MALEK

ANALYSIS OF THE WAR

Outcome of the Battle

1. Men and Material. Battle of Atlantic was the days of infamy for mankind,
where people suffered heavy casualties and material loss were substantial. In all,
the German submarines accounted for the loss of 2603 merchant and 175 naval
vessels. Apart from this German aircraft, surface raider and mine sank a total of
2101 allied ships. Total1162 U-boats were built, out of those 784 were lost. When
the Battle of Atlantic was over, more than 4600 merchant ships totaling more that
21 million tons was lost. In human terms, the cost to both sides was shocking.
More than 28,000 German U-Boat sailors lost their lives. More than 30,000 men of
the British navy and merchant marine lost their lives with many more thousands of
merchant seamen from other countries. Lot of tactics and technology were
invented to suppress the U-Boat but no one was fruitful eventually. Therefore
British-US allies could wipe out the losses by building the ships faster than the U-
Boats could sink them. At the end of 1944 German launched new designed U-
Boats, which were fitted with effective homing torpedo system and were able to
stay submerged for longer period. They could not disrupt convoy system due to
their slow production. Before becoming handsome amount in number allied brought
the out come in favour of them and Germany surrendered in May 1945 in
continental battle.

IMPLICATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Germany

2. Adoption of the Strategy of Sea Denial. The Germans correctly adopted

the strategy of sea denial being a weaker navy. This strategy was practised by two
complimentary methods those are the tonnage strategy and the flow strategy:

a. The Tonnage Strategy. Donitz, the German Commander of

submarine force believed that in order to win the war, Germany had to sink
ships faster than the allies could build them. This was the tonnage strategy.

b. The Flow Strategy. It was about attacking allied shipping at

dispersed locations, thereby increasing the turn round time. This would
prevent essential cargo from reaching in required time.

.
3. Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare. In mid November 1939, the Germans
adopted the ‘unrestricted U-Boat warfare’, which allowed U-Boats to attack all
vessels including Liners without warning if identified as hostile. They also declared
prohibited zones (Sperrgebier) around British Isles, embracing the English

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Channel, western sector of the North Sea and extending up to 20° west into the
Atlantic.

4. Wolf Pack Tactics. Due to limitation of air effort, Donitz devised this as the
best tactics for his submarine. The first U-boat to sight a convoy did not attack but
instead sent a signal to nearest headquarter giving convoy courses, speed and
numbers as well as her own position. The first U-Boat then continued to track the
convoy and only when a number of U-Boats had been moved into the position,
then U-Boat head quarter used to gave the order to attack under cover of
darkness. This wolf pack tactics made the British ASDIC ineffective and useless.

5. Breach of Cryptographic Security. After capturing one British ship in the

fifth phase, German had a major breakthrough in breaking the British naval cipher
no 3. This carried the mass of allied communication concerning north Atlantic
convoy.

British and Allied

6. When war broke out in September 1939 the British immediately set up a
system for convoying merchant ship. Despite the initial dilemma of adopting this
concept by Allied powers, it was the main method of their success or existence in
the Battle of Atlantic. This concept was perfect during this war and still effective
today. The essential strategic problem for convoying had not been changed since
1914. Therefore British strategic aim was:

a. To prevent German warships from getting out into the Atlantic sea.

b. Ensure logistics and troops supply across the Atlantic from United
States, Canada and rest of the world.

7. To fulfill their aim, them have adopt following tactics:

a. Escort of Convoy. Up to the end of may 1940 convoys had only

been escorted out to 200 miles west of Ireland, but in July October the limit
was extended to 19 degrees west. From that point the merchant ships of the
convoy sailed in company for another 24 hours and then dispersed, living
the escort to take over the incoming convoy.

b. ASDIC. To make their convoy effective they have invented ASDIC

system, which was the genesis of present sonar system. The British tactics
on combination of convoy and ASDIC was as a means of detecting and
destroying U-Boat. But ASDIC could not detect the surfaced submarine.
There fore threat and use of ASDIC soon proved ineffective.

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 c. Radar. The effective answer of Wolf Pack was efficient surface radar
when ASDIC proved ineffective. British invented radar type 271 but that did
not install on board British ships before May 1941.

d. Huff Duff. Another important sensor was a high frequency radio

direction finder known as Huff Duff, which was derived from initial letters of
high frequency. Huff Duff could pinpoint the source of radio transmission.
The U-Boat could be detected while they were still shadowing the convoy.
Therefore it forced the shadower to submerged to frustrate their planned
attack. Moreover U-Boats were unable to communicate with their
headquarter to provide the positions to other submarine and convoy.
.
e. The Hunter Killer Concept. This Allied concept was based on an
ASW group with an escort carrier to maintain control of the sea against the
U-Boat. This strategy was unsuccessful as it wasted the scarce assets in
searching areas not the immediately relevant. After the losses of Ark Royal
and Courageous, the Admiralty abandoned the Hunter-Killer concept. This
concept of achieving sea control of an area using escort carrier group is still
not feasible today.

f. Arming Merchant Fleet. British fitted catapult gun on the forecastle

of few merchant ships to neutralize German aircraft operating against British
convoy.

g. Merchant Aircraft Carrier (MAC). The next step was providing

mercantile hull and wooden flight deck to permit fighters to land as well to
takeoff. With the directives of US, British made little number of MAC ships or
merchant aircraft carriers, which used to carry cargo as well as act as
platform for aircraft. But latter on it found not as an economic viable and its
growth was controlled.

