Respondents Nattrinai Final 2023

STATE LEVEL ENGLISH MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2023
NATTRINAI
IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

OF VARUSA NADU
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 59/2010
VIRUTHAN & OTHERS………………………………………………....APPELLANT(S)
V.
STATE OF VARUSA NADU………………………………………...……RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 1

S.No. TABLE OF CONTENTS Pg.No

1. Table of Exhibits 03
2. Index of Authorities
a) Statutes 04
b) Table of Cases 04
c) Legal Databases 06
d) Books 06
e) Articles 07
2. Statement of Jurisdiction 08
3. Summary of Facts 09
4. Issues Raised 10
5. Summary of Arguments 11
6. Arguments Advanced
I) Whether the death of the deceased is a culpable homicide 12
amounting to murder or not?
II) Whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused 22
herein beyond all the reasonable doubts?
III) Whether the punishment imposed by the trial court is 22
appropriate, legal, and valid?
7. Prayer 34

TABLE OF EXHIBITS
PROSECUTION WITNESS (அ.சா.)

PW. No. NAME PW. No. NAME PW. No. NAME
1 Angai 7 Karavaan 16 Tharuna
2 Idhazha 9 Ezhuvan 17 Kanali
3 Madhanan 10 Kanniyan 21 Adhigan
4 Kayaman 11 Namban 22 Pathiravan
5 Aadhimani 15 Dr. Kandan 23 Ahamed
25 Sarvaraaj
MATERIAL OBJECT (சா.ப ா.)

MO.No. Material Name MO.No. Material Name
1 White veshti (blue border) 6 Aruvaal (41.5 cm)
2 Bloodstained white shirt 7 Black Sokkiya 1100 cellphone
3 White poomex underwear 8 Motorcycle
4 Sony Ericson cellphone 9 Kodofone sim card
10 ISNL sim card
EXHIBIT for PROSECUTION (அ.சா.ஆ)

ExP.No. Name of the Exhibit
1 Complaint given by Angai
2,4 161 Statement (Idhazha), (Adhimani)
7 Recovery Mahazar (VN 99 AFA 8335 – Black Hero Honda Splendor)
8 Recovery Mahazar (41.5 cm Aruvaal with ever-silver handle)
9, 32 Confessional statement (Aruvan), Confessional statement (Viruthan)
10 Signature of Ezhuvan in Seizure Mahazar dated 17.10.2010
11 Signature of Kanniyan in Confessional Statement given by Aruvan
12 Signature of Kanniyan in Seizure Mahazar dated 17.10.2010
13 Observation Mahazar
14 Seizure Mahazar (Gold metallic ADC 147 Ambassador and Black Sony Ericson
cellphone)
15 Ambassador car photo
16 Postmortem report (given by Dr. Kandan)
17 Final report (given by Dr. Kandan)
18 Request letter given by the Police (for postmortem)
19 Summary of the case (given by Police to Dr. Kandan)
20 Report of Biological Division
21 Report of Serology Division
22 Report of Toxicology Division
29 First Information Report
30 Rough sketch prepared by Police
31 Inquest Report
33 Seizure Mahazar (Black Sokkiya 1100 cellphone, Kodofone sim card,
ISNL sim card)
34 Report submitted by Investigating Officer for changing sections

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
S.No STATUTES
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)
2. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
TABLE OF CASES
S.No. CASE NAME & CITATION Pg.No.
1. Fowler v. Padget, (1798) 7 Term Rep 509 11
2. Basdev v. State of Pepsu, 1956 AIR 488 1956 SCR 363 11
3. Shivaji Sahabrao v. State of Delhi, 2020 SC 11
4. State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1264 12
5. Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 13
6. State of U.P v. Virendra Prasad, AIR 2004 SC 1517 13
7. Ankeri v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 842 14
8. Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2574 14
9. Ramakrishna Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay, (1955) SCR 903 16
10. K. Ramaraj v. the State of Tamilnadu, (2014) 1 CTC 289 16
11. State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [2000(1) SCC 471] 16
12. Brij Lal v. Prem Chand, AIR 1989 SC 1661 17
13. Tribhuvan Nath v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 3 SCC 511 18
14. Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. State of Maharahtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1 18
15. Krist S.E. Toppo v. State, 2002 Cri LJ 3642 (Jhar) 19
16. Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 3462 20
17. State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Dave (2021) 2 SCC 735 20
18. Mujendra Langeshwaran v. State (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 266 20
19. Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Others v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 20
SCC 793
20. Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 672 20
21. State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram AIR 2007 SC 144 21
22. Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 SC 1091 21

23. State of MP v. Dharkole (2004) 13 SCC 308 21

24. Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC 158 21
25. State v. Willis (1982) 632 S.W.2d 63 22
26. V. Ambi v. State of Kerala, 1962 CriLJ 135 22
27. R v. Palmer [1886] 115 N.Y. 506 22
28. P.V. Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 811, 1971 CriLJ 22
676, (1971) 1 SCC 483, 1971 III UJ 339 SC
29. Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P (2005) 9 SCC 631 23
30. Raju Manjhi v. State of Bihar, (2019) 12 SCC 784 23
31. Harbajan Singh v. State of J&K (1975) 4 SCC 480 23
32. State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Venkata Reddy & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 454 23
33. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Chand (2002) 10 SCC 518 24
34. Malkhansingh & Ors v. State of MP (2003) 5 SCC 746 24
35. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P. (2010) 2 SCC 748 24
36. Queen v. Blake and Tye, 67 I.A. 336: AIR 1940 P.C. 176 25
37. State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254 25
38. Ashok v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 4 SCC 393 25
39. Bodh Raj Alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002) 8 SCC 45 25
40. Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2021) SCC OnLine SC 542 26
41. Ammu v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 8 SCC 93 26
42. Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 6 SCC 204 27
43. Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana (2018) 6 SCC 610 27
44. R v. Steven Edward Dossett [2013] EWCA Crim 710 27
45. R v Moloney [1985] AC 905 (HL). 27
46. Krishna Mahadev Chavan v. State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine 28
Bom 191
47. Arun Raj v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 457 28
48. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalicharan & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 809 28
49. Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam, AIR 2013 SC 2422 28
50. State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808 28
51. Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127 29
52. State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, (1999) 3 SCC 507 29

