1

I.PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
1. How are constitutional provisions interpreted?
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. (Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156 February 3, 1997)

2. When is a constitutional provision considered self-executing?

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.(Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997)

3. Distinguish between amendment and revision.

Amendment Revision
Refers to a change that adds, reduces, Implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
or deletes without altering the basic like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
principle involved. checks-and-balances.There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
Generally affects only the specific Generally affects several provisions of the constitution
provision being amended.
(Lambino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 174153, October 25, 2006)

4. What is internal and external self-determination?

Internal Self-Determination External Self-Determination
A people's pursuit of its political, The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
economic, social and cultural association or integration with an independent State or the
development within the framework emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
of an existing state. people constitute modes of implementing the right of
self-determination by that people
(The Province of North Cotabato vs. The GRP, GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 citing Re Succession of Quebec)

5. When can the exercise of police power be considered reasonable?

It must satisfy the "valid object and valid means" method of analysis. First, the interest of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires interference; and second, the means employed are
reasonably necessary to attain the objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. (Association of
Medical Clinics v. GCC Approved Medical Centers, G.R. No. 207132, December 6, 2016)

6. What are the Constitutional Limitations on Taxation?

a. Due Process
b. Equal Protection of Laws
c. Religious Freedom
d. Non-Impairment of Contracts
e. Prohibition against Imprisonment for Non-payment of Poll Tax
f. Uniformity and Equality of Taxation and Progressive System of Taxation
g. Delegated Authority to the President to Impose Tariff Rates
h. Prohibition against Taxation of Real Property of Charitable Institutions, Churches, Parsonages or
Convents, Mosques and Non-profit Cemeteries
i. Prohibition against Taxation on Non-stock Non-Profit Educational Institutions
j. Absolute Majority Vote of Congress for Grants of Tax Exemptions
k. Prohibition against the use of Tax Levied for Special Purpose
l. Tax Bills should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
m. President’s Veto Power on Appropriation, Revenue, and Tariff Bills
n. Judicial Power to Review Legality of Tax
o. Grant of Power to Local Government Units to Create its Own Sources of Revenue
(Art. III, Sec.1; Art. III,Sec. 5; Art. III, Sec. 10; Art. III, Sec. 20; Art. VI, Sec. 28 (1),(2), (3); (4); Art. XIV, Sec. 4(3); Art. VI, Sec. 29(3);
Art. VI, Sec. 24; Art. VI, Sec. 27 (2); Art. VIII, Sec. 5; Art. X, Sec. 5)

7. Distinguish the three inherent powers of the State.

Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation
Purpose Promote public welfare Taking of property for Raising revenue
through regulation public use
Limitations Limited to the cost of No exaction, but the No limits
regulation, issuance of the government pays the
license, or surveillance owner of the property just
compensation limited to
the market value of the
property taken from the
owner

3
 Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation
Benefit to the No direct benefits The owner of the property No special or direct benefit other
Owner received yet a healthy receives just than the fact that the government
economic standard of compensation equivalent secures to the citizen that general
society is maintained to the market value of the benefit resulting from the
property taken in protection of his person and
exchange. property and the welfare of all
Right to Allows merely the restraint The right to property is Taxes paid form part of the public
Property on the exercise of transferred to the State funds
property rights (property is converted for
public use)
Application Applies to all persons, Only particular property is Applies to all persons, property
property comprehended and exercises that may be.
subject thereto

8. What are the essential requisites for the exercise by a local government unit of the power of
expropriation?
The essential requisites for the exercise by a local government unit of the power of expropriation are
a. the enactment of an ordinance (basically a law, which passes through three readings, which is general
and permanent in character), and not a resolution (which need not go through three readings, unless
otherwise decided by a majority of the lawmakers;
b. is temporary and is merely a declaration of a sentiment or opinion of the law-making body);
c. it must be for a public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
d. the payment of just compensation; and
e. its exercise must be preceded by a valid and definite offer made to the owner, who rejects the same.
(Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, 6 April 2011)

9. What is the relevance of Article II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies?
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These principles
in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature
in its enactment of laws. (Tañada vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997)

10. What is the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws;
to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three
great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
(Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013)

11. How is the Principle of Checks and Balances observed by the three co-equal branches of the
Government?
a. Legislative to check Executive
i. Power to impeach the President
ii. Power to override the veto of the President
iii. Power to declare war
iv. Power to confirm or reject certain appointments
v. Power to revoke the proclamation of Martial Law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
Habeas Corpus
vi. Power to determine the salary of the President and Vice-President
vii. Conduct legislative inquiries
viii. Power to pass budgets of the government
b. Legislative to check Judiciary
i. Power to pass the budget
ii. Power to impeach the Members of the Supreme Court
iii. Power to conduct legislative inquiries
iv. Power to reorganize the lower courts except the Supreme Court
c. Executive to check Legislative
i. Power of the President to veto the bills
ii. Power to reject any item/s in appropriation, revenues or tariff
d. Executive to check the Judiciary
i. • Power to grant pardon, reprieve and commutation
e. Judiciary to check the Legislative
i. Power to declare a law passed by the Congress unconstitutional
f. Judiciary to check the Executive
i. Power to declare the acts of the President and subordinates unconstitutional
(Art. XI, Sec. 2 & 3; Art. VII,Sec.27; Art. VI, Sec. 23; Art. VII, Sec. 16; Art VII, Sec. 18; Art.VII, Sec.6; Art. VI, Sec. 21 & 22; Art.VI,
Sec.24, 25 & 29; Art. VIII, Sec. 10; Art. XI, Sec. 2; Art. VI, Sec. 21 & 22; Art. VIII, Sec. 2(2); Art. VI, Sec 27(1); Art. VI, Sec 27(2); Art.
VII, Sec.19; Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2); Art VIII, Sec. 1)

4
12. Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), a member of the Clearing House established by Central Bank of
the Philippines (CBP), filed a complaint for sum of money against CBP for the Nine (9) Million pesos
discrepancy it discovered in its inter-bank reconciliation statements. The discrepancy was caused by
the bank fraud committed by CBP’s employees. CBP’s Charter provides that it waived its immunity
from suit. May BPI sue CBP for collection of sum of money although it performs governmental
functions?
Yes. CBP is not immune to suit although it performs governmental functions. While the State may not be sued
without its consent, however, immunity from suit may be waived expressly or impliedly. Nonetheless, while
the CBP performed a governmental function in providing clearing house facilities, it is not immune from suit as
its Charter, by express provision, waived its immunity from suit. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines and Citibank, G.R. No. 197593. October 12, 2020, J. Hernando.)

13. Distinguish express consent from implied consent to be sued.

Express Consent Implied Consent
Effected only by will of the legislature through the Implied consent on the part of the State to be
medium of a duly enacted statute; may be embodied subjected to suit when the State enters into a
either in a general law or a specific law. contract.
(Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-36084, August 31, 1977; Philippine Textile Research Institute vs. CA, G.R. No. 223319, October 9,
2019)

14. Explain the Archipelagic Doctrine.

It is the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one
cohesive entity. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011)

II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

15. What is the rule on delegation of legislative powers? Is it absolute?
It is non-delegable because it involves the exercise of judgment or discretion. However, this rule is not
absolute. The only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters ; and (b)
constitutionally grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government. (Dalamal v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-16812, October 31,
1963) / Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

16. What are the two tests for a valid delegation of legislative power?
Completeness Test Sufficient Standard Test
The law must be complete in all its A sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the
terms and conditions when it delegate’s authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating
leaves the legislative such that the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. This
when it reaches the delegate the is intended to prevent a total transference of legislative power from
only thing he will have to do is to the legislature to the delegate. The standard is usually indicated in
enforce it. the law delegating legislative power.
(Belgica v. Ochoa G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)

17. What are the two permissible delegation of legislative power?

Contingent Legislation Subordinate Legislation
Congress undertakes contingent Subordinate legislation entails delegating to administrative
legislation when it delegates to another bodies the power to "fill in" the details of a statute. Enacting
body the power to ascertain facts subordinate legislation has become necessary amid the
necessary to bring the law into actual "proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant
operation peculiar problems”
(Lagman vs. Ochoa, GR No. 197422, November 3, 2020)

18. Distinguish between initiative and referendum.

Initiative Referendum
Initiative is the power of the people to propose Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve
amendments to the Constitution or to propose or reject legislation through an election called for the
and enact legislation. purpose.
(Section 3, Republic Act 6735)

19. What are the privileges of the members of the Congress?

a. Privilege from arrest which grants the legislators the privilege from arrest while Congress is “in session”
with respect to offenses punishable by NOT more than 6 years of imprisonment, whether or not he is
attending the session.
b. Freedom of speech and debate which "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should
enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." (Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution/ People

5
 vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000; Pobre vs.Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009)

20. What are the limitations on the privilege from arrest of the members of the Congress?
a. Crime has a maximum penalty of not more than 6 years;
b. Congress is in session, whether regular or special;
c. Prosecution will continue independent of arrest;
d. Will be subject to arrest immediately when Congress adjourns. (Art. VI, Sec 11, and People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos.
132875-76, February 3, 2000)

21. What are the prohibitions attached to a legislator during his term of office?
Incompatible Office Forbidden Office
A member cannot accept any other office or employment in Any office created or the emoluments of
government during his term unless he waives or forfeits his which have been increased during the
seat in Congress. term for which he was elected, not
merely during his tenure or period of
It includes any kind of office or employment in the government, actual incumbency. The ban against
or subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including appointment to the office created or the
government-owned or controlled corporations or their emoluments thereof increased shall,
subsidiaries during his term. Forfeiture of the seat in Congress however, last only for the duration of the
shall be automatic upon the member’s assumption of such term for which the member of Congress
other office deemed incompatible with his seat in Congress. was elected.
(Art. VI, Sec. 13)

22. What is the rule on apportionment of legislative districts?

Legislative districts are apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area. Legislative
districts are apportioned in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. But each city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative, and each province shall have at least one representative. The question of the validity of an
apportionment law is a justiciable question. (Macias v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-18684, September 14, 1961)

23. What are the guidelines to determine participation in the party-list elections?
a. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
b. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
c. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
d. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
e. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
f. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. (Atong Paglaum vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)

