Document of

The World Bank

Report No: 121710-NP

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IDA-Cr. No. 5138-NP)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 38.7 MILLION (US$60.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL

FOR A

BRIDGES IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

January 11, 2018

Transport and ICT Global Practice

South Asia Region
 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2017)

Currency Unit = Nepalese Rupee (NPR)

US$1 = NPR 103.40
SDR 1 = US$1.39

FISCAL YEAR
July 15 – July 14

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB Asian Development Bank

BIMP Bridges Improvement Maintenance Program
BMS Bridge Management System
BSM Bridge Site Monitoring
CIAA Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority
CMS Contract Management System
CPS Country Partnership Strategy
DLI Disbursement-linked Indicator
DoLIDAR Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads
DoR Department of Roads
EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework
F&C Fraud and Corruption
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GESU Geo-Environmental and Social Unit
GoN Government of Nepal
GRM Grievance Redressal Mechanism
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
ISN Interim Strategy Note
LRN Local Road Network
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoPPWTM Ministry of Physical Planning, Works, and Transport Management
NPC National Planning Commission
NPV Net Present Value
NVC National Vigilance Center
OAG Office of the Auditor General
OHS Occupational Health and Safety
PAP Program Action Plan
PDO Program Development Objective
PforR Program-for-Results
PIP Priority Investment Plan
PPA Public Procurement Act
QAP Quality Assurance Plan
RBN Roads Board Nepal
RSDP Road Sector Development Project
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SRN Strategic Road Network

Regional Vice President: Annette Dixon

Country Director: Takuya Kamata
Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen
Practice Manager Karla Gonzalez Carvajal
Project Team Leader: A.K. Farhad Ahmed; Dominic Pasquale
Patella
ICR Team Leader: Sami Ali
ICR Author Sami Ali
 NEPAL
BRIDGES IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

Table of Contents
DATA SHEET..............................................................................................................i
1. Program Context, Development Objectives, and Design...................................................1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes....................................................11
3. Assessment of Outcomes..................................................................................................18
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome................................................................24
5. Assessment of Bank Performance....................................................................................25
6. Lessons Learned...............................................................................................................27
Annex 1. Results Framework and Key Outputs.......................................................................30
Annex 2. Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs)..................................................................32
Annex 3. Program Action Plan (PAP).....................................................................................33
Annex 4. BIMP Expenditures..................................................................................................37
Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision........................................38
Annex 6. Borrower’s Comments..............................................................................................39
Annex 7. Economic Analysis...................................................................................................40
Annex 8. Supporting Documents.............................................................................................45
DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION
Product Information
Project ID Project Name
BRIDGES IMPROVEMENT AND
P125495
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

Country Financing Instrument

Nepal Program For Results

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Ministry of Finance Department of Roads

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO
The Program Development Objective is to provide safe, reliable and cost-effective bridges on
Nepal’s Strategic Roads Network.

Revised PDO
n.a.

FINANCING
Actual
Original Amount (SDR) Revised Amount (SDR) Disbursed
(SDR)
World Bank Financing
IDA-51380 38,700,000 38,700,000 38,700,000
Total 38,700,000 38700000 38700000

KEY DATES
Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing
28-Jun-2012 20-Dec-2012 21-Jan-2013 15-Jul-2017 15-Jul-2017
 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING
Amount Disbursed
Date(s) Key Revisions
(US$)
13-Jan-2017 41,632,976Reallocation of Financing Proceeds.
KEY RATINGS
Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality
Satisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory
RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs
Actual
Date ISR
No. DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements
Archived
(SDR)
Moderately
01 19-Dec-2012 Unsatisfactory 9.68
Satisfactory
Moderatly Moderately
02 25-Nov-2013 9.68
Unsatisfeactory Unsatisfactory
03 04-Jun-2014 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 9.68
Moderately Moderately
04 20-Dec-2014 13.30
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Moderately Moderately
05 24-Jun-2015 20.14
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Moderately Moderately
06 11-Feb-2016 20.14
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Moderately Moderately
07 03-Aug-2016 28.87
Satisfactory Satisfactory
Moderately
08 16-Mar-2017 Satisfactory 28.87
Satisfactory
09 28-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 38.70
SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors
Major Sector/Sector (%)
Rural/Inter-Urban Roads 100
Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 100
Themes
Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)
Infrastructure Services for private sector development 90
Governance & Institution Building

ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Annette Dixon
Country Director: Ellen Goldstein Qimiao Fan

ii
Senior Global Practice Director:
Practice Manager:
Task Team Leader(s):
ICR Author:
John Henry Stein Jose Luis Irigoyen
Binyam Reja (Acting) Karla Gonzalez Carvajal
A.K. Farhad Ahmed;
A.K. Farhad Ahmed
Dominic Pasquale Patella
Sami Ali
iii
1. Program Context, Development Objectives, and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

Country Background

1. At the time of appraisal in 2012, Nepal was still emerging from a 10-year armed
conflict, that ended in 2006, and was passing through a momentous and prolonged political
transition. Nepal’s economic growth had been adversely affected by the political uncertainty.
Growth over the past decade had been below potential, relying largely on remittances and
tourism. Nonetheless, Nepal had made good progress both in poverty reduction and
improvement of social indicators. The proportion of poor people had fallen substantially from
45 percent in 1995–96 to 25 percent in 2010–11. This reduction in poverty level came with
improvements in income equality. Nepal’s overall Gini coefficient had simultaneously
declined from 0.41 to 0.35, a measure that shows poor segments of the population had been
able to increase household incomes (often with the help of remittances). Nepal had also made
impressive progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the
areas of primary education, gender parity, and under-5 child mortality. Several MDG targets
had already been met and Nepal had received the United Nation’s MDG award for reducing
maternal mortality.

2. Many of the improvements in social outcomes had benefitted from improved access to
all-weather roads. Between 1995–96 and 2010–11 the proportion of people with access to
paved roads had increased from 24 percent to 51 percent. However, while the quantity of
access had increased, the armed conflict and the political instability had a detrimental impact
on the overall quality of the road network and bridges on those roads. The proportion of the
Strategic Road Network (SRN) in poor condition had increased from 18 percent in 2008 to 22
percent in 2010 and much of the existing bridge stock was over 35–40 years old and in
desperate need of rehabilitation and maintenance. Further, there were still many gaps in the
SRN caused by lack of bridges contributing to a substantial lack of physical access to
economic centers and social services, particularly in remote areas. Nepal’s topography and
geology also complicated efforts to provide adequate transport infrastructure. The lack of
physical access was seen as one of the root causes of the conflict and instability in the
country. Roughly one-fourth (18 out of 75) of district headquarters did not have an all-
weather road connection. This lack of connectivity had adversely impacted the ability of
people, particularly in the severely affected rural areas, to participate in economic activities
and access quality health care and education services. As a result, Nepal’s economic growth
had not reached its potential. One of the key priorities of the Government of Nepal (GoN)
was investing in physical and social infrastructure to attain broad-based growth and poverty
reduction.

Macroeconomic and Fiscal Background

3. Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Nepal doubled from US$350 in
2006 to US$735 in 2011. Nepal’s economy was projected to grow by 4.6 percent in FY2012
compared to 3.9 percent in FY2011. Inflation was running at 7 percent, which was the lowest
level attained in three years. The overall fiscal discipline had been maintained and Nepal’s
general government debt level, at 34 percent of GDP, was among the lowest in the South
Asia Region. While Government revenues had risen and supported increased spending, the
quality of expenditures remained a concern. On the external sector front, with high remittance
growth, Nepal’s account was in surplus and reserves had risen to a level sufficient to cover

1
nine months of goods and services imports (as of mid-March 2012). Remittances played a
large role in the Nepalese economy and were estimated to be 20 percent of GDP in 2010.

4. Fiscal priorities of the GoN had shown a shift toward greater levels of investment in
physical infrastructure in an effort to drive economic growth and achieve policy goals
relating to socioeconomic integration. The Ministry of Physical Planning, Works, and
Transport Management (MoPPWTM) was the lead line ministry for developing transport
infrastructure and managed 86 percent of all budgeted expenditures in the sector. A key aim
of increased transport sector investment was to connect all 75 district headquarters with all-
weather road access. Increasing resource allocations to the transport sector demonstrated the
GoN’s commitment for achieving road transport-related policy objectives that would support
economic growth and social integration.

Sector Background

5. The road network in Nepal totaled about 42,800 km. The SRN and Local Road
Network (LRN) were roughly 10,800 km and 32,000 km, respectively. National highways,
feeder roads, and other roads of national importance constituted the SRN. Rural roads and
urban roads constituted the LRN. The SRN was managed by the Department of Roads (DoR)
under the MoPPWTM and the LRN came under the Department of Local Infrastructure
Development and Agricultural Roads (DoLIDAR) and municipalities under the Ministry of
Local Development. Due to the challenging terrain of Nepal, bridges played a significant
role. They were managed and budgeted for as a subset of the main DoR program. Most new
bridge construction on both the SRN and LRN had been managed by the DoR. This was
because the department was considered to be the most technically capable organization to
undertake this work. The DoLIDAR had focused on trail bridges, which provided non-
vehicular access to remote communities. Going forward, the GoN wanted to clarify
institutional responsibilities. Under the new arrangement, the DoR would only be responsible
for SRN-specific bridges and the DoLIDAR would take over all LRN bridge-related
responsibilities.

6. In 2007, the GoN developed a 10-year (2007–2016) Priority Investment Plan (PIP) for
the road sector, which prioritized investments to reach target accessibility levels by 2016 (87
percent of hills and 100 percent of Terai population within four-hour and two-hour of
walking time, respectively, to the nearest all-weather road). The projected upgrading and
maintenance costs of the SRN during the plan period were estimated at NPR 100 billion
(US$1.25 billion). Since June 2007, the development partners had committed approximately
US$400 million for the SRN projects. This still left a substantial deficit (approximately
US$0.85 billion) to implement the PIP. This plan had largely ignored bridges and hence,
there was a need to provide support to these critical assets.

7. The nature of funding and its allocation process had also been a considerable
challenge for the DoR’s bridge sector investments. The overwhelming majority of the budget
for bridge maintenance and new construction had been allocated directly, through separate
budget lines, to the DoR. These funds had been used for both the LRN and SRN bridges and
had been subject to an ad hoc prioritization that was often driven by political expediency.
Maintenance activities were taking second place to new construction. However, some bridge
failures had made the Government rethink its priority. Then maintenance activities received a
higher priority and funding. The lack of clear institutional mandates and opaque planning and
funding mechanisms for bridge development had resulted in a proliferation of bridges on

2
non-priority routes, over procurement, and under completion. Some bridges remained
incomplete for up to 10 years.

8. The priority for the sector was to clarify institutional responsibilities and develop
mechanisms for funding and planning that prioritize activities according to the most
beneficial social and economic returns possible. The Roads Board Nepal (RBN) was set up to
manage maintenance activities on the country’s road network. Revenues to the RBN came
from the fuel levy and vehicle registration fees, of which it received roughly 78 percent
(about US$35 million) from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in FY2011/12. The limited
revenues to the RBN diminished its role and effectiveness in the sustainable maintenance of
road and bridge infrastructure. Its levels of funding were only sufficient for fully supporting
routine maintenance of roads and bridges.

9. The recently closed World Bank-financed Road Sector Development Project (RSDP)
had been helping the DoR in improving its management of bridge assets. Consultancy
services procured under the RSDP had been used for updating bridge inventory and condition
data, developing a Bridge Management System (BMS), and preparing prioritized
maintenance and investment plans based on sound technical, economic, and social criteria.
The BMS included updated asset inventory data. The DoR worked to fully integrate the BMS
into its operating processes.

1.2 Rationale for Bank Engagement

10. Support to the SRN Bridge Program was consistent with the Interim Strategy Note
(ISN) for Nepal (FY2012/13), particularly the first pillar that related to enhancing
connectivity and productivity for growth. Poor road and bridge quality was seen as one of the
main constraints to the provision of universal physical access. The ISN explicitly mentioned
supporting bridge-related interventions in Nepal to extend year-round accessibility and
improve the quality of existing bridges.

1.3 Rationale for Choice of Financing Instrument

11. The decision to adopt the Program-for-Results (PforR) instrument—and the Bridges
Improvement Maintenance Program (BIMP) was the second World Bank PforR to go to the
World Bank Board—reflected the outcome of the World Bank’s and other development
partners’ dialogue with the GoN on taking a more programmatic and results-oriented
approach on interventions in the roads sector.

