Special Rapporteurs of Human Rights

Bodies
Antje C Berger

Content type: Encyclopedia Product: Max Planck

entries Encyclopedias of International
Article last updated: August Law [MPIL]
2013 Module: Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public
International Law [MPEPIL]

Subject(s):
Civil and political rights — Economic, social, and cultural rights — International organizations, practice and procedure
Published under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law under the
direction of Professor Anne Peters (2021–) and Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum (2004–2020).
A. Notion
1 Over the years, human rights bodies , ie intergovernmental bodies assigned with the protection
of human rights , have established temporary mandates of special rapporteurs . Generally,
these special rapporteurs are independent individuals authorized to investigate the human rights
situation in a specific country or to address a certain thematic issue on → human rights . They have
been instituted at international and regional levels. At UN level, special rapporteurs ’ mandates are
institutionalized in particular by the Human Rights Council (→ United Nations Commission on
Human Rights /United Nations Human Rights Council) within the so-called ‘system of special
procedures’. On a regional level, the inter-American and the African human rights systems have
developed mechanisms of special rapporteurships. Similar forms of mandates have also been
established within the → Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), eg the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media. Furthermore, the → Council of Europe (COE)’s Committee
of Ministers uses independent rapporteurs on certain human rights issues under Art. 17 COE
Statute.

2 Special rapporteurs of human rights bodies have in common that they are not mentioned
in any of the treaties on the protection of human rights . They have developed as an ad hoc
mechanism for monitoring governments’ → compliance with core human rights standards and have
to be sharply distinguished from a treaty-based human rights body (→ Human Rights , Treaty
Bodies ). Not treaty-based, actions of special rapporteurs do not depend on the ratification of a
certain human rights instrument. Furthermore, they therefore do not depend on the exhaustion of
domestic remedies. Special rapporteurs can investigate on their own initiative, and in practice use all
available sources of information. The mechanism is based on → fact-finding, including on-site missions.
They are obliged to report regularly and publicly to a human rights or other intergovernmental body .

B. The United Nations Special Rapporteurs

1. The United Nations System of Special Procedures

3 Special rapporteurs are mandate holders of the so-called special procedure system of the UN
Human Rights Council (‘Council’; ‘HR Council’), which inherited the system from its predecessor, the
UN Commission on Human Rights (‘UNCHR’: ‘Commission’). Under the then Commission the system
of special rapporteurship was known as ‘1235 Procedure’, named after ECOSOC Resolution 1235
(XLII) of 6 June 1967, as distinguished from the ‘1503 Procedure’, based on ECOSOC Resolution 1503
(XLVIII), which provided for confidential communications (→ United Nations, Economic and Social
Council [ECOSOC]). Both procedures are continued by the Council under its Resolution 5/1 of 18 June
2007. The ‘open’ special procedure system encompasses the mandates of special rapporteurs ,
independent experts, members of a special procedure working group, and special representatives of
the UN Secretary-General mandated by Council or Commission (see also, → Special Representative).
The different titles have only political, not legal implications. Independent experts tend to focus more on
advisory services and technical cooperation than special rapporteurs and are often used for States in
transitional processes. Working groups consist of five members from the different regional groups of
the UN. This balance gives them more accountability and acceptance on a regional level. For the purpose
of this entry, the term special rapporteur is used generically to encompass all mandate holders of
the UN special procedure system. The ‘open’ special procedure system is split into country mandates
and thematic mandates.

2. Country Mandates
4 The special procedure system developed in the 1960s, one year before ECOSOC Resolution 1235
(XLII) of 1967, as a country-oriented system. Pressure was on the Commission to react to the policies of
→ apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa. ECOSOC Resolution 1102 (XL) of 4 March
1966 authorized the Commission to consider the issue of ‘ human rights violations and fundamental
freedoms’ which finally put an end to the so-called ‘no power to act doctrine’ of ECOSOC and the
Commission (UNCHR ‘Report of the First Session’ [1947] E/259; ECOSOC Res 75 [V] 1947),
characterized as ‘an extraordinary degree of … abdication’ (H Lauterpacht International Law and
Human Rights [Steven London 1950] 236). ECOSOC Resolution 1102 was clearly intended for the
situation in southern Africa, in particularly South Africa, but from its wording it was not restricted to any
country or region.

