S E C U L A R I Z A T I O N I N T H E LO N G 1 9 6 0 s

Secularization in
the Long 1960s
Numerating Religion in Britain

CL IVE D . F I E LD

1
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 Preface

The long 1960s have become increasingly central to charting and explaining
the religious transformations experienced in the West during the past half-
century, including, not just in Great Britain, but across large tracts of continental
Europe, as well as North America and Australasia. To many contemporaries,
this extended decade appeared of seismic importance in the immediacy of its
perceived impact on the social role of religion and the fortunes of religious
organizations. Viewed retrospectively, and with the benefit of hindsight, few
scholars would still deny this was a religiously significant period, particularly
as regards the waning institutional and cultural influence of Christianity, a
process which has been variously described as secularization, dechristianiza-
tion, or the end of Christendom. But there is less consensus about the origins,
magnitude, and legacy of these religious changes and therefore about the
extent to which there was, as Callum Brown has argued, a ‘religious crisis’ of
truly ‘revolutionary’ proportions in the 1960s, marking it out as a critical
turning-point in the history of religion.
In this book, using Britain as a case study, we will take the spiritual pulse of
that decade using a balanced portfolio of statistical measures embracing the
full spectrum of religious belonging (Chapters 2 and 3), behaving (Chapters 4
and 5), and believing (Chapters 6 and 7), as well as indicators of institutional
Christianity (Chapter 8). This is a much broader quantitative evidence base
than is conventionally drawn upon, which has often been limited to church
membership and attendance. Wherever possible, the data cover the years
1955–80, in order to ensure that the 1960s are appropriately contextualized
in terms of what happened just before and afterwards, and to allow for
differing interpretations of when the 1960s actually began and ended. Atten-
tion is especially concentrated on developments at the national level, both
Britain and its constituent home nations of England, Wales, and Scotland;
although regional and local examples are frequently cited, for illustrative
purposes, no claim is made for comprehensive treatment of the subnational
scene. The sources used are introduced in Chapter 1, alongside the religious
historiography of the 1960s and an explanation of chronological and other
parameters.
The outcome of the research, in the form of a religious balance-sheet of the
1960s (Chapter 9), suggests a much more nuanced picture than is offered by some
historians and sociologists, notably Callum Brown. It comprises elements of
continuity with preceding eras, some instances of more sudden change (asso-
ciated with, but not necessarily occurring during, the 1960s, narrowly defined),
vi Preface

and other cases where large-scale religious decline did not take place until later.
While still identifying some components which might be described in terms of
crisis, quantitative indicators provide a corrective to the more dramatic accounts
of the 1960s which are often to be found in contemporary writing and subsequent
memoirs and oral history. This conclusion is consistent with the gradualist
secularization which is implicit in the author’s earlier micro-period studies of
religion in twentieth-century Britain.1
August 2016

1
All the following by C. D. Field: (1901–14): ‘ “The Faith Society”? Quantifying Religious
Belonging in Edwardian Britain, 1901–1914’, Journal of Religious History 37 (2013): 39–63;
(1914–18): ‘Keeping the Spiritual Home Fires Burning: Religious Belonging in Britain during the
First World War’, War and Society 33 (2014): 244–68; (1918–39): ‘Gradualist or Revolutionary
Secularization? A Case Study of Religious Belonging in Inter-War Britain, 1918–1939’, Church
History and Religious Culture 93 (2013): 57–93; (1939–45): ‘Puzzled People Revisited: Religious
Believing and Belonging in Wartime Britain, 1939–45’, Twentieth Century British History 19
(2008): 446–79; (1945–63): Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving,
and Believing in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
 Acknowledgements

This book has drawn to a considerable extent upon unpublished primary

sources supplied to the author over several decades, especially by organiza-
tions or individuals which conducted or commissioned fieldwork during the
late 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. They are far too numerous to list in
full, but, without their generosity, most of these sources would now be lost to
scholarship since they are otherwise extremely poorly archived, many of the
originals having been destroyed. Particular thanks are due to Bob Wybrow
and Gordon Heald, formerly of Gallup, the pollster which was most active in
investigating religion from the 1950s to the 1990s. Special tribute must also be
paid to Tony Spencer who has kept the flag of socio-religious research flying in
the Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales since the 1950s, with
minimal official assistance, and who has copied or lent sundry reports from
the Pastoral Research Centre Trust’s Newman Collection, in the process of
transfer to Durham University. Unless a specific repository is cited, all mate-
rial designated as ‘unpublished’ in the footnotes is held by the author.
A small grant from the British Academy in the 1980s assisted with initial
research into opinion polls on religion. Further sources were identified
through the British Religion in Numbers project, which was supported for
three years (2008–10) by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and
the Economic and Social Research Council and is now a British Academy
Research Project. However, the research for, and writing of, this book itself has
been self-funded.
Ben Clements of the University of Leicester kindly prepared customized
analyses from many of the datasets at UKDA, which are referenced in this
volume, and additionally commented on first drafts of the chapters.
My wife Verena has continued to provide a highly supportive environment
within which to work, notwithstanding the significant health challenges which
she faced during the period when this book was written.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 4/1/2017, SPi

Contents

List of Tables xi
List of Abbreviations xv
Categorization of Social Grades xvii

1. Introduction 1
Historiography 1
Sources 8
Parameters 19
2. Belonging—Aggregate Measures 23
Religious Profession 23
Self-Assessed Religiosity 33
Religious Membership 37
Sunday School Enrolments 42
Religious Community 46
3. Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 50
Anglican Churches 50
Roman Catholic Church 55
Orthodox Churches 64
Other Churches 64
Non-Christian Faiths 76
Organized Irreligion 79
4. Behaving—Churchgoing 81
Introduction 81
National Church Data 82
Local Church Counts 90
National Sample Surveys 95
Local Sample Surveys 102
5. Behaving—Other Practices 105
Rites of Passage 105
Religious Broadcasting 115
Other Religious Practices 122
6. Believing—Beliefs and Experience 129
Measuring Religious Beliefs 129
Belief in Life Forces 133
Belief in Life after Death 137
Alternative Beliefs 141
Religious Experience 147
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x Contents

7. Believing—Attitudes 152
Influence of Religion and the Churches 152
Religious Prejudice 155
Sunday Observance 160
Religion and Morality 166
Religion and Politics 174
8. Institutional Measures 183
Places of Worship 183
Religious Personnel 191
Religious Finance 200
9. Conclusion 206
Belonging 206
Behaving 210
Believing 213
Institutional Measures 217
Final Reckoning 218
Secularization Redivivus 223

Select Bibliography 231

Index 259
 List of Tables

2.1 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, Gallup, 1963–82 25

2.2 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, BES, 1963–79 25
2.3 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, NOP, 1965–81 26
2.4 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, Gallup/EB, 1973–80 27
2.5 Religious profession by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1964 29
2.6 Religious profession by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1978 30
2.7 Religious profession, adults, English communities, 1962–74 32
2.8 Perceived importance of religion in personal life, adults, Great Britain,
1975–9 35
2.9 Religious membership, adults, United Kingdom, 1950–80 39
2.10 Adult church members, Great Britain, 1978–80 40
2.11 John Highet’s estimates of adult church membership, Scotland, 1951–66 41
2.12 Estimated Sunday scholars, United Kingdom, 1955–80 45
2.13 Estimated religious community, United Kingdom, 1955–80 49
3.1 Anglican communicants, Great Britain, 1955–80 51
3.2 Church of England confirmands, 1955–80 54
3.3 Reported Roman Catholic population, England and Wales, 1958–80 57
3.4 Estimates of Roman Catholic population, England and Wales, 1958–80 58
3.5 Source of change in reported Roman Catholic population, England
and Wales, 1959–80 62
3.6 Actual and estimated membership of non-Anglican, non-Roman
Catholic, and non-Orthodox Churches, Great Britain, 1955–80 66
4.1 Church attendance, England, 1975–9 86
4.2 Gender and age distribution of church attendance (England) and
attenders (Wales and Scotland), 1979–84 87
4.3 Church attenders, Wales, 1978–82 88
4.4 Church attenders, Scotland, 1980–4 90
4.5 Church attendance as percentage of population, English
communities, 1959–68 91
4.6 Claimed church attendance, adults, Great Britain, 1973–80 96
4.7 Claimed church attendance, adults, Great Britain, 1957–80 97
4.8 Claimed versus actual church attendance, adults, England, Wales,
and Scotland, 1976–87 99
4.9 Claimed church attendance by demographics, adults,
Great Britain, 1978 101
xii List of Tables
4.10 Claimed church attendance, adults, English and Welsh communities,
1958–81 103
5.1 Infant baptisms, four major denominations, Great Britain, 1958–80 107
5.2 Marriages by mode of solemnization, England and Wales, 1957–80 110
5.3 Marriages by mode of solemnization, Scotland, 1955–80 110
5.4 Last occasion of reading the Bible by members of households
possessing a copy, Great Britain, 1954–82 125
5.5 Attitudes to the authority of Old and New Testaments, adults,
Great Britain, 1960 and 1981 126
6.1 Belief in God and the Devil, adults, Great Britain, 1968–81 134
6.2 Belief in God and the divinity of Jesus Christ, adults, Great
Britain, 1957–81 135
6.3 Belief in life after death, adults, Great Britain, 1939–81 138
6.4 Belief in heaven, hell, and reincarnation, adults, Great Britain, 1968–81 140
6.5 Paranormal beliefs, adults, Great Britain, 1973–81 142
6.6 Paranormal experiences, adults, Great Britain, 1973–81 143
6.7 Paranormal beliefs by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1975 145
6.8 Religious experience by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1976
and 1985 150
6.9 Religious experience, adults, Great Britain, 1986 151
7.1 Extent to which religion was perceived as increasing or losing its
influence on British life, adults, Great Britain, 1957–82 153
7.2 Attitudes to Anglican/Nonconformist and Catholic/Protestant unity
negotiations, adults, Great Britain, 1949–82 157
7.3 Attitudes to the deregulation of Sunday activities, adults, Great
Britain, 1958–69 164
7.4 Attitudes to abortion by religion, adults, Great Britain, 1965–7 170
7.5 Attitudes to abortion by religion, adults, Great Britain, 1970–80 172
7.6 Attitudes to voluntary euthanasia by religion, adults, Great
Britain, 1976–85 173
7.7 Voting intention in advance of general elections by religion,
adults, Great Britain, 1964–79 177
7.8 Reported voting at general elections by religion, adults, Great Britain,
1964–79 181
8.1 Certified places of worship by denomination, England and
Wales, 1951–80 184
8.2 Estimated number of church buildings or congregations by
denomination, Great Britain, 1950–80 186
8.3 Places of worship by denomination and home nation, Great
Britain, 1979–84 189
 List of Tables xiii
8.4 Estimated number of clergy, ministers, priests, or other full-time
religious leaders by denomination, Great Britain, 1950–80 192
8.5 Members per minister, major denominations, Great Britain, 1950–80 194
8.6 Methodist ministers, Great Britain, 1955–80 196
8.7 Overseas missionary society personnel, Great Britain, 1972–82 199
8.8 Estimated income of major Christian Churches, United Kingdom, 1973 201
8.9 Ordinary annual income of Church of England parochial church
councils, indexed (1964 = 100), 1964–80 203
9.1 Conjectural religious profile of adult population, Great Britain,
c.1914, c.1939, c.1963, and c.1980 221
 List of Abbreviations

BES British Election Study

BMRB British Market Research Bureau
BSA British Social Attitudes
EB Eurobarometer
EVS European Values Study
Gallup Social Surveys (Gallup Poll)
Gallup, GIPOP G. H. Gallup, ed., The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls:
Great Britain, 1937–1975, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1976)
GPI Gallup Political Index
ITA Independent Television Authority
LHR Louis Harris Research
MORI Market and Opinion Research International
NDS Newman Demographic Survey
NOP National Opinion Polls/NOP Market Research
ORC Opinion Research Centre
PRC Pastoral Research Centre
RSL Research Services Limited
SCPR Social and Community Planning Research
UKDA United Kingdom Data Archive
 Categorization of Social Grades

AB Upper class; higher or intermediate managerial, administrative, or professional

C1 Supervisory or clerical; junior managerial, administrative, or professional
C2 Skilled manual
DE Semi- and unskilled manual; pensioners and others on subsistence incomes
 1

Introduction

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Viewed retrospectively, the British religious landscape of the 1960s exudes an

air of crisis, but even contemporaries were aware that significant change was
afoot. For example, one prominent churchman, Kenneth Slack, published two
editions of a survey of the state of the British Churches at the beginning and
end of the 1960s. He found the task of revision in 1969 ‘a sobering and even
depressing experience’, updating the statistics alone confirming ‘the acceler-
ating decline of the Church as an institution throughout the period’. ‘Passage
after passage of the book written in 1960 has seemed strangely optimistic and
has had to be excised.’ Any subsequent account of the British Churches, he
predicted, ‘may assume more the character of archaeology burrowing beneath
a collapsed edifice’.1
In fact, narratives of decline, and of the emergence of a ‘secular society’,
were relatively commonplace even by the early 1960s, as Simon Green has
noted, with at least some of the self-doubt emanating from ecclesiastics.2
Exceptional in this regard was Honest to God (1963) by John Robinson, Bishop
of Woolwich, which sold 350,000 copies in its first year and one million within
three years.3 The work’s significance lay not merely in what Robinson himself
had said but in the debate which it triggered,4 and in the insights into British
religiosity revealed by the huge correspondence which Robinson received

1
K. Slack, The British Churches Today (London: SCM Press, 1961), 2nd edn. (London: SCM
Press, 1970), xi.
2
S. J. D. Green, The Passing of Protestant England: Secularisation and Social Change,
c.1920–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 273–302. For a longer-term
perspective of Anglican decline narratives, see D. Nash, Christian Ideals in British Culture:
Stories of Belief in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 160–83.
3
(London: SCM Press, 1963). There is an extensive literature surrounding this work, but, for
a short introduction, see K. W. Clements, Lovers of Discord: Twentieth-Century Theological
Controversies in England (London: SPCK, 1988), 178–217.
4
D. L. Edwards, ed., The Honest to God Debate: Some Reactions to the Book ‘Honest to God’
(London: SCM Press, 1963).
2 Secularization in the Long 1960s

from the public.5 Indeed, Robinson was one of a number of leading Christians
later held responsible by Sam Brewitt-Taylor for the sudden appearance of
secularization discourses in the highbrow British print and broadcast media in
the early 1960s, thereby contributing to the initial stages of the religious crisis.6
This was notwithstanding that Robinson himself traced ‘the dramatic dip’ in
Anglican statistics to 1960 rather than 1963 (‘the climacteric of the theological
crisis’).7 In much the same way, Brewitt-Taylor has argued, the Student
Christian Movement fuelled the religious crisis by embracing ‘theologies of
secularisation’ in the early 1960s.8
The 1960s also witnessed the coming of age of sociology of religion in
Britain, and it is instructive to see how some of the classic sociological
accounts of that time described the contemporary religious scene. The two
principal British exponents of the discipline at that time were Bryan Wilson
and David Martin, respectively an ardent advocate and critic of the so-called
‘secularization thesis’, a product of modernization. In his Religion in Secular
Society (1966), Wilson examined the evidence for secularization (which he
defined as ‘the process whereby religious thinking, practice, and institutions
lose social significance’) in England and the United States, with particular
reference to the fortunes of Protestantism. While acknowledging that a com-
pletely secular society had yet to exist, he charted the statistics of English
religious decline from the late nineteenth century, laying no particular
emphasis on any precipitate falls in the early 1960s.9 Martin, fresh from his
critiques of secularization as a concept,10 took an altogether more optimistic
view of the condition of religion in his A Sociology of English Religion (1967).
He dismissed some of the Anglican trends as ‘largely statistical illusions’,
accounted for by patterns of migration and fertility, and, ‘some mild erosion’
of rites of passage and ‘the special difficulties of nonconformists’ apart, he
judged religious practice to have been ‘almost stationary’ since the Second

5
Subsequently analysed by R. C. Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of
Conventional Religion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
6
S. Brewitt-Taylor, ‘The Invention of a “Secular Society”? Christianity and the Sudden
Appearance of Secularization Discourses in the British National Media, 1961–4’, Twentieth
Century British History 24 (2013): 327–50.
7
New Christian, 2 October 1969.
8
S. Brewitt-Taylor, ‘From Religion to Revolution: Theologies of Secularisation in the British
Student Christian Movement, 1963–1973’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 66 (2015): 792–811.
His arguments on the secular society are developed in idem, ‘ “Christian Radicalism” in the
Church of England, 1957–1970’ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2012).
9
B. R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment (London: C. A. Watts,
1966), xiv, 1–18, 234–5.
10
D. A. Martin, ‘Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization’, in J. Gould, ed., Penguin
Survey of the Social Sciences, 1965 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965), 169–82; idem, ‘Some
Utopian Aspects of the Concept of Secularisation’, International Yearbook for the Sociology of
Religion 2 (1966): 86–96. Both are reprinted in idem, The Religious and the Secular: Studies in
Secularization (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969) at, respectively, 9–22 and 23–36.
 Introduction 3

World War.11 In his autobiography, published in 2013, Martin acknowledged

the flaws in A Sociology of English Religion: ‘I am embarrassed to have missed
the decline in the second half of the sixties. I insouciantly ignored what the
statistical experts in the Church of England were telling me . . . I was dubious
about using church statistics, even when, as in the case of Methodism, they
were very good.’12
Among religious historians, writing about the British 1960s after the event,
Alan Gilbert was one of the first to comment, in 1980. Although he traced the
roots of secularization back several centuries, he recognized that, at least on
the surface, ‘the decline of religion in modern society has been operating . . . with
devastating force only since about 1960’, with Honest to God ‘an important
catalyst’ of unbelief.13 Adrian Hastings wrote in a similar vein in 1986: ‘the
general picture is a common one: a rather stable, if not actually improving
state of affairs characteristic of the 1950s seemed almost overnight to be
replaced by a near-nightmarish quantitative slide’ from the mid-1960s to
late 1970s.14 For Gerald Parsons in 1993, ‘The 1960s . . . were to prove a
challenging and tumultuous decade for the traditional Christian Churches of
Britain in general—and indeed, in retrospect, a watershed for the religious life
of post-war Britain as a whole.’15 Ian Machin likewise concluded that, follow-
ing a period of relative stability in the 1950s, ‘during the 1960s many British
churches experienced unprecedentedly rapid decreases in membership’, with
decline even spreading to Roman Catholicism by 1970.16
During recent years Callum Brown has significantly extended these initial
interpretations, offering a picture of religious resurgence (both statistical and
cultural) in Britain after 1945, until around 1956, giving way to ‘sudden’,

11
D. A. Martin, A Sociology of English Religion (London: SCM Press, 1967), 37–40, 51. Cf.
idem, ‘The Secularisation Pattern in England’, in G. Walters, ed., Religion in a Technological
Society (Bath: Bath University Press, 1968), 34–54, reprinted in Martin, Religious and the Secular,
114–30; idem, ‘Great Britain: England’, in H. Mol, ed., Western Religion (The Hague: Mouton,
1972), 229–47.
12
D. A. Martin, The Education of David Martin: The Making of an Unlikely Sociologist
(London: SPCK, 2013), 131.
13
A. D. Gilbert, The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of
Modern Society (London: Longman, 1980), 77–9, 122–3.
14
A. Hastings, A History of English Christianity, 1920–1985 (London: Collins, 1986), 551–2,
580, 585–6, 602–6.
15
G. Parsons, ‘Contrasts and Continuities: The Traditional Christian Churches in Britain
since 1945’, in G. Parsons, ed., The Growth of Religious Diversity: Britain from 1945, Volume 1:
Traditions (London: Routledge, 1993), 23–94 at 34. Cf. idem, ‘How the Times They Were
a-Changing: Exploring the Context of Religious Transformation in Britain in the 1960s’, in
J. R. Wolffe, ed., Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion, and Coexistence (Manchester: Open
University Press, 2004), 161–89.
16
G. I. T. Machin, ‘British Churches and Moral Change in the 1960s’, in W. M. Jacob and
W. N. Yates, eds., Crown and Mitre: Religion and Society in Northern Europe since the Reformation
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1993), 223–41 at 224–5; idem, Churches and Social Issues in
Twentieth-Century Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 172, 178, 181, 211.
4 Secularization in the Long 1960s

‘shocking’, ‘spectacular’, and ‘revolutionary’ secularization in the 1960s, dur-

ing the course of which Britain experienced more secularization than in all
four preceding centuries put together. One single year, 1963, is said to be the
definitive turning-point. This revolution had two main components: one
essentially quantitative, the terminal decline of institutional Churches and
collapse of all religious performance indicators (illustrated by church statis-
tics), and the other more qualitative, the death of hegemonic Christian culture
as the dominant discourse of British life (exemplified in autobiography and
oral history). The process had but a single cause: gender—the simultaneous
depietization of femininity and the defeminization of piety, ending women’s
longstanding role as the bulwark of organized religion and disrupting the
intergenerational transmission of faith. Glimpses of this argument, to which
the foregoing summary inevitably cannot do justice, first appear in Brown’s
analysis of church adherence in 1992,17 but it was more fully worked up in his
1997 rewrite of his social history of religion in Scotland.18 It was then
generalized to the whole of Britain in the first (2001) edition of Brown’s The
Death of Christian Britain and vigorously restated in the second (2009)
edition, which included a postscript in which the author robustly defended
himself against his critics.19 The thesis, for it has really become such, has
subsequently been reiterated and nuanced in many other publications by
Brown touching on the 1960s.20

17
C. G. Brown, ‘A Revisionist Approach to Religious Change’, in S. Bruce, ed., Religion and
Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), 31–58 at 47, 54.
18
C. G. Brown, Religion and Society in Scotland since 1707 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1997), 1–2, 61–4, 158–76.
19
C. G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800–2000, 2nd
edn. (London: Routledge, 2009), 1–2, 170–92, 196, 201, 217, 227.
20
The following are amongst the most significant: C. G. Brown, ‘The Secularisation Decade:
What the 1960s Have Done to the Study of Religious History’, in D. H. McLeod and W. Ustorf,
eds., The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 29–46; idem, Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain (Harlow:
Pearson, 2006), 224–77; idem, ‘Secularization, the Growth of Militancy, and the Spiritual
Revolution: Religious Change and Gender Power in Britain, 1901–2001’, Historical Research
80 (2007): 393–418; idem, ‘What was the Religious Crisis of the 1960s?’, Journal of Religious
History 34 (2010): 468–79; idem, ‘Gendering Secularisation: Locating Women in the Transfor-
mation of British Christianity in the 1960s’, in I. Katznelson and G. S. Jones, eds., Religion and
the Political Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 275–94; idem,
‘Women and Religion in Britain: The Autobiographical View of the Fifties and Sixties’, in
C. G. Brown and M. F. Snape, eds., Secularisation in the Christian World: Essays in Honour of
Hugh McLeod (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 159–73; idem, ‘Sex, Religion, and the Single Woman,
c.1950–75: The Importance of a “Short” Sexual Revolution to the English Religious Crisis of the
Sixties’, Twentieth Century British History 22 (2011): 189–215; idem, ‘ “The Unholy Mrs Knight”
and the BBC: Secular Humanism and the Threat to the “Christian Nation”, c.1945–60’, English
Historical Review 127 (2012): 345–76 at 346–50; idem, Religion and the Demographic Revolution:
Women and Secularisation in Canada, Ireland, UK, and USA since the 1960s (Woodbridge: Boydell
Press, 2012); idem, ‘Gender, Christianity, and the Rise of No Religion: The Heritage of the Sixties in
Britain’, in N. Christie and M. Gauvreau, eds., The Sixties and Beyond: Dechristianization in North
 Introduction 5

Brown’s interpretation of religious change in 1960s Britain has not gone

unchallenged. Hugh McLeod, in particular, has suggested an alternative read-
ing of events, while not diminishing the decisive religious significance of the
1960s as constituting the end of Christendom and thus as perhaps of greater
religious impact than even the 1520s or 1790s. This challenge has been made
especially through The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (2007)21 but also via
preceding and subsequent articles and chapters.22 Setting aside McLeod’s
North American, European, and Australasian comparisons, his account of
British developments differs in four material respects from Brown’s. First,
McLeod subscribes to a more progressive and less revolutionary chronology of
secularization, identifying both long-term roots of the religious crisis of the
1960s as well as short-term precipitants. Second, he queries the extent of
religious revival in the late 1940s and early 1950s, positing a more double-
sided relationship between the 1950s and 1960s, viewing the 1960s as a hinge
decade between the Christian ethos of immediate post-war Britain and the
more overtly secular and pluralistic atmosphere of the 1970s and 1980s. Third,
whereas Brown emphasizes the crucial importance of the early 1960s (notably
1963), McLeod prefers to see the early 1960s (which he defines as 1958–62)
and mid-1960s (1963–6) as years of religious ferment, with dramatic decline
and religious crisis not emerging until the late 1960s (1967–74), especially in
1967–8. Fourth, McLeod rejects Brown’s monocausal explanation of religious
change, suggesting that the crisis did not have a single source but arose from
the cumulative impact of a variety of smaller factors, secular and religious, and
internal and external to organized religion, including diminished religious

America and Western Europe, 1945–2000 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 39–59;
idem, ‘Unfettering Religion: Women and the Family Chain in the Late Twentieth Century’, in
J. Doran, C. Methuen, and A. Walsham, eds., Religion and the Household, Studies in Church
History 50 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2014), 469–91.
21
D. H. McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Brown, ‘What was the Religious Crisis of the 1960s?’ is an extended review of this book. See also
the appraisal by L. Woodhead, ‘Implicit Understandings of Religion in Sociological Study and in
the Work of Hugh McLeod’, in Brown and Snape, Secularisation in the Christian World, 27–40.
22
D. H. McLeod, ‘The Sixties: Writing the Religious History of a Critical Decade’, Kirchliche
Zeitgeschichte 14 (2001): 36–48; idem, ‘The Religious Crisis of the 1960s’, Journal of Modern
European History 3 (2005): 205–30; idem, ‘Why Were the 1960s So Religiously Explosive?’,
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 60 (2006): 109–30; idem, ‘The Crisis of Christianity in the
West: Entering a Post-Christian Era?’, in D. H. McLeod, ed., The Cambridge History of Chris-
tianity, Volume 9: World Christianities, c.1914–c.2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 323–47; idem, ‘The 1960s’, in Katznelson and Jones, Religion and the Political Imagi-
nation, 254–74, idem, ‘Religious Socialisation in Post-War Britain’, in K. Tenfelde, ed., Religiöse
Sozialisationen im 20. Jahrhundert: historische und vergleichende Perspektiven (Essen: Klartext,
2010), 249–63; idem, ‘European Religion in the 1960s’, in S. Hermle, C. Lepp, and H. Oelke, eds.,
Umbrüche: der deutsche Protestantismus und die sozialen Bewegungen in den 1960er und 70er
Jahren, 2nd edn. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 35–50; idem, ‘Response to Fuller,
Kennedy, Maccarini, and Brown’, Journal of Religion in Europe 5 (2012): 514–20; idem, ‘Reflections
and New Perspectives’, in Christie and Gauvreau, The Sixties and Beyond, 453–67.
6 Secularization in the Long 1960s

socialization. He also downplays the emphasis placed by Brown on gender,

finding no evidence that women were leaving the Church in greater numbers
than men during the 1960s.
Other scholars besides McLeod have responded with qualifications or
scepticism to one or more aspects of Brown’s analysis of the 1960s, especially
those made in The Death of Christian Britain. Jeremy Morris, for instance, has
contended that Brown’s chronology (‘nothing significant until the 1960s, then
sharp collapse’) is ‘grossly oversimplified’. ‘Secularization has indeed been
under way in Britain—but it is a long, rather convoluted story, and its final
chapter has yet to be written.’ Morris found weaknesses in Brown’s notion of
‘discursive Christianity’ and considered that death was too strong a claim for the
cultural transformations which had affected religion.23 From his Black Country
perspective, Richard Sykes criticized Brown for insufficiently contextualizing
the religious changes of the 1960s within a slightly longer-term story of less
dramatic decline, preferring himself to see the Second World War as a more
important religious watershed.24 An Oxford research team discounted
Brown’s ‘big bang’ view of the 1960s as ‘overblown’, ‘implausible’, and ‘out
of line with recent historiography’; they considered that he had wrongly
extrapolated the cultural withering of religion from its institutional decline
and argued that post-war social changes had only occurred in an incremental
fashion.25 Nigel Yates rejected Brown’s characterization of the 1950s and 1960s
as polar opposites, regarding them more as a continuum: ‘the two decades
between 1950 and 1970 need to be seen as a single period in which consider-
able moral, religious and social change took place in Britain, but on the whole
much more slowly and often less dramatically than some have believed.’26
Steve Bruce, the leading contemporary proponent of the secularization
thesis, was likewise unconvinced by Brown’s notion of revolutionary secular-
ization in the 1960s preceded by a decade of religious revival, seeing the
religious crisis as the product of both novel causes and the cumulative effect
of a weakening commitment in previous generations. ‘At best what we see in
the late 1950s and 1960s is an acceleration of a pattern established at least half
a century earlier.’ Insofar as there was a hitherto undetected cause, Bruce

