White Paper

How the Army 2030 Divisions Fight

(Formerly Known as WayPoint 2028)

Version 3.5

02 February 2023
TRADOC Proponent Office—Echelons Above Brigade

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Prepared by: LTC Kevin Hadley, MAJ Savannah Spencer, MAJ Justin Martens, TPO-EAB,
Corps/Division Branch
Approved by: COL Michael Whitney, Director, TPO-EAB, 913-684-8544

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INTRODUCTION 1 0F

As Army 2030 force design updates (FDUs) reach the resourcing phase, there is a flurry of
activity around the Army 2030 Force in general and the Armor Division in particular.

With nearly 40 FDUs that integrate and support over 30 modernization initiatives, the U.S. Army
is transforming the Army to a division-centric force capable of multi-domain operations (MDO)
under large-scale combat operations (LSCO) conditions. Army 2030 increases the capacity of
divisions and corps to mass combat power in peer-on-peer combat operations. At the division
level in particular, Army 2030’s impact will be felt most strongly in training, because it
organizes divisions as formations composed of not only the headquarters but a task organized
formation purpose built to defeat enemy forces in detail.

As agencies and commands digest the myriad of Army 2030 products, the question remains:
“How does the division fight?” After moving artillery, cavalry, and other capabilities out of
brigade combat teams and into division-level commands, how will divisions and corps support
front-line units, and what are the dependencies at echelon? FM 3-0 codifies MDO as our
operational concept, and as we experiment with the designs using real, live units we must
dialogue and continue to capture lessons learned.

This paper is written to inform individuals and organizations experimenting with the Army 2030
designs. Specifically, it focuses on the question: How does the division fight?

This paper’s intent is a professional discussion, which means that it does not replace actual
authoritative documents found in doctrine and in organizational design documents.

ARMY 2030 BACKGROUND

The Army 2030 and Army 2040 efforts are initiatives that integrate capabilities required for
LSCO and MDO across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum. The Army 2030 effort, designed as an
“MDO-capable” force, reflects doctrinal changes based on our study of LSCO and MDO. It
takes that doctrine and translates it into an organizational design through FDUs. When it comes
to modernization, the CAC’s role is to “drive change”. With Army 2030, CAC is helping drive
change to organizations, and those new organizations and their commanders will drive change to
training as we implement MDO. Army 2030 also provides “landing spots” for new materiel
being developed to support MDO to set conditions for Army 2040.

1
This 3 May 22 version of this white paper is an update of the original November 2021 paper. This update adds
insights from recent experimentation events and expands the paper to cover all of the Army 2030 division designs.

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The ideas that became Army 2030 2 come, primarily, from two sources. The first is the CAC’s
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Large Scale Ground Combat Operations study, and the second is the Army Futures Command
(AFC) work developing MDO concepts and related materiel solutions. This work shifted the
Army’s focus from conducting limited contingency operations to how it would organize,
resource, and train for LSCO. LSCO, described in ADP 3-0, are extensive joint combat
operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at
achieving operational and strategic objectives.

The 2018-2019 Large Scale Ground Combat Operations study was a multi-year assessment led
by the CAC that drew on years of lessons from the MCTP and other sources. The study
identified 17 high-risk capability gaps ranging from intelligence analysis to survivable
headquarters. The key finding, however, was that the Army was not organized for large-scale
combat. The CAC’s Commanding General at the time of the LSCO Study, LTG Michael D.
Lundy, offered this summary of the assessment:

Central to the challenge of evolving the Army’s culture is re-enabling our

division, corps, and theater armies to operate and fight as combat formations.
Beginning with a perception in the mid-to-late 1990s of a reduced risk of great
power conflict and exacerbated by ongoing limited contingency operations, the
Army transformed from a division-based to a brigade-based modular force. As a
result, echelons above brigade (EAB) transformed from highly-capable
warfighting formations to headquarters that could be force-tailored with
warfighting “modules” to accomplish a variety of missions. Over time, the
separate modular components were further optimized for the prevailing fight—
counterinsurgency and other stability operations. When coupled with heavy
reductions during directed downsizing, EAB headquarters became much less
capable of supporting anything more than limited contingency operations. While
required at the time, the degradation of echelons above brigade formations and
their capabilities significantly reduced the Army’s ability to meet the entirety of
its primary function—to execute prompt and sustained land combat to defeat any
threat throughout the range of military operations. 3 2F

Thus, the key idea driving Army 2030 initiatives is that divisions, supported by corps and
theater, must be enabled to be the decisive echelon. The way the Army will do this is by
reorganizing capabilities, modernizing key capabilities, and providing anticipated future
capabilities at echelon to reflect a peer Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) threat environment.