5 Based on ECOSOC Resolution 1102, the Commission on 6 March 1967, at its 24th session, appointed the
Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on South Africa which was composed of eminent jurists and prison
officials. This event has been quoted in literature as the kick start of the special procedure system. In
addition, on 16 March 1967, the Commission appointed Manouchehr Ganji of Iran as the first ‘single’
Special Rapporteur on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in southern Africa with the mandate

to survey [United Nations] past action in its efforts to eliminate the policies and practices of
apartheid in all its forms and manifestations, to study the legislation and practices in South
Africa, South-West Africa and Southern Rhodesia … and to report with recommendations to the
Commission (UNCHR Res 7 [XXIII] [16 March 1967] at 20).

The two mandates, the Working Group on South Africa and the Special Rapporteur on Apartheid and
Racial Discrimination, worked in a complementary fashion. The Working Group on South Africa was
authorized to ‘[i]nvestigate the charges of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, detainees or persons in
police custody in South Africa (UNCHR Res 2 [XXIII] [6 March 1967] 77). At this time, only a working
group had the moral authority and acceptance to look into the highly sensitive issue of police custody in
South Africa. Special Rapporteur Ganji, on the other hand, had a broad mandate to generally
scrutinize the legal basis and practice of apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa including
‘forced labour and inequalities of opportunities in the economic, social and educational fields’ (UNCHR
Res 7 [XXIII] 20), in order to provide both Commission and Working Group with the necessary
background information and to report with recommendations. In 1970, the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination was entrusted to a Working Group, which was in
place for 18 years, and ceased in 1995, one year after the first democratic elections in South Africa.
6 Two months after the establishment of the Working Group on South Africa and the Special
Rapporteur on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination, ECOSOC backed the Commission with its famous
Resolution 1235 (XLII) of 6 June 1967. It authorized the Commission and Sub-Commission (→ United
Nations, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights )

to examine information relevant to gross violations of human rights and fundamental

freedoms …. [and] to make a thorough study of situations which reveal a consistent pattern of
violations of human rights (at paras 2 and 3).

Resolution 1235 made special reference to apartheid policy and racial discrimination in southern Africa
(paras 2 and 3). In fact, Resolution 1235 was primarily intended to allow the Commission to consider the
situation in southern Africa, in particular South Africa and → Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. However, whatever
the initial intent, ECOSOC Resolution 1235 has been interpreted as giving broad authority to the
Commission.

7 In 1969, a second working group on the Palestinian Territories occupied by Israel in 1967 was
established (→ Israel, Occupied Territories; → Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO])); and in 1975 a
third on Chile, following the military coup in 1973. The working groups, while gaining wide acceptance,
proved to be a financially expensive exercise. In 1978, one decade after the appointment of the first
‘single’ Special Rapporteur Ganji on Apartheid, time was ripe for the second: Abdoulaye Dieye of
Senegal, former member of the Working Group on Chile was appointed Special Rapporteur on Chile
(Ramcharan 51–2). Throughout the next decades, country mandates included eg Afghanistan, Bolivia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (‘DRC’; → Congo, Democratic Republic of the), El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait territories occupied by Iraq (→ Iraq-Kuwait War [1990–91]), Nigeria,
→ Rwanda, and the Former Yugoslavia (→ Yugoslavia, Dissolution of ).