23
J. Morris, ‘The Strange Death of Christian Britain: Another Look at the Secularization
Debate’, Historical Journal 46 (2003): 963–76 at 969–71; idem, ‘Secularization and Religious
Experience: Arguments in the Historiography of Modern British Religion’, Historical Journal 55
(2012): 195–219.
24
R. P. M. Sykes, ‘Popular Religion in Decline: A Study from the Black Country’, Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 56 (2005): 287–307 at 291–3. For the fuller picture, see idem, ‘Popular
Religion in Dudley and the Gornals, c.1914–1965’ (PhD thesis, University of Wolverhampton,
1999).
25
J. Garnett, M. Grimley, A. Harris, W. Whyte, and S. C. Williams, eds., Redefining Christian
Britain: Post-1945 Perspectives (London: SCM Press, 2007), 5, 116–17, 290, 292.
26
W. N. Yates, Love Now, Pay Later? Sex and Religion in the Fifties and Sixties (London:
SPCK, 2010), 14, 151–2.
 Introduction 7

speculated that it was perhaps social dislocation arising from the Second
World War which had increased the number of religious intermarriages and
impacted the family transmission of religion to children.27 Simon Green also
contradicted the 1950s revival and sought to demonstrate that, so far as
Protestantism in England was concerned, the main cultural changes had
already occurred by 1960.28 Dominic Erdozain was equally dismissive of
what he judged Brown’s distorted understanding of the pre-1960 era as one
of religious vitality and, while acknowledging that the 1960s were religiously
important, he asserted that Brown had exaggerated the extent of the crisis,
particularly objecting to his use of ‘finalising language’ of death. Additionally,
Erdozain challenged Brown for the priority given to religious discourse (observing
that Brown inferred religiosity from discourses which seemed to lack any
connection to transcendent faith) and for the over-emphasis on gender
(Brown’s own evidence being said to show femininity being depietized at a
much earlier date).29 Alister Chapman, too, felt that the centrality of gender in
Brown’s exposition was misplaced and that there had been a failure to take
account of another discourse effect, namely the decline in Christian national
identity after 1955 consequent upon the loss of the British Empire and the
rising level of immigration (especially by non-Christians).30
Far from establishing a consensus about the scale and chronology of
religious change in Britain during the 1960s, therefore, Brown has stimulated
ongoing debate. In this book an attempt will be made to evaluate his notion of
revolutionary secularization in 1960s Britain in the light of the available
quantitative evidence, using a balanced portfolio of religious performance
indicators spanning the dimensions of belonging, behaving, and believing,
the tripartite typology increasingly used to frame analysis of personal religi-
osity. Brown has been rightly critical of an overdependence on churchgoing

27
S. Bruce and T. Glendinning, ‘When Was Secularization? Dating the Decline of the British
Churches and Locating Its Cause’, British Journal of Sociology 61 (2010): 107–26; S. Bruce,
‘Secularisation in the UK and the USA’, in Brown and Snape, Secularisation in the Christian
World, 205–18 at 209–10; idem, Scottish Gods: Religion in Modern Scotland, 1900–2012 (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 117n28. Bruce has subsequently argued that none of
the major social crises to impact Britain in the twentieth century led to religious resurgence:
S. Bruce and D. Voas, ‘Do Social Crises Cause Religious Revivals? What British Church
Adherence Rates Show’, Journal of Religion in Europe 9 (2016): 26–43.
28
Green, Passing of Protestant England.
29
D. Erdozain, ‘ “Cause is Not Quite What It Used to Be”: The Return of Secularisation’,
English Historical Review 127 (2012): 377–400 at 390–5. Erdozain’s critique of secularization as ‘a
theology of doom’ is further developed in his ‘New Affections: Church Growth in Britain,
1750–1970’, in D. Goodhew, ed., Towards a Theology of Church Growth (Farnham: Ashgate,
2015), 217–33.
30
A. Chapman, ‘The International Context of Secularization in England: The End of Empire,
Immigration, and the Decline of Christian National Identity, 1945–1970’, Journal of British
Studies 54 (2015): 163–89.
8 Secularization in the Long 1960s

data, but his alternative basket of four indicators is by no means exhaustive,31

and we have extended it still further. Measures of the health of institutional
Christianity are also selectively explored. Of course, as Brown has reminded
us, there are important caveats to bear in mind in any attempt at ‘statisticising
secularisation’,32 and relevant methodological and interpretative issues will be
flagged up as we proceed. Moreover, statistics evidentially underpin only one
half of Brown’s thesis, and, as yet, they cannot prove or disprove his more
qualitative and discourse-based claims about the demise of a hegemonic
Christian culture. In time, corpus linguistic techniques should be capable of
quantitatively examining these claims and testing their validity. At present,
however, there are too few exemplars of content analysis of texts from the
1960s to constitute a valid basis of investigation.33

SOURCES

An historical overview of the development of British religious statistics is

readily available,34 so it is merely necessary to highlight those pertinent to a
study of the 1960s. A pamphlet guide by Peter Brierley in 197635 was soon
superseded by an entire volume in the Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical
Sources, commissioned by and published (in 1987) on behalf of the Royal
Statistical Society and Economic and Social Research Council but based
on research in the early 1980s.36 Although significantly out of date as a current
reference tool, that book remains an invaluable conspectus of sources
created between 1945 and 1980 and is thus of ongoing historical relevance.
Rather than summarize it here, we shall briefly comment on the roles of the
four principal data collection agencies: the state; faith communities; opinion
polling companies; and academic social scientists.

31
Brown, Religion and the Demographic Revolution, 39, 43, 72, 88.
32
Brown, ‘Secularisation Decade’, 41–4.
33
An isolated, if simple, instance is the content analysis of national daily newspapers in 1969
(replicated in 1990 and 2011) by R. Gill, The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2003), 153, 246, and idem, Theology in a Social Context: Sociological Theology, Volume 1
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 187–205.
34
C. D. Field, Religious Statistics in Great Britain: An Historical Introduction (Manchester:
Institute for Social Change, University of Manchester, 2010), <http://www.brin.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2011/12/development-of-religious-statistics.pdf>.
35
P. W. Brierley, Sources of Statistics on Religion: Supplement to the Guide to Official Statistics
(London: Central Statistical Office, 1976).
36
W. F. Maunder, ed., Religion, Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical Sources 20 (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 1987). This included the following: L. M. Barley, ‘Recurrent Christian Data’,
1–188; C. D. Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, 189–504; B. A. Kosmin, ‘Judaism’, 507–60;
and J. S. Nielsen, ‘Other Religions’, 563–621.
 Introduction 9

In many countries in the world, the state was a major player in the collection of
religious statistics by including a question about religious affiliation in the regular
(usually decennial) censuses of population. Although this was the practice in
Northern Ireland and many Commonwealth nations, religious profession was
not investigated in British censuses, entirely as a consequence of long-forgotten
nineteenth-century controversies between Anglicans and Nonconformists.37
A motion by John Parker, a Labour MP, in 1960 to amend the draft Order in
Council for the 1961 British census by inserting religion failed in the face of
government opposition, the latter’s rationale being: ‘there is considerable resis-
tance towards giving this kind of information and we are advised that the
questions would probably be widely resented and in consequence we would not
be likely to get the sort of truthful answers which we seek to obtain in the
census.’38 While the decision may have disappointed some religious experts,39 it
by no means displeased them all, one leading academic (John Highet) dismissing
censuses of religious affiliation in 1962 as ‘singularly worthless’.40 Notwithstand-
ing, another academic, Wallis Taylor, raised the issue again (without success) at
the advisory committee in connection with the 1971 census, and a third (Ernest
Krausz) made a public plea for the inclusion of a religious question, either in 1971
or the mid-term census scheduled for 1976 (but cancelled).41
Not until the 2001 and 2011 censuses did government relent and survey
religion in the census, and the only statistics of religious profession which it
gathered (but did not always publish) during the 1960s related to armed forces
personnel and prisoners,42 neither group representative of society at large.
There was never any central collation of religious affiliation data obtained
from hospital in-patients at the time of admission. The principal religious
statistics collected by the state in the 1960s were for the mode of solemnization
of marriage, one of the rites of passage, and then only intermittently in
England and Wales. This series went back to the advent of civil registration
in the early Victorian period.43

37
A. J. Christopher, ‘The Religious Question in the United Kingdom Census, 1801–2011’,
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 65 (2014): 601–19; idem, ‘The “Religion” Question in British
Colonial and Commonwealth Censuses, 1820s–2010s’, Journal of Religious History 38 (2014):
579–96.
38
C. D. Field, ‘Measuring Religious Affiliation in Great Britain: The 2011 Census in Historical
and Methodological Context’, Religion 44 (2014): 357–82 at 364.
39
For example, A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Numbering the People: Should the Census Ask About
Religion?’, The Tablet, 22 April 1961.
40
Quoted in J. Gould and S. Esh, eds., Jewish Life in Modern Britain (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1964), 135.
41
The Times, 9 February 1970.
42
For a series from 1972 onwards, see P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Church Statistics, 2005–2015
(Tonbridge: ADBC Publishers, 2011), 13.9.
43
J. C. Haskey, ‘Marriage Rites: Trends in Marriages by Manner of Solemnisation and
Denomination in England and Wales, 1841–2012’, in J. Miles, P. Mody, and R. Probert, eds.,
Marriage Rites and Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), 19–56.
10 Secularization in the Long 1960s

The Churches were a major source of religious statistics. Although a few

smaller bodies were quantiphobic, sometimes on biblical grounds,44 and
others lacked a central infrastructure to collect viable data, all the principal
denominations were gathering membership and some other figures on an
annual basis by the end of the nineteenth century, Methodists having led the
way as early as 1766. The statistics were originally published in denomina-
tional yearbooks and equivalent volumes, but national totals to 1970 have been
conveniently collated in Churches and Churchgoers which, rather contradict-
ing its own title, mainly concerns church membership (since there were no
national historic church attendance data, except for 1851).45 As we shall see,
criteria of membership differed considerably from denomination to denom-
ination, raising issues of comparability.
The Church of England was the most professionally organized in its data
handling, the Statistical Unit of the Central Board of Finance of the Church of
England having been established in 1955, headed by Ronald Neuss, and with a
permanent staff of eighteen by 1966.46 It is perhaps best known for the three
editions of Facts and Figures about the Church of England published between
1959 and 1965.47 The Church of England also commissioned some ad hoc
investigations, of which the Paul Report of 1964 on the clergy is a prime
example, one of whose recommendations was for the establishment of a small
sociologically focused research unit independent of the Statistical Unit.48
Although this proposal was supported by John Gunstone, citing the model
of the Department of Church Planning and Research of the Protestant Council
of the City of New York,49 it never came to fruition. The Church of England
thus had to be content with more modest initiatives, such as Leslie Harman’s
work as Director of Religious Sociology in the Diocese of Southwark from

44
Citing King David’s sin in numbering the people of Israel: 2 Samuel 24:1–25, 1 Chronicles
21:1–30.
45
R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church
Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). For a critique, see
the present author’s review in English Historical Review 94 (1979): 645–6. The tabular appendix
from this book is also available in Excel format at <http://www.brin.ac.uk/figures/
#ChurchesandChurchgoers>. For an earlier, briefer, and somewhat different presentation of
the data, see R. Currie and A. D. Gilbert, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed., Trends in British Society
since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure of Britain (London: Macmillan, 1972),
407–50.
46
Church Times, 14 January 1966.
47
Statistical Unit of the Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Facts and
Figures about the Church of England, 3 vols. (London: Church Information Office, 1959–65);
Church Times, 7 January 1966.
48
L. Paul, The Deployment and Payment of the Clergy: A Report (London: Church Informa-
tion Office, 1964), 207, 214. For a sociological critique, see B. R. Wilson, ‘The Paul Report
Examined’, Theology 68 (1965): 89–103. The working papers for the report are at Lambeth Palace
Library MSS 3444–58.
49
Church Times, 6 March 1964.
 Introduction 11

1963 to 1969,50 some secondary research on Church and society contracted

from the University of York to support the Archbishops’ Commission on
Church and State,51 and David Wasdell’s Urban Church Project (1973–83)
which, inter alia, carried out twenty-five in-depth case studies of local
churches (Anglican and Methodist).52 At diocesan level, episcopal and archi-
diaconal visitations continued to be conducted and to collect significant
amounts of data, but they rarely entered the public domain.53
The Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales had more success—at
least for a time—in setting up an agency inspired by the continental tradition
of sociologie religieuse,54 for it was briefly (1953–64) served by the Newman
Demographic Survey (NDS) under the direction of Tony Spencer prior to its
abrupt closure by the bishops, following a major dispute, and the transfer to
the Catholic Education Council of responsibility for the collection of the
Church’s pastoral and demographic as well as educational statistics.55 Spencer
remained active in the field through the independent Pastoral Research
Centre (PRC), even though his attempt to continue the NDS parish census
service terminated in 1965. He has relentlessly campaigned for the Church
to take statistics more seriously,56 and he recently compiled an invaluable
digest of Catholic data for the years 1958–2005, correcting numerous errors

50
Sunday Times, 10 February 1963. The main published output of this work was L. Harman,
The Church in Greater London: A Working Paper (London: Southwark Diocesan Department of
Religious Sociology, 1968).
51
K. Jones, R. W. Coles, and C. B. Campbell, ‘Church and Society’, in W. O. Chadwick,
chairman, Church and State: Report of the Archbishops’ Commission (London: Church Informa-
tion Office, 1970), 106–20.
52
File of its annual reports and other publications held by the author.
53
For an example from the Church in Wales, see P. M. K. Morris, The Days of Visitation:
A Practical and Statistical Study of the Parishes of the Diocese of Swansea and Brecon Based on the
Returns to the Visitation Questionnaires of Bishop Vaughan from 1977 to 1987 (Lewiston: Edwin
Mellen Press, 1990).
54
Especially associated with empirical research in the French Roman Catholic Church
undertaken or inspired by Gabriel Le Bras and Fernand Boulard. See M. J. Jackson, The Sociology
of Religion: Theory and Practice (London: B. T. Batsford, 1974), 121–35.
55
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘The Newman Demographic Survey, 1953–62: Nine Years of Progress’,
Wiseman Review 236 (1962): 139–54; idem, ‘The Newman Demographic Survey, 1953–1964:
Reflection on the Birth, Life, and Death of a Catholic Institute for Socio-Religious Research’,
Social Compass 11 (1964): 31–40; idem, ‘The Newman Demographic Survey’, in A Use of Gifts:
The Newman Association, 1942–1992 (London: Newman Association, 1992), 34–7; idem, ed.,
Annotated Bibliography of Newman Demographic Survey Reports & Papers, 1954–1964
(Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2006); Field, Religious Statistics in Great Britain, 82–6.
56
A. E. C. W. Spencer, Re-Inventing the (Statistical) Wheel: Recommendations on the Ration-
alisation of the Pastoral and Population Statistics System of the Catholic Church in England &
Wales (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2013), but written in 2003; idem, Facts and Figures for the
Twenty-First Century: An Assessment of the Statistics of the Catholic Community of England and
Wales at the Start of the Century (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2006). Both reports consider the
history of Catholic statistics.
12 Secularization in the Long 1960s

and anomalies in the process.57 Quite independently, the Catholic sociologist

Mike Hornsby-Smith also regretted the lack of a research and statistics unit
within the Church, identifying at least six areas where serious empirical
spadework was needed to inform pastoral strategies.58
The Methodist Church inaugurated a sociological subcommittee of its church
membership committee in 1961, which pored over its unusually rich annual
membership data and conducted additional small-scale research.59 Renamed
the Methodist Sociological Group in 1968, under its successive chairs, Bernard
Jones and Jeffrey Harris, it developed into a network of ministers, laity, and
academics with, at its peak, some sixty-five names on its books. It also convened
a short-lived (1978–80) and ultimately unsuccessful Inter-Churches Research
Group, with the intention of developing a programme of Church-based research
to coincide with the 1981 population census.
Among non-Christians, only the Jews had a quantitative inclination, and
that rather belatedly, the Board of Deputies of British Jews having founded a
Statistical and Demographic Research Unit in 1965 following revelations of
serious data gaps at a two-day conference on ‘Jewish Life in Modern Britain’ in
1962. ‘There is hardly a single figure that can be quoted with any firmness for
the Jewish community of Great Britain today’, one of the speakers (Sigbert
Prais) had declared gloomily.60 The Unit, initially directed by Prais as honor-
ary consultant (until 1972) and subsequently headed by Barry Kosmin and
Marlena Schmool, instituted annual returns of Jewish marriages and deaths
and quinquennial surveys of synagogue membership and became involved in
several local studies of Jewish populations.61 Regrettably, it was ‘undervalued
and generally unloved by the community it served’, not least when it down-
wardly revised estimates of the size of that community.62 Some research
was also conducted by an international body, the Institute of Jewish Affairs,
which relocated to London from 1965, while the Jewish Journal of Sociology,

57
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community of England & Wales,
1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation, and
Education (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007).
58
M. P. Hornsby-Smith, ‘The Statistics of the Church’, in J. Cumming and P. Burns, eds., The
Church Now: An Inquiry into the Present State of the Catholic Church in Britain & Ireland
(Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1980), 55–65 at 63–4.
59
D. Wollen, ‘Sociology and the Church Membership Committee’, London Quarterly and
Holborn Review 188 (1963): 26–33; Methodist Church Conference Agenda (1964), 267–89;
B. E. Jones, Family Count: A Study Pamphlet about Methodism Today (London: Methodist
Church Home Mission Department, 1970).
60
S. J. Prais, ‘Statistical Research: Needs and Prospects’, in Gould and Esh, Jewish Life,
111–26.
61
The Unit’s research in 1965–72 forms the basis of S. J. Prais, ‘Polarization or Decline?
A Discussion of Some Statistical Findings on the Community’, in S. L. Lipman and V. D. Lipman,
eds., Jewish Life in Britain, 1962–1977 (New York: K. G. Saur, 1981), 3–16. Cf. M. Schmool, ‘A
Hundred Years of British Jewish Statistics’, Jewish Year Book (1996), ix–xvii.
62
G. Alderman, ‘Not Lies but Damned Statistics’, Jewish Chronicle, 25 September 2015.
 Introduction 13

which commenced in 1959, included numerous quantitative articles about

British Jewry.
Pan-denominational cooperation over religious statistics was relatively limit-
ed until the late 1970s. An early venture was the Christian Economic and Social
Research Foundation, operating between 1953 and 1985. It was set up with the
intention of studying socio-economic conditions as they were affected by
material, moral, and spiritual factors, but the bulk of its work concerned
drink-related issues.63 In 1965, Socio-Religious Research Services Limited
was founded by Tony Spencer, Leslie Paul, and David Martin (respectively a
Catholic, an Anglican, and, at that time, a Methodist). Its initial goal was to offer
an ecumenical census service, but, so far as is known, only Bishop’s Stortford
was ever surveyed. As Martin recalled, ‘the churches did not consider
sociological knowledge a priority for scarce resources’, and the company was
dissolved in 1974.64 The British Council of Churches asserted in a report in 1972
that ‘a fresh approach to the collection and use of statistical information is the
basic prerequisite of any realistic planning for mission in the United Kingdom’.
It recommended that ‘those responsible for the collection of denominational
statistics meet and agree on common standards and categories with a view to
making them meaningful for comparative purposes and realistic planning’, a
goal so utopian that it was unsurprising that no progress was made from the
preliminary discussions which took place in 1973.65 Five years later, the Council
even declined to contemplate lobbying the Office for Population Censuses and
Surveys to include a question on religion in the 1981 census, for which the Inter-
Churches Research Group had been pressing.66
More successful in terms of statistics-gathering was the Nationwide Initia-
tive in Evangelism (1977–83), one strand of which concerned empirical
research, including the promotion of church and neighbourhood surveys,
but the Initiative will be best remembered for commissioning the first census
of churchgoing (and membership) in England in modern times, in 1979.67 The

63
Archives at London Metropolitan Archives, LMA/4006.
64
The Tablet, 6 November 1965; A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Religious Census of Bishop’s Stortford’,
in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press,
1968), 135–45; London Gazette, 10 October 1974; D. A. Martin, ‘Sociology and the Church of
England’, in L. Voyé and J. Billiet, eds., Sociologie et religions: des relations ambiguës (Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 1999), 131–8 at 133. Cf. J. Morris, ‘Enemy Within? The Appeal of the
Discipline of Sociology to Religious Professionals in Post-War Britain’, Journal of Religion in
Europe 9 (2016): 177–200.
65
B. K. Wollaston, Stand Up and Be Counted (London: Department of Mission and Unity,
British Council of Churches, 1972), 1–2.
66
Field, ‘Measuring Religious Affiliation’, 365.
67
Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties: From a Census of the
Churches in 1979, 2 vols. (London: Bible Society, 1980–3); B. R. Hoare and I. M. Randall,
More Than a Methodist: The Life and Ministry of Donald English—The Authorised Biography
(Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003), 146–55; R. Whitehead and A. Sneddon, An Unwanted Child?
The Story of NIE (London: BCC/CCBI, 1990).
14 Secularization in the Long 1960s

census was actually carried out by the Bible Society Research Department
under the leadership of Peter Brierley, formerly of the Government’s Central
Statistical Office and then the Society’s programme director, leaving in 1982 to
become European Director of MARC Europe and subsequently Executive
Director of Christian Research. Brierley had been involved in the collection
and analysis of religious statistics since the late 1960s and produced his first
digest of United Kingdom figures in 1977, covering the number of churches,
ministers, and members.68 These became standard features in successive
editions of the three reference works which he has edited over the years (UK
Christian Handbook, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, and UK
Church Statistics),69 together with other data, and he has also prepared several
standalone compilations.70 Brierley’s statistics mostly post-date 1970, the
period for which he is an unrivalled authority and has obtained most of his
information directly from Churches and religious agencies. Insofar as earlier
years are cited, they should be treated with some circumspection, unless
sourced from Churches and Churchgoers, since they are often estimates arrived
at by back-projection. More generally, Brierley has a tendency to exaggerate
the proportion of religious ‘nones’ and non-Christians.
Some international Church-based resources also included the United King-
dom, deriving their data from published directories, questionnaires sent to
Churches, and researchers in the field. Although they never achieved universal
coverage, they can occasionally be useful as a last resort, and they had a notable
concern for measuring Christian community as well as church membership.
The Survey Application Trust’s World Christian Handbook is important for
the immediate post-war years, passing through five editions between 1949 and
1968.71 David Barrett’s World Christian Encyclopedia was on an even grander
scale and, although not published until 1982, was substantially researched
during the 1970s; unusually, it includes sections on the Channel Islands and
the Isle of Man as well as the United Kingdom.72

68
P. W. Brierley, UK Protestant Missions Handbook, Volume 2: Home (London: Evangelical
Alliance, 1977).
69
P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, 12 vols. (London: MARC Europe, 1982–2006);
idem, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, 7 vols. (London: Christian Research,
1997–2008); idem, ed., UK Church Statistics, 2 vols. (Tonbridge: ADBC Publishers, 2011–14).
70
P. W. Brierley, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed., British Social Trends since 1900: A Guide to
the Changing Social Structure of Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 518–60; idem, A
Century of British Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley: MARC Europe,
1989); idem, Religion in Britain, 1900 to 2000 (London: Christian Research, 1998); idem,
‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed. with J. Webb, Twentieth-Century British Social Trends (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan, 2000), 650–74.
71
K. G. Grubb, ed., World Christian Handbook, 5 vols. (London: World Dominion Press,
1949–67).
72
D. B. Barrett, ed., World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and
Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900–2000 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982).
 Introduction 15

A third source of religious statistics for the 1960s are opinion polls. These
are sample surveys, based upon face-to-face interviews with cross-sections of
the adult population of Great Britain recruited via quota or random selection.
Although technically possible from c.1900 with developments in sampling
theory and the advent of the Hollerith tabulating machine, they only really
took off from the 1930s with a coalescence of interest from commercial market
researchers, opinion pollsters, print and broadcast media, and academics and
other social investigators. The British Market Research Bureau (BMRB) was
one of the earliest companies in the field, founded in 1933, but perhaps the
best-known agency was the British Institute of Public Opinion, later Social
Surveys (Gallup Poll) Limited (Gallup), whose early history, from 1937 to
1963, has recently been critically appraised.73 In the quarter-century after the
Second World War, many new commercial players appeared on the polling
scene, including Research Services Limited (RSL); Mass-Observation (hith-
erto renowned for participant observation and more informal data-gathering
techniques); Daily Express Poll; National Opinion Polls (NOP); Marplan;
Opinion Research Centre (ORC); Louis Harris Research (LHR); and Market
and Opinion Research International (MORI).74 All these companies did
some polling on religion-related topics, on behalf of media or other clients,
but Gallup was most active in the field, with more time series, and its
results are also generally more accessible at topline level,75 albeit there is
poor availability of datasets for all pollsters. A reasonably full and themat-
ically arranged catalogue of British religious polls from their origins to 1982
is included in Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical Sources,76 and a
more selective one for all periods is in the source database of British Religion
in Numbers.77
Polls had several clear advantages over other sources, in opening up the
possibility of more efficient, economical, and current data-gathering; investi-
gation of relationships between religion, demographics, and other secular

73
M. Roodhouse, ‘ “Fish-and-Chip Intelligence”: Henry Durant and the British Institute of
Public Opinion, 1936–63’, Twentieth Century British History 24 (2013): 224–48.
74
There is no adequate history of opinion polling in Britain, but some insights can be gleaned
from the several monographs on political polling: R. Hodder-Williams, Public Opinion Polls and
British Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); F. Teer and J. D. Spence, Political
Opinion Polls (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1973); R. M. Worcester, British Public
Opinion: A Guide to the History and Methodology of Political Opinion Polling (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1991); N. Moon, Opinion Polls: History, Theory, and Practice (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1999).
75
G. H. Gallup, ed., The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, 1937–1975,
2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1976), hereafter Gallup, GIPOP; C. D. Field, Religion in Great
Britain, 1939–99: A Compendium of Gallup Poll Data (Manchester: Cathie Marsh Institute for
Social Research, University of Manchester, 2015), available at <http://www.brin.ac.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2011/12/Religion-in-Great-Britain-1939-99-A-Compendium-of-Gallup-Poll-Data.pdf>.
76
Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, 327–442.
77
<http://www.brin.ac.uk/sources/>.
16 Secularization in the Long 1960s

variables; and comparative analysis, over time and cross-nationally. However,

they were not without methodological and interpretative challenges, some
generic to sample surveys and some more specific to investigations of religion.78
Four particular difficulties need to be constantly borne in mind when
deploying poll data. First, most aspects of religion (especially those touching
beliefs and attitudes) are conceptually complex and thus difficult to express in
the binary or otherwise simplified terms that are a prerequisite for the typical
survey. Many questions lend themselves to multiple understandings (or mis-
understandings) on the part of the interviewee. Second, even when there is
little ambiguity about the information being sought, the findings obtained are
very sensitive to the wording used in the question and to the range of response
codes which are on offer, as has been illustrated in relation to enquiries into
religious profession.79 Third, many people may not be especially interested in,
nor well-informed about, religious topics. Confronted by a question of this
sort, they may either decline to answer (which explains why large numbers of
‘don’t knows’ are characteristic of religious surveys) or impulsively select a
reply from the list of possibilities, without giving the issue any serious thought,
making it hard to assess their degree of religious conviction. Fourth, and
particularly during the 1960s, religion remained a ‘prestige’ and socially
respectable matter, and respondents were often reluctant to admit to a face-
to-face interviewer that their beliefs and behaviour fell short of societal
expectations. There was, accordingly, a tendency to exaggerate their degree
of religiosity, not least when it came to recalling frequency of churchgoing,
where claims are often susceptible to independent verification. This over-
reporting is a well-known international phenomenon.80
Academic social scientists were the fourth source of British religion data.
They came from a variety of disciplines, although some, such as psychology81
or geography,82 were still weakly represented and dominated by American