2
Army 2030 was originally called “WayPoint 2028.” Army 2040, was “AimPoint 2035.”
3
LTG Michael D. Lundy, “Meeting the Challenge of Large Scale Combat Operations Today and Tomorrow,”
Military Review, Sep-Oct 2018. Accessed at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-
Edition-Archives/September-October-2018/Lundy-LSCO/

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The second source for Army 2030 changes is the Multi-Domain Operations concept that began
as part of the U.S. Army Capability Integrations Center’s work on Russian Next-Generation
Warfare, an analysis of how our potential adversaries had adapted while the United States fought
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. FM 3-0 sees MDO as “an evolutionary inflection point, building
on the incremental changes in doctrine as the operational environment changed over the last forty
years.” 4 MDO expands the traditional land air and maritime domains by including space and
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cyber. Furthermore, the MDO concept describes the combined arms employment of joint and
Army capabilities on behalf of the joint force commander, to create and exploit relative
advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains. These
capabilities further extend the “extended battlefield” in ways that further raise the bar of
complexity into the physical, information, and human dimension. MDO doctrine offers tools to
capitalize on that complexity.

In response to these requirements, CAC initiated a series of DOTMLPF-P changes centered on

the Army 2030 FDUs. With the implementation of the 2030 changes, Army divisions and corps
will be able to:

• Function as part of a joint force, integrate, and employ capabilities from multiple
domains, including air, space, and cyberspace.
• Sustain high-tempo combat operations over distance.
• Protect critical nodes and assets.
• Defeat enemies contesting land forces in all domains.
• Conduct rear operations to support and sustain all operations within the division’s
assigned area.

Within resourcing and structure constraints, the main mechanism the Army uses to find these
capabilities is to consolidate capabilities—largely fires, ground reconnaissance, and engineering
capabilities—up to divisions and corps. This gives division and corps commanders the
flexibility to mass combat power at decisive points. Often we hear that divisions task-organize
and weight forces in Warfighters and other venues already, so why change the organization.
Here’s why: assigning forces like artillery and engineers to the division echelon makes sense
because it assigns them to the echelon where they will fight. The DIVARTY will fight as a
division force field artillery headquarters (FFAHQ). The engineers’ bridging and breaching
assets will fight from division effort to division effort. Therefore, moving to the division as the
unit of action and assigning forces accordingly yields training and leader development benefits
that will improve combat effectiveness. This is about organizing our teams to train how we
fight.

4
FM 3-0, Operations, 01 October 2022, page ix.

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EXPERIMENTATION IN SUPPORT OF ARMY 2030

The Army subjected Army 2030 designs to extensive

Summary Major Experiments
experimentation during the course of the development.
Supporting Army 2030
The purpose of the experiments, initially, was to help • CAC How The Army Fights
CAC design the divisions and other formations like the Workshop—Prioritization of
corps headquarters and functional battalions and capabilities in support of Army 2030
brigades that make up Army 2030. During 2021-2022, design process.
the experimentation is focused on refining and • MCCDID Limited Objective
validating designs to inform leaders making resourcing Experiment 22-1—Validated Army
2030 designs in an analytical
decisions.
environment.
• Joint Warfighter Assessment 22—3rd
Recent experimentation results are still being analyzed, Infantry Division replicated Armor
but some initial insights include: Division capabilities in a Warfighter.
• MCCDID Limited Objective
• Validation of divisions as the decisive tactical Experiment 22-2—Tested Army 2030
designs under simulated conditions.
formation—possessing the right level of
• FCC Division Experiment Series—
capability and capacity to execute successful
Ongoing simulation to refine division
maneuver in LSCO. capabilities and capacity.
• In order to maneuver in the close area, divisions • Center for Army Analysis Wargame—
require corps capable of massing fires, March 2021. Assessed division
sustainment, and intelligence collection in designs in a European scenario.
support of that maneuver.
• The art and science of sustainment remains the #1 driver of our operational reach.
• Robotic systems like ALE and EW systems like TLS provide significant capability to
commanders that will increase our ability to maneuver.
• Emerging air defense systems have the right capabilities, but units will still need to mass
and layer those systems to create the capacity to defeat adversary massed fires.

THE ARMY 2030: FIVE DIVISION TYPES

While final designs and fielding timelines are still pending resourcing decisions by senior
leadership, there are five division designs as part of the Army 2030 design:

• Armor Divisions (Reinforced) —The 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and
the 34th Infantry Division reorganize to mass combat power at the division level with
additional capabilities assigned to enable the division to train for wet-gap crossing
operations.
• Armor Divisions—Armored and motorized formations that receive significant multi-
domain capabilities and are capable of task-organizing to respond to contingencies

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 worldwide. This design covers 1st Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 4th Infantry
Division, and 36th Infantry Division.
• Airborne Divisions—The 82nd Airborne Division re-organizes in peacetime as a division-
centric formation capable of worldwide strategic deployment and joint forcible entry
including airborne assaults.
• Air Assault Divisions—The 101st Airborne Division re-organizes in peacetime as a
division-centric formation capable of worldwide strategic and operational deployment
and joint forcible entry including division-level air assault operations.
• Light/Motorized Divisions—Infantry-centric formations that receive significant multi-
domain capabilities and are capable of task-organizing to respond to contingencies
worldwide. This design covers 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 11th
Airborne Division, 28th Infantry Division, 29th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division,
38th Infantry Division, 40th Infantry Division, 42nd Infantry Division

While all divisions and corps receive important MDO-related updates under Army 2030, the
Army prioritized three division designs for increased capabilities. These designs are the Armor
Division (Reinforced), the Airborne Division, and the Air Assault Division designs. 5 The Army4F

will field two active and one reserve-component Armor Divisions (Reinforced). The 82nd
Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division will be resourced for the Airborne and Air
Assault Division designs respectively.

