FABIG TM79 DDTandDetonationPredictionswithCFD ORHansen

DDT AND DETONATION
PREDICTIONS WITH CFD - TIME TO

BE CONSIDERED IN EXPLOSION
RISK ASSESSMENTS?
Olav Roald Hansen

Llyod’s Register Consulting
E: olav.hansen@lr.org
T: +47 91 17 17 87
Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 101

DDT and Detonation Predictions with CFD
- Time to be Considered in Explosion Risk Assessments?
FABIG technical meeting, Aberdeen & London June 25-26, 2014

Olav Roald Hansen Lloyd’s Register Consulting, Bergen, Norway
Working together
for a safer world
FLACS validation and new application areas - Focus for 20 years:

Good results for explosion and dispersion- hydrocarbons, hydrogen, LNG, dust, explosives etc.
Sometimes hard to understand reasons for deviation
FLACS validation against full scale tests1997-98, HSE Phase 3A test 4, 19 and 22
©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

HSE Phase 3A Test 4 - blast pressures severely underpredicted
3.7 barg
17 barg
2.0 barg
TEST
Pressure at end of test rig Pressure 12m, 24m and 48m outside
FLACS
1.0 barg
0.6 barg
2.4 barg
Deflagrations
Strong deflagrations require turbulence

(obstructions– e.g. pipes/equipment or trees)
1 to 10+ barg pressure & ~1000 m/s flame speed
Flames slow down outside congestion
DNV GL video from 1980s

Most (near all) explosion studies consider deflagrations to be worst-case
(sometimes only 5-10% of energy contributes)
Deflagration -
only congested
units contribute Unit 1 Unit 2
Blast energy
Unit 3 Unit 4
Safe design not stimulated

Gas cloud
=> Focus on sufficient distance to congestion

Deflagration
DNV GL video
Detonation
Detonations propagate by ignition of unburnt gas ahead of flame due to shock waves
16-20 barg pressure & 1600-2000 m/s (detonation limits similar to flammability limits - LFL:UFL)
From OECD hydrogen safety report and other sources
~1 cm ~3 cm ~ 5-10 cm ~ 30 cm

Fast deflagrations may transit to detonations (DDT)
Detonations propagate by shockwave interaction

16-20 barg pressure & 1600-2000 m/s
Both within congestion and gas cloud outside
DDT is deflagration-to-detonation-transition DNV GL video from1980s
At
Flame speed > 600 m/s DDT BLASTENERGY Unit 1 Unit 2
Pressure > 2 barg Unit 5
and sufficient scale Unit 3 Unit 4
DDT has been observed in experiments Gas Cloud
ALL energy in flammable cloud may contribute to blast waves

Detonation
DNV GL video

DDT observed in several recent major accidents
Buncefield 2005 (DDT)

Jaipur
Puerto Rico 2009 (likely DDT)
Jaipur 2009 (DDT)
Sunrise Toronto 2008 (concluded DDT)
Buncefield
There are likely more …
Sunrise
Puerto Rico???
DDT also observed in several large scale experiments
 45m BG test (cyclohexane)

 BEX tests (ethylene/propane)
 MERGE tests (propane, ethylene)
 HSE Phase 3A full-scale rig (natural gas)
 Buncefield explosions in trees (propane) 28m x 12m x 8m rig HSE Phase 3A
 Various hydrogen tests (FLAME facility, KOPER tests, pipe-tests, BakerRisk, Fh-ICT)
 BakerRisk congestion rig tests (ethylene)
 Shell tests congestion block (e.g. ethane)
 NIOSH 73m 1.05m diameter pipe tests (natural gas)
Car and drum placed inside detonation test

GL Spadeadam April 2013

DDT predictions using FLACS (Middha & Hansen) 2006=>
DDT predicted using normalised spatial pressure gradient DPDX (-)

[Simple explanation: Max pressure change (bar) per grid cell inside flame front]
Max DPDX < 0.5 DDT unlikely