78
D. Voas, ‘Surveys of Behaviour, Beliefs, and Affiliation’, in J. A. Beckford and
N. J. Demerath, eds., The Sage Handbook of the Sociology of Religion (Los Angeles: Sage,
2007), 144–66; idem, ‘Afterword: Some Reflections on Numbers in the Study of Religion’, Diskus
16 (2014): 116–24; C. D. Field, ‘Religious Surveys’, in L. Woodhead, ed., How to Research
Religion: Putting Methods into Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
79
Field, ‘Measuring Religious Affiliation’, 368–78.
80
For an introduction to the literature, see C. K. Hadaway and P. L. Marler, ‘Did You Really
Go to Church This Week? Behind the Poll Data’, Christian Century, 6 May 1998: 472–5 and
P. S. Brenner, ‘Investigating the Effect of Bias in Survey Measures of Church Attendance’,
Sociology of Religion 73 (2012): 361–83.
81
For a conspectus of British and American research, see M. Argyle, Religious Behaviour
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958); M. Argyle and B. Beit-Hallahmi, The Social Psychology
of Religion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).
82
J. D. Gay, The Geography of Religion in England (London: Duckworth, 1971); C. A. Piggott,
Population Change and the Churches in Scotland, 1951–1971 (Edinburgh: Department of Geog-
raphy, University of Edinburgh, 1977); idem, ‘A Geography of Religion in Scotland’ (PhD thesis,
University of Edinburgh, 1978); idem, ‘A Geography of Religion in Scotland’, Scottish Geographical
 Introduction 17

contributions until the 1970s. There was a much stronger research showing by
British educationalists, partly through a desire to investigate the impact and
legacy of the Education Act 1944 (which had provided for compulsory reli-
gious education and collective worship with a Christian ethos in schools) and
partly because, as has been recently demonstrated by Rob Freathy and Stephen
Parker, the 1960s and 1970s were a time of crisis for religious education, when
it was vulnerable to challenge from humanists and secularists on the one hand
and an emergent multiculturalism on the other.83 Humanists and secularists
were dismayed by the apparent acquiescence of the public in general, and
parents in particular, in state-sponsored religious instruction,84 and they
sought to discredit the evidence for its popularity,85 as well as commission
their own poll from NOP in 1969, which was hardly free of bias either.86
As for the religious beliefs and practices of children and adolescents them-
selves, the primary literature from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s is too vast to
summarize here, but there are several bibliographical guides.87 It is actually
quite difficult to interpret and compare, for the research among pupils was
generally conducted in school under classroom conditions, and different ages

Magazine 96 (1980): 130–40; I. Williams, ‘Spatial Distribution of Religious Bodies in Wales’, 2 vols.
(PhD thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1982).
83
S. G. Parker and R. J. K. Freathy, ‘Ethnic Diversity, Christian Hegemony, and the Emer-
gence of Multi-Faith Religious Education in the 1970s’, History of Education 41 (2012): 381–404;
R. J. K. Freathy and S. G. Parker, ‘Freedom from Religious Beliefs: Humanists and Religious
Education in England in the 1960s and 1970s’, in S. G. Parker, R. J. K. Freathy, and L. J. Francis,
eds., Religious Education and Freedom of Religion and Belief (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2012), 7–27;
R. J. K. Freathy and S. G. Parker, ‘Secularists, Humanists, and Religious Education: Religious
Crisis and Curriculum Change in England, 1963–1975’, History of Education 42 (2013): 222–56;
R. J. K. Freathy and S. G. Parker, ‘Prospects and Problems for Religious Education in England,
1967–1970: Curriculum Reform in Political Context’, Journal of Beliefs and Values 36 (2015):
5–30; R. J. K. Freathy, S. G. Parker, and J. Doney, ‘Raiders of the Lost Archives: Searching for the
Hidden History of Religious Education in England’, in S. G. Parker, R. J. K. Freathy, and
L. J. Francis, eds., History, Remembrance, and Religious Education (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2015),
105–37.
84
For evidence from the 1950s and early 1960s, see C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious
Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), 80; R. J. Goldman, ‘Do We Want Our Children Taught about God?’, New
Society, 27 May 1965: 8–10; P. R. May and O. R. Johnston, ‘Parental Attitudes to Religious
Education in State Schools’, Durham Research Review 5 (1965–8): 127–38. There are no
equivalent surveys of public opinion for the late 1960s and 1970s.
85
Notably in M. Hill, RI and Surveys: Opinion Polls on Religious Education in State Schools
(London: National Secular Society, 1968).
86
British Humanist Association, NOP Survey, Moral & Religious Education: What the People
Want (London: the Association, 1969).
87
J. W. Daines, Religious Education: A Series of Abstracts of Unpublished Theses in Religious
Education, 4 vols. (Nottingham: Institute of Education, University of Nottingham, 1963–72);
L. J. Francis, ‘The Child’s Attitude towards Religion: A Review of Research’, Educational
Research 21 (1978–9): 103–8; Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, 259–62, 266–7;
L. J. Francis, ‘Research in Religious Education: A Perspective from England and Wales,
1960–2000’, in R. Larson and C. Gustavsson, eds., Towards a European Perspective on Religious
Education (Stockholm: Artos, 2004), 279–95.
18 Secularization in the Long 1960s

of children, different educational attainments, different types of school (com-

prehensive schools not becoming the norm until after 1965), and different
locations were surveyed. Since only a limited number of strict replications
were undertaken, genuine trends are hard to detect, the best examples being
studies of national samples of second-year sixth-formers by Derek Wright and
Edwin Cox in 1963 and 197088 and quadrennial tests by Leslie Francis of the
religious attitudes of pupils in the first five years at two state-maintained
comprehensive schools between 1974 and 1994.89
Sociology was the social science discipline which made the greatest contri-
bution to the academic investigation of religion in Britain in the 1960s. There
were two strands of input. The first was the longstanding tradition of com-
munity studies, which often included religion as one facet of the life of the
locality. The other was the sociology of religion, which was still in a very
embryonic state in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as a series of
literature reviews prepared at that time revealed, most of the publications cited
not emanating from a recognizably sociological stable.90 John Highet’s work in
Scotland in the 1950s and early 1960s was a notable exception.91 Sociology of
religion established itself as an academic field in the late 1960s and early 1970s:
a cluster of student textbooks on it were written by British sociologists
at that time; A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain was published

88
D. Wright and E. Cox, ‘Changes in Moral Belief among Sixth-Form Boys and Girls over a
Seven-Year Period in Relation to Religious Belief, Age, and Sex Difference’, British Journal of
Social and Clinical Psychology 10 (1971): 332–41; D. Wright and E. Cox, ‘Changes in Attitudes
towards Religious Education and the Bible among Sixth-Form Boys and Girls’, British Journal of
Educational Psychology 41 (1971): 328–31. Outputs from the 1963 research comprise: E. Cox,
Sixth Form Religion: A Study of the Beliefs and of the Attitudes to Religion, Religious Instruction,
and Morals of a Sample of Grammar School Sixth Form Pupils (London: SCM Press, 1967);
D. Wright and E. Cox, ‘Religious Belief and Co-Education in a Sample of Sixth-Form Boys and
Girls’, British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 6 (1967): 23–31; D. Wright and E. Cox, ‘A
Study of the Relationship between Moral Judgment and Religious Belief in a Sample of English
Adolescents’, Journal of Social Psychology 72 (1967): 135–44.
89
Summarized in W. K. Kay and L. J. Francis, Drift from the Churches: Attitude toward
Christianity during Childhood and Adolescence (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1996), 35–43,
204–6.
90
N. Birnbaum, ‘La sociologie de la religion en Grande-Bretagne’, Archives de Sociologie des
Religions 1 (1956): 3–16; C. K. Ward, ‘Sociological Research in the Sphere of Religion in Great
Britain’, Sociologia Religiosa 3 (1959): 79–94; N. Birnbaum, ‘Soziologie der Kirchengemeinde in
Grossbritannien’, in D. Goldschmidt, F. Greiner, and H. Schelsky, eds., Soziologie der Kirchen-
gemeinde (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1960), 49–65; J. A. Banks, ‘The Sociology of Religion in
England’, Sociologische Gids 10 (1963): 45–50, reprinted in J. B. Brothers, ed., Readings in the
Sociology of Religion (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967), 61–8; J. B. Brothers, ‘Recent Developments
in the Sociology of Religion in England and Wales’, Social Compass 11 (1964): 13–19. For
Scotland, see J. Highet, ‘A Review of Scottish Socio-Religious Literature’, Social Compass 11
(1964): 21–4; idem, ‘Trend Report on the Sociology of Religion in Scotland’, Social Compass 13
(1966): 343–8. More international in focus is D. A. Martin, ‘The Sociology of Religion in the
1960s’, Church Quarterly 2 (1969–70): 234–41.
91
Field, Religious Statistics in Great Britain, 87–8.
 Introduction 19

between 1968 and 1975;92 and the British Sociological Association Sociology
of Religion Study Group was founded in 1975. However, as Roy Wallis and
Steve Bruce observed in 1989, the sociology of religion in Britain was always ‘a
relatively small enterprise, with modest ambitions’, possessing only ‘a mar-
ginal status in British sociology’.93 As the textbooks exemplified, there was a
disproportionate preoccupation with theoretical, conceptual, and typological
matters, including the secularization thesis. Empirical research was heavily
skewed towards sects and, later, New Religious Movements, and there was
limited engagement with the mainstream Christian Churches other than
Roman Catholicism, on which Mike Hornsby-Smith majored in the 1970s
and 1980s.94 Sociologists of religion largely missed the opportunity to capitalize
on the growth of religious pluralism through immigration, leaving the field to
sociologists of ethnicity.

PARAMETERS

This section outlines the scope of the volume, commencing with the thorny
issue of defining the 1960s. Logically, the decade might be thought to embrace
the years 1960–9 or 1960–70, and there is certainly some scholarship which
adopts such a narrow criterion, including Mark Donnelly’s book on Sixties
Britain, whose chronology is dictated by the general elections of 1959 and
1970.95 However, it is more usual to apply an extended date range based
around the concept of the ‘long 1960s’. For example, Arthur Marwick, in his
more international history of the decade, proposed limits of 1958–74,96 while
the focus of the academic journal The Sixties, launched in 2008, is on
1954–75.97 In a more purely British context, Callum Brown has oscillated
between a ‘long 1960s’ (1956–73 or 1957–75) and a ‘short 1960s’ (1963–70),
but with change especially concentrated in 1963–5 and 1967.98 Hugh McLeod,

92
8 vols. (London: SCM Press, 1968–75). The first two volumes were edited by D. A. Martin,
the third by Martin and M. Hill, and the final five by Hill alone.
93
R. Wallis and S. Bruce, ‘Religion: The British Contribution’, British Journal of Sociology 40
(1989): 493–520 at 512–13.
94
For a synthesis of much of this research, including a survey of English and Welsh Catholics
in 1978, see M. P. Hornsby-Smith, Roman Catholics in England: Studies in Social Structure since
the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
95
M. Donnelly, Sixties Britain: Culture, Society, and Politics (Harlow: Pearson, 2005).
96
A. Marwick, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States,
c.1958–c.1974 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
97
<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsix20#.Vdwy6ctRHX4>.
98
C. G. Brown, ‘Essor religieux et sécularisation’, in D. H. McLeod, S. Mews, and
C. d’Haussy, eds., Histoire religieuse de la Grande-Bretagne: XIXe–XXe siècle (Paris: Éditions
du Cerf, 1997), 315–37 at 335–6; idem, ‘Secularisation Decade’, 31, 35; idem, Religion and Society
20 Secularization in the Long 1960s

as we have seen, utilizes a ‘long 1960s’ from 1958 to 1974 sub-divided into
early (1958–62), mid (1963–6), and late (1967–74) periods, with major trans-
formations located in the ‘late’ period.99 The editors of a recent collaborative
volume reached the conclusion that ‘no single definition will do’ and gave
discretion to their contributors to adopt whatever chronology seemed fitting
for their chosen topics. The editors further suggested that it was necessary to
distinguish between the ‘1960s’ in a decadal sense and the ‘Sixties’ as a
shorthand descriptor for a particular period in post-war British history.100
The core period of interest in this book is from 1963 until 1975, 1963 being
selected as the starting-point for two reasons: because (in Brown’s estimation)
this was the year from which ‘virtually all indices of religious adherence . . . passed
below the known scale’ and from which ‘historians have to recalibrate their
barometer of religiosity’;101 and, more arbitrarily, to dovetail with this
author’s previous quantitative account of British religion in the ‘long 1950s’
(1945–63).102 The terminal date of 1975 aligns with the approach of other
scholars, as noted earlier, to extend the 1960s until the mid-1970s. However,
the ‘1960s’ need to be appropriately contextualized, in terms of what happened
just before and afterwards, if we are to be able to differentiate genuine changes
from more persistent undercurrents. Wherever possible, therefore, time series
data will be presented from 1955 to 1980.
Spatially, the focus of the book is on Great Britain, excluding Northern
Ireland, a province whose religious history cannot easily be isolated from the
wider melting-pot of politics and nationality which is ‘the Irish question’.
Whenever they are readily available, statistics are separately presented for
England, Wales, and Scotland, but there is only limited regional disaggrega-
tion within England. Local studies are deployed either to illustrate the geo-
graphical diversity of religious life or where they cover a topic which is not well
represented in national-level sources. No systematic attempt is made to draw
international comparisons which are occasionally possible from sample sur-
veys, albeit the major cross-national series, such as the European Values Study
(EVS), mostly post-date the 1960s and 1970s.
Demographically, reflecting the coverage of many Church data and sample
surveys, the emphasis is on the adult population, variously defined as aged 15,
16, 18, or 21 and over. If breakdowns are available (and, generally, they are
not), then both types of source are analysed by gender and age groups. This is

in Twentieth-Century Britain, 224–77 at 224–5; idem, Death of Christian Britain, 1, 188; idem,
Religion and the Demographic Revolution, 29.
99
McLeod, ‘Religious Crisis of the 1960s’, 221–8; idem, Religious Crisis of the 1960s, 1, 60,
241; idem, ‘The 1960s’, 258.
100
T. Harris and M. O’Brien Castro, ‘Introduction’, in T. Harris and M. O’Brien Castro, eds.,
Preserving the Sixties: Britain and the ‘Decade of Protest’ (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014), 1–9 at 6–7.
101
Brown, ‘Secularisation Decade’, 35. 102
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?
 Introduction 21

in an effort to validate or refute Brown’s claims that the revolutionary secu-

larization of the 1960s was a highly gendered phenomenon, led by the young.
As already noted, surveys of schoolchildren are problematical to interpret, but
some specialized studies of young people and other subpopulations are refer-
enced.103 Investigations of the religiosity of university students are largely not
considered since, both before and immediately after the 1963 Robbins Report,
which led to an expansion in higher education numbers, they remained
a privileged elite and mostly unrepresentative of society as a whole. The
enquiries among students tended to be fairly small-scale and to be reported
in inaccessible publications.104 They were also non-recurrent, with the excep-
tion of one at the University of Sheffield which found ‘a substantial and
statistically highly significant movement away from religion’ on eight indices
between 1961 and 1972.105 Gender and age apart, some information is
recorded on the relationship between religion and social class.
Finally, it should be noted that this is an empirically grounded book,
designed to assemble the facts about religious change during the 1960s (as
defined earlier) and to draw conclusions about the retrospective religious
significance of the decade in the light of the developing historiography.
Although frequent reference is made to secularization, the word is used in a
purely descriptive sense (to denote the extent to which the social role of
religion, howsoever measured, has become weakened over the years) and in
preference to the alternatives of dechristianization or the decline of Christendom,
which are also now in circulation. This work does not overtly seek to engage
with the secularization thesis which, although less dominant than it once was,
has framed the religious history of Britain over the past half-century. The case

103
The principal exemplars are noted in Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, 262–73.
104
However, there are convenient overviews of many of them in P. Black, ‘The Religious
Scene: Belief and Practice in the Universities’, Dublin Review 234 (1960–1): 105–25 and
J. B. Brothers, ‘Religion in the British Universities: The Findings of Some Recent Surveys’,
Archives de Sociologie des Religions 9 (1964): 71–82. More extensive enquiries were R. J. Rees,
Background and Belief: A Study of Religion and Religious Education as Seen by Third-Year
Students at Oxford, Cambridge, and Bangor (London: SCM Press, 1967) and J. M. Brown, Men
and Gods in a Changing World: Some Themes in the Religious Experience of Twentieth-Century
Hindus and Christians (London: SCM Press, 1980)—based on a survey of students (and staff) at
the University of Manchester. Cf. D. W. Bebbington, ‘The Secularization of British Universities
since the Mid-Nineteenth Century’, in G. M. Marsden and B. J. Longfield, eds., The Seculariza-
tion of the Academy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 259–77.
105
G. W. Pilkington, P. K. Poppleton, J. B. Gould, and M. M. McCourt, ‘Changes in Religious
Beliefs, Practices, and Attitudes among University Students Over an Eleven-Year Period in
Relation to Sex Differences, Denominational Differences, and Differences between Faculties
and Years of Study’, British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 15 (1976): 1–9. The earlier
study is reported in P. K. Poppleton and G. W. Pilkington, ‘The Measurement of Religious
Attitudes in a University Population’, British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 2 (1963):
20–36 and G. W. Pilkington, P. K. Poppleton, and H. Robertshaw, ‘Changes in Religious Attitude
and Practices among Students during University Degree Courses’, British Journal of Educational
Psychology 35 (1965): 150–7. There was a third survey in 1985.
22 Secularization in the Long 1960s

for the thesis has been repeatedly and strenuously advanced over the years by
sociologists Bryan Wilson and Steve Bruce,106 and its inadequacy as a master
narrative of religious change has been exposed by Jeffrey Cox and other
leading historians.107 Even when they have been in supposed dialogue,108
the debate between proponents and opponents has rarely moved matters
forward. It has become sterile and, at times, has run the risk of obscuring
the very realities on the ground which both sides have sought to explain. Here
we mostly prefer to let the facts speak for themselves, albeit the conclusion
naturally explores the broader chronology and causation of secularization
in Britain.

106
Most recently in S. Bruce, Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011). Cf. Bruce’s appendices to B. R. Wilson, Religion in Secular
Society: Fifty Years On, ed. S. Bruce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 231–58.
107
J. L. Cox, ‘Secularization and Social History’, Theology 78 (1975): 90–9; idem, The English
Churches in a Secular Society: Lambeth, 1870–1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982),
3–20, 265–76; idem, ‘Secularization and Other Master Narratives of Religion in Modern Europe’,
Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 14 (2001): 24–35; idem, ‘Master Narratives of Long-Term Religious
Change’, in McLeod and Ustorf, Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750–2000, 201–17;
idem, ‘Provincializing Christendom: The Case of Great Britain’, Church History 75 (2006):
120–30; idem, ‘Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularisation: A Progress Report’, in
Brown and Snape, Secularisation in the Christian World, 13–26. Cf. D. Nash, ‘Reconnecting
Religion with Social and Cultural History: Secularization’s Failure as a Master Narrative’,
Cultural and Social History 1 (2004): 302–25; J. C. D. Clark, ‘Secularization and Modernization:
The Failure of a “Grand Narrative” ’, Historical Journal 55 (2012): 161–94.
108
S. Bruce, ed., Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization
Thesis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Cf. Bruce’s answer to historians of British religion in
‘History, Sociology, and Secularisation’, in C. Hartney, ed., Secularisation: New Historical Perspectives
(Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 190–213.
 2

Belonging—Aggregate Measures

RELIGIOUS PROFESSION

Our exploration of the British religious landscape during the long 1960s begins
with religious belonging, a concept which subsumes several different indica-
tors. In this chapter we shall examine some of the key aggregate measures,
including religious profession, while in the next the focus will switch to how
individual denominations and faiths measured the sizes of their respective
constituencies.
According to Callum Brown, the growth of ‘no religionism’ has been one of
the most distinctive features in the religious life of the West during the second
half of the twentieth century. Indeed, in his writings, he seeks to reconceptu-
alize secularization, not as the decline of religion, but as a positive narrative
about the rise of the people of no religion, with the 1960s seen as a turning-
point, both numerically and in extending the range of meanings of no
religionism.1 In the absence of religious census data for Britain before 2001,
as noted in our introduction, Brown inevitably finds it more difficult than for
other countries to document this change over the longer term. Fortunately,
national sample surveys are a relatively plentiful source of data about religious

1
C. G. Brown, ‘The People of “No Religion”: The Demographics of Secularisation in the
English-Speaking World since c.1900’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 51 (2011): 37–61; idem,
Religion and the Demographic Revolution: Women and Secularisation in Canada, Ireland, UK,
and USA since the 1960s (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 60–70, 105–23, 266–7; idem, ‘The
Twentieth Century’, in S. Bullivant and M. Ruse, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 229–44; idem, ‘Men Losing Faith: The Making of Modern No
Religionism in the UK, 1939–2010’, in L. Delap and S. Morgan, eds., Men, Masculinities, and
Religious Change in Twentieth-Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),
301–25; idem, ‘Gender, Christianity, and the Rise of No Religion: The Heritage of the Sixties
in Britain’, in N. Christie and M. Gauvreau, eds., The Sixties and Beyond: Dechristianization in
North America and Western Europe, 1945–2000 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013),
39–59; idem, Becoming Atheist: Humanism and the Secular West (London: Bloomsbury Aca-
demic, 2017). Cf. M. Sheard, ‘Ninety-Eight Atheists: Atheism among the Non-Elite in Twentieth
Century Britain’, Secularism and Nonreligion 3/6 (2014): 1–16.
24 Secularization in the Long 1960s

profession,2 the earliest such question being posed by Gallup in 1943, albeit
they require careful interpretation. In particular, there is significant variation
in results arising from alternative forms of question-wording, as is still the case
today,3 and inconsistent coding of denominations to the principal religious
groupings. The boundaries of the Free Churches tended to become especially
blurred, while non-Christians were rarely separately identified at all, and, in
Gallup’s case, the ranks of the nones were often swollen by the inclusion of
non-respondents.
British poll statistics on religious profession for the long 1950s have been
reviewed elsewhere.4 They are not wholly compatible, but, in general, it can be
said that one-half to three-fifths of Britons professed to be Anglicans during
that period, one-fifth affiliated as Free Church or Presbyterian (mostly Church
of Scotland in the latter case), one-tenth were Catholic, and less than one-
tenth had no religion. For all the talk of religious crisis, the position did not
change radically in the 1960s and 1970s, at least according to the standardized
question (‘what is your religious denomination?’) employed by Gallup from
around 1960. Results for its largest samples (arrived at by aggregating three or
more consecutive individual polls) are summarized in Table 2.1. The Anglican
market share was stable at three-fifths, as was the Church of Scotland’s at 7 or
8 per cent. Roman Catholics amounted to a growing one-tenth of the popu-
lation, while the combined category of Free Churches and other religions fell
away modestly from 15 per cent. The number of nones fluctuated, perhaps
within the limits of sampling error, rising only slightly but remaining under
one-tenth.
The first British Election Study (BES) used a similar question to Gallup’s
default (‘what is your religion?’), achieving comparable findings, albeit with
somewhat more Anglicans and rather fewer nones (Table 2.2).5 So did NOP in
the late 1960s, its recording of nones being confined to atheists or agnostics, who
represented just 3 per cent of adults in 1970 (Table 2.3). Although it moved to
two alternative questions in the 1970s, in reality their substance had changed
little. The consequence was that NOP’s topline figures for the 1970s were not
vastly different to those for the previous decade, Anglicans reducing by a mere
handful of points and atheists or agnostics rising to no more than 7 per cent.

2
Only a selection of relevant data is reproduced here. For a fuller checklist to 1982, see
C. D. Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, in W. F. Maunder, ed., Religion, Reviews of United
Kingdom Statistical Sources 20 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), 365–87.
3
C. D. Field, ‘Measuring Religious Affiliation in Great Britain: The 2011 Census in Historical
and Methodological Context’, Religion 44 (2014): 357–82 at 368–78.
4
C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing
in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 17–22.
5
In terms of religious profession, BES is bedevilled by an inconsistent approach to both
question-wording and classification: I. Crewe, A. Fox, and N. Day, The British Electorate,
1963–1992: A Compendium of Data from the British Election Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 458, 476.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 25
Table 2.1 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, Gallup, 1963–82 (percentages
across)
Year N= Anglican Roman Church of Free Other No
Catholic Scotland Church religion religion

1963 21,495 61 10 8 11 4 6
1964 6,693 61 10 8 11 4 6
1974, Feb. 9,540 61 11 7 7 6 8
1974, Sept.–Oct. 8,428 60 11 7 6 7 9
1978 11,061 60 12 7 7 6 8
1979 11,097 61 12 7 7 5 8
1982 5,800 58 13 8 8 6 7

Note: The question was: ‘What is your religious denomination?’

Sources: (1963) J. B. Brothers, Religious Institutions (London: Longman, 1971), 12; (1964) The Gallup Election
Handbook, March 1966 (London: Social Surveys, Gallup Poll, 1966), B8 and ‘Gallup General Election Surveys,
1964’, dataset at UKDA, SN 2051; (1974, February) Gallup Political Index (GPI) 163 (1974): 253 and ‘Gallup
General Election Surveys, February 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 658; (1974, September–October) GPI 171
(1974): 12 and ‘Gallup General Election Surveys, September–October 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 659; (1978)
unpublished; (1979) GPI 225 (1979): 21 and ‘Gallup General Election Survey, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN
1352; (1982) unpublished.

Table 2.2 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, BES, 1963–79 (percentages
across)
Year and N= Anglican Roman Church of Other No
question Catholic Scotland religion religion

What is your religion?

1963 2,009 65 9 10 14 3
1970 3,242 62 10 8 15 5
Do you belong to any religious denomination?
1974 2,365 41 9 5 10 34
Do you belong to any church or religious group?
1979 1,893 31 10 4 12 43
Sources: (1963) ‘Political Change in Britain, 1963–1970’, dataset at UKDA, SN 44; (1970) D. E. Butler and
D. E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, 2nd edn. (London: Macmillan,
1974), 156 and ‘Political Change in Britain, 1963–1970’, dataset at UKDA, SN 44; (1974) ‘British Election
Study, October 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 666; (1979) ‘British Election Study, May 1979’, dataset at UKDA,
SN 1533.

The obvious objection to the ‘what is your religious denomination?’ or

similar question is that it was a ‘leading’ one, inferring not simply that
respondents should or would have a religion to declare but that they could
also denominationalize it, thereby encouraging religious nominalism. It par-
ticularly invited allegiance to the Church of England (and, in Scotland, to the
Church of Scotland) since, as the religious affairs correspondent of The Times
pointed out, in the absence of any category for non-denominational Christians
(pioneered by the British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys after 1983), choosing
26 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 2.3 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, NOP, 1965–81 (percentages
across)
Year and N= Anglican Roman Other Atheist/ Other
question Catholic religion agnostic replies

What is your religion, if any?

1965 4,157 63 10 24 1 2
1967 3,709 63 10 23 2 2
1968 1,218 64 10 22 3 1
1970 1,705 65 10 21 3 1
Which religious group would you say you come into in terms of your beliefs?
1970 1,396 60 10 26 4 1
1973 1,974 57 9 24 5 5
1976 1,865 58 12 24 4 2
1978 3,837 58 10 22 6 4
1981 1,991 57 11 21 5 6
Regardless of your religious upbringing, would you tell me what your religion is now?
1976 2,125 59 10 19 7 4
1978 1,952 59 9 20 7 5

Note: Other replies includes don’t knows, no religion, refusals, and no answers, invariably inadequately
differentiated.
Sources: Unpublished apart from: (1965) R. J. Goldman, ‘Do We Want Our Children Taught about God?’,
New Society, 27 May 1965: 8–10 at 8; (1967) ‘National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys’ [September
1967], dataset at UKDA, SN 67027; (1968) ‘National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys’ [August 1968],
dataset at UKDA, SN 68019; (1970) NOP Political Bulletin (February 1970): 23–4; (1976) D. Hay and
A. M. Morisy, ‘Reports of Ecstatic, Paranormal, or Religious Experience in Great Britain and the United
States: A Comparison of Trends’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 17 (1978): 255–68 at 260.

the Church of England as ‘a non-denominational, non-sectarian national

church’ was ‘clearly the next best thing’.6
To offset this potential bias, new questions were introduced in the 1970s,
incorporating the notion of belonging, with its implication of a stricter and
more formal allegiance to a religion. Unsurprisingly, this perceived higher bar
deterred many people. Thus, a Gallup series for the European Economic
Community in 1973–80 (Table 2.4) revealed the proportion claiming to
belong to a religion was reduced to three-quarters, with nones constituting
one-quarter rather than well under one-tenth in the ‘what is your religious
denomination?’ surveys. Anglicans were also transformed from the majority
to a plurality in the process. BES (Table 2.2) followed suit, with two different
formulations of belonging questions in 1974 and 1979, the second of which
saw the number of nones climbing to 43 per cent, outstripping the Anglicans
on 31 per cent (representing half the share the latter obtained from the ‘what is
your religion?’ question in the baseline BES of 1963).