53. Rakesh v. State of U.P., 6th July 2021 30

54. State v. Laly @ Manikandan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 851 30
S.No LEGAL DATABASES

1. Indiankanoon.org
2. Casemine.com
3. Legalserviceindia.com
4. Manupatrafast.com
5. Scconline.com
BOOKS
S.No BOOK NAME AUTHOR
1. Indian Penal Code K.A. Pandey
2. Indian Penal Code Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
3. Indian Penal Code C.K. Takwani
4. Commentary on The Indian Penal Code K.D. Gaur
5. Criminal Law P.S. Achuttam Pillai
6. Criminal Procedure Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
7. Criminal Procedure R.V. Kelkar
8. Code of Criminal Procedure S.N. Misra
9. Principles of The Law of Evidence Avtar Singh
10. Law of Evidence Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
11. Law of Evidence Vepa P. Sarathi
12. Commentary on the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (14th edn, CJ M Monir
Universal Law Publishing 2021) 589
13. Illinois Criminal and Traffic Law Manual, 2004 Edition

ARTICLES
S.No ARTICLE NAME AUTHOR NAME
1. An article on Vocal Technique and Acoustics (2000) Jordan Dal
2. A School History and Geography of Northern India Hunter William
(1891) Wilson
3. Foundation of Material Sciences and Engineering (2006) Smith, William,
Hashemi, Javad

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellant has approached this Hon’ble High Court by invoking Section 374(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1972. The Respondents humbly submits to this Hon’ble Court
under the Jurisdiction.
Section 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure states that,
(1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original
criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions
Judge or on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than
seven years 2[has been passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same
trial], may appeal to the High Court.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any person, -
(a) convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant Sessions
Judge or Magistrate of the first class, or of the second class, or
(b) sentenced under section 325, or
(c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed
under Section 360 by any Magistrate, may appeal to the Court of Session.

SUMMARY OF FACTS
1) The Maraiyur Zamindar held some land which was given on lease to various persons
and one of them was Eyakan, the father of Viruthan. Uthiyan, the deceased was the
Union Secretary of the Kurunji Nila Party (Right). As Eyakan did not measure the lease
correctly, his land was handed over to Uthiyan who in turn distributed the land among
his village people. There were disputes between Eyakan, his son Viruthan and Uthiyan
regarding the land and Viruthan was holding a grudge against Uthiyan and vowed
publicly that “Uthiyan’s death will be in his hands.”
2) On 16.10.2010, Uthiyan went to Belathur village to attend to the death of his relative
Inban in a car driven by Aruvan who is not his regular diver. He attended the death and
left the house by 12.45 pm. By 1.00 pm. the Sub-Inspector of Police received
information that Uthiyan was lying dead with 17 cut injuries on the banks of river
Kodhai near the crematorium shed in Mattikulam and the car in which he came was
abandoned and Aruvan was not found there. The police started the investigation and
came to know that Viruthan held a serious grudge against Uthiyan and was also
conspiring with Thurithan and Aruvan to kill Uthiyan.
3) The police started the search and on 17.10.2010 at 10.00 am arrested Viruthan and
Thurithan. Based on their confessions, the police recovered material evidence like
Billhook and motorcycle and subsequently, Aruvan was also arrested. Owing to all
materials on record and all identifications, recoveries along with the testimonies of
witnesses that were held to support the overall case, the Trial Court convicted and
sentenced all the three accused u/s. 120(b) r/w 302 I.P.C and shall suffer a life
imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000 and sentenced further U/s.302 r/w 109 I.P.C and
shall suffer a life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000. Challenging the said conviction
and sentence, all three convicted accused filed an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court
Judicature, Varusa Nadu.

ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE - I
WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED IS A CULPABLE HOMICIDE

AMOUNTING TO MURDER OR NOT?
ISSUE – II
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE

ACCUSED HEREIN BEYOND ALL THE REASONABLE DOUBTS?
ISSUE – III
WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS

APPROPRIATE, LEGAL, AND VALID?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE – I
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Varusa Nadu that the essential
ingredients of the offence committed by the accused have met in the facts and circumstances
of the present case on the grounds, that there is the presence of actus reus and mens rea,
circumstantial evidence, statement of the witnesses, confessional statement of the accused
which led to the discovery of murder weapon. And thus, establishing the guilt of the accused.
ISSUE - II
It is most modestly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of Varasu Nadu that the present
case is one of circumstantial evidence and the respondent has satisfied the standard of proof in
accordance with the five golden principles of circumstantial evidence. The circumstances relied
upon by the prosecution conclusively establish an unbreakable chain of circumstances that is
consistent only with the guilt of the accused.
ISSUE - III
WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS
It is most modestly produced before the Hon’ble High Court of Varasu Nadu that the
punishment imposed by the trial court is appropriate, legal, and valid. The present case is based
on circumstantial evidence that placed a greater degree of burden on the prosecution before the
Trial Court. During the Trial proceedings, the respondent had proved the single chain of
circumstances that incriminate the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE – I

It is humbly submitted that the essential ingredients of offences committed by the accused have
been met in the facts and the circumstances of the instant case and so the findings of guilt
recorded by the Additional Sessions Court were consistent with the evidence on record, hence
the conviction of the accused calls for no interference. For the purpose of convenience, let us
address the commission of the crime in its chronological order.
A) WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE LIABLE U/S. 302 OF THE IPC, 1860?
For the commission of a crime since both Actus Reus and Mens Rea are required 1
and by establishing both, the prosecution has proved that the accused are liable U/s.302
of the IPC, 1860 which was also held by the Sessions Court.
(A.1) Whether the MENS REA of the accused has been established?
It is humbly submitted that the prosecution has established Mens Rea on the
following grounds: Firstly, whether the Accused has the motive to commit an offence.
Secondly, whether the Accused has the intention to commit an offence.
(A.1.1) Accused has the MOTIVE to commit an offence

A motive is something that prompts a man to form an intention.2 Motive is
included in most of criminal cases based on the testimony of an eyewitness or
circumstantial evidence which includes any previous threat, previous argument or
enmity between the parties that admittedly shows motive.3 A person’s motive can be
drawn out from the circumstances of the case. In the instant case, according to the
testimonies of,
i) PW.1: The Maraiyur Zamindar held some land which was given on lease to
various persons and one of them was Eyakan, the father of Viruthan. As Eyakan
1
Fowler v. Padget, (1798) 7 Term Rep 509.
2
Basdev v. State of Pepsu, 1956 AIR 488 1956 SCR 363.
3
Shivaji Sahabrao v. State of Delhi, 2020 SC.