0.5 < Max DPDX < 5 DDT possible  criterion to be fulfilled,
5 < Max DPDX DDT likely DPDX-region > 7-10 across
Validated against numerous tests:

 Hydrogen tests (FLAME, KOPER, BakerRisk, Fh-ICT, …) Buncefield tre simulering DPDX
 Ethylene tests (MERGE & BakerRisk)

 Propane tests (Buncefield trees)
 Natural gas (fullscale rig, 73m pipe)
From Hansen & Johnson (2013)
2012: Method to simulate DDT and detonation with FLACS (Hansen & Johnson 2013)
Simulated Buncefield Test 2 (DDT and detonation) in 2012
Proper analysis of trees

used to develop “dummy trees”
Handout from Mike Johnson’s presentation at FABIG March 2014
mm % vol/m m/m3 m2/m3 m/m3 adj m2/m3 adj Diameter model m/m3 m2/m3 Pr 3 x 3 x 4m
170 0,00 0,023 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
120 0,41 0,011 0,36 0,14 0,12 0,05 100 1 0,314 V 36
85 1,04 0,006 1,83 0,49 0,61 0,16
60 0,40 0,003 1,42 0,27 0,47 0,09 50 2 0,314 H 72
42 0,21 0,001 1,52 0,20 0,51 0,07
30 0,24 0,001 3,40 0,32 1,13 0,11 25 4 0,314 H+V 144
22 0,18 0,000 4,74 0,33 1,58 0,11
18 0,19 0,000 7,47 0,42 2,49 0,14 10 20 0,628 H+V 720
12 0,23 0,000 20,35 0,77 6,78 0,26
8 0,23 0,000 45,78 1,15 15,26 0,38 5 52 0,816 1872
3 0,23 0,000 325,55 3,07 108,52 1,02
7,15 2,382 Original estimate 2,386
3 x high 3 x high 2,65 Final estimate
©Lloyd’s Register Consulting Method used November 2012 to develop tree-model used by Hansen & Johnson (2013)

Simulation of Buncefield Test 2 with trees
FLACS simulation predicted likely DDT, can we also predict consequences?

Tweaking parameters in FLACS => detonation can be simulated
Test 2 – standard FLACS simulation (video)

Test 2 – simulated with DDT and detonation settings (video)
Video frames
From Hansen & Johnson (2013) Mike Johnson FABIG presentation March 2014
Good results predicting DDT and detonations
Test 2 detonation modelling: Realistic pressures and flame speeds
From Hansen & Johnson (2013) [updated to include experimental results]


Good results predicting DDT and detonations
Test 2 detonation modelling: Observed and simulated pressures
Sensor 1-3 Sensor 4-6 Sensor 7-9
HSE Phase 3A Test 4 – ”perfect results” assuming DDT
From Hansen & Johnson (2013)

LRC has made automatic DDT & detonation prediction functionality
Scripts are developed which will

 Evaluate potential for DDT in running simulation
 Define exact time and location for DDT
 If DDT, start detonation simulation in parallel
=> Efficient evaluation of DDT risk (including consequences)
Automatic scripts for Safety Gap Issue + Blast Smearing also developed
FLACS will give too high pressures

after safety gap, work-around exists
Standard FLACS Improved
FLACS will smear and underpredict far-field

Improved
blast from strong explosions, work-around exist
Standard
FLACS

Summary Differences Deflagration & Detonation Flames
Parameter Deflagration: Detonation:

Flame propagation: by turbulence/congestion by shock-waves
Flame speeds: 1 m/s – 1000 m/s 1600-2000 m/s
Pressures 0.001 to ~10 barg 16-20 barg
Blast waves Often directional Strong in all directions
Strong explosion expected Inside congestion & near stoichiometry Anywhere flammable
Natural gas 8-11% Natural gas 5-15%
Deflagration
Visual look
Detonation
GL Buncefield tree test video captures (Source New Scientist Website)
Implication of DDT: Onshore & offshore (FPSO/FLNG and platforms)
For onshore facilities it may be a “game changer” to consider DDT in design

