The original
‘Bases for Destroyers Deal’; of September 1940, followed by the lend lease
act in march 1941 permitted more war material to be transferred to British.
A month later US extended its western hemisphere defense zone to 26°
west. Meanwhile US war ships used to escort British and Canadian
merchant ships. Then on 17 October the US ship Reuben James was sunk
with hundred of her crew after being torpedoed by U 562. Soon after that
president Roosevelt declared war against Germany. Initially Americans
took two years to observe the development of U-boat warfare, yet failed to
make any contingency plan for a U-boat offensive off their eastern
seaboard. Even when the attack developed, they failed to institute an
interlocking convoy system to marry up with the North Atlantic convoys.
They employed their spare A/S forces uselessly in A/S hunting patrols,
ignoring the British experience and seemingly forgetting WW-I lessons.
After catastrophic losses, gradually the US defence was strengthened by
increased air and surface patrol and the implementation of the convoy
system started in the middle of May 1942.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

29. Like all other wars technology played a very crucial role in the U-boat
operation of Second World War. Both sides exploited the technology
available to them to the fullest extent to win over the other. It was also a
war of science and technology.

30. Allied Forces.

a. ASDIC. From the First World War the British had the
ASDIC. Both the active and passive sonar were improved upon and
the SONAR could obtain the target position.

b. Radar. The primitive 286M radar set had the drawback of

limited arc of detection to 120° ahead of the ship. The improved 10
centimeter 271M radar had the advantage of full 360° coverage. This
all round scan, which was capable of detecting a surfaced U-boat up
to 4 miles distance.

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c. DF. The fitting of High Frequency Direction Finder (HFDF)

used to be known as ‘Huff Duff’ made it possible to detect the
approximate direction of U-boats’ high frequency radio transmission.

d. Leigh Lights. The U-boats also lost their immunity to air

attack at night when aircraft were fitted with ‘Leigh Lights’. A 24
inches naval searchlight with a range of 5,000 yards was installed in
air crafts to illuminate the U-boats.

e. Depth Charge. Depth charge attacks had also become more

accurate with the development of an Ahead Throwing Weapon
(ATW) known as Hedgehog. Before this innovation the main
shortcomings of a depth charge attack was that the pattern of
charges could only be positioned as accurately as the firing ship’s
stern could be manoeuvred.

31. Germany.

a. German Radar Search Receiver. To answer British Leigh

Lights, radars and aerial depth charges the Germans equipped their
boats with radar search receivers Metox. Despite its primitive nature,
Metox was proved effective in giving early warning of approaching
aircraft. Metox remained effective until February 1943, when British
AS VII was replaced by AS VIII 10 centimeter radar, as Metox
became unable to detect the transmission of this radar. Shortly
Wanze was developed which covered a wide wave band to detect
10-centimeter radar.

b. Torpedo. As the German torpedoes with magnetic pistol

were not much effective, they developed a magnetic proximity fuse,
which became operational in November 1942. This newly developed
torpedo was designed especially for use against convoys; being
designed to run a zigzag course after a predetermined length of
straight run. If the torpedo missed its intended target, the period of
zigzag amidst the columns of ships in convoy would have a far
greater probability of hitting another ship than a conventional straight
running torpedo.

c. Snorkel. Towards the end of war, the another advanced

technology completed in time by Germany to enhance performance
of the U-boat, that was the Snorkel: a ventilating apparatus which

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allowed the boat to remain submerged while recharging her batteries

and which expelled the exhaust fumes.

d. Propulsion and Design. As early as 1937, German

engineer Prof Walter invented an Ingolin driven turbine, which could
attain a submerged speed of over 23 knot. These boats had deep
diving capacity along with improved manoeuvrability. They had long
endurance at high silent running speed of 5 knot for 60 hours,
compared to existing boats. Large fuel capacity extended the radius
of action to the whole of the North and South Atlantic without reliance
on U-Tankers.

e. Sensors. Moreover the Germans were carrying out

experiments with IR detection, magnetic anomalies and underwater
SONAR at the last phase of war.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