h. Integral /Shore Aircraft. It was revealed that sinking of allied ships was
reduced considerably with the introduction of radar equipped medium range
aircraft. The aircraft could detect submarines on radar and attacked using
depth charges. Apart from destruction the aircraft forced the U-Boats to
spend more time underwater thereby decreased their effectiveness.

f. Ultra Operation. From 1943 the Royal Navy also began

intermittently to enjoy the invisible benefits of the ultra operation. They could
decipher Germany famous Enigma ciphered communication system. They
were able to do it by capturing one German U-boat (U-110) and they
analyzed enigma’s operating system.

g. Concept of Support Ships. US provided enormous numbers of

warships particularly 50 destroyers, frigate and escort aircraft carriers, under
lend lese act. With these extra ships RN could begin to take offensive

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 actions by building up support groups to go for support of hard pressed
convoys or to pursue contacts for destruction. From September 1942 there
were a number of these groups operating in western approaches, carrying
out the fight to the U-boats rather than waiting for them to attacks.

8. American Strategy and Tactics. Throughout 1940-41 the United States

was steadily moving towards over support of Britain. The original ‘Bases for
Destroyers Deal’; of September 1940, followed by the lend lease act in march 1941
permitted more war material to be transferred to British. A month later US extended
its western hemisphere defense zone to 26° west. Meanwhile US war ships used to
escort British and Canadian merchant ships. Then on 17 October the US ship
Reuben Tames was sunk with hundred of her crew after being torpedoed by U 562.
Soon after that president Roosevelt declared war against Germany. Initially
Americans took two years to observe the development of U-boat warfare, yet
failed to make any contingency plan for a U-boat offensive off their eastern
seaboard. Even when the attack developed, they failed to institute an interlocking
convoy system to marry up with the North Atlantic convoys. They employed their
spare A/S forces uselessly in A/S hunting patrols, ignoring the British experience
and seemingly forgetting WW-I lessons. After catastrophic losses, gradually the US
defence was strengthened by increased air and surface patrol and the
implementation of the convoy system started in the middle of May 1942.

Impact of Technology

9. Like all other wars technology played a very crucial role in the U-boat
operation of Second World War. Both sides exploited the technology available to
them to the fullest extent to win over the other. It was also a war of science and
technology.

10. Allied Forces.

a. ASDIC. From the First World War the British had the ASDIC. Both
the active and passive sonar were improved upon and the SONAR could
obtain the target position.

b. Radar. The primitive 286M radar set had the drawback of limited
arc of detection to 120° ahead of the ship. The improved 10 centimeter
271M radar had the advantage of full 360° coverage. This all round scan,
which was capable of detecting a surfaced U-boat up to 4 miles distance.

c. DF. The fitting of High Frequency Direction Finder (HFDF) used to

be known as ‘Huff Duff’ made it possible to detect the approximate direction
of U-boats’ high frequency radio transmission.

d. Leigh Lights. The U-boats also lost their immunity to air attack at
night when aircraft were fitted with ‘Leigh Lights’. A 24 inches naval

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 searchlight with a range of 5,000 yards was installed in air crafts to
illuminate the U-boats.

e. Depth Charge. Depth charge attacks had also become more

accurate with the development of an Ahead Throwing Weapon (ATW)
known as Hedgehog. Before this innovation the main shortcomings of a
depth charge attack was that the pattern of charges could only be positioned
as accurately as the firing ship’s stern could be manoeuvred.

11. Germany.

a. German Radar Search Receiver. To answer British Leigh Lights,

radars and aerial depth charges the Germans equipped their boats with
radar search receivers Metox. Despite its primitive nature, Metox was
proved effective in giving early warning of approaching aircraft. Metox
remained effective until February 1943, when British AS VII was replaced by
AS VIII 10 centimeter radar, as Metox became unable to detect the
transmission of this radar. Shortly Wanze (Hagennuk-Wellenanzeiger) was
developed which covered a wide wave band to detect 10-centimeter radar.

b. Torpedo. As the German torpedoes with magnetic pistol were not

much effective, they developed a magnetic proximity fuse, which became
operational in November 1942. This newly developed torpedoes was
designed especially for use against convoys; being designed to run a zigzag
course after a predetermined length of straight run. If the torpedo missed its
intended target, the period of zigzag amidst the columns of ships in convoy
would have a far greater probability of hitting another ship than a
conventional straight running torpedo.

c. Snorkel. Towards the end of war, the another advanced

technology completed in time by Germany to enhance performance of the
U-Boat, that was the Snorkel: a ventilating apparatus which allowed the boat
to remain submerged while recharging her batteries and which expelled the
exhaust fumes.

d. Propulsion and Design. As early as 1937, German engineer Prof

Walter invented an Ingolin driven turbine, which could attain a submerged
speed of over 23 knot. These boats had deep diving capacity along with
improved manoeuvrability. They had long endurance at high silent running
speed of 5 knot for 60 hours, compared to existing boats. Large fuel
capacity extended the radius of action to the whole of the North and South
Atlantic without reliance on U-Tankers.

e. Sensors. Moreover the Germans were carrying out experiments

with IR detection, magnetic anomalies and underwater SONAR at the last
phase of war.

