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    Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism

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    Carlos Ayala
    Sociología

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    “Readers accustomed to the high concep ual and sys dards characteristic of analytic philosopty ati bese pointed by Hurka’s discussions... Hur building an elegant and attractive verion of nestecagrn admirable rigor and clarity, his book wil! surcly renee Ne treatment ofthe heuty by am analyae phil cor heeft ey lll lone a great ka has dongs hein By presening perfectionism inthe best pose ight as ince to the theory's supporters and! o> alike? All Review A brillant book. It ingeniously develops ar persuasively defen moral theory assigning intrinsic value to the ctertise ef oat OXFORD ETHICS SERIES Series Editor: Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford ‘THE LIMITS OF MORALITY Shelly Kagan PERFECTIONISM ‘Thomas Hurka INEQUALITY Lamy S. Temkin MORALITY, MORTALITY, VOLUME 1 Death and Whom to Save from It FM. Kamm | PERFECTIONISM Thomas Hurka New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (Oxford Univesity ress Aten Aectnd“Bigick Boy (eta Cipe Town Dare a Ee Boras Hog Kong sab Rance uit Compr Moder Madd” Metone esc Chy Nui ane Sige “hip Tay "Toone “pote ma Copyright © 1993 by Thomas Hurks i bled in 199 by Onl Uses Prt, "OH Mado Aveme, Rew Yat, Now Yet ost ime oan Oxf Univesy Pres pape, 1596 sfc seer nda of Of Une Pt, ‘A gh roe No un fh picn mayb epi, 3 wien ay Sr ny ea ‘kev, sec epg dn ee ‘ite premio Or Ul Pee ‘iy Cones Calg icon Da Tua, Thoms, 92- Perctan Tonia Bom (Ox ir ers) Incas ilogaphel ree nines, san O18 sa0ie yah OP sII6y pk) 1 Peeion— Mer mee prs The See. SINFO Iw IT Smad Sa nthe te Sete of Aneice To the memory of my parents, in their own ways both perfectionists Preface ‘This book's history is both academic and persona. first studied philosophy at the Universty of Toronto in the 1970s, when that department's teaching was still primarily historical, My first exposure to philosophi- fal ethiestherefore came through the works of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, and other classical perfectionsts, And the ideas [ found in those works fit well with the values I had learned as a child. My parens, themselves products of the liberal, Cultured Czechoslovakia ofthe interwar yeas, had taught me the intrinsic worth of knowledge, achievement, and the arts, as against mete amusement or material Acquistion. Inthe perfectionist tradition I found a theoretical grounding for my own ‘deepest convictions. ~ In my last term as an undergraduate and then asa graduate student at Oxford | studied contemporary moral theory, whose techniques I found profoundly illuminat- ing. I decided to apply these techniques tothe perfectionism I had found in classical ‘writes but that seemed so thoroughly ignored in contemporary ethics. Two early attempts at this project were theses for the B. Pil. and D. Phil. at Oxford; this book fs, Lhope, a less inadequate treatment For their guidance of my early studies I thank Wayne Sumner, R, M. Hare, Charles Taylor, John Baker, Michael Lockwood, Derek Parfit, and Christopher ‘Taylor. As [began to turn my ideas into a 00k, intermediate drafts were read by Gavin Lawrence, Donald Regan, Wayne Sumner, Jeff McMahan,G. A. Cohen, the late Flint Scher, and two anonymous referes. Their comments and suggestions all Jed to fundamental improvements In 1989-90 I held an Annual Fellowship atthe Calgary Institue forthe Human- ities to make final revisions to my manuscript. I thank the Institute fr its generosity and for providing an ideal environment for my work. ‘The resulting manuscript received further detailed comments from Donald Re- gan and from the Oxford series editor, Derek Parfit. Both sets of comments forced me to address some important larger issues 1 had ignored and saved me from numerous smaller errors, They were models of sympathetic yet forceful eitique My greatest debts are to Dennis MeKerlie and to my wife, Terry Teskey. Dennis, an ideal colleague, has read any number of drafts and discussed countless issues both large and small. His patient encouragement and good judgement have influenced every part of the book. Temy nas provided a vigorous philosophical challenge to some of my ideas, and her practised editorial eye has improved every : Prefce Fg: tn wh ce ism ey ess a om PA ga feminine i fo te cr rin eaten ov “My Val Avon Sec Tey and Pacts 1 WOE fe ‘Consequentialism and Content," American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992), in Chapters S, 6, and 8; and “Perfectionism and Equality” in Rodger Bechler, David Copp, and Béla Szabados (eds.), On the Track of Reason: Essays in Honor of Kat ‘Nielsen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), in ‘Chapters 12 and 13. “ Contents Introduction, 3 I. The Perfectionist Idea ‘The Concept of Human Nature, 9 2.1. Distnctiveness and Essence, 10 2.2 Essence and Life, 14 2.3 Nature: Objections, 18, Accretions and Methods, 23 3.1 Accretions, 23, 3.2. Perfectionist Naturalism, 28 3.3. Defending Perfectionism, 31 3.4 How Are Essences Known?, 33, ‘The Human Essence, 37 4.1. The Aristotelian Theory: Physical Essence, 37 4.2. The Aristotelian Theory: Rationality, 39 4.3. The Aristotelian Theory: Obgctions, 44 44 The Wrong Explanations?, 48 Ti, Aristotelian Perfectionism ‘The Basic Structure, 55 5.1 Maximizing Consequentialism, 55 5.2. Time- and Agent-Neutralty, 60 5.3 The Asymmetry, 64 5.4 Competition and Co-operation, 65 x Content 6. Aggregation, 69 6.1 Summing and Averaging, 70 6.2 Maximax 75 6.3. Single-Peak Perfection, 79 64 Conclusion, 82 7. ‘The Well-Rounded Life, 84 7.1 Lexical and Constant Comparisons, 85 7.2. Balancing, 88 7.3 Dilettantism and Concentration, 91 7.4 Many-Person Balancing?, 97 8. Trying, Deserving, Succeeding, 99 8.1 Number and Quality, 99 8.2 Attempt, 103 8.3 Deserving Attempt, 105, 8.4 Success and Deserved Success, 108 8.5. The Best Units?, 112 9. Unity and Complexity, 114 9.1 Generalty: Extent and Dominance, 114 9.2 Generaity: Elaborations, 116 9.3. Top-o-Bottom Knowledge, 119 9.4 The Unified Life, 121 9.5 Complex, Difficult Activities, 123 10. Politics, Co-operation, and Love, 129 10.1 Political Action, 129 10.2 Co-operation, 132 10.3 Love and Friendship, 134 10.4 Generality: Objections, 137 10.5. Generality: The Tradition, 141 Ill. Perfectionism and Poli LL. Liberty, 147 11.1 Autonomy as a Perfection, 148 11.2 The Asymmetry Argument, 152 11.3 Sexual Enforcement and Paternalism, 156 11.4 Liberty versus Neutrality, 158 > —™ Contnas “ 12, Equality: Abilities and Marginal Utility, 161 121 Deep Equality, 161 12.2. Desert and Aggregation, 163 12.3. Natural Abilities, 165 12.4. Diminishing Marginal Uuity, 169 13, Equality: Co-operation and the Market, 176 13.1 Arguments from Co-operation, 176 13.2 Mustrations and Limitations, 180 13.3 Property and Property-Freedom, 183 13.4 Self-Reliance versus Dependeace, 185 14, Conclusion, 190 Notes, 193 Bibliography, 209 Index, 215 Fi it Introduction Ld Some moral theories have been carefully studied in recent moral philosophy, but one, as important as any, has been largely neglected. Fis moral theory stats from an accourt of the good aman life or the itrn- Siclly desimble life) And i characterizes this life in a distinctive way. Certain properties, it says, consiute human nature or are definitive of humanity—they fnake humans humans. The good life) it ten sas, developithese properties 10a high degres oF realizes what is central to human nature, Different versions of the theory may disagre about what te relevant properties are and so disagree about the content ofthe good lif. Bul they share th foundational idea that what i good, tltimately, is the development of human nate. This theory appear inthe work of many great morals. Aristotle and Aquinas thin nature‘obe rational and tat a good human exercises rationality to (aig degree, Marx views humans as both productive, because we transform nature through our labour, and socal, because we do so co-operatively. The bet life, he concludes, develops both capacities maximally as will happen under communism, For Heals such a8 Hegel and Bradley, bumans are but one manifestation of [Absolute Spr, and thei bet activities most flly realize identity with Spirit, as social life does in one realm, and a, religion, and philosophy do in another. Even Nietzsche reasons this way, saying that humans essentially exercise a wil to power and ae most admirable when their wis ae most powerful ‘These ae just some adherents ofthe theory; others are Plato, Spinoza Leibniz, Kant, Green, and Bosanquet. Despite dieing in their more specific moral claims, they all offer vaziants ona single theory, ene centred on an ideal ofthe good life defined in terms of human nature. : 12 {eal this moral theory erfecionismand its disiaguishing ideal that of human Perfection, Ober terms are wail ve and “eudaimo- nism" forthe theory, “flourishing” and “self-ealization” forthe ideal. But they ave other established uses in ethics and could prove confusing here. “Perfectionism has its own disadvaniages. If human development admits of degrees, so must human perfection, which initially sounds odd. And some readers ‘ Introduction may be used to broader definitions ofthe term. Last century, Sir William Hamilton efined "perfection" as “the full and harmonious development of all our faculties, ‘corporeal and mental intellectual and moral! More recently, John Raves lias said ‘that perfectionism direct us to “maximize the achievement of human excelience