did not measure the lease correctly, his land was handed over to my husband
(Uthiyan) who in turn distributed the land among the village people. There were
disputes between Iyakan, his son Viruthan and my husband regarding the land and
Viruthan was holding grudge against my husband and has vowed publicly that
“Uthiyan’s death will be in his hands.”4
ii) PW.2: Our party’s Union Secretary (Uthiyan) had previous enmity with Iyakan’s
son Viruthan regarding land matters.5
iii) PW.24: I know that Viruthan (A1) vowed that Uthiyan’s death will be in his hands.
I also have heard him saying so couple of times.6
iv) PW.4: My son distributed Maraiyur zamindar’s land as 33 cents each. Iyakan got
264 cents of land but did not measure lease for 2 years. When my son questioned
him, Iyakan said that he will not give the rent to him and will directly deal with the
Zamindar. Even when my son insisted, Iyakan refused to give the rent. So, my son
asked him not to cultivate the land. While this conversation was going on, Iyakan;s
son Viruthan (A1) said that my son’s death will be in his hands. I also heard him
saying so.7
Hence, the existence of previous enmity, previous threat, and previous argument
between the parties has been established which is relevant u/Sec. 8 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 as a fact that shows or constitutes a motive for the fact in issue.
(A.1.2) Accused has the INTENTION to commit an offence
The intention is the state of mind which has to be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of each case.8 Direct proof of intention is always very difficult to obtain.
However, the intention is something that can be gathered and inferred from the action
of the person and the surrounding circumstances, such as the motive of the accused,
nature of the attack, the time and place of attack, the nature of weapons used, the nature
of the injuries caused to the deceased and so on.9
Accordingly,
i) Motive: As submitted in the previous point, the motive of the accused is clearly
established.
4
Moot Proposition, Annexure 3, Examination-in-Chief.
5
6
Moot Proposition, Annexure 14, Cross Examination.
7
8
State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1264.
9
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, (LexisNexis, 2014)

ii) Nature of the attack: The collective reading of Section 300 of the IPC, 1860
shows the presence of a special Mens Rea which consists of four mental attitudes
and the presence of any one of which distinguishes murder from culpable
homicide. Those four mental attitudes are stated in the four clauses of Section
300.10 The crux of those four conditions is that the act which causes death is done
with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily
injury and that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death.11 From the depositions of,
a) PW.2: Viruthan (A1) got down from the motorcycle driven by Thurithan
(A2) and attacked Uthiyan with a Billhook. When Uthiyan fell on the banks
of the river, Viruthan (A1) hacked him multiple times with the Billhook
brutally despite his hues and cries.12
b) PW.3: Viruthan (A1) got down from the motorcycle driven by Thurithan
(A2) and hacked Uthiyan with a Billhook. Uthiyan slipped and fell near the
banks of the river. Viruthan (A1) hacked Uthiyan again several times.13
It is clear that Viruthan’s (A1) special Mens Rea caused the death of Uthiyan which his
act will in the ordinary course likely cause.
iii) Time and place of attack: From the depositions of PW.114, PW.215, PW.316,
PW.517, we could infer that all the three accused were aware that Uthiyan will
come to attend the condolence and fixed a deserted place to murder him. By fixing
the exact place and time, it is clear that they had the intention to finish off the
deceased and to conceal it from others which is relevant under Section 9 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as it affords an opportunity for the occurrence of the
crime.
10
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874.
11
State of U.P v. Virendra Prasad, AIR 2004 SC 1517.
12
13
14
15
16
17

iv) Nature of weapons used: The intention has to be inferred particularly from the
nature of the weapon.18 In the case of Ankeri v. State of Rajasthan,19 where it was
held when the appellant though armed with an axe caused only simple incised
injuries some of them are superficial and not causing any damage to the internal
organs of the body of the deceased, the accused cannot have the intention to cause
the death of the deceased. From the depositions of PW.220 and PW.321 it is clear
that the accused (A1) caused the death of the deceased with a Billhook which was
recovered22 through the information received23 from accused (A1) which is
relevant under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the same have
been marked as MO.6. In the autopsy report24 it is also stated that the injuries in
Uthiyan’s body might have been caused by a sharp object like Billhook leading to
17 cut injuries thus, corroborating the testimonies of PW.2 and PW.3.
v) Nature of injuries caused: When injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body
like the abdomen by a lethal or sharp-edged weapon, the irresistible inference is
that the accused intended to kill the deceased.25 In the instant case, the autopsy
report26 given by the doctor (PW.15) clearly states that the death of Uthiyan was
caused by injuries in important organs like the brain and lungs, blood loss, and
shock.27
vi) Previous conduct: According to PW.1, Viruthan (A1) has followed Uthiyan a
couple of times and Uthiyan also conveyed this to Angai (PW.1). So, the statement
of the accused (A1) that Uthiyan’s death will be in his hands is accompanied by
his act also.28 Thus, showing that his statement was not made generally but in
reference to this particular matter in question.
18
Ankeri v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 842.
19
Ibid 18.
20
21
22
ExP.8 – Recovery Mahazar, Moot Proposition, Annexure 14.
23
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 27, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872..
24
ExP.16- Autopsy Report, Moot Propositon, Annexure 9.
25
Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2574.
26
Ibid 18.
27
28

Thus, the state of mind of the accused to intentionally cause the death of the deceased
has been established clearly to show the intention which is relevant under Section 14 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
(A.2) Whether the ACTUS REUS of the accused has been established?
1) An Actus Reus, or a criminal act or omission generally involves three elements or

components: (1) a voluntary act or failure to perform an act, (2) that causes, (3) a social
harm condemned under a criminal statute.29
2) According to Section 299 of the IPC, 1860 which defines culpable homicide as
whoever causes death by doing an act,
(i) with the intention of causing death, or
(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
(iii) with the knowledge that he is likely by such an act to cause death,
Commit the offence of culpable homicide.
3) Since we have proved the intention in the previous sub-issue, let us discuss in detail
whether the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the accused.
Deposition of Witnesses:
1. PW.2: PW.2 being an eyewitness to the act of the accused has clearly stated that
when she was traveling by bicycle with PW.3 along the banks of river Kodhai,
heard the cries of someone. So, she asked PW.3 to hasten to the place. On the banks
of river Kodhai near the crematorium shed, an ambassador car was parked, and a
motorcycle was parked in front of the car. Viruthan (A1) got down from the
motorcycle and hacked Uthiyan with a Billhook who got down from the car.
Uthiyan slipped and fell near the river and Viruthan (A1) continuously hacked him
to death. Then Viruthan (A1) got on the motorcycle driven by Thurithan (A2) and
fled the place.30
2. PW.3: PW.3 being another eyewitness to the act of the accused has stated that when
he was there in Saraganur, PW.2 asked for a lift to him. When he was driving along
the banks of river Kodhai to drop PW.2 in her village, he saw that an Ambassador
car was parked near the crematorium shed in the banks of river Kodhai and a
motorcycle was parked in front of it. Viruthan (A1) got down from the motorcycle
29
Illinois Criminal and Traffic Law Manual, 2004 Edition.
30