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 PRINCIPLES OF WAR
12. In all military operations the time factor is critical and information may be
scanty. Danger, fog of war and fatigue exert their influence on judgment and
unforeseen problems may upset the best-laid plans. To meet these challenging
conditions the commanders common sense and judgment must be backed by
sound knowledge of those basics precepts or principles of war which have stood
the test of time and marked the success of commanders in past time wars. The
principles of those were observed in the Battle of Atlantic are:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. Hitler declared clearly that their

main enemy was England. From the beginning of the war the Germans
selected their aim to attack British and allied shipping to deprive them of vital
supplies and maintained it through out the war. Though their aim was clear
but it was not supported by recourses because at the outbreak of war
German Navy had only 39 operational U-Boats. Further more after
modernization U-Boat in 1944, the number of U-Boat was inadequate to
have an affect on allied convoy. On the contrary out of two aim British failed
to prevent German warships from getting out into the Atlantic sea. Keep
their SLOC open at any cost allied adopted for numerous tactical and
technical options.

b. Offensive Action and Surprise. Submarine itself is the symbol of

surprise and offensive platform. Donitz could exploit these characteristics
overwhelmingly. In the Atlantic submarine become real threat for allied
forces and jeopardized their total logistics system across the Atlantic. Due to
non-availability of effective sensors, U-Boat of World War II could go for
sneak attack on allies and achievement were highly significant.

c. Security. By the July of 1940 the French were out of the war and
new bases for U-Boat were established on the Atlantic coast of France.
These forward and well-supported bases amplified their overall efficiency
enhanced their secrecy. Moreover both the forces captured adversaries ship
and unveiled opponent’s communication secrecy. Specially German lost
their Enigma when their U-110 had been captured by British and their
cryptographic information was deciphered by them. Therefore German was
pushed out to the less important western part of the Atlantic and allied
forces lost huge number of ships.

d. Concentration of Force and Economy of Effort. German Wolf Pack

tactics was the perfect example of concentration of force, where a group of
U-Boats used to conduct attack on allied convoys and results of this tactics
were very successful by neutralizing the effectiveness of ASDIC. When
under Lends Lease Act 1941 US transferred 50 destroyers and massive war
materials to British. With these extra ships Royal Navy could begin to be
offensive by building up support group to support hard pressed convoys

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 where they concentrated good amount of forces. German had shown
judicious and rational use of their torpedoes. The U-Boats used to attacked
night on surface position after being confirmed their attack position. Even U-
boats used to use their gun for minor engagement instead of wasting
torpedo. The system of convoy with few escorts was an economy of effort
rather than forming numerous hunter killer groups and protected lanes. The
Americans were late to realise it. Furthermore when all the proactive
measures could not bring victorious results against U-Boat then British-US
allies could wipe out the losses by building the ships faster than the U-Boats
could sink them. Therefore allied could not achieved economy of effort.

CONTEMPORARY VALIDITY OF DIFFERENT LESSONS

13. Numerous technological and tactical developments took places in the battle
of Atlantic. Out of those few are still valid in the contemporary age:
a. Submarine still is the greatest menace for surface ship. Modern
submarines can possess threat to air elements even. Development of
SUBROC has eliminated the range limitation of torpedoes. Further more
nuclear power submarine becomes safest arsenal of ballistic missile, which
can engage any shore targets from several thousand miles, thus
contributing significantly to land battle. There fore SSBN and SSN promoted
to strategic platform from tactical platform. Contrary lot of development took
place in the field of ASW warfare, which also some times makes the
submarine untenable beneath the water column.

b. In the present day, with the availability of modern surveillance &

attack aircraft, integral helicopter and multifarious sensors with the
adversary, wolf pack tactic is no more feasible.

c. The concept of achieving sea control of an area and SLOC protection

using escort carrier group is also not feasible today. This entails huge
amount resources, which is difficult to spare at all times. There fore hunter
killer tactics also obsolete in present context.

. d. The Strategy of Sea Denial remains the most logical and suitable
option for the weaker Navy. The proliferation of SSM armed FACs and
conventional submarines have exceptionally increased the cost of building a
sea control capability.

e. The concept convoying is perfect and effective since First World War
till today. No other system or tactics could supersede the convoy escort
tactics toll today But with the passage of time there are variations in art of
convoying.

LESSONS LEARNT

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14. The following lessons can be learned through the study of battle of Atlantic:

a. Security of information must be maintained at any cost. Otherwise

total plan may be upset. As it happened both for Germany and allied forces.
Furthermore when own ship is about to capture by enemy, destruction of
cryptographic and communication security material are essential. As
Germany failed to destroy enigma when U-110 is about to capture by British.

b. There can be no doubt that submarines are a sea denial as well as a

sea control weapon that can be used against a superior naval power.

c. Optimum base support is essential to operate submarine. If Germany

could not able to use base facilities of France coast that would be
impossible to be menace for allied force.

d. Resource allocation is essential for submarine, which was not at all

enough from German high command. Thus hindered efficacy of U-boats.
Specially in last phase of attack after modernization of U-boats the number
were to scanty to be effective.

e. Speed of the submarine is very crucial both in anti-submarine as well

as ASu warfare.

f. Arming merchant ship also could not provide much protection and
instead became one of the reasons for German’s unleashing ‘unrestricted U-
Boat campaign’.

g. Independent sailing and evasive routing is not the substitute to the

convoy system. Independently sailing liner ‘Athenian’ became the first victim
of the war. Independent sailing and evasive route method should only be
resorted if there are no other alternatives or as part of tactics.

h. Submarines alone cannot be a decisive factor in a war. Other surface

and air elements including surveillance, intelligence, sensors, weaponry,
logistics etc are necessary. Garman wanted to win in Atlantic campaign by
only U-Boats. The Air Force Luftwaffe could not provide reasonable
surveillance, Germans had to depend only on intelligence. If U-Boats would
be integrated with surface and air elements significantly the result of the
battle could be different.

j. Tactics always have overwhelming supremacy over techniques.

Germany and the allied forces, both the adversaries developed numerous
technologies to beat each other and eventually all they have countered by
tactics.