6
The Times, 11 September 1978.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 27
Table 2.4 Religious profession, adults, Great Britain, Gallup/EB, 1973–80 (percentages
across)
N= Anglican Roman Church of Free Other No
Catholic Scotland Church religion religion

1973 1,933 47 9 7 7 4 24
1975 1,138 47 9 4 8 6 26
1976 2,079 43 9 6 7 5 28
1977 2,177 44 8 7 7 5 27
1978 2,157 47 9 6 6 6 25
1980 1,135 42 12 6 6 5 28
Total 10,619 45 9 6 7 5 26

Note: The question was: ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion? If so, which of them?’
Sources: Centre for Comparative European Survey Data Information System, <http://www.ccesd.ac.uk>, apart
from (1973) ‘European Communities Study, 1973’, dataset at UKDA, SN 864.

There is, therefore, no hard and fast answer to the question about the extent
of religious profession in the 1960s and 1970s. It all depended upon which
form of question was used. However, there is certainly nothing to suggest that
religious profession collapsed in either decade as a result of any religious crisis;
the pronounced tailing-off apparently came later.7 Much the same impression
is formed by back-projection analysis of pooled BSA surveys for 1983–2008.
When these data are rearranged by respondents’ years of birth and cohorts, a
fairly steady growth in no religionism can be traced back to the beginning of
the twentieth century, with no period effect visible for the 1960s. This is
consistent with a progressive, rather than revolutionary, chronology of secu-
larization and with an intergenerational causation of the decline in religious
allegiance.8 BSA surveys for the generation born or growing up in the 1960s,
those aged 25–34 in the early 1990s, likewise reveal that 85 per cent still
received a religious upbringing, about half as Anglicans. However, in practice,
parental religious oversight was very weak, with only 21 per cent of the 1960s
generation recalling in 1986 that their parents had tried very or quite hard to
transmit their religious beliefs to their children, 32 per cent saying they had
not tried very hard, and 47 per cent that they had not tried at all.9
The foregoing are invariably cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data.
In other words, they are snapshots of religious profession at a particular point
in time rather than a record of the religious movements of individuals over

7
Field, ‘Measuring Religious Affiliation’, 371–2.
8
D. Voas and A. Crockett, ‘Religion in Britain: Neither Believing nor Belonging’, Sociology
39 (2005): 11–28; A. Crockett and D. Voas, ‘Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 20th-
Century Britain’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45 (2006): 567–84; S. McAndrew,
‘Religious Affiliation by Birth Decade’, British Religion in Numbers, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/
news/2011/religious-affiliation-by-birth-decade/>.
9
Calculated from British Social Attitudes Information System, <http://www.britsocat.com>.
28 Secularization in the Long 1960s

time. Such denominational switching undoubtedly occurred to an extent,

13 per cent of the public telling Gallup in 1957 that they had formerly belonged
to a different denomination than at interview.10 A major element of this change is
likely to have occurred between upbringing and early adulthood, a process
illuminated by the National Survey of Health and Development, which traced
the evolution of the lives of a sample of babies born in Britain in 1946. Of those
brought up in a particular religion, by 1972, when they were 26 years old, just
three-fifths subscribed to the same religion, the Church of England, Church of
Scotland, and the Roman Catholic Church enjoying the best retention rates, at
around seven in ten, and Nonconformists the lowest, at under one-half. There
had been a particularly big jump in the proportion of nones, from 13 per cent
in childhood to 33 per cent at age 26, but the gender balance did not support
Brown’s theory: 62 per cent of those who had disaffiliated were men rather than
women.11 In the case of women, overall changes in profession may have been
linked to marriage, with a weakening convention for a wife to take on her
husband’s religion. This phenomenon partially negates some of the attempts
made in the 1960s to calculate the index of denominational intermarriage from
couples’ declared religious allegiance after marriage.12
Religious profession was not evenly distributed across the population. Some
indication of the scale of demographic variation in the 1960s and 1970s can be
gleaned from Tables 2.5 and 2.6, which disaggregate large-scale Gallup data-
sets from 1964 and 1978, respectively, employing the ‘what is you religious
denomination?’ formulation. In terms of the three home nations, Wales had
marginally the most nones at both these dates, although an ORC poll in the
principality in 1968 recorded only 3 per cent,13 and the 1979 Welsh Election
Study 7 per cent.14 England and Scotland had similar, and gently increasing,
numbers of nones, albeit Scotland was the first home nation to implement a
religious belonging question, which dramatically inflated no religionism to 26
per cent in 1974 and 30 per cent in 1979.15 The Anglican majority was greatest
in England, at around two-thirds, confirmed by a Gallup study in the London,

10
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 404.
11
M. E. J. Wadsworth and S. R. Freeman, ‘Generation Differences in Beliefs: A Cohort Study
of Stability and Change in Religious Beliefs’, British Journal of Sociology 34 (1983): 416–37 at
423–4, 428.
12
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Religious Census of Bishop’s Stortford’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A
Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 135–45 at 141–4;
M. Stacey, E. V. Batstone, C. R. Bell, and A. Murcott, Power, Persistence, and Change: A Second
Study of Banbury (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 109.
13
R. Rose and I. McAllister, United Kingdom Facts (London: Macmillan, 1982), 136.
14
‘Welsh Election Study, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1591.
15
(1974) ‘British Election Study, October 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 681; (1979) ‘Scottish
Election Study, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1604. A belonging question had previously been
used in a local survey of Dundee in 1968: J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver, ‘Religion and Voting:
A Critical Review and a New Analysis’, Political Studies 18 (1970): 205–19 at 209.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 29
Table 2.5 Religious profession by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1964 (percentages
across)
Anglican Roman Church of Free Other No
Catholic Scotland Church religion religion

Total 60 11 8 11 4 7
Gender
Men 58 11 8 12 4 8
Women 62 11 7 10 4 5
Age
16–20 67 7 7 9 4 6
21–24 59 13 8 9 4 7
25–29 53 18 7 9 4 9
30–34 58 13 7 11 4 6
35–44 59 12 8 10 5 7
45–49 63 11 7 10 3 5
50–64 62 8 8 12 4 6
65+ 63 7 7 13 3 6
Occupation
Non-manual 61 10 7 12 5 5
Manual 60 12 8 10 3 7
Home nation
England 68 11 1 10 4 6
Wales 45 6 1 35 5 8
Scotland 2 16 70 2 5 6
English region
North 66 13 1 14 4 3
Yorkshire East/West Riding 66 11 0 14 3 7
North-West 59 19 1 12 3 7
North Midlands 72 5 1 12 2 9
West Midlands 73 11 1 7 2 6
East 73 6 1 11 3 5
London 66 13 1 6 6 8
South-East 73 7 1 8 3 8
South 76 4 2 11 3 4
Urban/rural
Rural 62 7 8 13 3 6
Under 50,000 59 9 9 14 3 6
50,000–100,000 68 10 1 11 4 7
100,000+ 61 8 11 8 6 6
Birmingham 67 13 1 10 4 5
Merseyside 56 25 0 11 3 6
South-East Lancashire 60 18 1 9 8 5
Yorkshire West Riding 63 14 0 10 3 9
Tyneside 66 13 0 13 2 6
Greater London 60 11 3 14 2 11
Clydeside 39 14 30 4 5 9
Source: ‘Gallup General Election Surveys, 1964’, dataset at UKDA, SN 2051, N = 5,790, adapted from analysis
by B. Clements.
30 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 2.6 Religious profession by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1978 (percentages
across)
Anglican Roman Church of Free Other No
Catholic Scotland Church religion religion

Total 60 12 7 7 6 8
Gender
Men 58 11 7 6 7 11
Women 62 13 7 7 6 6
Age
16–24 57 13 7 5 6 13
25–34 58 13 6 6 7 11
35–44 59 13 7 6 7 8
45–54 63 11 7 7 5 7
55–64 64 10 8 9 5 5
65+ 61 9 8 9 7 5
Social grade
AB 56 9 8 6 9 12
C1 58 11 6 8 8 10
C2 62 12 7 6 5 8
DE 60 13 8 7 5 6
Occupation
Non-manual 57 11 7 7 8 11
Skilled manual 59 12 7 6 6 10
Semi-skilled 62 13 6 6 4 9
manual
Unskilled manual 66 12 8 4 3 6
Social self-rating
Upper/upper 59 10 5 5 12 9
middle class
Middle class 61 10 6 8 7 8
Lower middle class 61 12 6 7 6 8
Working class 60 12 8 6 6 8
Home nation
England 65 12 2 7 6 8
Wales 61 7 0 15 8 9
Scotland 9 14 63 1 5 8
English region
North 64 13 4 7 7 5
North-East 70 9 1 7 5 8
North-West 58 21 3 8 4 7
East Midlands 70 7 2 9 6 7
West Midlands 74 7 0 7 6 6
East Anglia 67 8 1 6 6 12
Greater London 54 19 1 5 9 12
Rest of South 72 8 1 6 5 8
South-West 65 7 1 8 9 10
Source: Gallup, unpublished, N = 11,061.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 31

Midland, and Northern Independent Television areas in 1963–4, which put it

at 67 per cent.16 The Church of Scotland achieved a similar ascendancy north
of the border, securing a 72 per cent market share in one study in 1970,17 but
losing some ground between 1964 and 1978.18 In Wales, by contrast, the
Church in Wales and the Free Churches had traditionally been close to parity,
which was still almost the case in 1968 (45 per cent versus 41 per cent).
However, Welsh Nonconformity was contracting by the 1960s and 1970s, the
1978 data suggesting some transfer of allegiance to the Church in Wales,
although the 1979 Free Church figure was (at 35 per cent) less bleak than in
the previous year and the same as in 1964, as well as being significantly higher
than in England. Inconsistencies in coding Nonconformists doubtless explain
these apparent anomalies. Roman Catholicism was proportionately strongest
in Scotland, where it attracted one in seven adults, and weakest in Wales.
There were also some regional variations within England.19 Greater London
had historically enjoyed a reputation for relative irreligiosity.20 However, a
survey of 5,900 Greater Londoners by David Glass in 1960 did not suggest
a particularly atypical profile of religious profession: 64 per cent Anglican;
10 per cent Catholic; 14 per cent Free Church; 6 per cent other religions;
and 6 per cent nones.21 The situation had changed somewhat by 1964 and
1978, when the nones had reached double digits, with Anglican and Free
Church allegiance reducing and Catholic numbers growing. No religionism
was disproportionately an urban and, to a degree, southern phenomenon.
Anglican influence was strongest in the South and Midlands, especially in
small towns and rural districts (exemplified by the situation in Gloucester,
Bishop’s Stortford, Banbury, and the Clun Valley in Table 2.7). It was com-
paratively weak in the North-West, which was a stronghold of Catholicism
and where Catholics accounted for one-fifth of the regional population in 1964
and 1978, including 25 per cent in Merseyside alone at the former date.
They were still more prevalent in particular communities such as Preston
(32 per cent in 1968, Table 2.7) or areas of urban redevelopment in Greater

16
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion (London: University of London Press,
1964), 9–18, 131.
17
‘Attitudes towards Devolution, 1970’, dataset at UKDA, SN 173.
18
For other Scottish surveys, including System Three polls in 1976 and 1980 which failed to
differentiate between Protestant denominations, see C. D. Field, ‘ “The Haemorrhage of Faith”?
Opinion Polls as Sources for Religious Practices, Beliefs, and Attitudes in Scotland since the
1970s’, Journal of Contemporary Religion 16 (2001): 157–75 at 160–2.
19
For an equivalent poll-based analysis for the immediate post-war years, see Field, Britain’s
Last Religious Revival?, 19–21. More generally on the geography of English religion, see J. D. Gay,
The Geography of Religion in England (London: Duckworth, 1971).
20
For a general review of the evidence, see C. D. Field, ‘Faith in the Metropolis: Opinion Polls
and Christianity in Post-War London’, London Journal 24 (1999): 68–84 at 70–2.
21
Unpublished.
32 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 2.7 Religious profession, adults, English communities, 1962–74 (percentages
across)
Year Place N= Church of Roman Other No
England Catholic religion religion

1962 Gloucester ? 76 5 18 2
1965 Kirkby Stephen 1,464 54 1 44 1
1966 Bishop’s Stortford 1,295 75 9 13 4
1967 Banbury (borough) 875 72 8 18 2
1967 Banbury (rural) 529 79 5 13 3
1968 Clun Valley 250 75 1 17 7
c.1968 Preston 5,000 55 32 11 2
1973–4 Stoke-on-Trent 753 63 10 18 8
1973–4 Sunderland 770 66 12 17 5
1974 Birmingham (Small 1,744 46 22 29 4
Heath)
Sources: (Banbury, borough) M. Stacey, E. V. Batstone, C. R. Bell, and A. Murcott, Power, Persistence, and
Change: A Second Study of Banbury (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 31; (Banbury, rural) unpub-
lished; (Bishop’s Stortford) A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Religious Census of Bishop’s Stortford’, in D. A. Martin, ed.,
A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 135–45 at 137; (Birmingham,
Small Heath) J. Morton-Williams and R. Stowell, Inner Area Study, Birmingham—Small Heath, Birmingham:
A Social Survey (London: Department of the Environment, 1975), 31, ‘Small Heath, Birmingham: An Inner
Area Study, 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 717; (Clun Valley) C. R. Hinings, ‘Religiosity and Attitudes towards
the Church in a Rural Setting: The Clun Valley’, in A. Bryman, ed., Religion in the Birmingham Area: Essays in
the Sociology of Religion (Birmingham: Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture,
University of Birmingham, 1975), 112–22 at 116; (Gloucester) A. T. Allen, ‘An Investigation into the Social
Structure of the Population of Gloucester CB’ (MLitt thesis, University of Durham, 1964), 191–3; (Kirkby
Stephen) D. Middleton, ‘A Social Anthropological Study of Kirkby Stephen’ (PhD thesis, University of
Durham, 1971), 208–10; (Preston) A. Mercer, J. S. O’Neil, and A. J. Shepherd, ‘The Churching of Urban
England’, in J. Lawrence, ed., OR69: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Operational Research
(London: Tavistock, 1970), 725–39 at 726–7; (Stoke-on-Trent) ‘Quality of Life’, dataset at UKDA, SN 250;
(Sunderland) ‘Quality of Life’, dataset at UKDA, SN 251.

Merseyside (such as Runcorn New Town with 31 per cent in 1972).22 Catholics
fared less well in the South, London excepted, and in rural districts. In 1964,
the Free Churches commanded greatest support in the northern half of Eng-
land and, to a lesser extent, the East and South-West, but a marked decline
appears to have taken place by 1978, to which coding differences may have
contributed. As the small Cumbrian market town of Kirkby Stephen exem-
plified (Table 2.7), Methodism remained a force to be reckoned with in its
traditional heartlands; here no fewer than 41 per cent of the inhabitants
declared their allegiance to it. Non-Christians, who were rarely separately
identified in general polls, were concentrated in inner-city areas with many
overseas immigrants, such as Small Heath, Birmingham (Table 2.7), where
16 per cent of the residents were Muslims in 1974.

22
R. Berthoud and R. Jowell, Creating a Community: A Study of Runcorn Residents, 1972
(London: Social and Community Planning Research, 1973), 8.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 33

Men were more likely to profess no religion than women, with the gap
greater in 1978 than in 1964, despite Callum Brown’s claims. Nevertheless, the
overwhelming majority of men (92 per cent in 1964 and 89 per cent in 1978)
continued to subscribe to some religion. Women were somewhat more prone
to embrace Anglicanism than men, but otherwise denominational gender
variations were not large and, allowing for sampling error, probably not
significant. In terms of age, no religionism was increasingly associated with
youth, most visible in the 1978 statistics for under-35s, with Anglican alle-
giance correspondingly reduced. The Church of England disproportionately
attracted the over-45s, and the Free Churches were progressively ageing,
a trend which can be observed in other evidence.23 Roman Catholics, by
contrast, had a more youthful profile in both 1964 and 1978.
Nones were more likely to be found in manual than non-manual occupa-
tions in 1964, with above average representation among the very poor in a
separate analysis of Gallup data,24 but by 1978 the position appeared to have
been reversed, with a peak of 11 per cent for non-manuals, steadily falling to
6 per cent for unskilled manual workers. There was a parallel rise in Anglican
profession as the social scale was descended. Free Church adherents were
relatively more prosperous, with some tendency to concentrate in lower
middle-class occupations, again reflected in other sources.25 Roman Catholics
maintained their traditional appeal to the working classes but also drew in a
substantial non-manual component, including from the top (AB) social group.

S EL F - A S S E SS E D R E L I G I O SI T Y

Religious profession questions sought to capture denominational identity, but

from the 1960s sample surveys have also probed more generic forms of
religiosity. As is demonstrated elsewhere, these indicators of the personal
saliency of religion have tended to present one of the bleakest pictures of the
extent of secularization in contemporary Britain.26 The approach was pio-
neered by David Glass in Greater London in 1960 when he asked respondents

23
C. D. Field, ‘Zion’s People: Who Were the English Nonconformists? Part 1: Gender, Age,
Marital Status, and Ethnicity’, Local Historian 40 (2010): 91–112 at 100–3.
24
J. B. Brothers, Religious Institutions (London: Longman, 1971), 69.
25
C. D. Field, ‘Zion’s People: Who Were the English Nonconformists? Part 2: Occupations
(Quakers, Baptists, Congregationalists)’, Local Historian 40 (2010): 208–23 and idem, ‘Zion’s
People: Who Were the English Nonconformists? Part 3: Occupations (Methodists) and Con-
clusions’, Local Historian 40 (2010): 292–308; M. R. Watts, The Dissenters, Volume III: The Crisis
and Conscience of Nonconformity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2015), 409–75.
26
C. D. Field, ‘Secularising Selfhood: What Can Polling Data on the Personal Saliency of
Religion Tell Us about the Scale and Chronology of Secularisation in Modern Britain?’, Journal of
Beliefs and Values 36 (2015): 308–30.
34 Secularization in the Long 1960s

how important a part religion played in their life. In reply, 25 per cent said
very important, 36 per cent rather important, 24 per cent neither important
nor unimportant, and merely 14 per cent very or rather unimportant. Men
(19 per cent) were more likely to deem religion unimportant than women
(9 per cent), with an occupational range for males from 17 per cent for
non-manual to 20 per cent for semi- and unskilled manual workers.27
The first national survey in 1972 revealed that religious beliefs were very (29
per cent) or quite (34 per cent) important to just under two-thirds of Britons,
rising to 93 per cent among monthly or more churchgoers. The remaining
third (including 55 per cent of non-churchgoers) found religion not very
(22 per cent) or not at all (13 per cent) important.28 By 1974–5 only a plurality
of adults (49 per cent) considered their religious beliefs to be important (very
23 per cent, fairly 26 per cent) against 46 per cent as not too important (26 per
cent) or not at all important (20 per cent). The proportion declaring their
beliefs very important was on a par with the European Economic Community
average (25 per cent) but far lower than on other continents (the United States
figure, for example, being 56 per cent).29 A study in 1976 changed tack by
enquiring into the importance attached to the spiritual side of life, 22 per cent
assessing it was very important to them, 28 per cent fairly important, 23 per
cent slightly important, and 27 per cent not at all important.30 By 1979 the
majority of all Britons (52 per cent, but 61 per cent of men) declared that
religion did not have an important place in their lives, 54 per cent also
agreeing that people’s daily lives need not be governed by religious command-
ments. The 41 per cent who still attached personal significance to religion
included 47 per cent of women and the middle class.31
These questions about the importance of religion were put to national
cross-sections. Additionally, on behalf of Eurobarometer (EB), Gallup used
importance of religion as a supplementary question to those declaring a
religion in response to its belonging form of religious profession. Merged
data from eight surveys between 1975 and 1979 are summarized in
Table 2.8. It will be seen that 56 per cent attached either great or some
importance to religion in their lives, with highs of 65 per cent for women
and 70 per cent for over-55s, and that 43 per cent either had no religion or

27 28
Unpublished. NOP Political Bulletin 110 (1972): 20.
29
G. H. Gallup, ‘What Mankind Thinks about Itself ’, Reader’s Digest 109/654 (1976): 51–6
at 55; idem, The International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion, 1979 (Wilmington: Scholarly
Resources, 1981), 333; Gallup Opinion Index 130 (1976): 8; Public Opinion 2/2 (1979): 38.
30
D. Hay and A. M. Morisy, ‘Reports of Ecstatic, Paranormal, or Religious Experience in
Great Britain and the United States: A Comparison of Trends’, Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 17 (1978): 255–68 at 260.
31
World Opinion Update 5/3 (1981): 64; Survey Research Consultants International, Index to
International Public Opinion, 1980–1981, ed. E. H. Hastings and P. K. Hastings (Oxford: Clio
Press, 1982), 534–5.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 35
Table 2.8 Perceived importance of religion in personal life, adults, Great
Britain, 1975–9 (percentages across)
Great Some Little Not belong
importance importance importance to religion

Total 25 31 16 27
Gender
Men 19 27 17 35
Women 30 35 13 20
Age
15–34 14 30 17 38
35–54 23 34 16 26
55+ 39 31 13 16

Note: The question was: ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion? If so, do you
personally feel, irrespective of how often you go to church, that your religion is of great
importance, some importance, or only of little importance in your life?’
Source: Gallup/EB, Centre for Comparative European Survey Data Information System,
<http://www.ccesd.ac.uk>, N = 8,513.

accorded it little importance, including 52 per cent of men and 55 per cent of
15–34s. Although the polls are not wholly consistent, it is sufficiently clear
that, by the late 1970s, Britons were roughly evenly divided between those who
regarded religion as important to them and those who did not, with those
judging it very important numbering about one-quarter.
Self-assessed religiosity was a second line of enquiry. Again, Glass appears
to have been the pioneer, with a question about perceived devoutness in the
1959–60 Population Investigation Committee national survey. The results
appear to be lost, other than the proportion of men reporting themselves as
devout or moderately devout, being 62 per cent (65 per cent for non-manual
and 59 per cent for manual occupations).32 This was followed by an investi-
gation of people’s interest in religion in 1961, 23 per cent claiming to be keenly
and a further 55 per cent fairly interested.33 However, in 1963, when Gallup
invited a national sample to select from a list of twelve attributes, only 28 per cent
self-rated as religious.34 ORC adopted a more systematic approach in 1968,
developing a composite scale of ‘religiosity’ based on nine variables, but also
enquiring in two different ways whether interviewees viewed themselves as
religious. Asked whether they would describe themselves as religious, 58 per cent
replied either very (6 per cent) or fairly (52 per cent) religious, peaking
at 78 per cent of Roman Catholics, while 42 per cent said they were not very

32
Unpublished.
33
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television (London:
the Authority, 1962), 55. Cf. The Observer, 16 April 1961, for a local study in Huddersfield.
34
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 677.
36 Secularization in the Long 1960s

(33 per cent) or not at all (9 per cent) religious, including 71 per cent of nones.
Similar findings emerged when agreement or disagreement was invited to the
statement ‘I am not a religious person’: 59 per cent disagreed, indicating
that they saw themselves as religious (including two-thirds of women and
over-55s), and 37 per cent agreed, among them just under half of men and
under-35s.35
The first investigation in the 1970s, undertaken in urban Britain in 1971,
deployed a seven-point scale of religiosity, 45 per cent placing themselves at
the religious end of the spectrum (including 14 per cent saying they were
religious a very great deal), 34 per cent at the irreligious end, with 20 per cent
opting for the intermediate point of neither religious nor non-religious.36
An international study in 1973–4 revealed only 8 per cent of Britons
self-designating as very religious, 34 per cent as somewhat religious, 28 per
cent as a little religious, and 30 per cent as not very religious.37 LHR used
slightly different categories in a 1974 poll for the BBC: 6 per cent very
religious, 42 per cent fairly religious, 30 per cent not very religious, and
20 per cent not at all religious. The very and fairly religious combined were
most numerous among women (56 per cent), over-55s (62 per cent), and the
lowest (DE) social grade (51 per cent), while men (27 per cent) and 16–34s
(31 per cent) were preponderant among the ranks of the not at all religious.38
A neighbourhood survey by Queen’s Road Baptist Church, Coventry, in 1978
returned 19 per cent as very religious, 49 per cent as quite religious, and
33 per cent as not at all religious.39 BMRB used a simple binary question in
1980: ‘Do you consider yourself to be a religious person?’ Britons were fairly
evenly divided, 49 per cent replying yes (including 55 per cent of women and
68 per cent of over-55s) and 45 per cent no (among them 52 per cent of men
and 58 per cent of 15–34s).40 This mirrored the position revealed by questions
about the importance of religion. However, an over-time reduction in the
number of self-identifying religious was confirmed by Insight Social Research’s
1987 replication of the 1968 ORC study, falling from 58 per cent to 49 per cent,
with the not at all religious doubling to 18 per cent by 1987, seemingly on
account of a 12-point defection from the ranks of the fairly religious.41
The problem with both the self-rated importance of religion and religiosity
questions was that they were framed in the abstract and gave no indication of
how religion practically affected the day-to-day lives of adults. According
to ORC in 1968, 17 per cent of interviewees thought their religious beliefs

35
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland: A Survey of
Popular Attitudes (London: the Authority, 1970), 9–10, 12, 14–15, 17, 63–4; unpublished.
36
‘Quality of Life’, dataset at UKDA, SN 248.
37
‘Political Action: An Eight Nation Study, 1973–1976’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1389.
38 39 40
Unpublished. Unpublished. Unpublished.
41
M. Svennevig, I. R. Haldane, S. Spiers, and B. Gunter, Godwatching: Viewers, Religion, and
Television (London: John Libbey, 1988), 20–2.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 37

affected their everyday lives a great deal and 29 per cent quite a lot, with 44 per
cent not very much or not at all, but they were not asked to specify how exactly
their lives were impacted.42 The only attempt to do so at this time was in a
series of surveys for the Advertising Association, in which national cross-
sections were quizzed about religion as a regular topic of conversation with
family and friends. The saliency of religion was much lower on this indicator,
and falling, 24 per cent in 1972, 17 per cent in 1976, 16 per cent in 1980, and
15 per cent in 1984, with women and the over-55s most likely to converse
about religion. Respondents were also asked to select issues about which they
held the strongest opinions, religion scoring 22 per cent in 1972, 14 per cent in
1976, 12 per cent in 1980, and 15 per cent in 1984.43 If these measures can be
taken as a reasonable proxy of how much religion actually mattered to
individuals during the 1970s, then there was a considerable gulf between
claims and reality.

