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# 2010 University of South Africa
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University of South Africa
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HSY3703/1/2011±2013
98637134
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Contents
Study Unit Page
1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF GLOBALISATION 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Learning outcomes 2
1.3 Tutorial 1: The many facets of globalisation 2
1.4 Tutorial 2: ``Globalisation'': a disputed concept 9
1.5 Tutorial 3: A theory of globalisation 14
1.6 Conclusion 16
Bibliography 17
2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 19
2.2 Tutorial 1: World history in the age of globalisation 19
2.3 Tutorial 2: The origins of global disparities 26
2.4 Tutorial 3: Africa in world history 37
2.5 Conclusion 39
Bibliography 39
3 GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALISATION 41
3.1 Introduction 41
3.3 What is ``globalisation''? 42
3.4 Geography and globalisation 44
3.5 Globalisation as an economic phenomenon 48
(iii) HSY3703/1/2011±2013
Study Unit Page
3.6 Globalisation and environmental issues 67
3.7 Conclusion 80
Bibliography 80
4 THE GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS 83
4.1 Welcome 83
4.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of world politics 85
4.4 Tutorial 2: The evolution of international society 91
4.5 Tutorial 3: The globalisation of international society 95
4.6 Tutorial 4: The end of the Cold War 101
4.7 Tutorial 5: A selection of post-Cold War developments in world
politics 105
4.8 Globalisation and the post-Cold War world order 111
4.9 Conclusion 112
Bibliography and recommended reading 113
Useful websites 117
5 CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALISATION 118
5.1 Introduction 118
5.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of culture 119
5.4 Tutorial 2: The globalisation of a ``culture of consumerism'' 122
5.5 Conclusion 132
Bibliography 133
(iv)
Study unit 1
An introduction to the concept of Globalisation
Contents
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Learning outcomes
1.3 Tutorial 1: The many facets of globalisation
1.4 Tutorial 2: ``Globalisation'': a disputed concept
1.5 Tutorial 3: A theory of globalisation
1.6 Conclusion
Bibliography
1.1 Introduction
The use of the term ``globalisation'' has become very widespread and even fashionable in
many academic and non-academic contexts. It is associated with a diverse, but
interrelated, range of changing socioeconomic, political, environmental, technological
and cultural phenomena. These changes are usually linked in one or more ways to the
most central idea associated with globalisation, namely that we are all increasingly
closely interconnected with each other, and, indeed, increasingly interdependent. Thus,
we often come across the notion that ``change in one part of the world has implications
and ramifications for all other parts of the world'', and that people are becoming
increasingly conscious of this (Bromley 1999:280±281). The concept of globalisation is
also associated with the idea that these changes have important new implications for the
nature of the world around us.
However, it is important to note that the concept of globalisation and the associated
phenomena are the subject of a great deal of debate. Some scholars, for example, have
argued that ``globalisation'' is merely a new buzzword to describe old networks of
economic and political relations that have always existed, but have merely changed in
one way or degree. For example, they may believe that some of these relations may have
become more intense or more unequal. Other observers do not question the reality of
globalisation, but they disagree about its causes, characteristics and consequences. This
sort of debate obviously has implications for our understanding of the world. Do we
need a new ``global'' theory to make sense of the world today and, if so, what should
such a theory entail?
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The debate about globalisation is reflected in a wide range of academic disciplines. This
module, in line with the interdisciplinary nature of global studies as a whole, consists of
study units which look at globalisation from the viewpoint of the sociologist, the
historian, the geographer and the political scientist. You will notice that these study
units on globalisation reflect the concerns of the different disciplines involved, as well as
the interests and orientations of the particular authors. We invite you to critically explore
and compare these different approaches to globalisation, and draw from this study what
you find most pertinent and useful from your own point of view.
The main objective of this study unit is to introduce you to some important aspects of
the debate about globalisation. We want to make you aware of different ideas that have
influenced this debate. It is important to analyse the concept critically, so that you can
come to your own reasoned conclusions about questions surrounding globalisation, and
make decisions and act accordingly. We hope to help you achieve this main objective by
enabling you to do the following:
. describe some of the central aspects of globalisation
. describe and discuss the debate about globalisation
. use a set of ``key questions'' with which you can critically explore the debate about
globalisation, and thereby come to your own conclusions on the topic
. describe and discuss critically one contemporary and quite sophisticated attempt to
explain the nature of globalisation
1.3 Tutorial 1: The many facets of globalisation
As mentioned above, globalisation is associated with a wide and diverse range of
phenomena. Many accounts of globalisation tend to focus on its socioeconomic
dimensions, for the fairly obvious reason that socioeconomic structures and processes
form such an important part of all of our lives. For example, a growing concern for many
globalisation theorists is the increasing and unprecedented levels of inequality, which
divide the rich and poor all over the world. In the following section, we will look briefly
at some of the socioeconomic factors associated with globalisation. However, it is
important to note that globalisation cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors alone.
Consequently, we will also look at some important technological, political and
ideological issues linked to the concept. The other study units in this module also cover
important cultural, environmental and historical aspects of globalisation.
1.3.1 Socioeconomic aspects of globalisation
The socioeconomic phenomena commonly associated with globalisation include changes
in the distribution and organisation of work, changes in patterns of employment and
changes in the distribution of the fruits of economic activity. For instance, work and the
production process are increasingly seen to be influenced by the acquisition and
distribution of information that is controlled by large multinational or transnational
corporations (TNCs). Also, for most people, the nature of employment is becoming
increasingly ``casualised'': work has become contractual and temporary, part-time and
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home-based, thus reflecting the shift from the manufacturing to the service and even
informal sectors. ``Formal'', full-time employment opportunities, with all the usual
benefits, are decreasing everywhere.
The socioeconomic characteristics associated with globalisation are largely attributed to
the evolving activities of the TNCs. (You will also be made aware of the importance of
TNCs in study unit 3 which deals with geographical features of globalisation.) Some
observers have identified them to be among the main agents of globalisation. They argue
that these massive corporations are now getting exponentially bigger. They rival small to
medium-sized countries in wealth, power, size, reach and complexity. Hertz states
(2001:7):
Fifty-one of the hundred biggest economies in the world are now corporations,
[and] only forty-nine are nation states. The sales of General Motors and Ford are
greater than the GDP of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa; the assets of IBM, BP,
and General Electric outstrip the economic capabilities of most small nations;
and Wal-Mart, the US supermarket retailer, has higher revenues than most
Central and Eastern European states ...
TNCs tend to constantly reinvent themselves in their perpetual pursuit of productivity
for profit and for new ways and spheres in which to make profit; they reorganise,
restructure and rationalise themselves internally and externally (regarding their
subsidiaries and other acquisitions, their subcontractors, etc) and inside and outside the
``home'' country. TNCs often engage in this process with seemingly scant regard for
national and international boundaries, and, in some cases, for traditional and cultural
sensitivities. These global corporations seem to operate just as they please, engaging in
continuous mergers, acquisitions, unbundlings, rightsizing or downsizing, contracting
out and outsourcing, within and across national borders. They set up plant and service
delivery facilities wherever and whenever they choose Ð and just as easily close down,
relocate or restructure these facilities according to changing local and global needs and
opportunities which can be utilised for profit.
TNCs invest in the development of and use science and technology very efficiently in
their pursuit of profit, which has made the production process not only more complex,
flexible and knowledge-intensive, but also more capital-intensive. Many observers
criticise that this development has resulted in increasing job losses and in the
exploitation of ultra-cheap sources of labour. In this latter respect, TNCs often relocate
labour-intensive parts of production to low-paying and vulnerable labour markets Ð
often resorting to the exclusive employment of women and even children in the poorest
parts of the world. The recent exposures of the sportwear giants Nike and Adidas come
readily to mind. The result is therefore an increasingly ``dualistic'' tendency towards
unemployment on the one hand, and highly differentiated ``core'' and ``periphery''
labour markets and employment on the other. This notion of the differentiation of the
socioeconomic sphere into a ``core'' or ``centres'' and a ``periphery'' in the discourse on
globalisation is pervasive. It is linked to the inequalities associated with globalisation,
and we return to this dualism in a number of different ways below (see also study unit
3).
There consequently tends to be a decreasing relevance of the traditional ``blue-collar''
workers and their labour-intensive manual and associated skills, due to the transforming
activities of TNCs. There also is a call for less bureaucratically and hierarchically
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organised workplaces, staffed by ``flexible'', ``knowledgeable'' and `ìnformational''
workers with a wide range of specialised skills (see Rifkin 1995). Workers are expected to
be able to work independently or in teams, be innovative and creative, and be able to
exercise responsibility. This is why most jobs are increasingly only available in the service
industry and the informal sector. These jobs are often ``peripheral'' and ``casual'' in
nature, as the workers do not enjoy the benefits of decent wages, pensions and medical
aid schemes. Only a relatively small and decreasing number of top managers and core
workers enjoy interesting and well-paid work and relative job security. One often-cited
characteristic of globalisation is that much global economic activity takes place within
TNCs. According to Noam Chomsky (Marais 2001:145), for example, about 40 percent
of the US ``trade'' is actually internal to their TNCs, say, between a TNC's headquarters
in the United States and its subsidiary plants across the border in Mexico.
TNCs are increasingly also moving into sectors that are removed from ``manufacturing''
and ``production'', such as the finance sector, and into those sectors once thought to be
largely unrelated to ``the economy''. These companies are becoming more and more
involved in activities related to leisure, entertainment and culture. More importantly, the
services once provided by the state, such as healthcare, education, public transport and
pensions, are now also being taken over by private companies (see Cohen & Kennedy
[2000], Monbiot [2000] and Williams Cutler, Williams & Haslom [1987]).
Indeed, an important aspect of globalisation is that the nature of the global economy
and the different types and sectors of economic activity have undergone major shifts over
the last quarter of a century. The value and volumes of global trade, for instance, have
begun to far exceed those of production. More recently, flows of global finance,
speculative portfolio investment and currency speculation, in particular, now surpass the
value and volumes of even global trade. Furthermore, according to some theorists of
globalisation, the quantity of capital investment and other forms of finance flows (often
called ``foreign direct investment'' or FDI Ð whether for directly productive or more
speculative investment) around the globe are now increasing exponentially in terms of
frequency, speed, density and depth.
This combination of largely unfettered TNC activity and related global flows of finance
is linked to another dimension associated with globalisation, and that is an
unprecedented level of global inequality and an increasing polarisation of wealth and
poverty (Hertz [2001], Hoogvelt [1997] and Monbiot [2000]). In brief, global economic
flows, trade, finance and investment are increasing, at least to relatively more orthodox
economic activity such as manufacturing. However, they tend to be concentrated in the
more advanced and advantaged countries and regions. These countries and regions are
regarded as the ``core'' or ``centres'' of the global economy and they consist of mainly
``First World'' countries like the United States, Japan and those in Western Europe.
Relatively few of these flows go to ``periphery'' countries like Brazil and those in South
East Asia. Moreover, these relatively small flows tend to be concentrated in one or two
regions, such as South East China. Barely a trickle of global economic flows find its way
into the ``sub-periphery'' Ð the poorest of the ``Third World'' and ``Fourth World''
countries, which includes most of sub-Saharan Africa. Even the economic flow which
does find its way into sub-Saharan Africa is very concentrated, such as finances to
produce oil in Nigeria. In essence, economic globalisation and the associated benefits
largely bypass the poorest and most marginalised countries in the world, which contain
the majority of the world's population (Marais [2001] and Hoogvelt [1997]). Thus, as
4
many critics have pointed out, those who need FDI the most are excluded from these
global economic flows.
Some theorists of globalisation, such as Hertz (2001), Hoogvelt (1997) and Marais
(2001), argue that the socioeconomic flows associated with globalisation are
concentrated in and between the centres, because there is only a small group of relatively
competitive countries in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, such as Nigeria,
Brazil and South Korea. Thus, the only really globally relevant categories are the centres
and the small group of countries that make up the ``new'' or ``real'' periphery. All the
other countries, in this rather gloomy scenario, are often referred to rather dismissively as
``the rest''. It is frequently argued that the ``real'' peripheries have little if any chance of
ever catching up with the centres. (Also see study unit 2 for a historical discussion of the
emergence of this global division between the haves and the have-nots.)
These scholars emphasise that globalisation tends to bring about ``peripheral'' pockets in
and alongside the traditional centres and in the poorest of regions too. This is related to
the idea that the geographical location of global inequality and the global polarisation of
wealth, power, privilege and opportunity are increasingly irrelevant (compare with study
unit 3). These scholars argue that there is no longer a regionally located ``north-south'',
or ``first-to-fourth world'' global divide. The activities of the TNCs have shifted
production from the ``centres'' to low-wage ``peripheries'' in all countries, including the
wealthy regions. This increasing change towards ``casualised'' employment in the centres
themselves has, therefore, created extreme economic and political inequalities anywhere
and everywhere on the globe. In this view, global inequality is more of a socioeconomic
phenomenon than a geographical one (see also Crow 1997).
1.3.2 Technological, political and ideological aspects of
globalisation
There is more to globalisation than its socioeconomic characteristics: we also have to be
aware of the interrelationship between socioeconomic and technological developments,
specifically in the areas of transport, information and communications technologies
(ICT). Recent developments in new transport technologies facilitate, more than ever
before, greater and quicker flows of people and goods to just about every corner of the
globe. Perhaps more importantly, developments in communications and information-
processing technologies, in particular, have enabled almost instantaneous ``real-time''
communication, exchanges of information and flows of finance. These developments in
ICT, perhaps more than any other contemporary phenomena, inform what most people
mean when they talk about globalisation. They have generated a variety of descriptions
of contemporary society as being a ``knowledge'', `ìnformation'', ``learning'',
``postindustrial'', ``postmodern'' society and of the world as a ``global village''.
Developments in transport and in ICT have even led some theorists of globalisation to
suggest that global social reality is increasingly characterised by the irrelevance of
distance and the ``mastery of time''. This idea is reflected in notions such as ``space and
time compression'', the ``collapse of space into time'', or the `ànnihilation of space by
time'' (see Waters [1995] and Bromley [1999], among others). There is a common
perception that we can now transport most goods and travel anywhere in the world, and
that there is no restriction on global communication, exchanges of information and
capital flows. Some observers even believe that we have overcome the constraints that
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time and space have historically imposed upon us. For example, you can study today's
stock prices in the London Times newspaper while sipping Brazilian coffee and eating a
French croissant, while your American sneakers rest on the imported Italian tile floor of a
fashionable cafe
Â in Cape Town. Against the muted background noise of CNN and BBC
broadcasts coming from the numerous pay-satellite TVs in the cafe

Â, you can observe, on
the LCD monitor of your laptop PC, while faxing through your share instructions, the
reaction of your broker in New York as she hears you say you will be popping in for a
visit tomorrow after attending your company's board meeting this afternoon in
Johannesburg.
Developments in ICT are central, furthermore, to the ways in which TNCs have
transformed their production processes and employment practices, as discussed in section
1.3.1. TNCs tend to invest far more in the computerisation and automation of their
production processes than they do in labour. In addition to the nature of the production
process itself, even the monitoring and control of the flow and quality of work is
increasingly being automated. Furthermore, the intensification of capital flows associated
with developments in ICT has also facilitated an increase in the technological and
informational parts of the production process. All this has resulted in increased
productivity and the reduction of human error (as well as reduced opportunities for
human resistance to exploitation at work). It has also made many jobs redundant (and
thus also reduced the numbers of members of, and thus the power, of trade unions Ð
which further increases the vulnerability of many workers). The relationship between the
TNCs and technological innovation, which is reflected in sharper divisions between
economic core and periphery, and between a relatively small group of privileged ``core''
workers, and a majority of vulnerable, ``casualised'', ``peripheral'' workers, is often
discussed under the broad heading of the ``global Japanisation'' (see, among others,
Elger & Smith [1994]) of work. This means that many companies in the world have
adapted ideas and practices regarding productivity and labour discipline that were
originally developed by the large Japanese firms whose economic performance impressed
Western TNCs.
Developments in ICT have not only enabled the free flow of information that facilitates
the coordination of complex TNCs, but also the free flow of finance capital, as
mentioned above. Modern electronic banking systems enable massive amounts of capital
to flow all around the world, literally at the touch of a button, within and between
TNCs, and between TNCs and their clients (which include governments and
government agencies). Importantly, massive amounts of capital can just as easily and
instantaneously flow out of a subsidiary or country as in. This ``footloose'' nature of the
capital investment or FDI (see section 1.3.1) and capital flows controlled by financial
and other TNCs obviously has implications for any country trying to attract and retain
investment, as well as for the relative economic stability governments require to be able
to do any sort of broad economic planning. This is perhaps most keenly reflected in
fluctuations in the value of local currencies and market confidence and prices, with
fluctuations in flows of global finance. As already discussed, flows of finance capital,
involving both productive and more speculative types of investment, now far outstrip
the value and volume of global trade, which represents a major shift in global economic
activity. ``There is a tendency to invest money `ìn money'', rather than taking the more
laborious route of putting money into productive investments that will make money.
6
This combination of modern ICT and TNC activity also contributes in a variety of ways
to the creation and maintenance of global core-periphery relations, as mentioned above,
and the global polarisation of wealth and poverty. ICT's facilitation of currency
speculation and ``footloose'' capital can have a devastating effect on weaker political
economies. This is because the main rationale for global flows of capital by TNCs is to
seek profit. Investors want the greatest possible return on their capital, as quickly and as
safely as possible. For the majority of the global population Ð for those living on the
peripheries and, particularly, on the sub-peripheries of the ``global village'' Ð this
approach has tended to have rather unfortunate consequences. This is because the
biggest and wealthiest markets, the best socioeconomic and technological infrastructures
for the absorption of finance, and the most stable democratic societies tend to be found
in the centres themselves. Hence a tendency to concentrate global flows of finance,
investment, growth and development in the centres and a few fortunate peripheral
countries. This results in the increasing marginalisation and impoverishment of most of
the inhabitants of the global system. In poorer parts of the world, the `ìnvestment'' that
does occur, tends to be of a speculative, even exploitative nature (eg by taking advantage
of the `òpportunity'' to pay very low wages to women and children in sweatshops in the
Third World), rather than for productive and developmental purposes. Can you see the
interrelationship between the socioeconomic and technological aspects of globalisation?
The last of the characteristics associated with globalisation that we will briefly discuss
concerns features of the relationship between its socioeconomic, technological and
politico-ideological dimensions. In socioeconomic terms, globalisation is associated with
the ascendancy of free-market capitalism on a global scale after the collapse of
Communism and the end of the Cold War. In ideological terms, globalisation is
associated with, and in large part legitimated (justified) by the ideas and institutions of
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is in turn associated with the rise of Thatcherism in Britain
and Reaganism in the United States from the late 1970s onwards. Before this, ideas and
practices associated with social democracy and social welfarism predominated in many
countries, particularly in the First World. Briefly, this involved a great deal of state
intervention in the economy, strong trade unions, and the state's provision of extensive
services, social welfare and socioeconomic protections against the harsher effects of free-
market capitalism (eg low wages and unemployment) Ð particularly with regard to the
poorest and most vulnerable people in these countries (see Foster 1999). Neoliberals on
the other hand, claim that free-market capitalism and free trade will achieve the greatest
good for the greatest number of people. State intervention in society, and in economic
activity in particular, has therefore to be reduced to a minimum. Neoliberals argue that
the state should raise only minimal taxation to secure law and order, property rights, and
the provision of a bare minimum of welfare, but that there should be as little direct state
involvement as possible in economic production and the provision of services. The more
the state provides for or even interferes with these functions, the greater the impediment
to free economic activity Ð and thus to the greatest good for all. The global rise of
neoliberal ideology is also associated with developments in technology, because the
worldwide propagation of neoliberal ideas has been facilitated by the use of the satellite
media, such as CNN and the BBC.
This leads us to another central characteristic associated with globalisation, which is the
notion of the increasing irrelevance of the state. This view is particularly important in
neoliberal ideology, as we've indicated above. It is also linked to ideas about the nation-
state's declining power and sovereignty as a consequence of the increasing wealth and
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power of the TNCs, and governments' seeming inability to monitor, let alone control,
their activities. Some observers also link the ``decline of the state'' to the increasing
importance of new regional and global forms of governance like the European Union
(EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the United Nations
(UN). Other institutions of global political and economic governance include the
neoliberal World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Theorists like Hoogvelt (1997:67) argue that instead of states directly
driving their own domestic economies, now it appears that ``the functions of the state
become reorganised to adjust domestic economies and social policies to fit the exigencies
of the global market and global capitalist accumulation'', which, as we have already
mentioned, is dominated by TNCs and the neoliberal organisations and institutions of
regional and global governance mentioned above. In this regard, Sklair (1995) argues
that the ``global age'' is defined by the global vision and ``transnational activities'' of
``transnational actors'', who constitute a ``transnational capitalist class'' comprised
mainly of TNC and state elites. In fact, states now seem actively to be assisting these
corporations, as many states proceed to deregulate their finance sectors and open other
economic sectors to global market forces. Some states, in both the centres and the
peripheries (in Ireland and in Namibia, respectively), are even creating union-free and
tax-exempt `èxport-processing-zones'' (EPZs) to create the right (neoliberal) ``climate''
for TNCs.
As many critics have pointed out, these are some of the reasons why unemployment,
inequality and poverty are increasing, and the nature of work and employment is
changing to the detriment of those without the appropriate skills. Clearly, socioeconomic
trends in globalisation are intimately interrelated with technological, political and
ideological developments. Importantly, while most governments today have imple-
mented at least some aspects of neoliberalism, its effects have been felt most severely in
the poorest parts of the world. Since the 1980s, in terms of the ``Washington
Consensus'', all loans and aid to the ``developing countries'' granted by global economic
agencies like the World Bank and the IMF have been conditional on the acceptance by
the recipient nation of a package of standard economic reforms called ``structural
adjustment programmes'' (SAPs). In line with neoliberal orthodoxy, these reforms
include the deregulation and opening up of local economies to unrestricted global trade.
They also include the relaxation of exchange controls and the implementation of fiscal
austerity, monetary discipline and reduced social expenditure. Nation-states receiving
loans and aid from these agencies are also required to greatly reduce the role of the state
in the economy and, in particular, to privatise state enterprises and assets. Many critics
have pointed out therefore that the consequences of the imposition of SAPs have been to
further reduce wages, employment and the provision of social welfare. Furthermore,
many of the poorer countries are so deeply indebted to agencies like the World Bank and
IMF that they have little revenue available for local development and poverty alleviation
programmes once they've serviced their loans. Frequently, they thus have to resort to
further loans (and perhaps submit to even more stringent neoliberal conditions), and the
vicious cycle of indebtedness and poverty worsens. Consequently, the vast majority of the
global population has suffered from increasing impoverishment (Hertz [2001], Hoogvelt
[1997], Cohen & Kennedy [2000] and Marais [2001]).
8
Activities for tutorial 1
(1) Why have many observers criticised the role played by TNCs? Discuss critically.
(2) Discuss how globalisation has influenced the recent changes in the structures of work
and employment.
(3) ``Globalisation is characterised by unequal flows of trade and exchange between poor
and wealthy nations.'' Do you agree? Discuss critically.
(4) Discuss some of the ideas that are associated with neoliberalism.
(5) Why do many scholars view technology as an important aspect of globalisation?
Discuss.
(6) Do you agree with the view that the role of the state has become largely irrelevant as a
consequence of globalisation? Give reasons.
(7) In what ways do you think globalisation is affecting your life?
1.4 Tutorial 2: ``Globalisation'': a disputed concept
While we have so far been using the term and characterising it as if it were more or less
unproblematic, and despite the widespread use of the word ``globalisation'' in the mass
media and the academic community, there is a great deal of disagreement and debate
about what it means. As is the case with most important ideas and concepts, it is
difficult to define this term to the satisfaction of all the participants in the debate. While
many scholars suggest that we are in a new important phase in human history, others
argue that there is nothing new about economic and political networks which
interconnect the different regions in the world (see study unit 2). Critics argue that
``globalisation'' can be explained in terms of older theories, such as Wallerstein's (1979)
``world system'' theory (also see So [1990] and Kiely [1995]). Moreover, even among
those observers who accept that globalisation is a reality, there is a lively debate about its
causes, nature and consequences. There is also disagreement about the extent to which a
new theoretical paradigm or a new ``global'' way of thinking about our contemporary
world is required, and what such a theory should comprise.
More specifically, the debate on globalisation hinges on a number of related issues which
include the following key questions. After you have read through the discussion of the
debate that follows, please answer these questions carefully and critically and use them
to provide your own understanding of globalisation and your own position with regard
to the debate that surrounds it:
. Does ``globalisation'' really exist and is the concept of globalisation meaningful?
. Do we need a new theory in order to understand contemporary reality?
. What are the characteristics that we can associate with globalisation?
. How can we, if at all, ``periodise'' the history of globalisation?
. What are the causes of globalisation?
. Is globalisation inevitable?
. What are the consequences of globalisation for the future of humankind?
Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999) identify three broad positions in this
debate. They distinguish between the ``hyperglobalists'', the ``sceptics'' and the
9 HSY3703/1
``transformationalists'' (also see Amin [1997]). It is hardly possible, however, to identify
these three camps in terms of clearly defined political views, because they cut across most
conventional intellectual, theoretical, methodological and ideological divides. Each
position has its ``conservatives'', ``liberals'' and ``radicals''.There are, for example,
representatives from the pro-capitalist, (neo)liberal camp and the anticapitalist, neo-
Marxist camp in each of the hyperglobalist, sceptical and transformationalist positions.
1.4.1 Hyperglobalists
Hyperglobalists, such as Robinson (1996), Albrow (1996), Sklair (1995), Waters (1995),
Drucker (1992), Hoogvelt (1997) and Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) tend to argue
for the emergence of a historically unprecedented, fundamentally new type of globalised
world. Many of the more extreme claims that are frequently made about a new global
world order can be attributed to these ``hyperglobalists''. They tend to emphasise the
uniqueness, ubiquity and inevitability of globalisation, and they argue that it has
momentously positive and/or negative consequences. They associate contemporary
society with historically unprecedented global change which is occurring in socio-
economic, political, cultural and technological areas. Consequently, they call for a
corresponding ``paradigm shift'' in human perception, theory and action in order to face
the challenges of globalisation.
As with sceptics and transformationalists, hyperglobalists operate from within a variety
of ideological and theoretical traditions. Drucker (1992) and Womack et al (1990), for
example, argue from a conservative, pro-capitalist and neoliberal orientation. They claim
that capitalism's global ascendancy since the end of the Cold War, reflected in
increasingly free trade, global markets and technological innovation, is what is driving
globalisation. They argue that this development of Western capitalism is inexorably
transforming the whole world and that it will eventually benefit all countries and all
people in the world. They believe that unrestricted free trade, competition and the
participation by all in this emerging, single global capitalist market is a positive
development which will (ultimately) have benign consequences for all human beings.
However, there are hyperglobalists who are very critical of what they see as the
destructive consequences of globalisation. Hoogvelt (1997), for example, contends that
globalisation will increasingly marginalise and impoverish people in peripheral and sub-
peripheral areas, and thus exacerbate the global polarisation of wealth and poverty. An
anticapitalist, neo-Marxist hyperglobalist like Robinson (1996) argues that the
characteristics and consequences associated with globalisation are directly attributable to
the unfolding profit-seeking character and logic of the capitalist mode of production and
the related activities of a global monopoly capitalist and state elite. Departing from a
more or less orthodox Marxist reading of the ``laws of motion'' (or inner workings or
`ùnderlying workings'') of capitalism, Robinson then proceeds to present globalisation as
the contemporary, but radically new manifestation of globalised capitalism. He argues
that capitalism is now incorporating new and global arenas, since it has exhausted all
previous avenues of profit and has exacerbated class distinction and inequality such that
it has now reached the global level.
Robinson (1996) concludes his position by arguing that there are two broad possible
outcomes of globalisation. Firstly, he suggests that ``barbarism'' could result from the
unchecked continuation of global capitalism. This is because it is likely to bring about
10
exacerbated resource depletion, environmental destruction, uncontrolled TNC dom-
ination, rampant unemployment, poverty, crime and famine. Only a privileged minority
may be able to live a sheltered life style. Consequently, the vast majority of the world's
population may become impoverished and, therefore, resort to extreme measures,
possibly of through the agency of fundamentalist social movements, and/or possibly in
the form of various new types of criminality, in order to claim a more equitable
distribution of power and resources. This in turn may be met with increasingly brutal
official and private security measures. The second possible outcome, according to
Robinson, could be socialism. He derives this from the argument that just as capitalism
itself has developed socioeconomically and technologically, so the socioeconomic (eg
increasing inequality and poverty) and technological conditions and means (eg the
Internet, e-mail, the mobile telephone) for mass mobilisation of anticapitalist protest will
become increasingly more developed. All this could facilitate global, socialist
revolutionary action.
A substantial number of scholars, whether hyperglobalists, sceptics or transforma-
tionists, are concerned about the future consequences of the increasing global
polarisation of power, wealth and opportunity. Even some neoliberal authors, such as
Drucker (1992) and Fukuyama (1989), are aware of this problem, although they argue
that the economic and political benefits of globalisation will ultimately ``trickle down'' to
all people in the world. Conversely, Huntington (1996) and Barber (1996), not unlike
Robinson, foresee great conflict between the ``haves'' and ``have-nots'' as a result of the
globalisation of neoliberal, free-market capitalism and its associated ``Western'' values of
individualism, materialism and consumerism. They believe that these disparities could be
articulated as a ``clash of civilisations'', or as conflicts between cultures, ethnic groups,
religions and ideologies.
Some hyperglobalists tend to conceptualise globalisation in a rather monocausal and
linear manner. For example, Daniel Bell (1976) and Alvin Toffler (1980) tend to de-link
the causes and character of globalisation from capitalism. They tend to stress the
independent dynamics, structures and processes of industrialisation. This type of view
attributes the causes of globalisation to technology, particularly computerisation, as an
independent variable. Developments in ICT are even held to be among the most
important causes of the decline of the state, given that the state is no longer able to
monitor, let alone control, the exponentially increasing free flow of information, ideas
and capital. From this rather ``technologically reductionist/determinist'' perspective,
globalisation is held to be directly attributable to developments in information-
processing technologies in particular.
1.4.2 Sceptics
Sceptics, such as Hirst and Thompson (1996a) (and see Scott [1997], Du Boff, Herman,
Tabb & Wood [1997], Meiksins Wood [1996], Tabb [1997], Koechlin [1997],
Kleinknecht & ter Wengel [1998], Sweezy [1997] and Williams et al [1987]),
problematise and even question the usefulness of the concept of globalisation on both
empirical and theoretical grounds. Indeed, Hirst and Thompson (1996a) argue that
there is nothing even quantitatively different about contemporary international trade,
production, finance and local, regional and international governance. However, other
sceptics argue that quantitative Ð but not qualitative and thus not ``new'' Ð changes
have occurred or are occurring. Still other scholars concede that qualitative changes have
11 HSY3703/1
occurred, but reject the idea that these are the result of a new set of global forces. All
sceptics tend to agree, however, that understanding contemporary social reality does not
require a radically new set of ``global'' concepts or a new ``global'' theoretical paradigm.
Rather, they argue that whatever changes may have occurred merely represent variations
on old themes, such as the contemporary manifestations of industrial capitalism.
Hirst and Thompson (1996a and 1996b), among others, base their criticism of the
globalisation thesis on mainly empirical grounds. They associate globalisation with
increased global volumes of trade and finance flows, worldwide free-market capitalism,
(neo)liberal ideology, and the declining, or rather changing, role of the nation-state, as
mentioned in Tutorial 2. But they argue that the connection between the world economy
and the role of the nation-state has not changed qualitatively since the late 19th century.
They hold too that the nature and extent of global free-market capitalism, and its
legitimating neoliberal ideology, is today not appreciably different from what it was a
century ago. However, they, and other sceptics, argue that an intervening period, dating
roughly from the middle 1940s to the late 1970s, characterised by a reformist variant of
capitalism, differentiates the late 19th century from the present. On the basis of the
steady dismantling of the welfare state from the late 1970s, epitomised by
``Thatcherism'' in Britain and ``Reaganism'' in the United States, some sceptics argue
that in important respects the contemporary era represents a regression to the free
market capitalism of the 19th century (see Foster 1999). They contend, therefore, that
the claims made about globalisation are insufficiently grounded, as is the need for new
concepts. However, some sceptics, like Hirst and Thompson, have been accused of using
a narrowly conceptualised empirical methodology as the basis for their rejection of the
concept of globalisation.
1.4.3 Transformationalists
Transformationalists, such as Amin (1997), reject both hyperglobalist and sceptical
positions as being excessive, and hold a variety of positions between these extremes in
the debate on globalisation. Held et al (1999) characterise a transformationalist position
as one which entails a provisional acceptance of the emergence of a new form of
globalised society. Transformationalists, unlike either hyperglobalists or sceptics,
conceptualise globalisation as an incomplete and largely indeterminate phenomenon.
They view globalisation as an extremely subtle and complex feature of contemporary
reality that has to be analysed very carefully. From a transformationalist view,
globalisation has historical continuities and discontinuities. Transformationalists refer to
an increasing interdependency and reciprocity between local, regional, national and
international features of globalisation.
At first glance, the transformationalist position seems to be the most ``reasonable''
position to hold in the contradictory debate about globalisation. However some critics
have argued that the very ``provisionality'' of this position is its greatest weakness. While
the transformationalists are trying to do conceptual and theoretical justice to a complex
and elusive problem, their analyses of globalisation have been criticised as vague and
unsatisfying. In Tutorial 3 we will return to the theoretical attempts made by Held et al
(1999) to go beyond the debate between the hyperglobalists, sceptics and
transformationalists on globalisation. If you read their text as a whole, you will find that
their own orientation is very close to the transformationalist position.
12
Transformationalists, like many hyperglobalists and sceptics, look at global inequalities
of power and wealth and global environmental depletion. They also attack the neoliberal
concept for reducing democracy to participation in the market as a consumer (see Frank
2001), and they criticise the collaboration between TNCs and governments because it
weakens democracy (see Hertz [2001] and Monbiot [2000]).
1.4.4 Scott's critique
Finally, while we earlier listed Scott (1997) among the sceptics, he isn't really easily
identifiable as belonging to any of the ``camps'' in the debate on globalisation. But he
does offer an interesting critique of many of the claims made about globalisation,
especially by many hyperglobalists. His critique hinges on the neoliberal claims made
about free-market capitalism, and the idea that the role of the state is declining. In short,
he argues that there has always been tension between free-market competition and social
needs Ð that is, between self-interested and rational economic calculations of
individuals, and `ìrrational'' and community-based values, ties and reciprocal obligations
and expectations in a society. And this is a tension that regulatory institutions like the
state have always had to mediate, by alternately deregulating and (re-)regulating
markets. He holds that globalisation represents the ascendancy of a deregulatory phase,
and this is why he argues that globalisation has to be seen in large part as a political
project.
More specifically, Scott (1997) argues that the ``rhetoric'' (common ideas usually
associated with the term) of globalisation involves the central idea that politics and the
state are powerless in the face of inevitable and unstoppable global capitalist market
forces. In this rhetoric, globalisation is all but reduced to inexorable market forces that,
facilitated by developments in transport and ICT, are transforming the world.
Furthermore, both markets and technology are held to be ``neutral'' (in the sense that
they serve no particular interests) Ð globalisation and the globalisation of the capitalist
free market are not merely inevitable and unstoppable, but neutral too. Can you see how
this links up with the legitimating function of neoliberal ideology we talked about
earlier? In other words, so the rhetoric goes, whatever effects globalisation might have,
we can't really do anything about it, nor can we say that globalisation is either ``good'' or
``bad'' in and of itself. Can you see how this effectively removes and thus protects the
neoliberal globalisation of the capitalist free market from public discourse about the
``good society'', that is from discussion and debate about the kind of society we'd all like
to live in?
However, drawing on accounts (especially the ideas of Karl Polanyi) of the history of the
rise and decline of markets, Scott (1997:9) argues that markets are neither natural,
inevitable nor neutral. They've always been ``the outcome of political action and
decision'' and, furthermore, have always been ``regulated ... by state institutions''. He
holds that modern globalisation, or the modern globalisation of the capitalist free
market, is also the result of political or state decision, action and regulation. According
to Scott (1997:9±10),
globalisation ... is the realisation or side-effect of economic deregulation and the
lowering of social costs within national communities ... Deregulation ... is not a
response to competition but a means of extending it into areas which were
previously protected, or partially protected, from commodification. It is
deregulation that undermines the ability of nation states to protect themselves
13 HSY3703/1
and the community they represent from the social destructiveness of markets,
but it is also the nation state that is the key actor in bringing deregulation about
internally (e.g. through privatisation and lowering social costs within its borders)
and externally (e.g. by participating in and agreeing to proposals from
international fora ...) ... [C]ontemporary neo-liberalism has been successful
because it has persuaded many politicians, and perhaps voters also, that the
direction of causality runs from economic development to political response and
thus presents itself merely as an objective or at least neutral diagnosis rather
than as a contributor to the emergence of the very conditions it purports to
analyse ... [O]ne might ... characterise deregulation as that disease which
purports to be its own cure.
(1) Why is the term ``globalisation'' such a disputed concept? Give reasons for your
answer.
(2) Discuss the most important ideas that are associated with the positions taken by the
``hyperglobalists'', the ``sceptics'' and the ``transformationalists''.
(3) Which group could be said to hold the most positive views and which group the most
critical views of globalisation?
(4) Why do some scholars question the relevance of the term ``globalisation''? Do you
agree that globalisation is not a new phenomenon in human history at all? Give
reasons for your answer.
(5) ``Globalisation is the main reason for the contemporary global inequality and injustice.''
Do you agree with this statement? Discuss critically.
(6) Is globalisation inevitable? Give your reasons.
(7) Based on the ``key questions'' posed at the beginning of this tutorial, give reasons for
where you place yourself in the debate about globalisation.
1.5 Tutorial 3: A theor y of globalisation
Held and his coauthors (1999) use the term ``global transformations'', rather than
``globalisation'', as the title and the focus of their book. This is suggestive of their subtle
approach to a theory of globalisation. They attempt to provide a broad conceptual and
theoretical framework for understanding globalisation. The two most important features
of their theory of globalisation are their periodisation of globalisation and the criteria
they use to periodise global tranformations in world history.
Held et al (1999) offer a fourfold periodisation of globalisation, with each period more
``globalised'' than the one preceding it. They distinguish between the pre-modern epoch
(before 1500), the early modern epoch (1500±1850), the modern epoch (1850±1945)
and the contemporary epoch (1945 onwards). This distinction is made on the basis of
what they call the reciprocal relationships between the spatiotemporal attributes and the
organisational attributes of globalisation (see study unit 2 for a discussion on global
history). They focus on the nature of the global exchanges and interrelationships which
characterise each historical epoch. In their focus on the ``spatio-temporal'' aspects of
globalisation they analyse how socioeconomic and political relations have connected the
14
various regions in the world throughout the course of history, and how these relations
have changed human societies. When these authors refer to `òrganisational'' attributes
of globalisation, they refer to the complex ways these global interactions have influenced
the infrastructure and institutions in societies.
There are a number of important spatiotemporal aspects of globalisation. For example,
Held et al (1999) use the term `èxtensity'' to describe the ``reach'' of global flows; global
flows may range from a marriage which connects two villages, to the trade of salt across
the Sahara desert. Staying with this example, the term `ìntensity'' refers to the frequency
and duration of these matrimonial relationships, and to the hundreds of years during
which salt has been transported and traded in the African desert. The ``velocity'' of flows
means a combination of volume, pace and power, such as how many marriages occur
over a given period of time, how quickly these marriages take place, and the significance
of these marriages for the two villages involved.
Held et al (1999) also discuss the impact the combination of extensity, intensity and
velocity of global flows has on the decision-making process. For example, the chiefs from
both villages may get together to make a communal decisions on behalf of their subjects.
The ``flow'' of marriages between the villages may over time change various traditional
values and norms pertaining to the institution of marriage. These relations may even
result in new cultural practices being established concerning marriage and associated
institutions like property and lineage. Returning to the example of the salt trade, the
Bedouin traders may accumulate some surplus over the years, perhaps using it to buy
guns to accumulate wealth by more forceful means. They also may effect some
redistribution of wealth and power along their route because of the different ways people
have become involved in the salt trade. Finally, in terms of the structural impact of
global flows, the ongoing salt trade may encourage the development of a chain of
markets over time and some sort of facilitating infrastructure, oriented towards the
exchange of a larger variety of goods and services which eventually connects Africa with
other regions in the world.
The organisational attributes of globalisation comprise the arrangements and resources
which influence global flows, interrelations and networks. This may involve transport
systems, ranging from a camel train to the construction of a road or canal system, or
cultural patterns which encourage commerce with other regions. It also refers to the way
the economic `ìnstitution'' as a whole is organised. If a particular society is based on a
subsistence economy, this is likely to inhibit global flows and transformations.
Conversely, some people may be forced to move beyond their territorial boundaries to
supplement their subsistence. If the economy is capable of producing agricultural and
other surpluses, this is more likely to facilitate global economic trade. Stratification
systems also influence global exchanges. A society with a pronounced caste or class
system, for example, may be characterised by a high intensity of global flows among the
elite, since they are able to monopolise economic and political power to control these
networks. On the other hand, such a society may be characterised by a low intensity of
local flows among the poorer classes because they are deprived of access to resources.
Finally, if a society is influenced by an aggressive type of military or economic
organisation, this too will have implications for its own character and for its relations
with other societies. An obvious example here would be the global transformations
brought about by imperialism or colonialism.
15 HSY3703/1
Importantly, in Held et al's (1999) conceptualisation, the relationship between the
spatiotemporal and organisational attributes of global flows and exchanges is a reciprocal
one. Problems in organisational attributes may inhibit the spatiotemporal aspects of
global flows, but changes in the spatiotemporal attributes of global flows may result in
changes in organisational features which facilitate even greater ``global transformations''.
Thus, some societies are able to adapt their structures to establish wider networks of
trade and political relations. However, the development towards globalisation can be
interrupted or ``rolled back'' by destructive events, ranging from natural disasters to
wars. Globalisation is not inevitable and its outcomes are largely unpredictable.
Held and his coauthors believe that we need a new theory to explain globalisation
adequately and to make informed judgments for action. They also believe that they have
provided such a theoretical framework, as briefly discussed above. They reject the
sceptical position and they also criticise the hyperglobalist position, especially in its more
extreme forms, since they argue that globalisation always depends on the complex
relationship between its spatiotemporal and organisational attributes. Can you see that
their position is perhaps closest to that held by the transformationalists? What do you
think of their theory? Does it capture the best of the contributions to the debate? Does it
avoid the weaknesses and criticisms of some of the contributions to the debate? What do
you make of the criticism that Ð despite its undoubted sophistication Ð their theory,
being closest to the transformationalist position, is also subject to the weaknesses
associated with this position? Finally, think about this question: If globalisation can be
periodised way back into history, does this not mean that globalisation has always
existed in one form or degree? If so, then what is really new about contemporary
globalisation? We hope we've given you the tools with which you can come up with your
own reasoned answers to these questions.
(1) Discuss the most important features of the ``global flows'' which connect regions and
societies.
(2) Discuss those factors which facilitate ``global flows'' and explain why some societies
struggle to connect to or benefit from these global socioeconomic links.
(3) Do you agree with the view suggested by Held et al that a new theoretical framework is
needed to explain globalisation? Give reasons for your answer.
(4) How would you assess the further development of global trends? Are you optimistic or
pessimistic about the future of globalisation? Read the key questions in Tutorial 2 again
to help you structure your answers more systematically.
1.6 Conclusion
We have introduced you to some important facets of the concept of and debate about
globalisation in this study unit. We have also provided you with some important
analytical and critical tools with which you should be able to come to your own reasoned
conclusions on questions about globalisation. At first, this discussion on the concept of
and debate about globalisation may have seemed very challenging. It is important,
however, to be aware of the many facets involved, because any theory which tries to
come to terms with global issues is necessarily broad and abstract to a large extent.
16
Many of the issues that have been raised in this study unit will become clearer when you
have read the other study units in this module. There you will have the opportunity to
further explore other important historical, geographical and sociological aspects of
globalisation.
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18
Study unit 2
Historical perspectives
Contents
2.2 Tutorial 1: World history in the age of globalisation
2.3 Tutorial 2: The origins of global disparities
2.4 Tutorial 3: Africa in world history
2.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
After working carefully through the three tutorials in this study unit, you should be able
to:
. analyse globalisation from a historical perspective
. demonstrate a solid knowledge base and an informed understanding of some
important features of global history
. explain relevant aspects of the academic debates about the historical reasons for the
rise of the West
2.2 Tutorial 1: World history in the age of globalisation
2.2.1 Introduction
In the first study unit, you have been introduced to some important strands in the
debates about globalisation. You have seen that scholars do not only disagree on the
origins and the effects of globalisation but that they also debate the different concepts
and theories relating to globalisation processes. In this study unit, you will explore
globalisation from a historical perspective.
In tutorial 1, we discuss why it is important to analyse historical aspects of globalisation.
In tutorial 2, we examine three concepts more closely which have recently been
developed by scholars to explain the historical context of globalisation.
In tutorial 3, we focus on some aspects of the debates about Africa in world history.
19 HSY3703/1
2.2.2 The importance of a historical perspective in the study of
globalisation
Generally, the term ``globalisation'' is used to denote the rapid intensification in
economic and communication links in the post-Cold War era of late capitalism. Debates
about the origins of globalisation have resuscitated interest in world history as distinct
from ``national'' history. Even before globalisation became a household term in the
1990s, world historians explored how trade ties and political and cultural links between
regions, cultures and states created complex networks of relations among human
communities over many centuries. Historians today are increasingly drawn to what AG
Hopkins has called ``the most important single debate in the social sciences'': exploring
1
the many facets of globalisation. They are currently rediscovering economic, political,
social and cultural trends that extend across spatial and temporal boundaries, and are
evaluating both old and new theories that attempt to explain the emergence of large-
scale networks of interaction. Many historians agree that the shrinking of the world into
the often-cited ``global village'' is a process that evolved over a long historical period and
argue that we should not overemphasise the novelty of globalisation, even though
computerisation and a faster flow of information have added new elements to old forms
of interaction among the various regions in the world. It is not surprising, therefore, that
many historians are reexamining the history of colonialism and imperialism.
As historians we are also interested in globalisation because we increasingly realise that
national state boundaries do not contain the interaction among people of different
ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. Even local histories are embedded in wider
networks of interaction that extend across transnational and transcontinental space.
History has always been made by people who create new interrelations by exchanging
goods and ideas across large areas without being regulated by state governments.
Scholars have also become more wary of Eurocentric perspectives because the narrow
focus on European history obscures insights into important trends in Asia, Africa and
elsewhere. Renowned world historians, such as William H McNeill, have expanded the
scope of Western scholarly analysis to include a more integrative analysis of the

