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Hastings: An Unusual Battle

Stephen Morillo

Historians have refought the battle of Hastings regularly since the days of
Freeman and Round, and its importance justifies the attention paid it. Part
of the reason academic warriors have covered the ground so often is that the
battle is by no means easy to understand. It was unusual in a number of ways; so
unusual, that the battle demands special care in interpretation. Hastings must
be placed in a broader context of medieval military history than it sometimes
has been. Only thus can we see the unusual features of the battle clearly and
understand better what the battle 'means'.1
Hastings was unusual. It was unlike the vast majority of medieval battles
(and, in fact, most ancient and early modern battles) in three major ways.

1 I would like to thank James Alexander, Robert Patterson and Thomas Campbell for numerous
helpful cor¡ments on earlier drafts of this paper, Thomas Keefe for his encouragement, and J.F.A.
Mason for guiding the original research behind this paper. The main sources for the battle are William
of Poitiers, Ili.rtoire de Guillaume le Conquerant, ed. R. Foreville (Paris, 1952); and the Bayeux Tapestry:
The Bayeux Tapestry: A Compreherrive Survey, ed. Sir Frank Stenton, 2nd ed. (London,1965). The
Carmen de Hastingae Proelio of Bßhop Guy of Amiens,ed. C. Morton and H. Muntz (Oxford, 1972) also
offers a full account, but R.H.C. D avis,'The Carmen de Hastingae Proelio,' EHR93 (1978): 241-ó1, casts
doubt on the Carmen as an independent source for the battle. If approached cautiously, however, it can
at least offer some useful information about common battle tactics. Brief narratives which provide a few
extra details are foundinThe Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, trans. Dorothy Whitelock, et al. (London, 1961);
Guillaume de Jumièges, Gesta Normannorum Ducum, ed. Jean Man (Rouen, 1914); and Florence of
Worcester, Chronicon ex Chronicis, ed. B. Thorpe, 2 vols. ([,ondon, 1848-49). William of Malmesbury,
Orderic Vitalis, and Henry of Huntingdon add even less and are more distant from the event. The
secondary accounts tend to place the battle into one of two contexts: the conquest of England by the
Normans, in which case the battle is taken as evidence about the two societies involved; or the history of
'the art of war,' especially battle tactics. The latter approach is fa¡ too narrow from the point of view of
medieval military practice, in which the battle played a secondary role (on this point, see, for example,
John Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages ,' inWar and Govemment in the
MiddleAges: Essays in Honour of LO. Prestwich,ed. John Gillingham andJ.C. Holt [New Jersey,1984],
81-82). A broader approach to medieval military history could profitably be incorporated into the context
of the Norman conquest. No modern account of the battle is fully satisfactory, but most are useful to some
extent. These accounts include David C. Douglas, William the Conqueror (l-n,ndon,l964),196-204;John
Beeler,Warfare in England, 1066-1189 (lthaca, N.Y., 1966), 15-24; R. Allen Brown, The Normans and
the Norman Conquest (London, 1969), 15&-74; F.M. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England (Oxford, 1943),
58!88; J.F.C. Fuller, Decisive Battles of theWestern World (London, 1954), 1: 360-85; C.H. Lemmon,
'The Campaign of 106ó,' in D. Whitelock , et al., The Norman Conquest (London, 19ó6); A.H. Burne,
The Baulefield: of Engtand (London, 1950); and, least usefully, Charles W. Ornan, A Hßtory of the Art
of War in the Middle A ges, 2nd ed. (New York, lg24), 14946.
96 Haskins SocietY Iournal
First, it was unusually long. We are told that the fighting lasted from'the third
hour of the day until dusk,' at least nine hours.2 It is difficult to find more than
a handful of ancient and medieval battles that lasted more than an hour or two.
a counterattack on those Saxons who had pursued.s Now it was the Saxons'
turn to hold steady despite this setback. Thus passed the moment when most
battles would have been won - one side panics and flees, or one side panics,
rallies, and the other side breaks. At Hastings neither side broke, for even
the Saxons' final collapse was not sudden and panic-stricken but grudgingly
slow and stubborn.6
The second phase followed this crisis and was strange to those who saw it.
'There followed an unknown sort of battle,' says William of Poitiers, 'in which
one side launched attacks and numerous manoeuvres' the other stood like
rocks fixed to the ground.'7 It was this sort of strange fighting which then lasted