RELIGIOUS MEMBERS HIP

Self-identified religious profession and religiosity are obviously fairly passive

indicators, involving no real effort on the part of the believer, and being purely
a matter of declaration. At one level, this was also the case with religious
membership, the occasional survey asking whether respondents considered
themselves to be ‘members’ of a church, faith, or religion. For example, when
ORC asked this very question in 1968, 78 per cent of Britons replied in the
affirmative (including 50 per cent as Church of England) and only 22 per cent
in the negative.44 This, however, was not very meaningful and the conventional
understanding of religious membership required some form of registration
with, or at least recognition by, a religious body, usually with an expectation
that it would translate into some kind of religious practice. Unfortunately,
there was and is no common criterion of membership, the choice to adopt
such a concept at all and then how to operationalize it being a matter for
each religion, making it problematical to produce comparative national esti-
mates. In Chapter 3, we will examine the various ways in which individual
denominations and faiths counted their followers, on their own terms. The

42
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, 28–9.
43
Advertising Association, Public Attitudes to Advertising: A Survey, April 1972 (London: the
Association, 1972), 6; idem, Public Attitudes to Advertising, 1976: A Survey Commissioned by the
Advertising Association (London: the Association, 1976), 7, 9; idem, Public Attitudes to Adver-
tising, 1980/1981: A Survey Commissioned by the Advertising Association (London: the Associ-
ation, 1981), 7, 9; idem, Public Attitudes to Advertising, 1984: A Survey Commissioned by the
Advertising Association (London: the Association, 1984), 6–9.
44
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, 12–13.
38 Secularization in the Long 1960s

aggregate membership data presented here are therefore something of an

artificial construct, mixing different definitions and often with missing
observations. Such considerations explain why, according to the World
Christian Handbook, Protestant church membership in Britain apparently
doubled in the space of five years between 1957 and 1962, from 6,488,000 to
13,302,000, a principal explanation being that the Church of England crite-
rion was switched from electoral roll members to an estimate of confirmed
members.45
The World Christian Handbook apart, few contemporary works of reference
were brave enough to attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of religious
membership, most tending to quote statistics just for the largest Churches.46
This was also the case with the standard retrospective compilation of church
membership data, which juxtaposed Anglican and Presbyterian communi-
cants, Free Church members, and Roman Catholic population to produce an
annual series for Great Britain to 1970. It suggested that the membership of
the major Protestant Churches fell away, at a relatively steady pace, from
a post-war peak of 5,407,000 in 1956 to 4,311,000 in 1970. There was only
a limited 1963 effect (the decrease between 1962 and 1963 was 2.8 per cent and
between 1963 and 1964 2.6 per cent) and no discernible sign of reversal
following the crusades by Billy Graham in 1966–7.47 For reasons which we
will explore later, the Roman Catholic Church, by contrast, grew continuously,
by 27 per cent from 3,800,000 in 1955 to 4,829,000 in 1970.48
The post-1970 situation for the United Kingdom (rather than Britain) has
been charted, quinquennially, by Peter Brierley. His church membership
statistics are ostensibly more comprehensive in denominational coverage,
although many could not be derived from religious bodies but are estimates,
with numerous revisions and unexplained inconsistencies in multiple iter-
ations of the same data points, despite being routinely cited in the academic

45
E. J. Bingle and K. G. Grubb, eds., World Christian Handbook, 1957 Edition (London:
World Dominion Press, 1957), 13–14; H. W. Coxill and K. G. Grubb, eds., World Christian
Handbook, 1962 Edition (London: World Dominion Press, 1962), 208–10.
46
For example, A. M. Carr-Saunders, D. C. Jones, and C. A. Moser, A Survey of Social
Conditions in England and Wales as Illustrated by Statistics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958),
263–4; A. Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1962), 160–73;
D. E. Butler and J. Freeman, British Political Facts, 1900–1960 (London: Macmillan, 1963),
200–4 and British Political Facts, 1900–1968, 3rd edn. (London: Macmillan, 1969), 296–301; The
Reader’s Digest Complete Atlas of the British Isles (London: Reader’s Digest Association, 1965),
120–1.
47
For a checklist of major evangelistic initiatives during the 1960s and 1970s, together with
estimates of attenders and enquirers at each, see D. B. Barrett, ed., World Christian Encyclopedia:
A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900–2000 (Nairobi:
Oxford University Press, 1982), 709. An account of Billy Graham’s London crusade in 1966 is
J. Pollock, Crusade ’66: Britain Hears Billy Graham (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1966).
48
R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church
Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 25–7, 31–2.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 39
Table 2.9 Religious membership, adults, United Kingdom, 1950–80
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Protestants 7,101,000 7,112,000 6,966,000 6,722,000 6,367,000 5,365,000 4,902,000

Roman 2,432,000 2,567,000 2,845,000 2,793,000 2,746,000 2,525,000 2,455,000
Catholics
Orthodox 81,000 94,000 107,000 133,000 159,000 170,000 172,000
All Christians 9,614,000 9,773,000 9,918,000 9,648,000 9,272,000 8,060,000 7,529,000
As % of adult 25 25 24 23 22 19 17
population
Other 270,000 375,000 421,000 578,000 732,000 885,000 1,088,000
religions
All religions 9,884,000 10,148,000 10,339,000 10,226,000 10,004,000 8,945,000 8,617,000
As % of adult 25 26 26 25 24 21 19
population

Note: Other religions comprised non-Trinitarian Churches and non-Christian faiths.

Source: P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition
(London: Christian Research, 1999), 8.17–8.18.

and other secondary literature.49 Table 2.9 summarizes perhaps his most
holistic attempt to depict adult church membership between 1950 and 1980,
using Mass attendance figures for Roman Catholics and estimates of ‘active
members’ for other communities which did not have a concept of membership
and enumerated only their populations. Looking at the ratio of members thus
defined to the number of adults in the United Kingdom, it will be seen that
religious membership was broadly stable in the 1950s, experienced only
modest relative decline in the 1960s, but slid at a faster rate in the 1970s.
Brierley also computed membership ratios for Trinitarian Churches for the
four home nations of the United Kingdom in 1970, 1975, and 1980. By far the

49
These variant data for 1970, 1975, and 1980 will be found in P. W. Brierley, UK Protestant
Missions Handbook, Volume 2: Home (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1977), 10; Central Statistical
Office, Social Trends, No. 13, 1983 Edition (London: HMSO, 1982), 150–1; P. W. Brierley, ed.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1982), 14; idem, ed., UK
Christian Handbook, 1985/86 Edition (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1984), 110; idem, ed.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88 Edition (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1986), 132, 134; idem, ed.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1989/90 Edition (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1988), 144, 150; idem, A
Century of British Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1989),
24–7; P. W. Brierley and D. Longley, eds., UK Christian Handbook, 1992/93 Edition (London:
MARC Europe, 1991), 213; P. W. Brierley and V. Hiscock, eds., UK Christian Handbook, 1994/95
Edition (London: Christian Research Association, 1993), 246; P. W. Brierley and H. Wraight, eds.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1996/97 Edition (London: Christian Research, 1995), 240; L. J. Francis
and P. W. Brierley, ‘The Changing Face of the British Churches, 1975–1995’, Religion and the
Social Order 7 (1997): 159–84 at 162; P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends,
No. 1, 1998/99 Edition (London: Christian Research, 1997), 2.6; idem, Religion in Britain, 1900 to
2000 (London: Christian Research, 1998), 3–5; idem, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends
No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition (London: Christian Research, 1999), 8.17–8.18; idem, ‘Religion’,
in A. H. Halsey, ed. with J. Webb, Twentieth-Century British Social Trends (Basingstoke: Macmil-
lan, 2000), 654–5.
40 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 2.10 Adult church members, Great Britain, 1978–80
England, 1979 Wales, 1978 Scotland, 1980

Protestants 3,114,000 412,600 1,113,800

Roman Catholics 3,530,000 125,700 816,100
Orthodox 95,000 NA NA
All Christians 6,739,000 538,300 1,929,900
As % adult population 19 25 49
Sources: Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties: From a Census of the Churches in
1979, 2 vols. (London: Bible Society, 1980), I, 23; P. W. Brierley and B. Evans, Prospects for Wales: Report of
the 1982 Census of the Churches (London: Bible Society, 1983), 28; P. W. Brierley and F. Macdonald, Prospects
for Scotland: Report of the 1984 Census of the Churches (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1985), 60.

most religious nation was Northern Ireland, with around four-fifths of its
inhabitants in church membership. The least religious was England, where 15
per cent of adults were church members in 1970, 14 per cent in 1975, and
13 per cent in 1980. Then came Wales, where per capita membership dropped
from 27 per cent in 1970 to 23 per cent in 1975 to 21 per cent in 1980, while
in Scotland the figures were 44 per cent, 38 per cent, and 35 per cent,
respectively.50 Somewhat more inflated results emerged from the home
nation censuses of church attendance which Brierley was instrumental in
organizing, and which additionally requested information about membership,
grossed up to address missing returns (Table 2.10). The higher proportions
probably reflect a degree of over-estimation on the part of local clergy and
church officers completing returns, but, in the case of Scotland, the elevated
figure arose from using the whole Catholic population (including children)
whereas in England and Wales an estimate was made for only the adult
Catholic population.
It is possible to compare the Scottish ratios with those obtained from two
other pieces of research. First, John Highet produced a series of estimates
between 1951 and 1966, showing a reasonably stable relative position, with no
dramatic 1963 effect (Table 2.11).51 The divergence between Highet’s 1966
membership figure of 59 per cent and Brierley’s 1970 figure of 44 per cent is
stark and points to some underlying differences in methodology. The only
known variant factors are their alternative definitions of the adult population

50
Brierley, UK Protestant Missions Handbook, 10; Brierley and Longley, UK Christian
Handbook, 1992/93 Edition, 213.
51
Unfortunately, there is no equivalent series for England and Wales, where Highet only
made one calculation, for 1951: J. Highet, ‘Scottish Religious Adherence’, British Journal of
Sociology 4 (1953): 142–59 at 144; idem, ‘The Churches’, in A. K. Cairncross, ed., The Scottish
Economy: A Statistical Account of Scottish Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954),
297–315 at 299.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 41
Table 2.11 John Highet’s estimates of adult church membership, Scotland, 1951–66
1951 1957 1959 1964 1966

Numbers
Church of Scotland 1,271,200 1,315,600 1,315,466 1,259,162 1,233,800
Other Presbyterian 37,900 34,400 53,674 50,338 50,000
Other Protestant 202,100 203,600 170,710 170,700 172,000
Roman Catholic 505,200 525,200 530,550 539,800 545,200
Total 2,016,400 2,078,800 2,070,400 2,020,000 2,001,000
% of adult population
Church of Scotland 36.5 37.7 37.6 36.4 36.1
Other Presbyterian 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5
Other Protestant 5.8 5.8 4.9 4.9 5.0
Roman Catholic 14.5 15.0 15.0 15.6 15.9
Total 57.8 59.5 59.0 58.5 58.5
Sources: J. Highet, ‘Scottish Religious Adherence’, British Journal of Sociology 4 (1953): 142–59; idem, ‘The
Churches’, in A. K. Cairncross, ed., The Scottish Economy: A Statistical Account of Scottish Life (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1954), 297–315; idem, ‘The Protestant Churches in Scotland: A Review of
Membership, Evangelistic Activities, and Other Aspects’, Archives de Sociologie des Religions 4 (1959):
97–104; idem, The Scottish Churches: A Review of their State 400 Years after the Reformation (London:
Skeffington, 1960), 54–9, 213–14; idem, ‘Church Membership in Scotland and Some Comparisons in
England’, British Weekly, 15 February 1962: 5–6; idem, ‘Churchgoing in Scotland’, New Society, 26 December
1963: 13–14; idem, ‘Faithful after a Fashion’, Glasgow Herald, 11 October 1965: 8; idem, ‘How Religious is
Scotland?’, Glasgow Herald, 5 January 1968: 8; idem, ‘Great Britain: Scotland’, in H. Mol., ed., Western
Religion: A Country by Country Sociological Inquiry (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 249–69 at 255.

(aged 20 and over for Highet and aged 15 and over for Brierley) and of
Roman Catholics (estimated adults in the Catholic population for Highet
and Mass attenders for Brierley). Notional Mass attenders were also used
in the other comparative historical overview of ‘church adherence’ in
Scotland, that by Callum Brown, his series covering church members, active
adherents, and Sunday school enrolments. The raw data have not been
made available, only visualizations, Brown making clear that they are not
comprehensive and intended only to demonstrate trends. He has suggested
that per capita church membership and adherence in Scotland declined
relentlessly after 1956 and very steeply from 1963, reducing from 50 per cent
in 1965 to 44 per cent in 1974.52

52
C. G. Brown, ‘A Revisionist Approach to Religious Change’, in S. Bruce, ed., Religion and
Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), 42–7; idem, Religion and Society in Scotland since 1707 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1997), 61–6; idem, ‘The Secularisation Decade: What the 1960s Have Done to
the Study of Religious History’, in D. H. McLeod and W. Ustorf, eds., The Decline of Christendom
in Western Europe, 1750–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33–4; idem,
Religion and the Demographic Revolution, 89–90, 93.
42 Secularization in the Long 1960s

SUNDAY SCHOOL ENROLMENTS

Whereas religious membership was largely a measure of adult belonging,

Sunday school enrolment had been the traditional yardstick of the religious
allegiance of children and young people, at least among Protestants (the
movement did not take root in the Roman Catholic Church, which mostly
relied upon catechumen classes instead). Indeed, Sunday schools were a
potentially vital plank in the religious socialization of children, alongside the
home and, particularly since the Education Act 1944, the day school.
By the 1960s and 1970s, however, the role and influence of Sunday schools
had been much diminished.53 Scholars had failed to keep pace with population
increase since the 1880s, although this relative decline was only modest until
after the First World War. Considerable ground was lost between the wars,
especially during the 1930s,54 and the movement was further disrupted by the
evacuation of children during the Second World War.55 The post-war ‘baby
boom’ (most marked in 1946–8) had held out the prospect of resurgence, and
there was, in reality, some absolute growth in many Free Church and Presby-
terian Sunday schools for a few years, peaks for individual denominations
ranging from 1952 for Methodists to 1956 for the Church of Scotland. Rapid
decline then ensued, notwithstanding another spurt in crude birth rates.56
By 1980, the movement had become ‘a mere ghost of what it was’.57
This decrease in the late 1950s and early 1960s probably had several causes,
as Hugh McLeod has pointed out on the basis of oral evidence,58 but contem-
poraries often tended to blame it on rival attractions, notably the advent of
television and, more particularly, the big jump in ownership of motor cars

53
For background, see I. Reid, ‘Sunday Schools as Socialisation Agencies’, in G. White and
R. Mufti, eds., Understanding Socialisation (Nafferton: Studies in Education, 1979), 41–58; idem,
Sunday Schools: A Suitable Case for Treatment (London: Chester House Publications, 1980);
P. B. Cliff, The Rise and Development of the Sunday School Movement in England, 1780–1980
(Nutfield: National Christian Education Council, 1986), 272–321; D. Rosman, ‘Sunday Schools
and Social Change in the Twentieth Century’, in S. C. Orchard and J. H. Y. Briggs, eds., The
Sunday School Movement: Studies in the Growth and Decline of Sunday Schools (Milton Keynes:
Paternoster, 2007), 149–60; N. Stanton, ‘From Raikes’ Revolution to Rigid Institution: Sunday
Schools in Twentieth Century England’, in R. Gilchrist, T. Hodgson, T. Jeffs, J. Spence,
N. Stanton, and J. Walker, eds., Reflecting on the Past: Essays in the History of Youth and
Community Work (Lyme Regis: Russell House, 2011), 71–91; idem, ‘From Sunday Schools to
Christian Youth Work: Young People’s Engagement with Organised Christianity in Twentieth
Century England and the Present Day’ (PhD thesis, Open University, 2013), 75–136.
54
C. D. Field, ‘Gradualist or Revolutionary Secularization? A Case Study of Religious
Belonging in Inter-War Britain, 1918–1939’, Church History and Religious Culture 93 (2013):
57–93 at 85–7.
55
C. D. Field, ‘Puzzled People Revisited: Religious Believing and Belonging in Wartime
Britain, 1939–45’, Twentieth Century British History 19 (2008): 446–79 at 461–2.
56 57
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 35–8. Reid, Sunday Schools, 23.
58
D. H. McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
203–7.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 43

(facilitating family outings on Sundays). The Church of England’s chief

statistician was so convinced of the negative impact of the latter that he
published a diagram plotting Sunday scholars against private car licences,
unequivocally declaring ‘the decline in Sunday school attendance is associated
with the increase in the number of cars’.59 The response of the Churches was
to internalize Sunday schools, abandoning the free-standing afternoon ses-
sions almost entirely by the early 1970s60 and integrating the morning session
more closely with the morning service of worship through the concept of
‘family church’. In the process, Sunday schools finally lost most of their
contact with children of non-churchgoing working-class parents and became
much more dependent upon recruiting the children of existing church mem-
bers and attenders. Yet this was at the very time that family size was shrinking
through more widespread birth control, and worshippers were ageing. As one
Bolton Methodist minister remarked in 1960: ‘The small family of today does
not provide fodder for Sunday school, the hard core of the congregation are
past child bearing age.’61
Sunday schools did not disappear overnight, of course, and were still
reckoned to exist in one form or another (perhaps rebranded as junior church)
in more than four-fifths of English places of worship in 1979, according to
research by the Bible Society.62 But they were much reduced in size, so much
so that it no longer seemed worth the effort to collect and publish proper
statistics. The movement’s main umbrella organization, the National Sunday
School Union (later the National Christian Education Council), ceased to
gather them in 1972, having ascertained that the proportion of the day school
population associated with Anglican and Free Church Sunday schools had
fallen from 47 per cent in 1950 to 35 per cent in 1960 to under 30 per cent by
1970.63 The Church of England’s last formal return of Sunday scholars was in
1960, when there were 1,039,000 of them (equivalent to 13 per cent of the
population aged 3–14), of whom only 28 per cent were aged 11 and over
and 57 per cent were girls.64 These age and gender biases were characteristic
of Sunday school profiles generally, reflected in studies carried out among

59
R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England, Number 3 (London:
Church Information Office, 1965), 61. For local comment, see R. P. M. Sykes, ‘Popular Religion
in Decline: A Study from the Black Country’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 56 (2005): 287–307
at 304.
60
British Lessons Council Research Committee, ‘Report of the Pilot Survey into the Uses of
the British Lessons Council Syllabus Experience and Faith’ (1971, unpublished), 9; R. Hiscox, The
Future of the Church? A Report of the Survey of the Work for Children in the Diocese of Worcester,
1972 (Cookley: printed by the Cookley Printers, [1972]), 17.
61
Brighton, The Keep, Mass-Observation Archive, SxMOA1/5/19/65/C/1.
62
Church Times, 29 February 1980; Baptist Times, 20 March 1980.
63
Cliff, Rise and Development of the Sunday School Movement, 272.
64
Neuss, Facts and Figures, 61–2.
44 Secularization in the Long 1960s

secondary school pupils at the time.65 Twenty years later, in 1980, the Church
of England’s estimated enrolment was 500,000,66 but the rate of contraction
was even faster in some dioceses.67
The Methodist Church, the next largest denominational provider of Sunday
schools after the Church of England, did not publish figures of its scholars
after 1966, by which time they had fallen by 38 per cent since 1955. This was
three points more than for the combined total over the same period of four
other leading Free and Presbyterian Churches (Baptists, Congregationalists,
Presbyterian Church of Wales, and Church of Scotland).68 By 1975, 22 per cent
of Methodist places of worship no longer had a Sunday school, and Sunday
school attendance (which would have been lower than the number of scholars)
slumped by 34 per cent from 1972 to 1980.69 The Congregational Union and
the Presbyterian Church of England had 255,500 Sunday scholars between
them in 1957 but 126,300 in 1972, 51 per cent fewer, while their successor
bodies (United Reformed Church and Congregational Federation) had 76,700
in 1980, a drop of 39 per cent in just eight years. Baptist scholars declined by
48 per cent from 1957 to 1980, from 220,000 to 113,400.70 In Scotland
Presbyterian Sunday school enrolments represented 39 per cent of Scottish
children in 1956 but just 19 per cent in 1973.71
The progressively patchier record of Sunday scholars after the early 1960s
makes it difficult to gauge the national picture. Even the figures which have
been published for 1961, 2,547,000 in Great Britain or 2,106,000 in England
and Wales, are denominationally incomplete, omitting many smaller bodies.72

65
For example, University of Sheffield Institute of Education, Religious Education in Secondary
Schools: A Survey and a Syllabus (London: Thomas Nelson, 1961), 85; K. E. Hyde, Religious Learning
in Adolescence (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), 7–8; I. Reid, ‘Sunday School Attendance and
Adolescents’ Religious and Moral Attitudes, Knowledge, and Practice’, Learning for Living 17 (1977):
3–8 at 4; idem, ‘Sunday Schools as Socialisation Agencies’, 50–1; idem, Sunday Schools, 19–22.
66
Cliff, Rise and Development of the Sunday School Movement, 318–19.
67
Hiscox, Future of the Church?, 9, 17.
68
Calculated from Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 170, 179–80,
187–8, 191. See also Free Church Federal Council, Sunday Schools Today: An Investigation of
Some Aspects of Christian Education in English Free Churches (London: the Council, [1956]).
69
Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church (1975), 64, 75, (1981), 47. For a
case study of Methodist Sunday schools in the Leeds District about this time, see I. Reid, ‘Small
Schools “in Danger of Collapse” ’, Methodist Recorder, 8 November 1973; idem, ‘Some Views of
Sunday School Teachers’, Learning for Living 17 (1977): 79–81; idem, ‘Sunday Schools as
Socialisation Agencies’, 44–8; idem, Sunday Schools, 13–18.
70
D. M. Thompson, ‘The Older Free Churches’, in R. E. Davies, ed., The Testing of the
Churches, 1932–1982: A Symposium (London: Epworth Press, 1982), 87–115 at 115.
71
C. G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800–2000, 2nd
edn. (London: Routledge, 2009), 188. See also J. Sutherland, Godly Upbringing: A Survey of
Sunday Schools and Bible Classes in the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh: Church of Scotland
Youth Committee, 1960).
72
T. W. Laqueur, Religion and Respectability: Sunday Schools and Working Class Culture,
1780–1850 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 246–7; R. Gill, The ‘Empty’ Church
Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 225.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 45
Table 2.12 Estimated Sunday scholars, United Kingdom, 1955–80
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Anglican 1,470,000 1,188,000 959,000 767,000 540,000 319,000

Methodist 825,000 632,000 517,000 311,000 248,000 193,000
Other Protestant 1,265,000 1,040,000 860,000 771,000 625,000 490,000
Total 3,560,000 2,860,000 2,336,000 1,849,000 1,413,000 1,002,000
As % of under-15 30 24 19 14 11 9
population
Sources: P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition
(London: Christian Research, 1999), 2.15; idem, ed., UK Church Statistics, 2005–2015 (Tonbridge: ADBC
Publishers, 2011), 14.4.8.

Bravely, Peter Brierley has made two attempts to compute long-term changes
in scholars, using a high degree of estimation and varying definitions of what
constituted a Sunday school. His second effort is summarized, for the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, in Table 2.12.73 Although there are grounds for thinking his
data, both absolute and relative to the under-15 population, may sometimes be
a little on the low side, the direction of travel is clear and accurate, confirming
that Sunday schools had entered freefall well before Brown’s 1963 watershed.
The relative figure of 9 per cent of the child population by 1980 was not only in
marked contrast to the peak of 57 per cent exactly 100 years previously but
represented a fall of two-thirds in the quarter-century since 1955. The absolute
decline in scholars over these twenty-five years, according to Brierley, was
steepest for the Anglicans (78 per cent) and Methodists (77 per cent), being 61
per cent for other Protestants.
Brierley’s data are snapshots of the situation at quinquennial intervals, and
they will inevitably undercount the proportion of people who were touched by
Sunday schools at some stage in their lives, many attending infrequently or for
a few years only while others attended throughout their entire childhood.
A national enquiry by Gallup in 1957 discovered that 90 per cent had attended
Sunday school as a child, either regularly (73 per cent) or sometimes (17 per
cent), albeit under-30s were more likely than over-30s to have been occasional
attenders (27 per cent versus 15 per cent).74 Similar claims were advanced in
local studies, for example in Birmingham in 1965, with 21 per cent more
respondents in a middle-class area reporting that they had been to Sunday
school as a child than recalled their parents attending church at the same time,
and 30 per cent more in a working-class area.75 This was testimony to the
historic power of Sunday schools to reach out beyond the churchgoing classes.

73
His first effort is reported in Brierley, Century of British Christianity, 31–50.
74
Unpublished.
75
C. R. Hinings, ‘The Balsall Heath Survey: A Report’, Research Bulletin, Institute for the
Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham (1967): 56–72 at 62;
idem, ‘Church and Community: The Hodge Hill Survey’, Research Bulletin, Institute for the
46 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Sample surveys also revealed continuingly strong public and parental sup-
port for sending children to Sunday school, as many as 92 per cent in the 1957
Gallup poll and at a not dissimilar level in local investigations.76 However, in
an increasingly family-centred generation, there was greater acceptance that
children should only go to Sunday school if they wanted to (57 per cent in
the 1957 national poll, rising to 65 per cent among under-30s) rather than
being compelled to attend (35 per cent overall, 25 per cent for under-30s).
In practice, however, some involuntary attendance persisted, 33 per cent of a
Wellingborough sample recalling in 1964 that they had been compelled to go
to Sunday school and a further 28 per cent being put under some pressure to
do so.77 By 1970 NOP found that 61 per cent of parents still encouraged their
own children to attend Sunday school.78 Nationally, regular or intermittent
Sunday school attendance by those children was alleged to be 75 per cent in
1957 and 81 per cent in 1961,79 but it was down to 42 per cent by 1966, the
remaining 58 per cent of children never going.80 It was inevitable that, as with
other reports of socially respectable behaviour, these claims were highly
inflated, confirmed, of course, by the actual and estimated numbers of Sunday
scholars presented earlier.

RELIG IOUS COMMUNITY

In addition to their members and Sunday scholars, denominations and faiths

had other individuals associated with and known to them (in the sense of
being on their ‘books’), however loosely. At one end of the spectrum, many of
these people would have been quite religiously active, as regular attenders at
public worship and financial supporters but who elected not to become
members. At the other end, the links would have been much more distant,

Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham (1968): 21–37 at 27. For
other local evidence, see The Observer, 16 April 1961 (Huddersfield) and A. H. Bird, ‘Rhondda
Valley Survey’, Free Church Chronicle 21/4 (1966): 8–11 at 8.
76
A. T. Allen, ‘An Investigation into the Social Structure of the Population of Gloucester CB’
(MLitt thesis, University of Durham, 1964), 208–14; Hinings, ‘Church and Community’, 27; idem,
‘Religiosity and Attitudes towards the Church in a Rural Setting: The Clun Valley’, in A. Bryman,
ed., Religion in the Birmingham Area: Essays in the Sociology of Religion (Birmingham: Institute for
the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham, 1975), 112–22 at 117;
D. B. Rees, Chapels in the Valley: A Study in the Sociology of Welsh Nonconformity (Upton: Ffynnon
Press, 1975), 89 (Aberdare Valley).
77
D. Wright, Attitudes towards the Church in Wellingborough (Leicester: Department of
Adult Education, Leicester University, 1965), 24.
78
Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia, 700.
79
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes, 55.
80
‘This is Your Sunday’, Sunday 1/1 (1966): 4–6 at 5. Cf. Social Surveys (Gallup Poll),
Television and Religion, 129–30.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 47

perhaps as far back as infant baptism, in the case of Churches which practised
it. Indeed, for the Roman Catholic Church, the baptized population was the
basis of its membership, as we shall discuss in Chapter 3. For most religious
bodies, this wider community would still have encompassed a somewhat
narrower circle than was represented by religious profession, the latter includ-
ing those who would have been unknown to those bodies and whose ties may
have been purely sentimental or ancestral. Unfortunately, community is the
most unsatisfactory of all five aggregate measures of religious belonging since
there is so little hard data available to help define it.
The Church of England made a brief attempt to compute the size of its
community between 1958 and 1979. Using annual baptism and confirmation
rates, it estimated the number of living persons who had been baptized or
confirmed into the Church. Throughout this period the baptized Church of
England population hovered around 27,000,000, even though it fell as a
proportion of the whole population, from 63 per cent to 58 per cent. The
confirmed population dropped by one million over the same period, from
9,748,000 in 1958 to 8,700,000 in 1979, or from 23 per cent to 19 per cent of
home population.81 Since the statistics were discontinued after 1979 ‘because a
satisfactory basis for calculating them no longer exists’,82 it is probably
prudent not to attach excessive significance to them.
In the Free Churches there had historically been a category of adult
‘adherents’ which was frequently larger than the actual membership.83 They
were a dying breed throughout the inter-war and immediate post-war periods,
generally reducing at a faster rate than members, a trend which persisted in
some denominations into the 1960s.84 This was exemplified in the Presbyte-
rian Church of Wales, for which the longest time series of data about adherents
exists, those in the ‘whole congregation’ who were not members reducing from
54,000 (26 per cent) in 1955 to 31,800 (22 per cent) in 1968 (when the ‘whole
congregation’ was last returned). Deducting ‘children of the church’ and
probationer members, it has been estimated that non-member adult attend-
ants represented just 9 per cent of the ‘whole congregation’ in 1955 and 4 per
cent in 1968.85 In the much smaller (around 18,000 adult members) Britain
Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends, by contrast, non-member attendants

81
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church
of England Yearbook, 1981 (London: CIO Publishing, 1981), 22.
82
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church
of England Yearbook, 1982 (London: CIO Publishing, 1982), 1.
83
P. J. Yalden, ‘Association, Community, and the Origins of Secularisation: English and
Welsh Nonconformity, c.1850–1930’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 55 (2004): 293–324 at
296–300.
84
Field, ‘Gradualist or Revolutionary Secularization?’, 85; idem, Britain’s Last Religious
Revival?, 34–5.
85
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 77, 151, 179–80.
48 Secularization in the Long 1960s

at meetings for worship slightly increased as a proportion of all adults, from

22 per cent in 1965 to 25 per cent in 1980.86 In a sample of Baptist churches
in 1978 adherents represented 19 per cent of adults, one for every four
members.87 They also formed a significant minority of worshippers in the
United Reformed Church and Congregational Federation in the late 1970s.88
The Methodist Church did not count adherents in the traditional sense of
adult non-member church attenders but, having previously relied upon guess-
timates,89 did inaugurate a community roll in 1969, designed to capture all
those in pastoral contact with Methodism, including members as well as
Sunday scholars, young people, and attenders at Methodist local organiza-
tions. The metric was not well understood by Methodist form-fillers at first,
leading to inconsistent reporting, and it was not until 1973 that it had properly
bedded down, at 1,434,400. Thereafter, until 1980, there was a fairly stable
mean of 860,000 names on the community roll who were not members,
notwithstanding a membership slide from 570,300 in 1973 to 488,000 in
1980.90 In Scotland, adherents had always been less numerous than in England
and Wales, since the tradition had mainly been confined to the Free Church of
Scotland and Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland and some Church of
Scotland parishes in the North and North-West of Scotland.91 Allowing for
other denominations, a plausible estimate might be 1,000,000 Free Church
and Presbyterian adult adherents by c.1963, two-thirds the total in c.1939.92
These Anglican and Free Church examples illustrate the problematical
nature of quantifying religious community. Yet this has not prevented
several efforts to do so, the first by the World Christian Handbook, which
initially estimated Britain’s Protestant Christian community at 20,091,200 in
1957 before raising the figure by more than half, to 33,383,200 in 1962 and

86
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain, Tabular Statement
as at 31.xii.2012 (London: Britain Yearly Meeting, [2013]), 11. Statistics of non-member attend-
ants were not kept between 1925 and 1961.
87
Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Signs of Hope: An Examination of the
Numerical and Spiritual State of Churches in Membership with the Baptist Union of Great Britain
and Ireland (London: Baptist Union, 1979), xvi.
88
R. W. Cleaves, Congregationalism, 1960–1976: The Story of the Federation (Swansea: John
Penry Press, 1977), 131; United Reformed Church, The Final Report of the Priorities and
Resources Group, with Resolutions of the General Assembly, 1980 (London: United Reformed
Church, 1980), 3, 24.
89
The Methodist community was estimated at 2,100,000 throughout the 1960s: Minutes of
the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church (1962), 104, (1963), 95, (1964), 107, (1965), 95,
(1966), 105, (1967), 103, (1968), 99, (1969), 105.
90
Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church (1972), 100, (1975), 64, (1978),
47, (1981), 42.
91
J. Highet, The Scottish Churches: A Review of their State 400 Years after the Reformation
(London: Skeffington, 1960), 25, 27, 209–12; J. N. Wolfe and M. Pickford, The Church of
Scotland: An Economic Survey (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1980), 70.
92
Field, ‘Gradualist or Revolutionary Secularization?’, 91; idem, Britain’s Last Religious
Revival?, 35.
 Belonging—Aggregate Measures 49
Table 2.13 Estimated religious community, United Kingdom, 1955–80
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Anglican 27,800,000 27,600,000 27,400,000 27,800,000 28,200,000 27,700,000

Roman Catholic 4,300,000 4,800,000 5,300,000 5,400,000 5,600,000 5,700,000
Other Christian 7,500,000 7,500,000 7,200,000 6,800,000 6,400,000 6,400,000
All Christian 39,600,000 39,900,000 39,900,000 40,000,000 40,200,000 39,800,000
As % of population 77 76 74 72 72 71
Other religions 900,000 1,100,000 1,500,000 1,900,000 2,100,000 2,600,000
All religions 40,500,000 41,000,000 41,400,000 41,900,000 42,300,000 42,400,000
As % of population 79 78 77 75 76 75

Note: Other religions comprised non-Trinitarian Churches and non-Christian faiths.