12. This operation was seen as an appropriate candidate for use of the PforR instrument
for the following reasons:

(a) The GoN requested the World Bank to design an output/results-based bridge
program. This was because the previous interventions in the roads and bridges
subsector were not sustainable and the GoN was interested in producing a
sustainable model based on achieved results and promoting efficiency in the
subsector.

(b) There was strong Government support for the bridge sector and for improving
outcomes from the DoR’s existing SRN Bridge Program. The DoR recognized
that achieving better outcomes would require improvements to institutional
capacity and core business processes. The PforR instrument provided better

3
 alignment with the Government’s objectives for strengthening capacity while
simultaneously supporting the development and management of much-needed
physical assets.

(c) Developing a well-planned, prioritized and rigorously monitored investment

approach was the main challenge facing the SRN Bridge Program. A revised
approach should have balanced maintenance and rehabilitation needs with the
need for new bridges. The PforR instrument incentivized improvements in the
way that the DoR planned and prioritized investments to achieve this goal. Key
to this was the full integration of the newly developed BMS that provided the
basis for planning and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in the sector. Technical
assistance support helped the DoR staff integrate the BMS outputs with planning
and budgeting activities.

(d) The World Bank, and other development partners had been engaged with the
DoR for many years and had supported the development of fiduciary, social, and
environmental systems in line with good practice. The Government had shown
strong commitment to the development of these systems and continuous
development had been demonstrated. However, improvements were still needed
to apply these systems uniformly and effectively. The PforR approach allowed
the World Bank’s support to better align with and strengthen the application of
existing processes and procedures.

(e) Earlier bridge initiatives using traditional project approaches had not fully
succeeded at achieving sustainable results. Anecdotal evidence suggested that
these isolated project-style approaches succeeded at building assets but failed at
building the institutional mechanisms required for managing longer-term
maintenance. The PforR instrument mitigated this risk by facilitating the use of
processes that the DoR would use for managing the SRN bridge maintenance in
the future.

(f) The DoR’s SRN Bridge Program involved a decentralized implementation model
that depended heavily on the DoR’s 25 divisional offices. In general, SRN
bridges were numerous, short in span, and relatively inexpensive. Achieving the
Program Development Objective (PDO) for this type of diffuse capital program
required changes to broadly applied processes and organizational behaviors. The
Specific Investment Lending instrument was suitable for a concentrated capital
program involving fewer, higher-value assets. However, the PforR approach
aligned better with impacts needed to achieve the PDO given the structure of the
SRN Bridge Program.

13. The GoN demonstrated a strong willingness to use the PforR instrument, which
contributed to policy changes in

(a) Enhancing the quality assurance mechanisms within the Government’s bridge
program, by introducing independent verification systems and processes
undertaken by public entities such as the National Vigilance Center (NVC) and
the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA);

4
 (b) Helping the GoN activate their internal transparency and anticorruption
mechanisms to enhance the DoR management systems that had previously
delayed the project; and

(c) Improving efficiency of government procurement processes by strengthening

capacity and systems development, which contributed to accelerating
implementation during the last year of the program and ensuring the
sustainability of investments.

1.4 Description of the Program Scope and Activities

14. At the time of appraisal in 2012, the World Bank supported the SRN bridge-related
activities (hereinafter referred to as the ‘SRN Bridge Program’ or ‘Program’), which was a
subset of the overall program of capital investment by the DoR in Nepal’s road and bridge
infrastructure.

15. Program overview. The scope of the SRN Bridge Program encompassed three
primary activities: (a) planning, technical design, and quality control of bridges; (b) major
and minor maintenance of existing bridge assets; and (c) new bridge construction. There were
also a number of complementary activities that fell outside the scope of the Program and
related to the overall DoR Road and Bridge Program. These activities included the DoR’s
Annual Road Maintenance Plan which was funded and monitored by the RBN and did
include some routine maintenance activities of bridges on the SRN.

16. The DoR had identified the following medium-term goals to make progress against
the intended SRN bridge-related outcomes: (a) completing all urgent major maintenance
requirements, (b) completing the current backlog of unfinished bridges already under
construction, (c) reducing the accumulated backlog of major maintenance requirements, (d)
undertaking minor and routine maintenance to prolong existing asset lives, and (e) continuing
to develop economically and socially important new bridge crossings. The World Bank’s
operation supported the DoR in developing more explicit quantitative targets for Program
results.

17. Sound investment planning and improved implementation procedures were critical for
the Program’s success. While bridges did require specialized expertise and some posed
significant engineering challenges, most bridges under the Program were relatively small and
involved straightforward engineering design. The existing stock of bridges on the SRN had
an average span of 43 m, 47 percent were single span (average length 22 m), and only about
10 percent had 6 or more spans (average length of 214 m). The cost estimates for the Program
suggested that for 71 percent of the SRN bridges requiring urgent major maintenance, the
costs would be less than US$250,000 per bridge. Similar estimates suggested that 85 percent
of the new bridges were likely to cost less than US$1 million per bridge. The single most
expensive bridge that was being considered was estimated to cost US$8 million. Costs of
engineering designs, feasibility studies, and quality management were estimated to be
approximately 5–6 percent of civil work spending.

18. Government commitment to the Program. The Government’s budget activity

reflected increased priority for the bridge sector. The overall DoR expenditures across its
bridge sector programs had increased substantially in subsequent years. Most notably, there
had been a 450 percent increase in the budget for major maintenance works—albeit from a
low base. In FY2011/12, the total budget for the SRN bridges was approximately US$10

5
million and the GoN had indicated that this figure would increase to US$18.5 million in the
next fiscal year. While this was encouraging, the estimated cost of meeting all the SRN
bridge needs was in the range of US$328 million. With government funding alone it may
have taken nearly two decades to meet all the SRN bridge-related needs. Adding inevitable
future needs would have extended this estimate further.

19. The SRN Bridge Program supported the Government’s efforts to clear the backlog of
urgent and major maintenance, which over time would reduce the overall maintenance
burden for bridges. That said, there were still huge needs in the sector and limited resources
and capacity. It was expected that the Government would continue to rely on donor financing
and technical assistance in the foreseeable future. The other key to sustainability was
ensuring high-quality construction and good bridge asset management. Through the
institutional strengthening supported by the Program, the management capacity of the DoR
and other implementing agencies would be enhanced, so that these agencies could better
carry out the responsibilities for management and delivery of services.

20. Fiscal context. It was expected that over the five-year program, Nepal’s SRN Bridge
Program would spend approximately US$29.5 million per year. This amount was equivalent
to 0.2 percent of the International Monetary Fund’s estimates for Nepal’s 2012 GDP or 3.3
percent of what the GoN budgeted for capital investment in FY2011/12. The GoN’s
contribution to the SRN Bridge Program over the five years (US$87.9 million) fit within the
MoF indicated US$185 million funding envelope for the GoN’s contribution toward all the
DoR bridge sector investment programs and left sufficient room for other programs.

21. The additional funding from the World Bank’s operation would support the SRN
Bridge Program to deliver an increased volume of civil works, which would have otherwise
not been possible with government funding alone. Regardless of the World Bank’s
involvement, the DoR would have continued taking up new SRN bridge construction on
account of the social and political importance of new bridges. However, the World Bank’s
support prevented the SRN Bridge Program from making a tradeoff between completing its
backlog of bridges under construction and undertaking critical major maintenance needed to
sustain the existing stock of SRN bridges. The amount of World Bank funds committed for
this operation (US$60 million) was roughly equivalent to the expected amount of SRN
Bridge Program spending on major maintenance over the five years (US$58.5 million).

22. Planning, technical design, and quality management. A minimum of 5 percent of

its civil works budgets (US$7.4 million over the Program support period) was budgeted for
activities to plan, prepare, supervise, and monitor the civil works, including social and
environmental aspects. This included funding for consulting services to prepare detailed
engineering designs, supervision of bridge construction works, quality assurance and
monitoring, data collection linked to bridge conditions and maintenance of the BMS, auditing
and verification, training, and miscellaneous activities.

23. SRN bridge maintenance. The SRN Bridge Program was expected to focus on
approximately 98 bridges (about 6,225 m) that urgently needed major maintenance to prevent
impending failures. Many of these bridges were considered structurally unsound and
therefore unsafe. The Program would also complete major maintenance (233 bridges; totaling
10,900 m in length) and minor maintenance (95 bridges; totaling 3,500 m in length) on
bridges that were in a relatively stable condition.

6
24. SRN bridge construction. The SRN Bridge Program would construct approximately
121 new bridges (6,000 m). This total included approximately 95 bridges (5,000 m) in the
existing DoR backlog of bridge construction. In addition, a total of 26 new bridges (1,000 m)
on existing gaps would be constructed.

25. Role of development partners. Several development partners were already

supporting the SRN bridge construction through stand-alone projects. Specifically, the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Government of the
Peoples’ Republic of China, and the Government of India were all funding portions of the
SRN bridge construction. These entities were financing bridges associated with individual
road projects and had applied their own procedures to govern project implementation along
with ‘ring-fenced’ project budgets. As such, these bridges fell outside the remit of the SRN
Bridge Program until these completed assets were transferred for long-term maintenance. On
the LRN, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) was providing a
technical assistance program to support motorable bridges. Also, ADB, the U.K. Department
for International Development, SDC, and the World Bank were providing support for a trail
bridge sectorwide program. The World Bank support was being provided under its Rural
Access Improvement and Decentralization Project.

26. Program expenditures. The estimated funding envelope for the SRN Bridge
Program over the five years was approximately US$147.6 million. This included an
indicative commitment of US$87.6 million from the GoN and the proposed World Bank
support of US$60 million.

27. Program exclusions. The SRN Bridge Program excluded bridges that, in the opinion
of the World Bank, were likely to have significant adverse impacts that are sensitive, diverse,
or unprecedented on the environment and/or affected people or involved procurement of (a)
works, estimated to cost US$50 million equivalent or more per contract; (b) goods, estimated
to cost US$30 million equivalent or more per contract; (c) non-consulting services, estimated
to cost US$20 million equivalent or more per contract; and (d) consultants’ services,
estimated to cost US$15 million equivalent or more per contract. The exclusion of non-
consulting and consultants’ services exceeding the abovementioned amounts were related to
the country’s limited procurement capacity in these areas. The estimates suggested that a total
of approximately 24 (out of 760 potential Program interventions) existing or planned bridges
would be excluded under the SRN Bridge Program. This was just over 3 percent of the total
interventions planned under the SRN Bridge Program. Most bridges in Nepal’s
environmentally sensitive areas were lower priority or were likely to be financed by other
sources and their exclusion would not have undermined the integrity of the Program.

1.5 Program Development Objective (PDO), Key Results, and Disbursement Linked
Indicators

28. The DoR had a Bridge Policy and Strategy (2004), which was setting out the overall
vision for the bridge program in Nepal. In that document, the program objective, which was
used as the PDO for this operation, was stated as follows: to provide safe, reliable, and cost-
effective bridges on Nepal’s Strategic Roads Network.

29. The emphasis in the SRN Bridge Program objective was to provide safe, reliable, and
cost-effective bridges. In the Bridge Policy and Strategy (2004), safety referred to design that
adequately addresses standard loading requirements, user safety and climate and seismic
resilience; reliability referred to uninterrupted access through adequate maintenance and

7
emergency measures, and cost-effectiveness referred to the use of sound bridge management
and commercial practice within the sector. Achievement of these objectives was measured
through the following PDO indicators:

 PDO Indicator 1: Improved condition of bridges on SRN

 PDO Indicator 2: Increased share of bridges on SRN meeting minimum loading

requirements

 PDO Indicator 3: Strengthened performance management in the bridge sector

30. Disbursements under the SRN Bridge Program were triggered by the achievement of
specific results contributing to the PDO indicators called disbursement-linked indicators
(DLIs). The DLIs were designed to be simple and to address the primary objective of this
engagement: moving from the current ad hoc approach to planning and prioritization to one
which is driven by technical, economic, and strategic priorities. The DLIs were heavily
weighted toward maintenance activities, with DLI-1 on major maintenance activities and
DLI-2 on minor maintenance activities accounting for 55 percent of the credit amount. DLI-
3, which relates to new construction or upgrading activities (where the priority was on the
backlog of unfinished bridges), accounted for 30 percent of funds allocated. This reflected the
importance of extending year-round access on the SRN as a second priority to consolidating
the condition of existing bridge assets. These three DLIs supported the achievement of PDO
Indicators 1 and 2 and disbursed against physical targets being met in terms of the cumulative
meters of completed bridges for maintenance and new construction works. However, to
reflect the importance of the developed BMS in improving the management of the sector, the
completed bridges would only contribute toward one of the DLI targets if they were included
in a list prioritized by the BMS, budgeted for in the budget cycle, and included in the annual
Procurement Plan.