2
interaction among people from various historical and cultural backgrounds. This is not
only important because it alerts us to the histories of non-European cultures. World
historians have cautioned us to explore a more encompassing historical analysis if we
want to understand why some empires, cultures and societies became major powers and
were able to sustain themselves over longer periods, while others could not.
These issues are relevant to modern globalisation, because they also deal with the
question why some countries seem to be ``winners'' and some ``losers'' in a globalised
world. Historians explore these questions of causality and continuity in order to
understand the origins and dynamics of globalising processes that have created an
economically and technologically more unified world.
Since world history in a global age is a very broad field of study, we will focus mainly on
one important area: the historical reasons for the disparities between the West and non-
Western regions. The recent political changes and innovations in computer technology
have brought the world closer to forming one society, but this does not mean that
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ
1. AG Hopkins, `Ìntroduction: Globalization Ð An Agenda for Historians'', in AG Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History
(London: Pimlico, 2002), p 1.
The rise of the West: a history of the human community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
2. William Hardy McNeill,
20
historical inequalities between ``developed'' and ``developing'' countries have dis-
appeared. Even those observers who assert that this global society has positive features
(such as technological improvements) acknowledge that the citizens of the world have
unequal access to economic wealth, social benefits, human rights and political freedom.
Most historians are reluctant to suggest definite answers, but they raise relevant
questions about this contradictory globalising process which simultaneously creates
unity and diversity in, and across, disparate regions in the world. As you will see in this
study unit, they have offered differing explanations of the many economic, political,
social, cultural and technological facets of globalisation. We want to encourage you to
apply your analytical skills to evaluating these different views and to developing your
own position.
Before you read further, please do the following activities:
(1) Explain in your own words why historians have become involved in the debates about
globalisation. Can you identify any fields of research or themes where they could make
an important contribution to the study of globalisation?
(2) We have emphasised that there are ``winners'' and ``losers'' when it comes to
globalisation. Make use of your own general knowledge and give examples of countries
and regions which seem either to have benefited or to have suffered from the effects of
globalisation processes. Explain in what way they have been affected either positively
or negatively.
Feedback on activities for tutorial 1
(1) As historians, we are concerned with the changes in important economic, social,
political and cultural trends over time. We pointed out that the debate about the
causes and effects of globalisation has not been settled. This opens a huge research
area for global or world historians who explore changes and continuities in the
interaction among different human communities over many centuries.
(2) We pointed out that global interaction has made the world smaller but without
necessarily giving its inhabitants equal rights to accessing the benefits of
globalisation. Historians explore how developments that took place in the past, such
as colonisation, influenced the current disparities among wealthy and poor regions
and countries.
2.2.3 The debate about the historical origins of a unified world
society
Many observers of globalisation assume that it emerged in the 1990s and that its
historical roots do not extend much farther back in time than the modern period.
Frequently, observers identify the increasing economic and political power of the United
States as a major source of globalisation processes. If you have followed discussions in the
media, you are certainly aware that a great deal of ``global speak'' revolves around
computerised information technology in the era of late capitalism, and around various
21 HSY3703/1
modern socioeconomic, political and cultural developments of the kind which we discuss
in study unit 1. When scholars probe the historical dimensions of globalisation, they
often refer to the age of European maritime discovery from the late 15th century. Many
historians regard the period around 1500 CE (current era) as a major break in human
history, because it is associated with the rise of modern capitalism and its expansion to
the Americas, Asia, Africa and other regions. According to this view, the economic and
political expansion of Europe spun, for the first time in human history, a web of
economic and political relations around the world that affected even remote regions that
had previously existed in relative isolation or on the margins of other empires.
Despite the significance of the modern era, historians have also compared modern
developments with patterns of transnational and transcultural interaction in the pre-
modern period. Peter Wells, for example, argues that the focus on trans-boundary
3
connections provides relevant insights into the history of the Roman Empire. Rome
extended its economic and political ties over wide spaces, ranging from the British Isles
in the north of Europe to North Africa and the Middle East, and beyond. Wells has
analysed the diffusion of Roman commodities in Europe, India and Africa and sees
parallels with ``the current worldwide distribution of Coca Cola, McDonald's, and Levi's
4
jeans.'' He points out that native communities adopted religious and cultural features
from Roman culture, but without completely abandoning their own traditions.
According to this view, the conflict between cultural homogenisation and hetero-
genisation, which some scholars see as the hallmark of the current globalisation process,
5
is not an entirely novel historical phenomenon.
Apart from broadening the temporal framework of globalisation, historians have also
shifted the geographical focus from the West to other important economic and cultural
centres of globalising trends. As we gain more insights into non-Western networks of
interaction, we realise that we need to balance the perception that it was only the West
that has influenced global history. The geographer JM Blaut criticised Eurocentric
concepts of world history by developing the image of the ``westbound Orient Express''.
Moving along the reverse route of the famous luxury train, it begins its journey in the
Middle East to leave its `ìnferior'' Semitic or Oriental origins behind and, after stops in
ancient Greece and Rome, travels via feudal France to modern England. Then world
civilisation continues its northwestward journey by crossing the Atlantic to reach North
6
America. You will see as you read further in this study unit that scholars have become
increasingly sceptical about this image of the West steaming ahead on the road of
progress, effortlessly overtaking all non-European competitors.
These perceptions, however, have been deeply ingrained among scholars who have
described the technological and cultural achievements of the modern West as ``the
7
European miracle''. These accomplishments seem to justify the claim that the reasons
for the ``superiority of the West'' are based on Europe's exceptionalism. However, the
3. Peter S Wells,The Barbarians Speak. How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe (Princeton University Press, 1999), p 192.
Conversely, Jerry Toner argues that the Roman economy was stunted and, therefore, different from global
capitalism; Jerry Toner, Rethinking Roman History (Cambridge: The Oleander Press, 2002), p 58.
4. Wells, The Barbarians Speak, p 19.
5. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Cultural dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996), p 32.
6. JM Blaut, The Colonizer's Model of the World. Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History (New York: Guilford Press, 1993),
pp 4, 45, 91.
The European miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (Cambridge University
7. See Eric Jones,
Press, 2003).
22
debate about what exactly was exceptional in European societies has not been settled.
Which features in European societies gave the West a ``head start'' on indigenous
societies in other parts of the world? Depending on their analytical and ideological
approach, scholars have located the roots of European superiority in the continent's
cultural, religious, economic, military or technological history.
Anthony Pagdan has argued that these perceptions of Western superiority have a long
history. Ancient Roman and Greek ideas of exceptionalism and superiority later blended
into a broader European identity. Christianity initially sharpened Eurocentric perceptions
because Europeans saw the Christian religion as a major marker of difference from non-
Western peoples. Despite substantial diversity among Europeans themselves, philoso-
phers declared that Europe was the ``final stage'' in the history of humankind. By the
late 17th century, according to Pagdan, European intellectuals claimed that Europe was
culturally and technologically the most sophisticated place on earth and that it set the
8
developmental pace for all other societies in the world.
Not all scholars who emphasise the West as prime mover in global history would regard
this as an entirely positive trend. Although this strand of the debate is now somewhat
faded, ``world system'' theories used to be very influential. From the 1970s, these
Marxist concepts focused on how different societies interconnected through their systems
of economic production and mutual trade. In terms of this argument, ``strong'' capitalist
economies penetrated ``weak'' indigenous societies using unfair or exploitive trade
relations that, ultimately, made these societies even more vulnerable to further Western
capitalist and colonial intrusion. The debate about how Europe `ùnderdeveloped'' other
regions by forcing or luring them into the capitalist system sharpened scholarly
perceptions of how unequal trade impoverished Latin America and how the international
slave trade devastated Africa.
Not merely crude racism has placed the West firmly at the centre of global history: even
critics of Western colonialism and imperialism have frequently marginalised non-
European initiatives. Marxist ``world system'' theories have been attacked for their
Eurocentric bias. Critics argue that these concepts certainly aim to denigrate Western
colonialism and imperialism, but that they also affirm the view that a unified world
society would not have emerged without the economic, political and technological
developments in the West. Whether or not modern Europe's increasing global influence
is regarded as an unadulterated blessing for ``backward'' cultures on the one hand, or as
the root of all imperialist evil on the other, both views tend to relegate other regions to
the margins of world history, either as ``beneficiaries'' or as ``victims'' of Western
dominance.
The historical fact that it was Europe which rose to global pre-eminence in modern
history cannot be overlooked, regardless of where we draw the line in historical time.
But what are the reasons for Europe's rise to global power? Recently, historians tried to
find a way around this problem by looking more attentively at the global interplay of
socioeconomic, ecological and other factors. They have shifted the focus to a wider
context of a competitive world economy, rather than merely looking at Europe's internal
achievements in order to explain how Europe secured access to important resources,
invented new technologies and maximised production. For example, scholars used to
8. Anthony Pagdan, ``Prologue: Europe and the World Around'', in Euan Cameron (ed.), Early Modern Europe. An Oxford History
(Oxford University Press, 1999), p 12.
23 HSY3703/1
emphasise that the Industrial Revolution, which originated in 18th century England,
was a watershed in modern world history, and that it demonstrated how the West was
able to gain a huge technological and socioeconomic advantage in relation to the rest of
the world. In summarising the recent debates about the Industrial Revolution, CA Bayly
argues, however, that its significance has been overrated. Many historians now agree that
its economic and technological effects began to transform European societies at a much
slower pace than was previously thought. Moreover, the introduction of mechanised
production was preceded by what historians have called the `ìndustrious revolution'',
encompassing dramatic changes in the organisation of labour and in the consumption of
goods without involving the spectacular technological innovations that are associated
with the Industrial Revolution. Bayly paints a broader picture of several `ìndustrious
revolutions'' taking place in many regions in the world, from China to Arabia to Africa,
9
in response to global trends in commerce. He rejects the conventional view that the
Industrial Revolution brought about massive global imbalances as early as in the first
half of the 19th century. Instead, he emphasises that the gap between Europeans and
non-Europeans remained open until the second half of the 19th century. At this
relatively late stage, Western innovations particularly in military technology resulted in
an unprecedented growth in the global ambitions of modern industrialised European