in art, Science, and culture"? Neither ofthese definitions ientions human nature, yet ‘each has been influential, The theory Ihave identified is perfectionist in both the broader sense used by Hamilton and Rawls. In urging us to develop our natures, tells us to develop some: apacities)and also defines an ideal of excellence; My reason for defining “perfec. tion'* more narrowly is historical: I think this best fits the usage of writers such as ‘Astle, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz, For them “perfection"’ means not just excellence, but excellence defined by human nature, The definition also has anteced- nts in philosophical English. In Prolegomend to Ethics, T. H. Green ealls his ‘ealist morality “The Theory of the Good as Human Perfection," and similar language appears in Sidgwick and Bradley. Sidgwick defines “perfection” as cellence of Human Nature," while Bradley uses “development of human nature, “general perfection, "* and “perfection of human nature” interchangeably to refet to ‘one moral ideal.* My usage mirrors that of Green, Sidgwick, and Bradley: I use “*perfectionism’” (or ‘‘narrow perfectionism") to refer to a moral theory based on human nature, and ‘‘broad perfectionism” for the more inclusive view that values ‘some development of capacities or some achievement of excellence 13 This book isa study of narrow perfectionism and, a fortiori, of one form of broad perfectionism. I approaches is subject inthe spit of moral theory. According 10 Rawis, moral theory is idy of substantive moral conceptions, that i, the study of how the basic notions of the right, the good, and moral worth may be arranged to form different structures." Iti descriptive, seeking a systematic ac, count ofthe moral conceptions people actully hold, apart from questions about their ‘ruth or validity. I want to apply moral theory to perfectionism and reach the fullest, ‘most accurate understanding of it that I can. More specifically, I want to use moral theory to arrive at the best or most defensible version of perfectionism. Like other ‘moraliies, perfectionism can be developed indifferent ways, and the results cen be ‘more or less plausible. A descriptive account of the best perfectionism is the book's central sim, ‘Why study perfectionism or apply moral theory to it?]One reason is historical ‘Any view so prominent in our tradition deserves investigation. But there are also ‘moral reasons. Ibelieve that, understood properly and in its most defensible version, perfectionism isan important moral option today. It has often been given inadequate formulations and associated with dubious doctrines, But it can be separated from these, and when iti, has at least three claims on present moral though, Fist) perfectionism has an appealing central idea. That the human good rests ‘somehow in human nature is, although elusive, also deeply attractive. This quality is attested to by its history. If moralists as diverse as Aquinas, Marx, and Nietasche use the same idea to ground their views, it mast have intrinsic appeal ‘Second, perfectionism, when combined with a well-grounded theory of human ee Introduction s ss th pts ny bin sec ey otc Sean as eee tee catane: sa rn em i ah ae ae sce C sion pecs gree. a ae ee et le OS Nae ne Se a eS for ourselves, Perfectionism strongly rejects this views It has an ideal see he erin at alan betehiogets a aoue bron erty ce ae “zesreuan a oreo fe i i a ee are irene ere a a ey Res ow to a etay r/c esky aes so eo aT et a oe ent itr nt ee ri fies | s(desires or answers to positive eee te et ne : eS eae eee aie a ee piece eee hae es par inte eh ci wt et ei ‘moval theory. No philosopher would describe at length a morality he did not find a ee ew asaeret aay eras ohare ev meme = 14 fectionist idea, “The book has three parts, Part I (chapters 2-4) discusses the basi perf 3s Taras possible in abstraction from the detailed morality it supports. Tt asks how “human nature" should be defined; how we ean know which properties are con- c Inroduetion tained in human nature; and what, given our best evidence, those properties ae. It concludes by defending an “Aristotelian” theory of human natu, one in which ‘human rational, both theoretical and protea, plays a veut le Par Il (chapters 5-10) elaborates an Arsoelian perfectionism," one combi ing the perfectionist idea withthe Aristotelian theory of human nature. The fis issue itdiscussesis stricture. I argues thatthe best perfectionism is consequentialist (ina special sense) and agent-neutral, telling us to care nt just about our own perfection but about that of all humans. I then expands on these claims, explaining how we seek perfection in whole lives and whole societies, how we compare different Perfections, and what specific states contribute to the individual Aristotelian