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 Since electromagnetic wave is highly attenuated in the seawater. Therefore,
there is an inherent difficulty in submarine communications despite recent
developments in this field specially satellite communication. Submarines
lose her element of surprise when transmit and their movement is hindered
when she intends to use satellite communication.

l. Only a strong economic, material and industrial based country can

sustain a prolonged warfare. When allied could not wipe out the U-Boat
threat from Atlantic water, they adopt main strategy to produce more number
of ships than loss. Thus their total victory was ensured.

m. Efficacy of weapon of submarine is essential since submarine can

probably have one chance to use her weapon. Furthermore submarine is
high susceptible to ASW weapon where to destroy her pin point hit is not
required due to tremendous water pressure under the water column.

k. Arming submarines with anti-air guns was not successful. Submarines

defence against aircraft is concealment in deep water rather than fighting an
aircraft. Still it is difficult to use SUBROC against air elements.

p. ASW air elements specially rotary wing aircraft pose great threat
against submarine in the modern context. There fore integrated helicopter is
essential for ASW surface ships.
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CONCLUSION

15. The Battle of the Atlantic was unique in many ways. Firstly, the magnitude
of the losses inflicted in terms of lives and material was unprecedented in modern
maritime warfare. Secondly, the battle raged over an extended period of time.
Thirdly, it brought to the forefront, a new and dangerous weapon- the U-Boat,
which has greatly impacted maritime warfare ever since. The U-Boat was vitally
important aspect of World War II, for it came closer to gaining victory for Hitler, than
almost any other weapon in his vast armoury.

16. The end of the war gradually came into sight in end April 1945. Events on
land had finally imposed irrevocable defeat on the German army. But U-boats were
never defeated. Basically continental defeat of German Army compelled the
disengagement of U-Boats from the allies. At 1514 hrs on 04 May 1945, Doenitz
broadcast to all his U-boat commanders, instructions to cease fire, It was the end
of a tenacious but unsuccessful attempt by Germany to bring the Allies to their
knees, by severing their main artery, the ocean shipping routes on which their lives
depended. The U-boat operation of World War II had brought many lessons; the
prominent one is convoy system with surface and air escorts. Further more a
substantial improvement took place in technological and tactical aspects. Basically
Second World War laid the foundation for a rapid development in tactics,

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technology and warfare as whole. Recent developments in tactics, technology and
warfare particularly in the field of submarine and anti submarine warfare are the
continuation of those of the World War II.

17. At last it is revealed that the battle of Atlantic was the single most important
campaign of 2nd world war. It linked the original European war with the conflict in
the pacific. The United States might have survived without winning the Atlantic
battle but she had the disadvantage to fight in two fronts. If Germany would not lost
in continental war the outcome of World War I and the history of world order might
be different.

ERSHAD
Outcome of Battle

32. Man and Material. In all, the German submarines accounted for the
loss of 2603 merchant and 175 naval vessels. Apart from this a total of 2101 Allied
ships were sunk by German air craft, surface raider and mines. Out of the 1162 U-
boats built, 784 were lost. When the Battle of Atlantic was over, more than 4600
merchant ships totaling more that 21 million Tons was lost. In human terms, the
cost to both sides was stupendous. More than 28,000 German U-boat sailors lost
their lives. More than 30,000 men of the British navy and merchant marine lost their
lives with many more thousands of merchant seamen from other countries.
(SLIDE)

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33. Invention of New Weapon/Technology. During the war some
important technical advances were made in terms of detection equipment and
weapons. Those are:

a. New 10 cms radar

b. High frequency direction finder
c. New weapon ‘Hedgehog’

Implication of Strategy and Tactics

34. Adoption of the Strategy of Sea Denial. The Germans correctly

adopted the strategy of sea denial for the weaker German Navy. This strategy was
practised by two complimentary methods that are the tonnage strategy and the flow
strategy.

a. The Tonnage Strategy. Doenitz believed that in order to win the

War, Germany had to sink ships faster than the allies could build them. This
was the tonnage strategy.

b. The Flow Strategy. It was about attacking allied shipping at

dispersed locations thereby increasing the turn round time. This would
prevent essential cargo from reaching in required time.

The Strategy of Sea Denial remains the most logical course of action for the
weaker Navy. The proliferation of SSM armed FACs and conventional submarines
have prohibitively increased the cost of building a sea control capability.

35. Wolf Pack Tactics. German continued Wolf pack tactics as long as it was
possible. Despite the limitation of air effort available, Donitz devised this as the best tactics
for his submarine.

In the present day, with the availability of MR aircraft and integral helo with the adversary,
this tactic is not feasible.

46. The Hunter Killer Concept. This Allied concept was based on an ASW
group with an escort carrier could maintain control of the sea against the U- boat. This
strategy was a failure as it wasted the scarce assets in searching areas not immediately
relevant. After the losses of Ark Royal and Courageous, the Hunter-Killer concept was
abandoned by the Admiralty.

This concept of achieving sea control of an area using escort carrier group is still not
feasible today.

37. The convoy Escort Concept. Despite the initial dilemma of adopting this
concept by both Allied powers, it was the main stay of their success in the Battle of
Atlantic. This concept was perfected during this war and still effective today.

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 Application of Principles of War

Selection and Maintenance of Aim.

38. During the Battle of Atlantic, this essential principle of War was ignored by
the German Navy. Despite being unprepared for the War, the U-boat campaign
very nearly starved Britain into surrender. However, the deployment of U-boats
suffered from a clear-cut aim, which should have been severing the sea-lanes to
Britain.