10
states.
Another strand in this debate has developed which emphasises other important centres
in the world economy. For example, China had emerged as a centralised political unit
around 1000 BCE (before current era) long before the rise of Europe and therefore
constituted a formidable economic power which was socially, technologically and
culturally far more advanced than medieval and early modern Europe. Some scholars
hold that China's later penetration by Western and Japanese imperialism in the 19th
century was facilitated by the decline of the Chinese economy. This allowed Western
observers to claim that European ascendancy was the ``natural'' consequence of
established historical trends in Europe. We will return to this view in the second tutorial.
So in this study unit we are looking at a constant pattern in human history: whether we
like it or not, an important consequence of the interaction between human societies is
that some have gained from the interplay of socioeconomic, political and cultural forces,
while others have been reduced to inferior positions or were unable to climb to the same
position of economic and political power within the global framework. Considering this
question does not mean that we justify the current existing gap between the haves and
have-nots. As historians we are concerned with explaining ``why'', ``how'', ``when'' and
``where'' this asymmetry in power relations between different societies became ingrained
as a distinctive feature in human history. We may deplore the fact that this imbalance
exists, but we should be concerned with understanding it rather than merely
complaining about its lack of fairness and justice.
It has become commonplace to refer to Western colonialism as the main cause of this
global partition. The short-term focus on Western imperialism is important because it
helps to explain under what historical circumstances European countries, such as Spain,
Britain and France, penetrated non-European regions. From a global historical
perspective, however, it is also important to extend the scope of analysis beyond the
9. CA Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780±1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp 49±55.
10. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp 80±83.
24
relatively short history of Western expansion, because this is essential to understanding
the long-term reasons for the discrepancies among different societies. Moreover, we
should be aware that acrimony between societies has always been a pattern in history.
There have always been aggressive societies, such as the Egyptians, Romans, Aztecs and
the Zulu, who were able to conquer, annihilate or integrate other groups. The moral
condemnation of colonialism does not provide a satisfactory explanation why most
African, American and Asian societies were unable to resist or withdraw from Western
influence. The question is: Why was Europe able to overpower so many indigenous
societies all over the world? Why didn't the Africans or the Amerindians colonise Europe
instead?
We want to make you aware that it is important to consider a wider range of economic,
technological and ecological factors. Some societies have been disadvantaged by various
internal and external conditions, ranging from difficult ecological circumstances to
geographical proximity to aggressive neighbours, which worsened their position in an
increasingly competitive world.
For example, the aridity of large parts of Africa was not conducive to the emergence of
large political units based on organised food production, labour specialisation and
technological innovation. Few states enjoyed a long life span in the pre-colonial period,
such as the West African empires. Later, the crippling legacy of the slave trade and
colonialism compounded these problems and made it more difficult for contemporary
Africa to compete in the global arena. Conversely, the relatively isolated island-state of
Japan rose to economic and political power from the late 19th century partly because
there was no foreign intrusion, which could have thrown the domestic structures into
disorder. To be sure, Japanese society experienced various upheavals over time but the
political elites remained intact. In a concerted effort, they succeeded in modernising their
economic and political structures because they could build on an efficient agricultural
system, a functioning system of education, and a highly developed sense of community
that obliged individuals to serve the state. None of these explanations, however, is
completely satisfactory on its own because economic, political, cultural and ecological
factors are intertwined in a complex matrix.
In tutorial 2 you will read more about how scholars have tried to explain the historical
disparities between the West and other regions. Before you move on, however, read
tutorial 1 carefully and do the following activities. This will help you evaluate the
different views in the debate about the history of globalisation. You are encouraged to
consult the bibliography and to read as widely as possible. Do not be afraid to use your
general knowledge.
Further activities for tutorial 1
Before you read further, please do the following activities:
(1) Explain in your own words why many historians argue that the period around 1500 CE
constituted an important phase in the history of globalisation. Mention some of the
important events in this period, and explain how they contributed to globalising trends in
world history.
(2) Analyse CA Bayly's views on the Industrial Revolution. Why does he argue that the
impact of the Industrial Revolution on the rise of the West has been `òverrated''?
25 HSY3703/1
Feedback on further activities for tutorial 1
(1) The period of European maritime expansion from c1500 CE brought Europe, the
Americas, Africa and Asia closer together. Remember, however, that historians
emphasise this was not the first time in history that human communities established
economic, social and cultural links with each other across broad distances. We have
to analyse historical circumstances more carefully instead of claiming that modern
globalisation processes happened only because of European superiority. Connect this
historical analysis with the criticism of those Eurocentric views which claim that
indigenous Africans, Americans and Asians were ``backward'' and therefore unable
to influence global interaction among different communities.
(2) Bayly reminds us that we must analyse the reasons for historical disparities between
the West and other regions more carefully, instead of merely looking at events in
Europe. Take note that his comments on the Industrial Revolution also refer to
developments in Africa and Asia. Moreover, you will see from his remarks that the
economic and technological breakthrough of industrialising countries did not
immediately result in the decline of other important economic centres in the world.
2.3 Tutorial 2: The origins of global disparities
2.3.1 Introduction
In this section, you will be introduced to three different views on the reasons for the
global historical disparities between rich and poor, powerful and powerless. We have
selected three recent books because they have generated lively discussions among
academics:
. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel. A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000
Years (1998)
. Andre Gunder Frank, Re-Orient. Global Economy in the Asian Age (1998)
. David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are So Rich and Some So
Poor (1999)
You will become aware of how complex and controversial this debate is, and you will
gain insights into a wide range of concepts, methodologies and views. These studies,
however, constitute only a fraction of the large body of scholarship that deals with the
reasons for and the origins of a world society. Because we have to summarise these
explanatory models in a very brief and condensed fashion, we cannot do justice to the
sophisticated arguments presented by the various authors. It is important, therefore, that
you use the bibliography in this tutorial and that you read as widely as possible.
2.3.2 Answer 1: Europe is exceptional
To start with, let us look at how David Landes has explained the origins of Western
hegemony. In contrast to those scholars who reject the label of Eurocentrism for political
reasons, Landes argues that we have to adopt a Eurocentric approach in order to
understand why Europe (this term includes the whole of the Western world made up of
Western Europe and North America) became economically and politically more
26
11
powerful than other regions. His position does not necessarily imply that European
values and norms are morally superior to those of other cultures, or that Europeans have
performed more efficiently because they have a racial advantage over Africans or Asians.
Instead, his argument is based on the historical premise that from the 19th century
onwards (at the latest) Europe made unprecedented advances in many economic,
scientific and technological areas. Consequently, most of the other regions in the world
began to lag behind and were never able to catch up. Why did ``the West'' become the
leading global power and leave ``the rest'' behind? Landes readily acknowledges a
number of reasons, such as environmental factors which empowered some societies and
disempowered others, but culture is the key in his analysis.
Landes concedes that some non-European cultures were capable of inventing important
technologies, thus improving their economic productivity and creating impressive works
of art. But in contrast to European civilisation, the indigenous African, American and
Asian cultures had always been disadvantaged by their inability to overcome stifling
traditions which prevented them from making progress. Landes agrees with many
scholars that several important technologies which gave us gunpowder, the compass,
paper, writing and printing, for example, were originally invented in China. He also
recognises that in the 15th century CE, which also saw the beginnings of European
maritime expansion, several Chinese fleets Ð their ships being far superior to European
12
vessels Ð undertook journeys of trade and exploration as far as the East African coast.
Why then did Europe, and not China, emerge as the leading colonising power? Landes
argues that religious and cultural values restrained the Chinese from harnessing their
13
intellectual power and from extending their influence beyond China. Due to
conservative cultural prejudices against modernisation, they did not use their inventions
as dynamically as did the Europeans, who more enthusiastically embraced the challenges
of a changing world. The Chinese were content, therefore, to stay within the boundaries
of their large empire and to trade with their neighbours, rather than venture into the
unknown as the Europeans were prepared to do. Landes makes a similar point about
Islam, which enjoyed superiority over European culture (particularly in science) until at
least 1100 CE, but eventually became immobilised by religious dogma which proved
14
hostile to technological innovation.
Landes's argument hinges, therefore, on the idea that Europe was exceptional in the way
it unleashed its inventive spirit and expanded its geographical and intellectual horizons,
instead of sinking into the quagmire of tradition, religion and other forms of cultural
``backwardness''. Non-European societies suffered the consequences as they proved
unable to overcome the retarding elements in their culture and thus could not keep up
with the competition.
Conversely, Kenneth Pomeranz has argued that before the 19th century Europe did not
15
have an internal economic advantage over other regions in the world. Before the
1850s, he states, China and Europe shared many features, such as market-oriented
16
economies. In both China and Europe, however, economic growth was constrained by
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (London: Abacus, 1999), xxi.
11. David Landes,
12. Ibid., pp 93±97. See also Louise Levathes,When China Ruled the Seas. The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne 1405±1433 (New
York/London: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, pp 50±53.
13. Landes,
14. Ibid., pp 54±55.
15. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton/Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2000), p 17.
16. Ibid., p 107.
27 HSY3703/1
various technological and ecological limits. According to Pomeranz, Europeans were not
more productive and innovative or less restricted by institutional and cultural limitations
than the Chinese. Industrialisation was not an inevitable outcome of European economic
trends. Nevertheless, the Europeans possessed two advantages. First, Europe, more
specifically Britain, could leap forward into the Industrial Revolution because it had
access to large reserves of coal as the most efficient, portable type of energy. Without
coal to fire steam engines, many industries could not have been expanded. Second,
European colonial expansion relieved Europe of many of the ecological constraints on
agriculture as a base for industrial development. Unlike Asia, Europe was able to make
use of bigger amounts of energy and land when it conquered other parts of the world.
Without the newly discovered resources both underground and overseas, particularly in
the Americas, it could not have transformed itself into the leading technological and
economic power in the global arena.
As recent scholarship has increased our knowledge of non-European societies, the
argument that Europeans possessed exceptional qualities becomes more difficult to
sustain. Bayly points out that those Eurocentric perceptions frequently rest on an
exaggerated view of how ``stagnant'' African and Asian societies were. These societies,
however, responded to the challenges of modernity in their own ways because they
``were, after all, subject to similar patterns of international trade, the diffusion of
armaments, and even the spread of ideas which were affecting Europe and the Americas
17
over the period 1600 to 1800''. Thus, he argues, `ìt may be more satisfactory to write
of different and slower adaptations to change in Asia and Africa, rather than to see their
18
societies as `failures'''.
We must question the view that Europeans generally were modern, inventive folk who
discarded cumbersome cultural traditions whenever these stood in the way of progress.
Religious and traditional beliefs frequently exerted a restraining influence on Europeans
who called for greater freedom from superstition, or who proposed innovative measures
which threatened the interests of conservative powers. For example, one of the founding
fathers of modern physics, Isaac Newton, was also a firm believer in astrology and
19
alchemy. Moreover, in contrast to the conventional view that modern European
societies became less religious because of technological and scientific progress, there is
substantial evidence to show that new forms of religious and spiritual experience in fact
became more important in response to the challenges of modernisation.
Moreover, if we accept the argument that most human societies were stifled by religious
influences but Europe was not, then we have to explain more carefully why this was the
case. Some scholars have actually tried to prove that there is a direct link between
Christianity, particularly Protestantism, and capitalism. Others disagree. Why were
societies outside Europe unable to crash through ideological barriers, as was the case in
the great scientific and political revolutions of the West? To return to the Industrial
Revolution, it is problematic to assume that because it took place in Europe it could only
have happened there and must therefore prove the superiority of the Europeans. Why
should the Europeans alone have been able to understand that these innovations,
notwithstanding much initial resistance and scepticism, would eventually improve their
lives?
17. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p 75.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid, p 76.
28
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HSY3703/1
SAES NRETSAE EHT NI SETUOR EDART
pp. 128-129.
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations,
29
Landes,
Source:
2.3.3 Answer 2: Asia made Europe great
20
Our second explanatory model has been developed by Andre
Â Gunder Frank. His view
is diametrically opposed to Landes's Eurocentric approach because, for him, Asia Ð that
21
is China and India Ð constitutes the economic engine of global history. Frank
criticises most scholars, from the political left to the right, for having missed the point
because they only bothered ``to look under the European streetlight'' to find reasons for
22
the rise of the West. He argues that in order to understand world history we have to
accept that trade and the circulation of goods and money have always taken place in a
single global economy comprising various regions. Since Asia was demographically more
populous, economically more productive and technologically more advanced than
Europe for many hundreds of years, the reasons for the rise of the West cannot be located
in Europe's exceptionalism. Rather, they are to be found in the decline of the Asian
economy, which enabled Europe to take its place from c1800 CE onwards. Frank
presents a complex argument to show that this decline in Asian productivity and
commerce did not have anything to do with the inferiority of non-European cultures,
but rather with a recurrent series of cycles of economic deterioration and recovery, which,
in fact, continue to affect the global economy as a whole.
A crucially important feature of the global economy since c1500 CE, according to Frank,
was the European colonisation of the Americas, more particularly of South America. He
does not focus on the impact which European colonialism made on the indigenous
inhabitants of the Americas, but on its repercussions for the world economy. Vast amounts
of silver that the colonisers extracted from South American mines, with such devastating
consequences for the exploited indigenous population and imported African slaves, did not
in fact reach Europe. A substantial share circulated in the Chinese economy. This is because
Europeans had to pay Chinese traders in silver, because they were not interested in buying
European goods in exchange for luxury Asian products such as silk, spices, tea and
porcelain. According to Frank, American silver bought the Europeans ``tickets on the
23
Asian train''. Without the silver supplies derived from their American colonies, the
backward Europeans would not have been able to muscle their way into the lucrative
Asian market, which had previously been closed to European products:
Europe's disadvantaged position in the world economy was partly compensated
by its privileged access to American money. On the demand side, the use of their
American money Ð and only that Ð permitted the Europeans to enter and
then increase their market share in the world market, all of whose dynamic
centers were in Asia. On the supply side, access to and use of cheap Ð to the
Europeans virtually free Ð money in the Americas afforded the wherewithal to
acquire the supplies of real consumption and investment goods worldwide:
servile labour and materials in the Americas to dig up the silver in the first place;
slave labour from Africa; and from a European perspective virgin soil and
climate also in the Americas ... And of course their American-supplied money
was the only means of payment that permitted Europeans to import all those
famed Asian spices, silks, cotton textiles, and other real goods for their own
24
consumption also for re-export to the Americas and Africa.
20. Andre Gunder Frank, Re-Orient. Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
21. See the extensive discussion which took place on the H-World Internet forum: http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~world/. Also see the
debate between Landes and Frank, World History Center, Northeastern University, 2 December 1998: http://
www.whc.neu.edu/whc/events/publiclectures/pastpublect/frank-landes/Frank-Landes_01.html
22. Frank,Re-Orient, p 333.
23. Ibid, p 279.
24. Ibid, pp 345±355.
30
From this perspective, Europe's breakthrough in the 19th century had nothing to do
with any exceptional qualities of European culture or ``the European mind''. Since all
socioeconomic and technological trends are the result of global interplay of economic
factors, some regions are able to benefit from these trends if they happen to be in the
right place at the right time. The Europeans grasped the opportunity, not because they
were extraordinarily malicious or acquisitive people, but because they had the advantage
of exploitive relations with the Americas and Africa, which created a basis for making a
number of economic, scientific and technological improvements. Consequently, Europe
ventured on the road towards modernisation, ahead of Africa, Asia and other regions.
Frank argues that modern Europe might have won this competition for wealth and
power, but that this was only a temporary victory. He suggests that the West is currently
entering the downswing phase of the global cycle of economic boom and recession and
that the future belongs to Asia. This may be concluded from the tremendous economic
success of Asia after World War II, although you may note that he published his book
before the Asian financial crisis of 1997.
Frank's book is important, even though he argues at a relatively high level of abstraction
which may deter some readers. For the purpose of our discussion, his argument should
be seen as a radical alternative to the more conventional view that the West `àlways had
it all'' and that it somehow naturally or automatically acquired a position of global
leadership. One should also note, however, that Frank is mainly concerned with
economic factors and ignores other important issues. He does not investigate the power
of institutions, regional histories or intellectual initiatives. Not surprisingly, criticism has
been levelled at his ideas from various quarters. Frank, formerly an important Marxist
theorist, has come to renounce most of the received wisdom, because he became
convinced that most academic theories, on the left and the right, were spoiled by their
Eurocentric bias. He therefore rejects much of the conventional terminology, such as
`ìmperialism'', `ìndustrial revolution'' and even ``capitalism'', because he argues that
these ideas do not explain but rather distort global history. ``Globalisation'' is merely a
new word for an old phenomenon. By implication, his concept also entails that Western
colonialism did not play the all-powerful role which so many scholars assign to it because
it constituted only one phase in the long history of global interaction.
Source: Frank, Re-Orient , p. 65.
31 HSY3703/1
2.3.4 Answer 3: Environments are different, not people
25
Our third case study is provided by a natural scientist, not by a trained historian. Jared
Diamond has taken a different approach from the previous two authors, although his
views overlap to some extent with Frank's. He agrees with Frank in rejecting any
argument that is based on the supposed cultural exceptionalism of the West. Like Landes
and Frank, Diamond is also concerned with drawing a ``big picture'' of global history,
but he extends his analysis in historical time quite considerably, and also utilises medical
science, biology, linguistics and other disciplines. His analysis is concerned
predominantly with the impact that different types of environments have had on human
societies.
Thus, he extends the scope of analysis to ask why some societies seem to have had a
``head start'' compared with others, and have developed food production, urbanisation,
science and so on, placing themselves in a more advantageous position in the global race
for wealth and power. From this perspective, the customary differentiation between
`àdvanced'' and ``primitive'' societies is irrelevant because people in every society try to
make the best of the situation in which they find themselves. This situation is largely
determined by the accessibility of environmental resources because the economic and
technological development of every society depends on how it can interact with the
environment (and, of course, other societies). For example, the emergence of organised
food production meant a huge step forward for humankind because sedentary
agriculturalists (who have access to a more reliable and nutritious range of foodstuffs) are
able to live in larger communities than hunter-gatherers can. Increased population
density results in urbanisation which is associated with a more complex division and
specialisation of labour. Consequently, more political centralisation and a more
sophisticated standard of cultural and technological innovation come into being because
the society will seek to develop the technological means necessary to satisfy a wider
variety of needs. It can also afford to feed the craftspeople, artists, priests and
intellectuals who contribute to its modernisation. But when people have to survive in a
hostile environment that is unsuitable for agriculture and when they are relatively
isolated from other societies, they are forced to develop themselves according to a more
limited range of possibilities. So they are restricted by serious handicaps when they are
forced into contact with a more diversified society with stronger socioeconomic, political
and military structures.
The Aboriginal Australians, for example, survived for 40 000 years under what might be
considered difficult circumstances before the arrival of the first white settlers in the late
18th century. They did not have access to arable soil and there were no large animals
that could be domesticated. Apart from sporadic contacts in some regions, they had no
links with other civilisations because of the continent's geographical isolation. They
could therefore not import new crops or new animals which could have adapted to the
inhospitable Australian environment. Nor could they import new technologies and skills
to help them transform the environment. They had no choice but to live as hunter-
gatherers in small groups. There was no organised food production, no urbanisation and
no sophisticated specialisation or division of labour. So no major technological innovation
took place. As Diamond emphasises, the simple technology of the Aboriginal
Australians did not reflect inferior intellect. On the contrary, the fact that they survived
25. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel. A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years (London: Vintage, 1998).
32
under these difficult circumstances for tens of thousands of years demonstrates their
intelligence and resilience.
This argument also implies that technological innovations do not happen in a cultural
vacuum. A society has to accept a new invention. If the usefulness of some or other new
technology is not apparent, then it will not be adopted. For example, writing (one of the
most revolutionary achievements in human history) only emerged in urbanised societies
with a high degree of labour specialisation; before the emergence of mass literacy,
writing was an important means of communication in a small circle of religious experts
and administrators. If a pre-colonial Australian had invented the art of writing, the small
bands of hunter-gatherers would have had no use for this type of technology.
Diamond also analyses the European invasion of Latin America from a global
perspective. The Spanish conquest of the Aztec and Inca empires in the 16th century CE
had devastating consequences for the indigenous population. According to some
estimates, a shockingly high figure of 95 percent of the Amerindian population was
exterminated by superior European military technology, by cruel exploitation as cheap
labour and, particularly, by imported European diseases.
To begin with the reasons for European military superiority, it is important to
understand that the Spanish conquerors overwhelmed the numerically superior
Amerindian armies because of a combination of steel weapons, firearms (which were very
primitive at the time and did not in fact play a major role) and horses. The Amerindians
had to rely on weapons made of stone and they did not have horses. Diamond argues
that the absence of these technologies in pre-colonial American cultures had nothing to
do with an inherent inferiority of the native inhabitants. Rather, the differences in
technological development were due to the relatively late colonisation of the Americas
by humans only c11 000 years ago, in contrast to Europe where modern humans
appeared 40 000 years ago. This obviously delayed the emergence of metallurgy on the
American continent because the knowledge of producing iron tools resulted from
thousands of years of experimenting with natural outcrops of metals and processing in
furnaces. In parts of the Old World, the use of iron tools had been established by 900
BCE, while the Native Americans only started to produce bronze items at the time of
the European invasion, around 1500 CE. The discovery of iron smelting could not be
passed on to pre-colonial Amerindians because they did not have any contact with other
cultures which were in possession of metallurgy.
They were also restrained by another decisive disadvantage. Since the Americas had been
geographically cut off from other continents, the indigenous population was unable to
benefit from the mechanisms of diffusion similar to those that had disseminated a
substantial number of technological achievements across Eurasia (the term denoting the
geographical connectedness of Europe and Asia). Diamond argues that this had
important implications for the interaction and exchange of technologies among human
communities. The reason is that the same domesticated plants and animals, for example
wheat and cattle, could easily adapt to the environmental conditions prevailing in
regions that are located near the same latitude. He gives many examples of crops that
were spread over vast areas on the Eurasian continent. When plants and animals were
moved along a North-South latitudinal axis, however, they were not able to adapt or
survive in different climatic zones. Another environmental obstacle to technological
diffusion is the fact that there are more natural barriers, such as deserts and mountain
33 HSY3703/1
ranges, which block cultural contact more extensively on a North-South axis than on a
West-East axis.
The Sahara is a case in point. Technological changes took longer to filter down to sub-
Saharan Africa than from, for example, the Middle East to Western Europe. Generally,
this is an important aspect of human cultural and technological development because
various major inventions were originally made at only a few places before they spread
from these points of origin over a wide area. Writing, for example, emerged in only four
regions in the world before it quickly spread to other areas Ð to those, that is, which
were not geographically isolated.
Source: Diamonds, Guns, Germs and Steel, p. 177.
Another example of the environmental differences between North and South is the
settlement of Bantu-speaking farmers in the northeastern parts of pre-colonial South
Africa. Why did they not settle in the Cape? Their crops depended on summer rain, but
the Cape is a winter rainfall region where these plants do not grow. Consequently, the
Cape was inhabited by Khoekhoe pastoralists and San hunter-gatherers. Perhaps South
African history might have developed along different lines if the first white settlers had
had to deal with larger, politically centralised Bantu-speaking groups than with the
small disunited bands of Khoisan.
To return to the European invasion of the empires of the Aztecs and Incas, why did they
have to confront the Spanish cavalry on foot? A precursor to our present-day horse had
once lived on the American continent but it had become extinct, probably before the
arrival of the first human settlers c13 000 years ago. Therefore, Native Americans could
not domesticate the horse or Ð because of their geographical isolation Ð import it
from other areas. Consequently, the first Europeans had an enormous military advantage
because men riding on horses clad in metal armour and wielding steel weapons could
confuse and slaughter large numbers of Amerindian foot soldiers armed only with stone
clubs and slings. Later, however, Native Americans adopted European military
technologies. As every avid watcher of Western movies knows, Amerindians became
extremely skilful at handling horses and were feared by the white settlers once they had
34
become familiar with this new technology. This demonstrates once again that the defeat
of the Native Americans was not the consequence of some genetic defect or inborn lack
of intelligence.
Turning to the impact made on America by imported infectious diseases, it is important
to understand that these probably killed far more Amerindians than those who became
victims of European military technology or racist brutality. Due to the fast distribution
of germs, European diseases often reached and decimated Native Americans long before
the first white settlers set foot in their territory. Diamond emphasises that the
extermination of large parts of the indigenous population should also be understood
within an environmental context, because the major epidemic illnesses dangerous to
humans, such as smallpox, tuberculosis, measles and influenza, originally evolved from
human contact with domesticated animals. These ``deadly gifts from our animal friends''
devastated human populations that had not developed any immunity because they did
26
not possess domestic herds. Those societies, therefore, which had been in contact with
domesticated animals eventually gained much better protection against epidemics than
those that had only a few varieties of domesticated animals, or none at all. This was
precisely the case in the pre-colonial Americas. Native Americans only knew five types of
domesticated animals: the turkey, the llama/alpaca, the guinea pig, the duck, and the
27
dog. (It should be noted that these species cannot be used for heavy labour. None is
suitable as a draught animal; llamas can be used as pack animals but not for riding or
pulling carts. Compare this to the importance of horses, donkeys and oxen in Europe for
agricultural labour and transport). None of these American animals transmitted
dangerous diseases because they did not live close enough to humans or were not kept in
large numbers. Consequently, the Amerindians simply were not in a position to develop
immunity to the diseases that Europeans had learnt to live with, and many died because
they had been infected with smallpox or the common cold. Diamond summarises the
differences between the Old and the New World as follows:
Thus, we have identified three sets of ultimate factors that tipped the advantage
to European invaders of the Americas: Eurasia's long head start on human
settlement; its more effective food production, resulting from greater availability
of domesticable wild plants and especially of animals; and its less formidable
28
geographic and ecological barriers to intracontinental diffusion.
As in the case of the arguments of Landes and Frank, the complexity of Diamond's
argument is difficult to convey within the limited scope of this tutorial. This is
particularly so because it straddles a variety of scholarly disciplines and covers a range of
aspects much broader than the conventional type of historical analysis. Some scholars
have, therefore, expressed scepticism concerning his ``geographic determinism'' because
they believe that he overemphasises environmental factors at the expense of historical
causation. A small number of critics have been incensed by Diamond's rebuttal of racial
29
theory because they insist that such explanations are valid. However, his contribution
to the debate needs to be taken seriously as a sophisticated attempt to explore the
ultimate reasons for the diversity and inequality prevailing in our global society.
26. Human contact with cattle lead to the spread of smallpox, tuberculosis, and measles; pigs and ducks contributed to the
emergence of the flu; ibid., p 207.
27. Ibid, p 213.
28. Ibid, p 370.
29. J Phillip Rushton, ``Review of J. Diamond'', in Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 21 (1), 1999,
pp 99±107.
35 HSY3703/1
Before you move on to the last tutorial, do the following activities to test your
knowledge and analytical skills.
(1) Explain in your own words why Landes argues that Europe was exceptional. Why does
he emphasise cultural factors?
(2) What does Frank mean when he says that scholars have been looking `ùnder the
European streetlight'' when they tried to explain the rise of the West? Do you agree with
his view? Give reasons.
(3) Explain in your own words why Diamond argues that the differences among human
communities are based on environmental factors. Look at some of the examples he
has given to substantiate his view. Do you think that they are convincing? Based on
your general knowledge and on your reading of study unit 3, can you mention any other
examples of how societies have been advantaged or disadvantaged by environmental
patterns?
(1) We have pointed out that Eurocentric explanations of the inequalities in a globalised
world are based on the assumption that Europe was fundamentally different from
African, Asian, Amerindian and other societies. Landes and other scholars claim that
they have found such fundamental differences at the cultural level. Please keep in
mind, however, that it is not always easy to prove that cultural habits and attitudes
in different societies are completely incompatible. For example, there may be as
many similarities as differences between European and African cultural patterns.
Moreover, it is not clear at all how cultural differences influence economic, political
and technological trends in a society. Frequently, we claim to have identified
difference but merely rely on prejudice.
(2) We have seen that many scholars argue that there were other important economic
centres besides Europe in world history. Frank focuses on the importance of Asia. He
claims that Eurocentric observers of world history have taken Western superiority for
granted because they simply ignored events and developments in other parts of the
world. Please remember an important point that we have emphasised throughout
this study unit: in order to analyse the causes and effects of globalisation, we must
accumulate more knowledge about human communities and their interrelations.
(3) In contrast to explanations that focus on economic and cultural reasons for global
inequalities, an environmental perspective emphasises that interaction among
human communities has been crucially shaped by different environmental
conditions. Diamond reminds us that the differences between the ``winners'' and
``losers'' of globalisation cannot be explained by superficial comparisons among
different cultures or ``races''.
36
2.4 Tutorial 3: Africa in world histor y
This tutorial consists of extracts from the books that we discussed in tutorial 2. After
reading them, do the activities. This will help you to understand some important aspects
of the debates about how African history in particular is located in a global framework.
You are encouraged to use the bibliography, to read as widely as possible and to make
use of your general knowledge.
(1) ``The postcolonial Africans had no experience of self-government, and their rulers
enjoyed a legitimacy bounded by kinship networks and clientist loyalties. Abruptly,
these new nations were pressed into the corset of representative government, a form
alien to their own traditions and unprepared by colonial paternalism. In some
instances, the transition had been preceded by a war of liberation, which mobilized
passion and identity. But the legacy was rule by a strongman, autocratic
embodiment of the popular will, hence slayer of democracy. Stability depended on
one man's vigour, or when he was weakened or died (or was helped to die), the
anarchy of the short-lived military coup followed.''
Source: Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations , p 504
(2) ``[The] African population was at about 85 million in 1500 but was still only about
100 million two and a half centuries later in 1750, of which about 80 and 95 million
respectively were south of the Sahara. Of course, the slave wars and trade intervened
to subtract population and especially men (thus changing the ratio in favour of
women, but also subtracting fertile women) from the slaving areas. Moreover,
slavery was not limited to the Atlantic slave trade from West and Southwest Africa,
but included intra-African slaving as well as in and from East Africa to Arab lands.
However, the early suggestions of 100 million slaves exported by the slave trade
have long since been revised downward to about 10 million and then up again to
about 12 million; and the direct demographic impact appears not to have been very
substantial ... Whether it had a more indirect one is hard to tell, although
population and socioeconomic growth seems to have slowed relative to earlier
centuries. It is certainly remarkable that [the] African population remained stable
while [the] population throughout most of Eurasia expanded rapidly. That raises the
question whether Africa, far from being further incorporated, was relatively more
isolated from the worldwide forces stimulating the growth of production and
population elsewhere ...
In West Africa, cowrie shells became a major medium of exchange. They were
produced in the Maldive Islands, were in use as money in South Asia, and Europeans
brought them to Africa to buy slaves for export. The import of cowrie shells
increased massively Ð and later again deceased Ð concomitantly with the slave
trade ... However, cowrie shells could not again be exported, since Europeans and
others refused to accept them in payment. This one-way cowrie trade therefore
helped to marginalize Africans from world trade as a whole.''
Source: Frank, Re-Orient

, pp 71±73
(3) ``The proximate reasons behind the outcome of Africa's collision with Europe are
clear. Just as in their encounter with Native Americans, Europeans entering Africa
enjoyed the triple advantage of guns and other technology, widespread literacy, and
the political organization necessary to sustain expensive programs of exploration and
37 HSY3703/1
conquest. These advantages manifested themselves almost as soon as the collision
started: barely four years after Vasco da Gama first reached the African coast, in
1498, he returned with a fleet bristling with cannons to compel the surrender of
East Africa's most important port, Kilwa, which controlled the Zimbabwe gold
trade. But why did Europeans develop those three advantages before sub-Saharan
Africans could?
... all three [advantages] arose historically from the development of food production.
But food production was delayed in sub-Saharan Africa (compared with Eurasia) by
Africa's paucity of domesticable native animal and plant species, its much smaller
area suitable for indigenous food production, and its north-south axis, which
retarded the spread of food production and inventions ... In short, Europe's
colonization of Africa had nothing to do with differences between European and
African peoples themselves, as white racists assume. Rather, it was due to accidents
of geography and biogeography Ð in particular to the continents' different areas,
axes, and suites of wild plant and animal species. That is, the different historical
trajectories of Africa and Europe stem ultimately from differences in real estate.''
Source: Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel , pp 398, 400±401
(1) Read the first extract and discuss Landes's view of the negative impact which African
traditions had on post-colonial Africa. Do you agree with Landes's view? Why do you
maybe disagree with him?
(2) Read the second extract. According to Frank, how were the slave trade and the
circulation of cowrie shells connected to Africa's economic marginalisation in the early
modern period?
(3) Read the third extract. How does Diamond explain Europe's colonisation of Africa?
(1) We pointed out in tutorial 2 that Landes strongly emphasises that non-European
cultures were too ``backward'' to cope with modern developments. According to
him, African authoritarian regimes in the post-colonial period reflect the lack of
democratic traditions in the pre-colonial period.
(2) Frank compares demographic and economic growth in Africa and other regions in
the world in the 18th century. Apart from the negative effects of the slave trade, he
indicates that there could have been other important negative influences on African
economic growth, reminding us that we should be critical of monocausal
explanations of Africa's crisis. The circulation of cowrie shells is a significant example
of how a region may be economically connected to other continents, but without
benefiting from these trade networks. Remember that economic inequality is an
important issue in the debates about ``winners'' and ``losers'' when it comes to
globalisation.
(3) We have argued that it is important to look beyond the history of modern
colonialism in order to understand global inequalities. Diamond emphasises that we
have to be aware of environmental factors because these also influenced the
38
encounter among Africans and Europeans. Also remember that his argument aims
to demolish the view that Africans were culturally inferior to Europeans and
therefore unable to compete with them.
2.5 Conclusion
In study unit 2, you have been introduced to some explanations of globalisation from a
historical perspective. The main aim of the study unit was to make you aware of two
major issues in this debate. Firstly, we have to analyse the past in order to understand
why the West has developed into the hegemonic force in our contemporary globalised
world. Secondly, we have to examine the global interplay of ecological, economic,
political and cultural factors which gave rise to a unified world society. Since global
history must, by definition, cover a broad canvas, you have encountered many different
societies and cultures within an extensive historical framework. Such a complex debate
may be challenging, but by thinking about the issues discussed here, you should have
gained important insights into our challenging times.
Bibliography
Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large. Cultural dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis/
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford University Press,
1997).
Bayly C A. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780±1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
JM Blaut, The Colonizer's Model of the World. Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric
History (Guilford Press: New York, 1993).
Euan Cameron (ed.), Early Modern Europe. An Oxford History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel. A Short History of Everybody for the Last
13,000 Years (London: Vintage, 1998).
Andre Gunder Frank, Re-Orient. Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998).
Peter Golding and Phil Harris (eds.), Beyond Cultural Imperialism. Globalization,
Communication and the New International Order (London: Sage, 1997).
Hobsbawm E. Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century , 1914±1991 (London: Abacus,
1994).
AG Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History (London: Pimlico, 2002).
Michael Howard and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century
(Oxford University Press, 1998).
David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor
(London: Abacus, 1999).
Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens (eds.), Conceptualizing Global History (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1993).
39 HSY3703/1
William H. McNeill, A World History , 4th edition (Oxford University Press, 1999).
William H. McNeill, The rise of the West: a history of the human community (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963).
Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern
World Economy (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000).
JM Roberts, A Concise History of the World (Oxford University Press, 1995).
Jerry Toner,Rethinking Roman Histor y (Cambridge: The Oleander Press, 2002).
Peter S Wells,The Barbarians Speak. How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe
(Princeton University Press, 1999).
Websites:
H-World , a member of H-Net Humanities & Social Sciences OnLine: http://www.h-net.org/

~world/
World History Archives : A collection of documents for teaching and learning about world
history:http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/
World History : Attitudes and events, from early humanity to yesterday: http://
www.fsmitha.com/
40
Study unit 3
Geographic perspectives on globalisation
Contents
3.1 Introduction
3.3 What is ``globalisation''?
3.4 Geography and globalisation
3.5 Globalisation as an economic phenomenon
3.6 Globalisation and environmental issues
3.7 Conclusion
Bibliography
3.1 Introduction
As you already know from your work on the previous study units, globalisation is a
complex concept and takes on decidedly different meanings for different people. In the
last decade or two, the concept of globalisation has become part of many social science
disciplines, including geography. Globalisation is the worldwide process that makes the
world, its economic system and its society more integrated and increasingly
interdependent. In this study unit you will be introduced to a number of different
definitions of globalisation and we will look at how globalisation can be studied from the
perspective of geography. We will then focus on just two selected fields within
geography and investigate them from a geographical perspective. These two fields are
economic globalisation, and globalisation and the environment.
After working carefully through this study unit, you should be able to:
. explain why we live in a single integrated world and how globalisation impacts on
economic and environmental issues in the world
To achieve this you will need to be able to:
. explain globalisation as a concept from both a general and an economic-geographical
perspective
41 HSY3703/1
. describe and briefly explain the spatial pattern of socioeconomic development on a
global scale
. explain why not all countries have been integrated into the global economic system
in the same way and to the same extent, and why not all people are affected in the
same way by globalisation
. distinguish between investment by transnational corporations (TNCs) and foreign
direct investment (FDI) and explain the spatial distribution of both on a global scale
. analyse the most important features of the spatial division of labour
. explain the reassertion of the local in the age of the global
. describe the events leading up to the various world environmental conferences
. evaluate how each world conference has contributed to finding solutions for global
environmental issues
3.3 What is ``globalisation''?
The 20th century saw a vast spatial expansion of economic, social and cultural
interactions among people across the world. These interactions have affected some places
more than others, but they have come to affect such large portions of the earth's surface
and so many people that they are now grouped under the term ``globalisation''. At the
start of the 21st century we have more and more international markets (courtesy of
multi-modal transport systems), computerised tracking of sales and shipments, vast
corporate networks, mass production facilities (which produce a wide variety of products
through programmable equipment and rely on externalised networks of contractors) and
huge distribution networks. We have seen the advent of international brands and very
wealthy executives and owners, as economies of scale and the power of technical
standards allow some companies to make big profits and quite a few people to get very
rich.
Globalisation is one of the great defining dramas of our age, perhaps the most important
process of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Yet confusion abounds about what
exactly globalisation is. But most authors acknowledge that globalisation is primarily,
but not exclusively, an economic phenomenon, involving greater market integration
across the globe and the development of a transnational economy as opposed to a
discrete, national economy.
For some, globalisation means the worldwide spread of modern technologies and
communication of all kinds, regardless of frontiers. So now it seems we have a
``borderless world''. For others, globalisation means that nearly all economies are
networked with other economies throughout the world. Then others see the decline of
the nation-state and the rise of transnational structures of governance as exemplary of
globalisation. Yet others define globalisation in cultural terms, as a ``McWorld'' of
cultural homogenisation and hegemonic consumer culture that is eroding ``traditional
values'' and undermining established systems of identity and citizenship. Some see
globalisation as the linking and intermingling of cultural forms and practices that follow
when societies become integrated in the world economy. Still others equate globalisation
with the convergence and homogenisation of capitalist economic forms, markets and
relations across nations.
42
In some regions, social and political problems as well as economic problems result from
tension between the processes promoting a global culture and global approach for the
economy and environment on the one hand, and the practice and preservation of local
economic isolation, cultural traditions and localisation of environmental problems on the
other hand. Almost all national political leaders invoke the mantra of globalisation to
justify their particular economic or social policies.
The globalisation process is a useful way to explain why the movement of people, goods
and ideas within and among realms in the world is becoming more and more important,
not only to economic systems but also to cultural, political and environmental systems.
As today's citizens of the world we are exposed to a global culture, a global economy and
to global environmental change.
Understanding the geographies of global integration is a key task, as Bauman (1998:2)
suggests:
The term time/space ``compression'' encapsulates the ongoing multi-faceted
transformation of the parameters of the human condition. Once the social causes
and outcomes of that compression are looked into, it will become evident that
the globalizing processes lack the commonly assumed unity of effects. The uses
of time and space are sharply differentiated as well as differentiating.
Globalization divides as much as it unites; it divides as it unites the causes of
division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe.
Alongside the emerging planetary dimensions of business, finance, trade and
information flow, a ``localizing'', space-fixing process is set in motion. Between
them, the two closely interconnected processes sharply differentiate the
existential conditions of whole populations and of various segments of each
one of the populations. What appears as globalization for some means
localization for others; signalling a new freedom for some, upon many others it
descends as an uninvited and cruel fate. Mobility climbs to the rank of the
uppermost among the coveted values Ð and the freedom to move, perpetually
a scarce and unequally distributed commodity, fast becomes the main stratifying
factor of our late-modern or postmodern times.
Activity 3.1
If you haven't studied geography at Unisa you may be wondering what geography is all
about. Read the following extract on what the discipline of geography is about. After reading
this very brief explanation you should be able to:
. provide a short definition of geography to demonstrate that you understand the study field
of the discipline
Students who have taken geography at Unisa will be familiar with the concepts explained in
the reading below and may proceed with the next section.
43 HSY3703/1
Reading 3.1
What is Geography?
Most people have a fair understanding of the circumstances of their own lives and a ba-
sic knowledge of the region in which they live. Yet, even as the countries and regions of
the world become more interconnected, most of us know very little about the lives of
people in other societies or how their lives connect with our own.We know so little about
the world that is out there.Geography is a discipline that may be able to help you to make
places and regions in the world more meaningful. Geography attempts to give you an
appreciation of the diversity and variety of people and places in the world. It contributes
to an understanding of a world that is more complex and fast-changing than ever before.
Geography is the study of the spatial distribution of phenomena on the earth's surface
and the interaction between people and their environment. Geographers study the spa-
tial patterns of both natural and human phenomena as well as the spatial processes
which give rise to these patterns and change them over time.Geographers are therefore
interested in how things on earth are arranged or organised spatially, how they are con-
nected in space and how these spatial patterns change with time. Geographers study
phenomena on the earth surface from a perspective of a space-in-time.
Geography is a human science and people are the central point of reference of the dis-
cipline. That is why geographers limit their studies of the physical environment to that
part of the earth that constitutes the home of humankind: the human-environment sys-
tem. Human-environment interaction refers to the interactive relationship between peo-
ple and their natural and human environments. This interaction tends to differ from place
to place on the surface of the earth and also from time to time. Geographers also inves-
tigate the process underlining observed spatial distribution and patterns and they try to
understand the interactions among the different forces and process affecting a place.
The interrelations among factors affecting places helps us to understand why humans
behave as they do.
Geographers ask questions such as `` is a specific place or activity?'', ``