and hacked Uthiyan with a Billhook who got down from the car. Uthiyan slipped
and fell near the river and Viruthan (A1) continuously hacked him to death. Then
Viruthan (A1) got on the motorcycle driven by Thurithan (A2) and both of them
fled the place.31
Recovery of the Murder Weapon:
1) According to PW.25, when he arrested Viruthan(A1) and Thurithan(A2),
Viruthan(A1) gave a confession statement that he had thrown the Billhook which
was used to murder Uthiyan in a bush near the Mattikulam lake. Through his
statement, PW.25 recovered a 41.5cm long Billhook (MO.6) which was hidden
in a bush and its Recovery Mahazar was marked as ExP. 8.32
2) According to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, when any fact is
deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
3) Thus, in the instant case the fact that the concealment of the murder weapon was
discovered in consequence of the information given by the accused (A1) clearly
shows that the information was true and accordingly it can be safely allowed to
be given in evidence.33
4) When a recovery is made on the disclosure statement of an accused which is

relevant under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, three hypotheses
would follow: (1) The accused had hidden it (2) The accused had seen someone
hiding it (3) The accused was told by someone about it.34
5) In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh35, the Supreme Court has held that if the
accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the
31
32
33
Ramakrishna Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay, (1955) SCR 903.
34
K. Ramaraj v. the State of Tamilnadu, (2014) 1 CTC 289.
35
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh [2000(1) SCC 471].

concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities, the criminal court
can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. Here in the instant case,
since the accused had failed to prove the last two possibilities, we can presume
that he hid the murder weapon himself. Thus, the Doctrine of Confirmation by
Subsequent Event has been successfully established.
(A.2.1) Whether the accused (A2) and (A3) are guilty of abetment?
Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 enumerates abetment. Abetment is
constituted by instigating a person to commit an offence or by engaging in a conspiracy to
commit it or intentionally aiding a person to commit it.36
(a) Whether the accused are guilty of criminal conspiracy?
According to Sec. 120A of the IPC, 1860, when two or more persons agree to do or
cause to be done,
(i) An illegal act
(ii) An act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated criminal
conspiracy
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall
amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by
one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
(1) The Essence of The Offence of Conspiracy: The essence of the offence of
conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express
or implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the
agreement is made and continues to be committed as long as the combination persists,
that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by the completion of its
performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be.
(2) The Actus Reus in a Conspiracy: The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement
to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it.
(3) Meeting of the Minds: It is necessary to show a consensus ad idem between all
the members party to the criminal conspiracy i.e., a consensus to the effect of an
unlawful purpose.
According to Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where there is
reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to
36
Brij Lal v. Prem Chand, AIR 1989 SC 1661.

commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one
of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such
intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of
the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the
existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a
party to it.
According to the deposition of witnesses:
1) The following deposition of the witnesses proves that there exists a clear conspiracy
between all the three accused (Viruthan)A1, Thurithan (A2), and Aruvan (A3).
(i) PW.1: My husband Uthiyan asked A3 to drive the car as he wanted to attend the
condolence. My husband went to the condolence in the car which was driven by
A3.37
(ii) PW.5: I went to the condolence of Inban. When I was there, Uthiyan also came
there in a car. Then, when I went to a nearby teashop to have tea, I saw A3 speaking
with A1 and A3. I heard Viruthan A1 saying, “We should execute what we have
planned” and in turn, A3 said, “I will stop the vehicle at the place where you asked
me to stop and pretend to urinate. You finish off the job correctly as you said.”38
(iii) PW.2 and PW.3: An Ambassador car was parked on the banks of river Kodhai
near the crematorium shed and Uthiyan got down from the car.39
(iv) PW.25: An Ambassador was parked in the place of occurrence.40
(v) PW.1: When I went to the place of occurrence, A3 was not there.41
2) It is evident that a conspiracy existed among all the three accused from the deposition
of PW.5, the words of the accused and their actions. In furtherance to their words, the
car was also parked. Once the act of parking the car was completed, the same becomes
a relevant fact that conspiracy existed among all the accused and A3 was a part of
that conspiracy.
3) The statements by one accused to another and the evidence as to the acts done by him
disclosing participation by the other accused in the conspiracy are also relevant.42
Sec.10 of the Indian Evidence Act, of 1872 provides a unique and special rule of
37
38
39
Moot Proposition, Annexure 4 and 5, Examination-in Chief.
40
ExP. 13 – Observation Mahazar, Moot Proposition, Annexure 14.
41
42
Tribhuvan Nath v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 3 SCC 511.

evidence to be followed in case of conspiracy. Once the conditions given therein are
fulfilled, the statement made by one conspirator will be taken as evidence against all
other co-conspirators.43 In the instant case, the statement by A3 is taken as evidence
against all three accused for conspiracy.
4) Since their intention to conspire is inferred from their action, all the three accused are
guilty of conspiracy which was correctly held by the Hon’ble Sessions Court.
(b) Whether the accused (A2) and (A3) are guilty of aiding the murder of Uthiyan?
1. The following deposition of the witnesses proves that Thurithan (A2) had aided the
murder of Uthiyan.
PW.2: Thurithan (A2) was standing with the motorcycle when Viruthan (A1) hacked
Uthiyan. Then Viruthan (A1) got on the motorcycle which was driven by Thurithan
(A2) and fled the place.44
PW.3: Once Viruthan (A1) hacked Uthiyan, he got on the motorcycle of Thurithan
(A2) and both of them passed through us (PW.2 and PW.3) and fled the place. 45
PW.5: When I was having tea in the teashop, Viruthan (A1) and Thurithan (A2) came
in a motorcycle and were speaking to Aruvan (A3).46
PW.12: I gave my Motorcycle to Thurithan (A2) as he asked it for urgent work.47
PW.25: Thurithan (A2) gave a confession statement through which a black colour Hero
Honda Splendor motorcycle which was hidden by him was recovered. The motorcycle
is marked as MO.8 and the Recovery Mahazar is marked as ExP.7.48
2. From the above statements of the witnesses, we can clearly infer that Thurithan (A2)
have engaged in conspiracy with the other two accused to commit the murder of Uthiyan. He
has also consciously aided and assisted them to murder Uthiyan which is evident from his
actions and conduct. So, the abetment and conspiracy on the part of Thurithan (A2) are clearly
proved. As stated earlier, the words spoken, and the acts done in furtherance to it by Aruvan
(A3) clearly proves that he is also guilty of aiding and conspiring to murder Uthiyan.
43
Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. State of Maharahtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1.
44
Moot Proposition, Annexure 4, Examination-in Chief.
45
46
47
48