31. Three DLIs were related to the achievement of PDO. Indicator 3 on strengthening
overall performance management in the sector. DLI-4 was also a PDO-level indicator. It
related to the timely implementation of contracts. DLI-4 was a proxy for cost-effectiveness
because timely implementation could only take place with improved planning and
implementation based on reliable data from the BMS combined with improvements in
procurement and contract management. While DLI-5 related to the continued updating and
operationalization of the BMS, DLI-6 related to the improved management of complaints as
they related to improved transparency and social accountability. These elements had a
combined weight of 15 percent.

32. The first three DLIs (1, 2, and 3) were output indicators from the SRN Bridge
Program and considered as the highest-level indicators that could be accurately measured
given the basic M&E systems that were in place. The other three (4, 5, and 6) were process-
level indicators that set out a number of actions designed to ensure that the outputs were
delivered in a way that is cost-effective, transparent, and of the highest quality. Table 1
summarizes the DLIs.

33. The Results Framework Matrix for the SRN Bridge Program is provided in annex 1,
and annex 2 provides the details of the DLIs and their verification protocols.

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 Table 1. DLIs
Total
Disbursement
Percentage of
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Amount
Total Credit
(US$,
millions)
DLIs related to the achievement of PDO Indicator 1 and 2
DLI-1: Completion of major
maintenance of bridges on SRN 425 2,575 6,225 11,025 17,125 30 50
(cumulative meters)
DLI-2: Completion of minor
maintenance of bridges on SRN 700 1,400 2,100 2,800 3,500 3 5
(cumulative meters)
DLI-3: New bridges built or
improved on SRN (cumulative 1,700 2,800 3,800 5,100 6,000 18 30
meters)
DLIs related to PDO Indicator 3
DLI-4: Strengthened
performance management in
bridge sector (percentage of 20 25 30 40 50 3 5
bridge works completed on
planned schedule)
DLI-5: Improved Bridge Asset The BMS fully The BMS fully Condition survey Condition survey Condition survey 3 5
Management operational in 15 operational in all undertaken on at undertaken on at undertaken on at
divisional/regional 30 least 20% of the least 40% of the least 60% of the
offices divisional/regional SRN SRN SRN
offices
DLI-6: Increased effectiveness Grievance Report disclosed Report disclosed Report disclosed Report disclosed 3 5
of the institutions responsible redressal detailing status of detailing status of detailing status of detailing status of
for bridge sector management mechanism (GRM) complaints and complaints and complaints and complaints and
implemented in the actions on F&C actions on F&C actions on F&C actions on F&C
DoR and report and those related to and those related to and those related to and those related
disclosed detailing social and social and social and to social and
status of environmental environmental environmental environmental
complaints and issues issues issues issues
actions on fraud

9
 Total
Disbursement
Percentage of
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Amount
Total Credit
(US$,
millions)
and corruption
(F&C) and those
related to social
and environmental
issues
Total amount disbursed
8.8 9.2 11.5 14.7 15.8 60 100
(US$, millions)†

10
1.6 Main Beneficiaries

34. The main beneficiaries of the SRN Bridge Program were road users who benefited
from year-round access through structurally safe bridges to social and economic facilities and
services. Given the networkwide nature of the Program, the beneficiaries included all road
users in the country, including transport operators (both freight and passenger) and women,
children, poor, and physically challenged persons, who used their services. The new bridge
construction in the remote areas of the country benefited an estimated 3 million people, either
directly or indirectly. Evidence suggested that improved physical access to health facilities
and educational institutions would particularly benefit women, especially during the rainy
seasons. Investment in the Program would generate approximately 12 million person-days of
employment, including long-term maintenance work. Women were expected to get a fair
share of these opportunities. A separate impact evaluation study was planned under the
Program to estimate the actual benefits to various social and gender groups.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Key Factors during Preparation

Fit of Design with the GoN and World Bank Priorities

35. At the time of appraisal in 2012, support to the SRN Bridge Program was consistent
with the ISN for Nepal (FY2012/13), particularly the first pillar that related to enhancing
connectivity and productivity for growth. Poor road and bridge quality was seen as one of the
main constraints to the provision of universal physical access. The ISN explicitly mentioned
supporting bridge-related interventions in Nepal to extend year-round accessibility and
improve the quality of existing bridges. The support to the SRN Bridge Program was also
consistent with GoN priorities, as the Program was a subset of the GoN’s overall program of
capital investment in Nepal’s road and bridge infrastructure, which was prepared according to
the PIP (2007–2016) for the road sector that prioritized investments to reach targeted
accessibility levels by 2016.

Selectivity in Design

36. The design of the SRN Bridge Program focused on critical major and minor
maintenance needed to sustain the existing stock of SRN bridges, thus preventing the
Program from making a tradeoff between completing its backlog of bridges under
construction and undertaking the needed critical maintenance. The design also excluded
bridges that were likely to have significant adverse impacts on the environment and/or
affected people or involved high-risk large procurement. A total of approximately 24 (out of
760 potential Program interventions) existing or planned bridges were excluded under the
SRN Bridge Program. This was just over 3 percent of the total interventions planned under
the SRN Bridge Program. Most bridges in Nepal’s environmentally sensitive areas were a
lower priority or were likely to be financed by other sources and their exclusion did not
undermine the integrity of the Program.

Sustaining the Planning and Quality Management Capacity within the DoR

37. The design of the SRN Bridge Program included crucial interventions related to
strengthening planning, technical design, and quality management capacity within the DoR.
These interventions included activities to plan, prepare, supervise, and monitor the civil

11
works, including social and environmental aspects. The funding was made available for
consulting services to prepare detailed engineering designs, supervision of bridge
construction works, quality assurance and monitoring, data collection linked to bridge
conditions and maintenance of the BMS, auditing and verification, training, and so on. These
activities were intended to sustain the planning and quality management capacity of the DoR
which had been supported under the closed World Bank-financed RSDP. Under the RSDP,
support had been provided for updating bridge inventory and condition data, developing the
BMS, and preparing prioritized maintenance and investment plans based on sound technical,
economic, and social criteria. The BMS included updated asset inventory data. The DoR had
worked to fully integrate the BMS into its operating processes.

2.2 Key Factors that Affected Implementation

38. The implementation of the SRN Bridge Program benefited from its comprehensive
design to achieve its objectives. The adoption of the PforR instrument was welcomed, as it
focused the Government’s attention on outcomes rather than on inputs. Initially, the Program
faced declining performance from mid-2013 to end of 2014 due to a change in the DoR
management. The indifferent leadership during this time slowed down the Program
implementation. Further delays in 2015 were due to a number of reasons, including the
devastating earthquake of April 2015. The earthquake caused the priorities of the GoN to
change to provide immediate relief and reconstruction work to main roads and bridges.
During this period, the Program had fallen considerably behind in all key areas, such as not
using the BMS in the selection of FY2013/14 bridges for new construction, not making
progress on the BMS data verification and update, lacking progress on DLIs, delaying the
submission of dossiers for verification, and ignoring bridge quality management. Therefore,
until early 2015, the Program’s ability to achieve future DLI targets was questionable.

39. Despite losing approximately one and a half years of implementation, the Program
achieved its targets due to the GoN’s initiatives that were responsible for the Program’s
remarkable turnaround. The Program progressed very well during its last year. The DoR had
also increased the amount of resources spent on the maintenance of the SRN bridges
significantly in the later years. The amount spent on bridge maintenance in FY2015/16 (over
NPR 1,000 million) was over five times the amount spent at the inception year of the
Program in FY2012/13 (just over NPR 200 million). Also, the allocation for new construction
of the SRN bridges stabilized and hovered between NPR 2,000 million (FY2014/15) and
NPR 1,800 million (FY2016/17) in the last three years. This showed the Government’s
commitment to the preservation of existing bridge assets instead of the creation of new assets.

40. The implementation of the Program has also contributed to introducing innovative
design and construction techniques in the bridge sector, such as the introduction of
prestressed concrete bridges and precast concrete, the use of carbon fiber and micropiling in
bridge maintenance, and so on. The Program introduced new methods for bridge inspection
and testing, such as the use of bridge inspection vehicles and nondestructive testing
equipment. The Program also introduced the adoption of the Design and Build approach in
works contracts.

41. This Program was the first of the two PforR Programs approved by the World Bank
Board. Therefore, the efficacy of the PforR instrument, to some extent, depended on its
success. The Program closed successfully on July 15, 2017. It achieved all its objectives and
targets before its closure. Following a request from the Government, the Program was
restructured on January 13, 2017. The restructuring has revised two Program DLI targets

12
(DLI-1: major maintenance and DLI-2: minor maintenance) and reallocated the credit
proceeds between them. The DLI-1 and DLI-2 targets were revised to 14,125 m (original
17,125 m) and 10,000 m (original 3,500 m) respectively.

42. On the other hand, the planned Program’s impact evaluation study was not conducted
due to the lack of funds under the Program. The baseline data collection was completed at the
beginning of the Program with funds from a Trust Fund, but the end-of-program data were
not collected nor analyzed. This study would have been very useful in the evaluation of the
impact of the Program on the road users and on the accessibility of the Program beneficiaries
to social and economic services. A provision is required in the follow-up project for the
collection of ex post data and an analysis of the Program’s impact making use of the ex post
ante and ex post data. It is important to note that the lack of Program impact evaluation did
not affect the monitoring of Program results because the BMS was the primary source for
monitoring results under the SRN Bridge Program.

43. The following are some of the challenges faced during the Program implementation:

(a) Delays in major maintenance of bridges. This delay required continuous

monitoring of ongoing major maintenance contracts. The reason for this delay
was the large number of bridges that required major maintenance works,
especially after the damage incurred by the earthquake in Nepal, and the limited
capacity of local contractors executing the works.

(b) Poor bridge construction quality. Poor construction quality was a constant
issue throughout implementation. The National Planning Commission (NPC) had
not recommended disbursement of four new bridges during the verification
process due to their poor quality. These cases were referred to the CIAA. The
World Bank team worked closely with the DoR in improving the construction
quality. The main reason for the poor construction was the lack of resources in
the number of the DoR supervision staff and the limited experience of the DoR
staff to supervise the construction of new bridges. This issue could have been
mitigated by hiring qualified consulting firms to undertake the construction
supervision and provide capacity building in quality control and assurance to the
DoR staff. The PforR instrument contributed to enhancing the quality assurance
mechanisms within the Government’s bridge program, by introducing
independent verification systems and processes undertaken by public entities
such as the NVC and the CIAA.

(c) Poor occupational health and safety (OHS) on construction sites. The poor
enforcement of OHS has led to two fatal accidents in the construction sites
during the five years of Program implementation. The two fatalities happened in
FY2012/13 and FY2015/16. No further fatal accidents were reported since then.
Regarding the proper implementation of the OHS management procedures, the
inclusion of OHS in the contractor’s contracts in charge of the rehabilitation and
construction of the bridges was implemented in the last two years of the project,
which improved the strengthening of OHS on construction sites. The Program
has been leading the effort to make construction sites safer. It has also made
substantial progress in this regard by the end of the Program by enforcing OHS
measures on all sites and providing safety equipment to construction workers. It
is, however, necessary to sustain this effort. The proposed follow-on operation—

13
 BIMP II—should make provisions in order to further advance on this critical
issue.

Program Action Plan (PAP) Implementation

44. All 14 actions of the PAP were implemented satisfactorily. This materially
contributed to strengthening capacity and systems and, therefore, to achieving the Program
objectives. The one action of the PAP that was completed but still needs updating is related to
the operationalization of the Bridge Operation Toolkit that summarizes various bridge
planning, construction, maintenance, and management procedures. Recent changes in the
Nepal Public Procurement Act (PPA) have necessitated some modifications of the toolkit,
which are being incorporated. See annex 3 for more details.

Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols

45. The SRN Bridge Program was planned over a five-year period with disbursements up
to a maximum of US$60 million (SDR 38.7 million) over this period. However, due to the
depreciation of the SDR to the U.S. dollar, the total credit amount decreased to US$54.3
million by the end of the Program, which affected the extent to which the World Bank
financing contributed to the Government’s SRN Bridge Program. Moreover, the GoN spent
US$43 million on the SRN Bridge Program out of the initial budget allocation of US$87.9
million from the Government at the time of appraisal. The first three indicators (DLI-1, DLI-
2, and DLI-3) were fully scalable meaning that they could be adjusted to reflect the
performance of the SRN Bridge Program. The DLI targets were specified as the cumulative
number of meters completed for either the maintenance or new construction activities. A
bridge was only counted toward the target when it was completed. Partial completion of a
bridge did not count toward the target. The values over the period of the Program also took
into consideration the gradual improvement in implementation momentum in certain parts of
the Program. Where targets were not met in any particular year, the related disbursements
were rolled over into the next year. If the Program consistently outperformed the targets, the
credit/loans could be fully disbursed before the formal end of the operation.

46. The remaining DLIs were process DLIs. Two of which, DLI-4 on contract
implementation and DLI-5 on BMS updating, were partially scalable. DLI-6 on the GRM
was an ‘all-or-nothing’ target, which was considered both essential and achievable.

47. The BMS was the basis for providing the data needed for verifying most of the
Program results. The results from the BMS were validated through a verification process
undertaken by the NPC. The results were also uploaded on the DoR website. This provided
an opportunity for the general public to lodge any complaints linked to the improvement and
maintenance of bridges. To provide financing on time, an advance of US$15 million (or 25
percent of World Bank financing) was made when the operation became effective. Similar
advances were also made at the beginning of each financial year on a rolling basis and
provided funds were recovered through meeting subsequent DLIs. At the end of each period a
reconciliation was made based on the achievement of the DLIs in the preceding period and
forecast expenditures for the next. These arrangements ensured that the Program did not
suffer from implementation delays because of a shortage of funds, which was a common
problem in the Government’s program.

48. During 2013 to 2017, the NVC, a public entity in charge of technical auditing,
conducted 46 technical audits of different bridge construction and maintenance works. The

14
NVC selected a 20 percent sample of bridge works from different regions and topographies.
Out of this sample, the NPC did not recommend disbursement of four new bridges during the
verification process due to their poor quality. These cases were referred to the CIAA.

49. By closure of the Program, all six DLIs achieved their targets and the full credit
amount was disbursed (see annex 2).
Table 2. Achievement of DLIs

Revised Target
DLIs Original Target Achieved Remarks
(Restructuring)
DLI-1: Completion of 17,125 m 14,125 m 16,139 m Target overachieved
major maintenance of
bridges on SRN
(Length of bridge in
meters that has
completed major
maintenance)
DLI-2: Completion of 3,500 m 10,000 m 10,729 m Target overachieved
minor maintenance of
bridges on SRN
(Length of bridges
that have completed
minor maintenance)
DLI-3: New bridges 6,000 m 6,000 m 6,618 m Target overachieved
built or improved on
SRN
(Length of bridge in
meters
built/improved)
DLI-4: Strengthened 50 50 63 Target overachieved
performance
management in bridge
sector
(Percentage of bridge
works completed on
planned schedule)
DLI-5: Improved BMS fully BMS fully BMS fully Target overachieved
Bridge Asset operational in all operational in all operational in
Management 30 30 25 division and
divisional/regional divisional/regional 5 regional
offices; Condition offices; Condition offices;
survey undertaken survey undertaken Condition
on at least 60% of on at least 60% of survey
the SRN the SRN undertaken on
100% of the
SRN

15
 Revised Target
DLIs Original Target Achieved Remarks
(Restructuring)
DLI-6: Increased GRM GRM GRM developed Target achieved
effectiveness of the implemented in implemented in and is being
institutions the DoR and the DoR and made
responsible for bridge report disclosed report disclosed operational;
sector management detailing status of detailing status of Report disclosed
complaints and complaints and each year
actions on F&C actions on F&C detailing status
and those related and those related of complaints
to social and to social and and actions on
environmental environmental F&C and those
issues issues related to social
and
environmental
issues

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

Quality of M&E Rating: Satisfactory

Design

50. The PDO was clearly specified in the Program Appraisal Document and the Results
Framework had clear PDO indicators and DLIs to measure the progress in achieving the PDO
in providing safe, reliable, and cost-effective bridges. Considerable effort and care went into
the design of the Results Framework and the selection of indicators. With the adoption of a
results-based approach under the PforR, M&E was of major importance.

Implementation

51. The BMS was the primary basis for monitoring results under the SRN Bridge
Program. The BMS, in conjunction with appropriate Geographic Information Systems
software and spatial data, had the ability to provide data on (a) physical bridge characteristics
and recent works (for example, location, or meters constructed/maintained); (b) network
information (for example, potential detour time if a bridge is out of service); and (c) ‘soft’
variables such as the population served by a bridge. To control the quality of the BMS data,
the DoR developed a hierarchy of checks and approvals that aligns with the SRN Bridge
Program’s implementation structure.

52. An impact evaluation study for the SRN Bridge Program was also planned under a
separate technical assistance. This study would have looked at the impacts of new SRN
bridge construction. Specific areas for consideration would have included assessing travel
time savings for various road users and the broader socioeconomic impacts of new SRN
bridges. However, this impact evaluation study was not completed due to the lack of funds
under the Program. The baseline data collection was completed at the beginning of the
Program with funds from a Trust Fund, but the end-of-program data were not collected nor
analyzed. A provision is required in the follow-up project for the collection of ex post data
and an analysis of the Program’s impact making use of the ex post ante and ex post data.

2.4 Fiduciary and Safeguard Compliance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

16
53. At appraisal, an integrated fiduciary assessment had been carried out. It assessed the
fiduciary arrangements relevant to the SRN Bridge Program to determine whether they could
provide reasonable assurance that the Program funds will be used for their intended purpose.
Based on the assessment carried out, it was concluded that the overall fiduciary framework
for the SRN Bridge Program was adequate to support the Program implementation and to
achieve the desired results.

54. The GoN had a well-developed budget process along with a Medium-Term
Expenditure Framework and sectoral business plans. However, there were inadequacies in
their implementation. To address the fiduciary risks arising out of these shortcomings, the
MoF provided an indicative resource envelope for three years at a time for the SRN Bridge
Program against which annual plans were prepared. The ministry also informed the DoR of
the annual allocations of budgetary resources well in advance at the start of the fiscal year.
This was to ensure that the divisional offices had time to prepare the annual operating plans
based on a firm assurance of resource availability. Therefore, the risk linked to the
availability of financial resources to meet the Program’s operational requirements was low.

55. The NVC carried out integrated technical audits that examined the adherence of the
SRN Bridge Program to the technical, procurement, and social and environmental standards
and guidelines. The DoR referred all credible allegations/complaints regarding corrupt
practices to the MoPPWTM. If specific instances of F&C were identified, investigations were
conducted through the CIAA in accordance with Nepal’s laws and regulations.

56. The Program’s fiduciary performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The Program
has withdrawn all its allocated amount (SDR 38.7 million). The DoR continued to submit the
Financial Management Report on time. However, the Program faced some delays in
conducting the internal audit. Moreover, a few audit reports were also submitted with delay.

57. Although good lessons have been learned from the adoption of the Design and Build
approach in works contracts under the Program, the approach needs to be put on a stronger
legal footing in Nepal. Contract management also remained a challenge, which would need to
be improved in the proposed follow-up Program. Some bridge maintenance contracts
required price adjustments due to variations because of an increase or decrease of quantity of
items and/or the inclusion of new items. The contracts signed with the contractors did not
have a provision for price adjustment, which was a weak point in the contracts. The DoR was
accordingly required to conduct due diligence before providing price adjustment payments to
the contractors.

Environmental and Social Risks

58. At appraisal, an Environment and Social Systems Assessment was carried out. Given
the SRN Bridge Program’s scope, coverage, and size of the bridges, the adverse
environmental issues and impacts related to program implementation were limited in nature
and also in their geographic extent. While the Program was national in scope, it excluded
some investments that had an effect on environmentally sensitive areas such as Government-
listed national parks and conservation areas. At the same time, the Program delivered a
number of environmental benefits. The rehabilitation and maintenance of bridges ensured that
the risks of bridge failure were reduced and that erosion and sedimentation were minimized
through repair of failing foundations and river training or abutment works. Improved
performance of the DoR with respect to environmental planning and management helped
ensure that issues were identified earlier and more consistently and that contractors were

17
supervised more regularly with respect to the environmental provisions of contracts being
enforced more consistently.

59. Moreover, there were limited adverse impacts from land acquisition and resettlement
from the SRN Bridge Program, and the adverse social impacts were temporary. This was
because the area of impact was confined, mostly, within bridge worksites. Similar to
environmental benefits, the SRN Bridge Program benefited many isolated communities due
to improved physical access. The Program also benefited indigenous communities who
constitute a third of Nepal’s population.

60. Performance of environmental and social safeguards continued to be moderately

satisfactory. The DoR has completed all three PAP environmental and social actions,
including updating the DoR Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) to
cater to bridge-related environmental and social issues. All agreed actions were completed,
including the recruitment of two OHS specialists and the preparation of safeguards
implementation summary note. Safeguard teams, at the central and field levels, continued
their supervision and compliance monitoring of the ongoing bridge works. There were no
social or environmental risk mitigation issues that were unresolved. Any proposed follow-up
Program would need to deepen the gains made under this Program. Two main issues that
could be included in a follow-up Program are (a) improving the process of the timely
integration of safeguards assessments and inputs to engineering designs and bidding
documents, particularly in the case of Design and Build contracts and (b) improving OHS
more effectively, including the development of DoR-wide OHS guidelines and guidelines for
labor management. These guidelines could be based on those prepared by the International
Labour Organization.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

61. On May 15, 2016, the World Bank received a Government request to support a
second phase of the BIMP. The World Bank started the related project preparation. Although
the Program achievements are significant, the last review mission identified a few areas that
need further strengthening in the proposed follow-up Program, including the following:

(a) Further deepening the quality of bridgeworks. It is necessary to further

strengthen the bridgeworks quality assurance process. All bridgework
contracts have Quality Assurance Plans (QAPs) that are being implemented.
However, there remain concerns regarding the accurate implementation of the
plans, especially the quality control process, including material testing.

(b) OHS at bridge construction sites, including addressing the labor

accommodation and labor influx issues. Although the BIMP has been
leading the efforts with the DoR in this area, there is scope for further
improvements. It is necessary to develop an OHS policy and guidelines to
systematically address OHS issues. Another area that needs attention is the
labor accommodation and labor influx issues. The World Bank has also
undertaken a study to tackle the labor influx issues. The recommendation of
the study could be implemented in the proposed follow-up Program

(c) Bridge site monitoring (BSM) software and its expanded use. The BIMP
has developed a BSM application that is now being rolled out to field offices.
It is necessary for the follow-up Program to ensure that the application

18
 becomes a part of the regular bridgework monitoring process. A simplified
version of the application can be developed for the general public to report on
the quality of the ongoing bridgeworks or any bridge-related events (for
instance, collapse of a bridge).

(d) Mainstreaming of the contract monitoring system developed under an

IDA-assisted project. The World Bank-financed RSDP has developed a
Contract Management System (CMS) for the DoR. It was recognized during
the implementation of the BIMP that there were further requirements for
improving contract management within the bridge subsector in the DoR. The
follow-up Program should endeavor to use the CMS in improving the contract
management of bridges in the DoR.

3. Assessment of Outcomes
Rating: Satisfactory

62. This section assesses the overall results of the Program. Measuring results against the
targets set, the assessment confirms that the Program has contributed to a cultural change in
Nepal’s bridge sector by contributing to major improvements in the bridge sector’s planning,
design, and management of assets and by increasing transparency, accountability, and
inclusiveness. The accompanying investments supported under the Program had a significant
impact on improving the population’s accessibility to social services and economic
opportunities. The Program is assessed as relevant and the results efficiently delivered, often
more than the target and with good prospects of sustainability. The assessment therefore finds
the overall outcome of the Program Satisfactory.