goods. Par Il (chapters 11-13) applies perfectionism to politics, especially to questions about liberty and equality. Although the book's pars develop a single idea, they are to some extent sepa- able. A reader can find the general acount of perfectionism in pat I plausible bt ‘eect the spciic morality developed in pans Il and TI, either by tejecting my account of its structure or by rejecting the Aristotelian theory of human nature, Conversely, reader can find the specific morality of parts I and I atractve but ‘ot believe it benefits from foundation n human nature. A reader who finds perfec. tionism plausible only inthe broad sense defined by Hamilton and Ravls can read the book's lst two pats as developing such 8 theary, ne to which claims about human nature can be added but one that can also be aimed without them. ‘Throughout the book I consider perfectionism only a applied to humans. Its Posibe to generalize perfectionism and wo apply is idea o all living things. Then ther good, oo, consists in developing their nature. This extensions natu and the ‘most plausible perfectionism probably acceps it. The claim that human nature plains the human good is deepened if, in general, the nature of living things explains the good of living things. Nevenbeless, a generalized perfectionism is beyond the scope ofthis book. We will consider this theory only if we find its central laims about humans attractive, and there i enough to discuss in them. ‘The book aso examines only pure perfectionism, that i, a morality containing only the ideal of narow perfection and n0 others against which its claims are weighed. The ideal can also figure in pluralist morales, in which it combines with other broadly perfectionist values or with non-perectionst principles about lity or Tights. Some may think it a mark of sense to consider perfectionism only in this pluralist context, and I am not unsympathetic to their view, But I think that 9 Understand perfectionism and the contribution it can make to mor inclusive views, we should first ee what kind of morality its whea taken alone. This isthe best way to discover its stengths and weaknesses, and where it does and does not need supplementation. Pure perfectionism may notin the end prove the single most scceptable morality, but it isthe stategie subject for perfectionist moral theory. I THE PERFECTIONIST IDEA 2 The Concept of Human Nature In par I, I want to discuss some general questions about perfectionism without geting caught up in details about its structure or implications, For this reason Ihave defined the theory in a way that is less than completely determinate, Ihave said that perectonis is "based on" an ideal of hurian nature without saying exactly what ole this ideal plas. Doex perfectionism tellus fo seck just our own development of human nature or the development ofall humans? How does the perfection in our lives as a whole relate to our achievement it particular times? Questions like these ae the subject of part Il. Here, a the start of ou investigation, i is useful to have a Gefntion that does not settle them either wa ‘Even a pally indeterminate definition, however, raises questions of interprets- tion, of which the most important concem human nature. When perfectionism tells 1s 16 develop our natures as humans, what exactly does it mean? In what kinds of property does it take our nature to consis? The idea cannot be to develop all our human propentes. These are innumerable, and in any case, many cannot igure in plausible ieal of perfection. The concept of nature is clearly meant to pick out @ Subset of human properties, ones that are somehow specially important to being human. Which properties are these? "To develop the best or most defensible pzrfectionism, we need, most fundamen- tally, the best concept of human nature. Her there are wo text to apply. Our initial account of perfectionism has moral appeel, anda specification of its central concept ‘must, irs, reain this appeal. It must remain close to whatever motivates the idea thatthe human good rests somehow in hunan nature, and also reasonably close to the perfectionist tradition. Our nature as defined must sem i itself morally sign cant, Second} the specification must have intuitively plausible consequences. A perfectionist concept of nature astigns intrinsic value certain properties, and these ‘must on their own seem morally worth deveioping. A concept of nature may fail this testy nt including some properties that doseem valuable. Tis flaw is less serious, showing at most that perfectionism needs o be supplemented by other moral ideas, Itis more damaging if a concep of nature includes properties that on their own seem morally tivial—if it gives value to what, intuitively, lacks it, This isa telling ‘objection tothe concept. A morality