39. In the present day scenario of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the
national polity and the military leadership are in consonance on the aim and the
strategies of War.

Concentration of Force.

40. At critical junctures where the Battle of Atlantic would have swung in favour
of U Boats, Hitler ordered their diversion to the Norway and later to the
Mediterranean. These disruptions resulted in dilution of efforts in the Atlantic.

The Principle of Co-operation.

41. For German U-boats operation, MR aircrafts were not available in sufficient
numbers due to inter- service rivalries. Doenitz tried to offset this disadvantage by placing
his U Boats in a patrol line across the convoy routes but the Ocean is a vast space and the
patrol line could not cover all of it.

42. Incidentally, this malaise also afflicted the RAF in the initial stages of war,
wherein long-range bombers were not spared for convoy escort duties.

43. In any future scenario, air-sub co-operation would form a vital link in maritime
warfare.

Unity of Command.
44. In 1940, U-boat ace Gunther Prien in U-47 penetrated the defences of the
British Naval Base at Scapa Flow. Unknown to the U-boat command, the German
Naval High Command sailed warships into North Sea at the same time. This
caused the British carriers and the battleships to sail from Scapa Flow to counter
the German surface forces, thereby denying Prien of a much more successful
sortie.

45. In today’s multi- dimensional war, a joint command or positive

jointmanship is mandatory to ensure that the left hand knows what the right is
doing and own forces do not work at cross-purposes.

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 Lessons of the Battle of Atlantic

Failure to Learn from the Past.

46. The British Government’s failure to learn from history resulted in no ocean escorts
for convoys being built in the 30s. Even after the WW II broke out, no formal convoying
was resorted to till such time heavy losses forced the Admiralty to form convoys.

47. The Germans were no better at learning their lessons. Admiral Raeder’s plan for
building aircraft carriers and battleships despite the their failure of High Sea fleet and the
success of the U- boat campaign in the previous war.

Leadership.

48. On the German side Admiral Donitz failed to influence Hitler’s decision to divert
his U-boat forces to the Norwegian and Mediterranean theater, despite the unprecedented
success and strategic significance of his Wolf Packs in the Atlantic.

49. On the other hand British Prime Minister Wilston Churchill by his mastery in
diplomacy could pursue the USA to provide US $ 5 billion worth of military hardware to
Britain, including 50 destroyers and 14,000 aircraft in exchange of British possessions of
West Indies. This huge hardware supply reinforced the British efforts in convoy escort
duties successfully.

Necessity of Aligning National and Maritime Strategy.

48. In this battle Britain successfully aligned her national and maritime
strategy to keep SLOC open. However, Hitler failed to appreciate that the centre of
gravity for Britain was her sea routes to her colonies and the USA. If these could be
severed, Britain would be brought to her knees.

Necessity for Integral Air/ Shore air support.

49. Atlantic campaign shows that the sinking of allied ships reduced
considerably with the introduction of radar equipped MR aircraft. These Aircrafts
forced the U- boats to remain submerged, thereby decreasing their effectiveness.

50. Today, with the advent of integral helicopters equipped with radar and
dunking sonar and improvements in shore based MR aircraft, this factor is perhaps
even more applicable for Bangladesh.

Importance of the Geography of a Nation.

51. The continental geography of Germany prevented free access of her
warships to the Atlantic to disrupt British SLOCs. This caused the powerful

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German surface fleet to remain inactive almost throughout the WW II. The
utilization of Germans U-boat base facilities from the French Atlantic coast
dramatically enhanced the operating range of the German Navy. These results
were immediately evident in the Battle of Atlantic.

Need for a Secure Submarine Base.

52. The location of the U- boat bases were known to the allies almost since
the time they were constructed. The allied efforts at bombing the U Boat bases
were correct as far as they wanted to destroy the threat at source.

53. In the present day context, with the advent of PGMs and special weapons, these
bases would have been easily destroyed. Thus effective means for passive and active air
defence of these bases are of paramount importance today.

Necessity of Secure Communications.

54. The Germans and the Allies were able to break into each other’s codes
used for communicating with submarines and ships. Thus the fortunes of the U-
boats and the convoys fluctuated. The allies were also able to locate the wolf packs
and take effective measures.

55. It is therefore necessary that our forces should have secured

communications, which do not reveal its position.

Conclusion

56. The Battle of the Atlantic was unique in many ways. Firstly, the
magnitude of the losses inflicted in terms of lives and material was unprecedented
in modern maritime warfare. Secondly, the battle raged over an extended period of
time. Thirdly, it brought to the forefront, a new and dangerous weapon- the U boat,
which has greatly impacted maritime warfare ever since. The U boat was vitally
important aspect of World War II, for it came closer to gaining victory for Hitler, than
almost any other weapon in his vast armoury.

61. At times, Germany came close to achieving their aim. In the early years
of the battle, when the Allies could only replace a monthly loss of upto three
quarters of a million tons, and vital cargoes of oil, arms and machinery were sent to
the sea beds. It seemed that the course of the war was moving steadily in
Germany’s favour. However, effective employment of Convoy-Escorts and quick
replacement of Allied shipping losses ultimately turned the tide against Germany.

62. In these battles both sides made fundamental mistakes. The Allies identified their
mistakes and took steps to correct them. They put to use statistical methods to determine
the effectiveness of their actions. They also put technology to good use. The Germans, in

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comparison, made far greater errors. Their failure to align their national and maritime
strategies, failure to select and maintain an aim and failure to ensure co-operation between
their Navy and their Air force were but a few of the glaring errors. They set out to counter
the technological superiority of the Allies by improving their submarines, but time was not
in their favour. In the end, the side that made fewer mistakes and was quicker to seize
opportunities won.