3. Thematic Mandates
8 Thematic mandates developed in the 1980s. A starting point can already been seen in the early mandate
of the Special Rapporteur on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in southern Africa which could
be classified as a country-cum-thematic mandate. In the literature, the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances is mentioned as the first thematic mandate. However, this mandate also has a
strong reference to a country approach, since it was pushed by → non-governmental organizations
(‘NGOs’) as a response to situations in Latin America, in particular Argentina, but also Chile and
Guatemala (UNCHR Res 20 [XXXVI] 29 February 1980; → Human Rights , Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations). The first ‘single’ thematic mandate was the Special Rapporteur on
Extra-Legal Summary or/and Arbitrary Executions in 1982 held by Amos Wako (ECOSOC Res 1982/35 [7
May 1982]); followed by the 1985 Special Rapporteur on Torture Peter Kooijmans (UNHRC Res
1985/33 [13 March 1985]). Both rapporteurships still exist and have outstanding rapporteurs , among
others Sir Nigel Rodley, Theodoor van Boven, and Manfred Nowak. The first thematic mandates set the
basis for the procedural standards for special rapporteurs .

9 By 1995, further thematic mandates focusing mainly on civil and political rights followed: freedom of
religion and belief (1989); arbitrary detention (1991); sale of children and child prostitution and
pornography (1992); freedom of opinion and expression (1993); racism and xenophobia (1993); the
independence of the judiciary (1994); and on violence against women (1994). From 1995 onwards,
thematic mandates cover all ranges of economic, social, political, and cultural rights , including the
right to education (1998); human rights of migrants (1999); right to housing (2000); right to food
(2000); the situation of human rights defenders (2000); indigenous people (2001); internally
displaced persons (2002); minorities (2005); and human rights and terrorism (2005), among others.

4. Criticism and Transfer from Commission to Council

10 During the final decade of the Commission, country mandates were the focus of increased criticism.
One reason for replacing the Commission with the HR Council was the view that the Commission was too
selective in terms of its country-specific mandates, which was ‘due mainly to the political bias of
representatives and the ability of more powerful countries to deflect attention away from themselves and
those enjoying their support’ (Viljoen 2007, 61). The critics were echoed by the UN Secretary-General,
particularly in his 2005 Report ‘In Larger Freedom’, and the UN General Assembly assented and
established the HR Council in its Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006. According to Resolution 60/251,
the Council had one year to

assume, review and, where necessary, improve and rationalize all mandates, mechanisms,
functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights in order to maintain a
system of special procedure, expert advice and a complaint procedure; the Council shall
complete this review within one year after the holding of its first session (at para. 6).

11 The new HR Council inherited 13 country mandates and 28 thematic mandates from the Commission,
which were all extended for a transitional period of one year at the Council’s first meeting in June 2006
by its Decision 1/102 of 30 June 2006. It was proposed in 2006 that the Council should try its best ‘to
eliminate country mandates altogether’ (see Sunga 286). ‘Many developing countries seem to view
reporting on specific countries as a discriminatory exercise, permeated by arbitrary selectivity and
therefore constituting some kind of neo-colonial dominance’ (Tomuschat 149). However, after intense
debate, the Council decided in 2007 that it would continue with the practice of country mandates. In its
first years, the Council hesitated in creating new country mandates; however, since 2011 it has established
new mandates, inter alia, → Eritrea (2012), Iran (2011), and Syria (2011); and it has renewed others,
including Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Korea (→ Korea), Myanmar, Palestine,
Somalia(→ Somalia, Conflict), and → Sudan. Abolished mandates include → Burundi, → Cuba, and
→ Liberia. Currently, there are 12 country mandates. The Council reduced the length of a country
mandate to one year—open to renewal by resolution—while thematic mandates are only reviewed every
three years (HR Council Res 5/1 Annex para. 60).

12 After the review period of one year, the new Council prolonged all thematic mandates and has created
new ones: inter alia on contemporary forms of slavery in 2007; on access to safe drinking water and
sanitation in 2008; on cultural rights in 2009; on freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and
on discrimination of women in law and practice in 2010, and on → environment and human rights
in 2012; in sum a total of 36 thematic mandates. A list of all current thematic mandates and country
mandates is provided on the website of the Office of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights
(‘OHCHR’; → Human Rights , United Nations High Commissioner for [UNHCHR]).