Depending on the division type, major changes to divisions include:

• Layered reconnaissance including a Division Cavalry Squadron (DIVCAV)

• Massed artillery at the DIVARTY with an Extended Range Cannon-Artillery (ERC-A)
battalion
• Mobile Protected Firepower battalions providing direct-fire cannon support to light
infantry forces
• Modernized intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities including the Terrestrial
Layer System-Echelons Above Brigade (TLS-EAB)
• Information Advantage (IA) capabilities including the G-39 IA staff
• Massed engineer assets in the Division Engineer Brigade including assigned bridging
capabilities for Armor Divisions (Reinforced)
• A Protection Brigade to synchronize protection tasks and enhance rear area C2
• A purpose-built Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) with Air-Launched Effects (ALE) and
Spike Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) missiles
• Modernized air defense capabilities

5
These names are simply titles that accompany groups of FDUs through the TAA process. No division names will
be changed as part of this process.

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 Armor Division

Armor Division
(Reinforced)

Air Assault
Airborne
Division

Division

Division
Light
Division Cavalry X
TLS-BCT and TLS-EAB X X X X X
3x BCTs X X X
Mobile-Protected Firepower X X X
DIVARTY as a Formation X X X X
Extended-Range Cannon Artillery X
Division Engineers—battalion or brigade X X X X X
Multi-role Bridge Companies X
Modernized Air Defense Artillery Capabilities X X X X X
Additional Heavy Assault Air Capability X
Assigned Protection Brigade X X X X X
G39 Information Advantage Section X X X X X
Improve Rear Command Post X X X X X

It’s important to note that, for the new division designs, CAC is emphasizing the role of the
corps as the senior tactical echelon and also as the center of integrating joint and national multi-
domain capabilities to defeat enemy Integrated Fires Command. Experimentation over the last
year has reinforced this emphasis. FM 3-0 denotes that corps is the lowest headquarters of
convergence. Without the corps’ access (through theater armies) to the joint and national levels
and its sustainment, intelligence, and fire support, no division is able to conduct maneuver under
LSCO conditions. In recognition of its tactical role, some capabilities including rocket artillery
have been consolidated at the corps level. This allows the corps weights efforts with:

• MLRS rocket fires and corps cannon fires from the Operational Fires Command
anticipated to be multiple fires brigades for the main effort
• Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade and Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Battalion support
• Theater-Enabling CAB support
• Sustainment support

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THE DIVISION AS THE DECISIVE TACTICAL FORMATION

A key destinction for the Army 2030 and

MDO is the designation of the Division
as the Army’s principle tactical
warfighting formation. In the 1990s,
facing brigade-sized peacekeeping
rotations and deployments to limited
contingency operations, the brigade
became the unit of action around which
maneuver was planned. This was further
entrenched in 2005 with the advent of
brigade combat teams optimized for
rotations in support of counterinsurgency
and wide area security operations. The
LSCO study revealed that combined arms
operations at the brigade level did not
have the robust capability and combat
power to achieve a penetration of a
prepared defense against a peer
competitor. Furthermore, a brigade staff
lacks the capability to operate as the land
component within the context of a joint
Figure 1: Doctrinal template of depths and frontages from FM 3-94
force. In response to this, the Army
requires division to become the focal point of maneuver planning and capability across all
domains to shape the close fight. Designating the division as the decisive tactical formation
means that it possesses the bulk of the capabilities at its own echelon that it will need to
accomplish major battlefield tasks. Furthermore, it maintains the diversity of staff functions,
experience, and understanding of the joint common operating picture to maneuver forces and
achieve Corps and JFLCC objectives.

To further understand the implications of this, note Figure 1 taken from FM 3-94, Armies, Corps,
and Division Operations, which gives examples of distances that the division and corps
headquarters would be able to affect and control in LSCO given effective ranges of friendly joint
and adversary fires systems combined with the reconnaissance assets assigned to those echelons.
An 18-28 km frontage is significantly smaller than the 40-100km frontage divisions are normally
assigned in a Warfighter exercise. Also, the 24km allowance for the division deep area is
significantly shorter than futuristic concepts. Neither does it fit, necessarily, with the notion of
an extended deep area. Instead, the figures represent the designed capacity of the division
formation and the division headquarters.

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The solution to the extended battlefield challenge is not to extend the division’s responsibilities.
That would be stressing an already encumbered formation. Instead, FM 3-0 restores the tactical
roles of headquarters above the division, specifically the corps. Doctrine sees the division as
focused on the close fight. That division is supported by a very tactically-focused, fires and
sustainment-heavy corps.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS DESIGN FOR 2030

There are important changes in the Army 2030 division staff structures as well (see Figure 2).
We will address the G39 Information Advantage Cell, the Rear Command Post, and the
Protection Staff.