64. In this day and age it would be potentially disastrous to lose such vast
amounts of life and material, due to fundamental mistakes and flawed strategies.
Wars of the future will be quick and highly destructive, offering us little opportunity
to correct our mistakes. We need to learn to do things right the first time. We need
to learn during peace. We need to learn from history.
ERSHAD

ERSHAD INTERNET
AN ANALYIS OF THE BATTLE

“ Read and re read the great campaign of Hannibal and Caesar, of Gustavus Adolphus and Turene, of Prince
Eugene and Friedricke, this is the only way to capture the secret of art of warfare” Napoleon

58. There is an old adage “ Fools learn from their own mistakes, wise men learn from the mistakes of
others”. Thus it is necessary to analyse the bygone campaigns and learn the maximum from the blunders and
brilliance of the Admirals for amidst all the changes in the material means employed by the sailor, certain
immutable principles of military art stand out as applicable in every circumstance. These principles constitute
the science of war and they can definitely be learnt from history.

Lessons of the Battle of Atlantic

59. The failure to Learn from the Past. The British Government had passed an act in 1778 empowering
the Admiralty to enforce the convoy system for all ocean going merchant ships in order to save commerce
from pirates, privateers and enemy warships. This act was repealed in 1872 due to a prolonged period of
peace and led to high British casualties in World War I. The convoy was re introduced in 1917. However, the

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apparent defeat of U- boats in 1918 led to unjustified confidence that the U- boat threat had been mastered..
As late as 1937, Naval Staff reported, “ the submarine would never again be able to present us with the
problem we faced in 1917”. This failure to learn from history resulted in no ocean escorts for convoys being
built in the 30s. Even after the WW II broke out, no formal convoying was resorted to till such time heavy
losses forced the Admiralty to form convoys.

60. The Germans were no better at learning their lessons. While the Luftwaffe and the Werhmacht readily
adopted tactical doctrines in keeping pace with the advent of tank technology and aircraft deigns, the lessons
of WW- I were forgotten by the German Navy. Plan Z drawn up by Admiral Raeder for the build up of a
resurgent German Navy laid emphasis on building of aircraft carriers and battleships despite the obvious
failure of the German High Sea fleet and the success of the U- boat campaign in the previous war.

The Necessity of Aligning National and Maritime Strategy.

61. Taking into account the geographic disadvantage of Germany in respect of naval bases, it was
obvious that the German SLOCs would be in great peril in a War with Britain and USA. However, Hitler failed
to appreciate that the centre of gravity for Britain was her sea routes to her colonies and the USA and if these
could be severed, Britain would be brought to her knees. Consequently, Hitler did not give due priority to the
development of his Navy and especially the
U- boat fleet. It is a historical fact that the German Navy was unprepared for a War in 1939, with only 57 U-
boats operational and the ship building program halfway to completion. The German Navy fought valiantly but
could never really recover from this initial setback.

Adoption of the Strategy of Sea Denial.

62. The Germans were fortunate that Admiral Doenitz correctly adopted the strategy of sea denial for the
weaker German Navy.. This strategy was practised by two complimentary methods that is the tonnage strategy
and the flow strategy.

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63. Doenitz believed that in order to win the War, Germany had to sink ships faster than the allies could
build them. This implied sinking of all allied shipping irrespective of the cargo they were carrying. This was the
tonnage strategy.

64. The Flow Strategy. Was about attacking allied shipping at dispersed locations thereby increasing the
turn round time. This would prevent essential cargo from reaching in required time.

65. The Strategy of Sea Denial remains the most logical course of action for the weaker Navy. The
proliferation of SSM armed FACs and conventional submarines have prohibitively increased the cost of
building a sea control capability. In a future limited war, the strategy of Sea Control would require resources far
in excess of the net advantages, which may accrue from Sea Control.

66. The importance of the Geography of a Nation. The Geography of a Nation is one of the essential
components of its Seapower . The continental geography of Germany prevented free access of her warships to
the Atlantic to disrupt British SLOCs. This caused the powerful and expensive German High Sea Fleet to
remain inactive almost throughout the WW I. At the beginning of WW II, Germany had only 57 operational U-
boats and the Bismarck and Tirpitz were not completed. However, with the fall of France, the geography of the
nation was radically altered. The Germans built U-boat pens at Nazaire, La Rochelle and St. Lorient on the
French Atlantic coast. These pens dramatically enhanced the deployment range and pattern of the German
Navy and the results were immediately evident in the Battle of Atlantic.

67. Geography is an important asset for our country. India is singularly blessed as the peninsula juts out
into the Indian Ocean like a dagger pointing at the routes between pacific – Japan and the Gulf. This would
automatically qualify India as a great maritime nation as and when our economy can support an enhanced fleet
and our leaders acquire a maritime vision.

The Principle of Selection and Maintenance of Aim.

68. During the Battle of Atlantic, this essential principle of War was ignored by the German Navy.
Despite being unprepared for the War , the U-boat campaign very nearly starved Britain into surrender.
However, the deployment of U-boats suffered from a clear-cut aim, which should have been severing the sea-
lanes to Britain. The German Naval build up was halfway complete at the start of the war and due priority for
increased production of U-boats was not given. At critical junctures where the Battle of Atlantic would have

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swung in favour of U Boats, Hitler ordered their diversion to the Norway and later to the Mediterranean. These
disruptions resulted in dilution of efforts in the Atlantic In all fairness to Admiral Doenitz, it must be recorded
that he opposed the re deployment but was over ruled by Hitler.