based on the concept will be hard to accept ‘our particular judgements about value is last objection a name: the wrong properties objection, Then we this chapter. We want to specify a concept of nature that picks out 4 subset of human properties by using @crerion that i intrinsically appealing and ° 0 The Perfectionist Idea tne 10 the perfectionist idea. We also want a concept that avoids the wrong- ‘Properties objection, by having fall under it only properties that seem in their own Fight wont developing. We can hope tha these two desidersta wil coincide. I the perfectionist idea is genuinely appealing, the concept of nature most fitful to it should also have the most plausible consequences. Conversely, if a concept of bat picks ot wrong ropes, shoul somehow deviate om the erection ‘What ifthe perfectionist idea proves too indeterminate to pick out a single best ‘concept of nature? Them pas point we can only use the second test, about conse- ‘quences. We can only look atthe properties that different concepts select and see ‘which are most attractive. This approach would not be disastrous for perfectionism, "or would it make its tak of “human nature’ dle. Not just anything, afterall, can count as a concept of nature. Even a paly indeterminate perfectionist idea defines a fairly small area in moral-theoretical space, one that excludes many options. That, ‘consequences are then needed to select the best theory within the area does not make it unimportant to have circumscribed the area to begin with. Having to use just the second test would not be disastrous, but I hope to combine it with the firs test and show that the concept of nature with the best consequences is also trust 10 our ‘original understanding of perfectionism, 21 Distinctiveness and Essence What then, is human nature? Diferent views are defended inthe perfectionist 20d (ne view equates human nature wth ke properties dice of mans os (essed ony y humans, These properties topo e view aye: base ey separates fom ahr eps, no het anima hs tem. And our food comes the ful development. Pato soggest tis vew in Republic I, whee a thin’s ood is sid 10 be what ioe can pron, perfor Date than nyhing ces" Aad ae tre ecoes in ter ws. Ato ay man excellence cant inde mation or perception tecaute tne funciona shed by plan td animale Kast ‘ets erection” she development of powers characte of humanity os Gisinguished from animaly)."* Even Mark wants o Know how bumans "stn, fish hemeles fom anima" and esl seveal pacts tow how hoes Inbour ifes rom any atv of animals * Sot view enifierhuman ars "epee fr ay nae ph it appr tmpl, this view canbe dificult wo apply. Consider the ropes asocited with the human distve sytem. At the mos! gener vel they are shared by oer organo, whch leads Arle o deny vee to et development. Descted more speifely, however, they are nique NO oer Spee process food nex sane aos han has igenive tes The Concept of Human Natre u svn precisely the same structure Is there no.a distinctive property here? To say 0, ‘the, fineveness ‘view must have some way of excluding specifically described is, and what this could be isnot cla. Even when it canbe applied, the distinctiveness view faces a decisive objection. Homans have some atiractve distinctive properties, but they have many others that ‘are morally trivial, Humans may be uniquely rational, but they are also the only ‘Finals who make firs, despoil the enviroament, an Kil things for fun.® A dis- ticiveness perfectionism implis that developing these propertics i intrinsically urd implication = °°\We will see this pattern again: a concept of nature falling to the wrong-properties objection. But in this case the objections sucess has deeper rots. If the distinctive ‘view fas the second test about conseqaences it is because it fails the first est, that i,t fails to respect our original undestanding of “nature.” Whatever itis, human nature must be something lest in humans and depen- dest only on fats about humans, For ths reason it eannot consist in distinctive froperies. To say tata propery is distinc of humans is nt justo say some- thing about humans. Isto say thatthe property is possesed by humans and not by ther species, Iis Say as much about nonhumans a about humans, and how ean fact about nonhumans affect our nature and our good? The point has been well made by Robert Nozick.” At present, humans are the only beings wit fll rat palit. But what if dolphins develop ratiosaity? Will this development make its ‘reese no longer good in humans? What f we discover beings on another planet that have always been rational? Will our rationality never have been good? The tintinetiveness view makes the human good depend implausibly on facts about otber Species, and it does so because its central soncept refers to more than humans. It des not eapre our inutive sense of “naure™ and, nt surprisingly, has absurd implications. 