3. In the case at hand, the circumstantial evidence, the statements of the witnesses, the
confession statement of the accused which led to the discovery of the murder weapon
cumulatively form complete chain establishing the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable
doubts.49 Hence, it is evident that the accused are guilty u/sec. 302 r/w. 109 of the IPC, 1860
and u/Sec. 120B r/w. 302 of the IPC, 1860.
4. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Varusa Nadu
that all the three accused have murdered Uthiyan.
49
Krist S.E. Toppo v. State, 2002 Cri LJ 3642 (Jhar).

ISSUE – II and ISSUE – III

WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRAIL COURT IS

1) THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIAL CANNOT BE VITIATED ON

ILLEGALITY AND INCOMPETENCY.
A) It is most humbly submitted that the accused-appellants were rightly convicted by
the Trial Court under Section 302 r/w Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(‘IPC’) and section 120(B) r/w. Section 302 of IPC. The instant case is based on
circumstantial evidence that placed a greater degree of burden on the prosecution
before the Trial Court. During the Trial proceedings, the respondent had proved the
single chain of circumstances that incriminate the appellant beyond a reasonable
doubt. No substantial evidence was led by the appellant to indicate his innocence,
which further credited the case to the prosecution.
B) It is most humbly submitted before the hon’ble High Court that while it is necessary
that proof beyond reasonable doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases, it is not
necessary to be perfect.50 It has been observed by the Supreme Court that the Trial
Court is the best place to holistically appreciate the demeanor of witnesses and
evidence on record51. Further, the Supreme Court has persistently reiterated that
the conviction by the Learned Trial Court immunizes the accused from his
presumption of innocence before the Appellate Court52. It is well-settled that the
miscarriage of justice can also arise from the acquittal of the guilty 53. The
respondent pleads that the appellant should not be granted the presumption of
innocence as the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court remains substantial in
the eyes of law and should act as a cornerstone for High Court’s appellate powers54.
50
Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 3462.
51
State of Gujarat v. Bhalchandra Dave (2021) 2 SCC 735.
52
Mujendra Langeshwaran v. State (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 266.
53
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Others v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793.
54
Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 672.

C) In the instant case, the prosecution relies on the evidence of confessional statement,
deposition of witnesses and last seen together based on circumstantial evidence, all
the links in the chain of events establish the guilt of all three accused beyond the
shadow of a doubt and the established chain of circumstances are consistent with
the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his
innocence55. Therefore, the credibility of testimony, oral or circumstantial, depends
considerably on a judicial evaluation of the totality, not isolated scrutiny56.
2) THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS CORRECTLY APPLIED THE TEST OF

PROVING FACTS ‘BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT’.
A) The standard of beyond all reasonable doubt is defined as one that need not reach
certainty but carries a high degree of probability57. To constitute a reasonable doubt,
doubt cannot be trivial, imaginary, or a mere possibility, instead it must be premised
on reason and common sense and must be free of any abstract speculation58.
B) The Supreme Court in Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan59 laid down the golden
principles which have to be established to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt
when a case is based on circumstantial evidence. Firstly, the circumstances relied
upon to establish guilt must be fully established. Secondly, these facts that have
been established must exclude every other hypothesis except the one consistent with
the guilt of the appellant. Thirdly, the facts must be of a conclusive nature and
tendency. Fourthly, the circumstances must form a complete chain of events that
incriminates the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt.
C) It is submitted that the evidence put forth by the prosecution-respondent proves
beyond a reasonable doubt, a chain of evidence that is consistent only with the guilt
of the appellant. Each circumstance has been conclusively established and allows
only the inference of guilt on part of the appellant. The independent merit of each
circumstance in the chain of evidence is analysed below.
55
State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram AIR 2007 SC 144.
56
Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1978 SC 1091.
57
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (27th edn, LexisNexis 2019) 173.
58
State of MP v. Dharkole (2004) 13 SCC 308.
59
Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC 158.

2.1 MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT IS ESTABLISHED.
(a) Motive induces a person to act in a certain way60. It is recognized that motive alone
is not sufficient to impose criminal liability but remains a relevant factor in forming an
intention61. The fundamental maxim of criminal law ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’
which means an act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention should be
considered. In order to constitute a crime, the intent and act must concur, but in the ease of
insane persons, no culpability is fastened on them as they have no free will (furiosi nulla
voluntas est)62. In the cases of circumstantial evidence, it was observed that an enquiry into
motive presumes prime importance. In the instant case, the motive is highlighted through two
circumstances-
(i) The appellant A-1 had a long-standing quarrel for nearly the last sixteen
years with the deceased63.
(ii) The appellant A-1 had rivalry towards the deceased and he even followed
and threatened the deceased on multiple occasions64.
(iii) The appellant A-2 and A-3 were seen together with A-1 near a tea stall
conspiring a plan to kill the deceased which was overheard by the chance
witness65.
(b) The testimonies of PW. 1 and PW.4 along with PW. 2 and PW.3, jointly prove the
existence of rivalry on part of the accused-appellants thereby establishing his motive to
commit the murder. Motive is not judged on its seriousness or adequacy, given that
atrocious crimes have been committed for very insignificant gains as well66. A rivalry
between the two such as possession of property dispute has been held sufficient to prove
that a mental element existed to cause murder67. Thus, under Section 8 of the IEA the
existence and take back possession of land by appellant A1 from the deceased is a relevant
fact that formulates motive68 and provides an additional link in the incriminating chain of
evidence that establishes the guilt of the appellant.
60
State v. Willis (1982) 632 S.W.2d 63.
61
K.D. Gaur, Textbook on Indian Penal Code (7th edn, LexisNexis 2020) 119.
62
V. Ambi v. State Of Kerala, 1962 CriLJ 135.
63
Moot proposition, Annexure 3 to 6, and 14.
64
Moot proposition, Annexure 3 cross examination.
65
Moot proposition, Annexure 6 Main and cross examination.
66
R v. Palmer [1886] 115 N.Y. 506.
67
P.V. Narayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 811, 1971 CriLJ 676, (1971) 1 SCC 483, 1971 III UJ
339 SC
68
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 8, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872.