5. Legal Rules

(a) Legal Basis

13 The legal basis for special rapporteur mandates is in general a resolution of the HR Council,
establishing and defining the mandate. The Council itself is explicitly authorized by UN General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 which renewed the implicit authorization of ECOSOC Resolution
1235 (XLII) of 1967. The overall basis is the UN Charter, ‘reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human
rights ’ (Preamble para. 2) and international cooperation in ‘promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Art. 1 (3) UN Charter); as well as the Charter’s provisions
on ECOSOC which provide in Art. 68 for commissions on human rights .

14 Special representatives of the UN Secretary-General under the special procedure system can be
mandated by the Council or by the UN General Assembly, which eg mandated the former rapporteurship
on → children and armed conflict. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, was one
of the last representatives of the UN Secretary-General under the special procedure system. Special
representatives of the Secretary-General mandated by the Commission have been recently renamed
special rapporteur by the Council in a process of standardization, eg the mandate on Cambodia in
2009 (HR Council Res 9/25), or the mandate on internally displaced persons in 2010 (HR Council Res
14/6).

(b) Legal Status

15 Special Rapporteurs under the special procedure system of the HR Council serve in their
personal capacity; they are not UN officials. They receive no remuneration or any other financial reward
for their mandate by the UN; only their expenses are reimbursed. In general they are professionals with
full-time jobs and operate officially as special rapporteurs in their ‘spare time’. Therefore, the quality
of their output depends to a large extent on their personal engagement and on the personnel and
logistical support they receive from OHCHR. For that reason, more and more special rapporteurs
receive support from their home countries or third countries.

16 All special rapporteurs , representatives, and experts, irrespective of their title, are ‘experts on
mission’ within the meaning of Art. VI (22) Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations of 13 February 1946 (→ International Organizations or Institutions, Privileges and
Immunities). The International Court of Justice confirmed the immunity of special rapporteurs in
its advisory opinion on Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights of 29 April 1999. The advisory opinion
concerned the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (Dato’ Param
Cumaraswamy) who faced defamation suits from Malaysian courts.

17 In 2007, the HR Council passed the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures in order to enhance the
moral authority and credibility of special rapporteurs (HR Council Res 5/2 Annex). The Code of
Conduct sets standards of ethical behaviour and professional conduct. The Manual of Operations of
the Special Procedure of the Human Rights Council (‘Manual of Special Procedures’) was
amended in June 2008 to include the Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct has been criticized for
potentially restricting mandates (Weissbrodt 21).

(c) Legal Issues

18 Actions of special rapporteurs do not depend on the ratification of a certain human rights
instrument. As a Charter-based system, rapporteurs can scrutinize the situation in all UN Member
States. However, country visits require the consent of the State to be visited, since the basis for the
special procedures lies in non-binding resolutions of the Human Rights Council. As of January
2013, 92 States have given a standing invitation to thematic mandates.

19 At the beginning of the special procedure system, and from time to time, States claimed that the
system violates Art. 2 (7) UN Charter on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs (→ Domaine
réservé). However, ‘[w]ith regard to human rights , this provision is not even invoked any longer by
the countries targeted by a resolution’ (Tomuschat 150), because the rapid development of human
rights in international law precludes a State from claiming that the area of human rights is
exclusively placed under its → sovereignty (ibid 151).

20 Furthermore, where fundamental human rights form part of → iuscogens, particularly the ban
on → genocide, torture, → slavery, and racial discrimination, special rapporteurs can even look into
the situation of non-UN Members (which eg might be relevant in a situation of State → cession) since
these rights are → obligations ergaomnes.