6
24. What are the limitations on the law-making powers of the Legislative Department?
Substantive Procedural
a. Express: a. Only one subject, to be stated in the title of the bill
i. Bill of Rights b. Three (3) readings on separate days; printed
ii. On Appropriations copies of the bill in its final form to be distributed to
iii. On Taxation its members 3 days before its passage, except if
iv. On Constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the President certifies to its immediate enactment
the Supreme Court to meet a public calamity or emergency; upon its
v. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility last reading, no amendment shall be allowed and
shall be enacted the vote thereon shall be taken immediately and
vi. No specific funds shall be appropriated or the yeas and nays entered into the Journal
paid for use or benefit of any religion, sect, c. Appropriation bills, revenue bills, tariff bills, bills
etc., except for priests, etc., assigned to authorizing the increase of public debt, bills of local
AFP, penal institutions, etc. application and private bills shall originate
b. Implied: exclusively in the House of Representatives.
i. Prohibition against irrepealable laws
ii. Non-delegation of powers
(Art. III; Art. VI: Secs. 25 and 29(1&2), Secs. 28 and 29 (2) & (3), Sec. 30, Sec. 31; Art. VI: Sec. 26(1), Sec. 2(2), Sec. 24)

25. What are the constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures?

a. Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended.
b. Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by
a corresponding revenue proposal included therein. (Art VI, Sec. 25(4))

26. What are the constitutional rules on general appropriation law?

a. Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget.
b. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
c. No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation which it
relates. This is intended to prevent riders, or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to ensure its
approval.
d. Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and agencies.
e. Prohibition against transfer of appropriations (Art VI, Sec. 25 (5))

27. What are the Presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments?
a. Heads of the Executive departments, except the Vice-President who is appointed to the post
b. Ambassadors, other public ministers, or consuls
c. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain
d. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution (i.e. COMELEC members, etc.)
(Art. VII, Sec. 16)

28. What are the limitations in the confirmation of appointments by the Commission on Appointments?
a. Congress cannot by law prescribe that the appointment of a person to an office created by such law be
subject to confirmation by the Commission.
b. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress (Sarmiento III, v. Mison, G.R. No. L-
79974, Dec. 17, 1987)

29. Do members of the House Electoral Tribunal enjoy Security of Tenure?

Yes. Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the
expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the
political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group.(Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991)

30. The Constitution provides that each House of the Congress shall have an Electoral Tribunal that will
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Discuss when the Electoral Tribunals acquire jurisdiction over the said members.
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively
clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a
litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election
contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the
Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or
quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner. (Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010)

7
31. Can the Congress conduct investigations in aid of legislation?
Yes. The legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation did not need textual grant as it was
implied and essential to the legislative function. The power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. (Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, 18 July 1950)

32. Is the legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation absolute?

No. An investigation in aid of legislation must comply with the rules of procedure of each House of Congress,
and must not violate the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries under the Bill of Rights.
(Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991)

III.EXECUTVE DEPARTMENT
33. AAA filed a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against President BBB, the Health
Secretary, and the Chief Implementer of the National Task Force against COVID-19 to compel
respondents to observe Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) rules on acquisition, procurement, and
use of drugs particularly on the issue of trials and procurement of the Sinovac vaccine. Was the
President properly impleaded?
No. The President should be dropped as a respondent because settled is the rule that the President of the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued during his/her tenure. The concept of presidential immunity under
our governmental and constitutional system does not distinguish whether or not the suit pertains to an official
act of the President. Neither does immunity hinge on the nature of the suit. An incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued in any proceeding. (Nepomuceno vs. Duterte, UDK No. 16838, May 11, 2021
[Landmark Case Q&A])

34. Is the President exempt from criminal liability under the Rome Statute?
No. In determining liability under the Rome Statute, a person's official capacity is irrelevant. This Statute shall
apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as
a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall
it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. Immunities or special procedural rules which
may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the
International Criminal Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. (Pangilinan v. Cayetano,. G.R. no.
238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

35. Atty. AAA filed a Petition for Mandamus impleading President BBB to comply with his constitutional
duty to defend the national territory, which includes the West Philippine Sea, against Chinese
incursions. Does Presidential Immunity from Suit cover Petitions for Mandamus?
Yes, the President is immune from suit during his incumbency, regardless of the nature of the suit filed against
him. (Atty. Romeo M. Esmero, vs. His Excellency, Honorable President, Rodrigo Roa Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021
[Landmark Case Q&A])

36. Can an accused in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused?
No. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. (Soliven vs Makasiar, G.R. No.
82585 November 14, 1988)

37. Is presidential communication privilege absolute?

No. If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the
President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same
be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for
disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Therefore, presidential communication is presumptively
privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Whoever challenges it must show good and valid
reasons related to the public welfare. (Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008)

38. What are the Qualifications to Run as President of the Philippines?

a. natural born citizen of the Philippines
b. registered voter
c. able to read and write
d. at least 40 years of age on the day of election
e. resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election. (Section 2, Article VII)

39. How is a vacancy in the office of the President filled?

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect
shall have qualified. If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen and qualified. If at the beginning of the term of the President, the
President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall
become President. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President,
the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President
until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.(Section 7 and 8, Article VII)

8
40. How is a vacancy in the office of the Vice-President filled?
The President is authorized to nominate from either the Senate or House of Representatives to fill a vacated
office of the Vice-President. For nominations to be effective, it must be confirmed by a majority vote of all the
members of both houses voting separately. (Section 9, Article VII)

41. Can the Congress, through a law, impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego to fill a vacancy in the office of the Department Secretary?
No. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress,
in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should
be. (Pimentel vs. Ermita, GR No. 167978, October 13, 2005)

42. Is the President given the authority to reorganize the executive branch?
Yes. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. While the power to abolish an
office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive
branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws. (Malaria Employee vs Executive
Secretary G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007)

43. What are the constitutional prohibitions relative to the Executive Department?
a. They shall not receive any other emolument from the government or any other source.
b. They shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
c. They shall not practice, directly or indirectly, any other profession during their tenure.
d. They shall not participate in any business.
e. They shall not be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government, including GOCCs.
f. They shall avoid conflict of interest in conduct of office.
g. They shall avoid nepotism.
(Section 6 and 13, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

44. What is the rule on dual or multiple offices and its exceptions?
The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. The only two exceptions are: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet;; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the officials’ offices. Hence, the prohibition did not extend to other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary. (Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 citing Civil Liberties
Union v. The Executive Secretary)

45. The Secretary of Finance is an ex-officio member of the Board of Directors of AAA Corporation, a
Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation with its own charter. In one of the resolutions of the
Board, it resolved to conduct a reorganization scheme affecting its employees. BBB, one of the
employees,assailed said resolution and filed charges against the members of the Board, claiming that
said resolution is invalid and illegal. In his defense, the Secretary of Finance invoked the Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency, and should be absolved from any liability. Is the Secretary's contention
correct? Discuss.
The Secretary’s contention is incorrect because the doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply in
cases of ex-officio members. The Supreme Court held that when Cabinet Members sit as ex-officio members
of the Board of Directors of government agencies, such Cabinet members sit on the said Board of Directors of
ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the
President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. (Manalang-Demigillo vs.TIDCORP,
G.R. No. 168613, March 5, 2013)

46. What are the ‘graduated powers’ of the President?

These are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by
which the President decides which power to choose. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

47. Distinguish calling out powers, martial law, and suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it
Calling-out powers becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
The power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil
liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It
cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in
Martial Law Powers
the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the
people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual
freedoms.
Suspension of the The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
privilege of the writ of cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
habeas corpus

9
 (David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006/Article 3, Section 15, 1987 Constitution)

48. Can the President exercise his calling-out powers even without the safeguards by the Congress and
review by the Court?
Yes. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August
15, 2000)

49. What is the rule on calling the Congress to convene when the President proclaims a state of Martial
Law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Congress should convene in a joint session within twenty-four (24) hours
Congress in session
without need for call.
The provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it
Congress not in session does not explicitly state that the Congress shall already convene in joint
session
(Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017)

50. What are the constitutional limits on executive clemency?

a. It cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment;
b. Reprieves, communications, and pardons, and remission of fines and forfeitures can be given only after
conviction by final judgment.
c. A grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
(Section 19, Article VII)

51. Is the President’s foreign affairs powers absolute? If not, what are the exceptions?
No, the President’s foreign affairs powers are not absolute as such power is subject to the following
constitutional restrictions:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory;
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress;
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a majority of all the
Members of Congress;
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must be previously
concurred in by the Monetary Board;
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country must be in
the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate; and
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is required, should the
form of the government chosen be a treaty. (Atty. Romeo M. Esmero, vs. His Excellency, Honorable President, Rodrigo
Roa Duterte, G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

52. What are the rules on presidential veto?

Section 27(1) Section 27(2)
Upon presentation of a bill to the President, he shall The President shall have the power to veto any
have the power to veto it and return the same with particular item or items in an appropriation,
his objections to the House where it originated, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal item or items to which he does not object.
and proceed to reconsider it.
(Section 27, 1987 Constitution)

IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

53. What are the requisites of judicial review?
The following are the requisites of judicial review:
a. there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before this Court;
b. the question before this Court must be ripe for adjudication;
c. the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the
case. (Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Aquino, GR No. 210500, April 2, 2019)

54. What is the expanded power of judicial review?

It is the power of the court to inquire into the exercise of discretionary powers to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. (Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989)

55. Is the President’s approach to the West Philippine Sea dispute subject to judicial review? May the
same be subjected to a petition for mandamus?
No, if the President sees fit to take a different approach with China, it does not by itself mean that he has
unlawfully abdicated his duty to protect and defend our national territory, correctible with the issuance by this
Court of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. Being the Head of State, he is free to use his own discretion in
this matter, accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own conscience. Ultimately, the
decision of how best to address our disputes with China, be it militarily, diplomatically, legally rests on the

10
 political branches of government. While the Court loath to give a blank check especially where the risk of
grave abuse of discretion may be high, they cannot have an entrammeled executive who will be ill-equipped
to face the amorphous threats and perpetrators whose malign intent may be impossible to know until they
strike. The Constitution vests executive power, which includes to duty to execute the law, protect the
Philippines, and conduct foreign affairs, in the President- not the Court. Barring violations of the limits
provided by law and the Constitution, the Court should take care not to substitute our exercise of discretion for
his. As the branch that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails, the Court
cannot just simply blunder in. (Atty. Romeo M. Esmero, vs. His Excellency, Honorable President, Rodrigo Roa Duterte, G.R. No.
256288, June 29, 2021[Landmark Case Q&A])