212 ‘A more promising view uses the concept of essence. It equates human nture with the properties essential to humans, or that constitute she human essence. “Essence” is used here in the manner of Saul Kripke.* For Kripke, an essential property of a Kind is one the kind possesses necessarily, or possesses in every possible word where exsts. If property is essential toa Kind, nothing can be a member of the) ind and'lack iin every world where the kind exists, its members all posess i ‘These claims Concert necessity, but necessity de re, nol de dicto: that is, they) (depend, not on conventions of language, but ona knd’s own natue,‘The properties silt humans ar those any being must have to count as human, andthe second ‘view says tat these properties define the human good. “This view is much closer tothe perfectionist idea than waste earlier one about distintivenes, Tata propery is essential to humans is a fact only about humans; it involves no other species. Moreover, it seems a fact of just the right kind A kind's essential properties fix its boundaries of extension; they determine what sand isnot ‘member, Surely tis role makes esseathl properties suitable fora perfectionist Concept of nature. If our orignal ideal was to Become fully human o to develop 2 The Perfectionist Idea human nature, surely the properties that make us human must figue in its best formulation The View als clarifies the appeal of perfectionism. In formulating its idl, the ‘heory assumes tht being human isnot just another of our properts, like being a lawyer ora hockey fan Itis fundamental o vs. In developing human nature we do not realize something tangential to our identity, but realize what at bottom we ae. ‘The concept of essence clarifies this assumption, foreach of us is essentially a ‘human. In every possible word in which we exist, we belong tothe human species; in none are we fogs or fish. The essence view therefore makes double use of the concept of essence: to define human nature, and to He tat nature to individual ‘humans. The properties fundamental to the human species are in the same way fundamental to its individual members, The essence view is well represented in the perfectionist tradition. Hegel cals “universality the "essence" of human consciousness, and says that only ia the society he recommends are humans “in possession of their own essence or thelr cown inner universality." Marx says thal capitalism aienates workers ftom theit “human essence,” whereas communism will involve the real reappropraion of the human essence." Similar language appears in Nietzsche. He speaks of "a world whose essence is will to power" and of the will o power itself as “the innermost essence of being.""! Other writes use equivalent expressions. Aristotle and Aquinas say that goodness consits in actuality or in realizing form, both of which they equate with realizing essence. Stl oer perfectionsts make identi) claims. Plato says in the Phaedo thats human is ideatical to her sul and distnet from her body, from which she is separated before and after earthly life. This statement seems equivalent to acaim about essence, To sy tha human is identical to ber soul seems to imply that some properties of fer soul, suchas intelet, are essential to her, whereas those of her body are not. In its simple form, however, the essence view is 10 inclusive and flls to the wrong:propetes objection. Whatever their other essential properties, all humans swe necessarily self-denial, necessarily red if red, and neceseaily occupiers of space. None of these properties seems intrinsically worth developing. However well it does on the first test, the essence view fails the second test by including in our nature some intuitively tvial properties may be replied that these wivial properties donot admit of depres, so includ- ing them in human nature cannot affect the important perfectionist judgements istnguishing differen modes of living. Thre may be something to this reply, but doubt that there is enough. Can we be certain that no tivial essential properties ‘mit of degrees? If humans necessarily occupy space, may some not do so more by ‘ceupying more space? More importantly, a concept of nature tht includes morally idle properties o putt milly, inelegent. If nartow perfection isa serious moral ‘deal i shouldbe spcifiable without such useless clter. ‘The objections should not make us abandon the concept of essence it does too ell by the first test. We shoud instead ty to narrow the concept of nature soit includes some essential properties and not others: ones that avoid the wrong: Properties objection but not ones that are tv = ee The Concept of Human Nature 213 a 4: obvious move i o combine ours Wo ews and equate hur atte | re propers esental 10 and ditintive of humans. These are properties 4 wi ey humans nll he posible words where they exis and by them alone in Fevsctual world. They ae both necessary © and unique to the species. ~ This essence-and-distinctiveness view hes several attractive features. For one, it ‘seems likely to do well against the wrong-properties objection. Because it imposes Herons fr belonging to human nt, Wt sezm likely 0 slet ony 2 few ie ad 1 elude tose most commen ia wrong properties objections. Mak etre and despoiling te environment ae ruled out beavse, although distinctive, a yaa eset cay sce ea is x tee We dont “yet know what properties the view positnly selects; work would be needed to ety thom. Bute view seems likely to exclude most tial properties. The view also gives probably the truest reflection of the perfectionist tradition, any pereconss, anong tem Ars, Aguas, and Man, sek bot of CBr nd of distinctiveness, and for contency mist be airbed a compou Ser Sor ona different ground, must many others. Writers who claim to valve Sistine properties surely cannot mean a isnctive properties; te implistios tre too absurd. They mus mean what are dsincive among humans important propeizs tat is, among someting like ei essential properties Wforunatly, however the viewinbers defects from he distinctiveness view. ie shes the dif about what is and is not dsinive, say, aboot the human sven. aliomates ot gio denn fat tt etnias asks 4 property ean ccaset be distinctive becaueof changes in ober species, ican also ese tobe essential-and-dstinctve. Final, the view pushes perfectionism in @ Section [find unatracive. When works ast is meant fo, the dstnetivenes test “excludes from our good the development of any bodily properties. It supports ideals thatare purl) mental o even intellectual, sch as those of Pato and Aristotle. But thse dal ae surely too narrow, Tha we are embodied animals sa deep fect about | se some would sy a deep a fata anyand one an acceptable perfectionism "shold eit Is aim for ws sto develop or ature suey the bol pars ofthat future must be included. Our physical properties may not be our morally most Sinica propeies of ter development our greatest good (ce section 3.1.2, 21), buts al objection tothe Eompcond view is att gives our physical is 00 vale tall ro avoid these defects, we could ty amending the view to include oly proper- es that ae esenialand'necesardy disinrve, hai, those properies had by ‘humans alone in this world and by humans alone in any world. This amendment felps with the fist and especially the second defect. I only necessarily distinctive properies count, we canot imagine anole species’ auting a ropeny (or fre in our mare. Butt magnifies te thd defect, by excluding Irom our naare properties that many want included, Many erections think alionaliy i esenial fo humans, and in is sophsicated forms iis actually dsintive. Bu iis ot necessarily disntve, for we can image oer beings with the Same rational “4 The Perfectionist Idea ‘powers. In fact, we can wonder whether any human essential property, considered ‘on ts own, could not in principle be had by another species. If so, the amended view is so restrictive that it lets no properties whatever into our nature. It seems that no tinkering with distinctiveness will yield an acceptable concept of nature: we need some other device for defining a subset of essential properties. To find this subset, let us look more closely atthe different essential properties each ‘human has. 2.2 Essence and Life Esch individual human has ad classes of essential properties, distinguished by the range of objects they are shared by. First are the essential properties shared by al objects, such as selidenity and being red if red and, following that, a narrower class found only in physical objects. These properties include being made of (or being) elementary particles and occupying space. Let us identify these two classes 2, fst, the properties essential toa human qua object and, second, those essential to her qua physical object. Third come essential propertics found only in ving things and, fourth, those found only in animals. Both thes classes contain sructural properties Inanimate matter is made ofthe same elementary particles as living lsh, obeying the same physical laws. What distinguishes the later must thus be the Partles’ organization, To count as animate, mater must be organized for functions such as nutrition, growth, and movement, and what is essential to a human qua living thing or qua animal i that her bod is structured for these organic functions. ‘The fih lass contains the essential properties that distinguish humans from other ‘animals, perhaps including rationality. Finally there are the essential properties that

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