Figure 2: Division Staff

G39 Information Advantage (IA). Emerging information operations doctrine and practice
integrates information functions from cyber, space, PSYOP, CA, and information operations.
FM 3-0 describes how Army forces maneuver across the multiple domains to seize positions of
advantage in three dimensions—physical, human, and information. IA is about seizing positions
of advantage in the information dimension. The manual defines IA as “a condition when a force
holds the initiative in terms of relevant actor behavior, situational understanding, and decision
making.” The new G39 structure on the division staff gives the division commander the

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capability to create IA conditions by giving him the capability to plan and execute IA operations,
assess effects, and then re-address targets. This happens in concert with a host of new
capabilities being fielded for Army 2030: Theater Information Advantage Element, Theater
Strike Effects Group, Theater Fires Element / Command, and others. Ultimately, the corps will
retain most authorities in the information dimension, but the division’s G39 gives the division
commander the ability to plan and integrate IA-related capabilities.

Rear Command Post. The Army 2030 designs acknowledge the divisions’ lack of capability and
capacity to command and control the rear area. The current division design includes only a 19-
Soldier Support Area Command Post (SAC-P). Unit experiences vary, but by-and-large, the
SAC-P is not the right capability and does not enable C2. There was also a doctrine change. FM
3-94 redesignates the consolidation area as the rear area and describes a RCP to command and
control that area. To that end, the Army 2030 design builds an 81-Soldier RCP that, in concert
with a Protection Brigade, C2s the rear area and sustains the fight.

TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARMY 2030 FOR CORPS AND DIVISIONS

First, corps must qualify as a tactical echelon again. Corps/JFLCC must set conditions for
divisions to maneuver by leveraging capabilities in all domains to disintegrate the threat IFC.
While targeting the IFC, the Corps must posture divisions to rapidly exploit gains, while
isolating objectives; preventing the enemy the ability to reposture and commit a reserve element.
Think about maneuvering one divison through or even closely past another division. Think
about the joint fires, intelligence, and signal aspects of that maneuver. Those are not capabilities
that our corps headquarters are practiced at controlling in a live training environment. Army
2030 has significant implications for training our divisions and corps.

Second, in LSCO, all the divisions maneuver with other divisions underneath a tactical-role
corps. In current WarFighter exercises, divisions are allocated a wide, 40-60km AO and given
minimal maneuver direction from corps. The Army 2030 force envisions a LSCO fight where
the corps maneuvers divisions, setting conditions for them across a corps AO not just with joint
fires and intelligence, but with other divisions, maneuvering to set up a main effort division for
an attack and exploitation of a prepared enemy defense. The corps will retain many capabilities
at their level as the corps while it shapes the deep area and then weight a main effort with fires,
aviation, sustainment, and intelligence collection when it commits to a maneuver option.

Third, Army 2030 divisions pack a real MDO punch with TLS-EAB, the G39, DIVCAV, and
ALE/Spike-NLOS-enabled CABs. It’s easy to see the power of integrating sensors capabilities
from ground, aerial, space, and cyber reconnaissance with the analytical capacity of the G39 and
the execution capacity of attached IA elements.

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Fourth, ABCTs can no-longer establish their own conditions for maneuver. ABCTs always
required support, but they were self-contained up to a point. Shorn of their artillery and cavalry,
this is no longer the case. This is the flip side of the consolidation and massing of artillery and
cavlary forces—there is minimal ABCT deep fight, either in space or time. Instead, the division
maneuvers ABCTs much more actively. For example, ABCTs won’t even be able to conduct an
in-stride breach without DIVARTY support. But the ABCTs that receive division support,
instead of an assigned artillery battalion, will see not one, but multiple artillery battalions in
Direct support and/or General Support of their maneuver.

ARMY 2030 DIVISION DESIGNS: THE ARMOR DIVISION (REINFORCED)

Figure 3: Armor Division (Reinforced)

Figure 3 lays out the task organization of the Armor Division (Reinforced). Notice first that the
division’s artillery forces are assigned to DIVARTY. The Armor Division (Reinforced) will also
receive the ERC-A battalions when they are fielded. The Division Engineer Brigade also
contains significant forces for the penetration mission. The Protection Brigade is the new
construct for integrating protection tasks and augmenting security in the rear area. The Division
Sustainment Brigade changes to accommodate the new division structure. We will tackle each
one of these formations in turn.

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ABCTs. The ABCT transfers its 18 howitzers to the DIVARTY and is reduced to a troop in
terms of ground reconnaissance. This is sweeping change for our ABCT commanders. Without
assigned cannon artillery or reconnaissance squadron, the ABCT’s ability to shape deep for its
battalions is severely curtailed. As a result, ABCTs become much more maneuver-centric as the
Army consolidates fires and ground reconnaissance at the division level. The opportunity here is
for ABCTs, supported by division assets, to become more nimble and maneuver-focused without
the sustainment and movement problems of the artillery and the deep fight of the cavalry
squadron.