2.2 THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE BY THE

REASON OF DOCK IDENTIFICATION.
The identification evidence of a witness is admissible under Section 9 of the

IEA. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in
court69. There is no provision in CrPC that obliges the investigating agency to hold or
confer a right on the accused to claim a test identification parade. And absence to hold it
would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court70. The testimony of a
witness cannot be discarded or become inadmissible on the ground that no TIP was
conducted before the dock identification71. Further, in regard to the identification of an
accused by a witness, the Supreme Court has held that the testimony of a witness in the
court constitutes substantive testimony and the identification of an accused in the TIP is
only confirmatory of the testimony made before the court72. TIP is not obligatory and does
not render the identification evidence inadmissible73 nor is it fatal to the case of the
prosecution74. Presently, the accused-appellant was identified by three witnesses in the
court. The testimonies of these witnesses are established to be credible:
2.2.1 Testimonies of PW.2 and PW.3 are Admissible and Credible:
(a) PW.2 while along with PW.3 eyewitnesses were returning from Silakanatam
to Puliyantatai after PW.2 went grocery shopping in the Rubam grocery store in
Silakanatam. As PW.2 did not get any bus to return she asked PW.3 to drop her in
Puliyantatai. While they were on the way in cycle near the Kothai riverbank she heard a
voice screaming “ayoo…. Appa….”. When they went faster toward the direction of the
voice near the Kothai riverbank crematorium shed, she saw an ambassador car parked, and
a two-wheeler vehicle was parked right in front of the car. One among them, was standing
with one leg leaning towards it. From the parked two-wheeler one person got down and
slashed the person who got down from the car. The wounded person screamed
“Ayoo…appa….” and fell on the waterfront. Deceased Uthiyan and PW.2 were Kurinji
69
Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P (2005) 9 SCC 631.
70
Raju Manjhi v. State of Bihar, (2019) 12 SCC 784.
71
Harbajan Singh v. State of J&K (1975) 4 SCC 480.
72
State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Venkata Reddy & Others (1976) 3 SCC 454.
73
Raju Manjhi v. State of Bihar (2019) 12 SCC 784.
74
Harbhajan Singh v. State of J&K (1975) 4 SCC 48.

nila party members and she was one of the party members for 5 years. Therefore, she was
well aware of the fact that Uthiyan and Viruthan A1 had a long-standing quarrel regarding
the lease of a Zamin land and hence PW.2 knows A1. When the accused is known to the
witness and is identified by the witness in Court, a TIP is not essential75. A TIP is required
only when the witness does not have a particular reason to remember the appellant76.
Presently, PW.2 deposed that she particularly recalled Virthan A-1 atrociously slashing
Uthiyan who fell on the waterfront. And Thurithan A2 was the person driving the two-
wheeler. Most importantly, PW.2 identified both of them in the Court. Thus, it can be
concluded that PW.2 had a specific reason to remember the appellant and a TIP was not
required in her case.
(b) Secondly, chance witness PW.3 saw in broad sunlight that the A1 viruthan
slashed Uthiyan, and after attacking him with billhook A1 got in the bike with Thuritan A2
and crossed them. And he deposed that aruvan who was standing there did not try to catch
the accused who drove away from them.
(c) PW.2 and PW.3 dock identification77, is corroborated by the groceries bill
from Rubam groceries store in Silakanatam where she had visited for groceries the same
noon78. The Supreme Court observed that the court identification (dock) of the accused
without TIP is admissible if the court finds it trustworthy79. The trustworthiness of PW.2
and PW.3 testimony is established by the fact that they had no animosity towards the
appellant. Therefore, there is no reason to suspect any falsity in their witness’s statement
or identification of the accused by way of any personal inducement or interest. This
trustworthy statement would thus not be adversely affected in the absence of a TIP.
2.2.2 Testimony of PW. 5 is Admissible and Credible:
(a) Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired
together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by
any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such
75
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Chand (2002) 10 SCC 518.
76
Malkhansingh & Ors v. State of MP (2003) 5 SCC 746.
77
Moot proposition, Annexure 4, 5.
78
Moot proposition, Annexure 4.
79
Musheer Khan v. State of M.P. (2010) 2 SCC 748.

intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the
persons believed to so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the
conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it80.
(b) The accused-appellants here were seen near the Kaapur corner tea stall road where the
PW. 5 had come to have a cup of tea after attending the funeral of Inban. There, PW. 5
himself saw A1 Viruthan, A2 Thurithan came together in a two-wheeler and he heard A1
calling driver Aruvan A3 and asked “Shall we proceed to implement the plan?” and for
which A3 Aruvan answered “I’ll park the car where you said. And you finish your work
there” After which they dispersed from the place81. And notably, PW.5 identified the three
accused in the Court-identification (dock). Moreover, the deposition by PW.5 about the
conspirator’s statements corroborates with the incident of crime which was witnessed by
PW.2 and PW.3. Consecutively, facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a
fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether occurred at the
same time and place or at different times and places82.
(c) Therefore, the credibility of these three witness testimonies cannot be suspected on the
ground that a TIP was not held.
2.3. THE DECEASED WAS LAST SEEN WITH THE APPELLANT.
The ‘Last Seen Theory’ functions on the presumption that if the deceased was last seen
in the company of the accused right before his death, the accused is said to have caused the
death83. The presumption becomes conclusive if the existence is corroborated by the
surrounding circumstances, relations between the accused and the deceased, non-explanation
of death by the accused etc84. The Last Seen Theory can be established as:
2.3.1 There was Close Proximity of Time and Place
The intervention in the proximity of time when the deceased and the appellant
were last seen alive together and when the deceased was discovered to be dead is of essence85.
It is herein submitted that the appellant A3 driver was in the company of the deceased 86 at the
80
81
Queen v. Blake and Tye, 67 I.A. 336 : AIR 1940 P.C. 176.
82
83
State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254
84
Ashok v. State of Maharashtra (2015) 4 SCC 393.
85
Bodh Raj Alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002) 8 SCC 45
86
Moot proposition, Anexxure 3.