56. When is a case or issue considered Moot and Academic? What are its exceptions, if any?
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use. (Cervantes vs. Aquino III, [G.R. No. 210805. May 11, 2021)
However, a court may still decide a case otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that: (a) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is
involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No.
197930, April 17, 2018)

57. To implement the Modernization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center (MPOC Project), the Department
of Health (DOH) executed a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Agreement with the Consortium of
Megawide Construction Company and World Citi Medical Center (the “Consortium”). A Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition was filed seeking to annul and set aside the proposed privatization or
commercialization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center and the award of the MPOC Project to the
Consortium. However, during the pendency of the case, a “Notice of Termination” of the BOT
Agreement was served by the Consortium. Should the case be dismissed for being moot and
academic?
Yes. The petition has become moot and academic by virtue of the supervening termination of the BOT
Agreement that transpired after the filing of the instant petition. A case or issue is considered moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. (Cervantes vs. Aquino
III, [G.R. No. 210805. May 11, 2021, J. Hernando)

58. What is the operative fact doctrine?

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play. (League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, 24 August 2010)

59. Presidential Decree 634 (PD 634) and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) expressly mandated the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to conduct an investigation and to properly show violations on the
part of Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. (MIPTI) prior to making any recommendation to
suspend or revoke MIPTI’s franchise. PPA did not conduct any investigation. However, President Cory
Aquino issued Executive Order 30 (EO 30) revoking MIPTI’s franchise. Thereafter, EO 30 was declared
invalid. Should the revocation of MIPTI's franchise, the consequent takeover by the PPA, and the
award to the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) of the contract be respected
because they have long been in effect even before EO 30 was declared invalid?
No. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. An exception to the above rule, however,
is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be
ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
law. It affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. The
use of said doctrine "must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to
validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It
applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application." It must be stressed that PD
634 and the MOA expressly mandated the PPA to conduct an investigation and to properly show violations on
the part of MIPTI prior to making any recommendation to suspend or revoke MIPTI's franchise. Thus, PPA's
transgressions could not be solely anchored on EO 30. (Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. vs. Philippine Ports
Authority, G.R. No. 196199. December 7, 2021, J. Hernando)

60. What is meant by Judicial Independence?

Judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and
institutional independence." Decisional independence "refers to a judge’s ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand,
institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative
branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the
judiciary as a body." (Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the
Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012)

11
61. How is the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary observed?
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary
must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. (Sec 3, Art VIII; Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April
15, 1992)

62. President AAA, two months immediately before the next presidential elections, appointed BBB as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. CCC, one of the shortlisted candidates assailed BBB's
appointment, contending that it is invalid because it violated the prohibition against Midnight
Appointments under the Constitution. Discuss.
The contention of CCC is incorrect because the prohibition on Midnight Appointments is only confined to
appointments made in the Executive Department. Under jurisprudence, the Supreme Court discussed that the
prohibition does not extend to Judiciary because the Constitution established the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), and the JBC’s nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions ensures that there would
no longer be midnight appointments in the Judiciary. (De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010)

63. What are the qualifications of the Members of the Supreme Court?
a. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
b. At least 40 years of age
c. Must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engages in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
(Section 7(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

64. Are the provisions of Republic Act 7662 (RA 7662), – which provides for the powers of the Legal
Education Board (LEB), insofar as it includes "continuing legal education" as an aspect of legal
education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control, insofar as its objective of legal
education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society, and insofar as it gives the LEB the power to adopt a
system of mandatory continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary, –
unconstitutional for encroaching upon the power of the Court?
Yes. The Court acknowledges and upholds the authority of the LEB to carry out the purpose of the law, which
is in line with the State's constitutional mandate to promote quality education. However, the foregoing
provisions unduly expand the scope of the LEB's authority by giving a construction to the term "legal
education" inconsistent with the law's clear intent. By their terms, the provisions no longer just ventured into
improving the study of the law in law schools, but clearly and directly encroached upon the Court's exclusive
constitutional authority to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar, the practice of law, and admissions
to the bar. As such, they cannot be given imprimatur by this Court. (Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No.
230642, G.R. No. 242954, November 09, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

65. Is RA 7662 unconstitutional because it vested the authority to supervise and regulate legal education
in the Legal Education Board, instead of the Supreme Court?
No. The authority to supervise and regulate legal education is lodged with the political departments, as
exercised through regulatory measures enacted through the police power of the State. Moreover, historically
and constitutionally, the political departments, not the Supreme Court, have actually and directly exercised
supervision and regulation over legal education. While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such
power may be delegated. By a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under
an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991. In the case of legal education, the legislature
created the LEB to carry out the purpose of the law of uplifting the standards of legal education in the country.
It is indubitable that as a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the
supervisory and regulatory competency of the State. It belongs to the political departments as an exercise of
the State's police power. (Pimentel vs. LEB, G.R. No. 230642, G.R. No. 242954, November 09, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

66. Are decisions of the division appealable to the en banc?

No. Divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions
considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The
divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court.
(People v. Dy G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 16, 2003)

67. When are cases decided by the Supreme Court en banc?

a. cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question;
b. criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion perpetua;
c. cases raising novel questions of law;
d. cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
e. cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit;

12
 f. cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of a
lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding forty
thousand pesos;
g. cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed
judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge’s suspension or a
lawyer’s suspension from the practice of law;
h. cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any Associate Justice of
the collegial appellate court;
i. cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be modified or
reversed;
j. cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
k. cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
l. Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects the welfare
of a community;
m. Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three Members of
the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc;
n. Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and
o. all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their personnel.
(Section 3, Rule 2, A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC)

V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
68. What are the safeguards to ensure the independence of Constitutional Commissions?
The safeguards to ensure the independence of Constitutional Commissions are:
a. They are constitutionally created; they may not be abolished by statute.
b. Each is expressly described as “independent.”
c. Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute.
d. The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.
e. The Chairmen and members are given fairly long term of office of 7 years.
f. The terms of office of the chairmen and members of all the commissioners are staggered in such a way
as to lessen the opportunity for appointment of the majority of the body by the same President.
g. The chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity.
h. The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during
continuance in office.
i. The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.
j. Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
k. The chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity.
l. The Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service Law.
(Art. IX-A: Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17; Art. IX-B, C and D )

69. What are the qualifications and composition of members of the Constitutional Commissions?
Commission on Elections Commission on Audit Civil Service Commission
Qualifications a.natural-born citizens of a.natural-born citizens of a.Natural-born citizens of the
the Philippines and, the Philippines and, Philippines and,
b.at the time of their b.at the time of their b.at the time of their
appointment, at least appointment, at least appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, thirty-five years of age, thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college Certified Public with proven capacity for
degree, and must not Accountants with not public administration, and
have been candidates for less than ten years of must not have been
any elective positions in auditing experience, or candidates for any elective
the immediately members of the position in the elections
preceding elections. Philippine Bar who have immediately preceding
However, a majority been engaged in the their appointment.
thereof, including the practice of law for at
Chairman, shall be least ten years, and
members of the must not have been
Philippine Bar who have candidates for any
been engaged in the elective position in the
practice of law for at least elections immediately
ten years. preceding their
appointment. At no time
shall all Members of the
Commission belong to
the same profession.
Composition Chairman and six Chairman and two Chairman and two
Commissioners Commissioners Commissioners

(Article IX, 1987 Constitution)

13
70. Does the Civil Service Commission (CSC) have the authority to impose the sanction of dismissal with
several accessory penalties on AAA who was found guilty of dishonesty for allowing another person
to take, on his behalf, the Police Officer I Examination, considering that Republic Act No. 8551 (RA
8551) mandated the National Police Commission (NPC) to have exclusive power to administer for both
the entrance and promotional examinations for police officers?
Yes, the CSC has the authority to impose the sanction. The CSC has the authority and jurisdiction to
investigate anomalies and irregularities in the civil service examinations and to impose the necessary and
appropriate sanctions. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government,
including every government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 91 of R.A. No. 6975 or the Department
of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that the "Civil Service Law and its implementing rules
and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department," to which herein AAA belongs. It is true that the
NPC has the power and authority to administer entrance and promotional examinations for police officer and
senior police officer positions and consequently, investigate the anomalies and irregularities committed during
said examinations. However, as the central personnel agency, the CSC has the original disciplinary
jurisdiction over the act of AAA in order to protect the integrity of the civil service system which is an integral
part of the CSC's duty, authority and power as provided in Article IX-B, Section 3 of the Constitution by
removing from its roster of eligibles those who falsified their qualifications. This should be distinguished from
ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that
constitute violations of the law or the rules of service. Clearly, the NPC has no jurisdiction concerning matters
involving the integrity of the civil service system. (San Felix vs. Civil Service Commission, [G.R. No. 198404. October 14,
2019, J. Hernando.]

71. Does the Commission on Audit (COA) have power to examine the books of accounts of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, Caltex Philippines, Inc., and Petron Corporation charged with cartelization
under RA No. 8479?
No. The books of accounts of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, Caltex Philippines, Inc., and Petron
Corporation may not be opened and examined by the COA because said companies are beyond its audit
jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the anti-cartel provisions of the Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act. The Court noted that said oil companies are not public entities nor are they
nongovernmental entities receiving financial aid from the government. (Commission on Audit vs. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. No.
188760. June 30, 2020, J. Hernando.)

72. What is the rule on the Judicial Review of Constitutional Commissions?

Constitutional Rule Powers Court Grounds
Commission Exercised
Civil Service Commission Rule 43 Quasi-Judicial Court of Appeals Questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions
of fact and law
Commission on Elections Rule 64 Judicial or Supreme Court Grave abuse of discretion
and Commission on Audit Quasi-judicial

VI. CITIZENSHIP

73. Who are citizens of the Philippines?

a. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
b. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
c. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
d. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
(Article IV, Section I, 1987 Constitution)

74. Does the requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when a child reached the age of majority under
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the governing law when AAA was born, and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 apply to AAA who is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother?
No. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, AAA automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. (Uy-Belleza vs. Civil Registrar of Tacloban City, G.R. No. 218354. September 15, 2021, J. Hernando)

75. What is the difference between dual citizenship and dual allegiance?
Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance
It is the result of the concurrent application of the It refers to the situation in which a person
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously owes by some positive act,
simultaneously considered a national by said states loyalty to two or more states.
Involuntary Result of an individual’s own volition.