(d) Mandate and Methods of Work

21 The individual mandate of a special rapporteur is laid down in the respective resolution of the
HR Council establishing or renewing it. In general, the main task of a special rapporteur is to
investigate and respond quickly to the allegations of human rights violations. According to the
Manual of Special Procedures of 2008 special rapporteurs are required to ‘analyse’, ‘advise’,
‘alert’, ‘advocate’, and ‘activate’ on a specific human rights situation (at para. 5), including to follow-up
on a given situation.

22 Their methods of work are different from a human rights treaty body . Special rapporteurs
can receive information from anyone: individuals, groups, NGOs, or governments. The special
rapporteurs ’ work method includes urgent appeals, country visits, normative work, and follow-up
mechanisms, in particular dialogue with the respective government. Largely, it is a fact-finding
mechanism which follows the Terms of Reference for Fact-Finding Missions by Special
Rapporteurs /Representatives of the Commission on Human Rights of 23 December 1998, still
applicable under the new Council. Special rapporteurs have adopted their own formulae expressing
their views on the intensity and gravity of a given human rights violation or threat. On the lowest
level is (a) ‘concerned’, which is followed by (b) ‘gravely concerned’, (c) ‘condemns’, and lastly (d) ‘strongly
condemns’.

23 The result is in general a report to the HR Council or the UN General Assembly, which can be
endorsed by them in a resolution, having only the legal character of a recommendation. Recently, joint
reports by different mandates holders are produced, eg, the combined report on the Situation of
Detainees at Guantánamo Bay of 27 February 2006 (UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/120) by five mandate
holders, or the Joint Study on Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of 19 February
2010 (UN Doc A/HRC/13/42) by four special rapporteurs .

C. Regional Mandates of Special Rapporteurs

1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

24 The first ‘rapporteurship’ established in 1990 by the → Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACommHR) was the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Indigenous People (Relatoría sobre
Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas), which created an individual case system, followed by the
Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women in 1994. Five additional rapporteurships including one
working group have been established since then (Children; Persons Deprived of their Liberty; Racial-
Discrimination; Migrant Workers; Working Group on Human Rights Defenders). Neither the
→ American Convention on Human Rights (1969) (‘ACHR’), establishing in its Chapter VII the
IACommHR, nor the Statute of the IACommHR of 1979 explicitly mentions rapporteurships, but the
overall authority of the Commission under Art. 41 ACHR and Art. 17 IACommHR Statute, which even
provides for on-site observations with State consent in para. (e), is seen as the legal basis for the
rapporteurs in the Inter-American System. The rapporteurs are commissioners, elected in their
personal capacity, and work on a part-time basis.

25 In contrast to the rapporteurship headed by one of the seven commissioners, the Office of the
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, established in 1998 by the Declaration of Santiago,
is a permanent body headed by a full-time independent specialist with functional independence and its
own budget.

2. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

26 In 1994 the → African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACommHPR) started its
system of special rapporteurs with the establishment of the first Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution. The African system of special rapporteurships is based
on a ‘progressive interpretation’ of the → African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981)
(Viljoen 392). Currently, the ACommHPR has 14 special rapporteur ships, including working groups
and committees, inter alia, on freedom of expression; on human rights defenders; on prisons and
conditions of detention; on refugees, asylum seekers and internationally displaced persons; on women;
on torture; and on people living with HIV/AIDS. Special rapporteurs are in general commissioners,
while members of the working groups and committees include individual experts and representatives of
NGOs in addition to commission members. It is said that ‘[w]hile Special Rapporteurs investigate
specific issues with a view to making recommendations, working groups are more exploratory and
research-directed, focusing on emerging issues or matters internal to the Commission’s functioning’
(Viljoen 400). Most of the special mandates were promoted by NGOs; eg → Amnesty International
(AI) was instrumental in the establishment of the first Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary and Arbitrary Executions in Africa. The combination of NGOs with available funds and
commissioners in the working groups has proven to be successful.