the rest of the day, indicating that neither side had a decisive advantage.
The third unusual aspect of Hastings is that it was in the end so completely
and far-reachingly decisive.s There were, of course, many battles in which one
2 rùy'illiam of Jumièges, 135; Florence of Worcester, 1:227.
3 H.W.C. Davis and R.L. Poole, 'A Contemporary Account of the Battle of Tinchebrai,' EHR25
(19f0): 295-9ó (letter of Priest of Fécamp).
a Briefly, the major stages of the battle were as follows. An initial Norman attack commenced about
9 a.m. involving archers and heavy infantry as well as cavalry (William of Poitiers, 186-88; William
to
Tapestry, Pls.60-ó3).
r, with indications of a textbook canon. J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages,
see infra, 99). William ed
k (William of Poitiers, an
attacks and feign
especially on the
of Poitiers, 196-
s William of
the Saxon pursuit and William's counterattack.
ó rlVilliam of Poitiers, 202-4.
Hastings: An Urunual Battle 97
side beat the living daylights out of the other. But few of these transferred
rule of a major kingdom from one people to another, \4,ith little subsequent
opposition after the battle, and few transfers have had such fundamental
consequences for the kingdom involved. Much of this is the result of a
context for the battle that goes far beyond the scope of this essay. However
our understanding of the events on the field of Hastings must account for this
decisiveness.
One way to account for the decisiveness of the Norman victory is by reference
to the supposed superiority of Norman cavalry over Saxon infantry. This is in
fact a standard view of Hastings, proposed most forcibly by R. Allen Brown
and echoed by many others. In this view Hastings was the inevitable victory of
stirruped cavalry over helpless infantry,e infantry which was 'already obsolete
in the greater part of western Europe'l0 and which had 'failed to keep abreast
with the latest developments in military science.'11 I see a number of problems
with this explanation.
e Brown, Normans and the Norman Conquest,95-99, 1ó6. The notion of an'Age of Cavalry'goes
back to Oman, Art of War, for whom the battle of Adrianople in 378 ushered in a period when heavy
cavalry 'had become the arbiter of war, the lineal ancestor of all the knights of the Middle Ages, the
inaugurator of that ascendancy of the horsemen which was to endure for a thousand years.' (p. 14)
But Oman describes more than he explains. The fountainhead of the 'stirrup theory' of cavalry
dominance is Lynn White, Jr., Medievol Technology and Social Change (Oxfotd, 1962), chap. 1,
'The Stirrup, Mounted Shock Combat, Feudalism and Chivalry.' For White, the fusion of horse and
rider, which the stimrp allowed, created an irresistable fighting machine against which no infantry stood
a chance. Bernard S. Bachrach, 'Charles Martel, Shock Combat, the Stirnrp and Feudalism,' Sødies
in Medieval and Renøissance Hßtory 7 (1970): 47-75, offers some telling criticisms of many details
of White's analysis, but the theory in broad outline seems to have passed into the realm of accepted
trans. Sumner Willard and S.C.M. Southern (Amsterdam, 1977),5, places the stirrup at the heart
of knightly dominance; Philippe Contamine, War in îhe Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford,
f984), 179-84, notes some of the problems associated with dating the introduction of the stinup, but
accepts its eventual impact. John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, and John Buckle¡, ,4 Hßtory of Western
Societies,2nd ed. (Boston, 1988), 1:335, is but one example of the theory's spread to introductory
textbooks, while Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford, 1976), chap. 1, 'The rWars of
the Knights,' represents the acceptance of the theory into a scholarly synthesis of European military
history. Martin van Creveld, in his suwey, Technology and War lrom 2000 B.C. to the Present (New
York, 1989), 18, sums up the case: 'Modern authors, however much they may differ in detail, are united
in their opinion that, sometime between 500 and 1000 4.D., the stirrup and the high saddle . . . spread
to Europe. Add the horseshoe, the origin of which is simply unknown, and the ascent of cavalry over
ancient infantry becomes at least understandable.' It is the contention ofthis paper that while the stirrup
may indeed have appeared in Europe sometime between 500 and 1000, it does not explain the ascent of
cavalry and more particularly cannot explain the details of Hastings.
10 Stenton,
Anglo-Soxon England, 516.
11 English
Historical Documenß, 2: 1042-1189, ed. David C. Douglas and G.W. Greenaway
(tondon, 1953), 20 (editor's introduction).
rl