14
76. On 25 July 2023, an infant was left at the doorsteps of a church in Quezon City, Philippines. Due to the
constant cries of the infant, a nun assigned to the said church came out, saw the infant and took the
child in. The nun, together with the other nuns and priests contacted the local DSWD. The DSWD
assisted in the investigation, including contacting the media to help locate the parents. In the press
release, it was noted that the infant had a light complexion, almond eyes, and had a high bridged
nose. However, despite the efforts of the DSWD, the parent/s could not be located. The church
provided food and comfort for the infant, unfortunately, while conducting the investigation, the infant
fell ill and eventually died. What, if any, are the liabilities of the nuns and the priest? What is the status
of the child?
The nuns and the priest have no civil liability. The Safe Haven principle under the Foundling Recognition and
Protection Act (RA 11767) provides that a safe haven who receives a foundling shall be exempt from any civil
liability for any act or omission done in maintaining custody of the infant, except if the safe haven acted in bad
faith with gross negligence. In this case, the church accepted the infant, took care of her, and provided food
and shelter. There was no showing that the church was negligent while taking care of the infant. As for the
nationality of the child, while the child does have the features of a foreign-born child, the provisions of the
same law are clear. Any child found within the Philippines shall be considered as a Natural-Born Filipino
Citizen. Had the investigation and post-investigation procedure continued, the child would have been
registered as a natural born citizen, unless the parents were found. As clearly shown, the search for the
parent/s proved futile making the child a natural born citizen. (Sec. 13, RA 11767)

VII.BILL OF RIGHTS

77. Can the Bill of Rights be invoked against private individuals? Is this rule absolute?
The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private individuals. In the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. The equal protection erects no shield against
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. But the rule is not absolute. Where the husband invoked
his right to privacy of communication and correspondence against a private individual, his wife, who had
forcibly taken from his cabinet documents and private correspondence, and presented as evidence against
him, the Supreme Court held these papers are inadmissible in evidence, upholding the husband’s right to
privacy. (Zulueta v. CA, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996; (Yrasegui v. PAL, G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008)

78. What are the two components of due process?

The first, procedural due process, pertains to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property; the second, substantive due process, to the justification for the
denial or restriction on life, liberty, or property. While due process has no exact definition, the standard in
determining whether a person was accorded due process is whether the restriction on the person's life, liberty,
or property is consistent with fairness, reason, and justice, and free from caprice and arbitrariness. This
standard applies both to procedural and substantive due process. As applied to procedural due process, the
question to be asked is whether the person was given sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard. On the
other hand, as applied to substantive due process, the question is whether such deprivation or restriction is
necessary and fair to the affected parties. (Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No.
196199. December 7, 2021, J. Hernando)

79. Is arraignment an indispensable part of criminal due process?

Yes. Due process requires that the accusation be in due form and that the accused be given the opportunity
to answer the accusation against them. As their liberty is at stake, the accused should not be left in the dark
about why they are being charged, and must be apprised of the necessary information as to the charges
against them. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature
and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime. (Villarba vs. CA, GR. No. 227777, June 15,
2020 citing Kummer vs. People)

80. AAA was held liable by the Commission on Audit – Commission Proper (COA-CP) for excessive
payments made to a contractor for the construction of three (3) houses. AAA filed for reconsideration
and requested that they be furnished copies of the documents upon which the Notice of Disallowance
was based. Such was partially granted by COA-CP when it held that although the reference of the
documents were disclosed, the authenticated copies were not presented to the AAA. Was AAA’s right
to due process violated upon the failure of COA-CP to promptly resolve AAA’s notice of disallowance
case within the prescribed period under the Constitution as it took COA-CP thirteen (13) years before
finally deciding the case?
No. The essence of due process, as the Court has consistently ruled, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or
to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of; thus for as long as the
party was afforded the opportunity to defend himself/herself, there is due process. AAA was not denied due
process as she was able to exhaust all legal remedies available to her and that she was informed of the basis
of the disallowance. As to the length of time that the case was pending before COA-CP, this does not in any
way affect the validity of the Notice of Disallowance. (Henson vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 230185. July 7, 2020, J.
Hernando.)

81. Sometime in June 1986, Manager of the Port of Manila sent two (2) letters to Manila International Ports
Terminal, Inc. (MIPTI) informing it of alleged violations in the latter's port activities, and urging it to

15
 take necessary actions in improving its deteriorating performance and equipment. On 18 July 1986,
Philippine Ports Authority’s (PPA) General Manager served a letter to MIPTI notifying it about the
strike being staged by various trucking and brokerage firms at North Harbor caused by its alleged
poor performance and illegal practices. On 19 July 1986, then MIPTI's President submitted a reply
denying all the allegations. On the same date, then President Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No.
30 (EO 30) revoking MIPTI's franchise due to substantial violations of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), which resulted in the deterioration of port services, and authorizing PPA to undertake, on its
own, the cargo-handling operation at North Harbor. PPA maintains that the swift revocation of MIPTI's
franchise was necessary since “the interdiction of vital port operations, and its tremendous cost to
the economy, had to be abated as soon as possible." Is EO 30 unconstitutional?
Yes. EO 30 is unconstitutional for violating MIPTI's right to procedural due process. A franchise cannot be
revoked or forfeited without due process of law. While a franchise is still characterized as a special privilege in
the sense that the grant thereof is not a demandable right, and that when granted, is subject to the
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress, franchise is a property right that cannot be revoked or forfeited
without due process of law. Further, the legislative power to grant and regulate franchise is subject to due
process of law. Thus, even if the grant of franchise is broad and plenary, and even if courts do not ordinarily
interfere with the exercise of legislative prerogatives, this is not the case when there is a "a clear, patent or
palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative:'' There was sufficient notice to
MIPTI. Nevertheless, The standards of fair play and freedom from arbitrariness have not been observed, in
violation of MIPTI's constitutional right to due process. The manner in which MIPTI's franchise was revoked
was so arbitrary and so despotic that it evinces an obvious lack of regard or respect to the fundamental
principle of due process and to the Constitution that guarantees it. One day, it was business as usual for
MIPTI. The following day, it was informed of its violations. The next day, it no longer has a business. The lack
of respect is so flagrant that no person can possibly think that it is justified, or at the very least, acceptable,
even if it was done in the aftermath of martial law. Even if the need to revoke such franchise was immediate,
MIPTI's constitutional right to due process should still have been respected. (Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc.
vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199. December 7, 2021, J. Hernando.)

82. The Commission on Audit (COA) issued an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) indicating the
observations relating to the reimbursed amounts incurred and claimed by AAA as business
development expenses (BDE). In the said AOM, the COA Auditor further remarked that the
deficiencies were contrary to the Government Auditing and Accounting Manual (GAAM) requiring
complete supporting documentation for claims against government funds. AAA filed a reply to the
AOM. Finding no merit in AAA's explanation, the COA Auditor issued a Notice of Suspension (NS)
which formally disallowed the BDE claims of AAA for being irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant (IUEE) expenditures. AAA appealed the disallowance. It maintained that it had duly
submitted receipts and/or certifications to substantiate all of its BDE claims. Invoking the
constitutional guarantee of due process, AAA posits that the Notice of Disallowance (ND) is a patent
nullity based on the following arguments: 1) the ND merely stated a legal conclusion that the
payments of business development expenses (BDE) violated COA Circular No. 85-55-A pertaining to
irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant (IUEE) expenditures of government funds; 2) the ND
failed to characterize the BDE claims as IUEE based on the "operational definitions and standards or
situational cases" under the COA Circular; and 3) the ND is not supported by evidence. Did COA
violate the right to due process of AAA?
No. Due process simply requires that a party be properly notified of the allegations against him or her and be
accorded an opportunity to be heard and to controvert those allegations. AAA availed itself of the opportunity
to challenge the COA Auditor's findings even prior to the issuance of the subject ND when it filed a reply to
the AOM. Here, the issuance of an AOM by the COA Auditor, while not mandatory in audit cases, more than
satisfied the due process requirement because it operated to notify AAA of the deficiencies noted in the audit
of its account. It also accorded AAA the opportunity to comment thereon and submit documents to support the
questioned disbursements of government funds. Having submitted documents in proof of its claims and fully
argued against the deficiencies observed in the AOM from which the ND was issued, AAA cannot feign
ignorance of the factual and legal bases for the disallowance. (PSALM v. COA, G.R. No. 211376, December 07, 2021
[Landmark Case Q&A])

83. What are the requisites for valid classification?

Classification, to be reasonable, must:
a. Rest on substantial distinctions;
b. Be germane to the purpose of the law;
c. Not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. Apply equally to all members of the same class. (PADPAO v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 223505, 3 October
2017)

84. Is the Search Warrant, which states in part, “in her house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna” a
general warrant for failing to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity?
No. The Constitution provides that a search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. The test of whether the requirement of
definiteness or particularity has been met is whether the description of the place to be searched under the
warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises located within the
surrounding area or community. The search warrant in the instant case clearly complied with the foregoing
standard since it particularly described the place to be searched, which is the accused's "house at Gitna,
Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna." (Diaz vs. People, G.R. No. 213875. July 15, 2020, J. Hernando)

16
85. What are the instances of a valid warrantless search?
Warrantless a. Arrest must be lawful;
Search b. Search must be within the permissible area within the person’s reach or within
Incidental to the area of the person’s immediate control
Lawful Arrest
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
Plain View
b. The discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
Doctrine
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained
when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But
it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile
Search of a
ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out
Moving Vehicle
of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. However, for a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains
imperative.
To constitute a waiver, it must first appear that:
Consented a. the right exists;
Warrantless b. the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
Search existence of such right;
c. the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
a. the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under
customs law;
Customs Search
b. the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and
c. the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.
For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal
knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an
Stop and Frisk illicit act. It is emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal
observation of a suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement
of the "basic right to security of one's person and effects.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in
this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
Exigent and
There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Emergency
Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity
Circumstances
to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
(Sec 13, Rule 126; People vs. Lagman, GR No. 168695, December 8, 2008; People vs. Mariacos, GR No. 188611, June 16, 2010;
People vs. Nuevas, GR No. 170233, February 22, 2007; De la Cruz vs. People, GR No. 209387, January 11, 2016; Manibog vs. People,
GR. No. 211214, March 20, 2019; People vs. De Gracia; GR No. 102009-10, July 6, 1994)