Where are Why
people and activities located where they are?'', `` do the phenomena and activities
How
at one place interact to make such a place unique?'', `` are the interrelationships be-
What
tween different places?'' and `` factors or processes cause the specific spatial dis-
What
tribution of phenomena and activities?''.
By finding answers to such questions geography offers a unique perspective for better
understanding the world we live in.
Can you now say in your own words what geography is all about?
......................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
3.4 Geography and globalisation
Just consider how much the world has changed in the last few decades. The world map
of states has been redrawn many times and the current political and economic map of
the world is the product of humankind's endless political-geographic accommodation
and adaptation through the centuries. New countries have arisen from old ones. New
names have appeared on regional maps (also on the map of South Africa). New economic
44
and political alliances have been formed and new industrial regions and new trade routes
have emerged. Discussions of the world order are generally based on principles of state
sovereignty and self-determination, but as the number of states has multiplied the
number of actual and possible conflicts among states has grown.
In a world that is experiencing rapid changes in economic, cultural and political life,
geographical knowledge is especially important and useful. In a fast-changing world in
which our fortunes and ideas are increasingly bound up with those of other people in
other places, the study of geography provides an understanding of the crucial
interdependencies that underpin the lives of all. Globalisation has produced economic,
social and cultural geographies that look less and less like the world map of states.
Describing these spatial distribution patterns will be a challenge for geographers for
generations to come.
An appreciation of the diversity and variability of people and places in the world is a
central theme in geography. Each place on earth has a unique combination of
characteristics which is the result of the interaction between human and environmental
factors. Geographers are interested in the differences and similarities between places and
the implications of these differences and similarities for people. Places in the world are
unequal in terms of welfare, power, job opportunities, climate, resources and other
characteristics Ð all of which influences the way these places develop economically,
politically and culturally. We can use two apparently contradictory geographical
tendencies to help us to understand what makes places different and causes changes to
occur at the present time. These two tendencies are globalisation and localisation.
According to Bradshaw, White & Dymond (2004:2),
Globalization, in its simplest form, is the increasing level of interconnectedness
among people throughout the world ... Localization is both a response to and an
outcome of globalization. On the one hand, global exchanges and flows of
information, ideas, people, money, and technology move us towards worldwide
political solutions, economic exchanges, cultural attitudes, and environmental
concerns. On the other hand, localization focusses on distinctive identities of
places or people in regions, countries, or local areas.
An outstanding characteristic of globalisation is an increase in the percentage of the
world's economic and cultural activities that have become international. Financial and
trade links tie together people in distant places; economic actions in one part of the
globe can have an immediate effect on areas thousands of miles away. The integration of
economic activities in the world tends to make national and regional differences less
noticeable, but the communal experience of globalisation is modified by local conditions.
Globalisation has resulted in an intensification of a global connectedness, and it has
given rise to concepts such as ``the world as one place'' or ``the global village''. However,
this intensive connectedness is only applicable to about 1 billion or so of the world's
population who are directly tied to global systems of production and consumption and
who have access to global networks of communication and knowledge. The rest of the
world's approximately 6 billion people live on the fringes of this global village.
One of the popular myths about globalisation, perpetrated by economists, is that by its
very nature it signals an `ènd of geography'' and the ``death of distance'' (Bryson, Henry,
Keeble & Martin 1999:24). These two phrases resonate according to Dicken (1999:10),
45 HSY3703/1
either explicitly or implicitly, throughout much of the globalisation literature. According
to this view dramatic developments in the technologies of transport and communication
have made capital, and the firms controlling it, ``hyper-mobile'', ``free from the tyranny
of distance'' and no longer tied to ``place''. One of the key features of this view of
globalisation is called ``de-localisation'': the uprooting of economic and social
relationships from local origins and cultures. In other words it implies that economic
activity is becoming ``deterritorialised''. Anything can be located anywhere and, if that
does not work out, can be moved somewhere else with ease. Economic activities are not
bound to a specific territory.
Activity 3.2
According to some authors, globalisation is a process that involves the phenomena of a
``shrinking'' world. This ``shrinking'' is not in absolute terms, but in terms of the time and cost
involved for people, goods or a piece of information to travel from one place to another.
Study the extract in reading 3.2 and make sure you understand why geography is becoming
more important in our ``shrinking world''.
Reading 3.2
Regions and the world economy
One of the apparent paradoxes of social theory today is that, precisely when it is preoc-
cupied by visions of a shrinking world and a new global order, it simultaneously pro-
claims the rediscovered significance of geography in the arrangement of human
affairs. To be sure, some analysts, caught up in a wave of enthusiasm induced by the
speed and extent of globalization, have asserted that the end of geography is nigh,1
but, as I hope to demonstrate at length in the present volume, this prognosis is entirely
premature.
The shrinking of the modern world is in fact the very reason why geography now as-
sumes or re-assumes such enormous importance. It goes without saying that geogra-
phy has always played a major role in shaping historical outcomes, if only in the most
obvious sense that spatial separation and propinquity, or more generally distance ef-
fects, invariably exert a profound influence over the structuring of economic and social
relationships. Today, a new version of this socio-spatial duality is coming into being, one
that is global in its reach and meaning, yet is also expressed as a patchwork of highly
individualized localities or places. In the present context, I refer to these localities or
places by the generic term region, by which I mean a geographic area of subnational ex-
tent. As such, my usage of the term is consistent with its traditional meanings, and
stands in sharp contradistinction to the usage that is made of it nowadays by some so-
cial scientists to designate an area of continental proportions. In addition, I will usually
use the term to designate a geographic area characterized by some minimal level of me-
tropolitan development together with an associated tract of hinterland, i.e. an area that
functions as the common spatial framework of daily life for a definite group of people,
and that contains a dense mix of socio-economic activities subject to centripetal or po-
larization forces. This new socio-spatial duality thus assumes in its most general form
the contours of a mosaic of regions scattered across the globe. This mosaic can be
mapped out in terms of a network of local economies forming an integrated or quasi-in-
tegrated world-wide system of production and trade. As a corollary, and in light of the
compression of space-time relations that has also been occurring at an accelerating
pace in recent years, each region's economic fortunes are at once threatened and po-
tentiated by developments in all other regions around the world.
1. Cf R O'Brien, Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography , London: Pinter,1992.
Source : Scott (2000:1^2).
46
Feedback on activity 3.2
Although transport and communication technologies have indeed been revolutionised,
both geographical distance and place remain fundamental. Every component in the
production chain, every firm and every economic activity is, quite literally, ``grounded''
in specific locations. Such grounding is both physical in the form of cost expended and
less tangible in the form of localised social relationships. Not only does every economic
activity have to be located somewhere; more significantly there is also a very strong
propensity for economic activities to form localised geographical clusters and
agglomerations. In fact the geographical concentrations of economic activities at the
local or subnational scale is the norm not the exception. (The agglomeration and
location of economic activities in space is discussed in detail in the third-year geography
module GGH302X.)
Geographers find the study of the world challenging because it is such a diverse,
complex and rapidly changing place. While the world stays the same in physical size and
the absolute distances between specific places remains constant, the connectiveness
among people as a result of globalisation brings places relatively closer. Geographic
literacy is very important today because people from diverse regions and cultures are
connected and are interacting on unprecedented levels because of globalisation.
Activity 3.3
After working through the previous sections you should have a better understanding of how
geographers view and study globalisation as a process and, therefore,
. you should be able to explain, in about 10 lines, how geographical knowledge contributes
to the study of globalisation
When phenomena are studied from a geographical perspective, the study must include
references to where the place, phenomena or activity is located on the surface of the earth
and how the interaction between people and their environment impact on the activity or
phenomena. You can also refer to the differences and similarities between places and
their implications for people. Geography is a human or anthropocentric science and
humans must always be the central point of reference when you study something from a
geographical perspective. Also remember that geographers study phenomena on the
earth's surface as they differ from time to time and not just from place to place. The
space-in-time perceptive must be present in all geographic studies.
47 HSY3703/1
3.5 Globalisation as an economic phenomenon
3.5.1 Introduction
Financial and trade links connect people in distant places and actions in one part of the
globe can have an immediate effect on areas thousands of miles away. The collapse of
communism around the world and the reduction in state governmental intervention into
corporate life have facilitated the globalisation of the world economy. The world
economy is characterised by diminishing trade barriers between countries and an increase
in the influence of transnational corporation (TNCs). This is accompanied by a relative
weakening of the power of individual states by way of the removal of institutional and
trade barriers.
Over the last few years, new telecommunication technologies, corporate strategies and
institutional frameworks have combined to create a dynamic new framework of real-
world geographies. New information technologies have helped to create an international
financial system that never slows down, while TNCs are now able to transfer their
production activities from one part of the world to another in response to changing
market conditions. This flexibility in terms of location has meant that a high degree of
functional integration now exists between economic activities that are increasingly
dispersed, with the result that products, markets and organisations are both spread out
and linked across the globe.
Economics is the study of how people and societies use resources to meet their material
needs through producing, distributing and consuming goods and services. In economic
geography the focus is on the spatial aspects of economic activities within the human-
environment system. Geographers study the location of economic activities and the
spatial organisation and growth or development of economic systems. Geographers also
study the interaction between people and their environment and people's use and abuse
of natural resources.
3.5.2 The global economic system
A world economy or global economic system has been in existence for several centuries
and a comprehensive framework of sovereign nation-states and an international system
of production and exchange have developed. `Ìnternational trade has been carried on for
millennia, and trade always triggers regional specialization and increases in productivity,
as well as new cultural possibilities and combinations'' (Bergman & Renwick 2005:532).
As new means of transport and communication link world regions at lower cost, more
goods are produced and traded in the world economy. Over time the world economy has
been reorganised several times and each change has resulted in major changes in world
geography and also in the character and fortunes of individual places.
Economic change may be either rapid and traumatic or gradual, taking place
progressively over a long period of time. ``The superimposition of these different types of
economic change with different frequencies and severities at different locations means
the way national and local economies evolve varies over time and from place to place''
(Healey & Ilbery 1990:3). The impact of economic change is differently experienced in
different places and the contrasts between places also have an impact on the processes of
change. The recent round of reorganisation has created a highly interdependent world
economy and globalisation now affects the lives all people in the world. The notion that
48
something fundamental is happening, or indeed has happened, in the global economy is
generally accepted, according to Dicken (1999:1).
Some of the most important changes in the world economy are that the production of
raw materials has become less important, trends in manufacturing employment are
becoming increasingly unrelated to trends in manufacturing production and flows of
capital, rather than trade in goods and services, have become the driving force in the
global economy. With these changes in the structure of economic activities we find
accompanying changes in spatial patterns. For example, the places where people live and
work have been influenced by the shifts in the economy from the agricultural sector to
the industrial sector and later to the services sector. Changes in the economic system
have given rise to enormous international and regional differences. Finding explanations
for this variability in the spatial outcomes of economic changes is a major challenge for
economic geographers.
Several theories have been proposed to account for the emergence and structure of the
world economy. There are theories which focus on cycles of technological innovation and
their economic effects, theories which argue for the progressive incorporation of the
world into a European world economy from the 16th century onwards with the global
periphery providing the basis for economic growth at the core, and theories which see
the world economy as the outcome of interaction between national economies and their
internal relations (Knox, Agnew & McCarthy 2003:70). An account of the world
economy needs to incorporate the major insights of each of these groups of theories and
must focus on the historical evolution of the world economy, the geographical structure
of the world economy and the role of national economic structures in shaping the world
economy. In this study unit we will focus only on the geographical structures of the
world economy.
According to Knox et al (2003:71±83) we can distinguish six basic features of the world
economy:
. Firstly, the world economy consists of a single world market, in which production is
for exchange rather than use. Producers exchange (through trade) what they produce
for the best prices they can get. Because the prices of products are not fixed, but set
in a geographically extensive market, there is competition between producers. More
efficient producers can undercut other producers to attain or capture their share of
total production.
. Secondly, the world economy has always had a territorial division between political
states. This division both predates and grew along with the geographical expansion
of the modern state system. In the contemporary state system each state attempts to
the best of its ability to insulate itself from the rigours of the world market while
trying at the same time to turn the world market to its advantage. States are the
most important means of defining political identity and can create alternative
adaptations to the world economy for its citizens. The global economic system
cannot be isolated from the international political system. Economic and political
activities on a global scale are not separate processes, but aspects of an overall
international political economy which is generally known as the global economy.
Today all the states of the world are to a greater or lesser extent linked to this overall
system which influences economic and political events in virtually every state of the
world. The ability to see places and regions as interconnected components of this
ever-changing system is essential as a basis for knowledge and understanding of the
49 HSY3703/1
world in which we live. The political system may be regarded as a subsystem of the
human environment system. The international political system comprises some 200
independent states divided by international borders.
. A third characteristic of the modern world economy it that it has taken the shape of a
basic, three-tiered pattern, as it has expanded to cover the globe. This pattern or
geography is defined by the global division of labour at any particular time. This
three-tiered pattern is modelled on the core-periphery model of development
(fig 3.1) and is eminently suitable for explaining spatial imbalances in development
on all scales. On the macro scale (global scale) the developed industrialised countries
(Western Europe, the US and Japan) form the core of the global spatial economic
system while the developing countries, representing about 60 percent of the global
population, form the periphery. Together the core and the periphery form an
integrated whole, just as the more and less developed countries collectively form a
whole in the global economic system (or global capitalist system). This dualistic
division does not imply that the core or the periphery are homogeneous entities. The
division is mainly used to illustrate the imbalance in economic relations in the global
economy. The core is defined by processes that produce control over the world
economy, advanced technology, diversified production and relatively high average
incomes. The periphery is defined in terms of processes that lead to dependence,
unsophisticated technology, undiversified production and relatively low incomes.
Uneven development on a global scale is not a recent phenomenon or a by-product of
the world economy; it is one of the world economy's basic features. There are
different ways to classify states into the three tiers of the contemporary world
economy, but the two most commonly used are indicators based on relations between
states (eg trade flows) and indicators based on individual characteristics of states (eg
GDP). Irrespective of the indicator used, the United States and Europe are always
classified at the core, whereas Africa is always the periphery. It is, however, not so
easy to classify the semi-periphery and most authors feel this category is in a state of
flux and cannot be given a fixed position within the spatial structure of the world
economy (Knox et al 2003:74).
. A fourth characteristic is that the modern world economy has followed a number of
cyclical patterns of growth and stagnation. The nature and causes of these temporal
patterns are the subject of considerable controversy and time does not allow an
explanation of the theories surrounding all these cycles in this module. These cycles
are associated with the dominance of a specific country, such as Britain and the
United States, in the world economy. The capitalist world economy not only persists
but it also changes as a new country, deploying different cultural logics, becomes
dominant and attains hegemony (Knox et al 2003:76±77).
. A fifth characteristic is that the world's population resists or adapts to incorporation
into the world economy rather than invariably accepting or succumbing to it. The
potential for resistance or adaption would depend on the internal strength of the
`ìndependent system'' and its compatibility with the world economy. Over the years
resistance and adaptions have continued. At one extreme, as with Japan, we have the
conjunction of adoption and adaptation Ð while the other extreme, as with Iran
since 1979, is overt rejection (Knox et al 2003:80).
. The sixth and final characteristic is that every part of the world has its own particular
relationship to the evolution of the world economy and each has had a particular
response to the evolution of the world economy (Knox et al 2003:80±83).
50
3.5.3 Levels of economic development in the global economy
The human-environment system, which is the study field of the geographer, is
characterised by spatial inequalities in the distribution of both human and natural
phenomena. There are spatial variations in population numbers, natural resources and
levels of economic development in the world. We all know that some parts of the world
are economically and technologically highly developed, while others are less developed.
Inequalities in levels of economic development are produced over a very long period
through the working of complex economic, social and political factors within a physical
environment which is characterised by diversity and the unequal distribution of
resources.
The distribution of natural resources has a very important influence on the patterns of
international economic activity and development. Not only are key natural resources
such as energy, minerals and cultivable land unevenly distributed, but the combination
of particular resources in particular nations and regions makes for a complex mosaic of
opportunities and constraints. A lack of resources can of course be remedied through
international trade (Japan is a prime example), but for most countries the resource base
is an important determinant of development. In overall terms, a very high proportion of
the world's key nonrenewable resources are concentrated in Russia, the United States,
Canada, South Africa and Australia. Note however that the significance of particular
resources is in most cases a function of prevailing technologies. As technologies change,
resource requirements may change. This means that countries and regions that are
heavily dependent on one particular resource are very open to the consequences of
technological change.
There have been numerous attempts to classify levels of development in the world. In
the previous section we saw that one of the characteristics of the world economy is the
distinction between core, semi-periphery and periphery countries (fig 3.1). The Brandt
Report (Brandt 1980) divides the world into North and South, a division which is not
entirely accurate from a geographical point of view but which gives a fair idea of the
distinction between the ``rich'' North and the ``poor'' South (Knox et al 2003:23±24).
The division into North and South corresponds broadly with the core-periphery division
on a global scale (fig 3.2).
For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank divides the world into four
groups. The main criterion for this classification is gross national income (GNI) per
capita. Previously, this term was referred to as gross national product (GNP). Based on
its GNI per capita, every economy is classified as low income, middle income (subdivided
into lower middle and upper middle) or high income. Low income countries are
countries with a GNI of $765 or less; lower middle income countries have a GNI of
between $766 and $3035; upper middle income countries have an income of between
$3036 and $9385; and high income countries have an income of more than $9386
(World Bank 2005).
The United Nations (UN) classifies the countries of the world into three groups:
developed economies, economies in transition, and developing economies. Economies in
North America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan and New Zealand are developed
economies. Economies in Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the Commonwealth of
Independent states (former USSR) are economies in transition. Economies in Latin
America and the Caribbean Islands, Africa, Southeast Asia and western Asia are
classified as developing economies (United Nations 2005).
51 HSY3703/1
FIGURE 3.1
The world system: core, periphery and semi-peripher y
Source: Knox et al (2003:66)
52
FIGURE 3.2
International variation in gross domestic product
53 HSY3703/1
The revolution in information technologies is perhaps the globalisation force. The new
information technologies permit the generation and growth of expanding networks of
rapid information flow and exchange, but the new communication technologies do not
affect all geographical areas equally. Access to these new technologies are concentrated in
the core regions or economically developed parts of the world (North America, Europe
and Japan), while the periphery or less developed countries (such as those in Africa) have
little or no access. Information and computer technology, and transportation, make
differences among places more important rather than less important. North American
companies, for example, dominate the software development and distribution networks
along which the technology flows and exchanges takes place. The information-based
process of global integration therefore seems to be reinforcing the established patterns of
uneven world development (Warf 1999:60).
Activity 3.4
(1) How, would you say, are the six basic characteristics of the world economy (as defined
by Knox et al 2003) linked to globalisation? Think in terms of what we have been
discussing so far, namely that globalisation is the increasing interconnectedness of the
world, before you attempt this activity.
(2) Choose a number of countries in the world and make a table to indicate the selected
countries' level of development according to the core-periphery structure, GDP per
capita, the World Bank's classification and the UN's classification.
(1) We defined globalisation as the increasing interconnectedness of the world. The first
characteristic of the world economy according to Knox et al (2003:71) is that the
world economy consists of a single world market in which production is for
exchange rather than use. This single market implies that all countries are connected
and use the same market. Try and make this link in terms of the other five
characteristics of the world economy.
(2) A table like the following one gives us an idea of the economic inequalities between
countries. Select your own countries and complete the open rows of the table. If you
are feeling a bit lost consult the maps in figures 3.1 and 3.2 and the following
websites which contain information relevant to this activity: the United Nations'
website http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/index.html#wespnew under World Eco-

nomic and Social Survey and the World Bank website http://www.worldbank.org/data/
countryclass/countryclass.html for their classification of the countries of the world. If
you do not have access to the Internet you can try and find these publications in the
Unisa library.
54
Country Core-periphery GDP per capita World Bank UN
(fig 3.1) (fig 3.2)
South Africa Semi-periphery Between $5 000 and Lower-middle income Developing country
$9 999
United Kingdom Core Between $20 000 High income Developed country
and $29 999
3.5.4 International trade
There is a lot of international specialisation in agricultural and industrial production in
the world, which makes the geography of international trade very complex. One
significant reflection of the increased economic integration of the world system is that
global trade has grown much more rapidly over the past 25 years than global
production. Technological changes, especially improvements in transportation and
communication, are reducing the friction of distance and barriers to worldwide
exchanges. Increased reductions in transportation costs have improved physical exchange
due to continuing low costs of energy. Advancements in telecommunication provided by
fibreoptic networks and satellite technology, and the ease, speed, quantity and quality of
information transactions has rearranged the global economic system. Since transporta-
tion and communication costs have decreased, many local services and goods are
becoming internationally mobile.
Economic activities and production at local, regional and national levels are important,
but what happens at these levels is increasingly determined by the role of a place, region
or country in the global system of production, trade and consumption. The rules
regulating business vary so widely from nation to nation that international trade requires
international regulation. The first preliminary General Agreement of Tariffs and

Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947. By 1994, 125 countries had signed the agreement
which outlines the rules for international trade in raw materials and manufactured
goods. GATT did not extend to trade in farm products and services, so in 1995 the
World Trade Organization (WTO) was established to replace GATT. A panel of
neutral specialists convened whenever trade disputes between countries occurred. The
panels of the WTO had more authority than GATT and countries found to have broken
the rules of international trade had to alter their domestic policies and laws or else offer
compensation. New agreements include rules to cover trade in some services, but trade
agreements for food products have not yet been reached. Membership of the WTO
brings nations significant trade advantages; by the end of 1997, 130 countries belonged
to the WTO.
55 HSY3703/1
Activity 3.5
(1) Go to the Internet site of the WTO (http://www.wto.org) and find out how many
countries belong to the WTO today. If you do not have access to the Internet try and
find these publications in the Unisa library.
(2) Have China and Russia been admitted to the organisation?
(3) How would you classify the countries that hold observer status at the WTO? Are they
developed or developing countries?
(4) How, would you say, do WTO membership countries influence the movement of money
across the world. Does money only move between member states or is there also
large-scale movement to and from countries that are not members of the WTO? Buy a
newspaper and look in the financial section for evidence of what you are discovering
here.
(1) The WTO's web pages have a lot of information on trade agreements and members
and make for very interesting reading. On 16 February 2005, 148 countries were
members of the WTO. South Africa became a member on 1 January 1995. This
means that more and more countries in the word are becoming part of the WTO,
which is evidence of globalisation at work (World Trade Organization website:
accessed 1 April 2005)
(2) China became a member on 11 December 2001 but the Russian Federation is not
yet a member; it is only an observer at WTO meetings.
(3) Most of the countries that are observers are small, less developed countries. This
information emphasises the fact that globalisation, and the membership of global
organisations, is not evenly spread and that the more developed countries seem to
get the most benefit from globalisation.
(4) The movement of money is mostly between WTO member states and large-scale
movement is mostly between countries at the core of the world economy.
The global economy is characterised by ongoing internationalisation of production, trade
and services. Interaction in the global economy is fuelled and sustained by the
governments of the most powerful states of the world, TNCs, international banks and
trade networks, and by various international agreements on trade and the environment.
These governments and institutions are located mostly in the core areas of the world but
their influence stretches to the farthest corners of the world.
Two developments in the world economy contributed to the acceleration of economic
globalisation. One was the evolution of the world market for certain primary products,
such as foods and minerals, and the other was the increase in international investments
(Bergman & Renwick 2005:533) in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). In the
next section we will look more specifically at the role of TNCs and FDI in the process of
globalisation.
56
3.5.5 Transnational corporations and direct foreign investment
Multinational or transnational corporations (MNCs or TNCs) are the principal
instruments of economic globalisation in the world and they are producing new
efficiencies in production, distribution and the use of the world's resources. A TNC is a
corporation that has a large commitment of resources in international business, engages
in production and manufacturing in a number of countries and uses a global perspective
in its management and decision making. In this study unit we use the term transnational
corporation (TNC) rather than multinational corporation (MNC) since it is the term
normally used by geographers.
TNCs are not limited to manufacturing, but are involved in the entire spectrum of
economic activities from the exploitation of natural resources to recreation and tourism.
A TNC is usually large in size and its worldwide activities are controlled by a parent
company. The size of a TNC is measured by its annual turnover. In many instances the
revenue earned by a TNC exceeds the GDP of many developing countries. In 1985, for
example, General Motors and Exon each had a gross sales value that exceeded the GDP
of most developing countries. According to Dicken (1987:58), The Singer corporation
can be regarded as the first true TNC from the United States since they started
establishing marketing agents for sewing machines in Canada, Europe and Latin
America in the 1850s. They built their first overseas factory in Glasgow, Scotland, in
1867. Other large TNCs such as Heinz, Unilever and Nestle

Â have been operating since
the beginning of the 20th century.
Reading 3.3
Transnational production and investment
Enormous enterprises have grown up that own and coordinate production and market-
ing facilities in many countries. These are called multinational or transnational corpora-
tions. Transnational companies (as defined by the United Nations) with international
production facilities now number 60 000 and about 500 000 foreign affiliates, account-
ing for an estimated 25 percent of total global production.
Their evolution generally follows four stages. In the first stage, the corporation exported
products from its home country to meet demand abroad. In the second stage, the cor-
poration established production facilities abroad to supply specific markets abroad; ex-
ports from the home country dropped. In stage 3, the foreign production facilities began
to supply foreign markets other than their own local markets. In stage 4, the foreign pro-
duction facilities began to export back into the home country. These stages appeared
first in trade in primary materials such as copper and oil. Later, the stages were repeated
in the evolution of international manufacturing, and today they are being repeated in the
tertiary sector. For example, a US accounting firm ö a service industry ö will first ad-
vise a Belgian company from its New York office. Then the accounting firm might estab-
lish an office in Brussels to serve Belgian companies. In stage 3 the firm will serve
companies throughout Europe from its Brussels office, and, finally, in stage 4, the Brus-
sels office might advise firms back in the United States.
The ownership and range of activities of transnational corporations are so widespread

that it is difficult to tell which corporations are corporate citizens of which countries.
NestlÅ is generally regarded as a Swiss corporation, yet its shares are traded on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange. The company's board of directors includes citizens of several
countries, but no records reveal who NestlÅ's actual stockholders are.One economist es-
timates that US citizens own about 14 percent of NestlÅ. Gilbert Williamson, president of
NCR Corporation has said,`Ì was asked the other day about United States competitive-
ness, and I replied that I don't think about it at all.We at NCR think of ourselves as a global
competitive company that happens to he headquartered in the United States.''
57 HSY3703/1
Multinational corporations challenge individual nations to regulate them or to tax them.
Imagine, for example, that a multinational corporation manufactures sneakers for $1 per
pair at a subsidiary in Malaysia and sells them to a US-based subsidiary for $40 per pair.
The multinational has kept enormous profits in Malaysia where tax rates may be lower
than in the United States. Trade among different divisions of individual corporations to-
day accounts for an estimated one-third of all international trade, and the corporations
can allocate investment and profits wherever they wish.
Source : Bergman & Renwick (2005:533^534)
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important criterion by which the activities
of TNCs are measured. The value of FDI in a country is an indication of the value of the
stock of productive capital in that country, which is owned by foreign companies.
Transnational investment funds are concentrated predominantly in the developed
economies of the world. Over time the amount of FDI has increased to such an extent
that it is now several times more than the amount of foreign aid being given around the
world. One of the reasons for this increase is that FDI has been much more successful in
triggering economic growth than international aid has. Developing countries today tend
to court foreign companies (TNC) to invest in their countries.
Since 1980, global FDI has grown three times faster than world trade and four times
faster than total world output, to a total of over $5 trillion (Bergman & Renwick
2005:536). Global flows of FDI have greatly increased and significantly redistributed
the world productive capacity over the last few decades (fig 3.3).
TABLE 3.1
Percentage foreign direct investment in the world
Country of origin 1960 1973 1989
USA 47,1 48 28,3

Canada 3,7 3,7 4,8
Europe 45,2 39 50,2
UK 18,3 13 16,7
Germany 1,2 5,6 9,1
Italy 1,6 1,5 3,8
France 6,1 4,2 5,3
Netherlands 10,3 7,5 6,1
Other 7,7 7,2 9,3
Japan 0,7 4,9 11,5
All other 3,2 4,4 5,2
Total 100 100 100
Source: Sweezy & Magdoff (1992a:12)
58
FIGURE 3.3
Flows of foreign direct investment
Activity 3.6
The following activity may help you to understand the spatial patterns of FDI in the world
better.
Study table 3.1 and figure 3.3 and complete the following sentences:
. The country or region from which the largest share of the world's foreign direct investment
originated in 1960 is: _______________________ .
. The country or region from which the largest share of the world's foreign direct investment
originated in 1989 is: _______________________ .
. The country or region that had the largest increase in the share of the world's FDI from 1960
to 1989 was: _______________________ .
According to table 3.1 the largest share of FDI came from the United States in 1960
and 1973, but by 1989 most of the FDI came from Europe. Companies from an
increasing number of countries have become active investors in other countries from
1960 to 1989, but the FDI share of Germany and Japan increased the most. It is very
evident from table 3.1 that most of the FDI in the world comes from the United States,
the European Union and Japan. Figure 3.3 also shows that within this triad the largest
flows of FDI are between the United States and Europe.
Most of the top financial, insurance, accounting and advertising TNCs have their
headquarters in the United States and US firms account for about 30 percent of global
FDI (Bergman & Renwick 2005:537). The United States is also the world's largest
59 HSY3703/1
recipient of FDI from other countries. An important characteristic of TNCs is, therefore,
that a small number of countries in the core of the world economy are virtually the
exclusive source and destination of FDI.
There are, however, also TNCs that have their headquarters in developing countries. In
the early 1990s the top 600 TNCs in the world in the mining and manufacturing sectors
included two South African companies (Barlows in position 128 and Iscor in position
505). Other developing countries with TNCs are Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, Malaysia, India, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. TNCs from the periphery
differ in some respects from those that have their headquarters in core countries. The
TNCs from the periphery tend to use more labour-intensive production technology and
most of their FDI is in the same vicinity in the periphery. Exceptions are some of the
joint enterprises of Asian TNCs in African countries.
Three trends characterise the geography of FDI in the world economy (Bergman &
Renwick 2005:537). The most important trend is that the greatest share of global FDI
(about 75%) flows from one developed country to another. The developed countries are
the main sources of FDI (table 3.1) but also the main destinations of FDI (table 3.2).
The flow of FDI is mainly between developed countries and these investments seem to
be geographically concentrated. This means that US firms tend to invest more in Europe
and Japan than in Asia and Africa. Secondly, the flows of FDI to developing countries
have been geographically selective. The countries that have attracted most investment
are those that have export-led economic growth. An example is the group of four
countries called the `Àsian Tigers'': Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
These Asian countries grew so fast with the aid of FDI that within a decade they reached
levels of prosperity comparable to Europe's. These countries then became the sources of
technology and capital for the next tier of Asian developing countries: Thailand, China,
Malaysia and Indonesia.
TABLE 3.2
Destination of FDI
1967 1973 1980 1989
Developed countries 69.4 74 78 80.8