DIVCAV. In current warfighters, division commanders often task-organize a ground

reconnaissance effort by pulling a cavalry squadron from a BCT. Results are often mixed, as the
staffs and commanders of that cavalry organization do not have the training or relationships
required for effective integration.

Army 2030 provides a true, assigned DIVCAV to the Armor Division (Reinforced) commander.
A dedicated, purpose-trained ground reconnaissance element allows the division commander the
ability to fight for information, conduct security operations and other enabling operations, and a
unit to use in an economy of force role if required. Opportunities here include seamless
coordination with the division staff and the CAB as well as the ability to extend all-weather
reconnaissance and EW effort into the deep area for the Joint force under A2AD conditions. A
DIVCAV may also conduct a guard operation for the whole division as a economy of force effort
instead of using a BCT-minus.

DIVARTY. In addition to the massed effect of 54 howitzers, the DIVARTY coordinates joint
effects in coordination with the Corps’ Operational Fires Command. In a situation where the
Armor Division (Reinforced) is the main effort, it will most likely receive tactical control of
another fires brigade. The DIVARTY commander remains the FSCOORD for the division
commander to synchronize lethal and non-lethal fires within the division commander’s concept
of the operation.

Division Engineer Brigade. The Engineer Redesign FDU, part of the Army 2030 force design
updates, builds a three-battalion engineer formation including combat engineer companies and
multi-role bridging companies (MRBCs). This brigade allows the Armor Division (Reinforced)
commander to train his division for the wet-gap crossing with organic assets while weighting his
main-effort ABCT for penetration missions. In Army 2030, ABCTs retain their brigade engineer
battalions.

Protection Brigade. The protection brigade reduces the C2 demand on the division rear
command post (RCP) and provides a headquarters and commander solely focused on the
protection warfighting function across the area of operations. The protection brigade

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commander becomes the Division protection coordinator (PCOORD) integrating protection tasks
into the concept of operations. The Protection Brigade is the “landing spot” for the Army’s
MSHORAD capabilities. The brigade also fields another Engineer Battalion focused on force
protection missions. In the case of a by-passed or isolated enemy force in the rear area, the
Division Commander may assign a Tactical Combat Force to the Protection Brigade to continue
the consolidation of gains.

CAB. Armor Divisions and Armor Divisions (Reinforced) receive a tailored CAB. ALE and
Spike-NLOS represent important new capabilities for the divisions. The aviation branch’s
redesign produced theater CABs which are important for the Army’s concept of fighting in MDO
and LSCO. Importantly, the CAB becomes the “landing spot” for Future Vertical Lift
capabilities.

HOW THE DIVISION FIGHTS: THE WET-GAP CROSSING

In order to show how the Armor Division (Reinforced) fights, the following discussion walks
through two tactical scenarios. First, we’ll consider a wet gap crossing executed by an Armor
Division (Reinforced). Second, we’ll discuss a joint forcible entry operation using an Airborne
Division.

Both discussions focus on the “what’s different” for the Army 2030 Force. We will see that,
while Army 2030 is primarily an organizational change, it’s a powerful doctrinal idea calibrated
for LSCO success.

The first critical task is to set conditions for maneuver. Before the Armor Division (Reinforced)
makes enemy contact, reducing A2AD, including IADS, ISR, EW, and IFC elements, is
primarily a theater army and corps fight. Critical conditions include identifying and destroying
enemy surveillance capabilities. These surveillance capabilities include SUAS, electronic
warfare, unconventional warfare, OSINT, space, and cyber capabilities. Theater and corps
leverage the Theater Fires Command with the MDTF, the OFC with multiple fires brigades, the
Theater Information Advantage Element or Detachment (TIAE or TIAD) with multiple
detachments at corps and division level, and organic, joint, national, and multi-nation
intelligence, cyber, and space assets. The corps initiates indirect fire, electronic, and direct fire
contact with the enemy’s disruption zone forces using supporting effort divisions to develop the
situation and seize positions of advantage in the physical, human, and information dimensions.
During this phase, the Armor Division (Reinforced) and its adjacent divisions and brigades not in
contact preserve combat power, conduct rehearsals, and conducting combat operations as
directed in support of the corps’ initial efforts.

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Figure 4: Simplified Sketch of Armor Division (Reinforced) in Wet-Gap Crossing

