POLITICAL RISK • ISRAEL • POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS • ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR • BMI

Israel-Hamas War Trajectory Uncertain As

Rafah Invasion Looms
14 Feb 2024
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Key View
• We think that the Israeli authorities are publicly claiming a potential expansion of
ground operation to Rafah in the Gaza Strip as a strategic move to either coerce
Hamas into ceasefire negotiations or as a prelude to actual military expansion in
the region, which could sustain or elevate tensions.

• In a first scenario, we think that the threat of invading Rafah may push Hamas,
under pressure from Egypt, to agree on a temporary ceasefire which would bring
about a temporary cessation of hostilities.

• In a second scenario, we think that Israel would invade Rafah, which would likely
lead to increased regional tension, complicate relations with Egypt, hinder
humanitarian aid, and attract international criticism, especially if it coincides with
the holy month of Ramadan.

We think that Israeli authorities’ public claims of an invasion of Rafah will

either serve to either push Hamas to negotiate or sustain elevated tensions in
the region. The Israeli leadership has recently hinted to the possibility of expanding
its operation in the Gaza Strip to Rafah, which borders Egypt. Rafah currently
houses more than 1.4mn Palestinian refugees and is considered the last safe area
in which civilians can stay. The Israeli claims came after the faltering of negotiations
with Palestinian resistance militias over a ceasefire and the release Israeli hostages.
We see two potential scenarios unfolding. The first scenario under which Israel uses
the Rafah invasion card as a leverage to encourage Egypt and Hamas to agree on a
temporary ceasefire. The second scenario whereby Israel, which is still looking for a
victory narrative and PM Netanyahu is fighting for his political survival, actually
expands its ground operation in Rafah. To make its threat credible, the Israeli
government will also use the freeing of two hostages on February 12 in a military
operation in Rafah to rally domestic and international public support for a ground
operation in Rafah. While the first scenario could bring about an agreement to
cease hostilities temporarily in the next couple of months, we now see the war
dragging into Q2 2024.

Rafah Invasion Poses Renewed Risks For The Trajectory Of The

War
Map Of The Gaza Strip
Source: Israel Palestine live map, BMI

Scenario 1: Threat of ground operations in Rafah pushes the Palestinian

resistance to the negotiating table
We think that Israel could be publicly claiming it will expand its operations in Rafah
to pressure Palestinian resistance factions into successfully reaching a ceasefire that
would secure the release of the remaining hostages. Under this scenario, the
possibility of an operation in Rafah would incentivise Egypt (key mediator with
Hamas) to apply pressure on the leadership of Hamas to make concessions in the
current negotiations in order to avert any possible spillover from an invasion of
Rafah to Egypt, especially Palestinian refugees entering Sinai. While the Hamas
leadership seems unwilling to negotiate a deal that will not bring about the end of
the war, we think that the threat of an invasion of Rafah could possibly lead to
negotiations that could yield a temporary cessation of hostilities (such as during the
month of Ramadan).
Scenario 2: Israel expands its operations into Rafah thus raising regional
tensions and increasing the risks of miscalculations. This could either happen
immediately or only after the relocation of Palestinian refugees to the north of the
strip. The expansion of ground operations to Rafah would not only widen the rift
between Israel and its international allies but it would also jeopardise Israel’s
relations with Egypt.
First, an evacuation of civilians from Rafah will be challenging, especially as
Palestinian refugees perceive that they have no guarantees for their safety.
Furthermore, after relocating several times since October 7 2023, we expect some
refugees will choose to remain in Rafah, thus further complicating the Israeli
invasion. This will increase the cost of civilian casualties, which will make it harder for
the US to keep publicly supporting Israel’s military action. Ground operations in
Rafah would also disrupt the entry of humanitarian aid (even if temporarily) through
the Rafah Crossing Point, the only crossing point between Gaza and Egypt.
Additionally, Israel is set to present evidence that it had complied with the
International Court of Justice provisions later in February as part of South Africa’s
genocide case against it. An invasion of Rafah would pose further questions as to
whether the IDF is ensuring it can limit Palestinian civilian casualties and draw
harsher international criticism of Israel.
Second, Israel’s expansion of its ground operation to Rafah would compromise
relations with Egypt, but would not lead to the breaking of the peace treaty between
the two countries. Egypt would still be exposed to higher security risks in case the
invasion of Rafah leads to an influx of refugees to Sinai or infiltration of Hamas
militants to Egyptian territory. Similarly, domestic criticism of the current leadership
in Egypt could rise if the influx of refugees is mishlandled by the Egyptian military or
if the public perceives that leadership failed to stand up for the Palestinian cause.
Third, this would risk fueling further antagonism of both Israel and the US in the
Middle East and increase the risk of an escalation of attacks by Iranian-backed
militias on US bases in Syria and Iraq, or an escalation of Houthi attacks. An invasion
of Rafah, if it occurs in the next couple of weeks, would prove to be time sensitive as
it coincides with the holy month of Ramadan, which could also serve to heighten
tensions in the West Bank.
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