time of the murder as he made a stop in an isolated place87 which is Kothai riverbank. This is
corroborated by the fact that the PW.6 witnessed A1 and A2 talking to A3 “Shall we proceed
to implement the plan?” to which A3 Aruvan answered “I’ll park the car where you said. And
you finish your work there” After which they dispersed from the place88. The post-mortem
report in the instant case confirmed the time of death to be between 2 hours to 12 hours89. Also,
according to the deposition of PW.3 the accused A1 and A2 went in a two-wheeler passing
Aruvan but he did not try to catch him90. This shows that driver Aruvan was on the spot during
the murder, and he stopped the car in which Uthiyan was traveling to abet the accused. This
confirms that the time when the appellant A3 departed from the deceased’s company was
proximate. The time when appellant A3 departed from the deceased’s company is solely in the
knowledge of the appellant A3, his failure to provide a reasonable explanation forms an
additional link in the chain of events toward the establishment of his guilt91.
2.3.2 The Appellant Failed to Establish the Plea of Alibi
(a) The Supreme Court observed that the conviction of the appellant last seen
with the deceased can be upheld if the accused-appellant is unable to offer any explanation as
to circumstances in which he departed from the company of the deceased and there is motive
to commit the crime92. Subsequently, the burden of proving the circumstances in which the
appellant departed the company of the deceased is on the appellant under Section 106 of the
IEA93.
(b) According to the deposition of PW.1 wife of late Uthiyan stated that there is
a taxi stand near to their home. And Aruvan had his own car for taxi services. And one day to
attend the funeral for Inban in Pelathur village, his friend Aruvan came to drive the car for the
same94. This leads to a presumption that Aruvan had glance of every moment of Uthiyan and
waited for the right moment to execute their plan of attacking Uthiyan. To corroborate this the
fact that PW.5 Aadimani saw Aruvan talking with A1 and A2 and said that he will act according
to the plan95. And mainly, PW. 3 Madhanan deposed that he saw driver aruvan in the murder
87
Moot proposition, Annexure 6, 14.
88
Moot proposition, annexure 6.
89
90
91
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 106, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872
92
Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2021) SCC OnLine SC 542.
93
Ammu v. State of Maharashtra (2003) 8 SCC 93.
94
95

scene and though the accused tried to escape in their bike passing through aruvan, he did not
try to catch them.
(b) Presently, apart from the witness statement, the accused appellant A3
provided no corroborating evidence to suggest that he was absent from the crime scene96. In
fact, no evidence was led by the appellant in the Trial proceedings. Where the plea of alibi is
not proved, the Court is entitled to draw an adverse inference against the appellant97. The failure
of the accused-appellant A-3 to provide a reasonable explanation under Section 10698 forms a
strong presumption against him99 and entitles the court to draw an adverse inference against
the appellant on these grounds100.
2.3.3. The Present Circumstances Do Not Amount to Fleeting Glance
The Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom case of R v Dossett (2013)101 has
given a narrow interpretation of fleeting glance. It held that taking in a person’s features was
an instinctive process and was separated from conscious mental processes. It was also held that
it is not necessary to look at an individual’s face for long to gauge their essential features,
especially when there is good reason for it to be imprinted on the mind of the observer. The
quality of such an observation was held well enough to constitute an identification.
PW.5 Aadimani deposed that there was no vehicle parked around the tea shop and hence when
the accused A-1 and A-2 came in the two-wheeler to the same tea shop road it acted as a good
enough reason to draw Mr. Aadimani’s attention. Thus, his identification of the appellants by
PW. 5 cannot be classified as a fleeting glance.
2.4. THAT THE ACCUSED A1 HAD THE INTENTION TO MURDER THE

DECEASED
A) Intention is the purpose or design with which an act is done102. In R v. Moloney103,

it was observed that the foresight of the consequences of the actions by the accused can be
admitted inferring the intent of the offender. In the present case, the post-mortem report
96
Moot proposition.
97
Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012) 6 SCC 204.
98
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 106, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1872
99
State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254.
100
Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana (2018) 6 SCC 610.
101
R v. Steven Edward Dossett (2013) EWCA Crim 710.
102
CJ M Monir, Commentary on the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (14th edn, Universal Law Publishing 2021) 589
103
R v Moloney (1985) AC 905 (HL).

indicated that the deceased died as a consequence of wounds in the main part of the body such
as the brain, lungs, and many deep wounds happened due to the deep cut of the billhook
machete and blood loss resulting in trauma. An injury on the head of the deceased signified
that the appellant was in fact aware of his actions because the nature of the injuries found on
the body of the deceased is of determinative significance104.
B) The Supreme Court reiterated that the nature of weapon used and vital part of the
body where the injury was caused prove beyond reasonable doubt the intention of the accused
to cause death of the deceased105. It was held that when death is caused by a single blow on
vital part of the body, the accused can be charged with murder under the Penal Code106.
C) To this extent, it is established that the appellant caused a head injury and other
gruesome deep injuries to the deceased with an intention of causing murder.
2.5.STATEMENTS MADE BY THE APPELLANT WERE VOLUNTARY
A) It is most humbly submitted that confessions by the accused person shall not be
proved under section 25107 and 26108 of IEA, however section 27109 provides for an exception
to such admissions. It has been held by the Supreme Court that “the basic idea embedded in
section 27 of the IEA is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events, i.e., if any fact is
discovered in a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such
a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true.”110
B) It was observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad111
that the mere questioning of an accused in police custody by a police officer resulting in an
incriminatory statement is not compulsion. The Court further observed that, for establishing
compulsion, the element of ‘duress’ must be proved to have existed. ‘Duress’ can be said to
have existed, if it can be proved that the appellant was either forced to provide the information
“by injury, beating or unlawful imprisonment” or by the ‘threat’ of death, grievous harm to
body, or unlawful imprisonment. Presently, there is no evidence on record to prove that there
was any injury or harm caused to the person of the appellant or that he was unlawfully
104
Krishna Mahadev Chavan v State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 191.
105
Arun Raj v Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 457.
106
State of Madhya Pradesh v Kalicharan & Ors (2019) 6 SCC 809.
107
108
109
110
Rumi Bora Dutta v. State of Assam, AIR 2013 SC 2422.
111
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad AIR 1961 SC 1808.