3.1 Relevance of Program Objectives

Rating: High

63. The relevance of the Program objective is rated High at Program closing, based on
Nepal’s current development priorities and current World Bank Country Partnership Strategy
(CPS). This evaluation is based on () the current World Bank strategy in effect (CPS 2014–
2018) and (b) the ongoing engagement of the World Bank to meet the GoN’s request for a
second phase of the Program. Specifically, the GoN’s positive assessment of the SRN Bridge
Program, as a whole, and the commitment from the highest level to duplicate this successful
Program demonstrates the continued relevance of the Program to national priorities. On the
World Bank’s side, current priorities in the CPS (2014–2018) build on Nepal’s achievements,
including those of the SRN Bridge Program, to emphasize inclusive growth and strengthened
governance and institutions for improved service delivery and accessibility to all citizens.

64. More importantly, Nepal’s topography and geology complicate the provision of
adequate transport infrastructure. The lack of physical access was seen as one of the root
causes of the past conflict and instability in the country. This lack of connectivity had
adversely affected the ability of people, particularly in the rural areas, to participate in
economic activities and access quality health care and education services. As a result, Nepal’s
economic growth is dependent on people’s connectivity to reach its potential. Therefore, one
of the current key priorities of the GoN is to invest in physical and social infrastructure to
attain broad-based growth and poverty reduction, through maintaining existing bridge
infrastructure and building new bridges to ensure safe and reliable connectivity, given the
significant role that bridges play in peoples’ connectivity due to Nepal’s challenging terrain.

19
65. Evidence has shown, according to the midterm review of sectorwide road study and
PIP (2015), that the expansion of the SRN to its current (operational and under construction)
length of 12,809 km has achieved the primary goal of improving the overall levels of
accessibility throughout the country. The role of the SRN is to provide connectivity
throughout the country and enable improved levels of accessibility to be achieved locally
through the development and expansion of the local road and bridge networks.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: High

66. The efficacy of the program is rated High, as measured by the PDOs. The emphasis in
the SRN Bridge Program’s objective was to provide safe, reliable, and cost-effective bridges.
In the Bridge Policy and Strategy (2004), safety referred to design that adequately addresses
standard loading requirements and user safety; reliability referred to uninterrupted access
through adequate maintenance and emergency measures; and cost-effectiveness referred to
the use of sound bridge management and commercial practice within the sector. The
achievement of these objectives was measured through the following PDO indicators.

PDO Indicator 1: Improved condition of bridges on SRN

Rating: Substantial

67. The efficacy of this element of the PDO ‘reliability of bridges’ is rated Substantial
because it exceeded the end-of-program target. Based on the BMS monitoring tool under the
Program, 481 bridges (81.2 percent of the bridges under the SRN Bridge Program) have
improved condition (good or fair condition) and are under routine maintenance or require
only minor maintenance. This result exceeds the end-of-program target of 376 bridges (75
percent of the bridges under the SRN Bridge Program). This excellent result was achieved by
conducting major maintenance of the existing bridges and by constructing new bridges under
the SRN Bridge Program (see annex 1).

68. However, because of the NPC’s decision not to recommend disbursement of four new
bridges during the verification process due to their poor quality, the efficacy of this element
of the PDO was rated Substantial.

69. All related programmed actions in the PAP were satisfactorily achieved, social and
environmental impacts were successfully managed, and operation and maintenance and
longer-term sustainability of the assets were ensured by the DoR. Both DLIs, on completion
of major maintenance of bridges and bridges built or improved, achieved full disbursement
(see annex 2). Improved reliability of bridges has increased the access of the population to
social services and economic opportunities.

PDO Indicator 2: Reduced number of structurally unsafe bridges

Rating: High

70. The efficacy of this element of the PDO ‘safety of bridges’ is rated High because it
has achieved the end-of-program target. Based on the BMS monitoring tool under the
Program, the percentage of bridges on the SRN rated as structurally unsafe was reduced from
6 percent in 2012 to 1 percent in 2017. A total of 85 bridges were made structurally safe
through undertaking urgent major maintenance. This result achieved the end-of-program
target of 1 percent bridges on the SRN rated as structurally unsafe. See annex 1.

20
71. All related programmed actions in the PAP were satisfactorily achieved. As
mentioned earlier, both DLIs on the completion of major and minor maintenance of bridges
achieved full disbursement (see annex 2). Improved safety of bridges has increased the safety
and connectivity of road users.

PDO Indicator 3: Strengthened performance management in the bridge sector

Rating: High

72. The efficacy of this element of the PDO ‘cost-efficiency of bridges’ is rated High
because it has achieved the end-of-program target. Based on the BMS, the percentage of
bridge works completed on planned schedule was increased from 20 percent in 2012 to 63
percent in 2017. This result achieved the end-of-program target of 50 percent bridge works
completed on planned schedule.

73. All related programmed actions in the PAP were satisfactorily achieved. One of the
completed actions needs updating. This action is related to the operationalization of the
Bridge Operation Toolkit that summarizes various bridge planning, construction,
maintenance, and management procedures. Recent changes in the Nepal PPA have
necessitated some modifications of the toolkit, which are being incorporated. The DLIs
related to strengthened performance management in the bridge sector, improved bridge asset
management, and increased effectiveness of the institutions responsible for bridge sector
management achieved full disbursement (see annex 2). The abovementioned three DLIs have
increased the cost-efficiency of bridge construction in Nepal, as demonstrated by the
project’s economic analysis in annex 7.

3.3 Efficiency
Rating: Substantial

74. The efficiency of the Program is rated Substantial. For this Implementation
Completion and Results Report (ICR), the World Bank undertook an economic analysis
(annex 7) of a sample of bridges that were constructed or maintained under the Program.
Overall, the study confirmed the findings of implementation review and support missions:
that bridge construction and maintenance were mostly executed on time, with acceptable
quality of works. This was done through competitive tendering, professional specifications,
and costs that are in line with costs recorded for similar public sector projects, and generally
sound arrangements for management and financing of operation and maintenance. In a few
cases, the quality of works was an issue such as in the case of the abovementioned four
bridges that were rejected due to issues related to the quality of construction.

75. In general, the Design and Build type of contract used under the Program has
decreased the cost of bridge construction and reduced the construction duration as evidenced
by the fact that 63 percent of the bridges were completed on time (DLI-4) and that no claims
were issued for delay penalties nor price adjustments were made during implementation.
Moreover, the use of new construction technologies and practices, such as carbon fibers and
precast concrete, were much more cost-effective than the traditional practices, because these
new practices allowed the contractor to work without disruption of traffic. See the economic
analysis in annex 7.

76. Summary of the economic analysis. The economic analysis of the SRN Bridge
Program was conducted based on a sample of bridges requiring urgent major maintenance,
new construction, and capacity expansion. Nine bridges were selected at appraisal that reflect

21
the typical types of interventions. The selected bridges included three bridges of each
category: new construction, rehabilitation, and capacity improvement. The intervention was
appraised over a period to 2033 and the rate of discount and the opportunity cost of capital
were taken at 12 percent. Road user cost savings were calculated using the World Bank’s
Roads Economic Decision software. Traffic growth rates were estimated at 6.6 percent over
the period of the appraisal and maintenance costs at 1.8 percent per year of the new
construction cost.

77. The model assumptions adopted at appraisal were maintained at the ex post economic
analysis. Out of the nine bridges, eight were constructed under the current project and were,
thus, evaluated. The analysis showed very high rates of return particularly for major
maintenance activities and capacity enhancements but lower returns for new construction.
Except for one bridge (Goji), the overall ex post economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of
these bridges was estimated well above 12 percent, which shows that the project has a robust
economic justification. While the project encountered a few delays in implementation,
adequate implementation contributed to its satisfactory efficiency.

78. As shown in the table 7.1, the ex post economic evaluation yields high net present
values (NPVs) and high EIRRs for all but one bridge at a discount rate of 12 percent.

79. The economic analysis has also assessed the impact of the poor quality of works on
bridge life by undertaking a sensitivity analysis for different scenarios related to (a) asset life,
and (b) maintenance costs. The results of the sensitivity analysis for the following three
scenarios: (a) asset life reduced to 10 years and incremental maintenance cost increased to (b)
5 percent and (c) 10 percent of capital cost are summarized in table 7.2. It demonstrates that
poor construction quality may affect economic viability. Scenarios (a) reducing asset life to
10 years and (c) increasing maintenance cost to 10 percent show the highest sensitivity.
However, in all but one case the economic justification remains robust among the bridges that
were economically justified in the base case. For bridge Bangandi (narrow bridge at
appraisal), the base scenario yields an EIRR of 16.5 percent, whereas in the sensitivity
analysis scenario (a) yields –3.1 percent and scenario (c) yields 10.9 percent. See table 7.2 for
further details.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

80. As mentioned earlier, the Program was relevant to both the country and World Bank
priorities at both appraisal and during implementation. The results demonstrate that the
Program delivered the intended outcomes and achieved the PDO. Table 3 summarizes how
the PDO indicators were met and exceeded. All three results indicators were achieved and
two of them even exceeded their targets (see annex 1).

81. The assessment of the Program’s success in the three areas: relevance, efficacy, and
efficiency, is summarized as follows:

(a) Relevance - High. The Program, as at the time of its preparation, is still relevant
in the current development context of Nepal. The Program supports the objective
of the 14th three-year Transport Sector National Periodic Plan. The transport
sector objective in the plan is to provide safe and reliable connectivity. The
Program constructed and maintained bridges that either enhanced connectivity or

22
 maintained connectivity. The Program’s planned maintenance activities helped in
making provision for safe and reliable connectivity.

(b) Efficacy - High. The Program has achieved all PDO and intermediate results
indicators. The six DLISs have also been achieved.

(c) Efficiency - Substantial.

(i) The Program maintenance interventions prolonged the life of bridges, which
is economically more viable than their premature replacement due to non-
maintenance;

(ii) Modern maintenance techniques have enabled prolonging life of bridges,

which might not have been possible with traditional maintenance
techniques. Without the use of these techniques, the repaired bridges would
have required replacement. Again, this constitutes economic viability of the
approaches under the BIMP;

(iii) The BIMP undertook emergency major maintenance of a number of unsafe

or nearly collapsing bridges on a priority basis. This approach again
constitutes to economic gains;

(iv) The Program adopted a Design and Build approach, which has captured the
private sector’s efficiency; and

(v) The Program has successfully reduced the contract execution time for
bridges, which resulted in savings from nonpayments of price adjustments
and delay compensation expenditures.

(vi) Although, as demonstrated by the economic analysis, the poor construction

quality may affect the economic viability of the Program by reducing the
assets life and increasing the maintenance cost in the future. For that reason,
the Program Efficiency was rated Substantial.

82. These results are particularly noteworthy given that the Program is the first
infrastructure Program financed by the World Bank’s PforR financing instrument. The
Program closed as planned on July 15, 2017. It is one of the few programs in the history of
the World Bank’s engagement in the Nepal transport sector that closed on time, achieving all
its objectives and targets. Also, the Program passed through rough patches, losing over two
years of implementation time due to a number of reasons, including the sudden change of
Program management, post-earthquake uncertainties from end-April 2015, and unofficial
trade blockades along the Nepal-India borders for over six months. The Program also
facilitated the introduction of the PforR instrument in Nepal as the Government has
confirmed the effectiveness of the instrument. This led to the use of this instrument in at least
two other sectors—health and education. Therefore, the Program can be termed successful.

83. Overall, a positive judgement on the Program’s high relevance, achievement of

targeted results, positive impacts on beneficiaries’ lives, and institutional development
justifies a rating of Satisfactory.

23
 Table 3. PDO-level Results Indicators
End-of-
Baseline Current
Indicators program Remarks
(%) Achievements (%)
Target (%)
PDO-level Results Indicators
Indicator 1: Improved
75 (376 bridges 81.2 (481
condition of bridges
53 improved to the bridges Target overachieved
(Percentage of SRN bridges in
stated condition) improved)
good or fair condition)
Indicator 2: Reduced number
1 (85 bridges 1 (85 bridges
of structurally unsafe bridges
6 made made Target achieved
(Percentage of SRN bridges
structurally safe) structurally safe)
rated as structurally safe)
Indicator 3: Strengthened
performance management
(Percentage of bridges works 20 50 63 Target overachieved
completed on planned
schedule)
Intermediate Results Indicators
All the intermediate indicators are DLIs (six in number). All of them are achieved.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts

(a) Citizen Engagement and Gender Aspects of the Program

84. Ensuring citizen engagement in such a Program with mainly small-value interventions
in widely dispersed and remote areas has been found to be extremely challenging. The
Program has adopted innovative approaches to enhance citizen engagement, including the
design and operationalization of the GRM, the provision of signing boards on all construction
sites with contact details of the responsible official(s) to be contacted in addressing
grievances, and informing the general public about the Program plan using local FM radio
stations.