86. What are the parameters for the application of the plain view doctrine?
The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
(People vs. Lagman, GR No. 168695, December 8, 2008)

87. When are checkpoints considered legal?

Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of right against unreasonable search. (People vs. Usana, GR Nos. 129756-58, January 28, 2000)

88. Is there a valid warrantless search and seizure based solely on confidential or tipped information?
No. In situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of
confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. (People vs. Sapla,
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)

89. Distinguish facial invalidation from as-applied challenge.

Facial Invalidation As-applied challenge
An examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only Considers only extant facts
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption affecting real litigants
or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
Not applicable to a criminal statute
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network Inc., vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR No. 178552, October 5, 2010)

17
90. Distinguish Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine from Overbreadth Doctrine.
Void for Vagueness Doctrine Overbreadth Doctrine
Definition The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
law is facially invalid if men of common governmental purpose, constitutionally
intelligence must necessarily guess at its subject to state regulation, may not be
meaning and differ as to its application. achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.
Applicability The "void-for-vagueness" doctrine applies to The doctrine of overbreadth applies
criminal laws, not merely those that regulate generally to statutes that infringe upon
speech or other fundamental constitutional freedom of speech.
right. (not merely those that regulate speech
or other fundamental constitutional rights.)
The fact that a particular criminal statute
does not infringe upon free speech does not
mean that a facial challenge to the statute
on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.
(Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017; Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)

91. Is Section 4 of RA 11479, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which provides for the definition of terrorism
void for vagueness or overbroad in violation of the constitutional right to free speech and
expression?
Only the proviso. The main part of Section 4 chiefly pertains to conduct. It is plain and evident from the
language used that the enumeration refers to punishable acts, or those pertaining to bodily movements that
tend to produce an effect in the external world, and not speech. The acts constitutive of the crime of terrorism
are clearly forms of conduct unrelated to speech, in contradistinction with the enumeration in the proviso,
which are forms of speech or expression, or are manifestations thereof. The proviso’s “Not Intended Clause”
is void for vagueness as it has a chilling effect on the average person. Before the protester can speak, he
must first guess whether his speech would be interpreted as a terrorist act under Section 4 and whether he
might be arrested, indicted, and/or detained for it. The danger of the clause is made graver by the fact that by
shifting the burden to the accused to explain his intent, it allows for law enforcers to take an “arrest now,
explain later” approach in the application of the ATA to protesters and dissenters - only that it must be the
latter who does the explaining, which makes it even more insidious. The vagueness of such provision is likely
to result in an arbitrary flexing of the government muscle, which is equally aversive to due process.
Furthermore, the “Not Intended Clause” renders the proviso overbroad. Section 4 supposes that speech
“intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a
serious risk to public safety” is punishable as terrorism. This abridges free expression, since this kind of
speech ought to remain protected for as long as it does not render the commission of terrorism imminent.
(Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 07, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

92. When is a speech considered unprotected speech?

A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Being of little or no value, there
is, in dealing with or regulating them, no imperative call for the application of the clear and present danger rule
or the balancing-of-interest test, they being essentially modes of weighing competing values, or, with like
effect, determining which of the clashing interests should be advanced. "Fighting words," then, which bring
about a general disorder that actually immediately threaten the State with a clear and present danger, such as
in sedition and rebellion, are unprotected speech. On the other hand, words that are merely spewed out in a
fight or quarrel between private individuals, although profane and vulgar, are still protected. (MTRC vs. TV5, GR.
No. 212670, July 6, 2022, J. Hernando)

93. Does the inclusion of AAA, an international evangelical Christian Church and social welfare
organization, under the coverage of the Social Security Law violate the non-establishment clause of
the Constitution?
No, the coverage of a religious institution, such as AAA, in the SSS does not violate the non-establishment
clause of the Constitution because the funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public
funds, but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. "Establishment"
requires a positive action on the part of the State involving the use of government resources with the primary
intention of setting up or adhering to a particular religion. Simply, in "establishment" there are two factors that
concur: one, there must be a government action, the primary consideration for which must be religion; and
second, that public money or property is employed primarily for the furtherance of a particular church. In other
words, the aid, excessive entanglement, or preference exhibited by the government must be on account of
religion or directed towards religious matters and realized with the use of government resources. In this case,
the petitioner is dealt with not as a religious institution but as an employer of its ministers. It is in this capacity
that the petitioner's obligation to register and extend the benefits under the SSS law in favor of its ministers
arose. The funds involved are not owned by the government but merely held in trust for the members who are
the beneficiaries thereof. Irrespective of whether the funds are characterized as public in nature, there is no
"establishment" to speak of as the social security benefit is given to ministers not on account of their religion
but as employees of the petitioner; the religious character of the nature of their employment is merely
incidental to the extension of the coverage in the SSS law. (The Salvation Army vs. Social Security System, G.R. No.
230095, September 15, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

18
94. Did the Social Security Commission infringe the constitutional right to free exercise of religious belief
and practice of AAA, an international evangelical Christian Church and social welfare organization,
when it denied AAA’s request for the conversion of its ministers from employee members to
non-employee members?
No, there is no infringement of the right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the Constitution because
the principle of separation of church and state applies only to ecclesiastical affairs. As defined, an
"ecclesiastical affair" concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the
membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership."
Just because a case involves the relationship between the Church and its religious ministers does not
automatically bring it within the ambit of a purely religious affair. An employer-employee relationship may exist
between a religious organization and its ministers. It is the existence of this relationship that determines the
status and triggers mandatory coverage under the SSS law. (The Salvation Army vs. Social Security System, G.R. No.
230095, September 15, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

95. AAA corp’s landholdings were placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform program under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and thus it was deprived of its landholdings since 1972. Until now
(2020), it has not been paid just compensation for its properties. What should be the reckoning point
for the computation of just compensation?
Just compensation should be computed using the values at the time of payment judicially determined and not
at the time of taking in 1972 considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land although ownership thereof has not yet been transferred in their names. It would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guidelines provided by P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 considering the lapse of a considerable length of time. Just compensation should be determined
in accordance with R.A. No. 6657, and not P.D. No. 27 or E.O. No. 228 considering that just compensation is
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full, and ample. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307. October 14, 2020, J. Hernando.)

96. When is one considered under custodial investigation?

Any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way. It starts when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. (People vs. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 citing People vs. Marra)

97. What are the rights of persons under custodial investigation?

a. Right to remain silent;
b. Right to competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice;
c. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with one
d. Right to be informed of his rights;
e. Right against torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will;
f. Right against secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or similar forms of detention;
g. Right to have confessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights considered inadmissible in
evidence. (Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, June 13, 1966)

98. What is the exclusionary rule pertaining to custodial investigation?

Any confession or admission obtained from the person arrested in violation of the rights of a person under
custodial investigation are inadmissible in evidence and cannot be used against said person. (Section 12, Article
III, 1987 Constitution)

99. What are the factors to be considered in determining violation of the right to speedy disposition?
In the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced
are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay
First, as to the length of delay. Approximately six years had elapsed from the time when the
complaint-affidavit was filed until the case was filed before the Sandiganbayan. This period to conduct and
complete the preliminary investigation is already excessive.
Second, as to the reason for the delay. Valid reasons for the delay identified and accepted by the Court
include, but are not limited to: (1) extraordinary complications such as the degree of difficulty of the questions
involved, the number of persons charged, the various pleadings filed, and the voluminous documentary and
testimonial evidence on record; and (2) acts attributable to the respondents. The prosecution offered no
explanation regarding the delay in conducting the preliminary investigation and in its findings indicting BBB of
the offense charged.
Third, as to the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused. It is not for BBB to ensure that the
wheels of justice continue to turn. Rather, it is for the State to guarantee that the case is disposed within a
reasonable period. It is sufficient that she raised the constitutional infraction prior to her arraignment before
the Sandiganbayan.
Fourth, prejudice caused by the delay. The inordinate delay defeats the salutary objective of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, which is "to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and
expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time

19
 compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose."
(Zaldivar-Perez vs. Hon. First Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 204739. November 13, 2019, J. Hernando.)

100. When can a respondent in a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman invoke
his or her right to speedy disposition of cases?
The right is commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations conducted by the
Ombudsman because while these proceedings do not form part of the criminal prosecution proper, the
respondent may already be prejudiced by such proceedings, and equally because the Ombudsman itself is
constitutionally committed to act promptly on complaints filed before it. (Lacbain vs. Sandiganbayan,G.R. No. 244649,
June 14, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

101. When is the right to a speedy disposition of cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution deemed violated?
The right to speedy disposition of cases is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and
balance. A mere mathematical reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient. (Lacbain vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 244649, June 14, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

102. How is the right to speedy trial different from right to speedy disposition of cases?
Right to Speedy Trial Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
May only be invoked in criminal May be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial
prosecutions against courts of What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the
law. proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
(Lacbain vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 244649, June 14, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

103. Is the right to speedy disposition of cases an absolute right?

No, it admits certain exceptions such as (1) if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was
solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence; and (2) waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of
cases where the accused acquiesced to the delay. Failure of the accused to file the appropriate motion upon
the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods constitute a waiver to his or her right to speedy disposition of
cases. (Lacbain vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 244649, June 14, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

104. Discuss the rules on bail.

Bail as a matter or right
Before conviction when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua
(People vs. Tanes, GR No. 240596, April 3, 2019)
Bail as a matter of discretion
Offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment. Bail will be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong

105. When is a counsel considered competent and independent?

To be a competent and independent counsel in a custodial investigation, the lawyer so engaged should be
present at all stages of the interview, counselling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. It has been made clear that counsel
should be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
innocent. (People vs. Agustin, GR No. 247718, March 3, 2021 citing People vs. Peñaflor)

106. Is the right to counsel imperative in administrative proceedings?

No. In an administrative proceeding like that conducted against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of
engaging the services of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative
investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service. (Vivo vs. PAGCOR, GR No. 187854, November 12, 2013)

107. What is the scope of the right against self-incrimination?

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it
may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (Dela Cruz vs. People, GR No.
200748, July 23, 2014)

108. What are the requisites of double jeopardy?

As a general rule, the following requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid
indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea
entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case

20
 against him without his express consent. (Kho vs. Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc., (G.R. No. 213400. August
4, 2021, J. Hernando.)

