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Vogel’s “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation”

Vogel argues that the way reply to the skeptic is to appeal to the idea that it is reasonable to favor
a hypothesis that offers a better explanation of your data over one that offers a worse
explanation. The data in this case is the fact that we have the experiences we do.
What makes an explanation good? Vogel gives some criteria. Here are two:
 Other things being equal, the simpler the theory, the better it is. Explanations that are
unnecessarily complicated are less likely to be true.
 Other things being equal, the more a theory explains, the better it is.
Think of these criteria as tie breakers. If two theories are the same in all relevant respects but
one is simpler than the other, one should favor the simpler one. And if two theories are the same
in all relevant respect but one explains more than the other, one should favor the theory that
explains more.
Vogel argues that the ‘real world hypothesis’ (i.e., that there are tables, trees, hands, etc. that
cause our experiences) gives a better explanation of our experiences than the computer
simulation hypothesis.

Computer Simulation Hypothesis Real World Hypothesis

These theories are supposed to explain why we have the pattern of experiences that we have.
Suppose we have a skeptical hypothesis with the same structure as the real world hypothesis
(RWH). It posits objects corresponding to the objects of RWH and posits a pattern of properties,
relations, and generalizations that mirror those of RWH. Then, one might think, we have two
competing explanations that are equally good.
RWH Explanation for your Experiences
You experience a piece of paper being blown off your desk by wind.
Explanation:
 Your visual experience is caused by the movement of the paper.
 Your sensations of wind are caused by the wind.
 The cause of the wind experience causes the cause of the visual experience (i.e., the wind
causes the motion of the paper).

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Now explain the vast majority of our experiences in this way. This is RWH.
The skeptic abstracts way from the content of RWH and identifies objects, properties and
relations that give us an account with the same structure but with different objects and relations.
CSH Explanation for your Experiences
You experience a piece of paper being blown off your desk by wind.
Explanation:
 Your visual experience is caused by a computer program that simulates the movement of
the paper.
 Your sensations of wind are caused by a computer program that simulates wind.
 The cause of the wind experience causes the cause of the visual experience (i.e., the
running of the one program causes the running of the other).
Now explain the vast majority of our experiences in this way. This is CSH.
 It is important to understand that RWH and CSH are empirical theories. You might
revisit the first part of the notes on Descartes, where “empirical” and “conceptual” are
defined. You cannot understand Vogel if you are not completely clear about this
distinction.
Again, one might think that the skeptic’s ability to generating accounts of experience with the
same structure as RWH shows that it is impossible to view RWH as a better theory than any
skeptical hypothesis with the same structure.
But Vogel argues that we have to take into account the content of theory as well as its form (i.e.,
structure). It assigns spatial characteristics to the causes of experience.
 For example, it says that no two physical objects can occupy the same location at the
same time. This generalization about location explains why we never have experiences
according to which two objects are in the same place at the same time.
 Notice that it is a conceptual truth, like “If something is a bachelor, it is unmarried.” It is
not an empirical generalization but a conceptual truth.

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Not examples of two things in the same place at once

CSH does not appeal to this conceptual truth because it does not posit physical objects as the
causes of our experiences. It says that there are physical properties of the computer disk—call
them pseudo-locations because they make it seem like you are seeing something in a location
when you really are not.
So, RWH explains some experiences by referencing locations, while the CSH explains by
referencing pseudo-locations. Again, pseudo-location is the property of a computer disk—a disk
has it when it makes it appear to you that there is an object in a location.
So:
 It is a conceptual truth that no two objects can occupy the same spatial location. (So, it is
not a brute fact.)
 But it is not a conceptual truth that no two objects can occupy the same pseudo-location;
pseudo-location is a property that, theoretically, can be shared by two different portions
of a disk—a disk can, in principle, have two portions one of which assigns fake object 1
to a “place” in your visual field, one of which assigns fake object 2 to that same “place”.
So, if you never “see” two objects in that place at the same time, that is not a conceptual
truth—it is because the computer happens to make things come out that way.
 Why does the computer make things come out that way? The answer to this question
points to the tie breaker:
o If it is a brute fact that it does (no explanation) CSH explains less than RWH
(since RWH does not say that it is a brute fact no two objects ever occupy the
same location).
o If it is not a brute fact, there is, according to CSH, an explanation for the fact that
no two parts of a disk ever have the same pseudo-location, but that explanation
makes CSH a more complicated (less simple) empirical theory than RWH. It is
more complicated because the explanation of the computer’s behavior will not
appeal to a conceptual truth but an empirical generalization.
For this reason, RWH is a better explanation for your experiences than CSH.
Even the evil demon hypothesis (EDH) faces this objection. EDH says that a powerful deceptive
evil demon is responsible for all of your experiences.

Evil Demon Hypothesis

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Let’s call the non-physical activity of the demon by virtue of which it is causally responsible for
your experience of spatial location “demon-pseudo-location.” Then we can say:
 It is a conceptual truth that no two objects can occupy the same genuine spatial location.
 But it is not a conceptual truth that no two objects can occupy the same demon-pseudo-
location; the demon could assign fake object 1 and fake object 2 to the same “location” in
your visual field.
 Why does the demon never make two objects appear in the same place to us? The answer
points to the tie breaker:
o If it is a brute fact (no explanation) then EDH explains less than RWH (since
RWH does not say that it is a brute fact no two objects ever occupy the same
location).
o If it is not a brute fact, there is, according to EDH, an explanation for the fact that
the demon never assigns two fake objects the same “location” in your visual field,
but that explanation makes EDH more complicated (less simple) than RWH. It is
more complicated because the explanation of the demon’s behavior will not
appeal to a conceptual truth but an empirical generalization that has no
counterpart in RWH. For example, EDH might say that there is a second demon
that makes the first demon never assign two fake objects the same “location” in
your visual field.
For this reason, RWH is a better explanation for your experiences than EDH.
This is Vogel’s reply to the skeptic. Inference to the best explanation justifies our belief in
RWH.