(b) Institutional Strengthening

85. The design of the SRN Bridge Program included crucial interventions related to
strengthening planning, technical design, and quality management capacity within the DoR.
These interventions included activities to plan, prepare, supervise, and monitor the civil
works, including social and environmental aspects. The funding was made available for
consulting services to prepare detailed engineering designs, supervision of bridge
construction works, quality assurance and monitoring, data collection linked to bridge
conditions and maintenance of the BMS, auditing and verification, training, and so on. These
activities were intended to sustain the planning and quality management capacity of the DoR
that had been supported under the closed World Bank-financed RSDP. Under the RSDP,
support had been provided for updating bridge inventory and condition data, developing the
BMS, and preparing prioritized maintenance and investment plans based on sound technical,
economic, and social criteria. The BMS included updated asset inventory data. The DoR
worked to fully integrate the BMS into its operating processes.

(c) Other Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

86. Improvement to government processes. The GoN had a bridge program of its own
during the design of the BIMP. It was one of the major capital investment programs of the
GoN. However, it was not effective due to several issues, including a nontransparent bridges

24
prioritization process and poor construction quality. These factors resulted in the construction
of poor quality bridges on non-priority routes. Furthermore, the bridge maintenance planning
and implementation was ad hoc, and the proportion of funding for maintenance was not
adequate when compared with new bridge construction. This was an opportune moment for
the World Bank to support the Government’s program.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

87. Risks were reviewed throughout the implementation period and were systematically
assessed by the implementation support missions as Substantial. This assessment remains
valid at completion in respect of risks to the sustainability of outcomes, which are principally
the following:

(a) SRN Bridge Program funds sustainability. The sustainability of the SRN
Bridge Program funds was identified as an area of risk at appraisal, and measures
to manage this risk were incorporated into the Program. Sustainability was
increased by creating a separate budget framework for the SRN Bridge Program;
establishing an SRN bridge asset inventory, including the needs and priorities for
existing bridges/new crossings; and developing the BMS providing a technically
rigorous basis for prioritizing investment according to needs.

(b) Bridge construction quality. Poor construction quality was a constant issue
throughout implementation. The main reason for the poor construction was the
lack of resources in terms of the number of the DoR supervision staff and the
limited experience of the DoR staff to supervise the construction of new bridges.
This issue could be mitigated by considering the hiring of qualified consulting
firms to undertake the construction supervision and provide capacity building in
quality control and assurance to the DoR staff.

5. Assessment of Bank Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

88. The World Bank’s decision on the use of PforR. The World Bank’s assessment was
that PforR would be a more efficient and cost-effective business model that would reduce
transaction costs. Appraisal judged that the risks were manageable and that the capacities
were adequate. The World Bank’s judgements thus coincided with the GoN’s requests and
were well-matched to this program. Overall, the decision to go for the BIMP as the World
Bank’s first PforR was well judged. The soundness of these judgements was confirmed by
the overall successful implementation and results of the Program.

89. World Bank’s decision on selectivity. The design of the SRN Bridge Program
focused on critical major and minor maintenance needed to sustain the existing stock of SRN
bridges, thus preventing the Program from making a tradeoff between completing its backlog
of bridges under construction and undertaking the needed critical maintenance. The design
also excluded bridges that were likely to have significant adverse impacts on the environment
and/or affected people or involved high risk and large procurement. A total of approximately

25
24 (out of 760 potential Program interventions) existing or planned bridges were excluded
under the SRN Bridge Program. This was just over 3 percent of the total interventions
planned under the SRN Bridge Program. Most bridges in Nepal’s environmentally sensitive
areas were a lower priority or were likely to be financed by other sources, and their exclusion
did not undermine the integrity of the Program.

90. Adequacy of the World Bank’s assessments. Three careful assessments (technical,
social and environmental, and integrated fiduciary) of the BIMP were completed during the
preparation of the Program. They provided the basis for assessing the Program’s scope,
formulating interventions types, designing the PAP, and envisaging risk mitigation measures.

91. Sustaining the planning and quality management capacity within the DoR. The
design of the SRN Bridge Program included crucial interventions related to strengthening
planning, technical design, and quality management capacity within the DoR. These
interventions included activities to plan, prepare, supervise, and monitor the civil works,
including social and environmental aspects. The funding was made available for consulting
services to prepare detailed engineering designs, supervision of bridge construction works,
quality assurance and monitoring, data collection linked to bridge conditions and
maintenance of the BMS, auditing and verification, training, and so on. These activities were
intended to sustain the planning and quality management capacity of the DoR which was
supported under the closed World Bank-financed RSDP. Under the RSDP, support had been
provided for updating bridge inventory and condition data, developing the BMS, and
preparing prioritized maintenance and investment plans based on sound technical, economic,
and social criteria. The BMS included updated asset inventory data. The DoR had worked to
fully integrate the BMS into its operating processes.

92. Risk assessment and management. The World Bank’s risk assessment proved
accurate as all the risks during implementation proved manageable within the risk framework
at appraisal.

93. DLIs. The BIMP had only six DLIs. The DLIs were tangible, transparent, verifiable,
and under the Program’s influence. They also had an agreed verification protocol. In this
event, the Program was fully implemented, the targeted objectives were met (as measured by
the indicators), and disbursements reached 100 percent, confirming the appropriateness of the
DLIs.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

94. The successful implementation of the BIMP and the World Bank’s full understanding
of the BIMP’s structure, institutions, and processes justified the decision that the World Bank
would move from ‘supervision’ to ‘implementation support’, as required under PforR. During
implementation, the World Bank provided all the needed support in different areas of the
Program implementation. The Government provided a positive assessment of these
contributions and acknowledged the value of the World Bank’s focus on results.

95. One area where the World Bank provided strong support was on the introduction of
citizen engagement under the Program. Ensuring citizen engagement in such types of
programs, which involve mainly small-value interventions in widely dispersed and remote
areas, has been found to be extremely challenging. The Program has come up with a number
of innovative approaches to enhance citizen engagement, including the design and

26
operationalization of the GRM, provision of a sign board in all construction sites with contact
details of the responsible official(s) to be contacted in addressing grievances, and information
to the general public about the Program plan using local FM radio stations.

96. In addition to its implementation support role, the World Bank systematically
reviewed, with the GoN, the monitoring and verification of the results and DLIs and the risk
assessment, and tracked compliance with the GoN’s fiduciary, environmental and social
systems, and safeguards. The World Bank consistently raised issues and proposed solutions
to overcome these issues, such as issues related to the quality of bridge construction and OHS
on construction sites. The Program also made good progress, with the World Bank’s support,
in preparing and adopting modern bridge technologies, including the increased use of
prestressed concrete technology and network arch bridges.

97. World Bank inputs. The World Bank maintained co-task team leaders throughout
the Program. The budget was adequate and well used, and the World Bank fielded qualified,
multidisciplinary teams with fair continuity. Regular site visits were made to assess progress
over the life of the Program.

98. The World Bank thus implemented all aspects of the implementation support
satisfactorily and acted as the GoN’s technical support partner throughout the supervision
period. The World Bank also had an important role in supporting the GoN in its remarkable
turnaround of the Program that happened despite losing approximately one and a half years of
implementation.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

99. Based on a Satisfactory rating of World Bank performance at program design and
implementation, an overall rating of Satisfactory is appropriate.
Table 4. Ratings
Description Rating
1. Outcomes Satisfactory
2. Relevance of Program Objectives High
3. Efficacy High
4. Efficiency Substantial
5. Risk to Outcome Substantial
6. Bank Performance Satisfactory

6. Lessons Learned

100. Factors to be considered before opting for and during the implementation of a PforR
are the following:

(a) The PforR can be an effective tool for supporting a Government with a
vision and plan. The PforR was an effective instrument in supporting the DoR’s
existing SRN Bridge Program, which was already supported by the Government
in its vision and plan to improve Nepal’s vital bridge sector.

(b) Political economy of the Program. The Program suffered in its early phase due
to political economy and transparency-related issues. The Program design could

27
 not adequately assess the risks linked to the LRN bridges program. This affected
the Program negatively, although eventually the issues were resolved.

(c) Implementation agency’s experience with the World Bank. The BIMP’s
implementing agency, DoR, has extensive experience of working with the World
Bank. The department has been found to be capable of managing fiduciary,
social and environmental risks, and technical aspects of the Program. However,
the PforR was a new instrument whose processes and mechanisms took time to
adapt to,

(d) Clear understanding of the client’s Program/appropriate timing of the

Program. The GoN had a bridge program of its own during the design of the
BIMP. It was one of the major capital investment programs of the Government.
However, it was not effective due to a number of issues, including a
nontransparent bridge prioritization process and poor construction quality. These
factors resulted in the construction of poor quality bridges on non-priority routes.
Furthermore, the bridge maintenance planning and implementation was ad hoc
and the proportion of funding for maintenance was not adequate when compared
with new bridge construction. It was an opportune moment for the World Bank
to support the Government’s program.

(e) Tracking of expenditure. One of the fundamental issues of a PforR operation is

the ability to track expenditures under the Program. This ensures that the
Program resources are used for the intended purposes and are not diverted for
non-Program purposes. So, developing a tool for tracking expenditures is
essential.

(f) Achieving some basic milestones before Program inception. Before the
BIMP, Nepal did not have the full inventory and a system for effectively
managing bridge assets on its SRN. A World Bank-financed RSDP helped Nepal
in developing a BMS that included a full inventory of SRN bridges. The BMS
has been the backbone of the Program planning since the inception of the
Program.

(g) Limiting ambition during Program design and careful assessment of the
Program. The BIMP’s scope is focused on three types of activities, as
mentioned earlier. The BIMP has only six DLIs. The DLIs are tangible,
transparent, verifiable, and under the Program’s influence. They also have an
agreed verification protocol. Three careful assessments (technical, social and
environmental, and integrated fiduciary) of the BIMP were completed during the
preparation of the Program. They provided the basis for assessing the Program’s
scope, formulating interventions types, designing the PAP, and envisaging risk
mitigation measures.

(h) Implementation agency’s capacity in the PforR requirements, procurement

management, and monitoring the quality of the physical works. The DoR’s
capacity of managing procurement processes efficiently has helped the
implementation of the Program. However, the Program faced a number of issues
managing works quality effectively, given the poor performance of the field
officials and poor control structures. A few bridges have been rejected by the
third party during the DLI verification process. The Program initially suffered

28
 due to the client’s limited understanding of the PforR requirements, especially in
financial management, budgeting, managing social and environmental risks, and
planning of the Program’s interventions. Providing detailed training on the PforR
requirements to the client at the beginning of the Program would have saved a
great deal of time.

(i) The PforR instrument allowed a focus on systemic change and institutional
development with positive implications for sustainability beyond the ambit
of the Program itself. The PforR assessments and the PAP strengthened the
Program’s focus on systemic change and institutional development. In addition
to the Program-specific results, the PforR helped the GoN strengthen its audit
capacity and systematic audit approaches. The fiduciary guidance developed has
also been mainstreamed in the DoR operations. Similarly, the environmental and
social guidance, prepared under the Program, has been adopted by the DoR in
their operating mechanism.

101. Other factors include the following:

(a) Citizen engagement and gender aspects of the Program. Ensuring citizen
engagement in such a Program, which involves mainly small-value interventions
in widely dispersed and remote areas, has been found to be extremely
challenging. The Program has come up with several innovative approaches to
enhance citizen engagement, including the design and operationalization of the
GRM, provision of a sign board in all construction sites with contact details of
the responsible official(s) to be contacted in addressing grievances, and
information to the general public about the Program plan using local FM radio
stations.

(b) Technological shift. The Program made good progress in preparing and
adopting modern bridge technology, including the increased use of prestressed
concrete technology and network arch bridges. However, one of the lessons
learned from the Program is that it is necessary to prepare a long-term plan for a
significant shift toward modern bridge technologies to take root.