Developing countries 30.6 26 22 19.2
Source: Sweezy & Magdoff (1992a:14)
Areas that did not attract large amounts of FDI have been slower to develop. For
example, since independence in 1947, India was committed to import substitution with
the result that the economic growth rate in India was much lower than in the above-
mentioned countries which received FDI. India began to invite FDI in the mid-1990s,
but despite this its share of world trade was less than 1 percent in 2001. Africa attracted
only 2,4 percent of total global FDI (Bergman & Renwick 2005:537) and almost all that
investment was in extractive activities such as oil and mining. Political instability is one
of the major factors discouraging international investors from investing in African
countries.
60
A third characteristic of the FDI pattern is that each one of the three main FDI agents
(the US, the EU and Japan) tends to have a cluster of countries in which it has the
majority share of FDI: these countries become economic satellites of each of these three
main agents. These clusters help to explain world trade patterns. Thailand, for example,
falls within the Japanese cluster and electronics companies in Thailand are mostly owned
by Japanese corporations. Thus the consumer products that the United States imports
from Thailand benefit both the Thai economy and the Japanese corporations. Hong
Kong and South Korea also form part of the Japanese cluster. The US cluster includes
many South American countries, such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela as well as other countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines. The EU
cluster includes the countries of Eastern Europe such as Russia, Croatia, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
Global FDI is not only an economic force Ð it also has political ramifications. At the
end of 1997 the financial setbacks in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and
the Philippines triggered angry tirades from political leaders in those countries which
undermined international investor confidence and spurred investors to get their money
out. The result was that local currencies fell and new investments came to a standstill.
Local leaders realised they could not exercise the same authority that they had over their
own people over international investors. FDI cannot be attracted without acceding to
international rules. The low rates of FDI in Africa can also be attributed to political
factors. After independence many of the assets of TNCs in Africa were taken over or
nationalised by new African governments. Over the last decade there have been attempts
to privatise many state-controlled companies, which gives TNCs the opportunity to
invest in Africa.
Geographers watch capital flows carefully, because the pace of development within
individual countries is increasingly determined by their ability to attract foreign capital.
The world map of wealth and trade continues to change. The FDI that is redrawing the
world map is however only a fraction of the vast amounts of capital moving around the
world. Multinational banking and telecommunications make it possible to instanta-
neously monitor trade in national currencies, stocks and bonds listed anywhere in the
world. Many banks have located their international headquarters in places that are
known for their lenient banking regulations. The small (260 square kilometres) British
Caribbean colony of the Cayman Islands (population 36 000) is one of the world's
greatest financial centres, holding assets of about $700 billion (Bergman & Renwick
2005:538). It has however almost no vaults, tellers, security guards or even bank
buildings. Assets are held electronically in computers. Many banks consist of one-room
offices and local laws protect the confidentiality of the transactions.
International trade in services (the tertiary sector of the economy) demonstrates the same
trends as trade in goods. Countries are losing their autonomy to an increasingly global
market. TNCs treat the world as `òne place'' and exploit resources, locate facilities and
market their products accordingly. Many developing countries have educated young
people willing to work for wages lower than those in the developed countries, but their
domestic economies cannot employ them. Large corporations in developed countries
need clerical assistants and computer operators. Today's telecommunication technology
allows the corporations to make use of these pools of labour wherever they are. The
relocation of these jobs can boost national economies and it can also disseminate cultural
values and practices. For many decades companies in developed countries like the United
61 HSY3703/1
States have been moving clerical operations out of urban centres to the national
periphery. Now companies are relocating these jobs to the world periphery.
Activity 3.7
After working through the previous section of this study unit the following question will help
you find out how much of the material you understand and to what extent you are achieving
the outcome of this study unit:
. Discuss the role of TNCs and FDIs in the globalisation process.
It is important to understand the role and functions of TNCs and FDI and when you
discuss their role in globalisation you should give attention to:
. how a TNC and FDI are defined
. where in the world the headquarters of most TNCs are located
. the four stages in the evolution of a TNC
. the current international geographic pattern of FDI flows as illustrated in figure 3.3
. the idea that ``the distribution of FDI is geographically specific''
3.5.6 Globalisation and the changing spatial division of labour
The division of labour implies that the production process is divided into separate
elements and that each worker or group of workers is responsible for only one such
element. This division is based on the assumption that workers can attain a higher
degree of efficiency if they are restricted to one process. The unfolding evolution of
capitalism and globalisation has brought a changing spatial division of labour. This is the
idea that the division of labour within and between firms and over space is not fixed, but
responds to changes in the historical-structural context in which firms operate (Knox et
al 2003:16±17).
In a company where production takes place at different locations Ð whether it is
different regions in the same country (regional industrial specialisation), in different
countries or even on different continents Ð we have a spatial division of labour. The
spatial division of labour is manifested in different ways depending on particular
conditions of production. It can also change over time. The term ``spatial division of
labour'' refers to the regional economic specialisation in labour based on the distribution
of resources and markets and on the exploitation of economies of scale, agglomeration
economies and locational economies. The spatial division of labour in national economies
is based on different regional industrial specialisations and the geographical clustering of
all functions associated with a given industry in a particular region. Labour is regionally
differentiated.
62
In the Fordist era the basic division of labour was organised within regional parts of the
economy in national economies such as Britain and the United states. Named after
Henry Ford, the original principles of Fordism were mass production, assembly line
techniques and scientific management, all pioneered in the manufacturing processes of
Ford motorcars at the beginning of the 20th century. Mass production was possible due
to a production line and labour specialisation where each labourer had only a specific
duty such as attaching wheels, attaching lights, or painting the cars. In economic terms,
Fordism refers to a regime of accumulation that focuses on the mutual reinforcement of
mass production and mass consumption (Knox et al 2003:9). During the Fordist era,
production, plants, firms and industries were national phenomena which were organised
around national markets, national industries and certain national social (class) divisions.
Although capital, labour and technology were often imported and exported they were
subject to intensive regulations by national governments. The internal geography of a
national economy reflected its position in the international division of labour.
Under the new conditions of neo-Fordist and disorganised capitalism, such regional
specialisation has been challenged and undermined (Knox et al 2003:17). The spatial
division of labour is now structured in a variety of ways Ð depending on needs and
characteristics of particular industries. In addition to regional specialisation and regional
dispersal that has long characterised consumer services (stores, hospitals, etc) and some
manufacturing industries (shoes, food, etc) four other types of spatial division of labour
can now be identified. The first new type of labour division is the functional separation
between management/research activities (skilled labour) in metropolitan areas, skilled
labour in the old manufacturing areas and unskilled labour in the regional peripheries. A
second type of labour division is the functional separation between management/research
activities in the major metropolitan regions and semi-skilled and unskilled labour in the
regional periphery. A third type is the functional separation between management/
research and skilled labour in more advanced industrial regions and unskilled labour in
the global periphery. In the last instance we find a labour division between areas with
investment, technical change and job expansion and other areas with stagnant and less
productive production and job losses (Knox et al 2003:17±18).
These new spatial divisions of labour have been made possible by a set of transportation
and communication technologies created by globalisation that have provided a
``permissive'' environment: in which firms could decentralise manufacturing and primary
production activities but maintain central control. There is now the possibility of
intensive interaction and diffusion without geographic proximity. For example, firms can
remain headquartered in, or relocate to, world cities such as New York, London or Paris,
but locate manufacturing facilities in places with isolated and a disorganised labour
force, with a particular combination of labour force skills or costs (such as developing
countries) or close to regional markets. The main push for such restructuring has come
from the increasingly competitive environment faced by large firms resulting from a less
regulated and more internationalised marketplace. A number of major cities around the
world have grown in prominence and authority because of the globalisation of
manufacturing and service industries, labour market restructuring, the agglomeration of
finance, business and money, and the rapid development of information technology
(Knox et al 2003:18).
Under this new international division of labour (NIDL) investments and production
are no longer organised around national economies. The actual process of production is
63 HSY3703/1
now global. Components are obtained from multiple suppliers in different countries and
assembled in several other countries. Increasing numbers of products have no nationality
and it is often difficult to distinguish an `Àmerican'' car from a ``Japanese'' car. The
advantages to manufacturers of a global assembly line are manifold. A standardised
global product for a global market helps to maximise economies of scale. A global
assembly line also allows production and assembly to take advantage of the full range of
geographical variations in cost. Basic wages are much higher in developed countries than
in developing countries and labour-intensive work can be done in developing countries
where labour is cheaper. In the same way raw material can be processed near their source
of supply and assembly can take place near major markets. A global assembly line also
means that a producer is no longer dependent on a single source of supply for a specific
component, thus making it less vulnerable to industrial troubles. The pace of this
economic globalisation has increased since the late 1960s. For example, between 1961
and 1976 the number of employees of German firms outside Germany increased tenfold
(Knox et al 2003:18±19).
The national economy (ie the economy of one country) is no longer the sole building
block of the world economy and markets have become worldwide. This shift has
important consequences for the spatial distribution of economic activities both globally
and nationally. Globally it has given rise to the newly industrialised countries (South
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil and Mexico). It has also contributed to
the polarisation of income and wealth in the world. Within national economies of the
core countries the NIDL has led to both the reorientation of employment away from
manufacturing to services and massive restructuring of regional economies.
Activity 3.8
After working through the previous section of this study unit the following question will help
you find out how much of the material you understand and to what extent you are achieving
the outcomes for this study unit:
. Discuss the influence of globalisation on the spatial division of labour in the world
economy.
When you answer this question, you must explain the terms ``spatial division of labour''
and ``new international division of labour''. Also indicate how globalisation has changed
the spatial division of labour and what the new international spatial division of labour
means. With globalisation and international integration, the removal of trade barriers
would lead to a more pronounced spatial division of labour.
How has globalisation influenced the spatial division of labour in the ``world'' that you
are accustomed to? Do you work for a company who adhere to the ``new international
division of labour''? How do they do it and where do you fit in?
64
3.5.7 The reassertion of the local in the age of the global
Over time, international economic and communication links have shrunk distance in the
world as expressed in terms of time and cost, but of course not physical distance. In spite
of the world becoming ``smaller'' and more integrated, people still live in their distinct or
unique environments, which are affected in different ways by integration in this global
system. In a world of expanding global communication networks and greater global
problems, the geography of individual places does not disappear; on the contrary, it
becomes an even more important element in attempts to understand and process the
changes brought about by globalisation.
The increasing ``time-space compression'' or ``time-space shrinkage'' at the heart of
globalisation means the displacement of activities (that were until recently local) into a
network of relations whose reach is distant and worldwide. Although some authors
argue that places are becoming hybridised socioeconomic composites (places tending to
have similar socioeconomic qualities), this hybridisation of the ``local'' through
``globalisation'' does not mean that places are losing their distinctiveness and becoming
similar. Globalisation does not mean the homogenisation of all social and economic
relations across space. Globalisation does not make every place in the world like every
other place, or every person like every other person. The reality is that globalisation is
variously embraced, resisted, subverted and exploited by people as it makes contact with
specific cultures and settings. In the process, places are modified and reconstructed
rather than being destroyed or homogenised. The free movement of capital, production,
information, money and cultures across frontiers occurs because places differ from each
other and there are differences between localities, regions and nations. Globalisation
simultaneously reinforces the pluralism of places and pluralism within places (Bryson et
al 1999:22±25), even though homogenisation certainly does occur and is feared by some
people.
The more universal the diffusion of material culture and lifestyles, the more valuable
regional and ethnic identities become. The nurturing of 11 languages in South Africa,
instead of just making English Ð the world language Ð the official language, is an
example. The faster the information highway takes people into cyberspace the more they
feel the need for a subjective setting Ð a specific place or community Ð that they can
call their own. An example is the range of the new private custom-built residential
development that has sprung up in developed countries around large metropolitan areas,
each designed to create a sense of community and identity for their residents. The
greater the reach of TNCs, the more easily they are able to respond to place-to-place
variation in labour markets and consumer markets, and the more often and the more
radically the economic geography has to be reorganised. Athletic shoe manufacturers
like Nike, for example, frequently switch production from one less-developed country to
another in response to the changing international geography of wages and currencies.
The greater the integration of transnational governments and institutions, the more
sensitive people have become to localised cleavages of race, ethnicity and religion. An
example is the resurgence of nationalism and regionalism all over the world.
According to Knox et al (2003:379) there is a global trend towards ever more powerful
states and ever-larger corporate structures. The increasing prominence of supranational
institutions and initiatives (such as the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement
[NAFTA], the WTO, or the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) and TNCs) can
suggest a pervasive bureaucratisation of modern life under the control of fewer and fewer
65 HSY3703/1
organisations and individuals. Yet while trends towards centralisation, homogenisation
and standardisation are real enough, there is also persisting and even increasing
differentiation and decentralisation. For example, the industrialisation of the periphery
and especially the growth of the newly industrialised countries is a trend where industrial
activities are decentralised. Another example of the trend towards differentiation is the
revival and creation of regional identities such as in the Ukraine, Quebec, Scotland and
the Punjab (Knox et al 2003:379).
While the world economy is an international system of production and exchange of
economic goods and services, the earth's natural environment is a dynamic system of
interacting events that combine in various ways to produce regional differences in
natural environments. Although the natural environment operates largely outside
human controls, it is impacted by specific human activities. Human interactions with the
natural world convert forests and grasslands into farmland but they also pollute air,
water and soils. In the next section we will take a closer look at the links between the
human processes of globalisation and global environmental issues.
Activity 3.9
Now that you have worked through the section on globalisation as an economic
phenomenon you should be able to write essays on the following topics:
(1) Globalisation is most commonly seen as an economic phenomenon. Discuss this
statement from a geographical perspective.
(2) The principal instruments of economic globalisation are multinational corporations and
foreign direct investment. Discuss this statement from a geographical perspective.
(1) You could begin this essay with a definition of globalisation from various
perspectives. Make use of all the information in all study units in the study guide
when you define globalisation. You could continue by explaining why globalisation
is commonly seen as an economic phenomenon. Since you ought to make use of a
geographical perspective, it will be a good idea to include a section in your essay on
the perspective which geographers use. You can also discuss the distinctive spatial
patterns of levels of economic development in the world. When discussing these you
could include information from study unit 2, which deals with the origins of global
disparities. Also remember to discuss economic issues such as world trade, TNC,
FDI and the spatial division of labour in your essay. As a third-year student it would
be advisable to explain how these issues are related. For example, explain the spatial
differences in world trade, TNC and FDI in terms of the core-periphery relations and
in terms of World Bank or UN classifications. You will be able to write an adequate
essay with the information provided in this study guide but it is always a good idea
to do some research and to read more widely on the topics.
You should be able to write two to three pages on each of these five topics. So the
essay will be about 10 to 15 pages long. This is the type of question we may ask in
the final project for this module.
66
(2) You could also begin this essay with a definition of globalisation from various
perspectives. You could then explain what economic globalisation entails. Since you
must, once again, use a geographical perspective, you should include a section on the
perspective used by geographers. You should give a brief overview of the different
facets of economic globalisation and mention the spatial patterns of levels of
economic development in the world, world trade, TNCs, FDI and the spatial
division of labour. You should then concentrate on TNCs and FDI as the principal
instruments of globalisation. In order to write a good essay on this topic you will
have to do more reading and research. You can consult some of the sources given in
the bibliography at the end of this study unit. You can also do research on the
Internet. Begin with the web pages of the WTO (http://www.wto.org), the World
Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/) and the United Nations (http://www.un.org).
3.6 Globalisation and environmental issues
3.6.1 Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century, it is clear that human activity is changing the
environment. This change is not for the better and it is unlike any previous types of
change. Extensive and excessive resource use, energy-inefficient lifestyles, industrialisa-
tion and the pursuit of economic growth are inextricably linked to environmental
degradation. This degradation is within and across state borders.
The sheer scale and capacity of the present globalised world economy means that
humans are now capable of altering the environment on a global scale. In addition to the
spectre of global warming (as a result of emissions of gaseous materials into the
atmosphere) we also face the reality of serious global environmental degradation through
deforestation, desertification, acid rain, loss of genetic diversity, smog, soil erosion,
ground-water decline, and the pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans.
Measuring the value of environmental quality and natural resources is difficult enough in
itself but it is even more difficult when we recognise that people in different countries
value resources differently. Many North Americans and Europeans place a high value on
tropical rainforest biodiversity and argue that deforestation should be halted in order to
protect that diversity, even if it means curtailing some economic benefits of deforestation.
The governments of most nations in tropical regions, however, are much less concerned
about biodiversity and more concerned with the economic gains to be made by
exploiting the rainforests. Environmental issues of only regional or national concern are
usually resolved at that level. But when we consider resources of global importance,
international negotiations must resolve conflicts derived from differences in valuing
resources. In this section we will discuss some examples of major environmental issues
that have been the subjects of global-scale negotiations or that are likely to become so in
the near future.
The transnational character of many environmental problems poses a serious challenge
to the modern state system. Should all countries be subject to the same rules? Or should
the poorer countries be exempt from some of the more costly regulations? And can an
effective response be organised without undermining state sovereignty? Organising
effective responses to global environmental problems requires international institutions
67 HSY3703/1
with powers and authorities that have been traditionally reserved for states. As
international institutions take on this critical role they risk creating serious hardships if
all places are treated alike. Instead geographical variations in modes of livelihood,
economic wealth and social stability are unavoidable parts of the picture. In a world of
increasingly globalised networks and problems, geography does not disappear. Instead it
becomes a profoundly important element of any effort to comprehend and confront
changing international orders.
3.6.2 Global environmental degradation
Since the 1950s, industrial production in the world has increased fourfold and energy
production has increased exponentially by a factor of about 4,5. World oil production
increased by a factor of almost 6 between 1950 and 1992 and fertiliser use increased
tenfold in the same period. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide emissions have
increased exponentially since the Industrial Revolution and now stand at something in
the vicinity of 360 parts per million (PPM), which will contribute to a change in average
global temperatures and rising of sea levels (Elliot 1998:1).
Many economic activities are unsustainable and contribute to the depletion of natural
resources. This affects the environment, which in turn affects livelihoods, especially of
people in developing countries. The environmental impacts of people's economic
activities have been widespread. Land degradation has increased to an extent that as
much as one third of the world's land surface is now threatened by desertification. World
water use doubled between 1940 and 1980 and by 1996 per capita water supply in
developing countries was only one third of the 1970 level (Elliot 1998:1). This is related
to the increase in world population which was already more than 6,5 billion people in
2005. Water scarcity is on the increase and over 80 countries are now facing water
shortages.
Air pollution and contamination of waterways and coastal areas have become a standard
feature of industrial and developing countries' ecosystems. The world forests, both
tropical and temperate, are in decline. Every day as many as 50 of the earth's species
become extinct. Environmental degradation increases the poverty of those who are
already poor, especially in those parts of the world where livelihoods and lives are closely
dependent on terrestrial, river, stream and coastal ecosystems. Desertification and land
degradation undermine the agricultural and subsistence practices of people in the
developing countries. Pollution of rivers and streams affects the irrigation of farms in
developing and developed countries, it diminishes people's access to clean drinking water
and it kills fish upon which local communities rely for food. Deforestation denies sources
of food, medicine and the basics of daily life to millions of forest dwellers and indigenous
peoples, as well as undermining their cultural and spiritual identity. Increasing scarcity of
fuel wood and water increases the burden on the lives of women in developing countries.
In both developed and developing countries, hazardous waste dumping and toxic
pollution causes environmental degradation as well as the death of many people (eg in
Bhopal) and illness among the population (eg in Minimata). You can find out more
about these events by doing the following activity.
68
Activity 3.10
Since this study unit is written from a geographical perspective, you might find the following
geographical exercise interesting. If you do not have a world atlas at home and do not have
access to the Internet you can skip this exercise. If you do have a good atlas and access to
the Internet, do attempt this activity on your own before looking at our feedback. We want
you to work independently at times and to look for information on your own. So try this
exercise first, before checking your answer by reading our feedback.
(1) Find Bhopal and Minimata on a world map in any world atlas or on a map on the
Internet. In which countries are these places located?
(2) Are these countries part of the developed or the developing world, as defined in this
study unit?
(3) What was the role of globalisation in these environmental incidents? You can read
more on the Bhopal incident on the http://www.bhopal.com/ website. Information on this
tragedy is available on various Internet sites. Do a search of ``Minimata'' on one of the
search engines on the Internet, such as http://www.google.com/ or http://www.lycos.-
com/ to find out more about the disaster at Minimata.
(1) Bhopal is located in India and its absolute location is 23 8 20' N and 77 8 30' E.
Minimata is a bay on the Shiranui Sea around Japan.
(2) India is part of the developing world or the periphery of the world economy, while
Japan is a developed country in the core of the world economy.
(3) The Chisso Corporation, located in Kumamoto, Japan, was once a fertiliser and
carbicle company, and gradually advanced to a become a petrochemical and plastic-
maker company. Chisso Corporation started developing plastics, drugs and perfumes
through the use of a chemical called acetaldehyde in 1932. Acetaldehyde is
produced using mercury as a compound, and was a key component in the
production of their products. The company was considered an economic success in
Japan. Chisso Corporation's sales increased dramatically, considering Chisso was the
only manufacturer of a primary chemical called DOP, a plasticiser (diotyl phthalate).
They supplied this chemical to various other manufacturers inside and outside
Japan. Having a monopoly on the chemical enabled Chisso to expand rapidly. Chisso
Corporation was the main industry in the small Minamata town, and the town's
growth period from 1952 to 1960 paralleled Chisso's progress. From 1932 to 1968,
Chisso Corporation dumped tons of mercury into Minamata Bay in Japan.
Thousands of people living around the bay developed methyl mercury poisoning
through the consumption of contaminated fish. The victims suffered from severe
neurological damage, which later became known as Minamata Disease.
In the early hours of December 3, 1984, methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas leaked from
the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) plant in Bhopal, India. According to the
state government, approximately 3 800 people died, approximately 40 people
experienced permanent disability, and approximately 2 800 other individuals
experienced partial disabilities. Union carbide is a TNC and its headquarters are in
the United States.
69 HSY3703/1
Since environmental problems and issues are now global issues Ð ecologically,
politically and economically Ð they require international responses and global
solutions. Cooperation among states has become a necessary condition for controlling or
preventing the causes of environmental degradation and for finding ways to overcome or
at least mitigate both the global environmental impacts of local human activity and the
local impact of global environmental degradation. According to Johnston (1996:159),
`ènvironmental systems are global in their interaction; no part of the earth is
independent of all others, and no system or sub-system is contained by àrtificial'
political boundaries''.
As early as the 1960s scientists began to raise concerns about the potential impacts of air
pollution on ozone concentrations in the stratosphere. One of the substances that was
particularly worrisome is a class of chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). CFCs
are human-made chemicals that are used in a wide variety of applications including
refrigeration and air conditioning and many industrial processes. In the 1970s there were
strong theoretical reasons to believe that CFCs would harm stratospheric ozone, and
these were sufficient to cause most nations to ban the use of CFCs as propellants in
aerosol spray cans.
By the mid-1980s, scientists had accumulated clear evidence that damage to the ozone
shield was in fact occurring, especially in high latitudes, and that this damage was
attributable to CFCs. When this became known, international action was obviously
called for. Consequently, in 1987 an international agreement was reached that has since
been ratified by over 125 countries. The agreement, called the Montreal Protocol, called
for signatory nations to freeze CFC production at 1989 levels and then cut production
50 percent by 1999. Despite certain concerns raised, the Montreal Protocol is generally
regarded as a success story in international environmental management.
Environmental problems such as pollution, soil degradation and the obliteration of
forests are problems shared by a number of states throughout the world and are
therefore trans-global problems. Because such problems are shared by many countries
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) took the initiative and the
Stockholm Conference of 1972 was the first in a series of international conferences on the
environment.
3.6.3 The Stockholm Conference of 1972
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the Stockholm
Conference) is frequently described as a watershed in the development of international
environmental law, and as the beginning of serious international cooperation and debate
on the environment. It represented a formal acknowledgment (by industrial countries in
particular) of the importance of multilateral efforts to deal with trans-boundary
environmental problems.
According to Connelly and Smith (1999:201), the Stockholm Conference provided the
first major international opportunity for the South to highlight the links between the
prevailing international economic system, environmental degradation and poverty.
Stockholm witnessed major disagreements between the North and South on the causes
of global environmental degradation and poverty. Conflicts over the relative impact of
population levels and consumption that emerged at this conference have raged on ever
70
since. Only a broad set of sometimes contradictory principles were forthcoming.
However, the Stockholm Conference allowed the issues to be aired for the first time in an
international context and it opened possibilities for further developments, in particular
the emergence of UNEP and the legitimising of environmental and development NGOs.
The Stockholm Conference (5±16 June 1972) was attended by about 1 200 delegates
from 114 countries. There were three substantive outcomes of the conference process: a
declaration, an action plan and an organisational framework for tackling environmental
concerns within the United Nations system. The first outcome, the Stockholm
Declaration, a non-binding declaration of 26 principles, balanced the shared interests of
states in maintaining the principle of state sovereignty and the competing interests of
developed and developing countries. The Declaration balances the importance of a
global commitment to protect resources and limit pollution against the importance of
economic development. It emphasises, in principles 9 to 12, the importance of aid,
technology and other assistance in overcoming the underdevelopment which is identified
as the cause of most environmental problems in developing countries. The most quoted
principle is principle 21 which asserts a state's sovereign rights over its resources as well
as responsibility for environmental damage beyond its borders, but which gives no
guidance on how these two potentially competing purposes might be reconciled. The
second major outcome of the Stockholm Conference was Action Plan 109, which
contained recommendations relating to human settlements, resource management,
pollution, development and the social dimensions of the impact of environmental
degradation on the human environment (Elliot 1998:12).
The third major outcome of the Stockholm Conference was institutional. The conference
paved the way for the UN's General Assembly to establish the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP). While the creation of UNEP ensured that the UN
system would become the major site for international environmental diplomacy and the
future development of international environmental law, political factors constrained
UNEP's potential contribution to global environmental protection. Developed countries
were generally cautious about any institution which would require substantial funding.
Developing countries were reluctant to accept an institution whose decisions might place
restrictions on their development and existing UN agencies were intent on jealously
guarding their existing environment-related prerogatives. Thus UNEP was established
as a programme with a role as coordinator and catalyst, rather than as a specialised
agency with an operational mandate. It has a large governing council (58 members) and
is headquartered in Nairobi rather than one of the usual UN locations of New York,
Geneva or Vienna. Its operating budget was (and remains) small, to be supplemented by
voluntary contributions to an environmental fund (Elliot 1998:13).
A major achievement of the Stockholm Conference was that it brought together
governments to debate international environmental issues and that it provided a basis for
the slow development of international environmental law in the years to follow. So its
success was primarily political, rather than environmental (Elliot 1998:13).
3.6.4 The decade after the Stockholm Conference
In the two decades after the Stockholm Conference scientific knowledge and public
concern about environmental degradation and the impact of environmental degradation
grew along with a sense of planetary crisis and demands for international cooperation to
71 HSY3703/1
halt and then reverse the environmental impact of human activity. The result was an
increase not only in the number and scope of environmental concerns on the
international agenda but also the number of multilateral treaties adopted to respond to
those concerns (Elliot 1998:15):
In the 1970s, following Stockholm, there was a series of agreements on oceans
pollution (the 1972 London Dumping Convention and the 1973 International
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MARPOL
, the agreement), on
endangered species (the 1973 Convention on international Trade in Endangered

Species)
and on acid rain (the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution .
) In 1989, 116 countries adopted the Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. [This was] the
first major agreement on the degradation of the global atmosphere. The Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was adopted in 1985. Two years
later, before that Convention had come into force, governments established
reduction targets in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
In 1983, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) established a special independent
commission, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), also
known as the Brundtland Commission (after its chairperson Gro Harlem Brundtland,
the Prime Minister of Norway and former Norwegian Environment Minister), to
formulate a long-term agenda for action. More than half of the members came from
developing countries, ranging from China, India and Brazil to the Ivory Coast, Guyana
and Zimbabwe. One of the hallmarks of the Commission's work was the series of public
hearings held throughout the world between March 1985 and February 1987, enabling
commissioners to hear from a wide variety of interested people and organisations. The
Commission's report, Our common future (World Commission on Environment and
Development 1987), put the concept of ``sustainable development'' firmly into the
global environmental lexicon.
The significance of the Brundtland Report cannot be understated: it put the concept of
sustainable development on the map. The report contains the well-known and oft-
quoted definition of susbainable development: ``development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs''
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987:43).
Brundtland's interpretation of sustainable development emphasises the links between
environmental degradation and patterns of economic development and argues that
environment and development policies must be integrated in all countries. However, the
report's prescription for sustainable development emphasises the centrality of continued
economic growth for environmental protection; as such the language of ecological
modernisation became common currency at the international level.
The Brundtland Report emphasised the importance of mutually reinforcing economic
growth, social development and environmental protection, making a forceful case for a
higher level of multilateral cooperation and the need to reform economic practices such
as trade, finance and aid. These recommendations found widespread support among
many states and international economic organisations, since the case for continued
economic growth was understood as reaffirming their legitimacy. Although the
Brundtland Report raised the profile of the environment in international politics, at the
same time it ensured that future deliberations would be structured by the discourse of
72
ecological modernisation; interpretations of sustainable development that centred on a
more locally sensitive and pluralistic understanding of sustainability could find no voice
on the international stage. However, although the Brundtland Report can be seen as
marginalising more radical accounts of sustainable development, it must be recognised
that if the policies it suggested were to be implemented, the world would definitely be a
more just and sustainable place Ð in itself it would have a quite radical and far-reaching
impact (Connelly & Smith 1999:202±203).
The year following publication of the WCED report was the year in which
environmental concerns became a top item on the international agenda. In January
1988, scientists, policy-makers and representatives of intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations met in Toronto for the conference Changing Atmosphere:

Implications of Global Security
, adopting voluntary targets for greenhouse gas emissions. In
the same year, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP established
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), involving over 1000 scientific,
legal and policy experts from over 60 countries.
Late in 1989, UNGA adopted a number of resolutions on the global impact of
environmental degradation. Resolution 44/207, ``Protection of the Global Climate for
Present and Future Generations of Mankind'', acknowledged an urgent need to deal
with climate change. Resolution 44/224 declared that deterioration of the environment
was one of the main global problems facing the world today, while Resolution 44/228
paved the way for what was intended to be the environmental highlight of the 1990s. In
1992, two decades after Stockholm, representatives of governments, international
organisations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) met in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. This conference
is also called the Rio Summit, the Earth Summit, or just UNCED (Elliot 1998:17). The
conference was hailed as firm evidence that environmental concerns had moved to
occupy a central place on the agenda of world politics.
3.6.5 The Earth Summit and Agenda 21
General Assembly Resolution 44/228 of 22 December 1989, which was adopted when
the nations of the world called for UNCED to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992,
expressed concern regarding the continuing deterioration of the state of the environment
and the serious degradation of global life-support systems. The resolution stated that the
global character of environmental problems and identified unsustainable patterns of
production and consumption, particularly in industrialised countries, are the cause of
much of that deterioration. It stressed the importance of international cooperation,
scientific research and access to technology and new and additional financial resources for
developing countries. The resolution identified a number of major environmental
concerns: protection of the atmosphere, freshwater and ocean resources, land resources,
biological diversity and biotechnology, waste management (including toxic wastes) and
issues related to urban settlements, poverty and human health conditions.
The 1992 conference in Rio de Janeiro reaffirmed the Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972. It
sought to build on it in order to establish a new and equitable global partnership by
creating new levels of cooperation among states, key sectors of societies and people Ð
all working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and
73 HSY3703/1
protect the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system. Africa
played a major role both during the process leading up to the Rio Summit and at the
conference itself. The region, through the OAU, presented the African Common Position
on Environment and Development, which highlighted the region's environmental and
development priorities.
Five important agreements were signed at the 1992 Rio Summit: the Rio Declaration,
Agenda 21, Declaration on Forest Principles, Convention on Climate Change, and the
Convention on Biological Diversity. Strictly speaking, the conventions on climate change
and biological diversity were not part of the Rio process Ð they were negotiated
through separate processes but were signed at the Summit.
The Rio Declaration's stated goal is the establishment of a new and equitable global
partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among national states, key
sectors of societies and people. Principle 1 establishes ``human beings'' at the centre of
concerns for sustainable development, rather than elaborating a prior and fundamental
concern for protection of the planetary ecosystem. The second principle reasserts
principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, elaborating states' sovereign rights over
resources as well as recalling their trans-boundary responsibilities. The political-
economic concerns of developing countries informed several of the principles. The right
to development (controversial in human rights debates) is asserted in principle 3.
Principle 5 emphasises the importance of eradicating poverty, principle 6 requires that
the special needs of developing countries should be given priority and principle 7
reinforces the common but differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing
countries. Principle 8 calls for a reduction in, and eventual elimination of, unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption as well as the promotion of appropriate
demographic policies, a rather oblique and finessed response to debates over population
growth.
The Declaration is more inclusive than its predecessor at Stockholm. Individuals are to
have access to information; public awareness and participation is to be encouraged
(principle 2). Women, youth and indigenous communities are recognised as important
participants in the pursuit of sustainable development. Principle 23, the subject of some
controversy, calls for the environment of people under oppression, domination and
occupation to be protected, an injunction that Israel resisted as an intrusion into Middle
Eastern politics. It was accepted in the Rio Declaration on the understanding that the
wording would not be used in Agenda 21. Principle 12 calls for the further promotion of
a supportive and open international economic system. The Declaration reasserts the
precautionary principle (principle 15), arguing that lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures and ``the polluter pays''
measures (principle 16) which encourages the full internalisation of environmental costs.
The Declaration also draws attention, in principle 24, to warfare as inherently
destructive of sustainable development and notes that ``peace, development and
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible'' (principle 25). In a final
flourish, states are to solve their environmental disputes peacefully (principle 26) and
states and peoples are to cooperate in good faith and a spirit of partnership to fulfil the
Declaration's principles (principle 27) (Elliot 1998:15±17).
According to Connelly and Smith (1999:204±205), Agenda 21 is probably the most
significant outcome of the Earth Summit. It is an effort to show the way forward for the
environment into the 21st century and is perhaps the most thorough and ambitious
74
attempt at the international level to specify what actions are necessary if development is
to be reconciled with global environmental concerns. With its adoption by all the
nations represented at UNCED, it is intended to guide all nations towards sustainable
development into the 21st century.
Like the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 (UNCED 1992) is a non-binding agreement. It
sets out a detailed plan of action for implementing the principles of the Declaration and
for achieving sustainable development. It has 40 chapters grouped together in a
preamble (chapter 1) and four sections Ð and is about 800 pages long. Each chapter
adopts the same approach of identifying and elaborating on the issue, and then
describing the proposed programme and giving an estimate of the cost involved to
implement the proposed programme. The point of departure is that human beings are at
the centre of concerns for sustainable development. Another significant focus is the
global dimension of environmental problems and issues.
Agenda 21 consists of four sections (Connelly & Smith 1999:205):
(1) Social and economic dimensions: highlights the interconnectedness of environmental
problems with poverty, health, trade, debt, consumption and population.
(2) Conservation and management of resources for development: emphasises the need to manage
physical resources such as land, seas, energy and wastes to further sustainable
development.
(3) Strengthening the role of major social groups: stresses the need for partnership with
women, indigenous populations, local authorities, NGOs, workers and trade unions,
business and industry, scientists and farmers.
(4) Means of implementation: discusses the role of governments and nongovernmental
agencies in funding and technological transfer.
Section one of the Agenda, on social and economic dimensions, includes chapters on
combating poverty, changing consumption patterns, managing demographic dynamics,
human health and human settlements. The second section is the environmental issues
section. Under the broad heading ``Conservation and management of resources for
development'', this section contains chapters on atmosphere, land resources, deforesta-
tion, desertification and drought, sustainable agriculture and rural development,
biodiversity, biotechnology, oceans, freshwater resources and various aspects of waste
management. Section three (chapters 23±32) focuses on strengthening the role of what
are called the major groups Ð women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, NGOs,
local authorities, trade unions, business and industry, science and technology, and
farmers. The final section on means of implementation covers financial resources and
mechanisms, technology transfer, institutional arrangements and legal instruments as
well as chapters on science, education and capacity building (Elliot 1998:16).
The document was the result of long and protracted negotiations between virtually all
political, social and economic interest groups in the run-up to UNCED and at the
conference itself. The text is often contradictory because of the need to find compromises
acceptable to the different interests. About 15 percent of Agenda 21 went to the
Conference bracketed (ie without a consensus). Each of those chapters on which
agreement had not yet been reached Ð (atmospheric protection, deep sea fisheries,
biotechnology safety concerns, technology transfer, institutional arrangements, poverty
and consumption, and financial resources) Ð was dealt with by one of eight contact
75 HSY3703/1
groups. The Main Committee ran out of its allotted time and disputes on the content of
three chapters Ð forests, finance and atmosphere Ð were resolved after discussion at
ministerial level. The final text only appeared in September 1992, four months after the
conference.
In some ways the debate at the Rio conference appeared not to have moved on since
Stockholm two decades earlier. The industrialised nations of the North were looking to
focus on environmental degradation as a short-term, technically solvable issue; in
response, the South argued that such an approach only tackled the symptoms of the
crisis and avoided the background issues which they believed desperately needed
tackling, namely the international economy, debt, SAPs, the role of TNCs, and financial
and technological transfers.
After the 1992 Earth Summit hopes and expectations were high that the world would
take major steps towards sustainable development. Yet in the decade that followed
progress did not match these expectations as the world forged ahead to feed, clothe and
house its people while poverty deepened in many areas and environmental degradation
continued unabated. Some environmental issues, such as greenhouse gases, received
global attention over the decade, but other types of environmental degradation such as
deforestation continued without any global recognition. Meanwhile, the gap between
rich and poor became wider than ever, hunger and poverty persisted worldwide and
environmental degradation, ozone depletion and global warming continued to worsen.
In the years after the Earth Summit there was a crisis in capacity, a failure of governance,
and an apparent lack of political will to focus on the underlying structure of global
political processes involving the environment.
At both the Stockholm and Rio conferences the contrasting agendas of developed and
developing countries were major barriers to international agreements and actions to
protect the global environment, although international friction was less in 1992 than in
1972. In 1992 at the Earth Summit an international agreement was signed that
committed most countries to undertake serious efforts to reduce global emissions of
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. That agreement did not require any country
to reduce CO2 emissions. In 1995 negotiators met in Berlin and in the Berlin Mandate a
small step towards controlling CO2 was taken. This called upon industrialised nations to
control emissions voluntarily. Negotiation on reducing CO2 emissions culminated in a
conference in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997. The US and EU representatives insisted
on divergent reduction rates of emissions with the latter insisting on a 15 percent
reduction below 1990 levels by 2010. In the end an incomplete agreement was reached
in which the United States agreed to reduce emissions by 7 percent below 1990 levels by
2010. Some issues, notably enforcement and the terms under which emissions reductions
could be traded internationally, were not resolved. The treaty, however, could not take
effect unless it was ratified by the governments of the signatory countries. The new US
President, George W Bush, decided in April 2001 to pull out of the Kyoto Treaty, saying
stricter limits on gas emissions could further weaken the US economy. You can follow
further developments on the reduction of CO2 emissions in the international news
media.
In 2002, a decade after the Earth Summit in Rio, world leaders and environmentalists
gathered again, this time in Johannesburg, South Africa, to review the outcome of the
ambitious goals adopted in 1992.
76
3.6.6 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg,
2002
The World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, from 26 August
to 4 September 2002, sought to overcome the obstacles to sustainable development and
generate initiatives that would deliver results and improve people's lives, while
protecting the environment. The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio provided the fundamental
principles and the programme of action for achieving sustainable development. At the
Conference in Johannesburg delegates reaffirmed their commitment to the Rio principles
and the full implementation of Agenda 21.
They also committed themselves to achieving the internationally agreed development
goals, including those contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration and in
the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and international agreements
since 1992. All 191 UN member states pledged to meet the following Millennium
Development Goals by the year 2015. The set of eight goals included the eradication of
extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender
equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health;
combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability;
and developing a global partnership for development.
Governments adopted a political declaration in which world leaders pledged to commit
themselves to act together, united by a common determination to save our planet,
promote human development and achieve universal prosperity and peace. They also
pledged commitment to the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and to expedite the
achievement of the time-bound, socioeconomic and environmental targets contained
therein.
The Johannesburg Plan built on the achievements made since the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development and expedited the realisation of the
remaining goals. It was stressed that countries must promote the integration of the three
components of sustainable development Ð economic development, social development
and environmental protection Ð as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars.
Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and consumption
and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social
development are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable
development. The implementation should involve all relevant actors through partner-
ships, especially between governments of the North and South, on the one hand, and
between governments and major groups, on the other, to achieve the widely shared goals
of sustainable development (Johannesburg Summit 2002).
The Plan of Implementation adopted in Johannesburg included a section on sustainable
development in a globalised world. According to the plan, globalisation offers
opportunities and challenges for sustainable development. It recognises that globalisa-
tion and interdependence are offering new opportunities to trade, investment and capital
flows and advances in technology, including information technology, for the growth of
the world economy, development and the improvement of living standards around the
world. At the same time, there remain serious challenges, including serious financial
crises, insecurity, poverty, exclusion and inequality within and among societies. The
developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in
responding to those challenges and opportunities. Globalisation should be fully inclusive
77 HSY3703/1
and equitable, and there is a strong need for policies and measures at the national and
international levels, formulated and implemented with the full and effective
participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition, to help
them to respond effectively to those challenges and opportunities (Johannesburg
Summit 2002: paragraphs 47 to 52).
Activity 3.11
After working through the section on globalisation and the environment above you should
have a better understanding of how environmental issues became part of the global
agenda. Make sure you are familiar with the proceedings and results of the Stockholm, Rio
de Janeiro and Johannesburg Conferences of the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). To test your knowledge and understanding of the role of globalisation in
environmental degradation and protection you ought to be able to write an essay on the
following topic:
. Analyse the influence of globalisation of world environmental issues from a geographical
perspective.
You should have done the following in your essay:
. Begin by giving the various explanations for globalisation.
. Explain what the perspective of geography is. Geographers study the relationships
between people and their environment, both the human and the natural
environment. Environmental degradation and its influence on people is a very
important field of study within geography.
. Provide a brief background to the present state of the environment. What are the
major environmental issues influencing people's lives?
. Explain why the first conference on the environment was held in Stockholm in 1972
and what the outcome of the conference was.
. Discuss the trends in global environmental issues which emerged in the years after
the Stockholm Conference. After the Stockholm Conference environmental issues
received attention at global level. Environmental issues were put into an
international context, which opened possibilities for further developments. The
conference did not however reverse or even halt the causes of environmental
degradation in the world.
. Explain the significance of the Brundtland Report and the report Our common future .
The most significant contribution of the Brundtland Report was its definition of
sustainable development and the emphasis on the mutual reinforcing of economic
growth, social development and environmental protection. The World Commission
on Environment and Development (1987:43) defined sustainable development as
``development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs''.
. Discuss the most important decision taken at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, and compare it with the Stockholm Declaration. Perhaps the most defining
78
decision of the Earth Summit was the granting of equal footing, in the Rio
Declaration, to the environment and to development. This was a significant
departure from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, which gave prominence to the
environment, despite its groundbreaking decisions on political, social and economic
issues. The decisions at Stockholm balanced the shared interests of states in
maintaining the principle of state sovereignty and the competing interests of developed
and developing countries. It balanced the importance of a global commitment to
protect resources and limit pollution against the importance of economic
development. While the Stockholm Conference defined an environmental right,
the Earth Summit not only reaffirmed this right, but also balanced it with the right
to development, which it said must be fulfilled to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations. The Rio Declaration was
more inclusive than its predecessor at Stockholm. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration
states that `ìn order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered
in isolation from it''. Globalisation played an important role in the drawing up of this
declaration, as can be seen from principle 7, which reads: ``States shall cooperate in a
spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity
of the Earth's ecosystem.'' You can read the whole Rio Declaration on the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) website (http://www.unep.org/Docu-
ments/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163) and more on Africa's role
at this conference also on the UNEP website (http://www.unep.org/dewa/Africa/
publications/AEO-1/024.htm).
. Explain what Agenda 21 is and what it means for the protection of the global
environment. Agenda 21 is an effort to show the way forward for the environment
into the 21st century and it is perhaps the most thorough and ambitious attempt at
the international level to specify what actions are necessary if development is to be
reconciled with global environmental concerns. With its adoption by all the nations
represented at Rio it is intended to guide all nations towards sustainable
development into the 21st century. If you are interested you can read the whole
Agenda 21 on the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) website
(http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=52)
. Discuss the most important decision taken at the 2002 World Summit in
Johannesburg and compare it with the outcomes of the Rio Earth Summit. You will
find more information on the Johannesburg Summit and the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation on the United Nations website: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/
documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm
. Identify any other international gatherings and treaties about global environmental
issues besides those organised by UNEP. Discuss these international gatherings and
treaties briefly.
. Conclude your essay by drawing together all the environmental problems caused by
globalisation and explaining how globalisation as such is contributing to finding
solutions to these global environmental problems. You can also briefly give your
opinion on the significance of the globalisation process for environmental issues in the
world.
79 HSY3703/1
These are some of the points you should cover in your essay. Although most of what is
required for this essay is included in the study material you should also read more widely
than the study guide and do some research on the Internet.
3.7 Conclusion
A general trend all over the world in the wake of globalisation and the increased
integration of the world economy has been a sharper differentiation between places. So,
even though the world has become ``smaller'' in terms of flows of goods, services and
investments, differences in local characteristics and cultural practices have taken on
greater significance.
We have seen that the modern global economy is dynamic and changes over time. The
increasing interdependence in this global economy means that the social, economic,
political and environmental welfare of nations, cities and regions all over the world will
depend increasingly on complex interactions determined on a global scale. Although
local, regional and national conditions are very important, what happens in a country or
a place is determined largely by the role of the place or country in the global system of
production, trade and consumption. The paradox that confronts us at the beginning of
the new millennium is that, while living in an increasing integrated world, the
distinction remains between rich and poor, developed and developing, and core and
periphery in the global economy, and differences are in fact becoming more pronounced
as globalisation accelerates. In future the world will be divided into those who have
access to information and knowledge and those who do not.
As we consider the many consequences of global integration and greater cultural and
economic interaction between the rich and the poor countries, the greatest challenges
will be those arising from differences in value systems, both economic and cultural, of
the people involved. The enormous economic gaps between rich and poor, both between
and increasingly within countries, only intensify the challenges posed by increased global
interaction. As we grapple with the many social, economic and political tensions created
by global change and integration, will we have the opportunity to protect what remains
of the natural environment? Or will we focus on economic development to such an
extent that the idea of sustainability will remain an idea and never become a reality?
In searching for answers to these questions we must consider a wide range of topics
simultaneously: socioeconomic development, climate, resources, culture, religion,
politics, economics and many more. Such a wide-ranging or multidisciplinary viewpoint
is open to a student of any subject, but geography with its focus on the interrelationships
between people and their environments, demands such a multifaceted analysis of its
students.
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tis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed 1 April 2005).
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Study unit 4
The globalisation of world politics
Contents
4.1 Welcome
4.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of world politics
4.4 Tutorial 2: The evolution of international society
4.5 Tutorial 3: The globalisation of international society
4.6 Tutorial 4: The end of the Cold War
4.7 Tutorial 5: A selection of post-Cold War developments in world politics
4.8 Globalisation and the post-Cold War world order
4.9 Conclusion
Bibliography and recommended reading
Useful websites
4.1 Welcome
In this study unit we look at some of the implications of globalisation for the states
system and for the nature of world politics. Globalisation can be defined as `` processes
whereby social relations acquire relatively distance-less and border-less qualities, so that human
lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place '' (Scholte 1997:14).
Globalisation is a process and not a single event in world history. It is linked to a number
of far-reaching historical changes in the world order. Although some indications of
globalisation were evident in the 19th century, the process became more apparent during
the 1960s. At the beginning of this millennium, the process of globalisation offers a
direct challenge to some of the remnants (such as the state) of the ``Westphalian'' states
system. The erosion of state sovereignty is one of the most significant changes in the
system in which international actors operate. It is a consequence of globalisation and
contributed to four emergent patterns of global governance which will be discussed in
this study unit. Despite all the advantages of globalisation, it has some worrying
implications for democracy.
The idea of international society and some of its historical manifestations will also be
discussed. `Ìnternational society'' refers to an association of member states which
interact across international borders as well as sharing common purposes, organisations
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and standards of conduct. One of the key features of the globalised international society
which will be discussed in this study unit is the development of military power and
technology by European states to project their influence on a global scale. Another
feature is that European international law, diplomacy and balance of power came to be
applied on a worldwide scale. Lastly, revolt against the imperialism of European states
led to decolonisation and the expansion of international society (Jackson 1997:43±44).
Here we focus on the most important aspects of the emergence of the international
political system. We want you to become aware of the implications of globalisation for
the states system and for the nature of world politics more generally. The end of the Cold
War offered grounds for an optimistic or for a pessimistic reading of the globalisation of
world politics. An optimistic reading emphasises the creation of a new world order at the
end of the Cold War which has ushered in a period of relatively peaceful international
relations. Some refer to the end of the Cold War as a `ùnipolar moment in world
politics''.
A pessimistic reading of the end of the Cold War, however, focuses on the ethnic violence
which emerged as a consequence of the disintegration of the successor states of former
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 15 new
independent states were created (Roskin & Berry 1997:102).
Discussions on globalisation often involve issues of far-reaching historical change. A
number of concepts are associated with the globalisation of world politics:
. Information society. Some scholars have argued that contemporary global society
has been experiencing a shift in the focus of production since the early 1970s.
Previously, production revolved around agriculture and manufacturing. In a
globalised world, production is based more on information and knowledge.
. Late capitalism. Marxists and some scholars from other ideological or political
backgrounds maintain that contemporary history brought about changes in the
institutions and processes of capitalism. They emphasise a shift in the focus on
accumulation away from older industries to economies of data, signs and images.
. Postmodernity. From a postmodern perspective, the current human condition
involves the loss of the modern, rationalist, positivist conviction which is based on
science. So there are no fixed and universal truths and meanings anymore.
. The end of history. Francis Fukuyama, a former US Department of State official,
coined this phrase. He argued that the demise of communist regimes from the end of
the1980s signalled a worldwide victory for liberal democracy over all other forms of
government.
. Non-discrimination. This refers to a doctrine of equal treatment among states in
the international system.
. Self-determination. This is the right of a political community or a state to become
and act as a sovereign state.
. Right of self-defence. This refers to a state's right in terms of international law to
wage war in its own defence.
. International society. This is an association of member states which interacts across
international borders and shares common purposes, organisations and standards of
conduct. Various historical examples of international society exist Ð most notably
84
the contemporary international society characterised by globalisation. A core value of
international society is that of political independence (Jackson & Owens 2005:48).
. Global covenant. This refers to the rules, values and norms which govern the global
society of states (Jackson 1997:34).
. World politics. World politics, as we approach it in this module, is more inclusive
than international politics or international relations. World politics refers to the
interplay between politics, political patterns in the world and not only those between
nation-states. World politics includes the study of the relations between organisations
(be it state, or non-state organisations) (Smith & Baylis 2005:3).
After working carefully through the tutorials in this study unit, you should be able to:
. define the concept of globalisation as it relates to world politics
. identify and discuss historical aspects of the globalisation of world politics
. discuss in broad outline how globalisation has been shifting world politics away from
the ``Westphalian'' system and its central premise of sovereign statehood
. review the four emergent patterns of global governance
. review the arguments that current trends in global governance under conditions of
globalisation have negative implications for democracy
. define and discuss the origins and development of international society
. discuss the globalisation of international society
4.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of world politics
4.3.1 Introduction
The main theme of this section is the implications of globalisation for the states system
and for the nature of world politics.
The globalisation of world politics has its roots in:
. the emergence of powerful multinational corporations (MNCs or TNCs) in North
America, Europe and Japan
. more efficient communication
. the opening of vast new markets in Eurasia and China in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
. the rapid commercialisation of information technologies originally developed for the
defence industries
. the growth in consumer electronics
. the rapidity with which global financial institutions adopted these new technologies
and systems (Cleary 1999:24±25)
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As Cleary (1999:25), among others, indicates, some of the definitive characteristics of
globalisation are:
. the universal availability of information via the Internet
. the internationalisation of products, shifting the balance of power between
corporations and governments in favour of companies
. the scale and rapidity of global financial capital flows
. the homogenisation of global values brought on by capital broadcasters (such as
CNN and the BBC), global branding (such as Coca Cola, Nike, McDonalds and
Toyota) and global advertising
The concept of ``globalisation'' became part of our lexicon towards the end of the 20th
century. Because of all the debate and argument about the concept, we introduce you to
various definitions here:
. ``Processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless
qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single
place'' (Scholte 1997:14). This contributes to the fact that boundaries between
territorial states in the international political system are becoming less central to our
lives, although they remain significant.
. ``The intensification of worldwide social reactions which link distant localities in such
a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice
versa'' (Giddens in McGrew 2005a:24).
. ``The integration of the world economy'' (Gilpin in McGrew 2005a:24).
At this stage it is important to mention the distinction between globalisation and
internationalisation . The latter refers to a process of `ìntensifying connections between
national domains'' (Scholte 1997:15). The result of internationalisation is, therefore, that
states may come to have deep effects on each other, yet remain distinct and separate
places. The process of globalisation, however, results in a world where borders between
states become less significant and more permeable.
4.3.2 Patterns of contemporar y globalisation
Let us first examine some of the main manifestations, as indicated by McGrew
(2005a:27), of the globalisation of world politics:
. Communications. The development of communications is one of the best examples
of globalisation. Computer networks (such as the Internet) and electronic mass media
(eg CNN) permit any individual anywhere to have immediate contact with any other
individual regardless of their location and the state borders between them.
. Economic. The proliferation and growth of multinational companies, which
function as regulatory agencies that operate as trans-border networks, have furthered
the process and extent of globalisation.
. Social. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International
Committee of the Red Crescent, Shell, Coca Cola and Me