Next, having set the conditions for a penetration maneuver, corps directs the Armor Division
(Reinforced) to conduct forward passage of lines and approach the gap. During this phase, the
Armor Division (Reinforced) moves from tactical assembly areas to the crossing areas. The
Armor Division (Reinforced) conducts forward passage of lines with an adjacent division. The
DIVCAV sets the tempo linked closely with aerial reconnaissance, aerial attack, and electronic
warfare elements including TLS-EAB as well as the analysts in the G2 and G39. One ABCT,
the support force, attacks to destroy the enemy’s disruption zone forces and secure the near bank.
The division TAC with the division deputy commander for operations establishes a command
post to control the crossing. The engineer brigade establishes the routes, the holding areas, and
the engineer equipment parks supporting the crossing sites. In the G39, the Information
Advantage Operations Center, monitors intelligence feeds, analyzes enemy decision-making
processes, and recommends deception and control options to the commander. The FSCOORD
allocates fires battalions from the organic artillery assets, from corps battalions in direct support,
and joint fires. The FSCOORD is already looking ahead to confirm planned PAAs and ammo
supply points for the wet-gap crossing supporting fires. The DSB is marshalling the required
transportation assets for the Class-V movement that begins in a few hours. ABCTs provide
forces to reduce by-passed enemy forces behind the DIVCAV and clear areas of possible enemy
units. The PCOORD is adapting the air defense concept to account for changes in the maneuver
plan as the DIVCAV identifies gaps in the enemy’s counter-mobility scheme.

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The corps shapes the crossing areas for the division, reducing enemy radar and electronic
warfare assets using ALE, PRSM, and Spike-NLOS. The corps reinforces spatial and temporal
gaps in the division’s deep fight with assets from the Theater-Enabling CAB and shapes the
crossing area and beyond for the Armor Division (Reinforced) with the OFC which is
synchronizing its own fires brigades, the artillery of adjacent divisions, and joint fire support.
The corps sustainment capabilities from the ESC are staging for their throughput mission to build
sustainment at the bridgehead. The corps physical and temporal deep fight frees the Armor
Division (Reinforced) for rapid movement as it masses its own C2, artillery, intelligence, EW,
air, and cavalry efforts on the difficult wet-gap crossing. The corps reaches forward to set the
division’s rear boundary as far forward as possible to give the main effort the chance to focus its
resources on the close fight.

The next phase is the assault across the gap. For this operation, the Armor Division (Reinforced)
is resourced with seven MRBCs, enough for two 400-meter spans. For this example, the division
has chosen to use two crossing sites within the same crossing area to maximize its ability to build
combat power on the far side. During this phase, the support ABCT, division fires, and
intelligence capabilities all work under the direction of the TAC to suppress and obscure the
crossing sites and far-side objectives. In terms of fires, one cannon brigade suppresses and
obscures one crossing site, while an attached or direct-support fires brigade suppresses and
obscures a second crossing site. A third fires brigade of rocket artillery acts as the counter-fire
headquarters. The division’s ERC-A battalion shapes at the bridgehead line. Corps focuses on
reducing IADS to gain freedom of maneuver for the CAB. The MRBCs move forward at the last
possible moment. Having trained repeatedly with this division and these ABCTs, the bridging
unit, the maneuver units, and the fires units move cohesively to conduct familiar tasks.
DIVCAV, the CAB with ALE, the lead maneuver units, with TLS-EAB, ERC-A, and
sustainment throughput from the ESC or DSB are all preparing for the assault to the bridgehead
line and to push sustainment and support across the gap.

As the unit advances from the far side and secures the bridgehead line, two ABCTs complete
their seizure of the bridgehead objectives and reconnaissance forces including the DIVCAV and
air cavalry begin to extend a screen line beyond the bridgehead as support and sustainment re-
establish support areas on the far side. The PCOORD directs the reestablishment of protection
tasks including air defense integration and reduction of by-passed forces. The division finishes
collecting the information required begin exploitation with assigned or attached BCTs and his
attack aviation. The rapid advance gave EW assets including TLS-EAB access to additional
nodes and information. In coordination with the G2 and G39, they identify an opportunity for a
CAB attack out of contact. The division staff coordinates with Corps to align space and cyber
activities with special operations forces that allows the Armor Division (Reinforced) commander
to rapidly integrate air, space, cyber, and land capabilities during the next period of darkness to

15
achieve a convergence that has the potential to dis-integrate the enemy’s remaining IADS and
fires network.

ARMY 2030 DIVISION DESIGNS: THE AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT DIVISIONS
(JFE)

Figure 5 lays out the task organization of the Airborne Division, which is similar to the Air
Assault Division. This section discusses those structures.

Figure 5: Airborne Division

Brigade Combat Teams. Airborne Divisions are built around Mobile Brigade Combat Teams
(MBCT)s whose infantry forces employ Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs) to move rapidly to
assault objective and follow-on objectives from the airhead. Air Assault Divisions utilize Light
Brigade Combat Teams (LBCTs) which are formations with minimum vehicles designed for
strategic and operational mobility who can dominate complex terrain. Both the MBCT and
LBCT divest of their assigned artillery, the cavalry squadron, and engineer units—although they
retain a reconnaissance company.

DIVCAV. Airborne and Air Assault Divisions employ a light division cavalry squadron
(DIVCAV) to provide all-weather ground reconnaissance and security. DIVCAV can also
accomplish economy of force missions. The Light Division Cavalry Squadron design includes a
Cross Domain Troop works to maintain enemy contact through multiple dimensions including
UAS and allows the squadron to leverage the division’s multi-domain capabilities.