 Must optimize design for individual units to prevent DDT
Must ensure deflagrations
do not undergo DDT Unit 1 Unit 2
Blast energy
Unit 3 Unit 4
Gas cloud
For FPSO and FLNG risk for DDT should be considered (more slides follow)
 Optimize design to minimize DDT potential
 Avoid gas clouds detonating at critical locations (e.g. at hull deck)
 Extreme loads may be seen locally, still it is feasible to design for far field loads onto LQ
Offshore platforms
Illustration
 Already optimized using CFD (?) Not caused by DDT
 Higher loads expected with DDT
 However, already in “trouble” at DDT
Could make automatic deluge more attractive! DDT can represent a significant potential for complete loss

FPSO study: Geometry model and study approach
From GCPS 2014 paper by O. R. Hansen, R. Martini, Y. Ryu and J. Choi
Lloyd’s Register Consulting & Samsung Heavy Industries
Process areas below yellow decks
Study approach:
1 Ventilation & dispersion study
=> frequency for ignitied clouds estimated
2 Clouds are exploded (deflagration) evaluating DDT crieria

=> Likely DDT scenarios will be re-simulated assuming DDT
3 Risk reduction measures evaluated

=> Study repeated with 3 separation walls through process areas
FPSO study: Dispersion Study (84 CFD calculations)

Simplified Probabilistic Approach

• Three (3) release locations/directions (R1, R2 and R3 in Figure)
• Two (2) gas compositions: Propane and NG (85% methane, 10% C2 and 5% C3)
• Seven (7) release rates (3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96 and 192 kg/s)
• One (1) wind direction (-10 degrees)
• Two (2) wind speeds 3 m/s and 9 m/s
• 60s to ESD + 60s to stop release
Wind direction and 3 release locations indicated

FPSO study: 84 CFD dispersion calculations
Leak frequencies:
• Typical distribution
• Somewhat low (0.5/year)
Ignition model:
• Time dependent OGP (UKOOA)
• 55% of ignition frequency from 10s to 150s
• Not sensitive to gas cloud size, only initial release rate
Likely conservatism in leak location/direction + ignition model (compared to NORSOK OLF)
FPSO study: Results from dispersion calculations

Cloud development
• Natural gas rises, propane/condensate fall when losing momentum
• Comparable maximum cloud sizes, longer duration for propane
• Significant clouds at hull deck for large propane releases
Natural gas
96 kg/s
Propane 96 kg/s

FPSO study: Resultats from dispersion simulations
Q9-cloud is used as hazard indicator

(Q9 is an ESC= equivalent stoichiometric cloud)
Observations:
• 2-3 times larger Q9 cloud during low winds
• Flammable cloud (LFL:UFL) ~ twice the size of Q9
• NG & propane have similar maximum cloud sizes
• 10-4/year ignited cloud comparable for NG & propane
 NG release frequency 50% higher
 Longer exposure for propane clouds
10-4/year clouds twice the size as normal for FPSOs
Main reasons:
 Conservative choice of free horizontal jet into domain
 Choice of transient ignition model (normally OLF used)
FPSO study: Explosion calculations

~45 FLACS explosion calculations performed Cloud size Base case Base case
Q9 (m3) NG Propane
• 13-15 different cloud sizes, 1-3 ignition positions 400
• propane and natural gas 700
• conservative ignition location 1000
1400
• some simulations repeated as DDT 2000
Too few scenarios for quantitative DDT evaluation 3000
4500 Near DDT
6000
Observations: 8000 Near DDT
10000 DDT DDT
• DDT seems likely for all propane clouds Q9 > 10,000m3
12000 DDT
• DDT seems likely or near for some natural gas clouds 14000 DDT
17000 DDT
20000 N/A DDT
24000 N/A DDT
The figure shows identified DDT potential.
Too few simulations for quantitative evaluation
and to conclude there is no DDT in green cells.