(c) Quality of bridge construction. Poor construction quality was a constant issue
throughout implementation. The main reason for the poor construction was the
lack of resources in terms of the number of the DoR supervision staff and the
limited experience of the DoR staff to supervise the construction of new bridges.
This issue could have been mitigated by considering the hiring of qualified
consulting firms to undertake the construction supervision and provide capacity
building in quality control and assurance to the DoR staff. The PforR instrument
has contributed to enhancing the quality assurance mechanisms within the
Government’s bridge program, by introducing independent verification systems
and processes undertaken by public entities such as the NVC and the CIAA.

(d) OHS on construction sites. The poor enforcement of OHS has led to two fatal
accidents in the construction sites during the five years of Program
implementation. The Program has been leading the effort to make construction
sites safer. It has also made substantial progress in this regard by the end of the
Program by enforcing OHS measures on all sites and providing safety equipment
to construction workers. However, the main challenge under the Program was to

29
elevate Nepalese standards to internationally accepted, World Bank standards.
The World Bank can help the client by advising on provisions for OHS breaches
in contracts, particularly related to fines and penalties. These should correspond
with the expected level of performance and risk associated with the
implementation of projects. Underestimated fines for OHS breaches can result in
inadequate performance by the contractors and passing on of responsibilities.
Other measures need to be properly enforced from the beginning, such as the
submission and approval of the qualifications of OHS staff and organization
chart and ensuring that sufficient number of OHS officers are on-site, to ensure a
proactive rather than reactive approach to OHS compliance.

30
 Annex 1. Results Framework and Key Outputs

Date (of the data End-of-Project

Indicators Baseline Value Date Progress to Date Date
collection) Target Value
PDO: To provide safe, reliable, and cost-effective bridges on Nepal’s Strategic Roads Networks
PDO-level Results indicators
PDO Indicator 1: 53% October 2012 Achievement: 81.2%. Total number of July 15, 2017 75% July 15, 2017
Improved condition bridges in good or fair condition: 1,387
of bridges on SRN numbers, out of total existing 1,709
(The percentage of bridges.
bridges on SRN rated
as being in good or
fair condition)
PDO Indicator 2: 6% October 2012 Achievement: Reduced to 1%. Total July 15, 2017 1% July 15, 2017
Reduced number of number of bridges in unsafe condition: 17
structurally unsafe (total existing 1,709 bridges).
bridges
(The percentage of
bridges on SRN rated
as structurally unsafe)
PDO Indicator 3: Negligible October 2012 Achievement: Bridge works completed on July 15, 2017 50 July 15, 2017
Strengthened planned schedule 63%.
performance
management in the
bridge sector
(Percentage of bridge
works completed on
planned schedule)

Intermediate Result indicators

Intermediate Results 0 Achievement: July 15, 2017 14,125 July 15, 2017
Indicator 1: Major maintenance of 16,139 m length of
Completion of major bridges completed
maintenance of
bridges on SRN
(Cumulative meters)

31

Indicators Baseline Value
Intermediate Results
Indicator 2:
Completion of minor
repairs of bridges on
SRN (Cumulative
meters)
Intermediate Results
Indicator 3: New
bridges built or
improved on SRN
(Cumulative meters)
Intermediate Results
Indicator 4:
Improved Bridge
Asset Management
(Number of actions
completed)
Intermediate Results
Indicator 5:
Increased
effectiveness of the
institutions
responsible for bridge
sector management
(Number of actions
completed)
(a)
Date (of the data End-of-Project
Date Progress to Date Date
collection) Target Value
0 Achievement: July 15, 2017 10,000 July 15, 2017
Minor Maintenance of more than 10,729
m length of bridges completed
0 Achievement: July 15, 2017 6,000 July 15, 2017
New construction of 6,61 8m length of
bridges (76 bridges) completed
0 100% achieved. July 15, 2017 60% condition July 15, 2017
BMS operational in the DoR. survey and BMS
Public version of BMS is available on the update
DoR website: http://www.dor.gov.np.
The DoR has made the BMS compatible
with Annual Road Maintenance Plan and
also with a tablet-based BSM for
budgeting and monitoring and reporting
purpose.
BMS updated completely.
0 GRM policy developed and approved. July 15, 2017 Adoption and July 15, 2017
The DoR formally launched the GRM implementation of an
system on April 16, 2014. appropriate
GRM Procedural Manual approved. grievance handling
Work in progress to mainstream the GRM mechanism by the
system particularly in field-level DoR DoR.
offices according to an agreed action plan.
32
 Annex 2. Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs)

Revised Target
DLIs Original Target Achieved Remarks
(Restructuring)
DLI-1: Completion of major maintenance of 17,125 14,125 16,139 Target overachieved
bridges on SRN
(Length of bridge in meters that has completed
major maintenance)
DLI-2: Completion of minor maintenance of 3,500 m 10,000 m 10,729 m Target overachieved
bridges on SRN
(Length of bridges that have completed minor
maintenance)
DLI-3: New bridges built or improved on SRN 6,000 m 6,000 m 6,618 m Target overachieved
(Length of bridge in meters built/improved)
DLI-4: Strengthened performance management in 50 50 63 Target overachieved
bridge sector
(Percentage of bridge works completed on planned
schedule)
DLI-5: Improved Bridge Asset Management BMS fully operational in all BMS fully operational in all BMS fully operational in Target overachieved
30 divisional/regional offices; 30 divisional/regional offices; 25 division and 5 regional
Condition survey undertaken Condition survey undertaken offices;
on at least 60% of the SRN on at least 60% of the SRN Condition survey
undertaken on 100% of
the SRN
DLI-6: Increased effectiveness of the institutions GRM implemented in the GRM implemented in the GRM developed and is Target achieved
responsible for bridge sector management DoR and report disclosed DoR and report disclosed being made operational;
detailing the status of detailing the status of Report disclosed each
complaints and actions on complaints and actions on year detailing status of
F&C and those related to F&C and those related to complaints and actions on
social and environmental social and environmental F&C and those related to
issues issues social and environmental
issues

33
 Annex 3. Program Action Plan (PAP)

Action Description Deadline Responsible Party Completion Achieved Updated Status

Measurement (Y/N)
(i) BMS, the basis for planning, Ongoing Bridge Project/Regional Personnel trained Y  The BMS priority has been the basis
prioritization, and M&E, to be Directorate/Divisional in use of BMS, for preparation of Annual Program for
continuously maintained and used for Office conditions new bridges and maintenance bridges
prioritization of the program. surveys updated in the DoR.
and annual  The BSM system has been made
prioritized available to the projects and divisions
programs since early December 2016.
available.  BB has updated around 100% bridge
data in the BMS.
(ii) The DoR implements a QAP. All Ongoing Bridge Project/DoR Continued Y  Preparation and implementation of
materials testing to be undertaken compliance will QAP has been made a part of
according to specifications as described in be monitored by contractual requirements. These are
the QAP and in the contract between the technical audit being monitored on a regular basis and
DoR and the contractor. consultants. materials testing ongoing according to
QAPs.
(iii) The DoR will assign a project October 31, DoR Continued Y  Project Management Team is formed
management team for each contract that 2012, and compliance will in all projects and the DoR divisions
has value over US$125,000 equivalent ongoing be monitored by according to the Government circular.
(roughly NPR 10 million). The project technical audit
management team will comprise technical, consultants.
social, and environmental personnel. A
team can manage multiple contracts
depending on the operational
requirements.
(iv) Through the MoF, during the October 31, MoPIT/MoF Increased Y  The MoF is allocating at least 5% of
implementation of the Program, allocate at 2012, and July budgetary the capital budget.
least 5% of its total civil works budget 31 in allocation
under the Program in each said fiscal year, subsequent
for feasibility studies, design, supervision, years
quality control, management of
environmental and social impacts, and
other required inputs for the maintenance
and construction of bridges under the
Program.

34
 Action Description Deadline Responsible Party Completion Achieved Updated Status
Measurement (Y/N)
(v) The DoR prepares annual October 31, DoR/Bridge Project Training plan Y  Annual training plans developed and
training plans for all the SRN bridge- 2012, and prepared and its implementation ongoing
related functions and implements these annually training
plans throughout the Program thereafter implemented.
implementation period. Activities
supported by
capacity-building
consultants
(vi) Creation of separate budget heads Effectiveness MoF Separate budget Y  The MoF created separate budget
for the SRN bridges which will provide condition lines for the SRN heads for the SRN bridges in
the budget allocation for expenditures and LRN bridges FY2012/13.
under the SRN Bridge Program appear in the
annual budget
issued by the
MoF.
(vii) Annual preparation and public October 31, Bridge Project Annual Y  PIPs are being prepared and disclosed
disclosure of prioritized investment and 2012, and investment plan on the DoR website.
maintenance plans based on the BMS and annually prepared and
limited by an identified budget envelope disclosed on the
DoR website
(viii) Appoint and maintain a October 31, DoR A memo from Y  All divisions, projects, and BB have
procurement unit chief in each of the 2012, and the DoR with the appointed and maintained
procuring entities with clear job revise the list list of procurement unit chiefs. Job
descriptions and provide them with at as appropriate procurement unit description is available.
least one week training on procurement (if chiefs and a  Training (one week) conducted on
they are not already trained). confirmation procurement on a regular basis.
from the DoR
that training has
been provided
(ix) Through the DoR, (a) establish October 31, DoR The committee Y  The DoR committee is established
an audit committee meeting the 2012 will have met according to the OAG requirements.
requirements of the recipient’s Office of following receipt  The DoR addresses audit observations
the Auditor General (OAG), to address of the from FY2009/10 and onward.
outstanding audit observations from preliminary Progress is being reported to the OAG
FY2009/10 and those in subsequent years, report and on a monthly basis (NPR 5.61 billion).
if any, resulting from the DoR’s own responded within

35
 Action Description Deadline Responsible Party Completion Achieved Updated Status
Measurement (Y/N)
operations and (b) ensure that all said 35 days.
outstanding audit observations from
FY2009/10 are addressed according to a
time-bound action plan acceptable to the
Association and the recipient’s OAG.
(x) Through the DoR, review and October 31, DoR/GESU Revised ESMF Y  The DoR ESMF was reviewed and
revise the DoR’s current environmental 2012 disseminated via revised (March 18, 2013) and
and social management rules and web and hard disclosed.
procedures to incorporate bridge-specific copy
environmental and social impact
mitigation measures, in form and
substance satisfactory to the Association,
and immediately thereafter implement the
revised rules and procedures in a manner
satisfactory to the Association throughout
the Program implementation.
(xi) Through the DoR, provide the October 31, DoR Memo from the Y  The DoR DG has delegated
Geo-Environmental and Social Unit 2012 DoR to formally authority/power to GESU through an
(GESU), within the DoR, with power and assign GESU to administrative order in October 2013.
adequate resources, acceptable to the the SRN Bridge  GESU has adequate staff and financial
Association, to enable it to carry out the Program resources now.
social and environmental management
measures in accordance with the revised
rules and procedures referred to in action
(i) above.
(xii) Preparation of a plan and October 31, DoR GESU is Y  Business plan prepared, approved, and
subsequent implementation of that plan, to 2012, and strengthened is being implemented since
strengthen GESU both in manpower and ongoing according to the FY2013/14) with adequate manpower
financial resources agreed plan and financial resources.
(xiii) GRM developed, made September, DoR GRM developed Y  GRM developed and made operational
operational, and implemented in the DoR 30, 2013, and and made
for managing all type of complaints, ongoing operational
including technical, fiduciary, and
social/environmental issues
(xiv) Preparation of a Bridge December 31, Bridge Project Toolkit Y  Developed. However, it is currently
Operations Toolkit (with support from the 2012 developed and being updated to incorporate the

36
 Action Description Deadline Responsible Party Completion Achieved Updated Status
Measurement (Y/N)
Association) that will summarize various published amendments recently made to the
bridge planning, construction, PPA.
maintenance, and management
procedures. The toolkit will be developed
based on the existing procedures in
different DoR manuals, guidelines, and so
on.