DIVARTY. Division Artillery (DIVARTY) becomes a formation with three assigned cannon
battalions of 105mm and 155mm towed howitzers. Artillery in an airborne assault or air assault

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will be task-organized to an airborne assault task force, but as follow on forces flow into the
airhead, the division commander will be able to constitute a division artillery that he can
organize and allocate across the battlespace.

Combat Aviation Brigade. Both the Airborne and Air Assault Divisions’ CABs will be tailored
as part of aviation initiatives. Airborne CABs will see little change. However, the Air Assault
Division receives an additional Heavy Assault Battalion that enables that division to move a
BCT in one period of darkness.

Protection Brigade. For JFE Divisions, significant portions of the Protection Brigade will reside
in the reserve component.

Other Division Formations. The Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) Battalion provides direct
fire cannon support to infantry forces. The Division Engineer Battalion consolidates engineer
combat power at the division level to enable the division commander to allocate and task
organize forces. The Division Sustainment Brigade includes key adjustments to account for the
new design but does not change significantly in capability.

HOW THE DIVISION FIGHTS: THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT

In the next scenario, we will describe an Airborne Division, in a non-contiguous area of

operations after an airborne assault, conducting operations as part of a Joint Task Force.

In this scenario, the Joint Force Commander wants to use an airborne assault to turn an enemy
force out of his prepared defenses. The Joint Force has established air, space, and cyber
superiority and reduced the enemy IADs to present this option to the Joint Force Commander.
That means that in order to focus on Army 2030 capabilities, the scenario we are considering
assumes the Joint Force established the conditions to provide this option to the Joint Force
Commander. In the scenario, a U.S. Army corps operating as tactical echelon and comprised of
Armor and Light Divisions with associated support elements is prepared to conduct a penetration
of the enemy’s defenses on the JTF’s main line of effort. The Joint Force Commander’s intent is
to combine the effects of this penetration with the effects of a turning movement, the airborne
assault, which threatens the enemy’s lines of communication on a different avenue of approach.
The intent is to fix a significant portion of the enemy’s combat power with this turning maneuver
to prevent them from committing their whole force against the penetration maneuver.

In the situation in Figure 6, the Airborne Division’s assault force secured and stabilized the
airhead and allowed the division to flow in follow-on echelons. However, the division is still
being sustained by air which limits its ability to maneuver. The division commander intends to
fix enemy forces by interdicting their lines of communication vicinity objectives near the built-
up area marked as OBJ KANSAS.

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One MBCT conducts the attack towards OBJ KANSAS with two ICV-mobile infantry
battalions. They are task-organized with two companies of MPF and an engineer company, and
they have an attack aviation company flying in direct support. The MBCT is positioning a TLS
from the corps’ IEW battalion. Linking with other TLS assets in the Division and across the
Joint Force gives the Joint Force ground access to multi-domain avenues of approach. Three
batteries of artillery are DS to the MBCT.

One MBCT secures the airhead. It takes two infantry battalions and enablers to accomplish this
mission. This MBCT emplaced a TLS as well and has been task-organized with an engineer
company. Its artillery support comes from an artillery battalion on the airhead.

The DIVCAV conducts a guard mission. It has been allocated MPF and engineer support to
accomplish that task. The DIVCAV positioned a TLS on terrain that gives it access to important
data streams. The DIVCAV’s habitual relationship with the G2 and G39 staff build dividends as
it provides critical intelligence and early warning to the rest of the Joint Force.

Figure 2: Simplified Sketch of Airborne Division

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The CAB is deployed with an assault air task force including a company of attack aircraft. The
CAB’s Spike-NLOS and ALE capabilities give attack aviation important stand-off capability.
The lift aircraft accomplish a variety of missions.

The bulk of the Protection Brigade is on rear echelon still, but Protection Brigade assets are
being utilized. In particular, an MSHORAD battery is deployed to protect units from enemy air
and small UAS and an IFPC battery is deployed to protect the airhead from attack by ballistic
and cruise missiles.

For the division command posts, the division commander decided to deploy two reinforced
TACs to maximize flexibility and redundancy. The division command posts link in with
subordinate command posts and U.S. Air Force command posts in the airhead to provide
multiple redundancy options.

CONCLUSION

There is still work to be done as these tactical echelons assume their respective roles in the
LSCO and MDO environment. TPO-EAB has developed a list of Army 2030 learning demands
(Appendix 1) that identify key areas of emphasis aligned with LSCO gaps, that inform capability
development and integration decisions.

As we have seen, Army 2030 grapples directly with the problems of large-scale combat in MDO.
This results in a renewed emphasis on the tactical roles of divisions and corps with the key
capabilities from the joint force provided by theater armies. The MDO environment requires
massed effects, and the Army 2030 delivers that in terms of, again, organizational design, key
modernization, and anticipated future capabilities.