32. In all military operations the time factor is critical and information may
be scanty. Danger, fog of war and fatigue exert their influence on judgment
and unforeseen problems may upset the best-laid plans. To meet these
challenging conditions the commanders common sense and judgment
must be backed by sound knowledge of those basics precepts or principles
of war which have stood the test of time and marked the success of
commanders in past time wars. The principles of those were observed in
the Battle of Atlantic are:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. Hitler declared clearly

that their main enemy was England. From the beginning of the war
the Germans selected their aim to attack British and allied shipping to
deprive them of vital supplies and maintained it through out the war.
Though their aim was clear but it was not supported by recourses
because at the outbreak of war German Navy had only 46
operational U-boats. Further more after modernization U-boat in
1944, the number of U-boat was inadequate to have an affect on
allied convoy. On the contrary out of two aim British failed to prevent
German warships from getting out into the Atlantic sea. Keep their
SLOC open at any cost allied adopted for numerous tactical and
technical options.

b. Offensive Action and Surprise. Submarine itself is the

symbol of surprise and offensive platform. Donitz could exploit
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these characteristics overwhelmingly. In the Atlantic submarine

become real threat for allied forces and jeopardized their total
logistics system across the Atlantic. Due to non-availability of
effective sensors, U-boat of World War II could go for sneak attack
on allies and achievement were highly significant.

c. Security. By the July of 1940 the French were out of war and
new bases for U-boat were established on the Atlantic coast of
France. These forward and well-supported bases amplified their
overall efficiency and enhanced their secrecy. Moreover both the
forces captured adversaries’ ship and unveiled opponent’s
communication secrecy. Specially German lost their Enigma when
their U-110 had been captured by British and their cryptographic
information was deciphered by them. Therefore German was pushed
out to the less important western part of the Atlantic and allied forces
lost huge number of ships.

d. Concentration of Force and Economy of Effort. German

Wolf Pack tactics was the perfect example of concentration of force,
where a group of U-boats used to conduct attack on allied convoys
and results of this tactics were very successful by neutralizing the
effectiveness of ASDIC. When under Lends Lease Act 1941 US
transferred 50 destroyers and massive war materials to British. With
these extra ships Royal Navy could begin to be offensive by building
up support group to support hard pressed convoys where they
concentrated good amount of forces. German had shown judicious
and rational use of their torpedoes. The U-boats used to attacked
night on surface position after being confirmed their attack position.
Even U-boats used to use their gun for minor engagement instead of
wasting torpedo. The system of convoy with few escorts was an
economy of effort rather than forming numerous hunter killer groups
and protected lanes. The Americans were late to realise it.
Furthermore when all the proactive measures could not bring
victorious results against U-boat then British-US allies could wipe out
the losses by building the ships faster than the U-boats could sink
them. Therefore allied could not achieved economy of effort.

CONTEMPORARY VALIDITY OF DIFFERENT LESSONS

33. Numerous technological and tactical developments took places in the

battle of Atlantic. Out of those few are still valid in the contemporary age:

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a. Submarine still is the greatest menace for surface ship. Modern

submarines can possess threat to air elements even. Development of
SUBROC has eliminated the range limitation of torpedoes. Further
more nuclear power submarine becomes safest arsenal of ballistic
missile, which can engage any shore targets from several thousand
miles, thus contributing significantly to land battle. There fore SSBN
and SSN promoted to strategic platform from tactical platform.
Contrary lot of development took place in the field of ASW warfare,
which also some times makes the submarine untenable beneath the
water column.

b. In the present day, with the availability of modern surveillance

& attack aircraft, integral helicopter and multifarious sensors with the
adversary, wolf pack tactic is no more feasible.

c. The concept of achieving sea control of an area and SLOC

protection using escort carrier group is also not feasible today. This
entails huge amount resources, which is difficult to spare at all times.
Therefore, hunter killer tactics also obsolete in present context.

d. The Strategy of sea denial remains the most logical and

suitable option for the weaker Navy. The proliferation of SSM armed
FACs and conventional submarines have exceptionally increased the
cost of building a sea control capability.

e. The concept of convoying is perfect and effective since First

World War till today. No other system or tactics could supersede the
convoy escort tactics till today. But with the passage of time there are
variations in art of convoying.

LESSONS LEARNT

34. The following lessons can be learned through the study of battle of
Atlantic:

a. Security of information must be maintained at any cost.

Otherwise total plan may be upset. As it happened both for Germany
and allied forces. Furthermore when own ship is about to capture by
enemy, destruction of cryptographic and communication security
material are essential. As Germany failed to destroy enigma when U-
110 is about to capture by British.