69. In the present day scenario of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the national polity and the military
leadership are in consonance on the aim and the strategies of War Whilst the aim of War may be political, the
strategy for War is the preserve of professionals and the polity should not interfere with the conduct of War.

The Principle of Co-operation.

70. After the initial losses, the allies began to sail their ships in convoys. The first phase of Atlantic battles
was the location of such convoys. This was primarily done by reports from German ships and U Boats,
intercepts of allied communications and by the use of MR aircraft like FW 200 Condor operated by the
Luftwaffe. However, the Luftwaffe persistently refused to release these aircraft for convoy locations and
attacks.

71. Yet, aircraft were not available in sufficient numbers due to inter- service rivalries. Doenitz tried to
offset this disadvantage by placing his U Boats in a patrol line across the convoy routes but the Ocean is a vast
space and the patrol line could not cover all of it.

72. Incidentally, this malaise also afflicted the RAF in the initial stages of war wherein long-range
bombers were not spared for convoy escort duties.

73. In any future scenario, air-sub co-operation would form a vital link in maritime tactics. Without
availability of MR aircraft, the submarine is limited by its sensors to detect enemy shipping. In a fluid maritime
operation, without complementary air effort, the submarine’s effectiveness is seriously hampered. Extrapolating
this factor, we should concentrate not only in development of air sub co operation but also on a network centric
warfare wherein satellites and MR aircraft feed information to the Ops Centre which re deploys or redirects
submarines.

The Principle of Unity of Command

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74. In 1940, U-boat ace Gunther Prien in U 47 penetrated the defences of the British Naval Base at
Scapa Flow. The photo recce of this British naval base had shown the presence of two carriers and four
battleships, which had prompted U 47 to undertake this hazardous mission. However, unknown to the U-boat
command, the German Naval High Command sailed warships into North Sea during this time. This caused the
British carriers and the battleships to sail from Scapa Flow to counter the German surface forces thereby
denying Prien of a much more successful sortie.

75. In today’s multi- dimensional war, a joint command or positive jointmanship is mandatory to ensure
that the left hand knows what the right is doing and own forces do not work at cross-purposes. In our country,
where joint command still remains a distant vision, it might pay to form an informal tri- service core group to
prevent such occurrence.

Wolf pack Tactics

76. A German Wolf pack consisted of fifteen or twenty boats spread out on the likely sea lanes west of
Britain.If one U Boat sighted a convoy, it shadowed the convoy and reported its location to Headquarters in
Germany. Doenitz then radioed orders to the other boats in the vicinity to close in for the attack. The Wolf Pack
attacked the convoy and retreated. Once the escorts gave up the chase, the wolf pack returned to attack
again. This pattern continued as long as possible. Given the limitation of air effort available, Doenitz devised
the best tactics for his submarine.

77. In the present day, given the comparatively low number of submarines and a proliferation of MR
aircraft and integral helo with the likely adversary, this tactic is not feasible.

The Hunter Killer Concept

78. The allies resorted to active Hunter Killer concept along the SLOCs prior to implementation of
convoying. This was based on the premise that an ASW group with an escort carrier could maintain control of
the sea against the U- boat. This strategy was a failure for it frittered away the scarce assets in searching
areas not immediately relevant. The Ark Royal group was attacked by a U- boat during one such mission and
luckily for the allies ,the three torpedoes fired at Ark Royal malfunctioned. The Courageous group was not so

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lucky and the carrier was sunk by a U- boat. After the loss of Courageous, the Hunter Killer concept was
abandoned by the Admiralty.

79. The concept of achieving sea control of an area using escort carrier group is still not feasible today.

Necessity for Integral Air/ Shore air support

80. An analysis of the Atlantic campaign shows that the sinking of allied ships reduced considerably with
the introduction of radar equipped MR aircraft. The aircraft could detect submarines on radar and attack it
using depth charges. Apart from being active in terms of actual destruction of the U- boats, the aircraft also
forced the U- boats to spend more time underwater, thereby decreasing their effectiveness.

81. Today, with the advent of integral helicopters equipped with radar and dunking sonar and
improvements in shore based MR aircraft, this factor is perhaps even more important

The Necessity of Secure Communications

82. The Germans and the Allies were able to break into each other’s codes used for communicating with
submarines and ships. Thus the fortunes of the U- boats and the convoys fluctuated with the battle between
cryptologists in Berlin and London. The allies were also able to DF the wolf packs and take effective measures.

83. It is therefore necessary that our forces have reliable and secure communications which do not reveal
its position.

The Need for a Secure Submarine Base.

84. The location of the U- boat pens was known to the allies almost since the time they were constructed.
The allied efforts at bombing the U Boat pens were correct insofar as they wanted to destroy the threat at
source. However, the allies failed to destroy these pens from air and they could only be neutralised after the
seizure of the Normandy coast by the allies.

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85. In the present day context, with the advent of PGMs and special weapons, these pens would have
been easily destroyed. But it must be remembered that the means available for passive and active air defence
have also improved considerably. All the might and sophistication of the allied airforces could not fully
neutralise the Scud launchers of lone Iraq.

86. With the proposed deployment of nuclear submarines to complete our national nuclear Triad, it would
be necessary to construct suitably located and defended pens wherein our submarines can enter and leave
submerged and which will pose a difficult target for any of our future adversary to destroy.

The Necessity of Choosing Appropriate Strategic Targets.