Source: P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition
(London: Christian Research, 1999), 2.7.

33,556,800 in 1967.93 The World Christian Encyclopedia proposed an even

higher number for what were termed Christian affiliates in the United King-
dom in 1970 38,347,800 Protestants and 5,543,400 Catholics, or 43,891,200 in
all (equivalent to 79 per cent of the population), reducing to 42,255,200 (73 per
cent) by 1980.94 But perhaps the most robust, albeit still highly conjectural,
estimates of the Christian and non-Christian community in the United
Kingdom have been prepared by Peter Brierley, a simplified subset of his
calculations for 1955–80 appearing in Table 2.13.95 This shows the Anglican
community, as defined by baptized population, as being steady throughout
the 1960s and 1970s, a decline of one-fifth in other Protestants being counter-
balanced by expansion in the Catholic population, also baptismally-
determined. The overall Christian community was thus stable in absolute
terms, at around 40,000,000, although per capita size reduced by 4 per cent
in the 1960s. This hardly constituted a religious crisis. Moreover, substantial
growth in other religions clawed back one point of this loss. On Brierley’s
analysis, therefore, during the 1960s and 1970s more than three-quarters of
the United Kingdom’s citizens had links, however loose or distant in time,
with some denomination or faith.

93
Bingle and Grubb, World Christian Handbook, 1957 Edition, 13–14; Coxill and Grubb,
World Christian Handbook, 1962 Edition, 208–10; H. W. Coxill and K. G. Grubb, eds., World
Christian Handbook, 1968 (London: Lutterworth Press, 1967), 194–5.
94
Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia, 699. It should be noted that Barrett also reported
numbers of ‘adherents’, which he defined in the sense of religious profession, as discussed earlier.
95
There are other and sometimes different versions of some of these data. See Brierley, UK
Protestant Missions Handbook, 15; idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition, 28; idem, UK
Christian Handbook, 1985/86 Edition, 118; idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88 Edition, 148;
idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1989/90 Edition, 151; Brierley and Hiscock, UK Christian Hand-
book, 1994/95 Edition, 282; Brierley and Wraight, UK Christian Handbook, 1996/97 Edition, 284;
Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 1, 1998/99 Edition, 2.3–2.4; idem, Religion
in Britain, 1900 to 2000, 2; idem, ‘Religion’, 652–3, 662; idem, ed., UK Christian Handbook
Religious Trends, No. 3, 2002/2003 (London: Christian Research, 2001), 2.3, 10.7.
 3

Belonging—Denominations and Faiths

ANGLICAN CHURCHES

In Chapter 2 we reviewed several aggregate measures of religious belonging

which could be applied, at least theoretically, across denominations and faiths.
In this chapter we will focus on the indicators which individual religious
bodies found meaningful in enumerating their internal constituencies.
For the three Anglican Churches in Britain (Church of England, Church in
Wales, and Episcopal Church of Scotland) the emphasis had traditionally been
on communicants, especially those who received the sacrament at Easter, this
being a ‘condition’ of ‘membership’ in the Church of England dating back to
the canons of 1604. Unfortunately, there are several reasons why Easter
communicants are an imperfect record, not least the marked diachronic and
synchronic fluctuations in the relationship between general church attendance
and communicants noted by Robin Gill, a variation illustrative of the differ-
ential importance attached to the sacrament across time and space.1 It was
also the case that ‘the great majority of church members were unaware of the
minimum requirement regarding Communion’,2 and that ‘there is a consid-
erable group of people within the Church of England who attend regularly at
non-sacramental worship (i.e. Matins and Evensong), but as they have not
been confirmed they are unable to receive Communion.’3 In Rotherham
parish church in 1964, for example, about 15 per cent of churchgoers were
unconfirmed.4 The habit of viewing Holy Communion ‘as an occasional or
even optional rite rather than as the central act of worship’ was said to be
especially widespread in the North and Midlands.5 A further consideration is
that communicant numbers at Easter, then as now, were liable to be affected

1
R. Gill, The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 13, 124.
2
R. H. T. Thompson, The Church’s Understanding of Itself: A Study of Four Birmingham
Parishes (London: SCM Press, 1957), 88.
3
J. D. Gay, The Geography of Religion in England (London: Duckworth, 1971), 25.
4
Church Times, 18 December 1964.
5
W. O. Chadwick, chairman, Church and State: Report of the Archbishops’ Commission
(London: Church Information Office, 1970), 114.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 51
Table 3.1 Anglican communicants, Great Britain, 1955–80
Church of England Church in Wales Episcopal Church of Scotland Total

1955 2,263,000 175,000 57,000 2,495,000

1960 2,339,000 183,000 57,000 2,579,000
1965 2,108,000 165,000 55,000 2,328,000
1970 1,814,000 147,000 49,000 2,010,000
1975 1,682,000 134,000 45,000 1,861,000
1980 1,732,000 132,000 41,000 1,905,000

Note: Where figures were not available for specific years, they have been estimated from adjacent data points.
Sources: R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England, Number 3 (London: Church
Information Office, 1965), 60; R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns
of Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 129; Central Board of
Finance of the Church of England, Church Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about the Church of England
(1983), 24; J. Williams, Digest of Welsh Historical Statistics, 2 vols. (Cardiff: Welsh Office, 1985), II, 257–8;
P. W. Brierley, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed., British Social Trends since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social
Structure of Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 518–60 at 528, 540; idem, A Century of British
Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1989), 31; E. Luscombe, The Scottish
Episcopal Church in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: General Synod Office of the Scottish Episcopal
Church, 1996), 150.

by purely secular circumstances, such as how early or late in the year Easter
Sunday fell (there was no fixed date for the festival)6 or the state of the weather
on the day.
An additional complication is that neither the Church of England nor the
Church in Wales collected and reported communicant statistics on an annual
basis. Moreover, those that were published sometimes contained discrepancies.
To facilitate comparison, the figures have been represented and, where neces-
sary, estimated (from adjoining data points) for every fifth year between 1955
and 1980 (Table 3.1). They relate to communions in parish churches only and
exclude non-parochial establishments, such as hospitals and residential homes.
Church of England figures also involve a certain amount of double-counting
since they reflect communicants on Easter Day and during the rest of Easter
week (in most years around 180,000 individuals took Holy Communion during
the latter, many of whom would also have done so on Easter Day).
In absolute terms, Easter communicants in all three Churches fell during the
1960s and early 1970s, the increase in the Church of England in 1980 being only
temporary, and not sustained in the following decade. The decline between 1960
and 1980 was marginally greater in the Church in Wales and Episcopal Church
of Scotland (28 per cent each) than in the Church of England (26 per cent). The
overall fall was steeper in the second half of the 1960s (14 per cent) than in the
first (10 per cent). Easter communicants outstripped Christmas communicants
(a new measure from 1958) until 1970 but were overtaken by the latter

6
The Easter Act 1928, which did provide for a fixed date for Easter, has never been
implemented.
52 Secularization in the Long 1960s

thereafter, further undermining the credibility of the canonical requirement

surrounding Easter Holy Communion.7 Relative to the population aged 15
and over, Easter communicants in the Church of England hovered around
the 7 per cent mark until 1962, then reduced to 6 per cent for the rest of the
1960s and 5 per cent in the 1970s. This compared with under 2 per cent for
communicants on a ‘normal’ Sunday in the late 1970s.8
Notwithstanding Easter communion was the longstanding yardstick of
Church of England belonging and conformity, it was not actually the official
criterion of membership. This had been the electoral roll since its introduction
in 1924, which was the basis of participation in Church government. To be
eligible for enrolment, persons had to be baptized, aged 17 and over, and either
resident in the parish concerned or habitual worshippers at its church for
six months prior to applying to join the roll (no such attendance requirement
was placed on parishioners). The facility to include non-parishioners was
apparently widely used as a loophole through the marriage laws, to enable
couples to wed in a particular church in whose parish either or both partners
did not reside.9 Although rolls were supposed to be revised every five years, in
practice it proved difficult to keep them up-to-date, especially in larger parishes.
They thus contained ‘a load of paper membership’ and ‘a considerable forest of
“dead wood”’,10 representing the names of people who had died, moved away
from the area, or ceased to be involved in Anglican affairs. Theoretically, having
completed an application form once, an individual could remain on the roll for
life. Unsurprisingly, therefore, rolls were fairly static, at around 2,900,000, in the
first fifteen years after the Second World War, prior to reducing by 11 per cent
in the 1960s, from 2,862,000 in 1960 to 2,559,000 in 1970.
Tighter arrangements were introduced in 1972, whereby a completely new
roll was prepared every six years, which members had to sign on each compi-
lation. The move was hailed by one bishop as ‘the first time the . . . Church
of England electoral rolls have reflected with some reality the size of what
might best be described as the reasonably occasional adult congregations’,
albeit in his own suffragan see (Woolwich) the change highlighted how
tenuous a hold the Church had in working-class parishes.11 Predictably
enough, dramatic reductions in numbers followed the preparation of each
new roll, as the ‘dead wood’ was removed. Thus, the 1973 roll contained

7
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church of
England Yearbook (1980), 20; Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Church
Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about the Church of England, 1983 Edition (London: CIO
Publishing, 1983), 24.
8
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Church Statistics (1983), 24.
9
Gay, Geography of Religion, 25, 234n6.
10
Church Times, 22 October 1971, 3 February 1978.
11
D. S. Sheppard, Built as a City: God and the Urban World Today (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1974), 38, 359.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 53

21 per cent fewer names than in 1970 (2,021,000 against 2,559,000) and the
new 1978 roll 14 per cent fewer names than in 1976 (1,755,000 versus
2,033,000). After each revision, there were obviously fresh joiners, so the roll
grew during the six-yearly cycle, having reached 1,807,000 by 1980.12 The
mechanics of the electoral roll system, both pre- and post-1972, severely
curtail its utility as a barometer of the state of the Church of England. During
this period there was no direct equivalent in the Church in Wales or the
Episcopal Church of Scotland, although the latter did have a category of
permanent membership (including baptized children and non-communicant
adult worshippers), which contracted by 34 per cent between 1955 (108,000)
and 1980 (71,000), most heavily (by 20 per cent) from 1965 to 1975.13
Of rather higher quality than the electoral rolls, and also collected annually
and disaggregated by gender, were the number of confirmands in the Church of
England. At one level, confirmation has often been likened to the admission of
new members in the Free Churches, but there were some differences. It tended
to take place at a slightly earlier age, anything from 11 upwards and often
around 13 (which was the mean in the Diocese of Worcester in 1972),14 and in
Anglican circles it was something of an expected rite of adolescence, a not
entirely voluntary social convention pushed by many churches and schools (not
least public schools). Confirmation is of central relevance to Callum Brown’s
thesis concerning the gender-led revolutionary secularization of the 1960s.
Indeed, it affords the only major piece of statistical evidence which he offers
regarding the sexual division of religious belonging. He argues that the sudden
appearance of a female recruitment crisis in 1960–2, as manifested in confirma-
tion, was the trigger to a wider collapse of the Church of England.15 It is
therefore worth examining the confirmation statistics for the 1960s and 1970s
in some detail (they are summarized in Table 3.2).

12
Electoral roll statistics from R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England,
Number 3 (London: Church Information Office, 1965), 59; R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and
L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church Growth in the British Isles since
1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 129; Central Board of Finance of the Church of England,
Statistical Supplement to the Church of England Yearbook (1978), 14, (1979), 40, (1981), 36;
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Church Statistics (1983), 27.
13
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 129; P. W. Brierley, A Century of
British Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1989), 7;
E. Luscombe, The Scottish Episcopal Church in the Twentieth Century (Edinburgh: General
Synod Office of the Scottish Episcopal Church, 1996), 150.
14
R. Hiscox, The Future of the Church? A Report of the Survey of the Work for Children in the
Diocese of Worcester, 1972 (Cookley: printed by the Cookley Printers, [1972]), 20–2.
15
C. G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800–2000, 2nd
edn. (London: Routledge, 2009), 188–9, 227; idem, ‘Masculinity and Secularisation in Twentieth-
Century Britain’, in Y. M. Werner, ed., Christian Masculinity: Men and Religion in Northern
Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011), 47–59 at 49;
idem, ‘Gender, Christianity, and the Rise of No Religion: The Heritage of the Sixties in Britain’, in
N. Christie and M. Gauvreau, eds., The Sixties and Beyond: Dechristianization in North America
and Western Europe, 1945–2000 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 39–59 at 51.
54 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 3.2 Church of England confirmands, 1955–80
Men Women Total

Mean annual number of confirmands

1956–60 72,216 105,044 177,260
1961–65 68,883 98,857 167,740
1966–70 50,651 75,457 126,108
1971–75 40,053 61,788 101,841
1976–80 37,075 59,370 96,445
Gender distribution (%)
1956–60 40.7 59.3 100
1961–65 41.1 58.9 100
1966–70 40.2 59.8 100
1971–75 39.3 60.7 100
1976–80 38.4 61.6 100
Per 1,000 population aged 12–20
1955 28.3 39.7 34.0
1960 27.6 40.9 34.2
1965 19.1 29.5 24.2
1970 15.3 24.2 19.7
1975 12.0 19.1 15.4
1979 10.7 18.2 14.4

Note: Population density not available for 1980.

Sources: R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England, Number 3 (London: Church
Information Office, 1965), 55; R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of
Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 167–8; Central Board of Finance
of the Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church of England Yearbook (1981), 41, (1982), 30.

The annual figure for confirmands had ebbed and flowed somewhat
throughout the twentieth century but the trend had been broadly downwards
since the Church of England first published a national total in 1911, when
there were 244,000, representing the peak confirmation rate of 42.8 per 1,000
of the eligible population (defined as those aged 12–20). After the Second
World War the highest absolute number recorded was 191,000 in 1961 but the
biggest confirmation rate was achieved several years before, 34.5 in 1956 and
1957. Confirmation was thus in decline well before the 1960s. The mean
annual number of confirmands dropped by 46 per cent between the late
1950s and late 1970s, over half the fall occurring in the late (rather than
early) 1960s when there was a real sense of a Crisis for Confirmation (the
title of an influential book published in 1967), even though one sociologist of
the optimistic school still tried to diminish its significance by pointing to a
declining birth rate in the late 1940s as the main explanation.16 In fact, the
decrease relative to the eligible population was worse than the absolute figures,

16
D. A. Martin, ‘Interpreting the Figures’, in M. Perry, ed., Crisis for Confirmation (London:
SCM Press, 1967), 106–15 at 109.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 55

from 34.2 per 1,000 persons aged 12–20 in 1960 to 14.4 in 1979, the last year
for which the calculation was made, the discontinuation being justified by the
fact that ‘a substantial proportion of those confirmed are outside this age
range’.17 Moreover, relating confirmations to infant baptisms thirteen years
before reveals that the ‘wastage’ rate progressively worsened. Whereas con-
firmations in 1960 were equivalent to 36 per cent of baptisms in 1947, by 1979
it was only 23 per cent of baptisms in 1966.18 Changing religious fashion and
not diminishing fertility lay behind the ‘crisis’ of confirmation.
With regard to gender balance, confirmands had always been dispropor-
tionately female. Taking our period as a whole, the imbalance grew by
more than two points between the late 1950s and late 1970s. Only in the
quinquennium 1961–5 was there a tiny movement (0.4 per cent) towards male
candidates, which mainly occurred in 1963. Examining confirmation rates, the
fall between 1955 and 1979 was greater for men (62 per cent) than women (54
per cent). Factoring in the relatively small numbers of confirmands involved,
just 1 per cent of the eligible population for men by 1979 and 2 per cent
for women, the claims advanced by Brown seem excessive. Women may have
been deserting the Church of England during the 1960s and 1970s, but, to
judge by confirmation, they were not doing so more quickly than men.
According to statistics, women did not lead the charge to revolutionary
secularization in the early 1960s.

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The Roman Catholic Church had separate jurisdictions for England and
Wales and for Scotland, each of which kept its own statistics, with a common
basis of membership, the baptized Catholic population (including children),
whether practising or not. This was assessed at the parochial level, by
the individual priest, drawing upon his knowledge and records (if any) of
Catholics living in the parish. The returns were collated at a diocesan level,
often appearing in the relevant diocesan directory, and aggregated nationally,

17
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church
of England Yearbook (1982), 1.
18
Both sets of data are available for nine years between 1960 and 1979 (confirmations), from
Neuss, Facts and Figures, 54–5; Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 167–8;
Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church of
England Yearbook (1981), 22, 41. Cf., for the 1950s, C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?
Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2015), 26. Callum Brown has made a similar calculation but uses an interval of fourteen years
between baptism and confirmation: Brown, Death of Christian Britain, 188–9. Peter Brierley uses an
interval of fifteen years: Brierley, Century of British Christianity, 37.
56 Secularization in the Long 1960s

a version being published in arrears in the annual Catholic Directory of

England and Wales and of Scotland. These two national directories were, for
many years, effectively the only public domain source of information about
the estimated (baptized) Catholic population. However, they have been some-
what discredited in this particular matter for an overall lack of editorial
quality control, reflected in the many omissions, repetitions, inconsistencies,
and other anomalies in their data-reporting. One of the severest critics of the
Catholic Directory has been Tony Spencer, who has successively headed the
NDS and PRC and thus has unrivalled quantitative expertise.19 On this
account, in the case of England and Wales, the Catholic Directory is here
used only as evidence of last resort.20
Although the Catholic Directory was published with the imprimatur of the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, the official statistics of
the Church for the 1960s and 1970s have actually remained confidential until
relatively recently, when they were declassified for release by the PRC. The
collection of pastoral statistics had initially been standardized and improved
by the NDS between 1958 and 1962, and, following its closure by the hierarchy
in 1964, the work was carried on by the Catholic Education Council (CEC).
The NDS and CEC figures for reported (by priests) Catholic population are
summarized in Table 3.3. It will be observed that the trend was generally
upwards, albeit with a much larger increase for 1958–63 (15 per cent) than
for 1963–80 (6 per cent). Growth was not just absolute but relative to the civil
population of England and Wales, Catholics constituting 7.7 per cent of the
latter in 1958 and 8.6 per cent by 1980. These NDS/CEC figures mostly
exceeded those in the Catholic Directory by a variable amount each year, of
anything up to 7 per cent.
However, even the NDS/CEC tabulation of the Catholic population of
England and Wales was suspected of being an undercount. Comparisons
with sample surveys revealed that there were many more persons who pro-
fessed to be Roman Catholics than appeared in the NDS/CEC record,21 while a
Catholic Truth Society investigation in 1962 noted: ‘the experience of mis-
sioners and parish-priests who have conducted “Crusades for Souls”, which
includes a close door-to-door census, is that the Catholics known to the clergy

19
See the general notes on the Catholic Directory and other Catholic statistical sources in
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community of England & Wales,
1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation, and
Education (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007), 4–14, 21–4, 75–80.
20
Catholic population figures published in the Catholic Directory for England and Wales can
be found in Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 153 (until 1970) and at
<http://www.lms.org.uk/resources/statistics-from-the-catholic-directory>.
21
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Catholics in Britain and Ireland: Regional Contrasts’, in
D. A. Coleman, ed., Demography of Immigrants and Minority Groups in the United Kingdom
(London: Academic Press, 1982), 213–43 at 228.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 57
Table 3.3 Reported Roman Catholic population, England and Wales,
1958–80

1958 3,486,546 1970 4,113,971

1959 3,602,586 1971 4,071,640
1960 3,702,517 1972 4,142,200
1961 3,805,000 1973 4,177,310
1962 3,905,230 1974 4,173,770
1963 4,017,360 1975 4,182,210
1964 4,000,695 1976 4,190,550
1965 4,048,415 1977 4,190,492
1966 4,087,949 1978 4,220,750
1967 4,145,854 1979 4,209,050
1968 4,089,984 1980 4,257,789
1969 4,085,047

Sources: (1958–62) A. E. C. W. Spencer, Gains & Losses over 45 Years: A Review of the Natural
Increase of the Catholic Population of England & Wales, and Implicit Gains & Losses, as
Reported by the Parish Clergy to their Bishops, 1958–2002 (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2013),
8; (1963–80) Catholic Education Council, Pastoral & Demographic Statistics of the Catholic
Church in England & Wales, 1963–1991, ed. A. E. C. W. Spencer (Taunton: Russell-Spencer,
2006), 1–31.

are less than three-quarters of all the Catholics in the country.’ It suggested
that the true number of Catholics in England and Wales was, in fact, at least
5,500,000 or nearly 12 per cent of the population.22
The underestimation was confirmed by a series of calculations made by
Spencer for selected years (Table 3.4). They included two sets of extrapolations
of Catholic population from baptismal data, the second (Spencer Specific
Cohort Method) suggesting a substantial increase, from 12.3 per cent of English
and Welsh residents in 1958 to 14.9 per cent in 1980. Perhaps the most
meaningful of his measures of Catholic ‘membership’ was the Sacramental
Index or ‘four-wheeler’ Catholics who participated in all the Church’s rites of
passage. This showed a more modest rise between 1958 and 1963 followed by a
decline in the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980 figure being equivalent to 8.6 per cent
of home population and virtually identical to the NDS/CEC reported Catholic
population. This was in stark contrast to the situation in 1958 when the
Sacramental Index had exceeded the NDS/CEC return by 45 per cent.
Spencer also helpfully researched the dynamics of Catholic population in
England and Wales, illuminating the gains and losses which underlay the net
figures and teasing out the challenges facing the Church after the early 1960s
which those figures concealed. One important growth factor was natural
increase, the main component of which was the surplus of births (as measured

22
Anon., ‘How Many Catholics in England and Wales? ’, Catholic Truth 6 (1962): 5; Catholic
Herald, 8 June 1962.
58 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 3.4 Estimates of Roman Catholic population, England and Wales, 1958–80
1958 1963 1971 1980

Reported population—Catholic Directory 3,343,000 3,726,500 4,125,880 4,257,789

Reported population—NDS/CEC (revised) 3,489,732 4,017,360 4,092,176 4,257,789
Extrapolated from baptisms—Archer– 4,260,000 4,764,000 5,385,000 5,683,000
Dean–Cox Crude Cohort Method
Extrapolated from baptisms—Spencer 5,569,000 6,212,000 7,074,000 7,397,000
Specific Cohort Method
Sacramental Index population 5,058,500 5,200,200 4,557,800 4,257,400
Extrapolated from sample surveys NA 4,983,000 NA 5,767,000
Sources: A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Demography of Catholicism’, The Month 2nd New Series 8 (1975): 100–5 at
105; idem, ‘Catholics in Britain and Ireland: Regional Contrasts’, in D. A. Coleman, ed., Demography of
Immigrants and Minority Groups in the United Kingdom (London: Academic Press, 1982), 213–43 at 221–2,
229, 234, 238–9; idem, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community of England & Wales, 1958–2005,
Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation, and Education (Taunton: Russell-
Spencer, 2007), 18–20.

by infant baptisms) over deaths. In the immediate post-war period this excess
was very large, in reflection of higher Catholic birth rates and lower mortality
rates than in the country as a whole. This was partly a function of the
comparative youthfulness of the Catholic community but also rooted in
greater fertility levels (linked to Catholic avoidance of artificial methods of
birth control) and in suspected underreporting by the clergy of Catholic
deaths. However, this natural increase peaked in 1964, after which, in absolute
terms, total baptisms declined substantially (by 44 per cent between 1964 and
1980) and deaths rose (by 28 per cent over the same period).23
By 1980 the surplus of infant baptisms over deaths had been reduced to just
27,000, little more than one-quarter of the peak. The fall in infant baptisms,
illustrated in Spencer’s Index of Relative Fertility, had commenced as early as
1961 and was particularly steep after 1967. This exemplified a narrowing of the
traditional gap between Catholics and non-Catholics in attitudes to, and the
adoption of, contraception in marriage, to which several research studies in
the 1960s testified. Although Catholics still tended to have larger families than

23
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘The Demography and Sociography of the Roman Catholic
Community of England and Wales’, in L. Bright and S. Clements, eds., The Committed Church
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 60–85 at 74–5; idem, ‘Demography of Catholi-
cism’, The Month 2nd New Series 8 (1975): 100–5 at 101–2; idem, Alienation Re-Visited: The
Demography of Catholicism in England & Wales, 1958–1977 (Taunton: Pastoral Research
Centre, 2005), 2–3, 7–10; idem, From Crisis of Growth to Rapid Decline: Demographic Change
within the Catholic Community of England and Wales, 1958–1972 (Taunton: Pastoral Research
Centre, 2005), 1–3, 16; idem, Digest of Statistics, 29–35, 38–9, 59–68; idem, Gains & Losses
over 45 Years: A Review of the Natural Increase of the Catholic Population of England & Wales,
and Implicit Gains & Losses, as Reported by the Parish Clergy to their Bishops, 1958–2002
(Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2013), 5–8.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 59

non-Catholics, the differential was diminishing.24 An opinion poll in 1967

revealed that two-thirds of Catholics discerned good reasons for the use of
birth control in marriage, with substantial numbers wanting the Pope to
approve the Pill.25 Matters came to a head in 1968 with the papal encyclical
Humanae vitae, whose reaffirmation of the prohibition of artificial means of
birth control caused widespread (but far from universal) dismay among the
faithful, demonstrated in further sample surveys at the time (by ORC, Gallup,
and NOP).26 A decade later, lay views had become decidedly more liberal,
74 per cent of English and Welsh Catholics judging that ‘a married couple
who feel they have as many children as they want are not doing anything
wrong when they use artificial methods of birth control’.27 Their Scottish
co-religionists ranked ‘disagrees with birth control by artificial methods’ last
in a list of fifteen possible defining characteristics of a contemporary Catholic.28
Another significant engine of growth in the post-war Catholic population of
England and Wales identified by Spencer was immigration from predomi-
nantly Catholic countries.29 By the end of the 1970s, one-quarter of English