FPSO study: Explosion study, worst-case example
Ignited cloud at process deck Pressure at hull deck
Cloud at hull deck Maximum pressure at hull deck
DDT indication at process deck

Maximum pressure at process deck
FPSO study: Explosion study, example worst-case

Maximum pressure distribution

Deflagration only DDT and detonation
Hull deck LQ LQ
Process deck
LQ LQ
Detonation more energetic, sending energy in all directions

Predicted pressure at LQ comparable (or higher) for deflagration

FPSO study: Risk reduction with separation walls
Aim to reduce cloud sizes and explosion pressures

OK for ventilation:
• 45% reduction in typical flow velocities
• 20% reduction in air changes / hour
Good for dispersion:
• Clouds > 10,000m3 strongly reduced
• Minor changes for smaller clouds
Worse with explosions
• Much higher loads for same cloud sizes
• Increased DDT potential
Base case Walls
Deflagration pressures significantly higher with separation walls

FPSO study: Conclusion separation walls

Separation walls
• Reduce cloud sizes
• Give stronger explosions
• DDT predicted for smaller clouds
• Helps ensuring safe distance to LQ
=> Not convincing for risk reduction
Identified DDT potential, too few simulations for quantitative

PS: evaluation, DDT in green cells can not be ruled out.
More extensive study to be performed before concluding

Soft barriers may be better alternative.

Supertankers disappeared in moments Berge Istra 228,000 tons
315m long 50m wide
“Unsinkable”, double hull designs Iron ore & oil combination carrier
Berge Vanga + 2 more sister ships
29 Dec 1975: Berge Istra disappears near the Philippines

20 days later 2 crew members found on a raft
Hearing strictly confidential (insurance/claims?)
29 Oct 1979: Sister Berge Vanga disappears in Atlantic

70 officers and crew missing from 2 ships
Company stops combination cargo business
Berge Istra sank due to strong explosions inside tanks

Was this due to
* Oil spills in double hull + welding, or
* Unreliable flue gas inerting of empty tanks?
Not important => big ships can sink in moments!

Conclusion:
Must prevent this from happening on FPSOs/FLNGs
Strong explosions may lead to DDT

 Simplified FPSO study: DDT to be feared every 10-4 – 10-5/year
Detonations will give massive damage locally
Even with frequency lower than10-4/year we should:

 Ensure hull integrity to avoid sinking of ship
 Ensure that LQ can survive far field blast loads
Measures:
 Limit significant gas cloud build-up at hull deck
 Deluge activation at gas detection may limit DDT risk
DDT scenarioes should be considered when evaluating design
Tanker Shoku Maru explodes and sinks

A potential DDT offshore would not be “a black swan” May 29, 2014

… Questions or comments?
Olav Roald Hansen

Senior Principal Consultant
Bergen Norway
T +47 91 17 17 87 E olav.hansen@lr.org
Lloyd’s Register Consulting

www.lr.org/consulting
Working together
for a safer world
Lloyd’s Register and variants of it are trading names of Lloyd’s Register Group Limited, its subsidiaries and affiliates.
Copyright © Lloyd’s Register Consulting. 2013. A member of the Lloyd’s Register group.

Questions and answers
Q: For a FPSO, you advised to design so as to prevent DDT; do you have any
suggestions on how this can be done?
A: The only way I know to prevent DDT is to be very efficient at activating the deluge
system upon gas detection. Another solution is to prevent the gas from filling large
volumes at the hull deck. A DDT high up on the process deck would be significantly
less problematic than one occurring on the hull deck. You should therefore make
sure that gas is prevented from going down to the hull deck. If a gas cloud
detonates, it should be as far as possible from the hull deck as extreme loads are
inside the detonating cloud.
Q: Accidental DDTs are very rare and only seem to occur in large clouds in calm
condition. I have never come across DDTs on offshore structures; can you comment
on this?
A: Perhaps not, but does anyone want to be the first to experience a DDT offshore? After
the Buncefield accident which was the first of its kind, many similar events occurred.
We have seen experimentally that a stoichiometric natural gas can detonate in
modules of 28x12x8m; similar conditions can be achieved for a major gas release in
an offshore structure, so I think that a DDT offshore is a possibility.
Q: I understand that in many cases DDT occurs when the pressure rises ahead of the
flame, for instance when a reflected blast wave hits the flame front. As such, do you
think the DPDX parameter is reliable for predicting DDTs as it looks at the difference
between the pressure at the flame front and ahead of it?
A: We have simulated a lot of cases and the DPDX parameter seems quite reliable. What
you mentioned regarding ignition due to reflection seems to be more related to
laboratory experiments within a channel with pressure waves hitting a corner and
detonating there. In the case of large scale experiments, the occurrence of DDT is
mainly linked to what happens at the flame front.