D. Assessment
27 Special rapporteurs of human rights bodies are a flexible and fast method of responding
to alleged human rights violations or threats of violations and of monitoring a government’s
compliance with core human rights standards. Their competence does not depend on the exhaustion
of domestic remedies, they can act on their own initiative, and they do not have to rely on State
information only. On the international level, the particular significance of special rapporteurs lies
in the fact that he or she can act irrespective of whether a specific State has ratified a certain human
rights instrument or not. Their special value derives from their independence and objectivity.
However, since special rapporteurs only work part-time a lot depends on the engagement and
commitment of the individual person and on the support received from OHCHR. It is claimed that the
system of special procedures is still seriously under-resourced.

28 There are also time constraints on the HR Council’s agenda to consider all reports in-depth. Some
authors see a ‘certain degree of overlapping and duplication’ (Sunga 284), while others criticize the
proliferation of thematic mandates and fear that ‘[t]he great number of rapporteurs rather seems to
weaken [the procedure]’ (Tomuschat 148). In fact, some of the findings of the special rapporteurs
remained unnoticed. The worst case was Rwanda, where the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions warned in 1993 of the possibilities of genocide, but no adequate
responses followed. In particular, the report remained unnoticed by the UN Security Council. While there
is no formal relationship between the UN Security Council and the special procedure mechanism, it is
claimed that the Security Council should use the mechanism more effectively (Breen).

29 In many cases, the work of special rapporteurs has had an enormous impact and showed
positive concrete results, such as the release of prisoners, or the transformation of a death sentence to a
prison term. In other cases it was not successful. Also, some special rapporteurs have formulated
legal interpretations of human rights norms and contributed to the progressive development of
international law, eg the special rapporteurs view on corporal punishment is authoritative (Nifosi
18). Other recent authoritative works include the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based
Evictions and Displacement’ (2007) of M Kothari (UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 Annex), and the ‘Business and
Human Rights in Conflict-Affected Regions: Challenges and Options towards State Responses’ of J
Ruggie (2011; UN Doc A/HRC/17/32) endorsed by the Council (UN Doc A/HRC/Res/17/4).

30 Concerning country mandates, the practice of the newly established HR Council remains to be seen.
Given the politicization of former mandates, the Council has hesitated to create new ones. After 2011, the
Council has resumed the work of its predecessor, the Commission, and established new mandates, given
that the assignment of a country rapporteur is one of the most visible and forceful measures that the
Council can take in respect of a specific country situation. Thematic mandates, on the other hand, work
relatively free from political pressure. Characterized as ‘[o]ne of the most positive developments in the
UN’s work in the past 30 years’ (Weissbrodt 31), there is still potential for further development.

31 In particular, the awareness of coexistence between special rapporteurs on the international

and regional levels and the potential for collaboration needs to be enhanced. An example of → best
practice are the four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression (UN, ACommHPR, IACommHR,
OSCE) who have met since 1999 on an annual basis and adopted their Tenth Anniversary Joint
Declaration in 2010.

Select Bibliography
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Select Documents
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entered into force 17 September 1946) 1 UNTS 15.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1999] ICJ Rep 62.
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Miami to Santiago vol 1 (Office of Summit Follow-up Organization of American States 1998).
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of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council’ (August 2008).
UNGA Res 60/251 ‘ Human Rights Council’ (15 March 2006) GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol
3, 2.
UN Commission on Human Rights Res 2 (XXIII) (6 March 1967) ESCOR 42nd Session Supp 6,
76.
UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Terms of Reference for Fact-Finding Missions by
Special Rapporteurs /Representatives of the Commission on Human Rights ’ (23
December 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/104 Annex II.
UN ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII) (6 June 1967) ESCOR 42th Session Supp 1, 17.
UN HR Council ‘Resolution 5/1: Institution-Building of the United Nations Human Rights
Council’ (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/5/21 Annex.
UN HR Council ‘Resolution 5/2: Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of
the Human Rights Council’ (18 June 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/5/21 Annex.
UN HR Council ‘Tenth Anniversary Joint Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of
Expression in the Next Decade’ (2 February 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/23/Add.2 Annex.

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