24
G. Rowntree and R. M. Pierce, ‘Birth Control in Britain, Part I: Attitudes and Practices
among Persons Married since the First World War’, Population Studies 15 (1961–2): 3–31 at 11,
21–4, 30–1; R. M. Pierce and G. Rowntree, ‘Birth Control in Britain, Part II: Contraceptive
Methods Used by Couples Married in the Last Thirty Years’, Population Studies 15 (1961–2):
121–60 at 143–6, 151, 156–9; D. V. Glass, ‘Family Limitation in Europe: A Survey of Recent
Studies’, in C. V. Kiser, ed., Research in Family Planning (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1962), 231–61 at 257–61; Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion (London: Uni-
versity of London Press, 1964), 13–14, 81–2; A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Communication on the Effects
of Changing Social and Moral Beliefs on the Long Term Prospects of Fertility among Catholics in
Great Britain’ (paper to Council of Europe European Population Conference, 1966, unpub-
lished), 2–7, 10–12; R.-C. Chou and S. Brown, ‘A Comparison of the Size of Families of Roman
Catholics and Non-Catholics in Great Britain’, Population Studies 22 (1968): 51–60;
G. E. S. Gorer, Sex & Marriage in England Today: A Study of the Views and Experience of the
Under-45s (London: Nelson, 1971), 133–4; M. Woolf, Family Intentions (London: HMSO, 1971),
29, 54, 58–9, 86, 103, 134; C. M. Langford, Birth Control Practice and Marital Fertility in Great
Britain: A Report on a Survey Carried Out in 1967–68 (London: Population Investigation
Committee, 1976), 13, 51, 63–5, 82–7, 102–3, 130–6, 141; A. Cartwright, How Many Children?
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 45–6, 70–1, 144.
25
Sunday Telegraph, 26 March 1967; The Tablet, 1 April 1967; B. Martin, ‘Comments on
Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain
[1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 146–97 at 195.
26
Sunday Times, 4 August 1968; Sunday Telegraph, 11 August 1968; NOP Bulletin (August
1968), 6–7, ‘National Opinion Polls National Political Survey, August 1968’, dataset at UKDA,
SN 68019.
27
M. P. Hornsby-Smith and R. M. Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion: A Study of Roman Catholics
in England and Wales in the 1970s ([Guildford]: Department of Sociology, University of Surrey,
1979), 192. Similar findings emerged from a survey of British Catholics in 1977, reported in
Catholic Herald, 15 September 1978.
28
The Tablet, 28 April 1979.
29
Spencer, ‘Demography and Sociography of the Roman Catholic Community’, 75–6; idem,
‘Demography of Catholicism’, 102; idem, From Crisis of Growth to Rapid Decline, 3–4; idem,
Services for Catholic Migrants, 1939–2008: Background Data from the Archives and Databank of the
Newman Demographic Survey and the Pastoral Research Centre (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2008).
60 Secularization in the Long 1960s

and Welsh Catholics were first-generation immigrants with a further one-fifth

second-generation immigrants.30 Ireland had long been a principal country of
origin, the Irish presence being sufficiently large to establish a distinct Catholic
subculture in England and Wales, which posed some assimilation challenges
for the Church.31 Nevertheless, the 1950s were to witness the last great wave of
Irish emigration to Britain, with the proportion of Irish-born in Britain
increasing by 39 per cent between the censuses of 1951 and 1961. Immigration
from the Republic of Ireland peaked in 1957, declined thereafter, and even
went into reverse after 1968, the first time that net emigration from Britain to
Ireland was recorded. The difficulties of the British economy and the expan-
sion of the Irish economy following Ireland’s membership of the European
Economic Community in 1973 were the major explanations for this trend. By
1981 more than half the first-generation Catholic immigrants came from
countries other than Ireland, the majority from Europe but with the biggest
rise in those born in the New Commonwealth. Nevertheless, absolute numbers
of Irish-born Catholics in England and Wales remained somewhat higher in
1981 (590,000) than 1961 (570,000).32
Accessions to the Catholic population also came from beyond the Church,
in the form of mixed marriages (a non-Catholic partner marrying a Catholic
according to Catholic rites) and converts from other faiths. Although endog-
amy was the ideal adopted by the Church, in practice mixed marriages were
tolerated, the number increasing rapidly after first being recorded nationally in
1958. Dispensations were required from the Church for such marriages, which
were granted on condition that the children of these unions be raised as
Catholics. On the assumption that this commitment was honoured, and that
the fertility of mixed marriages was similar to that of other marriages, Spencer
regarded mixed marriages on the whole as a potential route to enlarge the
Church family.33 Other commentators took a more pessimistic view, seeing

30
M. P. Hornsby-Smith, ‘The Immigrant Background of Roman Catholics in England and
Wales: A Research Note’, New Community 13/1 (1986): 79–85; idem, Roman Catholics in
England: Studies in Social Structure since the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), 24–6.
31
J. A. Jackson, The Irish in Britain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 135–51;
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘The Catholic Community as a British Melting Pot’, New Community 2
(1973): 125–31; idem, Services for Catholic Migrants, 22–7; idem, Arrangements for the Integration
of Irish Immigrants in England and Wales, ed. M. E. Daly (Dublin: Irish Manuscripts Commission,
2012); M. P. Hornsby-Smith, ‘Irish Catholics in England: Some Sociological Perspectives’, in Irish
Catholics in England: A Congress Report, March 1978 (Dublin: Irish Episcopal Commission for
Emigrants, 1978), 26–60; idem, Roman Catholics in England, 116–32; E. Delaney, The Irish in Post-
War Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 129–69.
32
Spencer, Services for Catholic Migrants, 7; Hornsby-Smith, ‘Immigrant Background of
Roman Catholics’, 80.
33
Spencer, ‘Demography and Sociography of the Roman Catholic Community’, 73–4;
A. E. C. W. Spencer, Report on the Parish Register Statistics of the Catholic Church in Scotland,
1966 (Harrow: Pastoral Research Centre, 1967), 12; idem, ‘Demography of Catholicism’, 100–1;
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 61

mixed marriages as a dilution of the faith. The pessimist position was bolstered
by the findings of a major academic survey of English and Welsh Catholics in
1978, which revealed a complex typology of Catholic marriage, with a gener-
ational rise, not simply in mixed marriages solemnized by the Church, but also
in canonically invalid marriages involving Catholics, contracted entirely out-
side the Church (the latter comprising 19 per cent of all Catholic marriages in
1978 and 33 per cent of those which took place between 1970 and 1977).34 The
phenomenon must have negatively impacted the religious socialization of
children as Catholics.
As for converts to Catholicism, they comprised 10 per cent of the Catholic
community in England and Wales in 1978, but they were disproportionately
older than cradle Catholics and disproportionately female. The majority seem
to have joined from the Church of England, although there will also have been
traffic in the other direction.35 The ageing of converts reflected the diminish-
ing number, absolute and relative, of adults aged 14 and over converting to
Catholicism during the 1960s and 1970s, according to CEC returns. They had
peaked at 13,700 in 1959 and fell away rapidly from 1963, when they were
11,200, slumping to 3,900 by 1972. The pace of decline then slowed and there
was a modest recovery from 1978. Whereas in 1958 converts had represented
10 per cent of the total entry into the Roman Catholic Church, by 1971 it was
only 4 per cent. Moreover, a growing proportion of converts were women,
56 per cent in 1958 and 63 per cent in 1980.36
Spencer’s attempted reconciliation of these various sources of change in the
Catholic population is summarized in Table 3.5. This reveals the emergence
of unaccounted for net losses, which he believed could only be attributed to
what was variously described as ‘alienation’, ‘leakage’, or ‘lapsation’, whose
true scale was being masked by continuing net inward migration of Catholics

idem, Alienation Re-Visited, 2–3, 5, 7–11; idem, From Crisis of Growth to Rapid Decline, 1–2;
idem, Digest of Statistics, 53–6. Cf. P. Coman, Catholics and the Welfare State (London: Long-
man, 1977), 19, 101.
34
Hornsby-Smith and Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion, 106–21, 232–44; Hornsby-Smith,
Roman Catholics in England, 92–108.
35
Hornsby-Smith and Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion, 43–5, 179–87. For statistics of Catholic
losses to the Church of England, see D. H. Doig, The Membership of the Church of England:
Changes in Recent Years (London: Church Information Office, 1960), 3; Neuss, Facts and
Figures, 54.
36
Spencer, ‘Demography and Sociography of the Roman Catholic Community’, 76–7; idem,
‘Demography of Catholicism’, 102; Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers,
190–2; Spencer, Alienation Re-Visited, 3–4; idem, From Crisis of Growth to Rapid Decline, 4–5;
Catholic Education Council, Pastoral & Demographic Statistics of the Catholic Church in England
& Wales, 1963–1991, ed. A. E. C. W. Spencer (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2006), 1–31; Spencer,
Digest of Statistics, 35, 43–9, 74; idem, Gains & Losses over 45 Years, 7–8. For a local study, see
A. Archer, ‘A Sociological Study of Religious Conversions, with Special Reference to Conversions
to Roman Catholicism in the Area of Newcastle upon Tyne’ (MA thesis, University of Newcastle-
upon-Tyne, 1978).
62 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 3.5 Source of change in reported Roman Catholic population, England and
Wales, 1959–80
1959 1963 1971 1980

Population 1 January 3,489,732 3,905,240 4,113,971 4,239,171

Infant baptisms 112,775 131,844 97,373 69,180
Late baptisms 7,677 6,821 6,644 9,568
Converts 13,788 11,160 4,336 5,783
Deaths –31,713 –35,065 –36,604 –41,715
Other net gains/losses 6,178 –2,640 –93,544 –24,198
Population 31 December 3,598,437 4,017,360 4,092,176 4,257,789

Source: A. E. C. W. Spencer, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community of England & Wales,
1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation, and Education
(Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007), 68, 74.

(estimated at 4,000 in 1963 and 5,000 in 1971). Although alienation was

nothing new, so far as lax or non-attendance at Mass was concerned,37
Spencer identified a massive and sudden gap opening up between the Spencer
Specific Cohort Method for calculating the baptized population and the
Sacramental Index denoting use of the offices of the Church for birth, mar-
riage, and death. This first became significant in 1961, he argued, and had
begun to affect Catholic nuptiality by 1962 and fertility by 1964. The heaviest
losses occurred in 1964, 1968, and 1971. ‘The Catholic folklore that “once a
Catholic, always a Catholic” . . . was substantially true of England and Wales in
the late 1950s; it had altogether ceased to be true by the early 1970s.’ Accord-
ing to his reckoning, alienated Catholics constituted 249,000 in 1958 (under
5 per cent of Catholic population) but 2,599,000 (37 per cent) by 1971. Parallel
computation of indexes of religious perseverance suggested that, by the late
1960s, three in ten baptized Catholics were dropping out before their First
Communion and four in ten before confirmation (which, in the Catholic
Church, occurred earlier than in the Church of England, often around 7 or 8
years of age).38 Spencer’s revelations about the scale of alienation, first out-
lined in detail in an article in The Month in 1975, proved highly controversial
and led to a robust exchange in The Tablet with the secretary of the CEC.39
More localized research into lapsation in the late 1970s, measured in terms of

37
For an attempt to estimate its extent in these terms, see W. N. T. Roberts, ‘Why do
Catholics Lapse? I. The Size of the Problem’, The Tablet, 9 May 1964: 5–7.
38
Spencer, ‘Demography and Sociography of the Roman Catholic Community’, 77–8; idem,
‘Demography of Catholicism’, 102–5; A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Alienation in English Catholicism,
1958–1972’, in A. E. C. W. Spencer and P. A. O’Dwyer, eds., Proceedings of the Second Annual
Conference, Sociological Association of Ireland, Dublin, 4–5 April 1975 (Belfast: Department of
Social Studies, Queen’s University of Belfast, 1976), 115–34; idem, Alienation Re-Visited, 3–5, 7, 9,
11; idem, From Crisis of Growth to Rapid Decline, 5–7; idem, Gains & Losses over 45 Years, 1, 7–8.
39
The Tablet, 26 April, 10 and 17 May 1975.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 63

non-attendance at Mass, illuminated the complexity of its typology and

motivations.40
The foregoing analysis relates to England and Wales. Unfortunately, Spen-
cer’s work on Scotland was confined to the three years 1966–8, with reports
published only for the first two. His involvement, at the behest of the Scottish
bishops, reflected a similar lack of confidence in the accuracy of the statistics
published in the Scottish edition of the Catholic Directory as existed south of
the border.41 However, the parish register returns which Spencer organized
pointed to a reported Catholic population for Scotland of 823,000 in 1966 and
817,000 in 1967, which was actually lower than the Catholic Directory figures
of, respectively, 827,000 and 825,000. A substantial shortfall, particularly in
rural areas, was only revealed when the Sacramental Index was calculated for
1967 (888,000).42 The Scottish extrapolation from sample surveys was also
potentially higher, up to one million, but subject to unusually large sample
variance.43 James Darragh stuck more closely to Catholic Directory data, while
uplifting them for parishes failing to make returns. It recorded in excess of
800,000 Catholics in Scotland throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s,
equivalent to 16 per cent of the Scottish population (almost double the
proportion in England and Wales). On the negative side, baptisms fell sharply
from the mid-1960s, adult converts declined, mixed marriages increased, and
net outward migration was significant.44
Besides the official Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales and in
Scotland, several other Catholic Churches operated in the British Isles.
Some were essentially ‘secessionist’, such as the Old Roman Catholic Church,
the Liberal Catholic Church, and the Catholic Tridentine Church, with an
aggregate constituency of around 7,500 in the 1970s, according to the World
Christian Encyclopedia.45 Seven more, with a cumulative population of 11,000

40
M. P. Hornsby-Smith, R. M. Lee, and P. A. Reilly, Out of Practice? The Process of Lapsation
(Liverpool: Liverpool Institute of Socio-Religious Studies, 1977); P. Hardy, ‘Lapsation: A New
Perspective’ (SocD thesis, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1985). For an attempt to calculate
Catholic disaffiliation rates by birth cohort on the basis of post-1991 BSA data, see S. Bullivant,
‘Catholic Disaffiliation in Britain: A Quantitative Overview’, Journal of Contemporary Religion
31 (2016): 181–97 at 186–8, 191–2.
41
F. Macmillan, ‘The Faithful of Scotland: A Statistical Enquiry’, The Tablet, 25 July 1959: 4–5.
42
Spencer, Report on the Parish Register Statistics of the Catholic Church in Scotland, 1966,
3–6, 14–15; idem, Report on the Parish Register, Religious Practice & Population Statistics of the
Catholic Church in Scotland, 1967 (Harrow: Pastoral Research Centre, 1969), 5–9, 24–5.
43
Spencer, ‘Catholics in Britain and Ireland’, 225, 229, 236, 238–9.
44
J. Darragh, ‘The Catholic Population of Scotland, 1878–1977’, in D. McRoberts, ed.,
Modern Scottish Catholicism, 1878–1978 (Glasgow: Burns, 1979), 211–47. Various Scottish
Catholic data to 1970 can also be found in R. Currie and A. D. Gilbert, ‘Religion’, in
A. H. Halsey, ed., Trends in British Society since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure
of Britain (London: Macmillan, 1972), 407–50 at 422 and Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches
and Churchgoers, 153.
45
D. B. Barrett, ed., World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and
Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900–2000 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 707–9.
64 Secularization in the Long 1960s

or so in the 1960s and 1970s, catered for European national groups of Catholic
migrants, of which the Hungarian and Ukrainian were the largest.46

ORTHODOX CHURCHES

The Orthodox Church in the British Isles was a family of distinct national and
ethnic Churches, twenty-three of them by 1980, as listed in the UK Christian
Handbook. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was by far the oldest and the
largest, attracting perhaps nine-tenths of the Orthodox, especially Greek
Cypriots. The principal growth of the British Orthodox community occurred
after the Second World War, mainly as a result of immigration but, to a certain
extent, through conversion, and the 1970s was seen as a decade of particular
progress.47 Attaching precise numbers to this growth is impossible, and even
estimates are problematical and inconsistent. At one level, the best data derive
from Peter Brierley’s work, but his estimates until 1980 in the UK Christian
Handbook were radically revised upwards between the 1987/88 and 1989/90
editions, only to be scaled back in the 2000/01 edition. The latter is the source
of the Orthodox ‘active membership’ figures for 1950–80 which we have seen
in Table 2.9.48 The statistic for 1970 is there given as 159,000, whereas the
World Christian Encyclopedia cites more than double that, 360,000, as the total
for professing Orthodox in the same year.49 The figures can just about be
reconciled if we accept Brierley’s assumption that ‘active members’ constituted
two-fifths of the Orthodox community.50

OTHER CHURCHES

Other Christian Churches had a significant collective presence, mainly com-

prising Free Churches (defined in terms of member organizations of the Free
Church Federal Council), Presbyterian Churches, and sectarian movements.

46
P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium
Edition (London: Christian Research, 1999), 8.7, 10.2. More inflated figures appear in
P. W. Brierley, UK Protestant Missions Handbook, Volume 2: Home (London: Evangelical
Alliance, 1977), 14; idem, ed., UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition (London: Evangelical
Alliance, 1982), 25.
47
A. Hastings, A History of English Christianity, 1920–1985 (London: Collins, 1986), 605–6.
48
Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition,
8.18 for the total for all Orthodox Churches and 8.11–8.13 for individual Churches.
49
Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia, 699.
50
P. W. Brierley, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed., British Social Trends since 1900: A Guide to
the Changing Social Structure of Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 518–60 at 537.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 65

The majority operated some form of ‘membership’ associated with the tran-
sition from adolescence to adulthood, few being admitted under the age of 15.
Criteria of membership varied but in almost all cases were based upon
personal conviction of faith. Among evangelicals, at least, this was still
often preceded or accompanied by a ‘conversion’ experience which could be
precisely dated.51
Accurate statistics of membership of these other Christian Churches are not
universally available. Some denominations both collected and published them,
others collected but did not publish them, while others did not collect them at
all, often out of principle. Table 3.6 summarizes actual and estimated numbers
for the main groupings at quinquennial intervals between 1955 and 1980, also
showing actual data for denominations with more than 20,000 members.
An additional data point for 1963 is reported elsewhere.52 The table draws
upon a range of sources. In particular, the opportunity has been taken to revise
several estimates advanced by Peter Brierley in the UK Christian Handbook,
his figures sometimes being inconsistent and, in respect of those calculated by
back-projection before 1970, implausible. Detailed commentaries on estimates
for individual denominations will be found later in this chapter. In aggregate,
membership of non-Anglican, non-Roman Catholic, and non-Orthodox
Churches in Britain declined from 3,550,600 in 1955 to 2,839,200 in 1980,
or by 20 per cent, with a fall of 6 per cent in each of the three quinquennia
from 1965 to 1980. The absolute decrease during the early 1960s was under
3 per cent. Relative to the population aged 15 and over, the drop was from
8.9 per cent in 1960/61 to 6.7 per cent in 1980/81.
Methodism was preponderant among the Free Churches, with the Meth-
odist Church of Great Britain accounting for 98 per cent of Methodist
membership (the Wesleyan Reform Union and Independent Methodist
Churches contributing the balance).53 The Methodist Church lost just over
one-third of its members in the quarter-century after 1955, mainly during the
last three quinquennia, when the rate of net decline averaged 2 per cent per
annum, as much as the five-yearly figure for the late 1950s. The Methodist
Church membership committee pored over the data and commissioned sev-
eral small-scale surveys to better understand the dynamics and causes of

51
Evangelical Alliance Commission on Evangelism, On the Other Side (London: Scripture
Union, 1968), 181–90; idem, Background to the Task: Supplement to ‘On the Other Side’ (London:
Scripture Union, 1968); P. W. Brierley, ‘A Measure of His Purpose’, in M. Hill, ed., Entering the
Kingdom: A Fresh Look at Conversion (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1986), 98–107; idem, ‘Religion’,
542–3.
52
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 30–1.
53
There was also a tiny secession from the Methodist Church in Lancashire after 1971:
D. J. Tidball, ‘ “Secession is an Ugly Thing”: The Emergence and Development of Free Method-
ism in Late Twentieth-Century England’, in D. W. Bebbington and D. C. Jones, eds., Evangel-
icalism and Fundamentalism in the United Kingdom during the Twentieth Century (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 209–29.
Table 3.6 Actual and estimated membership of non-Anglican, non-Roman Catholic, and non-Orthodox Churches, Great Britain, 1955–80
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Methodist Churches
Methodist Church of Great Britain 744,300 728,600 690,300 617,000 541,500 488,000
Others 13,900 13,500 12,800 10,900 9,600 8,300
Sub-total 758,200 742,100 703,100 627,900 551,100 496,300
Baptist Churches
Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland 321,200 311,800 288,000 261,500 242,000 210,000
Others 23,400 24,200 24,400 24,700 22,100 24,300
Sub-total 344,600 336,000 312,400 286,200 264,100 234,300
Congregational/Reformed Churches
Congregational Union of England and 217,100 209,300 193,900 167,800 NA NA
Wales (English-speaking)
Union of Welsh Independents 123,600 111,300 103,300 88,900 77,000 67,500
(Welsh-speaking)
Congregational Union of Scotland 35,500 34,500 30,100 25,300 20,300 21,000
Presbyterian Church of England 69,700 71,300 67,600 59,500 NA NA
United Reformed Church NA NA NA NA 181,400 147,300
Others NA NA NA 4,500 19,200 19,300
Sub-total 445,900 426,400 394,900 346,000 297,900 255,100
Scottish Presbyterian Churches
Church of Scotland 1,307,600 1,301,300 1,248,000 1,154,200 1,041,800 953,900
Others 39,100 35,500 33,100 29,600 26,000 24,800
Sub-total 1,346,700 1,336,800 1,281,100 1,183,800 1,067,800 978,700
Pentecostal/Holiness Churches
Sub-total 45,000 53,000 72,000 105,000 141,000 157,000
Other Trinitarian Churches
Presbyterian Church of Wales 150,100 136,700 122,600 108,100 94,100 82,700
Religious Society of Friends 21,300 21,200 21,100 20,800 20,000 18,600
Others 258,800 257,400 253,300 254,800 260,400 274,300
Sub-total 430,200 415,300 397,000 383,700 374,500 375,600
Non-Trinitarian Churches
Jehovah’s Witnesses 28,100 43,700 48,900 59,700 79,600 83,500
Latter-Day Saints 9,200 19,300 71,000 85,200 99,800 114,600
Others 142,700 142,500 141,100 139,900 146,200 144,100
Sub-total 180,000 205,500 261,000 284,800 325,600 342,200
Total 3,550,600 3,515,100 3,421,500 3,217,400 3,022,000 2,839,200

Sources: The core sources are: R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977); P. W. Brierley, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed., British Social Trends since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure of Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 518–60;
and idem, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition (London: Christian Research, 1999). Gaps have been filled and/or corrections made
from various editions of Free Church Federal Council Annual Report, Free Church Directory, Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, UK Christian Handbook,
and World Christian Handbook. Data taken from denominational sources include: J. A. Beckford, The Trumpet of Prophecy: A Sociological Study of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1975), 62; D. M. Thompson, Let Sects and Parties Fall: A Short History of the Association of Churches of Christ in Great Britain and Ireland (Birmingham: Berean
Press, 1980), 204–5; M. L. Anthony, ‘Unto the Perfect Day: A Survey of Church Growth among Seventh-Day Adventists in the United Kingdom and Eire during the Period
1940–1980’ (1981, unpublished), viii; D. A. Cuthbert, The Second Century: Latter-Day Saints in Great Britain, Volume I, 1937–1987 (Cambridge: printed by Cambridge University
Press, 1987), 197; P. Escott, ‘Church Growth Theories and the Salvation Army in the United Kingdom: An Examination of the Theories of Donald McGavran and C. Peter Wagner
in Relation to Salvation Army Experience and Practice (1982–1991)’ (PhD thesis, University of Stirling, 1996), 65; and Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers)
in Britain, Tabular Statement as at 31.xii.2012 (London: Britain Yearly Meeting, [2013]), 11.
68 Secularization in the Long 1960s

failure. Its analyses appeared in the Methodist Church Conference Agenda

throughout the 1960s and, occasionally, in more formal publications.54
There was also some contemporary independent academic research into
Methodist membership.55 One official enquiry, conducted in the Bristol and
Manchester and Stockport Districts in 1966–7, exposed the demographic
imbalances in Methodism, 66 per cent of members being women and 60 per
cent aged over 45 (including 33 per cent over 60). Similar gender and age
skews were revealed in studies of the membership of the York Wesley Circuit
in 1967, the South Shields Circuit in 1970, the Durham and Deerness Valley
Circuit in 1975, and the Liverpool District in 1976.56 Subsequent scrutiny of
membership ‘flows’, the individual components of gain and loss which under-
pinned the net figure of ‘stocks’, has identified that Methodism’s two key
underlying problems, certainly by the 1970s, were its inability to recruit new
members and a rising mortality rate, the latter reflecting the progressive ageing of
its membership, resulting in a top-heavy population pyramid. Ominously, 1969
was the first year in which deaths exceeded new members. Another longstanding
source of net loss, transfers from one circuit to another as people moved
house, was in the process of being brought under control.57 The Methodist
Church was an early adopter of the church growth principles which had been
made fashionable in the United States during the 1970s.58
The membership of Baptist churches was mainly recorded in the Baptist
Handbook, but this is a somewhat problematic source in that (1) there was

54
For example, J. R. Butler, ‘A Sociological Study of Lapsed Membership’, London Quarterly
and Holborn Review 191 (1966): 236–44; B. E. Jones, Family Count: A Study Pamphlet about
Methodism Today (London: Methodist Church Home Mission Department, 1970); J. W. Harris
and P. Jarvis, Counting to Some Purpose (London: Methodist Church Home Mission Division,
1979).
55
For instance, B. S. Turner, ‘Institutional Persistence and Ecumenicalism in Northern
Methodism’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 2 (London:
SCM Press, 1969), 47–57; idem, ‘The Decline of Methodism: An Analysis of Religious Commit-
ment and Organisation’ (PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1970); idem, ‘Belief, Ritual, and
Experience: The Case of Methodism’, Social Compass 18 (1971): 187–201; L. Burton, ‘The Social
Stratification of Two Methodist Churches in the Midlands in Respect of Leadership, Member-
ship, and Adherence: A Study of the Social Structure of the Local Church’ (PhD thesis,
University of London, 1972); idem, ‘Social Class in the Local Church: A Study of Two Methodist
Churches in the Midlands’, in M. Hill, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 8
(London: SCM Press, 1975), 15–29.
56
All five local studies unpublished. For an overview of evidence about gender and age in the
Free Churches generally, see C. D. Field, ‘Zion’s People: Who Were the English Nonconformists?
Part 1: Gender, Age, Marital Status, and Ethnicity’, Local Historian 40 (2010): 91–112.
57
C. D. Field, ‘Joining and Leaving British Methodism since the 1960s’, in L. J. Francis and
Y. Katz, eds., Joining and Leaving Religion: Research Perspectives (Leominster: Gracewing, 2000),
57–85; idem, ‘Demography and the Decline of British Methodism: III. Mortality’, Proceedings of
the Wesley Historical Society 58 (2011–12): 247–63; idem, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 32–4.
58
J. W. Harris, Can British Methodism Grow Again? (London: Methodist Church Home
Mission Division, [1980]); idem, A Profile of Methodism (London: Methodist Church Home
Mission Division, 1982).
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 69

significant duplication between churches in membership both of the Baptist

Union of Great Britain and Ireland and of either the Baptist Union of Wales or
the Baptist Union of Scotland, and (2) individual churches not in the Baptist
Union of Great Britain and Ireland often had their membership reported in
the Baptist Handbook until 1972 but not thereafter, the subsequent omission
giving an exaggerated view of over-time trends.59 Table 3.6 attempts to correct
for the resulting inconsistencies by distinguishing churches in membership of
one of the Baptist Unions and those which were more independent or
belonged to another body such as the Strict and Particular Baptists. It will be
seen that the number of members in the latter category fluctuated little,
whereas the former exhibited a sharp decrease, of 35 per cent, between 1955
and 1980, with the rate of decline peaking in the late 1970s, by which time
Baptists had also become early adopters of church growth principles.60
Notwithstanding some pockets of advance from the mid-1960s, associated
with charismatic renewal in general and the Baptist Revival Fellowship in
particular,61 Baptist Union membership tumbled by 50,000 or 16 per cent
during the 1960s. In England and Wales the mean annual rate of adult
baptisms drifted downwards from 9,000 in 1955–6 (on the back of Billy
Graham’s missions in 1954–5) to 6,600 in 1957–64 to 5,200 in 1965–76 before
recovering somewhat.62 However, this did not prevent membership losses
exceeding gains by 19 per cent in a national sample of Baptist churches in
1978 and by 28 per cent in three Baptist Associations in 1980, erasures and
deaths being the major sources of loss, with a more modest net leakage
through transfers.63 As with Methodism, the Baptists suffered demographic
distortion, two-fifths of their members being over 60 and two-thirds women,64
the latter ratio characteristic of much of their history.65
Congregational decline had been relentless throughout much of the twentieth
century, with the number of Congregational members in England falling below