109. What are the exceptions to the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude?
a. Punishment for a crime for which the party has been duly convicted.
b. Personal military or civil service in the interest of national defense.
c. Striking workers – return to work order issued by the DOLE Secretary or the President in industries
affected with public interest. (Sec. 18[2], Art. III; Sec. 4, Art. II; 45 O.G. Supp. No. 9, p. 47)

110. When is punishment considered cruel and degrading?

A punishment is cruel and degrading, or disproportionate to the nature of the offense when It is flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. (Fuertes vs. Senate, GR No. 208168, January 7, 2020)

111. Do the penalties imposed under the Anti-Hazing Law violate the constitutional prohibition on cruel,
degrading, or inhuman punishment?
No. Petitioners have failed to show how the penalties imposed under the Anti­Hazing Law would be cruel,
degrading, or inhuman punishment, when they are similar to those imposed for the same offenses under the
Revised Penal Code, albeit a degree higher. To emphasize, the Anti-Hazing Law aims to prevent
organizations from making hazing a requirement for admission. The increased penalties imposed on those
who participate in hazing is the country's response to a reprehensible phenomenon that persists in schools
and institutions.122 The Anti-Hazing Law seeks to punish the conspiracy of silence and secrecy, tantamount
to impunity, that would otherwise shroud the crimes committed. (Fuertes vs. Senate, GR No. 208168, January 7, 2020)

112. Distinguish the Writs of Habeas Corpus, Kalikasan, Habeas Data, and Amparo.
Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Kalikasan Writ of Habeas Data Writ of Amparo
Who Natural Person Natural or juridical Any aggrieved party By the aggrieved party
may File person, entity may file a petition for or by any qualified
authorized by law, the writ of habeas person or entity in the
people’s data. However, in following order:
organization, cases of extralegal a. Any member
non-governmental killings and enforced of the immediate
organization, or disappearances, the family, namely: the
any public interest petition may be filed spouse, children and
group accredited by: parents of the
by or registered a. Any member aggrieved party;
with any of the immediate b. Any
government family of the ascendant,
agency aggrieved party, descendant or
namely: the spouse, collateral relative of
children and the aggrieved party
parents; or within the fourth civil
b. Any degree of
ascendant, consanguinity or
descendant or affinity, in default of
collateral relative of those mentioned in the
the aggrieved party preceding paragraph;
within the fourth civil or
degree of c. Any concerned
consanguinity or citizen, organization,
affinity, in default of association or
those mentioned in institution, if there is no
the preceding known member of the
paragraph immediate family or
relative of the
aggrieved party.

Rights Right to liberty Right to a Right to privacy in Right to life, liberty,

involved balanced and life, liberty, or and security
healthful ecology security

21
 Where to Supreme Court Supreme Court or Regional Trial Court Regional Trial Court of
File with any stations where the petitioner the place where the
of the CA or respondent threat, act or omission
resides, or that was committed or any
which has of its elements
jurisdiction over the occurred, or with the
place where the data Sandiganbayan, the
or information is Court of Appeals, the
gathered, collected Supreme Court, or any
or stored, at the justice of such courts.
option of the
petitioner
Supreme Court, CA,
Sandiganbayan
when the action
concerns public data
files of government
offices
(Rules of Court, Rule 102/A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC/A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC/A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)

VIII. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE, AND SPORTS

113. What is academic freedom?

Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of freedom of
thought, speech, expression and the press. Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the
faculty, but also by the students themselves. (Pimentel vs. LEB, G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019) It
incudes: (a) who may teach, (b) what may be taught, (c) how it shall be taught, and (d) who may be admitted
to study. (Cudia v. PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

114. Does academic freedom include the power of the school to instill discipline?
Yes. The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that
"the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to
its very survival." The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom,
i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. (Cudia v. PMA, G.R.
No. 211362, February 24, 2015)

115. RA 7662 provides that the Legal Education Board has the power to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly
accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law
course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)
months. It further provides that the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such
accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar. Are the said provisions violative of the academic freedom of law schools?
Yes. While the clause legal internship does not immediately strike as being intrusive of the academic
freedom of law schools, how the LEB exercised its authority under the provision effectively amounted to
control. It blatantly overstepped the authority of law schools to determine what to teach by dictating upon the
law schools how to undertake the legal apprenticeship and requiring law schools to submit their
apprenticeship program for assessment and evaluation prior to endorsement of the same to this Court for
approval. (Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642, G.R. No. 242954, November 09, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

116. LEB imposes an aptitude examination called Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a
requirement for law school admission. It also imposes a minimum passing rate before an applicant is
allowed to take a law school entrance exam. Does the imposition of aptitude examination and a
minimum passing rate violate the academic freedom of schools under the constitution?
The imposition of an aptitude examination for law school admission or PhiLSAT is not unreasonable per se,
however, the imposition of a minimum passing rate unreasonably infringes on the freedom of schools to
determine who to accept as students. The State has the authority to administer an aptitude test in the
exercise of its police power and given the existence of a compelling State interest to uplift the standards of
legal education. The compelling State interest in law schools is spurred primarily by the need to upgrade the
quality of legal education that has become languid over time and infiltrated by individuals or organizations
who are not qualified. Following the constitutionally-provided limits, however, the LEB must still show that the
current PhiLSAT, being a State-sanctioned exam, is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of RA
7662 and not unduly invasive and oppressive of private rights, particularly the academic freedom of law
schools. In this respect, the requirement of the LEB for prospective students to take the PhiLSAT does not
per se render it unconstitutional for as long as the results will only be recommendatory, with the law schools
retaining the discretion to accept the applicant based on their policies and standards. As an eligibility
requirement, though, the current PhiLSAT is not a lawful method to attain the lawful subject of the State.
Requiring the schools to accept only those who took and passed the exam amounts to a dictatorial control of
the State, through LEB, and runs afoul of the intent of the Constitution. (Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No.
230642, G.R. No. 242954, November 09, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

22
 IX. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

117. What is the Public Trust Doctrine in relation to the Regalian doctrine?
The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing supervision over
the taking and use of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties who acquired rights in trust property [only hold]
these rights subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner
harmful to the trust." The doctrine further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be
privately owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual and society as a whole.
A clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of public rights over private
rights for critical resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative duties of a trustee to manage these
natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations and embodies key principles of
environmental protection: stewardship, communal responsibility, and sustainability."
In this framework, a relationship is formed — "the [s]tate is the trustee, which manages specific natural
resources — the trust principal — for the trust principal — for the benefit of the current and future
generations — the beneficiaries." "[T]he [S]tate has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in
the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." But with
the birth of privatization of many basic utilities, including the supply of water, this has proved to be quite
challenging.
These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine to evolve from a mere principle to a resource management
term and tool flexible enough to adapt to changing social priorities and address the correlative and
consequent dangers thereof. The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts
can enforce the public trust doctrine even against the government itself. (Maynilad Water Services, Inc. vs. The
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 202897. August 6, 2019, J. Hernando.)

118. How is land of public domain converted to private land?

There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when
such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. (Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April
29, 2009)

119. The Constitution provides that "No franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens." Discuss the term "capital" stated in the provision above, and whether
China Oil Corporation's structure below complied with said requirement.
Outstanding Stock Kind of Stock Number of shares owned by
Filipinos
100 Common Shares 60
100 Class A Preferred Shares (with 60
right to elect directors)
100 Class B Preferred Shares (without 50
right to elect directors)
Under jurisprudence, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares
with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. The 60% requirement applies to both (1) the total
number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; and (2) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors. In this case, China Oil
Corporation did not comply with the 60% Filipino ownership requirement. Although the total voting shares is
120 out of 200, which is 60%, compliant with the first requirement, China Oil Corporation did not however
comply with the second requirement since only 170 out of 300 total outstanding stock is owned by Filipinos,
which is only 56.67% or 57% of the total outstanding stock. (Roy vs. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016)

X.LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW, AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT
120. Distinguish between Regular Appointment and Ad Interim Appointment.
Regular Appointment Ad-Interim Appointment
A regular appointment is one made by the An ad-interim appointment is one made by the President
President while Congress is in session after while the Congress is not in session, before the confirmation
the nomination is confirmed by the by the Commission on Appointments, is immediately
Commission on Appointments and continues effective, and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed
until the end of term. by COA upon the next adjournment of Congress.
(Sec. 16, Art VII)

121. Distinguish between Ad Interim Appointment and Appointments in an acting capacity.

Ad Interim Appointment Appointment in Acting Capacity

23
 Effectivity Effective upon acceptance Effective upon acceptance

When Extended Extended only during a recess of Congress Extended any time there is a vacancy
Submission to Submitted to the Commission on Not submitted to the Commission on
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection Appointments
Appointments
(Pimentel vs. Ermita, GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005)

122. Is former Chief Justice Corona’s retirement benefits, survivorship benefits and other allowances
under Republic Act 9946 (An Act Granting Additional Retirement, Survivorship, and Other Benefits to
Members of the Judiciary) and Administrative Circular No. 81-2010 (Guidelines on the
Implementation of Republic Act No. 9946) forfeited due to his impeachment?
No. The effects of a judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than to removal from office
and disqualification from holding any public office. Impeachment is designed to remove the impeachable
officer from office, not punish him. It is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in
nature. No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of impeachment
against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges that must be properly
filed with courts of law. Since a removal by impeachment does not explicitly provide for forfeiture as a
consequence thereof, as opposed to a criminal conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual or absolute
disqualification, an impeached official, like former Chief Justice Corona, cannot be deprived of his retirement
benefits on the sole ground of his removal. (Re: Letter of Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC. January 12, 2021, J. Hernando.)

123. Does the failure to judicially convict the ousted Chief Justice Corona for any post-impeachment
liability due to his death entitle him, therefore, to retirement benefits?
Yes. Chief Justice Corona may be considered involuntarily retired from public service. Forfeiture of
retirement benefits could have been imposed upon criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by
his death. Viewing it from another angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is a resolutory
condition after a verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in that the impeached official retains
all the post- employment privileges already earned unless otherwise declared by the competent tribunals.
Until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law, retirement eligibility and benefits
have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by impeachment. There being no such
determination of liability, his entitlement thereto subsisted. (Re: Letter of Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC. January 12,
2021, J. Hernando.)