Âdecins sans Frontiers
(Doctors without Borders) (1999 Nobel Peace Prize winners) regard the whole world
as their field of activity and regard humanity at large as their potential or target
group.
86
. Ecological. Another manifestation of globalisation occurs on an ecological level.
Global warming, ozone depletion, El Nio, and the decline in biodiversity are just
some of the manifestations of the global impact of environmental developments and
their effect on the world as a whole. Refer to study unit 3 in this regard.
. Global manufacturing and production. In terms of production, the proliferation
of global factories is another manifestation of globalisation. The various stages of the
manufacturing process (such as research and development, materials processing,
components preparation, parts assembly, finishing and quality control) are not
necessarily confined within one state, but extend across several states in a single
production line. Linked to this is the globalisation of money and finance with the
emergence of around-the-clock stock exchanges, globally recognised credit cards and
the increase in the use of currencies like the yen and euro around the globe.
. Military. Intercontinental ballistic missiles and spy satellites are only two indications
of the globalisation of the military industrial complex within and between states.
. Standards, norms and values. Our daily lives are influenced by certain norms that
govern our lives. We refer to universal human rights. In addition we are governed by
specific international global technical standards in industry.
. Culture. Lastly, but most importantly, globalisation has been evident in our everyday
thinking. As Scholte (1997:16) writes: ``Today we live not only in a country; in very
direct and immediate senses we also live in the world as a single place.'' We consume
the same soft drinks, wear the same designer clothes, or listen to the same hit singles
with millions of people spread across the globe.
4.3.3 Globalisation and the states system
Before we move on, let us define the state as a concept in international law. In order to
exist a state requires (Viotti & Kauppi 1997:46):
. a territory with defined boundaries
. a population with or without a national common identity
. a government or administration
. recognition as a sovereign state by other sovereign states
Before the onset of globalisation, world politics was mainly based on the ``Westphalian''
system. Before we discuss its origins, let us look at what a system constitutes. Adar
(1999:72) highlights the following characteristics of a system:
. A system is a set of component parts which together can perform some useful
activity.
. A system is also a functional interrelationship of the parts. Various components are
necessary for the system to operate.
. There exists an ongoing interrelationship between this set of component parts and
the environment (ie what is outside the system).
The origin of the Westphalian system dates back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648
(Said, Lerche & Lerche 1995:102±110). This peace accord contains an early official
statement of the core principles that guided the international system for the next 350
years. The Peace of Westphalia created an international system based on a states system
as a framework for governance. This framework for governance was characterised by two
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principles: statehood and sovereignty. Statehood refers to the world as being divided into
states (as territorial entities) and ruled by separate sovereign governments. This also
means that these states were a centrally, formally organised public authority enjoying a
legal monopoly over the major means of violence in the area under its jurisdiction.
Another characteristic of the Westphalian system is that of sovereignty. This means that
the state exercised comprehensive, supreme, unqualified and exclusive control over its
territory.
The phenomenon of the Westphalian system is now past history. The onset of
globalisation brought significant changes to states. Although the state survives in the
globalised era, state sovereignty is no longer operative. State sovereignty in the
Westphalian system was based on a world of clearly defined borders and jurisdiction.
One of the main characteristics of globalisation is the non-territorial nature of some
social relations and the diminishing of certain borders due to technological advances.
Another threat to sovereignty relates to material developments such as the increase in
the global activities of multinational corporations, the international focus on global
environmental issues and the rapid increase in global trading. In a way, the sun never
sets on the shop floor!
In addition to these changes, globalisation has also had a bearing on our cultural and
psychological affiliations to a particular sovereign state. Trans-border loyalties around a
particular issue seem to be more important than loyalty towards a particular state. One
manifestation is the low voter turnout in most industrialised states.
Although globalisation brought about an `ènd'' to sovereignty in terms of the
Westphalian system, it could not cause the demise of the state. Despite threats to the
survival of the state as a political entity, it persists. Although the state was not dissolved
by globalisation, there have been important changes. Two things are pertinent here:
. The constituency of the state is changing. The state no longer only advocates
domestic interests, but also those of a global nature.
. The process of globalisation is reducing the likelihood of major interstate wars
occurring.
Why does one international system change into another? Roskin and Berry (1997:12)
offer the following reasons:
. victory or defeat in war
. economic development or collapse
. arms race or arms control
. alliance formation or dissolution
. strong or weak leaders
Keep these factors in mind as we journey through world politics in this study unit!
The distribution of power in the world system changes over time, giving rise to specific
patterns of behaviour Ð as seen during the Cold War, for example. Systemic polarities
describe the distribution of power in the states system. Kaplan (Hughes 1997:68)
identifies six theoretically possible systemic polarities:
. The multipolar system exists when a number of great powers come together in an
alliance.
88
. The loose bipolar system exists when the two superpowers do not align the
remaining powers into strong alliances.
. The tight bipolar system exists when the two dominant powers organise the
remaining powers in alliances.
. The universal system exists when a single political entity organises and dominates the
political units.
. Should no effective political unit exist between the universal government and
individuals the system becomes hierarchical.
. The unit veto system requires that all states have the ability to defend themselves
individually from all others.
Globalisation brought significant changes to the states system. However, the major
functions of states remain unchanged (Holsti 1995:65):
. Only the state commands the allegiance of the people within its territory.
. Despite the role played by private military companies in some parts of Africa, the
state still possesses the major capability to employ the ultimate threat (ie war).
. Governments, unlike nongovernmental organisations and multinational corpora-
tions, are concerned with the full range of welfare and security issues of a particular
population over whom only a particular state enjoys sovereignty.
4.3.4 Emergent patterns of global governance
Other actors beside the state have also acquired important roles in world governance.
We identify four emergent patterns of global governance in contemporary international
politics:
. The growth of trans-border links between sub-state authorities such as provinces,
federal states or the German and Austrian LaÈnder . These trans-border relations
between sub-state authorities often include trade and international agreements,
thereby bypassing national governments. In this regard Van Wyk (1998), for
example, refers to examples of these links between South African provinces and sub-
state authorities in, for example, Germany, Austria and Belgium. Gugler (2004) also
refers to the global role of cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Johannesburg and
Shanghai.
. The expansion of global law. While trans-border links between sub-state authorities
increase, supra-state or global authorities such as the United Nations and the
European Union have seen their functions and jurisdiction enlarged. What used to be
called international organisations can rightly be called global governance agencies
covering a wide spectrum of globally shared governance issues. For example:
Ð macroeconomic policy as in the case of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Ð conflict management, as in the case of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Ð human rights, as in the case of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR)
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. Increased private sector involvement in global regulation. This is another emerging
pattern in global governance. Private sector institutions have contributed to the
development of codes of conduct with regard to global stock markets. Debt security
agencies such as Standard & Poor and Moody's Investors Service, for example,
perform a regulatory role in the global credit markets. Another example is the work
done by the World Economic Forum (WEF).
. The spread of global social movements. Apart from global market institutions,
global social movements (such as Greenpeace) play an important role in global
governance. These movements put social concerns and issues on the global agenda.
Global social movements are global in the sense that they pursue causes with a
worldwide impact.
The discussion above shows some of the ways in which globalisation has affected the
Westphalian states system. Although globalisation offers a number of possibilities for
enhancing democracy, in practice this has not been the case. In most cases the state has
limited control over the impact of globalisation on its citizens. Do global governance
agencies, however, such as those discussed above, provide the necessary guarantees of
democracy? Very little direct popular involvement exists in these institutions, and the
undemocratic character of these agencies has increasingly been criticised. See the
following summary of the key controversies of the politics of globalisation.
The politics of globalisation: selected key controversies
A The extent to which globalization might be seen to diminish the autonomy of the state and
``perforate'' the sovereignty of the nation state.
B The extent to which globalization might be seen to establish powerful tendencies towards
global political convergence and homogenization.
C The extent to which it is right to identify a globalization of political problems ö the prolifera-
tion of issues that require a response in the form of collected global action.
D The extent to which we can point to a parallel globalization of political solutions and the
corresponding emergence of more or less dedicated institutions, mechanisms and pro-
cesses of global governance.
E The extent to which we can identify the global diffusion of ``best practice'' policy solutions
(or potential solutions) and/or policy models in the form of the transfer of ideas about
``good'' practice between nations.
F The extent to which globalization might be seen to promote the development of a global
polity or cosmopolis capable of transcending the state.
Source : Hay (2005:238)
Activity for tutorial 1
You are encouraged to refer to your study guide, as well as to the sources cited in the
bibliography. Read as widely as possible.
(1) Define the following selected concepts introduced in this study unit and indicate how
each relates to the globalisation of world politics:
. globalisation
. state
. nation
. nation-state
90
. government
. war
. sovereignty
. global social movement
. multinational corporation (MNC)
. information society
. postmodernity
(2) Outline some of the causes of globalisation.
(3) Identify some of the main manifestations of globalisation.
(4) Describe and critically assess in broad outline how globalisation has been shifting world
politics away from the Westphalian system and its central premise of sovereign
statehood.
(5) Review the four emergent patterns of global governance introduced in this study unit.
You should not continue with the next tutorial on the evolution of international society
before you have answered these questions successfully.
4.4 Tutorial 2: The evolution of international society
4.4.1 Introduction
This section focuses on the idea of international society and some of its main historical
manifestations. Table 4.1 contains a selection of key concepts related to international
society.
TABLE 4.1
Selected key concepts
Coexistence : The doctrine of ``live and let live'' among states and political commu-
nities.
Territory : A portion of the earth's surface appropriated by a political community or
state.
State sovereignty : A state's characteristically being politically independent of all other
states.
Suzerain state: A state which dominates and subordinates neighbouring states without
taking them over.
Empire: A state which possesses both home territory and foreign territory. Also
called an imperial state.
Theocracy : A state based on religion.
Hegemony : Power and control exercised by a leading state over other states.
Reason of state: The practical application of the doctrine of realism.
Balance of power : A doctrine and an arrangement whereby the power of one state (or
group of states) is checked by the countervailing power of other states.
National security : A fundamental value in the foreign policy of states.
Society of states: An association of sovereign states based on their common interests, va-
lues and norms.
International law: The formal rules of conduct that states acknowledge or contract be-
tween themselves.
International order : A shared value and condition of stability and predictability in the rela-
tions of states.
Source: Jackson (1997:36)
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4.4.2 Origins of international society
The significance of the globalisation of world politics can only be fully grasped once we
have a clear understanding of the evolution of international society. Although the exact
historical origins of international relations are unknown we can take the time when
people settled down into separate political communities as a point of departure. Table
4.2 below contains an approximate chronology of international society. Once faced with
the need to coexist with another neighbouring group, the need for clearly demarcated
boundaries became imperative. For Jackson (1997:34) this horizontal coexistence is one
of the core issues in international politics.
TABLE 4.2
Approximate chronology of international society
500^100 BC Ancient Greek or Hellenic culture
1300^1500 Renaissance Italy or Renaissance Italian culture
1500^1650 Early modern Europe
1650^1950 European cum Western world
1950^ Global society
Source: Jackson (1997:36)
At this stage we can define the concept of `ìnternational society''. We apply Jackson's
(1997:34) definition:
International society stands for relations between politically organized human
groupings which occupy distinctive territories and enjoy and exercise a measure
of independence from each other. International society can thus be conceived as a
society of political communities which are not under any higher political
authority.
These political communities are referred to as states and are characterised by a
permanent population, occupying a defined territory, under a central government and
independent of all other governments of a similar kind.
Hedley Bull (Jackson 1997:35) defines international society as follows:
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states,
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in
their relations with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions.
With these two definitions of international society in mind we can describe it as a
pluralistic political agreement which focuses on creating the political conditions for the
separate geographical existence of states which are free from interference. These
arrangements embody and express important core values which involve the principles of
independence, self-determination, nonintervention and the right of self-defence.
92
Some of the most significant arrangements between sovereign states in international
society to maintain these core values are made around matters of state sovereignty,
diplomacy, international law, recognition, reciprocity and the laws of war.
4.4.3 Historical examples of international society
Some of the best-known historical examples of the phenomenon of international society
include the independent city-states of ancient Greece, the states system of Renaissance
Italy, the anti-hegemonial Peace of Westphalia, the Concert of Europe, the globalisation
of the European states system and the era of the two superpowers during the Cold War
(Jackson 1997:36). See also Buzan and Little (2000).
This section briefly discusses two historical examples of international society: ancient
Greece and Renaissance Italy.
4.4.3.1 Ancient Greece (500±100 BCE )
Ancient Greece, then known as Hellas, is the first historical manifestation of an
international society. Hellas was a specific geographical and cultural entity. The Hellenic
international society consisted of a large number of city-states situated on the lower
Balkan peninsula and the islands of the Aegean, Adriatic and Mediterranean seas. It is
important to emphasise that Greece was not a state and that this international society
consisted of a number of city-states sharing the same religion, language, traditions,
identity and ceremonies. Athens, Sparta and Corinth were three of the most important
cities in this first international society. Extensive and elaborate relations existed between
these city-states. Although the practice of diplomacy was developed much later, relations
between these city-states were maintained via the Oracle of Delphi (which was consulted
as a source of authority in disputes between city-states) and a proxeny (an institution
which served as a diplomatic institution). Another notable absence in this international
society was a body of international law. Each city-state was politically self-contained and
was not part of a larger political association under a common international law. Certain
principles were, however, recognised and governed international relations. Treaties, for
example, were under the special protection of the god Zeus.
The concept of sovereignty was not applied among the Hellenic city-states. Athens and
Sparta was regarded as the major powers of this period.
Macedonia, a continental state on the Balkan Peninsula, finally overwhelmed Hellas,
including Athens. A new period dawned in international society characterised by an age
of hierarchy and empire in international society.
Macedonia was eventually overwhelmed by the Romans. At its height the Roman
Empire conquered and occupied most of Europe and large parts of North Africa and the
Middle East. The Romans recognised the principle of jus gentium, a primitive law of
nations. However, jus gentium was not an expressed law for independent or sovereign
states. Rome was considered to be the only sovereign. Its relations with other political
entities were imperial rather than international.
During the 4th century CE the Roman Empire disintegrated under the impact of attacks
from the imperial peripheries. The Roman Empire was succeeded by a theocracy, the
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Latin Christendom. The Eastern Empire of Constantinople, another theocracy, continued
for another millennium. The Ottoman Turks destroyed it in the 15th century.
4.4.3.2 Renaissance Italy (1300±1500)
Another historical example of international society involves the small states of the Italian
Renaissance in northern Italy during the 14th±16th century period. The Renaissance
was a period of enlightenment in the arts and sciences launched by the recovery of
ancient Greek and Roman learning, mostly by Muslim scholars during the Middle Ages.
The Italians invented the concept of the modern independent state, or stato. The city-
states of Venice, Florence, Milan and the Papal state(s) were based on the example of the
Hellenic city-state. In some cases, such as the Venetian Republic, its authority extended
beyond state boundaries to include wider areas. The Venetian republic introduced the
practice and institutions of diplomacy in international society to other Italian city-states
and Europe. These international societies were eventually overwhelmed by neighbouring
hegemonic powers.
4.4.3.3 European international society (1500±1650 )
The classical European international society began in the early 16th century. It was based
on the modern territorial state which originated during the Italian Renaissance and the
Protestant Reformation. This gave further impetus to the rise of the state as we know it
today. During this period the sovereign state began to shape its relations with other
states, giving rise to the first indications of international relations. War became an
internationally accepted institution to resolve conflict between sovereign states. The bid
for European supremacy among sovereign states eventually culminated in the Thirty
Years' War (1618±1648). The Habsburg empire ended in 1918 which at one stage
consisted of areas in Austria, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Bohemia and Hungary. Two
treaties concluded the Thirty Years' War: the Treaty of Mu

Ènster and the Treaty of
Osnabru
Èck. These treaties became known as the Peace of Westphalia. The Peace of
Westphalia was the first expression of a European international society of states. This
international society displaced and succeeded the medieval Republica Christiana.
Jackson (1997:41) summarises the main characteristics of the European international
society as follows:
. It consisted of member states whose political independence and juridical equality
were recognised by international law.
. Every member state was regarded as legitimate by other member states.
. The relations between these sovereign states were managed by a professional corps of
diplomats and conducted according to an organised multilateral system of diplomatic
communication.
. The major religion of the European international society was Christian.
. A balance of power was conceived between member states. This was intended to
prevent any state from overpowering another.
94
You are encouraged to refer to your study guide, as well as to the sources cited in the
bibliography. Read as widely as possible.
(1) What has been the significance of the Treaty of Westphalia to Europe from the 17th
century to the contemporary international system?
(2) What are presently the main indicators of a significant departure from the Westphalian
states system?
4.5 Tutorial 3: The globalisation of international society
4.5.1 First stage of the globalisation of international society
European political control beyond Europe began in the late 15th century and ended in
the 20th century. Not only was this an expansion of European imperialism, but also of
the European international society. How do we explain some of the key transformations
in world politics in the 20th century? One way is to discuss the key features of the world
in 1900. One of the outstanding features of the world in 1900 was its domination by
European states. In addition to this 25 percent of the world's population lived in Europe.
The great European powers such as Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Russia and Austro-
Hungary were characterised by both their military strength and their economic power.
Across the globe more than 500 million people were subjects of European colonial rule
and by 1900 the search for colonies dominated international affairs.
The turn of the 20th century also saw several territorial empires in a protracted state of
collapse. These empires included the Habsburg Empire (including Austro-Hungary,
much of central Europe and the Balkans), the Ottoman Empire (mostly concentrated on
Turkey as well as including some parts of the Middle East and the Balkans), Tsarist
Russia and imperial China.
Another key feature of international history by 1900 was its global capitalist economy.
By 1900 the United Kingdom was by far the largest and most powerful imperial and
trading power, yet increasingly under threat. This period also saw the rapid expansion of
North America as well as the modernisation and industrialisation of Japan (Carruthers
1997:50).
Within just 45 years Europe lost its dominant position in the world. Two major factors
contributed to Europe's decline in international politics. One major factor was the
ambitions of unified Germany from the 1890s. Although the architect of a unified
Germany, Bismarck, warned against German expansionism, his successors sought to
achieve world power status. At this time France and Britain were already dominating
large parts of Africa and Asia. North Africa and the Middle East became prime German
targets.
Apart from Germany's ambitions, another internal root of European instability in the
period leading up to World War I was the impending collapse of the Ottoman Empire
which left a power vacuum from the Balkans to the Middle East. Added to this was the
growth in nationalism among the peoples of the Ottoman Empire. The assassination by
Serb nationalists in June 1914 of Franz Ferdinand (crown prince of Austro-Hungary)
exploded the powder keg in the region. Tsarist Russia refused to watch passively while
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Austro-Hungary threatened Russia's fellow Slavs in Serbia. What might have been a
local incident catapulted Europe into war (Carruthers 1997:53).
World War I started in 1914 and ended in 1918. It left a different Europe (and world).
Millions of ordinary people's lives were affected, national economies devastated and
empires came to an end. Not only were the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires
disintegrating, but in Russia the Tsarist regime was overthrown by the Bolshevik
revolution. After the war the major powers met in Paris to discuss the creation of new
states in terms of the principle of self-determination, the future of Germany and the
issue of ``war guilt'' and reparations. The victors decided that Germany was responsible
for the war and should pay for damages suffered.
The United States had entered World War I at a late stage. Not so much devastated by
the war as Europe, the United States soon became the guiding force at Versailles under
the leadership of US President Woodrow Wilson. He proposed a set of principles to
prevent another world war. His ``Fourteen Points'' called for a new approach to world
politics by putting a stop to secret agreements in international politics. He also called for
an international organisation based on collective security to prevent war. This was the
beginning of the League of Nations. Established in 1919, the League of Nations was one
of the distinctive features of the post-World War I period. It was the first formalised
attempt to create an international institution (as a first indication of global governance)
to mediate in international disputes, with a permanent structure and a codified charter.
Wilson also proposed the principle of national self-determination. He advocated a state
for each nation to defuse ethnic and nationalist tension. However, the ideal of national
sovereignty for every ethnic group proved to be unrealistic in the face of European
realities. Some of these nationalities were spread across large territories and state
boundaries.
The result of this idealism was the creation of weak and ethnically divided states in
southern and eastern Europe such as Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The principle of self-determination was applied in spite of
these problems, due to the threat of the possible resurgence of Germany and the threat
of Bolshevism, which were to be prevented at all costs.
The luxury of retrospection allows us today to see that the territorial settlement at
Versailles did not establish peaceful international relations in Europe. The Versailles
settlement branded Germany as the sole culprit of the war. It lost 13 percent of its
territory and seven million of its people were included in other states. The pressure on
Germany contributed to Europe's economic decline. Moreover, the Treaty of Versailles
paved the way for the rise of Hitler's National Socialists in the 1930s and, thus, another
world war.
Since the Industrial Revolution, a global capitalist economy had been developing. By
1900, as indicated earlier, Britain occupied the most powerful position in world trade
and the global economy. World War I brought severe effects to the economies of both
the victorious and the defeated. After the war, the United States emerged as the
dominant economic power in the world. By 1929, the United States produced 42
percent of the global industrial output and Germany, France and Britain a mere 28
percent. The Wall Street stock market crash of 1929 indicated that the world financial
system was in a serious crisis. The Great Depression of 1929 to 1933 resulted in the
96
decline of international trade which caused a global economic crisis. This provided fertile
breeding ground for political unrest in especially the weak states in Europe.
Authoritarian (fascist and communist) political mass movements spread across Europe.
Elsewhere the calls for independence gained momentum in the colonies of Britain and
France.
Developments in the interwar years in Asia, particularly in China and Japan, were
contributing factors to the outbreak of a second global war in 1939. During the reign of
Emperor Meiji (1868±1912) Japan experienced a period of rapid industrialisation and
modernisation of social, political and military structures. Like Germany during the same
period, Japan developed imperial ambitions. However, Japan did not possess the
territorial and mineral abundance needed for industrialisation. Just as Hitler searched for
Lebensraum for the German people in Europe, Japan turned to mainland China. By
1900 imperial China was threatened. By 1911, it slid into a protracted civil war between
the Nationalist Guomindang movement and the communists as the main rivals. The
internal chaos in China favoured Japan's ambitions much as the disintegration of the
European empires favoured Germany. Japan's position in China was further
strengthened by its alignment with the Allied powers during World War I. The
Versailles settlement left Japan discontented. Japan's efforts to have the principle of
racial equality written into the terms of the treaty failed. Japan maintained that it did
not receive sufficient territory in recognition for its part in the war effort. Moreover, the
Washington treaties limited Japan's naval capabilities. As the army gained prominence
in Japanese political life, its imperial ambitions grew. After Japanese right-wing elements
in the army staged the ``Manchurian Incident'' in 1931, Japan occupied a greater area of
Manchuria. By 1932, Japan supported a puppet state in Manchuria, called Manchukuo.
The League's response to this blatant act of aggression was minimal, opening the door to
more Japanese aggression in China. By 1937, Japan was involved in a full-scale war with
China.
In 1939 the United States cancelled its 1911 trade agreement with Japan. Relations
between these states deteriorated dramatically and culminated in the Japanese attack on
the American Pearl Harbour naval base in the Pacific, in December 1941. On 8
December 1941, Britain and the United States declared war on Japan. By 11 December
Germany and Italy reciprocated. World War II had indeed taken on a global character
(Carruthers 1997:61±63).
With events unfolding in Southeast Asia in the 1930s, Europe was experiencing one
international crisis after the other. Firstly, Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Germany
re-militarised the Rhineland, and the Spanish Civil War broke out. Then Germany
expanded into Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, which resulted in Britain's and
France's declaration of war against Germany in September 1939.
Europe's destruction in World War II (1939±1945) brought the United States to the
continent. It also saw the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union. European powers lost their dominance in world politics. The United States
and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers, thereby rearranging the international
system and world politics.
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4.5.2 Beyond 1945: Second stage of the globalisation of
international society
The second stage in the evolution of the globalised international society began after
World War II. The European continent became divided between East and West, with
German re-unification only taking place in 1990. In 1947 India gained independence in
a movement that would spread across Asia and Africa.
After World War II the prominence of the United States and the Soviet Union was
evident in the international system. Technological advances of the two world wars
contributed to US status as the world's first nuclear superpower after the explosion of
the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Japan) in August 1945. Whereas the
Soviet Union emerged from the World War II as a state in economic ruin, yet occupying
all Eastern and much of Central Europe, the United States emerged as the centre of the
international economy.
4.5.2.1 The end of imperialism and the onset of the Cold War
The civil war in China ended with victory for Mao and the communists. With the
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, one third of the world's
population lived under communist rule, in Eastern Europe and Asia (Carruthers
1997:51). The second stage of the globalisation of international society involved reactive
nationalism and anti-colonialism against European states, beginning with the
independence of India and Pakistan in 1947.
The decolonisation process in British territories was on the whole peaceful. In stark
contrast stood the French experience. French governments after World War II attempted
to maintain France's international status despite its defeat in the war. Prolonged guerrilla
wars broke out in French colonies such as Indo-China (contemporary Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam) and Algeria as France attempted to preserve its international role. France's
military defeat against the Vietnamese revolutionary forces (the Viet Minh under the
leadership of Ho Chi Min) brought an end to French ambitions in the Far East. The civil
war in Algeria (1954±1962) brought France herself almost to the edge of civil war.
Portugal was the last European empire in Africa. After the coup d'e
Âtat in Lisbon in 1974,
Portuguese colonies became independent.
The end of imperialism reflected diverse features in the attitudes of the colonial powers
and the nature of the local nationalist or revolutionary movements. The question
remains about the legacy of the end of imperialism. Ideologically, it seems one either of
nationalism or of communism. In Asia, a strong link existed between nationalism and
revolutionary Marxism. In Africa, the evidence suggests a legacy of nationalism.
The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II created one of the
most important dynamics of world politics. We discuss the key characteristics of Cold
War relations in the following phases:
. conflict, confrontation and compromise: 1953±1969
. the rise and fall of de

Âtente: 1969±1979
. ``The Second Cold War'': 1979±1986
98
In March 1946, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed the onset of
the Cold War in his now famous speech: ``From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the
Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent'' (Nossal 1998:390).
The failure to implement the agreements reached at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences
could be regarded as the onset of the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine indicated a shift
in East-West relations. US President Harry Truman's speech in March 1947 that it must
be the policy of the United States ``to support free people who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'' was intended to persuade the
US Congress to support limited aid to Turkey and Greece. The Truman Doctrine came
to be the key to the US policy of containment, a strategy for resisting perceived Soviet
expansion. Containment was inherently defensive and was underpinned by the US
Marshall Plan for European economic recovery.
During this period the Soviet Union consolidated its grip on its neigbouring states. The
Berlin blockade of 1948 was the first major confrontation between the emerging
superpowers. It occurred after Stalin attempted to resolve Berlin's divided status by
claiming it for the Soviet Union. The United States responded by increasing its military
presence in its occupied area of Berlin. By April 1949, the security alliance NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was signed. NATO was founded on the principle
that an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all members. It also
indicated US commitment to the defence of Western Europe.
The Cold War was also fuelled by events in Africa and Asia. Perceptions in both Moscow
and Washington were shaped by the victory of the communists under Mao Zedong in
China and by the attack by communist North Korea on South Korea in 1950 (Scott
[1997:76±77] and Goldstein [1996:39±43]).
The Korean War lasted until 1953. One of its consequences was the build-up of
American forces in Europe to prevent the spread of communist aggression to Western
Europe. The United States became convinced that Moscow controlled all communist
activities across the globe. Germany's rearmament in 1954 led to the establishment of
the USSR-aligned Warsaw Pact, which accelerated the arms race in Europe. By the
1960s Western Europe already had 7 000 nuclear weapons in its arsenal.
Joseph Stalin died in 1953. His successor, Nikita Khrushchev, attempted to modernise
the Soviet Union. This paved the way for reformist movements in much of Eastern
Europe. The Soviet Union, however, crushed these movements in Poland and in
Hungary.
Khrushchev's policy towards the West was paradoxical. On the one hand he tried to seek
coexistence while on the other hand he pursued confrontation. USSR support for
national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America evoked fear in Western
circles. Added to this was another crisis over Berlin in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis
of 1962. In both of these crises the risk of direct military confrontation and, moreover,
escalation into nuclear war were very high.
The period after the Cuban missile crisis was a relatively quiet period of coexistence and
competition. However, US involvement in Vietnam grew during this time. Moreover,
Sino-Russian relations deteriorated. By 1969, China and the Soviet Union became
involved in a border war over a territorial dispute.
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Despite these upheavals, some groundwork was laid in the improvement of relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union. De

Âtente was a relaxation of the tension
between the Soviet Union and the United States. This period from the late 1960s to the
early 1970s was characterised by negotiations and nuclear arms control agreements.
Relations between China and the United States were improved by rapprochement, the
re-establishment of more friendly relations in the 1970s. A third attempt at easing East-
West relations was West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik (Eastern policy),
which was designed to develop relations between West Germany and members of the
Warsaw Pact (Scott [1997:77±78] and Goldstein [1996:41±43]).
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 saw the fall of de