An Unusual Battle
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Hastings:
tii
98 Haskins SocietY lournal 99

William is implied by his actions in the campaign up to that point: his offensive
On a level of analysis specific ms in conflict
I

with the unusual length and d above' One strategy is otherwise incomprehensible.lT
I

li
Was Harold mistaken? When William's army retreated after its first
'.1 would not expect inevitable vi be so hard,
were in fact unsuccessful attack, at least part of the Saxon army pursued. The duke's
or to be almost lost. And the
I

knights were able to rally and cut down a number of the Saxons who had
left the solid defensive position.ts The success of the Normans' counterattack
against their Saxon pursuers would seem to suggest that Harold was mistaken;
but I believe the episode may be read in another way. The knights were able
to cut down those pursuers who scattered in the advance, but those who
maintained their formation in the advance were able to defend themselves.le
Had the entire Saxon army advanced in close order, densatim progredientes,2o
as it had in taking up its battle position, no opening for the cavalry would have
existed. The duke's army, demoralned, disordered, and thinking him dead,2l
was ready to be swept from the field by a general counterattack. Why was it
action.
not?
David Douglas concluded that Harold failed to order an advance and so
missed the opportunity, and was furthermore unable to impose discipline
and hold back those of his troops who did advance.zz But the matter is
might hold out, but they could not win.14
not clear. Failure to attack does not seem consistent with Harold's record
i will note first that this should not be the argument of those who see as a general up to that point, including his probable intentions regarding
To the extent that this William's invasion. In addition, there are indications that a general advance
f we grant this advantage was ordered: William sa\ry 'a great part of the enemy leave their positions,
resence of cavalrY on the and pursue his troops.'23 The question then becomes, if Harold did order a
e could not win? This is general advance, what happened to it?
essentially a question of Harold's generalship.
Could Harõtd have considered an attack? He knew his enemy from his stay 17 William of Poitiers, 154, desc¡ibes Harold as 'eager for battle.' For Harold's offensive intentions,
in Normandy.ls His army was capable of attacking, as Harold Hardraada see also Fuller, Decisive Battles,373,375; Douglas, William the Conqueror,l97; Brown, Normans and
learned at Siamford Bridge.ro Finally, that Harold thought he could attack the Norman Conquest, 159; Lemmon,'Campaign of Hastings,'95, lO7; but cf. Morton and Muntz,
Carmen,73-83, who argue that Harold's strategy was to trap William on the Hastings peninsula by
establishing a strong defensive position on Battle Hill (and see maps i¡ Carmen,110-11). This does
not necessarily imply a defensive approach to the battle itself; in fact, Morton and Muntz (following
William of Poitiers and the Carmen) say that 'the king was preparing to blockade him [Duke William]
by sea and surprise him in great strength on land,' (76) and suggest that the story of the fleet (for which
there is no sure evidence) was'calculated to bring the duke to battle forthwith.' (77-78,¡.5) In fact,
l2'peditesden estartof a real strategy of blockade and delay seems problematical: Harold was as likely as William to have run

ensitY of into supply problems from sitting still in the immediate vicinity, and unless there really were a Saxon
1
the battle; again,
417-22' fleet able to contain and defeat William's fleet, William would not, in fact, be trapped. It should be
the Saxon line. Th
noted that if William did land first at Pevensey (William of Poitiers, 164 and n. 3), then the move to
Bayeux Tapestry, pls. 62-63 show a massed shield wall about as well as the fofmat allows, while
Hastings would have involved use of the fleet as well as marching (see map in Carmen, ll0.).
pls. OO-OZ-1esp. pi. XI, detail from 66 - one of the finest pieces of draughtsmanship in the whole 18 William of Poitiers, 190.
tapestry) show the disastrous results a cavalry charge against such a formation could have. re Carmen, ll. 429-35,'pars ibi magna perit pars et densata resistit.'
13 William of Poitiers, 188. See also Lemmon, 'The Campaign of' 1O66,' 92' -
20 lbid., 1.367.
la This is the implication of Brown's argument that 'indeed, only a strong element of surprise could
21 William of Poitiers, 190; Bayeux Topestry, pl. 68.
crown with success an offensive action by an infantry force against an enemy strong in cavalry.' Brown' 22 Douglas, William the Conqueror, 200.
Normans and the Norman Conquest,lû. 23 William of Poitiers, 213. Ci. Orderic, 2:174. who
rs Bayeux Tapestry, pls. 17 -29' follows tüilliam word for wo¡d on this point.
Interestingly the Carmen has the Saxons pressing their attack against a feigned flight, turning it into
t6 ASC,a.10ó6. The army at Hastings was not exactly the same one as at Stamford Bridge, but the
core of housecarls was the same and the rest of the troops would have been similar in type and training,
a real rout: ll. 439-44. The problem, of course, is telling an abortive general advance from an
undisciplined pursuit.
if not all the same soldiers.
1