87. The allies undertook various strategic air campaigns against heavily defended targets like the ball
bearing factory at Schwienfurt and the famous Dam buster raids by the 617 Lancaster squadron. Yet,
inexplicably, the factory manufacturing U-boat batteries at Hagen was left unmolested till the end of the war.
This points to a serious intelligence failure and lack of co-ordination between the Royal Navy and the Bomber
command for a period of almost 4 years.

88. The strategic targets of an adversary or a potential adversary needs to be revised and upgraded
constantly by an inter- service team during peacetime.

Training

89. The production of U- boats finally reached the desired levels by 1942. This was subsequently also
augmented by new technical innovations like the snorkel and unechoic coating. However, the success of the
U- boats did not increase in proportion to their numbers. One of the major factor for the lack of commensurate
success was Training.

90. On the German side, the initial lot of highly trained and battle hardened aces like Prien were lost in
battle. Their replacements could not trained to the same degree of excellence due to
paucity of time. On the allied side, the escort commanders who had survived were now battle hardened
experts at hunting U- boats.

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91. Training is the bedrock of Naval performance in War. It must be perpetual and keep pace with the
doctrines. The best weapons become ineffective when men are not properly trained to use them To use a
cliché, it’s the men behind the machine that matters.

The Man in the Field is the Best Judge of a Weapons Efficacy.

92. One of the less popular stories about the elite German U-boat fleet is the torpedo crisis of late 1939-
early 1940. Although this was the period during which some of the most outstanding U-boat successes were
scored, it was full of bitter disappointments due to malfunctioning torpedoes. The real torpedo crisis unfolded
during Operation Hartmuth - the largest amphibious operation in German history, the invasion of Norway.
Assisting the surface vessels of the Kriegsmarine and standing guard against interference from the Royal Navy
were 8 tactical groups of submarines, comprising a high percentage of the operational strength of the U-boat of
April 1940. Thus deployed, the U-boats were in a position to intercept any British expeditionary force and
severely cripple it. However, it failed to do so, and the reason was largely defective magnetic and impact
pistols. The problem regarding the torpedoes had been reported by U Boat commanders right since the
beginning of 1937 and no action was taken by shore authorities in the belief that these were isolated incidents
which point towards improper firing practice rather than faulty torpedoes. This problem was finally resolved as
late as 1942.

93. Does this story sound familiar to most of you present here? The unfortunate fact is that snug in
Headquarters, we tend to overlook important feedback from the field. The man in the field is the best judge of
an equipment ‘s performance for he exploits it the way it would ultimately be exploited and his opinion and
reports should over rule all lab tests and reports

CONCLUSION

94. The Battle of the Atlantic was unique in many ways. Firstly, the magnitude of the losses inflicted in
terms of lives and material was unprecedented in modern maritime warfare. Secondly, the battle raged over
an extended period of time. Thirdly, it brought to the forefront, a new and dangerous weapon- the U boat,
which has greatly impacted maritime warfare ever since. The U boat was vitally important aspect of World War
II, for it came closer to gaining victory for Hitler, than almost any other weapon in his vast armoury.

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95. The end of the war gradually came into sight in end April 1945. Events on land had finally imposed
irrevocable defeat on the German army. At 1514 hrs on 04 May 1945, Doenitz broadcast to all his U-boat
commanders, instructions to cease fire, It was the end of a tenacious but unsuccessful attempt by Germany to
bring the Allies to their knees, by severing their main artery, the ocean shipping routes on which their lives
depended.

96. At times, Germany came close to achieving this aim. In the early years of the battle, when the Allies
could only replace a monthly loss of upto three quarters of a million tons, and vital cargoes of oil, arms and
machinery were sent to rot on the sea beds, it seemed that the course of the war was moving steadily in
Germany’s favour.

97. But then, war is serious business and errors can prove costly. Errors were made by both sides with
catastrophic consequences. Despite lessons from WWI, the British took time to re introduce the convoy
system, losing precious lives and cargo in the process. It is said while doctrines as always propounded,
strategies are always analysed in hindsight. Why do we commit mistakes in our strategies? Is it because of
our inability to put to practice what we learn from history?

98. Both sides made fundamental mistakes. The Allies identified their mistakes and took steps to correct
them. They put to use statistical methods to determine the effectiveness of their actions. They also put
technology to good use. The Germans, in comparison, made far greater errors. Their failure to align their
national and maritime strategies, failure to select and maintain
an aim and failure to ensure co-operation between their Navy and their Air force were but a few of the glaring
errors. They set out to counter the technological superiority of the Allies by improving their submarines, but
time was not in their favour. In the end, the side that made fewer mistakes and was quicker to seize
opportunities won.

99. In all, the German submarines accounted for the loss of 2603 merchant and 175 naval vessels. Out
of the 1162 U-boats built, 784 were lost. In human terms, the cost to both sides was stupendous. More than
28,000 German U-boat sailors lost their lives. More than 30,000 men of the British navy and merchant marine
lost their lives with many more thousands of merchant seamen from other countries. They were brave men
with enormously high morale and a technical command of specialist skills, which compels admiration.

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100. In this day and age it would be potentially disastrous to lose such vast amounts of life and material,
due to fundamental mistakes and flawed strategies. Wars of the future will be quick and highly destructive,
offering us little opportunity to correct our mistakes. We need to learn to do things right the first time. We need
to learn during peace. We need to learn from history.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Antony Preston, Navies of World War II, The Hamlyn Publishing Group
Limited, London 1976.

2. Helmut Pemsel, Atlas of Naval Warfare, Arns & Armour Press, London,
1977.

3. V E Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, Arns & Armour Press, London, 1989.

4. Antony Preston, U-Boat, Arns & Armour Press, London,1978.

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