124. Is the condonation doctrine applicable to all open and pending administrative cases as of April 12,
2016 or the date on which the Court had acted upon and denied with finality the Ombudsman's
Motion for Clarification/Motion for Partial Reconsideration in the Carpio-Morales case which
abandoned the condonation doctrine?
The condonation doctrine is still considered as "good law" in all administrative cases involving public officials
whose reelections occurred before April 12, 2016, regardless of the dates of filing of the administrative cases
against them or the status of said cases when the Carpio Morales ruling attained finality. The doctrine
applies to those officials who have been reelected prior to its abandonment. That is because when a public
official has been reelected prior to the promulgation and finality of Carpio-Morales, he or she has every right
to rely on the old doctrine that his re-election has already served as a condonation of his [or her] previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him [or her] from office, and a new doctrine decreeing
otherwise would not be applicable against him or her. (Gaudan V. Degamo, G.R. No. 226935, February 9, 2021 [Landmark
Case Q&A])

125. Differentiate impeachment from quo warranto.

Impeachment Quo Warranto
Nature Political Judicial
Jurisdiction The Congress is the Instituted either by the Solicitor General in behalf of the
prosecutor, the trier, and Republic of the Philippines or by an individual claiming the
the judge public office in issue, both of which petitions are cognizable
only by the Supreme Court.
Grounds Impeachment proceedings Quo warranto determines the legal right, title, eligibility, or
seek to confirm and qualifications of the incumbent to the contested public office
vindicate the breach of the
trust reposed by the Filipino
people upon the
impeachable official
Applicable The 1987 Constitution, as Quo warranto cases are dictated by the Rules of Court.
Procedural supplemented by the
Rules internal rules of procedure
of the Congress, directs the
course of impeachment
proceedings
End Result The end result of an When a quo warranto petition is granted, ouster from office
impeachment proceeding is is likewise meted, but the Court can likewise impose upon
the removal of the public the public officer additional penalties such as reimbursement
officer, and his or her of costs pertaining to the rightful holder of the public office

24
 Impeachment Quo Warranto
perpetual political and such further judgment determining the respective rights
disqualification from holding in and to the public office, position, or franchise of all the
public office parties to the action as justice requires.
(Re: Letter of Corona, A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC. January 12, 2021, J. Hernando.)

126. Define the powers granted to administrative agencies – quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and
investigatory.
Quasi-Legislative Quasi-Judicial Investigatory
The "power to make rules The power to hear and Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the
and regulations which determine questions of fact powers of an administrative body to inspect the
results in delegated to which the legislative policy records and premises, and investigate the
legislation that is within is to apply and to decide in activities of persons or entities coming under his
the confines of the accordance with the jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the
granting statute and the standards laid down by the disclosure of information by means of accounts,
doctrine of law itself in enforcing and records, reports, statements, testimony of
non-delegability and administering the same law. witnesses, and production of documents. This
separability of powers." power is distinguished from judicial adjudication
which signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of concerned parties.
(Genuino vs. De Lima, GR No. 197930, April 17, 2018; Alliance of Non-Life Insurance Workers vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 206159, August
26, 2020; Levi Strauss & Co., vs. Sevilla, GR No. 219744, March 01, 2021)

127. What is the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function?
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. (COURAGE vs. Abad,
GR No. 200418, November 10, 2020)

128. In the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, what must administrative agencies observe?
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling
statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. (Genuino vs. De Lima, GR No. 197930, April 17, 2018)

129. Atty. AAA claims that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) violated his right to due process
because the disbarment case against him was already submitted for resolution when it came to his
knowledge. He also insists that the IBP's resolution was solely based on complainant BBB's
evidence as the IBP did not act on his motion for reinvestigation. However, Atty. AAA filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Reinvestigation and a subsequent Answer to Letter-Complaint
Requesting for Formal Investigation upon being informed of the notices. He also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration before the IBP assailing the latter’s resolution which was in fact given due course
by the IBP. Was Atty. AAA’s right to due process violated?
No. Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Due process, as a constitutional
precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of
due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A thorough
examination of the records shows that respondent Atty. AAA was accorded ample opportunity to defend
himself and adduce his own evidence. (Ang vs. Belaro, Jr., A.C. No. 12408. December 11, 2019, J. Hernando.)

130. AAA, a health care institution duly accredited by the PhilHealth or PHIC, filed a complaint before the
RTC against the latter for failure to pay 160 reimbursement claims. PHIC contended that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case for failure to exhaust existing administrative
remedies, and that the case is not an exception to the doctrine on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. On the other hand, AAA argued that their filing of complaint with the RTC is justified due
to the denial of its claim by the PHIC’s Board. Is the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
justified?
Yes, the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies was justified. AAA's filing of the complaint with the RTC
without first exhausting available administrative remedies is justifiable in light of the denial of its claims by the
PHIC's Board itself, the body superior to the PHIC Regional Office or the Protest and Appeals Review
Department where AAA was supposed to file an motion for reconsideration or appeal. The trial court and the
appellate court also correctly considered AAA's Complaint as an exception to the application of the doctrine
on exhaustion of administrative remedies on the basis of strong public interest. Alternatively, the instant case
may also fall under the following exceptions: (a) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable; and (b) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Philippine Health Insurance Corporation vs. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, G.R. No. 214485. January 11, 2021, J. Hernando.)

25
131. AAA is a natural-born Filipino citizen. He was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America
(USA) and lost his Filipino citizenship. In 2009, he applied for repatriation under Republic Act No.
9225, before the Consulate General of thePhilippines in San Francisco, USA, took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship.In the same year, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in
Bustos,Bulacan, BBB, another candidate for the same position, filed a Petition to disqualify or to
cancel AAA’s COC on the ground that the latter is a foreigner. To support his claim, BBB presented
AAA’s travel record indicating that he has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the
Philippines even after renouncing his American citizenship. Decide.
AAA should be disqualified because he failed to meet the continuing requirement of Filipino citizenship.
Under jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that in cases of dual citizenship as a result of a positive act, in
this case repatriation, mere filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is not sufficient for purposes of renunciation of
a foreign citizenship. An affidavit of renunciation of such foreign citizenship shall also be filed in order to
qualify for public office. (Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

132. Supposing that AAA obtained the highest number of votes, and was thereafter disqualified due to the
use of his US Passport, who will succeed him, (a) the candidate who acquired the 2nd highest
number of votes, or (b) the Vice Mayor? Decide.
The candidate who acquired the 2nd highest number of votes will succeed him because the rule on
succession does not apply to a non-candidate. Under jurisprudence, if a candidate is disqualified by reason
of misrepresentation, such candidate’s Certificate of Candidacy is deemed as not to have been filed. In such
cases, succession does not apply since succession presupposes that there was a valid Certificate of
Candidacy. (Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

133. AAA filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for City Mayor. However, his CoC was subsequently
canceled for his material misrepresentation. He was, thereafter, substituted by his wife, BBB. CCC,
another candidate for the City Mayor, opposed BBB’s substitution alleging her substitution was void
because there was no candidate to substitute for because AAA’s CoC was canceled. Decide.
CCC’s contention is correct because for there to be a valid substitution, the candidate substituted must have
had a valid Certificate of Candidacy. Under jurisprudence, when a candidate is disqualified by reason of
misrepresentation, his Certificate of Candidacy will be canceled, and said candidate will be deemed not to
have filed his Certificate of Candidacy. (Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

134. Distinguish a petition to deny due course or to cancel Certificate of Candidacy (COC) and a petition
for disqualification.
Petition to deny due course or to cancel COC Petition for disqualification
Grounds Concerned with the false representation by a Relates to the declaration of a
candidate as to material information in the COC candidate as ineligible or lacking in
quality or accomplishment fit for the
elective position said candidate is
seeking
What Proof of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or Possession of a disqualification as
should be hide a fact relating to the candidate's requisite declared by a final decision of a
proved for residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal competent court, or as found by the
petition to qualification necessary to run for elective office Commission
prosper
Prescriptiv Within five days from the last day of filing of COCs, Any day after the last day of the filing
e Period but not later than 25 days from the filing of the COC of COC, but not later than the date of
sought to be canceled the proclamation
Effects The person whose certificate is canceled or denied A disqualified person is merely
due course is not treated as a candidate at all; prohibited to continue as a candidate;
One whose COC was denied due course or canceled A disqualified candidate may still be
cannot be substituted because the law considers him substituted if they had a valid COC in
or her to not have been a candidate at all the first place
(Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])

135. Does perpetual disqualification to hold public office fall within the ambit of “material representation”
in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code?
Yes. Perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility. Perpetual special
disqualification is a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not
eligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of
candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under
Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in
the COC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate (Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])

26
136. What is a pre-proclamation controversy?
A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides that the following shall be proper issues that may be raised:
1. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
2. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or
falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned
in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the Code;
3. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
4. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of
which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.
(Suhuri vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 181869, October 2, 2009)

137. Distinguish an election contest filed with the PET from a petition for quo warranto.
Election Contest Petition for Quo Warranto
Grounds Anchored on allegations of electoral frauds, Attacks the protestee's ineligibility or
anomalies, or irregularities in the protested specific acts of disloyalty to the
precincts Republic of the Philippines
Who may Limited to the registered candidate for President May be filed by any registered voter
file or Vice-President of the Philippines who received who has voted in the election
the second or third highest number of votes concerned.
Prescriptive Within thirty days after the proclamation of the Within ten days after the proclamation
Period winner of the winner.
(Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])

138. When can the Supreme Court take cognizance of an election contest?
The Court, sitting En Banc, can only take cognizance of an election contest if the following requisites concur:
(a) a petition is filed before it; and (b) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
who has been validly proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office. (Buenafe et. al vs.
COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case Q&A])

139. In a case filed before the Supreme Court questioning the validity of a Presidential candidate’s
certificate of candidacy, is it proper for the Court to dismiss the said petition and wait for the same
petition to be refiled with the Supreme Court sitting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)?
No. When the Court acts as the PET, it is not a separate and distinct body from the Court itself. The
constitutional provision refers to the same "Supreme Court sitting en banc." However, it should be
recognized that the proceedings before the PET require a distinct set of rules of procedure owing to the very
specific nature of its functions. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court En Banc as the PET is likened
to the characterization of specialized courts in relation to the then Courts of First Instance. They are the
same courts having the same jurisdiction, only that specialized courts are intended for practicality. Section 4,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution therefore should not be considered as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the
Court over the pending petitions. (Buenafe et. al vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 260374 and 260426, June 28, 2022 [Landmark Case
Q&A])