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ii
100 Haskins SocietY lournal Hastings: An Unusual Battle 101
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Perhaps the answer lies in the deaths of Earls Gyrth and Leofuine, Harold's
settled; the Saxons were not doomed. The strategic situation meant that the
Saxons could afford a draw, while the Normans could not. Had the Saxons
brothers and main subordinates. No conclusive moment in the battle has been
l

found for their deaths, for the sources are not specific on this point. If Harold
had ordered them to lead the counterattack, which is not unlikely, and they
were killed in front of the Saxon army just as the advance was getting under
for the disordered advances taking place on the wings of the Saxon army,
held together for an hour more, or through one more Norman attack, they
might have won the war without winning the battle.28
So the theory of cavalry dominance does not account convincingly for the
details of the action at Hastings. On a more general level, the theory of cavalry
dominance based on the stirrup is, I believe, untenable. A full analysis of this
issue is beyond the scope of this paper; I shall present my arguments on this
subject elsewhere. To state the outlines of my argument briefly, Hastings
took place in a period of decreased military effectiveness brought about by
the reduced effectiveness of central authority. Medieval armies were closer
to armed mobs than were classical or early modern armies.2? This reduction
generally affected infantry more than cavalry.3O In other words, it takes strong
government to produce strong infantry; in the Middle Ages, cavalry did not
get better, infantry got worse. Saxon and then Norman England, with their
relatively strong governments, were affected less than elsewhere, accounting
for the good showing of the Saxon infantry at Hastings, for the discipline both