Questions and answers
Q: Are you saying that if the difference between the pressure at the flame front and
ahead of it is more than one bar (for instance), then it is very likely that a DDT
will occur?
A: Not exactly. The parameter that we have developed looks at the next grid cell and a
very high flame speed is required to obtain large pressure differences within one grid
cell. More than two bar in the flame front and no pressure ahead seems to have led
to DDT in some experiments, both from the Spadeadam test site and from Hydrogen
experiments from the literature.
Q: Are you simulating everything with the same solver, or do you use one for
deflagration and another one for detonation?
A: It is the same solver, but we do a dump the results, tweak the parameters and
restart the simulation.
Q: Have you looked at DDTs in hydrogen gas clouds?
A: Yes, a lot. We actually started by considering hydrogen and then considered

other fuels.
Q: What is the effect of reduced congestion on DDT?
A: Reducing congestion will prevent DDTs as it will take longer to reach a DDT in
reduced congestion.

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DDT AND DETONATION

PREDICTIONS WITH CFD - TIME TO

Olav Roald Hansen

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 101

FABIG technical meeting, Aberdeen & London June 25-26, 2014

FLACS validation and new application areas - Focus for 20 years:

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 102

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Strong deflagrations require turbulence

DNV GL video from 1980s

Safe design not stimulated

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 103

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 104

Detonations propagate by shockwave interaction

DDT is deflagration-to-detonation-transition DNV GL video from1980s

Pressure > 2 barg Unit 5

and sufficient scale Unit 3 Unit 4

DDT has been observed in experiments Gas Cloud

ALL energy in flammable cloud may contribute to blast waves

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 105

Buncefield 2005 (DDT)

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

DDT also observed in several large scale experiments

 45m BG test (cyclohexane)

Car and drum placed inside detonation test

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 106

DDT predicted using normalised spatial pressure gradient DPDX (-)

Max DPDX < 0.5 DDT unlikely

Validated against numerous tests:

 Ethylene tests (MERGE & BakerRisk)

From Hansen & Johnson (2013)

Simulated Buncefield Test 2 (DDT and detonation) in 2012

Proper analysis of trees

Handout from Mike Johnson’s presentation at FABIG March 2014

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 107

FLACS simulation predicted likely DDT, can we also predict consequences?

Test 2 – standard FLACS simulation (video)

Good results predicting DDT and detonations

Test 2 detonation modelling: Realistic pressures and flame speeds

From Hansen & Johnson (2013) [updated to include experimental results]

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 108

Test 2 detonation modelling: Observed and simulated pressures

Sensor 1-3 Sensor 4-6 Sensor 7-9

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

HSE Phase 3A Test 4 – ”perfect results” assuming DDT

From Hansen & Johnson (2013)

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 109

Scripts are developed which will

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

FLACS will give too high pressures

Standard FLACS Improved

FLACS will smear and underpredict far-field

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Technical meeting proceedings - JUNE 2014 www.fabig.com 110

Parameter Deflagration: Detonation:

GL Buncefield tree test video captures (Source New Scientist Website)

©Lloyd’s Register Consulting

Implication of DDT: Onshore & offshore (FPSO/FLNG and platforms)