imprisoned by the police. There is also no evidence on record to prove that the police threatened
him with death, grievous bodily harm, or unlawful imprisonment to force him to falsely provide
incriminating statements out of ‘fear’ or ‘hope’. There is no evidence of use of any extraneous
process by the Police to condition the mental state of the appellant to make involuntary and
extorted statements.
C) During the investigation of the crime, the appellants A1 and A2 led the way to the
place where they threw the murder weapon and identified the 41.5 cm billhook machete behind
the bush near the Kothai riverbank and also blood-stained clothes belonging to A1 and
moreover, led them to the municipality cycle stand and identified their bike numbered VN 99
FA 8335 hero honda splendor bike. And the same were seized by the police 112 with the local
independent local witnesses113. The discovery assures the truth of the statement and makes it
reliable. This disclosure by the appellants-accused were made voluntarily and without any
compulsion and serves as evidence against him114. The Forensic Science Laboratory report
discloses that the samples collected from the scene of offence that is exhibit clothes of A1 had
bloodstains of human origin and belonged to ‘B’ blood group. But could not find the blood
group of the billhook machete as it was thrown into a muddy shrub. But though it was identified
as human blood. However, since the bloodstains will be disintegrated by the time bloodstains
were examined by the Forensic Science Laboratory, the blood group could not be
determined115. For the same, the accused cannot be unpunished, more particularly when the
bloodstains were found of human origin.
D) In State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram116, this Court concluded that even when the origin
of the blood cannot be determined, it does not necessarily prove fatal to the case of the
prosecution. In that case, the murder weapons had been recovered with blood on them, and the
origin of the blood on one of the weapons could not be determined. Therein, the Court held as
follows:
“25. Failure of the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of
the serum in the meanwhile does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe would not
112
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, § 102, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974
113
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, § 100(4), No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974
114
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (n 6) 110-111.
115
Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127.
116
State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, (1999) 3 SCC 507,

have been human blood at all. Sometimes it happens, either because the stain is too
insufficient or due to hematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a
serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. Will it then mean that the blood
would be of some other origin? Such guesswork that blood on the other axe would
have been animal blood is unrealistic and far-fetched in the broad spectrum of this
case. The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts.
Unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind
entertains with some objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused.”
The decision Teja Ram117, was followed in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001)
2 SCC 205 and in Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127.
E) Recovery of the weapon used in the commission of the offence is not a sine qua non
to convict the accused. If there is a direct evidence in the form of eyewitness, even in the
absence of recovery of weapon, the accused can be convicted. Similarly, even in the case of
some minor contradictions118 with respect to timing of lodging the FIR/complaint cannot be a
ground to acquit the accused when the prosecution case is based upon the deposition of
eyewitness - There can be a conviction on the basis of the deposition of the sole eye witness, if
the said witness is found to be trustworthy and/or reliable.119
2.6. NO INFERENCE ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER PERPETRATOR

CAN BE ESTABLISHED
A) The respondents allege that given the close proximity of time, motive and the kind
of injury that caused the deceased's death point towards the culpability of the appellants A1,
A2, and A3. In the given facts and circumstances, it would amount to an imaginary doubt to be
cast upon the chain of events. The presence of another criminal is also not corroborated because
all the belongings appeared on the deceased indicating that he did not encounter any other
criminal120. The culpability of the appellant is further corroborated by his intention as
established under 2.4.
117
Ibid 116.
118
Rakesh v. State of UP, 6th July 2021.
119
State v. Laly @ Manikandan, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 851.
120
Moot proposition.

B) Here, on the above points, without leaving any reasonable doubt for any conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused in all human probability, the act has been done by
the Accused.
For the reasons mentioned above, respondent submissively propose that the Trial Court has
correctly applied the test of proving facts ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ and hence there is no
ground to interfere with the impugned judgement and order of the Hon’ble Trial Court.

PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble High Court of Varusa Nadu
that it may be benevolently pleased to declare that:
1. The essential ingredients of Sections 300, 120(A), and 107 of the Indian Penal Code
have been met in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and uphold the Trial
Court conviction of Viruthan -A1, Thurithan -A2, and Aruvan -A3 offences under
Section 302 r/w. Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code of 1860 and 120(B)r/w. Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code 1860.
2. The facts and circumstances of the case establish the guilt of Viruthan -A1, Thurithan
-A2, and Aruvan -A3 beyond reasonable doubt and the Trial Court of Karambalur had
correctly applied this test while convicting the accused-appellants.
3. Dismiss the appeal.
And/or
Also pass any other order that this Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the
interests of justice, equity, and good conscience.
For this act of Kindness, the RESPONDENT shall be duty-bound forever to pray.
All of which is humbly prayed,

Counsels appearing on behalf of the RESPONDENT.

Respondents Nattrinai Final 2023

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Respondents Nattrinai Final 2023

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STATE LEVEL ENGLISH MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2023

STATE LEVEL ENGLISH MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2023

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 59/2010

VIRUTHAN & OTHERS………………………………………………....APPELLANT(S)

STATE OF VARUSA NADU………………………………………...……RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 1

S.No. TABLE OF CONTENTS Pg.No

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 2

PROSECUTION WITNESS (அ.சா.)

MATERIAL OBJECT (சா.ப ா.)

EXHIBIT for PROSECUTION (அ.சா.ஆ)

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 3

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 4

23. State of MP v. Dharkole (2004) 13 SCC 308 21

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 5

53. Rakesh v. State of U.P., 6th July 2021 30

S.No LEGAL DATABASES

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 6

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 7

Section 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure states that,

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 8

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 9

WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED IS A CULPABLE HOMICIDE

WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE

WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 10

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 11

WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED IS A CULPABLE HOMICIDE

(A.1.1) Accused has the MOTIVE to commit an offence

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 12

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 13

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 14

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 15

1) An Actus Reus, or a criminal act or omission generally involves three elements or

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 16

4) When a recovery is made on the disclosure statement of an accused which is

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 17

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 18

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 19

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 20

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 21

ISSUE – II and ISSUE – III

WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF THE

WHETHER THE PUNISHMENT IMPOSED BY THE TRAIL COURT IS

1) THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIAL CANNOT BE VITIATED ON

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 22

2) THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS CORRECTLY APPLIED THE TEST OF

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 23

2.1 MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT IS ESTABLISHED.

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 24

2.2 THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE BY THE

The identification evidence of a witness is admissible under Section 9 of the

2.2.1 Testimonies of PW.2 and PW.3 are Admissible and Credible:

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 25

2.2.2 Testimony of PW. 5 is Admissible and Credible:

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 26

2.3. THE DECEASED WAS LAST SEEN WITH THE APPELLANT.

2.3.1 There was Close Proximity of Time and Place

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 27

2.3.2 The Appellant Failed to Establish the Plea of Alibi

MEMORIAL for the RESPONDENT PAGE 28