28 William's army was not going to get any bigger; Harold probably fought with only a part of bis
military forces gathered: ASC (E), a. 1066; Florence of Worcester, 1:227. William, in a hostile country,
without a firm base of operations, and probably having to contend with the Saxon fleet (rililliam of
Poitiers, 180), was also more likely to run into supply problems than \r,as Harold. Finally, Harold was
2a Bayeux Tqpestry , pls. 62-68. The Normans charge (pl. 62), and are repulsed by the shield wall the sitting king, and a boxing analogy is here apt: the challenger has to win; the champion only has to
not lose.
(pl. ó3). Then Leofwine and Gyrth are killed (pls. 64-65), apparently out in the open, a\\'ay from the 2e By this I do not mean to place myself on the side of what Allen Brown called tbe 'heresy' that
at this stage
dense mass of the shield wall depicted in the preceeding scene. Why would they be separated
Following their deaths, we see French and English killing each other (pl. 66) 'medieval warfare was chaos, incompetently waged by individualistic exhibitionists' (Normans and the
except to lead an attack?
Norman Conquest, 164, n. 115). I believe medieval commanders were as intelligent and skillful, as a
and what appeaf to be less well-armed English troops isolated on a hillock (pl. 67). Finally, william
bares his head and rallies his army for further attacks (pl. ó8). The Catmen, l' 478, also may suppoft
group, as commanders from any other period of history and that usually medieval fighting men rvere
value) as not only brave, but skilled in thei¡ individual tasks. What I do mean is that medieval commanders did
this view, as Gyrth is named as a victim of William himself (which we need not accept at face
not have comparable social, economic, and institutional resources with which to mold their warriors
the duke led the counterattack on the Saxon pursuit.
ã In addition to their portrayal in the Tapestry, Gyrth and Leofwine are mentioned as killed along as effectively into coherent large groups, so that medieval fighters we¡e apt to be better warriors than
soldiers. Simply stated, medieval commanders did not have the luxury of standing armies. Cf. John
with Harold in ASC (D,E), a.106ó, and Florence of Worcester, l:227,bttt not (unsurprisingly) by
Keegan, TheFaceof Battle (London, 1976),175-77. AsR.C. Smail,CrusadingWarfare,203,points
William of Jumièges. rililliam of Poitiers notes their deaths having taken place (p. 200), but does not
out about Bohemond of Antioch on the First Crusade, 'he had not the well-drilled regiments of the old
name them or place their deaths in the sequence of events.
26 William of poitiers, 206, states that their bodies were found near Harold's. Paradoxically' the loss East Roman army, but a motley host of pilgrims which included many non-combatants. Among the
I
knights were adventurers and individualists, unused to military discipline and not inclined to accept it.'
of leadership may have inspired the Saxon army to fight even harder in defense' as the Saxon tradition,
To some extent (usually excluding the non-combatants), this was true of most medieval commanders.
at least in literature, emphasized rallying around a fallen lord. See, for example, the reactions of
the
Thus, medieval armies could be molded together, especially by long mutual experience, but the process
followers of Ealdorman Byrhtnoth in The Battle of Maldon: Anglo-Saxon Poetry ' traîs. R'K. Gordon'
was less complete than it can be in standing armies with extensive peacetime drill. .AJl armies are prone
rev. ed. (London, 1970), 332-33.
27 William of Poitiers, 1.94, where he notes that the feigned flights were modeled on the real flight to become armed mobs unde¡ too much stress (Keegan refers to the 'crowd' inside every army: Face of
Battle,lT5). The stronger the glue of group training and discipline that holds them together, the more
earlier in the day. Richard Glover, 'English warfare in 1066,' EHR 67 (1952): 1-r8' argues that
stress they may withstand before panicking and becoming a mob. Medieval armies generally could
the Norman cavalry did not have the training to execute such maneuvers (p. 12) and Lemmon, 'The
withstand less stress than Augustan legions or Louis XIV's regiments, for example. On this topic, see
campaign of 1066,; 108-10, also doubts the tactic; but for horsemen operating against slower moving
also Keegan, Face of Battle, chap.2; Verbruggen, Art of Warfare, 39-52, 76-82; Contamine, I,f/ar
foes, iniantry or more heavily armored cavalry, the tactic is natural and not difficult. R.C. Smail,
in the Middle Ages, 15-16, 30-32, 162-72, 250-û; J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renqissance
Crwading Warfare, 10g7-11b3 (Cambridge, 1956), 78-79, discusses feigned flights as a normal
by syrian Europe, 1450- 1620 (Baltimore, 1985), 46-7 4.
tactic of the part-time, non-professional Turkish armies and notes the use of feigned flights 30 This is because infantry depends more for its effectiveness on group cohesion than cavalry does,
Frankish armies as well. Norman knights had used the tactic in Sicily in 1060: D.P. Waley, 'combined
though it is important to both, and because infantry needs somewhat larger numbers than cavalry to be
Operations in Sicily, A.D. l0ó0-10t8,' Papers of the Britßh School at Rome23, p. 123. See
also
effective; and medieval armies were generally small. On infantry, see Keegan, Face of Battle,95-96,
Brown, Normans and the Norman Conquesl, l7l-72, n. L47, and Douglas, william the conqueror, 156; Howard, War in European Hßtory,14. On numbers, see Verbruggen, Art of Warfare,6-ll.
2Ol,¡.2.In general, see also Verbruggen, Art of Warfare,S9-90'
702 Haskins SocietY Journøl
sides showed that day, and for the continuity of the Anglo-Norman infantry
tradition after Hastings.3l
Another way of saying this is that the Saxon and Norman armies on the
field of Hastings were the products of two societies which were not all that
different in their organization, their values, and their ways of governing.32
The Saxons perhaps had the edge in sophistication; the Normans, in vigor.