Âtente and
NATO's deployment of land-based Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. When
Ronald Reagan took over the American presidency in 1980 there was a real fear of
nuclear war in Western Europe and the Soviet Union (Scott 1997:78±79). American
intervention in Grenada in 1983 and its attacks on Libya in 1986 were regarded as a
new belligerence in the Cold War. Soviet support for liberation movements across the
globe continued during this period. Throughout the 1980s Soviet leadership was
stymied by a succession of old leaders (Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko). Mikhail
Gorbachev became president in 1985. His policies of perestroika (restructuring) and
glasnost (openness) unleashed nationalist forces in the Soviet Union and ironically
destroyed the Soviet Union. In his foreign policy, Gorbachev transformed USSR relations
with the United States. His agreements on nuclear weapons served as confidence-
building measures for the West in terms of his sincerity about transforming Soviet
society (Scott 1997:79±80).
4.5.3 Problems of global international society
The core values of the contemporary global society of states focus on maintaining
international peace, security and state sovereignty, on the right to self-determination, on
the principles of non-intervention and non-discrimination, and on the inviolability of all
states. Since 1945, few international borders have changed Ð which, generally
speaking, has discouraged states from involving themselves in acts of aggression over
territorial disputes.
Despite these global values and the centrality of the state in international society, a
number of problems are associated with the international society. Firstly, it is
characterised by the lack of a common underlying culture. Secondly, the future support
of the global covenant depends on the support of all members of the global society.
However, these norms and values should be representative of all the members' concerns
and interests. Thirdly, regional diversities within contemporary global society are more
pronounced than those within European international society or any other society of
states. Fourthly, the doctrine of non-intervention has created an inversion of the
traditional security dilemma in many states. The threat against a state now seems rather
to be from within its own borders than between states. In addition to these, although the
global international society is based on the equality of states, huge substantive
inequalities remain. Furthermore, indications are that the global society is evolving into
a world society. Some indicators of a world society include the development of
cosmopolitan norms such as protection of human rights and the environment, regardless
of allegiances based on citizenship, the rebirth of minorities and the political activities of
aboriginal groups, the rise of gender politics and the rapidly expanding role of
100
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Lastly, the tendency of the international society
to evolve into a world society questions the primacy of state sovereignty (Jackson
1997:44±46).
For these questions, we encourage you to refer to the sources cited in the bibliography as
well as our discussion in the study guide. Read as widely as possible.
(1) In what ways did Europe dominate international politics until 1945? Can you offer an
explanation for the relative inaction of both the United States and the Soviet Union
between World War I and World War II?
(2) Discuss the changes in world politics in terms of the concept of state sovereignty.
(3) Critically discuss the globalisation of international society and the problems associated
with it.
4.6 Tutorial 4: The end of the cold war
4.6.1 Introduction
This section focuses on the end of the Cold War both as a turning point in the structures
of international politics and as an indicator of the globalisation of world politics.
One of the major causes of the end of the Cold War was the collapse of communism in
the Soviet Union and other parts of Eastern Europe. This has deep roots in the internal
dynamics of the Soviet Bloc. However, external factors also played a significant
contributory role. Crockatt (1997:89) concludes that the Soviet Bloc ultimately
collapsed because it failed to keep up with the globalisation of capitalism.
The events at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s terminated the broadly bipolar
structure evident in international politics since the end of World War II (Roskin & Berry
1997:9). The end of the Cold War forced states to reshape and reposition themselves.
Another important indicator of change lay in the new and modified roles for
international organisations. The end of the Cold War saw the disintegration of the
Warsaw Pact, debate on the relevance of NATO and the new European Union, for
example.
4.6.2 The Cold War: a definition
The Cold War (1945 to 1990) can be defined on two levels:
. The Cold War's open ideological confrontation between East and West since 1945
can be described as a certain kind of behaviour. Examples include the Truman
Doctrine (1947), Khrushchev's relaxation of Soviet relations with the United States
(mid-1950s) and the periods of de

Âtente (1953±1960, 1969±1975 and 1985±1989).
. The Cold War may be defined in terms of structure, rather than behaviour. The end
of the Cold War then refers to the end of a structural condition which was defined by
political and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. This
structural condition also referred to the ideological division between East and West in
101 HSY3703/1
terms of communism and capitalism, the division of Europe and the extension of the
Cold War between the superpowers to the outer regions of the international system
(Crockatt 1997:90±91).
In this section we explore the end of the Cold War with reference to internal
developments in the Soviet Bloc, external forces in the form of Western policies towards
the Soviet Bloc and the changing relative position of the Soviet Bloc with respect to the
West.
4.6.3 Internal developments in the Soviet Bloc: the collapse of
communism in the Soviet Union
A number of internal long-term and short-term factors in the Soviet Union caused the
collapse of communism. Some of the long-term causes include structural weaknesses of
the economy, an inflexible central planning system, the inability to modernise,
inefficiency and absence of incentives in agricultural production.
Some of the short-term causes of the collapse of Soviet communism include economic
stagnation in the 1970s and 1980s, poor harvests in the later 1970s and early 1980s and
Gorbachev's political and economic reforms (Crockatt 1997:93).
By 1980 the Soviet system showed all the signs of a system in distress. However the
most important cause lay not so much in dictatorial policies as in what the French
philosopher de Tocqueville identified as the danger of internal reforms. The previous
section referred to Gorbachev's policies of reform such as glasnost and perestroika.
Chernenko died in March 1985 and Gorbachev became secretary of the Soviet
communist party. Gorbachev became president of the Soviet Union in April 1988. He
inherited a weak economy which never fully modernised and which was essentially a war
economy.
4.6.3.1 The effects of Gorbachev's reforms
Gorbachev's reforms were mainly based on glasnost, or openness towards Soviet society
and its realities. Secondly, his reforms were based on perestroika, or the political and
economic restructuring of the Soviet Union. Both these approaches eventually led to the
demise of the Communist Party in Soviet politics. With these reforms Gorbachev
acknowledged the existence of a newly emerging civil society (apart from the
Communist Party and the government). Another feature of Gorbachev's reforms was the
creation of an executive presidency in the Soviet Union in an attempt to control the
transformation process
The Soviet empire consisted of 15 multi-ethnic, multilingual `àutonomous'' republics
held together by the powerful central institution of the Communist Party. Demands for
autonomy came mainly from the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and
Georgia. Another demand for autonomy came from Azerbaijan, arising from the desire
of Armenians in Ngorny Karabakh for incorporation into the Soviet Republic of
Armenia.
Gorbachev showed no sympathy towards these nationalities and their ambitions. Yet he
was unwilling to use force against secessionist movements to suppress them. While these
102
nationalistic groups were gathering momentum, Gorbachev was weathering a storm
against liberals and conservatives in the Soviet Union. His announcement of a Union
Treaty to devolve power upon the nationalist groups resulted in a coup against him in
August 1991. Although the coup failed and Gorbachev returned to Moscow after being
held in the Crimea, nationalistic tendencies were stronger. By December 1991, the
Soviet Union was dismantling and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was
established (Crockatt 1997:94±95).
4.6.4 The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe
A significant development in the Soviet Bloc contributing to the collapse of communism
was the rise of Solidarity in Poland. Solidarity was a movement established in the
shipyards of Gdansk as a workers' union. It quickly assumed a political role independent
of the Polish communist party. With wide popular support, Moscow became concerned
about events in Poland. A Soviet military intervention was prevented by the
appointment of a new Polish president, General Jaruselski. On Moscow's advice,
Jaruselski declared martial law in Poland and banned Solidarity. Solidarity remained very
active as an underground movement. By 1989, General Jaruselski had been forced to lift
the ban against Solidarity and hold elections, which were won by Solidarity under the
leadership of Lech Walesa.
From May 1988, protests against Moscow were mounting on the peripheries of the
Soviet Bloc, starting in Czechoslovakia. January 1989 saw the Hungarian parliament
making concessions that allowed for independent political parties. In April 1989 the ban
on Solidarity was lifted in Poland. In June Solidarity won the elections in Poland and in
July they invited Jaruselski to form a coalition government. In October Hungary
adopted a new constitution providing for multiparty democracy. On 3 November
Czechoslovakia opened its borders to the West.
The Berlin Wall fell on 10 November 1989. By now, the collapse was all the more
graphic with the Bulgarian secretary-general of the Communist Party resigning. By the
end of November the Czechoslovakian leadership had resigned, followed by the East
German leadership on 6 December. On 22 December the Ceausescu regime in Romania
was overthrown and the Ceausescus executed on Christmas Day in 1989 (Crockatt
1997:96±97).
4.6.5 The impact of external factors on the collapse of the Soviet
Bloc: the role of the United States
Having discussed the impact of internal factors on the collapse of communism above,
our focus in this section is the significance of external forces to the collapse. We look at
US-Soviet diplomacy between 1985 and 1991. Table 4.3 offers a brief summary of US-
Soviet summitry in this period. Opinion remains divided about the role of the United
States in ending the Cold War. On the one hand it is argued that Ronald Reagan's
hardline approach to the Soviet Union caused the collapse of the Union. On the other
hand, some argue that Reagan's policies towards the East were immaterial, or that they
may sometimes even have prolonged the Cold War.
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TABLE 4.3
US-Soviet summitry (1985^1991)
November 1985 Geneva Summit (Gorbachev-Reagan)
October 1986 Reykjavik Summit (Gorbachev-Reagan)
December 1987 Washington Summit (Gorbachev-Reagan). The Intermediate Nuclear

Forces (INF) Treaty is signed at this summit.
May^June 1988 Moscow Summit (Gorbachev-Reagan)
December 1989 Malta Summit (Gorbachev-Bush)
May 1990 Washington Summit (Gorbachev-Bush)
July 1991 START Treaty signed in Moscow (Gorbachev-Bush)
Source: Crockatt (1997:99)
An important stimulus for change in East-West relations was the new thinking in Soviet
foreign policy as a direct result of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. One of the main
themes of this new thinking was that the security of the Soviet Bloc could not be
maintained by the amassing of more and deadlier arms and weapons. Security was a
political rather than a military issue that needed to be achieved by recognising common
security interests. This approach by the Soviet leader Gorbachev helped improve East-
West relations. A series of summits on arms reduction followed, contributing to an
easing of relations (Crockatt 1997:99±101).
4.6.6 The interaction between internal and external environments
at the end of the Cold War
The causes of the end of the Cold War are to be found not only in internal and external
factors but also in the interaction between these factors. This interaction is discussed in
the `àgency-structure'' debate.
An important aspect of this interaction is the growing isolation of the communist system
from the global capitalist system. The economic conditions in the Soviet Union have
been discussed earlier. The ideological cohesion that once existed in the Soviet Bloc
became more difficult to sustain as the global capitalist economy made more and more
demands on the economies of the Soviet Bloc.
In some ways the Cold War could be described as two distinct but overlapping systems:
. a Cold War system defined as US-USSR rivalry, the nuclear arms race and standoff
and the extension of these central conflicts to the outer limits of the international
system
. the global capitalist system defined by the expansion of production and trade and
growing economic interdependence
The Soviet Bloc's existence was mainly defined and limited by the Cold War, whereas the
United States was a full and main participant in the development of global capitalism.
The economic problems experienced by the United States in the 1970s were
considerable. However, these did not produce a crisis of legitimacy as was the case in the
104
Soviet Union. The United States was never politically and economically consumed by the
Cold War as was the Soviet Union. Thus, it was the Soviet Union's inability to meet the
challenges posed by the political and economic globalisation of world politics which
contributed to its demise.
For these questions, we encourage you to refer to the sources cited in the bibliography as
well as to your study guide. Read as widely as possible.
(1) Discuss the end of the Cold War as an indicator of the globalisation of world politics.
(2) Can we regard capitalism as the victor and communism as the victim in the globalisation
of world politics?
4.7 Tutorial 5: A selection of post-cold war developments in
world politics
The ideological and military rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States
ceased with the end of the Cold War. Globalisation (as our discussion in section 4.3.2
indicates) has become increasingly pervasive in world politics and the international
economy. Whereas the Cold War was mainly characterised by state rivalry, the post-Cold
War world saw the emergence of powerful non-state actors on the world stage,
contributing to the bifurcation between the state-centric Westphalian international
system on the one hand and non-state forms of authority and social solidarity on the
other. The latter includes international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) such as
Greenpeace and the International Committee of the Red Cross, private individuals such
as Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama, sub-state political authorities (eg cities such as
Hong Kong playing a significant role in the international economy), religious
movements (such as fundamentalist Islam-based organisations), regional organisations
(such as the European Union and NATO), international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, global civil society movements (such
as the Jubilee Movement), and multinational corporations or transnational corporations
(MNCs or TNCs) such as Shell, Microsoft and Toyota.
Another significant development is the shift away from states' concern with mainly
military security. Global interactions revealed globally shared concerns such as the status
of women, child soldiers, trafficking in women and children, environmental degradation
and global warming, and the low levels of socio-economic growth in the developing
world (the global South).
In short, the contemporary international system is more closely integrated than in any
previous era. We defined globalisation in previous sections (such as sections 4.1 and
4.3.1). We add the following definition as well (Dauvergne 2005:371):
[Globalisation] is an ongoing and accelerating process that is restructuring and increasing

the connections among economies, institutions, and civil societies. This dynamic and
multidimensional process is integrating trade, production, and finance as well as
strengthening global norms and global social forces
Thomas Friedman (Dauvergne 2005:371) asserts that globalisation `ènables us,
wherever we live, to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever
105 HSY3703/1
before and at the same time allows the world to reach into us farther, faster, deeper and
cheaper than ever before.'' It is important to note that this does not mean that
globalisation is benefiting all on the globe, because global inequalities continue to exist.
In some instances, populations and states can be regarded as ``victims'' of globalisation,
and globalisation can also be termed as increasingly disrupting the lives of these
vulnerable people (see Mittelman 2004:223).
The process of globalisation is open ended insofar as it discloses no historically
determinate or fixed outcome. Tutorial 5 in this study unit is a short introduction to the
period subsequent to the Cold War, and the manifestation and consequences of
globalisation during this period.
4.7.1 Post-Cold War world politics
Globalisation encompasses an unprecedented historical transformation in world politics
(Mittelman 2004:220). As we indicate in study units 1 and 3, however, this view is not
shared by all scholars. This section covers some emerging issues relating to globalisation
since the end of the Cold War.
Notwithstanding the forces of integration at play in world politics since the end of the
Cold War, various developments suggest there are also forces of fragmentation. Rosenau
(2003:15) refers to ``distant proximities'': globalising and localising forces simulta-
neously operating. Table 4.4 presents some of these instances of interactive
``fragmegrative dynamics''. Here ``fragmegrative'' refers to the simultaneous processes of
fragmentation and integration.
TABLE 4.4
Rosenau's instances of interactive fragmegrative dynamics
Globalising forces Localising forces

. The ``free market'' (international corporations, . The dislocation of people and nations attrib-
international hedge funds, currency ex- uted to the irresponsible use of US and Eur-
change) opean capital; the growing gap between rich
. Global political and economic institutions (the and poor countries
United Nations,World Bank, the International . Resource scarcities caused by global warn-
Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organi- ing, loss of arable land and the destruction of
zation) the natural environment
. English as the lingua franca . Mass migrations, prejudice and ethnocen-
. US military, economic and cultural strength trism
. Science and technological innovation in in- . Movements to preserve heritage cultures
formation and transportation whose basis is often language and customs
. Resentment of American hegemony; terror-
ism
. Traditionalism religious fundamentalism; na-
tionalism
Source: Rosenau (2003:15)
4.7.2 The status of the state in a globalised world
Following the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, states and their sovereignty
became a cornerstone of international relations and world politics. The strong emphasis
106
on sovereignty maintained a state's equal status with that of any other state, as well as
its ability to act autonomously within its recognised and defined borders.
Some scholars maintain that states are as viable and competent as ever; some contend
that the state is in decline (see Holsti 2004:28±72). Whereas the state historically had
the legitimate monopoly over the use of force, non-state actors such as trans-national
terrorist groups (Al Qaeda, for example) are increasingly challenging this position.
Furthermore, power and wealth are increasingly generated by multinational corpora-
tions, individuals, private global financial transactions and criminal cartels (Rosenau
2003:65).
Globalisation confronts states with an authority crisis. Due to increased interconnect-
edness, citizens are able to redirect their loyalties away from the state. Rosenau
(2003:282±287) and Hall and Biersteker (2002:9) identify seven types of non-state
authority which often have a globalised character:
. Moral authority. This type emanates from social movements and NGOs organising
around a specific moral issue (such as the international anti-apartheid movement and
those providing relief in disaster areas).
. Knowledge authority. Scientific organisations (such as the World Health Organiza-
tion) can serve as a centre of authority when it makes pronouncements on certain
scientific, medical, biological and ecological matters.
. Reputational authority. Organisations such as Amnesty International and Transpar-
ency International with a reputation for integrity and competence fall in this
category and are often identified with moral and knowledge authority.
. Issue specific authority. An issue of global appeal driven by a particular respected
organisation also yields authority. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is an
example.
. Affiliative authority. This is attributed to collectives serving emotional needs of ethnic
minorities and diasporas.
. Market authority. Pauly (2002:77) states: `Ìn a world in which financial regulatory
power is dispersing and no particular national authority is truly dominant, cross-
border financial markets ultimately rest today not on private authority but on
interdependent public authorities and, increasingly, on the delegated public authority
of international political institutions. When we speak of the authority of the market
in other than an ultimate sense, we appropriately mix private and public categories.
The fact that actual governments routinely obfuscate their final authority in financial
markets is no accident. Blurring the boundaries between public and private, indeed,
is part of the intentional efforts to render opaque political responsibility for the
wrenching adjustments entailed in late capitalist development.'' Pauly (2002:77)
attributes market authority to institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
Citizens are able to challenge governments to face issues of local and global significance.
Furthermore, governments' ability to frame and implement policies are considerably
weakened because of, among other things, the enlarged competence of NGOs, social
movements and TNCs (Rosenau 2003:53). This brings us to types of contemporary
states. For our purposes we identify two types of states. These are failed states and
deviant/rogue states. State failure is described as a state's loss of authority and legitimacy,
decaying law and order, civil and communal strife, widespread humanitarian suffering,
107 HSY3703/1
regional instability, government links to organised international crime, weapons
proliferation and state-supported domestic and transnational terrorism (Dorff 2005:22).
Deviant or rogue states are states which, for example, contravene international law and
pose a threat to international peace and security. Germany under Hitler's leadership,
Libya, Cuba and North Korea have been described as deviant or rogue states.
Two significant effects of the globalisation of world politics is that it incorporates states
and, despite certain challenges it poses to the state, that it does sustain some of its
functions. However, simultaneously, globalisation is altering the very essence of the state
as well as undermining some of its constitutional foundations (Cerny 2003:207). The
state no longer has the exclusive right to provide security, authority and to resort to
violence. For Cerny (2003:208), the key to the transforming role of the state lies in
severe economic competition in the world. The contemporary ``competition state'' seeks
to produce as much as possible and to secure markets for its goods and services. In
contrast, the state during the Cold War could be described as the ``strategic state'' where
military security was of strategic importance.
One important notion of the Westphalian state system is that a state exists within a
specific recognised territory (see Holsti 2004:73±111). The history of states, Rosenau
(2003:66±67) reminds us, is a history of territorial division and the competition over
geographically bound spaces. States as territorial political units are increasingly
transgressed by technological mechanisms (such as the Internet) and open borders due to
regional integration (such as the European Union).
Table 4.5 offers a summary of the contemporary position of the state.
TABLE 4.5
The position of the state in the Westphalian and post-Westphalian (globalised) order
Westphalian constitution of The post-Westphalian

world politics globalised world order
Territoriality . Humankind is principally or- . Borders and territory remain

ganised into exclusive terri- significant. However, a new
torial and political geography of political orga-
communities nisation is emerging. Politi-
cal power is transcending
territories and borders
Sovereignty . A state or a government has . State sovereignty is being
within its borders an entitle- transformed and is increas-
ment to supreme, unquali- ingly understood as the
fied and exclusive political shared exercise of public
and legal authority power and authority be-
tween national, regional and
global authorities
Autonomy . Countries appear as auton- . Increased interdependence
omous containers of politi- forces states to engage and
cal, social and economic cooperate extensively on a
activity in that fixed borders multilateral level in order to
separate the domestic achieve their domestic
sphere from the world out- agendas. State autonomy is
side severely compromised
Source: McGrew (2005a:29 & 35)
108
4.7.3 Empire, hegemon or stabiliser? The role of the United States
in a globalised world
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11) are regarded as among the
most significant events in post-Cold War world politics. The destruction of the World
Trade Towers in New York highlights a significant feature of world politics. Central to
contemporary world politics is the hegemonic power of the United States (McGrew
2005a:223). In this regard, Mittelman (2004:223) mentions the role of the United
States in, for example, militarised globalisation. This is especially evident since 9/11 and
the subsequent declaration of the War on Terrorism. The United States succeeded in
delegitimising terrorism through its global coalition of states. Terrorism and liberation
struggles are contested phenomena. The global norm is that all conflicts and disputes
should be resolved by peaceful means. However, the US War on Terror is historic in the
sense that it managed to establish a coalition of states to combat terrorism in ways never
done before.
4.7.4 The role of China
When scholars refer to the end of the Cold War taking place in 1989, they refer to the
collapse of communist authority in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Notwithstanding its collapse in some parts, it was in fact reaffirmed in China with the
Tiannanmen Square massacre of June 1989 as one of the most vivid examples. Beijing's
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the United States and its subsequent
integration into the world economy resulted in China's unprecedented rise in the post-
Cold War order. China's rise in the 1990s and in the early parts of the 21st century is
based on a unique hybrid economic system blending communism and capitalism. The
United States, it seems, is more interested in China as a lucrative market than in
reforming its system (Cox 2005:144±146).
4.7.5 Contemporar y diplomacy and world politics
Apart from series of bilateral USSR-US diplomatic summits during the Cold War, Cold
War diplomacy involved bilateral relations, multilateral relations and agreements
maintained between the United States and its Western allies, as well as among the Soviet
Union and its Eastern allies. Whereas Cold War diplomacy had a strong military focus,
post-Cold War diplomacy tends to be characterised by economic matters.
Diplomacy is a process of communication and negotiation between actors in world
politics, and as such it is an important instrument in the conduct of relations between
actors. It can be defined as the resolution of conflict by dialogue and negotiation.
Traditional diplomacy evolved over a long historical period and was characterised by
specific institutionalised structures, regularised processes and agendas to tackle specific
issues (White 2005:389±391).
Two ideas underpinned the development of ``new diplomacy'' after World War I:
diplomacy should be open, and an international organisation should be established to
deal with international issues. The perception was that traditional diplomacy failed to
prevent World War I. This resulted in the establishment of the League of Nations and
the United Nations, among other things. The structure of ``new diplomacy'' remained
almost similar to that of traditional diplomacy. However, states were no longer the only
actors involved due to the proliferation of international nongovernmental organisations.
109 HSY3703/1
A second change pertaining to the structure relates to the scope of states' activities.
Whereas security was a main concern for states during the Cold War, welfare and
development have been included in their diplomatic agenda since the end of the Cold
War. These changes opened the door for the diplomatic efforts of (international) NGOs.
A third change is the distinction between ``high'' and ``low'' politics. The former refers to
issues of military security under traditional diplomacy. ``Low'' politics refers to the
developmental and welfare agenda of states (White 2005:391±392).
The Cold War and the increasing globalisation of world politics had a significant impact
on the conduct of diplomacy (see Holsti 2004:178±210). ``Cold War diplomacy'' refers
to international efforts to avoid global nuclear conflict between 1945 and 1989. White
(2005:392) distinguishes three types of Cold War diplomacy:
. Nuclear diplomacy. This refers to the interactions between nuclear armed states
where threats were made to use nuclear weapons. Nuclear diplomacy was an effort to
dissuade an opponent from using these weapons.
. Crisis diplomacy. A crisis can be defined as a short intensive period of a perceived
(nuclear or military) threat. Crisis diplomacy refers to the often delicate and secret
communications and negotiations to avert or resolve a crisis.
. Summit diplomacy. Various summits during the Cold War were direct meetings
between leaders of the superpowers to resolve major crises. See Table 4.3.
Globalisation is changing the nature and practice of diplomacy. Multilateral
international fora have gained considerable clout since the 1990s. The integration of
more newly established states, an awareness of mutually shared issues and technological
developments are but a few explanations for this. One of the effects of the globalisation
of world politics is that state-based diplomacy is increasingly supplemented by
multilateral forms of diplomacy due to the activities of international organisations.
Globalisation enables these actors to communicate their interests more widely and to
deploy their resources to affect the outcome of negotiations (White 2005:395±396).
This tutorial consists of extracts from recommended study material.
(1) ``The three waves of globalization:
Globalization is not a new phenomenon. Viewed as a secular historical process by
which human civilizations have come to form a single world system it has occurred in
three distinct waves. In the first wave, the age of discovery (1450±1850), globalization
was decisively shaped by European expansion and conquest. The second wave
(1850±1945) evidenced a major expansion in the spread and entrenchment of
European empires. By comparison contemporary globalization (1960 on) marks a new
epoch in human affairs. Just as the industrial revolution and the expansion of the West
in the nineteenth century defined a new age in world history so today the microchip and
the satellite are icons of a globalized world order.''
Source: McGrew (2005a:28)
In what way do you agree with McGrew? In what way do you disagree with his
assertions?
(2) ``Transformationalists approach the problem from two perspectives. The first suggests
that the authority of the state is ``leaking'', ``moving up'', or `èvaporating'' towards
forces, agents, and entities beyond it, including international organizations, transna-
110
tional associations, the global market, or the global civil society. The second suggests
that individuals within states are increasingly questioning the authority of the state,
withholding loyalty to it, and developing new loyalties toward more accommodating or
psychologically satisfying identity groups such as ethnic associations, churches, and
regional groupings. The first approach brings to mind the metaphor of a leaking balloon.
Its air is dissipating towards the outside, with the encasing ultimately collapsing. The
second suggests a crumbling house of cards. The emotional props of the state Ð
legitimacy and loyalty Ð are eroding, leading eventually to the collapse of the house, or
at least to its marginalization compared with other new houses above or within states.
Just as the early Westphalian state was challenged by the church authority above it
and by peasant rebellions and the numerous armed dukes, nobles, and pirates within it,
so the modern state is eroding in two different directions.''
Source: Holsti (2004:59)
Do you agree with Holsti's assessment of the position of the state? Why?
4.8 Globalisation and the post-cold war world order
Clark (2005:729) reminds us that `ìt is difficult to make out the characteristics of the
contemporary order''. Here order is defined as any regular or discernible pattern of
relationships between states that are stable over time, or may additionally refer to a
condition that allows certain goals to be achieved (Clark 2005:730).
We can identify elements of continuity and discontinuity between the Cold War and the
post-Cold War orders. See table 4.6 below.
TABLE 4.6
Elements of discontinuity and continuity between Cold War and post-Cold War orders
Cold War Post-Cold War
Discontinuity
Soviet power in Eastern Europe Dissolution of the USSR

Bipolar competition Unipolar peacemaking
Rival ideologies Supremacy of liberal capitalism
Global security integration Greater regional autonomy
Military security as high politics National identity as high politics
Continuity
Some security structures (NATO)