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 APPENDIX 1: ARMY 2030 LEARNING DEMANDS
1. Deep Sensing and Long-Range Fires
• Corps Deep Fight: In the deep fight, how are functions, responsibilities, and
capabilities divided between corps, division, and BCT? (LSCO Gaps 6 & 14)
• Information Advantage: How are IA-related functions and capabilities allocated and
employed at echelon across the battlefield?
• Offensive Robotics: How do BCTs, divisions, and corps employ and exploit
offensive robotic capabilities? (LSCO Gap 1)

2. Command and Control

• CP Survivability: In the near term, how can command posts from LSCO and Army
2030 designs disperse to remain survivable in LSCO? (LSCO Gap 6)
• Data and Decision Making: In the near term, how do division and corps
headquarters integrate capabilities that speed decision making? Includes data
analytics, AI/ML, decision agents, etc.

3. Protection
• Rear Area: How are protection tasks and processes divided and synchronized
between corps and division headquarters elements? (LSCO Gap 6)

4. Sustainment and Endurance

• Sustaining Division Maneuver: What sustainment capabilities at echelon, with
appropriate security, are required to provide support to dispersed, maneuvering
division formations. (LSCO Gaps 4, 10, 17)

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 APPENDIX 2: DIVISION DESIGNS:

ARMOR DIVISION

ARMOR DIVISION (REINFORCED)

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LIGHT DIVISION

AIRBORNE DIVISION

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AIR ASSAULT DIVISION

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 APPENDIX 3: ECHELON DEPENDENCIES
Echelon Corps
Space National space capabilities
supply and control space assets;
Corps SSE submits requests.
Cyber / EW National cyber capabilities
supply and control space assets;
Corps cyber cell submits
requests.
Aviation Corps routinely task organized
with the Theater Enabling CAB
for attack, air assault, air
movement, manned/unmanned
ISR.
Airspace Corps has dependency to
division.
Medical TMC routinely tasked organized
a MEDBDE to Corps.
Network Corps has organic Expeditionary
Signal BN
ADA Organic IFPC, Theater provides
Patriot and THAAD DS/GS.
Fires PRSM if Corps is allocated
CLV.
Corps is allocated additional
DS/GS FA BDE as needed.
Counterfire Corps conducts deliberate
targeting. Conducts dynamic
targeting for AOs not assigned
to subordinate units.
Sustainment Corps relies on theater to open
the theater and theater
distribution.
Mobility / Assigned/aligned EN BDE, and
Counter Theater routinely task organizes
mobility EOD GRP.
ISR Corps submit requests National,
Joint, MDTF and HADES
capabilities from theater as
needed.
R&S
Rear Area Assigned/aligned MP Brigade
Security units conduct area, site, route,
and convoy security.
CA Corps routinely tasked organized
with CA BDE.
Division
Division SSE, when provided, submits
requests for space support through
Corps' SSE.
Corps routinely task organizes divisions
with an IEW Battalion that provide TLS
EAB capability for attack and sensing.
Division has organic CAB to provide
attack, air assault, air movement,
manned/unmanned ISR.
AOC and JAGIC manage airspace to
enable DIVARTY and CAB operations.
MEDBDE task organizes elements (FH
and Multifunctional Med BN elements
including the MED CO Area Support)
to support the DIV.
Corps routinely supports division with
Expeditionary Signal BN.
Organic IFPC CO within MSHORAD
BN, corps provides additional IFPC
support as required.
Rocket BNs residing in FA BDEs are
assigned to Corps as needed. These
provide MLRS and HIMARS fires to
priority divisions.
Corps routinely assigns a rocket
battalion to act as counterfire HQ.
Division requires Corps ESC support to
enable maneuver more than 72 hours.
Corps task organizes CSSB to support
Corps and Theater enablers in AO.
Assigned EN BDE/BN, and Corps task
organizes EOD BN and augments EN
capabilities as needed.
Corps EMIB routinely provides IEW
BN DS to division including TLS-EAB
and TLS-BCT.
Division has organic DIVCAV (SQN in
priority divisions).
Assigned MP BN for Level I/II threats.
TCF task-organized to appropriate HQ
(PB/MEB/BDE) for Level III threats.
Corps routinely task organizes CA BN
to division.
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BCT
BCT S2 and other sections utilize
information from space capabilities to
conduct mission analysis.
BCT organic EW platoons, including
TLS-BCT. All EW capabilities,
including TLS-EAB and TLS-
BCT, operate as part of an overall
division and corps EW plan.
Division provides CAB for, attack, air
assault, air movement,
manned/unmanned ISR.
ADAM/BAE remain organic to BCT
staffs.
MEDBDE/MMB pushes surgical assets
and additional capabilities (Prev med,
behavioral Health, etc) to support the
BCT.
Corps Expeditionary Signal BN support
beyond the organic BCT signal
company.
Division routinely task MSHORAD
support to BCTs.
Division routinely provides 1x cannon
battalion DS to BCT.
Division provides counterfire support to
BCTs.
BSB must coordinate with DSB for
capacity/requirement issues for
additional enablers.
EN BN with CEC-As task-organized to
ABCT. CEC-I/CEC-S task-organized to
L/MBCT/SBCT.
Robotics PLT has organic ISR. Division
G2 CM may task unmanned from CAB
or TLS-EAB to support BCT as needed.
BCT requires R&S support from
DIVCAV.
Division routinely task organizes CA
CO to BCT.