Given the broad similarities of the two societies, should we really expect one
side's forces to be radically superior to the other's? Probably not. Hastings as
a victory of advanced cavalry over backward infantry is thus a problematical
construct.33
How then are we to understand the unusual features of this difficult battle?
Leadership is crucial to how any army performs. Armies whichwere somewhat
less than disciplined machines magnified the effects of leadership. Leadership,
I believe, can account for the unusual features of the battle of Hastings.
First, the length of the battle is a credit mostly to the resolve of the two
commanders. William, by personal example and sheer force of his personality,
held his army together when by all odds it should have broken. On the other
side, as long as Harold stood under his banner, both in the sense of remaining
alive and in the sense of refusing to run, the Saxon army stood with him. Their
respective ugh to follow their lead, and certainly
the length argues for the relatively high quality of
the armies onflict. It was the examples of William
and Harold (and their subordinates) which prevented either side from giving
31 Infantry was of necessity almost always present in medieval armies: Gillingham, 'Richard I,'91'
Anglo-Norman armies not only contained infantry per se (as did William's army at Hastings: William
of Poitiers, 184), but emphasized infantry tactics in battle to the extent that most or all of the knights
regularly dismounted, a development first conspicuous at Tinchebrai in 1106: Orderic, 6:88-90; the
Priestof Fécamp'sletter,296;Henryof Huntingdon, HistoriaAnglorum,ed.T.Arnold,R.s.(London,
1819),235; Eadmer, Historia Novorurz, ed. M. Rule, R.S. (London, 1884), 184. A full consideration of
this topic is once again beyond the scope of this essay.
32 The core of both armies was made up of semi-professional household warriors: lhe familia, or
housebold knights of the Normans and the housecarls of the Saxons; and both included stipendiary
troops. In broader terms, much of both sides' forces were ¡ecruited and held together by systems
of hierarchical lordship in which soldiers served a superior out of Personal loyalty and obligation,
the obligation sometimes being tied to grants of land tenure in some form. The differences, such
as the presence or absence of fiefs per se and of feudal tenure, though significant from many
perspectives, are from the point of view of raising field armies matters of detail. On terms of
service in late Saxon armies, see Richard Abels, Lordship and Military Obligations in Anglo-Saxon
England (Berkeley, 1988), 146-84; and C. Warren Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions on
the Eve of the Norman Conquest (Oxford, 1962). On Normandy, see David Bates, Normøndy before
106ó (London,1982); Charles Homer Haskins, Norman Institutlons (Cambridge, MA., 1925). And see
especially J.O. Prestwich, 'The Mil man l): l-37 '
33 By concentrating on the que hav the role of the
Norman a¡chers in the battle. It is ned effective than
reliance on one arm only, and the archers certainly played a role in the Norman victory. I would argue,
however, that the advantage of having archers was largely independent of the role of Norman cavalry'
Norman infantry wilh archers would have had an advantage over Saxon infantry without a¡chers.
Hastings: An Unusual Battle 103
in. The flight of Robert of Bellême from Tinchebrai provides an instructive
counterexample here.3a
Second, I have argued that the peculiar tactical standoffwhich characterised
much of the day's fighting was the result, not of the Saxons' inability to attack,
but of a critical loss of leadership. The unusual difficulty of the battle for both
sides, contributing also to its length, stemmed not from the Saxons' lack of
options imposed by the presence of enemy cavalry, but from a loss of options
imposed by a loss of its own leaders.
Finally, the role of leadership in the decisiveness of the battle is clear.
The battle William won decided the war because Harold died. Indeed not
just Harold, but a large proportion of the entire Saxon leadership class
perished, including any possible effective heirs to Harold's position. In this
the decisiveness of the battle was partly accidental. It is possible to imagine
Harold beaten at the end of the day, yet escaping into the darkness to raise
new forces. rililiam's road to the throne would at that point have become
much longer and harder. Yet the decimation of the Saxon leadership was also
partly a result of Harold's decision to stand firm and of William's relentless
determination. It seems that both leaders in the end decided to risk all on one
throw of the dice; William rolled the sevens.
What can we as historians learn from Hastings? For one, the length and
difficulty of the battle supports the conclusion that this \tras a hard-fought
battle between armies essentially equal in strength,3s with high levels of
leadership, discipline, and morale obtaining on both sides of the conflict.
The Saxon and the Norman military establishments both produced good
warriors. If it is true that Hastings was a battle between an army that
included some of the best cavalry in Europe and an army that included the
best infantry in Europe, it is equally true that the battle was not decided by
the inevitable superiority of one arm over the other. Given essentially equal
armies, William simply outgeneraled Harold and had a bit more luck.
Hastings should rather be seen as confirmation of the effectiveness of both
military establishments. The combined Anglo-Norman military organization
under firm royal control not only continued to produce good warriors,
it continued to produce soldiers capable of effective infantry tactics and
effective cavalry tactics. From the dismounted knights and English infantry
at Tinchebrai through the Assize of Arms to the levies who took up the
longbow and fought beside dismounted knights in Scotland and France, this
tradition would persist throughout English medieval history.
Wabash College
3a The Priest of Fécamp's let\e¡, 296.
3s D.J.A.Matthew, TheNormanConquest(l-ondon, 196ó),84; Lemmon,'TheCampaignof 1066,'
114.