Economic globalisation
Human rights
Reactions against secular states
Multiple identities
Environmental agendas
Poverty in the South
Source: Clark (2005:728)
111 HSY3703/1
World politics as indicated remains a very dynamic process. In this study unit you have
been introduced to the concept of globalisation as it relates to world politics. The 20th
century was one of great transformations. Some states lost their power, status, prestige
and parts of their territory. New superpowers emerged. After 1945 the international
system of states changed completely. A number of new states were created during
decolonialisation from the 1950s which also had an impact on the United Nations.
Furthermore, technological advances contributed to the rise of new powers such as Japan
and China. The arms race between the United States and Soviet Union also contributed
to major advances in the military and civilian application of technology. The rapidity,
frequency and intensity of globalisation and its effects had gained momentum since the
1960s. New alliances between states were formed and by the 1980s it was evident that
the rate and intensity of globalisation could not be absorbed by the Soviet Union. Its
collapse had a domino effect on world politics.
What will be the outcome and impact of the globalisation of post-Cold War world
politics? The short answer is: It is too soon to tell. However, we can offer some
preliminary insights from derived what is termed critical globalisation studies. One of its
advocates, James Mittelman (2004:227), maintains that some elements of the old order
will persist. He identifies some continuities and discontinuities in the contemporary
world order and offers some ideas about a possible new order. He calls the old order
multilateral globalisation and the contemporary structure militarised globalisation (these two
are both US-driven) and the potential constellation democratic globalisation (as a possible
emerging backlash against a mainly US-led process of globalisation seen as
Americanisation ).
Mittelman (2004:227) describes multilateral globalisation in terms of the worldwide
consensus which existed from the 1970s until 9/11, which was based on the recognition
of state political and territorial sovereignty, as well as the periodic use of force. This
follows our earlier discussion on diplomatic practice during and after the Cold War.
Militarised globalisation `ìs characterised by both interstate war ... and an erosion of the
Westphalian system, with the territorial state facing increasing pressure from above Ð
particularly the disciplinary power of markets and regionalizing processes Ð and from
below in the form of civil society'' (Mittelman 2004:227).
An attempt to build a counter-hegemony, democratised globalisation is a tolerant order seeking
novel ways to reconcile differences in a participatory manner, and seeking a dispersion of
power countervailing the prevailing world order under US hegemony (Mittelman
2004:228). The latter relates to the age-old issue in world politics, namely unchecked
and concentrated power, and begs for some form of balance of power (see Sharp
2004:302±305).
4.9 Conclusion
In this study unit we focused on the globalisation of world politics. We began with a
brief historical overview of examples of international society and its evolution. We also
discussed the end of the Cold War and the simultaneous process of globalisation.
We conclude with some of Clark's (2005:728±742) ideas about the globalisation of
world politics and the globalisation of the post-Cold War order:
112
(1) The global economy is mainly shaped by relations between three dominant
groupings, i.e. the US, Europe and East Asia and is managed by various mainly US
dominated institutions (particularly the so-called Bretton Woods institutions such as
the IMF and the World Bank).
(2) Globalisation is regarded as an effect of the end of the Cold War because this led to
its further geographical spread. However, globalisation should also be understood as
one of the factors that contributed to the end of the Cold War. It was the Soviet
Union's marginalisation from the process of globalisation that not only revealed, but
also intensified its weaknesses. In this sense, we can regard globalisation as an
element of both continuity and discontinuity in world politics.
(3) There is widespread resistance against the effects of globalisation. This resistance
takes various forms such as the emergence of new sources of authority other than
that of the state, as well as efforts by developing countries to improve their position
in the international economy.
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Study unit 5
Cultural perspectives on globalisation
Contents
5.1 Introduction
5.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of culture
5.4 Tutorial 2: The globalisation of a ``culture of consumerism''
5.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
5.1 Introduction
In study unit 1, we introduced you briefly to some of the central characteristics
associated with globalisation and to the debate about globalisation. We also provided
you with a set of key questions aimed at helping you to develop a basic understanding of
globalisation, along with a summary of one recent and quite sophisticated attempt to
explicate the nature of globalisation. In this study unit, we focus on the relationship
between globalisation and culture and we draw, in large part, on the content presented
in study unit 1. Please note that there is a growing amount of literature on the
relationship between globalisation and culture, and that globalisation and thus the
globalisation of culture remain concepts which are still widely debated. The discussion in
this study unit, therefore, while sensitive to the complexity of the topic, is nonetheless
merely one possible interpretation of the relationship between globalisation and culture.
The main objective of this study unit is to introduce you to the relationship between
globalisation and culture. We hope to help you to achieve the following outcomes:
. be able to form your own general overview of the ``globalisation of culture''
. be able to explain and critically discuss the idea that the ``globalisation of culture''
involves a ``global culture of consumerism''
118
5.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of culture
In study unit 1, we introduced you to Held et al's (1999) theory of globalisation. Their
view of globalisation involves a broad periodisation and conceptualisation of ``global
transformations'' in terms of a set of spatiotemporal and organisational criteria. Based on
their work, and the work of others, we asked the following key questions aimed at
helping you to explore and form your own reasoned position on important issues of the
debate about globalisation:
. Does ``globalisation'' really exist and is the concept of globalisation meaningful?
. Do we need a new theory in order to understand contemporary reality?
. What characteristics can we associate with globalisation?
. How can we periodise the history of globalisation?
. What are the causes of globalisation?
. What are the consequences of globalisation for the future of humankind?
In this tutorial, we use aspects of Held et al's (1999) theory to focus on the idea of the
``globalisation of culture''. In tutorial 2, we will introduce you to a particular theory of
this concept: the globalisation of a ``culture of consumerism''.
On the question whether a globalisation of culture exists, Held et al (1999:327) suggest
the following:
Few expressions of globalisation are so visible, widespread and pervasive as the
world-wide proliferation of internationally traded consumer brands, the global
ascendancy of popular cultural icons and artefacts, and the simultaneous
communication of events by satellite broadcasts to hundreds of millions of
people at a time on all continents. The most public symbols of globalisation
consist of Coca-Cola, Madonna and the news on CNN. Whatever the causal and
practical significance of these phenomena, there can be little doubt that one of
the most directly perceived and experienced forms of globalisation is the cultural
form. Despite the complexity of cultural interactions between societies over the
last three thousand years, the intensifying movement of images and symbols and
the extraordinary stretch of modes of thought and modes of communication are
unique and unparalleled features of the late twentieth century and the new
millennium. There is no historical equivalent of the global reach and volume of
cultural traffic through contemporary telecommunication, broadcasting and
transport infrastructures.
These scholars clearly believe that culture is being globalised and that the globalisation
of culture is one of the most salient features of contemporary globalisation. They argue
that the characteristics associated with the globalisation of culture are concerned mainly
with the globalisation of a ``popular culture'', as captured by the ubiquitous symbolic
significance of ``Coca-Cola, Madonna and the news on CNN'', simultaneously
communicated to ``hundreds of millions of people at a time on all continents''. Broadly
speaking, though, what do we mean by the concept of ``culture'' (ie when viewed as a
particular, contemporary variant which Held and his coauthors call ``popular culture'')?
According to Held et al (1999:328±329), the concept of culture refers to:
the social construction, articulation and reception of meaning ... a lived and
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creative experience for individuals as well as a body of artefacts, texts and
objects; it embraces the specialised and professional discourses of the arts, the
commodified output of the culture industries, the spontaneous and unorganised
cultural expressions of everyday life, and, of course, the complex interactions
between all of these.
So the concept of culture refers to a socially contextualised set of ideas, symbols, practices
and objects that reflect and embody the experiences and activities of more or less
organised individuals and groups. Since culture is `òut there'', as it were, and it endures
over time, it influences people's thoughts, actions and interactions in their communities.
The concept of culture is, however, a very broad and comprehensive concept, and also
includes aspects such as belief systems, traditions, religion, ethnicity and language. The
culture `òut there'' shapes people and feeds into their thoughts and actions by means of
their socialisation from birth onwards. One of the most important and frequently cited
functions of culture is, therefore, its functioning as a sort of ``social glue'' which binds
people together and guides their thoughts and deeds, by way of a common system of
beliefs, traditions, values, norms, language and prescribed practices. Please note that this
does not mean people are necessarily ``cultural dopes''; human beings have a capacity to
reflect and can, therefore, be quite aware of the cultural constraints they are subject to.
While culture certainly puts restrictions on human activities, it is necessary for social
survival and general community life. Although it forms the basis for thought and action,
we may, nonetheless, deviate from or even change existing cultural constraints in
thought or deed.
If culture is to be shared by a community and, indeed, if it is to take on anything like a
global dimension, it has to be communicated. We have already mentioned that the
communication and inculcation (internalisation) of culture primarily takes place by a
process of socialisation. The communication of culture, even that which takes place via
the socialisation process from the family through to education and work, entails various
prerequisites. According to Held et al (1999:328±329), the communication of culture:
refers to the ways in which these artefacts, beliefs and messages are moved
through time and space. This in turn can be broken down into a number of
discrete processes. For messages and meanings must be recorded, preserved and
reproduced. In turn, they must be physically transmitted or moved to another
place and another time. Communication therefore requires media of storage and
transmission, institutions that make that storage and transmission possible, and
media of reception.
The spatiotemporal characteristics of the dissemination of culture Ð its extensity,
intensity, velocity and impact Ð clearly depend on its organisational attributes: its
infrastructures, institutions, modes of interaction and stratification systems (see study
unit 1). Owing to the unprecedented globalisation of popular culture today, this
obviously involves relatively recent developments in ``contemporary telecommunication,
broadcasting and transport infrastructures''. If we return to the notion of the primary
socialisation that occurs in families (rather than the modern electronic transmission and
reception of popular culture), it is the family itself that provides the organisational
prerequisites for much of the early and more general inculcation of culture in human
beings.
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On the question of periodising the globalisation of culture, Held and his coauthors
(1999:330±336) seem to hold a somewhat ambivalent view. They assert, on the one
hand, that the contemporary globalisation of popular culture has no ``historical
equivalent''; on the other hand, however, they also conclude in their detailed
periodisation of the globalisation of culture that cultural globalisation had reached its
peak even before the modern, contemporary era. They characterise this period as being
dominated by a multiplicity of more or less secular and more or less insulated nation-
states and national cultures. These cultures were thus broadly ``liberal'', ``socialist'' or
``scientific'' and were linked to the idea of, say, ``British'' or ``French'' nationalism. The
cultural cohesion of each state was often underscored by a broadly common educational
curriculum and more or less centrally controlled telecommunications systems.
By contrast, they argue that in the premodern to modern eras, an epoch characterised by
(often mutually reinforcing) world religions and imperial cultures, culture was far more
globalised. The Romans, for example, faced great difficulties ruling their widely
dispersed empire from the centre. They consequently resorted to using a variety of
mechanisms in an attempt to create cohesive bonds between themselves and the rest of
their empire. One of the most important mechanisms employed was their use of the
Christian religion to create a culturally cohesive ``Holy Roman Empire''. In addition,
after their conquest, Rome would endeavour to incorporate local elite groups by
appealing to their material interests and by encouraging their mutual cultural ties. This
included a culture of literacy, learning and art, and the dissemination of a theatrical
culture in particular (including the construction of amphitheatres for more popular
forms of entertainment aimed at culturally incorporating the non-elite masses).
Analogously, the British later fostered a commitment to incorporating a global imperial
culture among local elites within the ambit of the British colonial empire around the
world, by creating access to and encouraging participation in the British education
system (either in Britain itself or in similar institutions created in the colonies). They, like
the Romans, hoped that this would create the sort of ``social glue'' that could help
``cement'' their respective empires. According to Held et al (1999), a common set of
cultural beliefs and practices was of far greater global importance in the Roman and
British empires than in any other nation-state system, including the contemporary
period.
Held et al's (1999) seemingly historical ambivalence about the globalisation of culture is
due, perhaps, to their understanding of the globalisation of ``popular'' culture today. It
may, alternatively, reflect their view that the impact made by contemporary globalisation
on popular culture is still incomplete and indeterminate. This follows from their
assessment of the different views of the globalisation of culture put forward by the
hyperglobalists, the sceptics and the transformationalists (see study unit 1). Briefly, the
hyperglobalists believe that a cultural homogenisation, in the form of Western, liberal
and capitalist consumerism, is taking place on a global basis. Sceptics believe that this
cultural form is extremely superficial and that religious, national and other local forms of
cultures remain far more important, particularly outside the Western world.
Hyperglobalists and sceptics alike highlight the increasing potential for both local and
global conflict to arise between Western and other cultural forms, as the former slowly
but surely spreads to all corners of the globe in one way or another. (See Barber [1996]
and Huntington [1996] for versions of the possibility of ``cultural clashes'', and
Fukuyama [1989] on the idea of a `òne-world culture''.)
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Transformationalists tend to argue that globalisation is bringing about various forms of
cultural intermingling and hybridisation. After examining this debate, Held and his
coauthors (1999:330) conclude that the contemporary globalisation of culture may
produce any number of different results, including ``homogenisation, contestation,
hybridisation, and indifference''. As indicated above, however, they also suggest
elsewhere that today's global proliferation of popular culture is nonetheless historically
unprecedented. Perhaps their ambivalence is based on the variable effect of the
globalisation of culture, rather than on the undeniable fact of the globalisation of culture
per se.
In summary, so far we have introduced you to the globalisation of culture, and have
indicated that it is indeed taking place. We have discussed a general concept of culture
and have suggested that the globalisation of culture taking place today is characterised
by a ``popular'' cultural form. We have also suggested that its unprecedented
dissemination is based on, if not necessarily caused by, contemporary telecommunica-
tions, broadcast and transport technologies. Finally, we pointed out that there is much
debate about the impact and consequences of the contemporary globalisation of culture,
and that Held et al (1999), while ambivalent on this issue (see tutorial 2), hold that
while the globalisation of culture certainly has taken place, its impact remains
indeterminate. We will turn to these key questions again in tutorial 2, this time focusing
on a theory of the causes and consequences of the contemporary globalisation of a
``culture of consumerism''.
(1) What is ``culture''? Give a definition of culture and then discuss this concept briefly.
(2) Write a paragraph in which you explain the differences between ``popular culture'' and
``culture'' in general.
(3) Why do Held et al (1999) argue that the globalisation of culture reached a high point
before the contemporary epoch? Why do they also claim that the globalisation of
``popular culture'' is historically unprecedented?
(4) ``Communication is a necessary prerequisite of the dissemination of culture.'' Do you
agree with this statement? Discuss the most important ways in which culture can be
communicated. Give reasons for your answer.
5.4 Tutorial 2: The globalisation of a ``culture of
consumerism''
In study unit 1, we discussed some of the most salient interrelated socioeconomic,
technological, political and ideological aspects associated with globalisation. We pointed
out that contemporary global society is liberal, capitalist and profit-oriented, and that
the main agents of our rapidly changing global capitalist system are a relatively small
number of enormously rich and powerful multinational or transnational corporations
(MNCs or TNCs). We also pointed out that in the pursuit of profit, these massive
corporations are fundamentally changing the nature of the world economy Ð the
relative importance of different sectors of the economy, the nature of production, the
nature of work and employment, and the distribution of the fruits of economic activity.
We emphasised that TNC activities are bringing about an increasing global polarisation
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of wealth and poverty, marginalisation of the poor or underdeveloped when it comes to
opportunities. The dualistic notions of ``core'' and ``periphery'', and `ìnclusion'' and
`èxclusion'' were used to describe today's growing global stratification of wealth and
privilege, and of poverty and deprivation between the rich countries in ``the North'' and
the poor countries in ``the South'', and even between elite and non-elite both within a
poorer country and within a richer country.
We also discussed the view that there is an almost symbiotic interrelationship between
these changing socioeconomic characteristics, and between the salient technological,
political and ideological features of the contemporary global capitalist era. Burgeoning
developments in ICT, for example, produced and/or used by the TNCs themselves, have
greatly facilitated their changing activities and their increasingly global reach and sphere
of operations. Moreover, the capitalist free market system has expanded, since states all
over the world have become more friendly to TNCs. This translates into policies of
deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation which are often justified in terms of an
`ìnevitable'' development towards a neoliberal world order. Many observers argue that
this furthers the profit-oriented cause of the TNCs and helps to justify the resulting
global polarisation of power and wealth. Neoliberalism not only enables states to claim
that they cannot do anything about the escalating inequality, but it also enables them to
claim that intervention in this regard is indeed undesirable, given the inviolability of the
principles associated with the free market. It is this ideology, and its associated ``culture
of consumerism'', that we are concerned with in this tutorial. In important ways, just as
neoliberal ideas are used to legitimate or justify the profit-making activities of TNCs, so
our internalisation of a culture of consumerism both legitimates and helps realise the
profits of TNCs. This is because we become ``consumed'' by the desire to buy the goods
produced and so seductively advertised by TNCs (often quite irrespectively of whether
we ``need'' them or not).
5.4.1 Some characteristics of the globalisation of a ``culture of
consumerism''
Burbach, Nunez and Kagarlitsky (1997:22±23), in observing the effect of contemporary
capitalist globalisation on culture, point out:
crass materialism and fetishism of commodities that is at the core of
contemporary capitalism. It is a major virus inherent in capitalism as it spreads
to every nook and cranny of the world. It eats away at the very fabric of society,
making people more and more cynical as they see that the rich take what they
want, and then taunt the rest of society through the media, the movies and
advertising with the ``good life'' of consumerism.
They hold that any other cultural values and norms that may once have bound people
together and encouraged respect for the law (which, perhaps only ideally, involves the
codification of social values and norms) are now subject to growing ``delegitimisation
and breakdown''. They argue:
[M]ass media through its enshrinement of consumerism has now so permeated
virtually all societies of the world ± First, Second and Third Ð that rampant
materialism is the dominant ethos. Be it the advanced and hedonistic
consumerism of the First World, or the migration of people from the Second
and Third Worlds to the metropolitan centres, the goal and objective is the
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same Ð to gain access to material luxuries and the good life. Except for a very
few isolated pockets, there are no longer totally separate or independent cultures
and societies. They have now all been penetrated by a specific form of
secularism, the market economy which drives people to possess commodities ...
[A] ``permissive cornucopia'' has become the new utopia replacing old religious
and ideological values in the world. The Western world through the media
spreads materialism and consumerism as the paramount values. In 1965, there
were only 180 million television sets in the world. Today there are well over a
billion. With one television for every five people, almost everyone in the world
has a visual conception (coloured of course by the ideologies and biases of the
media) of what other people in distant countries or continents are doing and
how they are living. Provincial, isolated views of the world are eclipsed, making
interests more global and at the same time more insatiable. Those in a position
to participate in the permissive cornucopia sold by the media orient their lives
around the accumulation of material pleasures and goods to the detriment of
more important values that deal with the quality of life. Simultaneously, much
of the world's population, unable to obtain many of these goods, grows
frustrated, resentful and rebellious.
Burbach et al (1997:103±105) hold that commercialism in the United States, in
particular, and its associated culture of consumption and consumerism, has had a
pervasive nihilistic and community/family bond-breaking effect on those (in the US and
wherever on the globe these values are disseminated by the mass media) unable to
materially ``buy'' into this world-view. They (Burbach et al 1997:104) argue:
[I]mages that corporate America uses to sell its culture of consumption to the
public are those of comfort, convenience, machismo, femininity, violence and
sexual stimulation ... [T]he primary motivation of the corporate world is to
make profits, and their basic strategy is to convince the public to consume.
These institutions have helped create a seductive way of life, a culture of
consumption that capitalises on every opportunity to make money. Market
calculations and cost-benefit analyses hold sway in almost every sphere of US
society. Corporate commercialism feeds on and develops some of the basest
tendencies of human nature. It fetishes love, foments rank consumerism,
generates mediocrity, augments selfish tendencies and encourages aggressiveness.
These values, while edging out non-market values that are more community and
family oriented, play upon and accentuate the individualism that has permeated
US society throughout much of its history. And for ... groups at the lower
income end of ... society, ... their inability to purchase many of the pleasures and
goods hyped by rampant commercialism leads to deep-seated despair and
nihilism. They feel that their situation is hopeless, that they are doomed to live
on the margins, denied access forever to all that corporate America holds up as
the ``good life''.
Burbach et al (1997:105), therefore, link contemporary negative socioeconomic trends,
ranging from unemployment to crime, to the symbiotic relationship between neoliberal
government policies and the activities of the TNCs. They also add that rising rates of
crime, and drug-dealing in particular, can also be understood in terms of the perception
(some would say the reality) among the poor and marginalised that such activity
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constitutes one of the quickest and most lucrative ways to tap into the consumerist
``good life'', especially in the increasing absence of formal employment opportunities.
The plight of the homeless and the underclass in general makes their living
conditions increasingly indistinguishable from those living in the Third World.
In all the major cities of the United States one commonly sees people begging in
the streets, scouring garbage for bits of food, and living in squalid sub-human
conditions, making their lives similar to many in cities like New Delhi, Sao
Paulo and San Salvador. The percentage of the destitute may still be larger in
Third World cities, but as the corporate and financial elites of the United States
internationalise their activities, the numbers and percentages of the dispossessed
and downtrodden in America are increasing.
We live in a world in which `à minority enjoys a grand banquet while large numbers are
castaways'' (Burbach et al 1997:143):
[There is] a profound sense of despair and nihilism. The poorest people Ð be
they in the United States, Mexico, the Philippines or Great Britain Ð feel they
are trapped, that neither they nor their children have any hope of escaping from
a life of poverty. Besieged by the media hype that the good life of consumerism is
the only way to live, the poor continually face those who are prosperous or well-
to-do, those who have a piece of the modern material dream. This type of
environment naturally breeds complete despair, and a turn to crime, alcohol and
drug abuse (Burbach et al 1997:144).
And, according to Burbach et al (1997:144±145), the globalisation of a ``culture of
consumerism'' does not only negatively affect poor people. Even among those ``middle
sectors'' around the globe
who have access to much of the material world, there is a sense that one's life is
controlled by a ``deus ex machina'' comprised of the ``marketplace''. Many feel
bound by a daily grind in which all they can do is try to survive though
continual hard work. They have no time or space to improve the quality of their
lives or that of their neighbours. Under globalisation it is a dog-eat-dog world
for much of humanity. Who can worry about the decline of the environment or
unrepresentative political systems when it is difficult to eke out a living on a
day-to-day basis?
These extracts from Burbach et al (1997) resonate with the hyperglobalists, and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, the sceptical views in the debate on the globalisation of culture
(see tutorial 1). However, despite Held et al's (1999) rejection of these two positions and
their emphasis on the irreducibly complex and indeterminate nature, causes,
characteristics and consequences of globalisation and the globalisation of culture in
particular, they express a similar view in places. They claim, for example, that
telecommunications, broadcast, transport technologies and radio, music, television,
movies and satellite technologies are owned and controlled by massive media and other
TNCs Ð whose main motivation is the pursuit of profit (Held et al 1999:341±375).
And it is precisely these TNCs that have generated the contemporary globalisation of a
``popular'' culture, expressed most saliently in the form of the consumption of goods
associated with ``Coca-Cola, Madonna and the news on CNN''.
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Furthermore, Held et al (1999:368) also emphasise the importance of today's transport,
information and communications technologies, because they are
intensively used for business and commercial communications as well as for the
production, transmission and reception of popular culture. Elite cultures, high
cultures, academic and scientific cultures, while obviously making use of these
technologies, and occasionally featuring as content within them, are drowned in
the high seas of business information systems and commercialised popular
culture. No historic parallel exists for such intensive and extensive forms of
cultural flow that are primarily forms of commercial enrichment and
entertainment ... this phenomenon has historic predecessors ... but in scope
and scale ... is dwarfed by today's industry.
Held et al (1999:368) argue that TNCs (particularly dedicated media corporations),
whose ``cultural reach and power is historically unparalleled'', are transforming the entire
ensemble of transport and media and ICT industry in the interest of private profit and
ownership rather than any cultural values. Consequently, `èven though most people
remain rooted in a local or national culture and a local place, it is becoming increasingly
impossible for them to live in that place disconnected culturally from the world in which
it is situated'' (Held et al 1999:369). Instead, they are locked into a popular, consumerist
culture.
Finally, Held et al (1999:372) point out:
[T]he ownership of culture industry MNCs is overwhelmingly Western and
within that predominantly American. British, German, French, Dutch,
Australian and Japanese corporations have a stake but often on the basis of
ownership of American-based subsidiaries. The majority of export markets are
controlled by these corporations. Thus there is a flow of imagery, genre and
content mainly from the USA and some Western cultures to other Western
states and most of the developing world.
And (Held et al 1999:374):
[I]n the end, Hollywood, Microsoft and AT & T are in the business of making
money Ð not founding alternative centres of political identity and legitimacy.
Yet the huge flows of information, people and imagery that circulate around the
globe, crossing borders with impunity, have changed the context in which
national projects of any kind must develop.
This context is informed by a culture of consumerism.
5.4.2 A theory of the globalisation of a ``culture of consumerism''
Leslie Sklair (1995) offers a theory of the globalisation of a ``culture of consumerism'' (or
a ``culture-ideology of consumerism'' as he prefers) linked to its central role in the
``transnational practices'' of a ``transnational capitalist class'' (TCC). Sklair argues that
this TCC serves to legitimate the hegemony and promote the interests of ``transnational
corporations'' (TNCs), which amounts to legitimating and promoting profit, via the
culture-ideology of consumerism in the contemporary global capitalist system. In other
words, the TCC disseminates a culture of consumerism that facilitates the survival and
126
promotion of the contemporary global capitalist system. (More recent contributions to a
variety of theories of cultural consumerism linking the interests of nation-states, state
and other elites, and the profit orientations of large MNCs or TNCs can be found in the
writings of Monbiot [2000], Hertz [2001] and Frank [2001].)
Sklair (1995:6±8, 20±21, 60±61) argues that transnational practices (TNPs) in the
contemporary global capitalist system, occur in and consist of a totality of interrelated
and mutually reinforcing economic, political and cultural-ideological levels or spheres.
The United States, in his view, is hegemonic in all three spheres, but other countries and
coalitions of various kinds share hegemony in some spheres to varying degrees. He holds
that the contemporary global capitalist system is now qualitatively different from
previous phases in the development of capitalist society. It has changed and continues to
do so, because it is driven for the most part by the qualitatively changing nature of
capitalism Ð from an international capitalist system to a transnational, global one. He
argues that each of the three levels of the global capitalist system has its own agent(s) of
transnational practice although, in reality, these agents often occupy overlapping
positions and exercise overlapping functions in each sphere. According to Sklair, TNCs
are the main agents of the transnational economy, a ``still-evolving'' TCC is the main
agent of TNPs at the level of politics, and the main agents of transnational cultural-
ideological practices of consumerism are the transnational mass media (Sklair 1995:60):
TNCs produce commodities and the services necessary to manufacture and sell
them. The transnational capitalist class produces the political environment
within which the products of one country can be successfully marketed in
another. The culture-ideology of consumerism produces the values and attitudes
that create and sustain the need for the products. These are analytical rather
than empirical distinctions. In the real world they are inextricably mixed. TNCs
get involved in host country politics, and the culture-ideology of consumerism is
largely promulgated through the transnational corporations involved in mass
media and advertising. Members of the transnational capitalist class often work
directly for TNCs, and their lifestyles are a major exemplar for the spread of
consumerism.
Sklair combines both culture and ideology in the predominant consumerism Ð because
of which the fact that we do consume, and the facts of what we consume and why we
consume (why we need or want particular things) are determined both culturally and
ideologically. By this he means that consumption patterns are not necessarily related to
needs, and/or shaped by local culture, because they are increasingly being shaped by the
transnational practices of the TNCs and the TCC in terms of their interests. Sklair
(1995:48±49), holds:
Culture always has an ideological function for consumerism in the capitalist
global system, so all cultural transnational practices in this sphere are at the
same time ideological practices, thus cultural-ideological ... The idea of cultural-
ideological transnational practices, and, in particular, the idea of the culture-
ideology of consumerism in the global system, are conceptual tools in the theory
of the global system. Global capitalism does not permit cultural neutrality.
Those cultural practices that cannot be incorporated into the culture-ideology of
consumerism become oppositional counter-hegemonic forces, to be harnessed or
marginalised, and if that fails, destroyed physically. Ordinary so-called counter-
cultures are regularly incorporated and commercialised and pose no threat,
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indeed through the process of differentiation (illusory variety and choice) they
are a source of great strength to the global capitalist system. For example, the
celebrations of the twentieth anniversary of the student revolts of 1968 became a
media event in Europe, less so in the Americas, and were relentlessly
commercially exploited, with the willing and presumably lucrative participation
of many of those who had then been (and still are) dedicated to the overthrow of
the capitalist system. Consumerist appropriations of the bicentennial of the
French Revolution are another interesting example. We shall have to wait for the
year 2017 to see what the culture-ideology of consumerism makes of the
Bolshevik revolution! The culture-ideology of consumerism is, as it were, the
fuel that powers the motor of global capitalism. The driver is the transnational
capitalist class. But the vehicle itself is the mighty transnational corporation.
Sklair (1995:46±49) argues that as the global capitalist system has unfolded, it has
become increasingly characterised by the selective inclusion and exclusion of people at
economic and political levels (see study unit 1). Economic globalisation is, for example,
characterised by the decreasing importance of the manufacturing industry and organised
labour with all the usual benefits. There is an increasing emphasis on the service sector
and a strong trend towards casualised, nonunion labour with few benefits, and
decreasing numbers of employed generally. However, this ``brave new economy'' uses
cheap labour profitably wherever it can be found in the (usually, Third) world. This is
due to the ability of TNCs to quickly and easily relocate parts of the production process
anywhere they like, especially the labour- rather than capital-intensive parts of the
production process. Politically, the tendency is towards the increasing irrelevance and
exclusion of subordinate classes. In parliamentary democracies, voting is seldom
compulsory and turn-out is usually low. ``While political organisation is usually
unfettered, the structural obstacles to genuine opposition to the capitalist system are
such that there are rarely any serious challenges to it'' (Sklair 1995:47). Such challenges
can be encountered successfully by the capitalist class by mobilising the army, police, and
other sectors of the `èstablishment''. In one-party states, political participation is actively
discouraged and repressed, and challenges are usually really about shifting people at the
top (in the form of a coup d'e

Âtat), rather than about changing the nature of the local and
global capitalist system.
However, at the level of culture-ideology, things are totally different Ð here global
capitalism is concerned with including all classes (and it goes without saying that the
bourgeoisie are already included). In Sklair's (1995: 47±48) words:
[T]he cultural-ideological project of global capitalism is to persuade people to
consume above their own perceived needs in order to perpetuate the
accumulation of capital for private profit, in other words, to ensure that the
global capitalist system goes on for ever. The culture-ideology of consumerism
proclaims, literally, that the meaning of life is to be found in the things that we
possess. To consume, therefore, is to be fully alive, and to remain fully alive we
must continuously consume. The notions of men and women as economic
beings, or political beings, are discarded by global capitalism, quite logically, as
the system does not even pretend to satisfy everyone in the economic or the
political spheres. Men and women are consumers. The point of economic activity
for ordinary members of the system is simply to provide the resources to be
consumers, and the point of political activity is to ensure, usually through
128
inactivity, that the conditions for consuming are maintained. This system has
been evolving for centuries, first for bourgeoisies all over the world, then
spreading to the working classes in the First World, and slowly but surely
penetrating to those with disposable income everywhere.
TNCs, for example, operate worldwide and spread Ð in a variety of ways Ð the
culture-ideology of consumerism to even the poorest regions of the globe, including the
poorest Third World countries. According to Sklair (1995:57):
[M]odern techniques of communication have intensified the demonstration
effect whereby the practices and beliefs of one society are introduced to other
societies and have increased the speed with which consumption patterns
common to one socio-cultural grouping spread to all corners of the world. Few
will wonder why the products and lifestyles of the industrialised world seem
desirable and relatively accessible to many in the developing countries.
According to Sklair (1995:71), there is a segment of the TCC who are ``professional
purveyors of the culture-ideology of consumerism'', which involves ``the mass media and
promotional personnel whose task it is to sell the consumerist goals of the global
capitalist system to the masses. These goals have to be sold to producers, citizens and
consumers.'' For Sklair, this class is motivated to perform this function for a number of
reasons. This includes that they ``tend to have global rather than local perspectives on a
variety of issues; they tend to be people from many countries, more and more of whom
begin to consider themselves `citizens of the world' as well as of their places of birth; and
they tend to share similar lifestyles, particularly patterns of luxury consumption of goods
and services''. Sklair (1995:71) constitutes the TCC as follows:
. TNC executives and their local affiliates
. globalising or globalisation-oriented state bureaucrats
. capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals
. consumerist elites (merchants, media personnel, etc)
Elaborating on the nature, function and motivation of the TCC, Sklair (1995:71±72)
argues that the TCC ``sees its mission as organising the conditions under which its
interests and the interests of the (global capitalist) system (which usually but do not
always coincide) can be furthered within the national and local context''. They are thus
involved in one way or another in the political struggle between capital and labour in
various forms of local and transnational political organisational forms, often using the
power of TNCs to influence local politics and labour in particular. They, especially those
involved in the ``brain drain from indigenous to transnational enterprises, mainly ...
TNCs'', tend to glamourise transnational over domestic practices, and, when it comes to
their domestic origins, they tend to create a ``comprador mentality'' there, by politically,
ideologically and culturally trying to ``persuade co-nationals that their interests are
identical with, or at least best served by, those of the TNCs''.
Sklair points out that in today's unprecedented unequal global capitalist system, it has
become more important than ever for the powerful and privileged (the TNCs and the
TCC) to be able to exercise effective hegemonic control, especially over those most
marginalised from the ``good life'' enjoyed by the few. Some sort of consent to the status
quo must be manufactured if it is to endure. Fortunately (for those who benefit from the
129 HSY3703/1
status quo), according to Sklair (1995:85±86), it is precisely within the cultural-
ideological sphere where the greatest opportunities have opened up for hegemonic
control. In large part, this is based on the development of modern communications
technologies, which have emerged within and as a result of the innovation characteristic
of the global capitalist system. This technology is now owned and controlled by a few
TNCs (Sklair 1995:87) who basically own the media industry, and for whom national
boundaries are virtually meaningless. These TNCs:
strive for total control in the production, delivery, and marketing of what we can
call the cultural-ideological goods of the global capitalist system. Their goal is to
create a ``buying mood'' for the benefit of the ... media, advertising and
consumer goods manufacturers. ``Nothing in human experience has prepared
men, women and children for the modern television techniques of fixing human
attention and creating the uncritical mood required to sell goods, many of which
are marginal at best to human needs'' ... [B]y the age of 16, the average North
American youth has been exposed to more than 300 000 television commercials.
The mass media do many things for the global capitalist system. Advertisements speed
up the circulation and consumption of commodities. As media consumers get younger
and younger (as more children of few years watch greater amounts of television), so the
dominant culture-ideology of consumerism becomes inculcated from an early age. This,
according to Sklair (1995:87), ``creates the political/cultural demand for the survival of
capitalism. The systematic blurring of the lines between information, entertainment, and
promotion of products lies at the heart of this practice.'' For Sklair (1995:88), it is not
that a culture of consumerism is new. He points out that capitalist elites have long
subscribed to one or other variant of such a culture to varying degrees. What he thinks is
indeed new and of major import today `ìs a reformulation of consumerism that
transforms all the public mass media and their contents into opportunities to sell ideas,
products, in short, a consumerist worldview''.
Here he gives a different example of the ``selling'' of a culture of consumerism to the
masses, that of the seductively designed and ubiquitous shopping malls geared to
enhance the consumer experience Ð and here again, people are exposed to the shopping
mall culture from childhood onwards, even in the poorest parts of the Third World. In
the case of the latter, the malls are designed to cater for expatriates and the local elite.
The impoverished majority can only look on in awe and envy Ð and hope that they too
may one day, somehow, join the ``banquet''. Goods (Sklair 1995:89) `àre framed and
displayed to entice the customer, and shopping becomes an overtly symbolic event''. The
symbols and images inherent in the malls and advertising are crucial. Regarding the
dissemination of a culture-ideology of consumerism, they ``play a central part, constantly
created and circulated by the mass media''. The result is the creation of a lifestyle and
self-image defined by consuming, from which few people are able to escape.
The United States has played, and continues to play, a central role in universalising this
consumer culture-ideology. According to Sklair (1995:90):
[T]hrough Hollywood, and the globalisation of the movies, via Madison
Avenue ... the modern advertising industry, to the more geographically diffuse
but ideologically monolithic television networking conceptualisers, the transna-
tional capitalist class in the United States has assumed leadership of the culture-
ideology of consumerism in the interests of global capitalism in the twentieth
130
century ... The universal availability of the mass media has been rapidly achieved
through relatively cheap transistor radios, cassette recorders and televisions,
which now totally penetrate the First World, almost totally penetrate the urban
Second and Third Worlds, and are beginning to penetrate deeply into the
countryside in every country. Thus, the potential of global exposure to global
communication, the dream of every merchant in history, has arrived. The
socialisation process by which people learn what to want, which used to occur
mainly in the home and the school, is increasingly taking place through the
media of the global communications industries.
Sklair (1995:94±95) summarises his theory in the following way:
The global system is made up of economic transnational practices and at the
highest level of abstraction these are the building blocks of the system. The
political practices are the principles of organisation of the system. Their agents
work with the materials on hand, but by manipulating the design of the system
they can build variations into it. The cultural-ideological practices are the nuts
and bolts and the glue that hold the system together. Without them, parts of
the system would drift off into space. In order to work properly the dominant
forces in each of the three spheres have to monopolise the key resources for
which there is great competition. The transnational corporations strive to control
capital and material resources, the transnational capitalist classes strive to
control global power, and the transnational agents and institutions of the
culture-ideology of consumerism strive to control the realm of ideas. Effective
TNC control of global capital and resources is almost complete. There are few
important national resources that are entirely exempt from economic
transnational practices. Transnational capitalist classes rule directly, through
national capitalist political parties or social democratic parties that cannot
fundamentally threaten the global capitalist project, or they exert authority
indirectly to a greater or lesser extent as the price levied on non-capitalist states
as a sort of entrance fee into the global capitalist system. In the last resort, it is
the global control of capital and labour that is the decisive factor for those who
do not wish to be excluded from the system. The control of ideas in the interests
of consumerism is almost total. The ideas that are antagonistic to the global
capitalist project can be reduced to one central counter-hegemonic idea, the
rejection of the culture-ideology of consumerism itself. Without consumerism,
the rationale for continuous capitalist accumulation dissolves. It is the capacity
to commercialise and commodify all ideas and the material products in which
they adhere, television images, advertisements, newsprint, books, tapes films and
so on, not the ideas themselves, that global capitalism strives to appropriate.
He summarises the application of his theory to the poorer parts of the world, particularly
the Third World, as follows (Sklair 1995:186±187):
The choice of high prestige, relatively costly non-essentials is deliberate, because
it is precisely the contradiction inherent in these ``mass-luxury'' products of
foreign origin that symbolises the problem that the global capitalist system faces
in extending itself over the whole world. The questions remain: can capitalism
ever achieve its global goal of transforming all the people of the world into
genuine consumers? Can it even meet the basic biological needs of the world's
people? Despite the ingenuity of the TNCs, the efforts of the transnational
131 HSY3703/1
capitalist class, and the hegemony of the culture-ideology of consumerism, the
answers are by no means clear. This sentiment encapsulates what many Third
World thinkers fear most about the impact of the TNCs on their countries in the
future. The spread of the new international division of labour, in its widest sense,
has indeed brought many jobs and a good deal of prosperity to the transnational
capitalist class and other groups in the Third World. Nevertheless, many in the
Third World believe that, despite the apparent successes of the culture-ideology
of consumerism, the material benefits, such as they are, will never percolate
through to the masses ... [P]roducts developed in advanced countries are likely
to have inegalitarian effects when introduced to poor countries and may, under
certain conditions, cause losses among some or all consumers ... [C]apitalism
will also have left behind in the Third World, as its most enduring contribution
to Third World development, an almost unfettered and wild consumerism,
undergirded by the new electronic entertainment technologies ... [M]ost would
agree that the TNCs have played a crucial role in raising consumerist
expectations that cannot be satisfied within the foreseeable future for the mass of
the population in the Third World.
(1) Discuss Sklair's views of culture, the globalisation of culture and the culture-ideology of
consumerism. In your discussion, make reference to the role played by TNCs, the TCC
and TNPs.
(2) ``The control of ideas in the interests of consumerism is almost total.'' Critically discuss
this statement. Do you agree with it? Give reasons for your answer.
(3) Discuss how ``consumerism'' affects people in developing countries.
(4) How important are contemporary communication technologies, for example the Internet
and television, to the dissemination of cultural practices at a global level? Discuss
critically.
(5) Think about and draw on your answers to the key questions posed at the beginning of
this study unit, your understanding of the differences between the hyperglobalists, the
sceptics and the transformationalists, and Held et al's (1999) ambivalence about the
globalisation of culture. Now provide answers to the following questions:
(a) Which of the key questions do you think is most relevant to exploring the issue of
the globalisation of culture? Give reasons for your answer.
(b) In terms of your own understanding of globalisation, do you agree with the view that
we are all being influenced by a pervasive culture of consumerism?
(c) Is the idea of a global culture of consumerism a hyperglobalist, sceptical or
transformationalist position? Give reasons for your answer.
(d) In what ways and to what extent (if at all) do you think life in South Africa has been
influenced by the globalisation of culture in general, and by a culture of
consumerism in particular? Give examples.
5.5 Conclusion
In this study unit we focused on a specific view of the causes and consequences of an
increasingly globalised culture. Culture in the context of globalisation constitutes a
complex terrain for critical analysis, because it involves various agencies, ranging from
132
big business corporations to the individual participant in different cultural practices.
Since these practices are influenced by local, regional and trans-regional norms and
values, it is often difficult to disentangle the complex web of contradictory relations.
Please work through the list of sources provided in the study units of this module to read
more about the various aspects of culture and globalisation.
Bibliography
York: Ballantine.
Burbach, R, Nunez, O & Kagarlitsky, B. 1997. Globalisation and its discontents: the rise of
postmodern socialisms . London: Pluto.
Frank, T. 2001. One market under God: extreme capitalism, market populism, and the end of
economic democracy . London: Secker & Warburg.
Fukuyama, F. 1989. The end of history? The National Interest 16:3±18.
Held, D, McGrew, A, Goldblatt, D & Perraton, J. 1999. Global transformations; politics,

economics and culture . Oxford: Polity.
Hertz, N. 2001. The silent takeover: global capitalism and the death of democracy . London:
Heinemann.
Huntington, S. 1996. The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Monbiot, G. 2000. Captive state: the corporate takeover of Britain . London: Macmillan.
Sklair, L. 1995. The sociology of the global system

. London: Prentice-Hall.
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Study Unit Page

1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF GLOBALISATION 1

1.2 Learning outcomes 2

1.3 Tutorial 1: The many facets of globalisation 2

1.4 Tutorial 2: ``Globalisation'': a disputed concept 9

1.5 Tutorial 3: A theory of globalisation 14

2.1 Learning outcomes 19

2.2 Tutorial 1: World history in the age of globalisation 19

2.3 Tutorial 2: The origins of global disparities 26

2.4 Tutorial 3: Africa in world history 37

3 GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALISATION 41

3.2 Learning outcomes 41

3.3 What is ``globalisation''? 42

3.4 Geography and globalisation 44

3.5 Globalisation as an economic phenomenon 48

3.6 Globalisation and environmental issues 67

4 THE GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS 83

4.2 Learning outcomes 85

4.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of world politics 85

4.4 Tutorial 2: The evolution of international society 91

4.5 Tutorial 3: The globalisation of international society 95

4.6 Tutorial 4: The end of the Cold War 101

4.7 Tutorial 5: A selection of post-Cold War developments in world

4.8 Globalisation and the post-Cold War world order 111

4.9 Conclusion 112

Bibliography and recommended reading 113

Useful websites 117

5 CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALISATION 118

5.1 Introduction 118

5.2 Learning outcomes 118

5.3 Tutorial 1: The globalisation of culture 119

5.4 Tutorial 2: The globalisation of a ``culture of consumerism'' 122

5.5 Conclusion 132

An introduction to the concept of Globalisation

1.2 Learning outcomes

1.3 Tutorial 1: The many facets of globalisation

1.4 Tutorial 2: ``Globalisation'': a disputed concept

1.5 Tutorial 3: A theory of globalisation

many academic and non-academic contexts. It is associated with a diverse, but

interrelated, range of changing socioeconomic, political, environmental, technological

increasingly conscious of this (Bromley 1999:280±281). The concept of globalisation is

nature of the world around us.

argued that ``globalisation'' is merely a new buzzword to describe old networks of

such a theory entail?

1.2 Learning outcomes

enabling you to do the following:

. describe some of the central aspects of globalisation

. describe and discuss the debate about globalisation

globalisation, and thereby come to your own conclusions on the topic

explain the nature of globalisation

1.3 Tutorial 1: The many facets of globalisation

As mentioned above, globalisation is associated with a wide and diverse range of

phenomena. Many accounts of globalisation tend to focus on its socioeconomic

globalisation theorists is the increasing and unprecedented levels of inequality, which

at some of the socioeconomic factors associated with globalisation. However, it is

important to note that globalisation cannot be explained by socioeconomic factors alone.

Consequently, we will also look at some important technological, political and

important cultural, environmental and historical aspects of globalisation.