140. Does the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal extend to interpreting or invalidating contracts
entered into by the COMELEC?
No. The authority of the SET is limited to matters affecting the validity of the protestant's title. While it may be
true that the SET has the power to control its proceedings, such power cannot, by any means, be construed
as including the power to interpret much less invalidate a contract between third parties. To rule otherwise is
to overstretch if not to go astray from the interpretation of the SET's constitutional grant of jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the Senate.
(Tolentino v. SET, GR No. 248005, May 11, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

141. Distinguish municipal corporation, quasi-corporation, and government-owned or controlled

corporation.
Municipal Corporation Quasi-Corporation Government-Owned or
Controlled Corporation
Territorial and political subdivisions. a. Created by the State, Must be:
They are established to govern a either by law or by a. organized as a stock or
portion of the State. authority of law, for a non-stock corporation;
Elements: specific governmental b. established for the common
a. legal creation; purpose; good or has public
b. corporate name; b. Renders public service or character;
c. inhabitants; and supplies public wants c. owned by the government
d. place or territory
(Section 1, Article X, 1987 Constitution; Public Corporations, Ruperto G. Martin, 1985; Funa vs. MECO, GR No. 193462, February 4,
2014)

27
142. What are the principles of local autonomy?
Decentralization of Power Decentralization of Administration
The decentralization of power involves the The decentralization of administration occurs when the central
abdication of political power in favor of the government delegates administrative powers to the LGUs as
autonomous LGUs as to grant them the the means of broadening the base of governmental powers
freedom to chart their own destinies and to and of making the LGUs more responsive and accountable in
shape their futures with minimum the process, and thereby ensure their fullest development as
intervention from the central government. self-reliant communities and more effective partners in the
This amounts to self-immolation because pursuit of the goals of national development and social
the autonomous LGUs thereby become progress. This form of decentralization further relieves the
accountable not to the central authorities central government of the burden of managing local affairs so
but to their constituencies. that it can concentrate on national concerns
(Mandanas vs. Ochoa, GR No. 199802, July 3, 2018)

143. What are the powers of local government units?

a. Police Power (General Welfare Clause)
b. Power to Generate and Apply Resources
c. Eminent Domain
d. Closure and Opening of Roads
e. Corporate Powers
i. To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
ii. To sue and be sued;
iii. To have and use a corporate seal;
iv. To acquire and convey real or personal property;
v. To enter into contracts; and
vi. To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided
in this Code and other laws.
f. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants
(Chapter II, RA No., 7160)

144. What are the requirements for the validity of an ordinance?

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the Local Government Unit
(LGU) to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to
the following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3)
not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) not unreasonable. (Manila Electric Company vs. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529. February 9, 2021, J.
Hernando.)

145. What are the two tests in determining the validity of an ordinance?
The Formal Test and the Substantive Test. The Formal Test requires the determination of whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether the same was passed pursuant
to the procedure laid down by law. Meanwhile, the Substantive Test primarily assesses the reasonableness
and fairness of the ordinance and significantly its compliance with the Constitution and existing statutes.
(Manila Electric Company vs. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529. February 9, 2021, J. Hernando.)

PART TWO: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

146. What is jus cogens?
Jus cogens is a peremptory norm of general international law. A peremptory norm of general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character. (Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)

147. What are the elements of customary international law?

The elements of customary international law include:
a. the widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (State practice);
b. the requirement that the acts must occur out of a sense of obligation (opinio juris); and
c. that the acts are taken by a significant number of States and not rejected by a significant number of
States. (Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, GR No. 159618, February 1, 2011)

148. Is the Senate's power to ratify limited to treaties to the exclusion of executive agreements?
No, Article VII, Section 21 does not limit the requirement of senate concurrence to treaties alone. It may
cover other international agreements, including those classified as executive agreements, if: (1) they are
more permanent in nature; (2) their purposes go beyond the executive function of carrying out national
policies and traditions; and (3) they amend existing treaties or statutes. As long as the subject matter of the
agreement covers political issues and national policies of a more permanent character, the international
agreement must be concurred in by the Senate. The constitutional framers were not linguistically ignorant.
Treaties follow a different process to become part of the law of the land. Their delineation from generally
accepted principles of international law was deliberate. So was the use of different terminologies and
mechanisms in rendering them valid and effective. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark
Case Q&A]).

28
149. Does the president enjoy unbridled authority to unilaterally withdraw from a treaty?
No, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from
treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that they run
afoul of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton,
arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific
circumstances attending Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the
Senate's specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and
may prevent him or her from proceeding with withdrawal. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021
[Landmark Case Q&A]).

150. What are the guidelines for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from
international agreements?
a. The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be
contrary to the Constitution or statutes.
b. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur.
c. Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate
concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence.
(Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

151. When is senate concurrence required in withdrawing from a treaty or international agreement?
Senate concurrence to withdraw from a treaty or international agreement is required (a) when the Senate
conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or (b) when the withdrawal itself will
be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law
which implements a treaty. (Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

152. On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court.
On March 16, 2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the
United Nations Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this
communication the following day, March 17, 2018. Can the court annul the action of the President of
withdrawing from the International Criminal Court?
No. Through the said actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all
consistent and in compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed
to enable withdrawal have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the
Philippines' action soon after it had withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a state of affairs correctible
by this Court's finite jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court's subsequent consummate acceptance of
the withdrawal all but confirmed the futility of this Court's insisting on a reversal of completed actions.
(Pangilinan vs. Cayetano, G.R. no. 238875. March 16, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])

153. What are the maritime zones?

Territorial Sea Territorial sea is an outwards belt of sea from the baseline and up to 12 nautical
miles. According to Art. 2 of the Law of the Sea, the coastal state has sovereignty
over the territorial sea and the airspace above as well as the seabed under, it is also
subject to the right of innocent passage.

Contiguous Zone The contiguous zone is an area of water which does not exceed 24 nautical miles
from the baseline, hence, it extends 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea’s edge.
The coastal state has the authority over such area only to the extent necessary to
prevent infringement on its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation authority over
its territorial waters or territory and to punish such infringement.

Exclusive An exclusive economic zone is an area which extends not more than 200 nautical
Economic Zone miles beyond the baseline. The coastal state has the rights over the sea’s natural
resources including the seabed and the subsoil, but it does not affect other state’s
right of flight and navigation.
Continental Shelf Continental or Archipelagic Shelf refers to (a) Submarine area’s seabed and subsoil
adjacent to the coastal state but is outside the territorial sea, until the depth of 200
meters or, beyond the limit, to a depth which allows exploitation, and (b) Areas of
seabed and subsoil adjacent to the islands. The rights of the coastal states within its
continental shelf are: right to explore and exploit the natural resources, to build
necessary installations, and to set-up a safety zone over the installations made by
the coastal state within 500-meter radius. This right does not extend to non-resource
material and does not affect the right of navigation of other states.

154. What are the principles on jurisdiction of states?

Territorial It pertains to the power of the State over persons and things within its territory
Personal It refers to the power of the State over its nationals, which may be exercised by
Jurisdiction or the State even if the individual is outside the territory of the State.
Nationality
Principle

29
 Extraterritorial It is the power exercised by the State beyond its territory in the following cases:
a. Assertion of its personal jurisdiction over its nationals abroad; or the
exercise of its rights to punish certain offenses committed outside its territory
against its national interests even if the offenders are nonresident aliens;
b. By virtue of its relations with other states or territories, as when it establishes
a colonial protectorate, or a condominium, or administers a trust territory, or
occupies enemy territory in the course of war;
c. When the local state waives its jurisdiction over persons and things within its
territory, as when a foreign army stationed therein remains under the
jurisdiction of the sending state;
d. By the principle of exterritoriality, as illustrated by the immunities of the head
of state in a foreign country;
e. Through enjoyment of easements or servitudes, such as the easement of
innocent passage or arrival under stress;
f. The exercise of jurisdiction by the state in the high seas over its vessels;
over pirates; in the exercise of the right to visit and search; and under the
doctrine of hot pursuit;
g. The exercise of limited jurisdiction over the contiguous zone and the
patrimonial sea, to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations.
Protective Principle The State has jurisdiction over acts committed abroad (by nationals or foreigners)
which are prejudicial to its national security or vital interests
Universality State has jurisdiction over offenses considered as universal crimes regardless of
Principle where committed and who committed them
Passive Personality State exercises jurisdiction over crimes against its own nationals even if
Principle committed outside its territory. This principle may be resorted to if the others are
not applicable

155. What are the areas not subject to the jurisdiction of individual states?
High Seas Deep Seabed Outer Space
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. The sea-bed The exploration and
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down and ocean use of outer space,
by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It floor, and the including the Moon
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: subsoil and other celestial
(a) freedom of navigation; thereof, bodies, shall be
(b) freedom of overflight; beyond the carried out for the
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; limits of benefit and in the
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations national interests of all
permitted under international law, subject to Part VI; jurisdiction, as countries,
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section well as the irrespective of their
2; resources of degree of economic
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. the area, are or scientific
These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the common development, and
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the heritage of shall be the province
high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this mankind of all mankind.
Convention with respect to activities in the Area.
(Art. 87, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; No. 1, Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed; Art. 1, Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies)

156. What is the doctrine of State Responsibility?

Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State (Art. 1, Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts)

157. When is there an internationally wrongful act of a State?

There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
a. is attributable to the State under international law; and
b. constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. (Article 2, Draft Articles on the Responsibility Of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts)

158. When is there an armed conflict?

An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State (Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 96–127 (Oct. 2, 1995).

159. Define international conflict, internationalized conflict, and non-international armed conflict.
International Conflict Internationalized Conflict Non-International Conflict
All cases of declared war or of any If a foreign Power sends troops into a Armed conflict not of an
other armed conflict which may territory to support a movement international character
arise between two or more of the opposing the local government. occurring in the territory of one
High Contracting Parties, even if Intervention may also take place by of the High Contracting Parties
the state of war is not recognized proxy when that Power merely (Art 3[1], GCI).

30
by one of them (Art 2 [1], Geneva supports and guides the uprising from
Convention for the Amelioration of the a distance (International Criminal Tribunal for
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Prosecutor v.
Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment [Appeals
1949 [GCI]). Chamber], 15 July 1999, para 84)

31