37
 Annex 4. BIMP Expenditures

Disbursed Amount
DLIs Target Revised Target Achieved Unit
(US$, millions)
DLI-1
Completion of major maintenance of
bridges on SRN 17,125 14,125 16,139 m 24.50
(Length of bridge in meters that has
completed major maintenance)
DLI-2
Completion of minor maintenance of
bridges on SRN 3,500 10,000 10,729 m 8.50
(Lengthof bridges that have
completed minor maintenance)
DLI-3
New bridges built or improved on
SRN 6,000 6,618 m 18.00
(Length of bridge in meters
built/improved)
DLI-4
(Strengthened performance
management in bridge sector 50 — 63 % 3.00
Percentage of bridge works
completed on planned schedule)
BMS fully operational in all 30 — BMS fully operational in 25
DLI-5 divisional/regional offices; division and 5 regional offices;
3.00
Improved Bridge Asset Management Condition survey undertaken on at Condition survey undertaken on
least 60% of the SRN. 100% of the SRN
GRM implemented in the DoR and — GRM developed and is being
report disclosed detailing the status of made operational;
DLI-6
complaints and actions on F&C and Report disclosed each year
Increased effectiveness of the
those related to social and detailing the status of complaints 3.00
institutions responsible for bridge
environmental issues and actions on F&C and those
sector management
related to social and
environmental issues

38
 Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision

Bank Staff Team

Name Role Specialization Unit Location

A.K. Farhad Ahmed Team Leader Transport GTI07 Washington, DC
Dominic Pasquale
Team Leader Transport GTI06 Washington, DC
Patella
Shambhu Prasad
Procurement Specialist Fiduciary GGO06 Kathmandu, Nepal
Uprety
Financial Management
Yogesh Bom Malla Fiduciary GGO24 Kathmandu, Nepal
Specialist
Social Safeguards
Annu Rajbhandari Safeguards GEN06 Kathmandu, Nepal
Specialist
Bibash Shrestha Team Member Admin GTI06 Kathmandu, Nepal
Deepak Man Singh
Team Member Transport GTI06 Kathmandu, Nepal
Shrestha
Social Safeguards
Drona Raj Ghimire Safeguards GEN06 Kathmandu, Nepal
Specialist
Social Safeguards
Jun Zeng Safeguards GSU06 Washington, DC
Specialist
Shubu Thapa Team Member Operations GTI06 Kathmandu, Nepal

Staff and Travel Cost

Fiscal Year Staff and Travel Cost (US$)

FY16 99,710.69
FY17 204,298.92
FY18 16,451.09
Note: There is no information available before FY16.

39
 Annex 6. Borrower’s Comments

The following are the borrower’s comments on the ICR of the Nepal Bridge Improvement
and maintenance Program (BIMP), received by email on December 31, 2017.

 The ICR is well written and represents the BIMP correctly. The good work is
appreciated

 However, there are minor discrepancies in the achieved figures for DLIs 1, 2,
and 3 in paragraph 49 and in annexes 1, 2, and 4; compared to the figures
included in the ICR version prepared by the GoN

 Most of the maintenance contracts were of 8 months’ contractual period so there

is no contractual provision for price adjustment for any contract having a
contractual period below 15 months. However, there is a provision of price
adjustment for materials only if the price varies more than 10 percent to that of
28 days before the date of bid submission. Such a case did not happen.

40
 Annex 7. Economic Analysis

1. The ex post economic analysis follows the same methodology that was used at
appraisal. Nine bridges were selected for appraisal that reflect the typical types of
interventions likely under the SRN Bridge Program. Eight of these bridges were constructed
under the Program and thus taken into consideration for the ex post economic analysis.

2. The road user cost savings were calculated using the World Bank’s Roads Economic
Decision software. Traffic growth rates were estimated at 6.6 percent over the 20-year period
and maintenance costs at 1.8 percent per year of the new construction cost.

3. New construction. Construction of a new bridge reduces both distance and time costs
of road use by shortening access distance and avoiding costs crossing the river by ford or
ferry, or both. Ford crossings are generally closed in the rainy season and thus, benefits to
bridge construction are distance cost savings (of a detour) during the rainy season and time
saved during the dry season (by crossing by bridge as opposed to fording). Where a new
bridge is replacing a ferry crossing, the costs avoided are the time costs incurred by vehicles
waiting to cross and crossing and the cost of providing the ferry services.

4. Weak bridges. When a weak bridge fails, two sets of costs may be incurred: the cost
of providing a temporary crossing while the bridge is being reconstructed (not considered in
ex ante and ex post analysis) and the costs of additional kilometers driven to find a detour.
The main issue is determining just when a weak bridge may be expected to fail and result in
road closure. For the present exercise, the probability of failure is assessed according to the
DoR’s 2012 bridge asset inventory with the probability of failure increasing every year over
the 20-year period. This assessment classified weak bridges into two categories:

(a) High probability of failure (within a period of four years). In the first year,
the probability of failure was assumed to be 25 percent. In subsequent years, this
probability increases by 5 percent a year until reaching near certainty and
remaining at that level for the remainder of the 20-year period.

(b) Medium probability of failure (with a period of 20 years or more). The

analysis assumes that these bridges have a 5 percent probability of failure that
increases at 5 percent over a 20-year period.

5. Inadequate capacity bridges. Replacing single-lane bridges with two-lane structures

avoids delays caused both by vehicles slowing to negotiate the narrow bridge and waiting for
approaching vehicles to cross. The analysis incorporates estimations of delays at single-lane
bridges based on Erlang queuing model. A single-lane bridge would have a width of 3.5 m.
The three bridges that were assessed are all wider than this but still have less than a full two-
lane capacity. Accordingly, the benefits from increased capacity are factored by the
difference between appraisal width and a single lane.

6. Table 7.1 shows the results of the ex post economic analysis. Investments for
rehabilitation, maintenance, and capacity increases yield very high EIRRs. New construction
is more difficult to justify given that new construction is costlier and generally occurred on
low-volume roads. However, the high economic returns on the large majority of bridges with
an EIRR well above 12 percent justify the project investments.

41
 Table 7.1. Results of Economic Analysis
New Construction Goji Dhud Koshi

Discount rate (%) 12 12

EIRR (%) 1.5 18.1
Present Value of Costs (US$, thousands) 2,427 1312.46
Present Value of Benefits (US$, thousands) 844 2,059.75
NPV (US$, thousands) ‒1,583 747.28
Benefit-to-cost ratio 0.3 1.6
Switch value for costs (%) ‒65 56.9
Switch value for benefits (%) 188 ‒36.28%

Major maintenance Tinau Bagmati

Discount rate (%) 12 12
EIRR (%) 207.9 39.7
Present value of costs (US$, thousands) 439 125
Present value of benefits (US$, thousands) 27,930 700
NPV (US$, thousands) 27,491 574
Benefit-to-cost ratio 63.6 5.6
Switch value for costs (%) 6,256 458
Switch value for benefits (%) ‒98 ‒82

Widening Bagmati Bangandi Chandi

Discount rate (%) 12 12 12
EIRR (%) 61.7 16.5 59.0
Present value of costs (US$, thousands) 282.6 207.7 88.0
Present value of benefits (US$, thousands) 15,505.7 334.2 1,950.9
NPV (US$, thousands) 15,223.1 126.5 1,862.9
Benefit-to-cost ratio 54.9 1.6 22.2
Switch value for costs (%) 5,388 61 2,116
Switch value for benefits (%) ‒98 ‒38 ‒95

7. The economic analysis has also assessed the impact of the poor quality of works on
bridge life by undertaking a sensitivity analysis for different scenarios related to (a) asset life
and (b) and maintenance costs. The results of the sensitivity analysis for the following three
scenarios: (a) asset life reduced to 10 years and incremental maintenance cost increased to (b)
5 percent and (c) 10 percent of capital cost are summarized in table 7.2. It demonstrates that
poor construction quality may affect economic viability. Scenarios (a) reducing asset life to
10 years and (c) increasing maintenance cost to 10 percent show the highest sensitivity.
However, in all but one case the economic justification remains robust among the bridges that
were economically justified in the base case. For bridge Bangandi (narrow bridge at
appraisal), the base scenario yields an EIRR of 16.5 percent, whereas in the sensitivity
analysis scenario (a) yields –3.1 percent and scenario (c) yields 10.9 percent. See table 7.2 for
further details.

42
 Table 7.2. Results of Sensitivity Analysis

Dudh Koshi (new

bridge)
Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%

Discount rate (%) 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00

EIRR (%) 18.10 13.50 17.1 15.4
Present value costs 1312.46 1285.77 1450.77 1681.29
Present value benefits 2059.75 1402.40 2059.75 2059.75
NPV @ 12% 747.28 116.63 608.97 378.46
Benefit-to-cost ratio 1.60 1.10 1.40 1.20
Switch value for costs
56.90 9.10 42.00 22.50
(%)
Switch value for benefits
–36.28 –8.32 –29.57 –18.37
(%)

Bagmati (weak bridge)

Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%
Discount rate (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
EIRR (%) 39.7 36.5 37.8 35.1
Present value costs 125.0 123.0 153.0 192.0
Present value benefits 700.0 398.0 700.0 700.0
NPV 574.0 276.0 547.0 507.0
Benefit-to-cost ratio 5.6 3.2 4.6 3.6
Switch value for costs
458.0 225.0 357.0 263.0
(%)
Switch value for benefits
–82.0 –69.0 –78.0 –72.0
(%)

Tinau (weak bridge)

Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%
Discount rate (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
EIRR (%) 207.9 207.9 206.9 205.3
Present value costs 439.0 430.0 536.0 674.0
Present value benefits 27,930.0 16,060.0 27,930.0 27,930.0
NPV 27,491.0 15,630.0 27,394.0 27,256.0
Benefit-to-cost ratio 63.6 37.4 52.1 41.4
Switch value for costs
6,256.0 3,637.0 5,109.0 4,041.0
(%)
Switch value for benefits
–98.0 –97.0 –98.0 –98.0
(%)

Bangandi (narrow
bridge)
Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%
Discount rate (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0

43
EIRR (%) 16.5 –3.1 14.2 10.9
Present value costs 207.7 288.3 253.4 318.8
Present value benefits 334.2 202.0 334.2 334.2
NPV 126.5 –86.3 80.8 15.4
Benefit-to-cost ratio 1.6 0.7 1.3 1.0
Switch value for costs
61.0 –30.0 32.0 5.0
(%)
Switch value for benefits
–38.0 43.0 –24.0 –5.0
(%)

Bagmati (narrow
bridge)
Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%
Discount rate (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
EIRR (%) 61.7 55.6 60.5 59.2
Present value costs 282.6 291.0 342.2 408.5
Present value benefits 15,505.7 1,799.9 15,505.7 15,505.7
NPV 15,223.1 1,509.0 15,163.5 15,097.2
Benefit-to-cost ratio 54.9 6.2 45.3 38.0
Switch value for costs
5,388.0 519.0 4,431.0 3,696.0
(%)
Switch value for benefits
–98.0 –84.0 –98.0 –97.0
(%)

Chandi (narrow
bridge)
Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%
Discount rate (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
EIRR (%) 59.0 55.4 57.0 55.0
Present value costs 88.0 92.3 115.2 144.9
Present value benefits 1,950.9 603.9 1,950.9 1,950.9
NPV 1,862.9 511.5 1,835.7 1,806.0
Benefit-to-cost ratio 22.2 6.5 16.9 13.5
Switch value for costs
2,116.0 554.0 1,594.0 1,246.0
(%)
Switch value for benefits
–95.0 –85.0 –94.0 –93.0
(%)

Dobhu Goji (new

bridge)
Base Case 10-year Asset Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost at
Life at 5% 10%
Discount rate (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
EIRR (%) 1.5 –18.4 –1.4 –7.0
Present value of costs 2,427.0 2,370.0 2,711.0 3,116.0
Present value of benefits 844.0 499.0 844.0 844.0
NPV –1,583.0 –1,870 –1,867.0 –2,272.0
Benefit-to-cost ratio 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Switch value for costs
–65.0 –79.0 –69.0 –73.0
(%)
Switch value for benefits 188.0 374.0 221.0 269.0

44
(%)

45
 Annex 8. Supporting Documents

 The World Bank Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of
US$60 million to Nepal for the Bridges Improvement and Maintenance Program, Report
No: 67866-NP, June 1, 2012

 World Bank’s Aide Memoires of supervision missions 2012–2017

 World Bank’s Project disclosed Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs)

 Midterm Review of Sector Wide Road Study and Priority Investment Plan (2015)

 Borrower’s Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for the Bridges Improvement
and Maintenance Program, December 29, 2017

 Pictures taken during the inspection of one of the bridges using the Bridge Inspection Vehicle
which was introduced under the Program—please see the images provided below.

46
47
Annex 9: Project Map

48