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b. There can be no doubt that submarines are a sea denial as

well as a sea control weapon that can be used against a superior
naval power.

c. Optimum base support is essential to operate submarine. If

Germany could not able to use base facilities of France coast that
would be impossible to create menace for allied force.

d. Resource allocation is essential for submarine, which was not

at all enough from German high command. Thus hindered efficacy of
U-boats. Specially in last phase of attack after modernization of U-
boats the number were to scanty to be effective.

e. Speed of the submarine is very crucial both in anti-submarine

as well as ASu warfare.

f. Arming merchant ship also could not provide much protection

and instead became one of the reasons for German’s unleashing
‘unrestricted U-boat campaign’.

g. Independent sailing and evasive routing is not the substitute to

the convoy system. Independently sailing liner ‘Athenia’ became the
first victim of the war. Independent sailing and evasive route method
should only be resorted if there are no other alternatives or as part of
tactics.

h. Submarines alone cannot be a decisive factor in a war. Other

surface and air elements including surveillance, intelligence, sensors,
weaponry, logistics etc are necessary. Garman wanted to win in
Atlantic campaign by only U-boats. The Air Force Luftwaffe could not
provide reasonable surveillance; Germans had to depend only on
intelligence. If U-boats would be integrated with surface and air
elements significantly the result of the battle could be different.

j. Tactics always have overwhelming supremacy over

techniques. Germany and the allied forces, both the adversaries
developed numerous technologies to beat each other and eventually
all they have countered by tactics.

k. Since electromagnetic wave is highly attenuated in the

seawater. Therefore, there is an inherent difficulty in submarine
communications despite recent developments in this field specially
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satellite communication. Submarines lose her element of surprise

when transmit and their movement is hindered when she intends to
use satellite communication.

l. Only a strong economic, material and industrial based country

can sustain a prolonged warfare. When allied could not wipe out the
U-boat threat from Atlantic water, they adopt main strategy to
produce more number of ships than loss. Thus their total victory was
ensured.

m. Efficacy of weapon of submarine is essential since submarine

can probably have one chance to use her weapon. Furthermore
submarine is high susceptible to ASW weapon where to destroy her
pin point hit is not required due to tremendous water pressure under
the water column.

n. Arming submarines with anti-air guns was not successful.

Submarines defence against aircraft is concealment in deep water
rather than fighting an aircraft. Still it is difficult to use SUBROC
against air elements.

p. ASW air elements specially rotary wing aircraft pose great

threat against submarine in the modern context. There fore
integrated helicopter is essential for ASW surface ships.

CONCLUSION

35. The Battle of the Atlantic was unique in many ways. Firstly, the
magnitude of the losses inflicted in terms of lives and material was
unprecedented in respect of modern maritime warfare. Secondly, the
battle raged over an extended period of time. Thirdly, it brought to the
forefront, a new and dangerous weapon, the U-boat, which has great
impact on maritime warfare ever since. The U-boat was vitally important
aspect of World War II, for it came closer to gaining victory for Hitler, than
almost any other weapon in his vast armoury.

36. The end of the war gradually came into sight in end April 1945.
Events on land had finally imposed irrevocable defeat on the German
army. But U-boats were never defeated. Basically continental defeat of
German Army compelled the disengagement of U-boats from the allies. At
1514 hrs on 04 May 1945, Donitz broadcast to all his U-boat commanders,
instructions to cease fire, It was the end of a tenacious but unsuccessful
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attempt by Germany to bring the Allies to their knees, by severing their

main artery, the ocean shipping routes on which their lives depended. The
U-boat operation of World War II had brought many lessons; the prominent
one is convoy system with surface and air escorts. Further more a
substantial improvement took place in technological and tactical aspects.
Basically Second World War laid the foundation for a rapid development in
tactics, technology and warfare as whole. Recent developments in tactics,
technology and warfare particularly in the field of submarine and anti
submarine warfare are the continuation of those of the World War II.

37. At last it is revealed that the battle of Atlantic was the single most
important campaign of 2nd world war. It linked the original European war
with the conflict in the pacific. The United States might have survived
without winning the Atlantic battle but she had the disadvantage to fight in
two fronts. If Germany would not lost in continental war the outcome of
World War II and the history of world order might be different.

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