59
A case argued at some length in Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Signs of Hope:
An Examination of the Numerical and Spiritual State of Churches in Membership with the Baptist
Union of Great Britain and Ireland (London: Baptist Union, 1979), 8–14.
60
P. Beasley-Murray and A. Wilkinson, Turning the Tide: An Assessment of Baptist Church
Growth in England (London: Bible Society, 1981).
61
I. M. Randall, ‘Baptist Revival and Renewal in the 1960s’, in K. Cooper and J. Gregory, eds.,
Revival and Resurgence in Christian History, Studies in Church History 44 (Woodbridge: Boydell
Press, 2008), 341–53; idem, The English Baptists of the Twentieth Century (Didcot: Baptist
Historical Society, 2005), 313–63.
62
Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Signs of Hope, 14–15; Brierley, UK Christian
Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition, 9.4.
63
Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Signs of Hope, xiv–xv; D. Jackson, ‘Attenders,
Members, and Candlestick Makers in an LCD Age’ (2001, unpublished), 8, 16–17.
64
Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Signs of Hope, 22–3, xiv—national sample,
1978; unpublished—Bristol Association, 1977.
65
C. D. Field, ‘Adam and Eve: Gender in the English Free Church Constituency’, Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 44 (1993): 63–79 at 64–70.
70 Secularization in the Long 1960s

the Baptist total for the first time in 1952 and consistently from 1955.66 The
Congregational Union of England and Wales, which lost 23 per cent of its
English-speaking membership between 1955 and 1970, sought an ecumenical
solution to its problems, by merging with the Presbyterian Church of England in
1972 to form the United Reformed Church. Not only did this not stem the
haemorrhage, the United Reformed Church shrinking by 19 per cent during the
second half of the 1970s, but it splintered the Congregational tradition. The
Welsh-speaking Union of Welsh Independents remained outside the 1972
merger, contracting by 45 per cent between 1955 and 1980, while the Evangel-
ical Fellowship of Congregational Churches (1966) and the Congregational
Federation (1972) provided a home for the minority of English-speaking places
of worship which had voted against joining the United Reformed Church. The
Congregational Union of Scotland did not join the United Reformed Church
until 2000. Taking all branches of the Congregational and Reformed family
together, there were 43 per cent fewer members in 1980 than in 1955, with losses
of 12 per cent in the late 1960s and 14 per cent in both the early and late 1970s.
By 1978 first admissions to membership in the United Reformed Church were
exceeded by deaths, even before factoring in a still greater number of deletions,
resulting in a net loss of 3 per cent of members.67 Surveys conducted in Greater
Manchester Congregationalism in 1966 and the United Reformed Church in
1978 confirmed that the membership was predominantly female (64 per cent
and 66 per cent, respectively) and growing older (with the over-60s accounting
for 35 per cent in 1966 and 48 per cent in 1978).68
Although Methodists, Baptists, and Congregationalists were all represented
in Scotland, that country’s dominant religious tradition was Presbyterianism,
as has already been seen in John Highet’s calculations of Scottish church
membership in the 1950s and 1960s (Table 2.11). According to Table 3.6,
the overwhelming majority (97 per cent) of these Presbyterians were commu-
nicating members of the Church of Scotland, the United Free Church of
Scotland being the most numerically important of several other Presbyterian
denominations. Taking the quarter-century 1955–80 as a whole, overall Scot-
tish Presbyterian decline was 27 per cent, the heaviest quinquennial fall being
10 per cent in the early 1970s followed by 8 per cent in the late 1960s and again
in the late 1970s. In the Church of Scotland, the all-time peak of membership
(1,319,600) was achieved in 1956 followed by a continuous decrease, slowly at

66
D. M. Thompson, The Decline of Congregationalism in the Twentieth Century (London:
Congregational Memorial Hall Trust, 2002).
67
United Reformed Church, The Final Report of the Priorities and Resources Group, with
Resolutions of the General Assembly, 1980 (London: United Reformed Church, 1980), 5.
68
P. L. Sissons, ‘Ethical, Social, and Theological Diversity in Contemporary Manchester
Congregationalism’ (MA thesis, University of Manchester, 1967), 58–9, 65–6; United Reformed
Church, Final Report of the Priorities and Resources Group, 3, 19, 23. For the historical gender
imbalance, see Field, ‘Adam and Eve’, 64–70.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 71

first and faster from 1967. Relative to the adult population, an impressive
34 per cent of Scots were members of the Kirk in 1960/61, but the proportion
had dropped to 24 per cent by 1980/81. The ostensibly rosy picture also needs
to be qualified by the fact that a significant minority of these communicants,
rising from 28 per cent in 1964 to 39 per cent in 1980, were inactive, in the
sense of having failed to take the sacrament at least once during the previous
year.69 Analysis of membership flows has pinpointed the reducing number of
admissions on profession of faith, from 1956 and especially after 1964, as the
principal explanation of Church of Scotland membership decline, accounting
for nine-tenths of all losses between 1957 and 1975, with the net loss through
transfers by certificate being a lesser cause.70 Many of these transfers would
have involved migration south of the border, where the Presbyterian Church
of England enjoyed healthy gains as a result between 1946 and 1968.71 Limited
evidence suggests that Church of Scotland members were disproportionately
female and over 35 years of age.72
The focus in this section thus far has been on denominational decline
during the 1960s and 1970s, but there were also parts of the British religious
landscape which were enjoying growth, none more so than Pentecostal and
Holiness Churches. These bodies rarely enumerated their exact membership,
but the estimates from which Table 3.6 has been built probably give a reason-
able indication of the scale of progress: a more than threefold expansion in the
quarter-century after 1955 and a doubling in numbers during the final fifteen
years. Pentecostal and Holiness Churches subdivided into two main types,
Anglo-Saxon denominations originating in the early twentieth century and
black West Indian and African Churches established on the back of post-war
Commonwealth immigration to Britain. The most important of the former
were the Assemblies of God and Elim Church, which had a combined mem-
bership of around 37,000 in 1955 and 65,000 by 1980, seemingly preponder-
antly female.73 The oldest of the black Pentecostal Churches was the New
Testament Church of God (1953), but the movement only really took off from
the mid-1960s, achieving a collective membership of approximately 33,000 in
1970 and 65,000 in 1980. Its slow start reflected its fragmented nature,
characterized by internal dissension and myriad bodies (230 of them by the

69
J. N. Wolfe and M. Pickford, The Church of Scotland: An Economic Survey (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1980), 74–6; Brierley, ‘Religion’, 529.
70
Wolfe and Pickford, Church of Scotland, 75, 80–6; I. Smith, ‘The Economics of Church
Decline in Scotland’, International Journal of Social Economics 20/12 (1993): 27–36 at 29–31;
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 32–4.
71
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 176–7.
72
P. L. Sissons, The Social Significance of Church Membership in the Burgh of Falkirk
(Edinburgh: Church of Scotland, 1973), 56, 58; Wolfe and Pickford, Church of Scotland, 71–3.
73
The classic sociological description of Elim is B. R. Wilson, Sects and Society: A Sociological
Study of Three Religious Groups in Britain (London: William Heinemann, 1961), 13–118.
72 Secularization in the Long 1960s

1980s); the difficulties which West Indians had in adjusting to harsh British
winters; the male majority among West Indian migrants until the 1960s when
women (the mainstay of immigrant Pentecostal Churches) arrived in large
numbers; and, according to one contemporary commentator (Clifford Hill), a
crisis in race relations around 1964.74 Although black Christianity is often seen
as synonymous with Pentecostalism, in fact there were also non-Pentecostal
manifestations.75 This was not initially through the white-led Anglican, Catholic,
and Free Churches, even though they had been widely attended by West
Indians in their homelands and had not been entirely renounced by them in
terms of religious affiliation.76 The explanation lay in the often ambivalent
attitudes which these mainline Churches adopted towards the first waves of
Commonwealth immigrants.77 The only white-led non-Pentecostal organization

74
A. Kiev, ‘Psychotherapeutic Aspects of Pentecostal Sects among West Indian Immigrants
to England’, British Journal of Sociology 15 (1964): 129–38; M. J. C. Calley, ‘West Indian
Churches in England’, New Society, 6 August 1964: 15–18; idem, God’s People: West Indian
Pentecostal Sects in England (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); C. Hill, ‘Immigrant Sect
Development in Britain: A Case of Status Deprivation?’, Social Compass 18 (1971): 231–6; idem,
‘From Church to Sect: West Indian Religious Sect Development in Britain’, Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion 10 (1971): 114–23; idem, ‘Pentecostalist Growth: Result of Racialism?’,
Race Today 3 (1971): 187–90; idem, Black Churches: West Indian and African Sects in Britain
(London: Community and Race Relations Unit, British Council of Churches, 1971);
I. MacRobert, ‘The New Black-Led Pentecostal Churches in Britain’, in P. Badham, ed., Religion,
State, and Society in Modern Britain (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), 119–43; N. R. Toulis,
Believing Identity: Pentecostalism and the Mediation of Jamaican Ethnicity and Gender in
England (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 25–34, 80–120.
75
On black Christianity in general, see C. Hill, ‘Some Aspects of Race and Religion in Britain’,
in D. A. Martin and M. Hill, eds., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 3 (London: SCM
Press, 1970), 30–44; R. Gerloff, ‘Black Christian Communities in Birmingham: The Problem of
Basic Recognition’, in A. Bryman, ed., Religion in the Birmingham Area: Essays in the Sociology of
Religion (Birmingham: Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University
of Birmingham, 1975), 61–84; Christian Action Journal (Summer 1978)—theme issue on Black
Churches in Britain and black Christianity; D. G. Pearson, ‘Race, Religiosity, and Political
Activism: Some Observations on West Indian Participation in Britain’, British Journal of
Sociology 29 (1978): 340–57; C. Wright, ‘Cultural Continuity and the Growth of West Indian
Religion in Britain’, Religion 14 (1984): 337–56; V. Howard, A Report on Afro-Caribbean
Christianity in Britain, Community Religions Project Research Papers New Series 4 (Leeds:
Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Leeds, 1987); G. Parsons, ‘Filling a
Void? Afro-Caribbean Identity and Religion’, in G. Parsons, ed., The Growth of Religious
Diversity: Britain from 1945, Volume I: Traditions (London: Routledge, 1993), 243–73.
76
For example, in 1974 72 per cent of West Indians in England and Wales still gave their
religion as Church of England, Roman Catholic, or Free Church: ‘Survey of Racial Minorities,
1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 428.
77
C. Hill, West Indian Migrants and the London Churches (London: Oxford University Press,
1963); E. Butterworth, A Muslim Community in Britain (London: Church Information Office,
1967); J. Fethney, ‘Prejudice and Churchgoers’, Race Today 5 (1973): 10–12; P. Jarvis and
A. G. Fielding, ‘The Church, Clergy, and Community Relations’, in Bryman, Religion in the
Birmingham Area, 85–98; Howard, Report on Afro-Caribbean Christianity in Britain, 28–38;
C. R. Taylor, ‘British Churches and Jamaican Migration: A Study of Religion and Identities, 1948
to 1965’ (PhD thesis, Anglia Polytechnic University, 2002); E. Burton, ‘From Assimilation to
Anti-Racism: The Church of England’s Response to Afro-Caribbean Migration, 1948–1981’
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 73

which was transformed by immigration was the Seventh-Day Adventist

Church; not only did its membership double between 1955 and 1980 but
it became mainly black (52 per cent by 1980) and mostly working class in
composition.78
Seventh-Day Adventists were not the only one of the other Trinitarian
Churches grouping to enjoy numerical prosperity during the 1960s and
1970s. Growth hotspots were also to be found among several other existing
groups, such as the Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches (whose
membership doubled between 1955 and 1980) and Churches for overseas
nationals, the latter obviously fed by immigration, albeit in the case of the
Lutherans (the largest community) the primary influx had been in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Second World War, with half having acquired British
citizenship by the mid-1960s.79 Among fresh entrants to the religious scene,
mainly in the 1970s, were the so-called House Churches80 and New Churches,
which mustered 30,000 members between them by 1980. Nevertheless, these
positive developments were not sufficient to offset decline among the other
Trinitarian Churches, which, as a whole, lost 13 per cent of their membership
in the quarter-century to 1980. Worst affected was the Presbyterian Church of
Wales, the pre-eminent denomination in Wales, whose numbers almost halved,
following on from its exceptionally poor performance during the long 1950s.
Equally prominent in the other Trinitarian Churches cluster was the Salvation
Army, which only routinely published statistics of corps and officers, not

(PhD thesis, University of the West of England, 2004); C. R. Potter [née Taylor], ‘Is Home Where
the Heart Is? Jamaican Migration and British Churches, 1948–1965’, Wesley Historical Society of
London and the South East Journal 80 (2011): 4–13; M. Grimley, ‘The Church of England, Race,
and Multi-Culturalism, 1962–2012’, in E. J. Garnett and A. Harris, eds., Rescripting Religion in
the City: Migration and Religious Identity in the Modern Metropolis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013),
207–21; P. Webster, ‘Race, Religion, and National Identity in Sixties Britain: Michael Ramsey,
Archbishop of Canterbury, and His Encounter with Other Faiths’, in C. Methuen, A. Spicer, and
J. R. Wolffe, eds., Christianity and Religious Plurality, Studies in Church History 51 (Wood-
bridge: Boydell Press, 2015), 385–98. For the religious correlates of attitudes to immigration
among the general public, see D. T. Studlar, ‘Religion and White Racial Attitudes in Britain’,
Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (1978): 306–15.
78
C. D. Handysides, ‘West Indian Integration in the Seventh Day Adventist Church in
Britain’ (BEd thesis, University of Reading, 1969); N. G. Barham, ‘The Progress of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Great Britain, 1878–1974’ (PhD thesis, University of Mich-
igan, 1976), 166–398; R. Theobald, ‘The Seventh-Day Adventist Movement: A Sociological
Study, with Particular Reference to Great Britain’ (PhD thesis, University of London, 1979);
idem, ‘The Politicization of a Religious Movement: British Adventism under the Impact of West
Indian Immigration’, British Journal of Sociology 32 (1981): 202–23. The denomination’s statis-
tics are helpfully collated in M. L. Anthony, ‘Unto the Perfect Day: A Survey of Church Growth
among Seventh-Day Adventists in the United Kingdom and Eire during the Period 1940–1980’
(1981, unpublished).
79
Lutheran Council of Great Britain, ‘Sociological Self-Study’ (1966, unpublished).
80
J. V. Thurman, New Wineskins: A Study of the House Church Movement (Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang, 1982); A. Walker, Restoring the Kingdom: The Radical Christianity of the
House Church Movement (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985).
74 Secularization in the Long 1960s

members (soldiers). It also failed to release a retrospective review of its

statistics which it commissioned Peter Brierley to undertake in 1992. Brierley’s
own unofficial estimates, appearing in successive editions of the UK Christian
Handbook, were inconsistent and clearly too high, including adherents and,
possibly, junior soldiers besides soldiers. According to a Salvation Army
officer who accessed the original sources, there were about 100,000 soldiers
in 1955 reducing steadily to 66,000 in 1980, except for a blip in 1976 when
recording methods were changed.81 Brierley’s assessment of the fall in
membership of the Christian (Open) and Exclusive Brethren over the same
quarter-century was from 103,000 to 90,000, but, while the former figure
appears approximately correct, the latter perhaps underestimates the extent
of Brethren decline from the 1960s, as implied in surveys of a sample of
Christian Brethren assemblies in 1966, 1978, and 1988 and by the upsurge
in assembly closures after 1975, especially in England.82 The membership drop
in the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) was a more modest 13 per cent
between 1955 and 1980, with a somewhat lower proportion of women (a fairly
constant 57 per cent) than in other Free Churches.83 Less optimistically, a
survey in 1964–5 revealed 55 per cent of Friends were 50 and above (including
28 per cent over retirement age) and 13 per cent were religiously inactive.84
Non-Trinitarian Churches (as defined by Brierley) comprised seven prin-
cipal and sundry smaller movements. The largest of these in 1955 was
Spiritualism, with an estimated 63,000 members, reducing to 52,000 by
1980. However, enumeration of Spiritualists was problematical, since there
were three national associations—Spiritualists’ National Union (18,000 mem-
bers), Greater World Christian Spiritualist League (20,000), and Spiritualist

81
P. Escott, ‘Church Growth Theories and the Salvation Army in the United Kingdom: An
Examination of the Theories of Donald McGavran and C. Peter Wagner in Relation to Salvation
Army Experience and Practice (1982–1991)’ (PhD thesis, University of Stirling, 1996), 63–5,
279–81, 335–6.
82
For the surveys, see G. D. Brown, ‘How Can We Improve Our Evangelism? Deductions
from a Survey of Assemblies’, Journal of the Christian Brethren Research Fellowship 21 (1971):
44–57; G. D. Brown and B. R. Mills, ‘The Brethren’ Today: A Factual Survey (Exeter: Paternoster
Press, 1980); P. W. Brierley, G. D. Brown, B. Myers, H. Rowdon, and N. Summerton, The
Christian Brethren as the Nineties Began (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1993), including, at 83–94,
an important appendix on Christian Brethren historical growth to 1960. For numbers of
assemblies, see T. Grass, Gathering to His Name: The Story of Open Brethren in Britain and
Ireland (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), 470, 518–19, and on decline generally 469–85. Cf.,
on Scotland, N. T. R. Dickson, Brethren in Scotland, 1838–2000: A Social Study of an Evangelical
Movement (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2002), 199–207, 330–44, 390, 393.
83
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain, Tabular Statement
as at 31.xii.2012 (London: Britain Yearly Meeting, [2013]), 11. For an analysis of Tabular
Statement data with regard to gender and turnover, see J. W. C. Chadkirk, ‘Patterns of
Membership and Participation among British Quakers, 1823–2012’ (MPhil thesis, University
of Birmingham, 2014), 47–80.
84
K. M. Slack, Constancy and Change in the Society of Friends (London: Friends Home
Service Committee, 1967), 73, 83–4.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 75

Association of Great Britain (7,000), plus unaffiliated Spiritualist churches and

individual Spiritualists belonging only to home circles.85 The largest move-
ment by 1980 was the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons),
with 114,600 members, an astonishing 1,146 per cent increase over the 1955
level, the major breakthrough being achieved in the early 1960s, when there
were 40,600 convert baptisms and church units multiplied from 100 to 276.86
At 197 per cent, the overall growth rate over the same period of another sect of
American origin, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, was also impressive, although year-
on-year advances slowed progressively while the drop-out rate rose (to an
estimated 18 per cent per annum in the mid-1970s).87 A third American sect,
Christian Science, fared less well, seemingly halving in numbers (from 31,500
in 1955 to 15,000 in 1980), and with a distinctly feminine and relatively elderly
profile.88 The Church of Scientology, by contrast, took root fairly quickly from
the late 1950s, supposedly trebling its membership in the 1970s (to 30,000 by
1980),89 while British membership of the Christadelphians was fairly stable, at
around 20,000, albeit ageing.90 The number of Unitarians is only known with
certainty from censuses carried out in 1942 (when there were 20,000 mem-
bers) and 1965–6 (15,800), but a variety of indicators (including the number of
elderly members and inactive members, and the balance of decreasing over

85
Association membership from Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia, 708. There was also a
Union of Spiritualist Mediums, established in 1956. The principal research into British Spiritu-
alism was by G. K. Nelson, ‘The Analysis of a Cult: Spiritualism’, Social Compass 15 (1968):
649–81; idem, Spiritualism and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969); idem, ‘The
Membership of a Cult: The Spiritualist National Union’, Review of Religious Research 13
(1971–2): 170–7; idem, ‘Spiritualism in the Midlands: A Research Note’, in Bryman, Religion
in the Birmingham Area, 128–36. Cf. J. Bassett, 100 Years of National Spiritualism (London:
Headquarters Publishing, 1990).
86
There are two versions of Mormon membership figures quoted in the Mormon literature.
The higher figures, used here, are from: D. A. Cuthbert, The Second Century: Latter-Day Saints in
Great Britain, Volume I, 1937–1987 (Cambridge: printed by Cambridge University Press, 1987),
197–9. The lower figures appear in V. B. Bloxham, J. R. Moss, and L. C. Porter, eds., Truth Will
Prevail: The Rise of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in the British Isles, 1837–1987
(Solihull: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 1987), 442. There are local studies by
R. Buckle, ‘Mormons in Britain: A Survey’, in M. Hill, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in
Britain, 4 (London: SCM Press, 1971), 160–79 (undertaken in Hereford) and D. J. Davies, ‘The
Mormons at Merthyr-Tydfil’ (BLitt thesis, University of Oxford, 1972).
87
J. A. Beckford, The Trumpet of Prophecy: A Sociological Study of Jehovah’s Witnesses
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), 61–7. Cf. A. T. Rogerson, ‘A Sociological Analysis of the Origin
and Development of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and their Schismatic Groups’ (DPhil thesis,
University of Oxford, 1972).
88
Wilson, Sects and Society, 119–215 at 198–9, 205–10.
89
Brierley classifies Scientology as a non-Trinitarian Church, hence its consideration at this
point. Sociologists, however, often categorize it as a New Religious Movement. The classic
contemporary sociological account of Scientology was R. Wallis, The Road to Total Freedom:
A Sociological Analysis of Scientology (London: Heinemann, 1976).
90
Wilson, Sects and Society, 217–314.
76 Secularization in the Long 1960s

growing congregations, found in 1965–6) point to ongoing decline, with

10,000 a likely total for 1980.91

NO N-CHRISTIAN F AITHS

Judaism apart, the non-Christian presence in Britain had been extremely

limited before the Second World War. Thereafter, other world faiths (notably
Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism) established a major presence on the back of
immigration from South Asia and elsewhere. This movement, which coin-
cided with the partition of India and was facilitated by the settlement rights
conferred on Commonwealth citizens by the British Nationality Act 1948, was
substantially driven by economic considerations. However, political factors
also played some part, as in the displacement of East African Asians
by Africanization programmes between 1965 and 1972. The first waves of
migrants in the late 1950s and early 1960s were predominantly men, to be
followed by their dependants in the late 1960s and 1970s, after controls on
primary immigration were introduced by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act
1962 and subsequent legislation. The migrant population had a notably
youthful profile with above-average fertility and thus increased very quickly.
Since Britain still lacked a census of religious profession, and most non-
Christian faiths collected no statistics about their constituencies (nor had a
national infrastructure to do so), quantifying the growth of religious pluralism
is challenging. Very often, only vague estimates are available, which diverged
widely, especially for the Muslims. These divergences are exemplified in Peter
Brierley’s attempts to enumerate ‘other religions’ in successive editions of the
UK Christian Handbook. His figures are of relatively limited value, not least
since he sought to calculate totals of ‘active members’, an artificial construct
designed for comparability with Christian denominations, rather than popu-
lation size (which generally would have been a more meaningful measure).92
Muslims quickly overtook Jews as Britain’s largest non-Christian commu-
nity.93 By the late 1960s a series of independent estimates agreed that there

91
Foy Society Survey Group, A Census of Unitarian Congregations in Britain (London:
General Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches, 1967); W. Needham, Unitarian
Congregations Surveyed: A Guide to the Report of the Foy Society’s Survey (London: General
Assembly of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches, [1967]); A. Ruston, ‘British Unitarianism in
the Twentieth Century: A Survey’, Transactions of the Unitarian Historical Society 25 (2011–14):
76–91 at 79–82.
92
For the most recent calculation spanning the 1960s and 1970s, see Brierley, UK Christian
Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition, 10.6–10.10.
93
For background, see H. Ansari, ‘The Infidel Within’: Muslims in Britain since 1800
(London: Hurst, 2004), 145–65 S. Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain: An Introduction (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 44–52. Also, M. M. Ally, ‘History of Muslims in Britain,
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 77

were about 250,000 of them,94 which is consistent with the figure of 226,000
for England and Wales in 1971 (up from 50,000 in 1961) arrived at by Ceri
Peach and Richard Gale through back-projection from the 2001 religious
census.95 Their 1981 calculation of Muslims was 553,000, fairly close to Kim
Knott’s estimate of 564,000 a few years later, although her figure of 354,000 for
1977 was probably too low,96 while the 1,000,000 proposed by Muhammad
Anwar was too high.97 Sikhs started from an even lower base, with no more
than 1,000 or 2,000 in Britain in 1945, but numbers rose through immigration
to 7,000 in 1951, 16,000 in 1961, 72,000 in 1971, and 144,000 in 1981.98 These
seem altogether more plausible totals than those suggested by Knott (305,000
in 1977 and 269,000 ten years later).99 Her estimates for Hindus (307,000 and
357,000, respectively) also appear inflated by comparison with those proposed
by Peach and Gale: 30,000 in 1961; 138,000 in 1971; and 278,000 in 1981.100
Hindus were disproportionately represented among the Asian refugees from the
Africanization of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Other non-Christian religions
apart from Judaism perhaps had a combined population of not much more than
100,000, of whom a significant minority were Buddhists, who, besides migration
gains, had success in attracting British converts in the 1970s.101 Despite their
media notoriety, the so-called New Religious Movements (NRMs), which

1850–1980’ (MA thesis, University of Birmingham, 1981); D. Joly and J. S. Nielsen, Muslims in
Britain: An Annotated Bibliography, 1960–1984 (Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic
Relations, 1985).
94
K. Harris, About Britain (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967), 169; E. Butterworth,
‘Muslims in Britain’, in Martin, A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 2, 137–56 at
137–8; Gay, Geography of Religion, 197; J. S. Nielsen, ‘Other Religions’, in W. F. Maunder, ed.,
Religion, Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical Sources 20 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987),
563–621 at 575. Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia, 699 is in obvious error in suggesting
635,000 Muslims in 1970.
95
C. Peach and R. Gale, ‘Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs in the New Religious Landscape of
England’, Geographical Review 93 (2003): 469–90 at 479.
96
K. Knott and R. Toon, Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus in the UK: Problems in the Estimation of
Religious Statistics, Religious Research Papers 6 (Leeds: Department of Sociology, University of Leeds,
[1982]), 20–1; K. Knott, ‘Calculating Sikh Population Statistics’, Sikh Bulletin 4 (1987): 13–22 at 19.
97
M. Anwar, ‘Religious Identity in Plural Societies: The Case of Britain’, Journal of the
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 2 (1980): 110–21 at 110–11.
98
R. Ballard and C. Ballard, ‘The Sikhs: The Development of South Asian Settlements in
Britain’, in J. L. Watson, ed., Between Two Cultures: Migrants and Minorities in Britain (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1977), 21–56; Peach and Gale, ‘Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs’, 479; G. Singh and
D. S. Tatla, Sikhs in Britain: The Making of a Community (London: Zed Books, 2006), 49–59.
A. W. Helweg, Sikhs in England: The Development of a Migrant Community (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1979) is a local study of Gravesend.
99
Knott and Toon, Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus in the UK, 20–1; Knott, ‘Calculating Sikh
Population Statistics’, 19.
100
Knott and Toon, Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus in the UK, 20–1; Knott, ‘Calculating Sikh
Population Statistics’, 19; Peach and Gale, ‘Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs’, 479.
101
E. Puttick, ‘ “Why Has Boddhidharma Left for the West?” The Growth and Appeal of
Buddhism in Britain’, Religion Today 8/2 (1993): 5–9 at 6 noted estimates ranging from 30,000 to
100,000 Buddhists in the early 1990s.
78 Secularization in the Long 1960s

emerged from the late 1960s and of which there were about 500 in Britain by
the 1980s, gained very few fully committed members, and these were prepon-
derantly young and male.102 NRMs mostly originated in religions of the East,
with the Unification Church (or Moonies) being best-known.103
Whereas the 1960s and 1970s were decades of expansion for most non-
Christian religions, for Judaism they were years of decline from an all-time
peak in the early 1950s. Estimated Jewish population was the usual measure of
belonging, but as Jewishness was an ethnic as well as religious identity, and
British Jews were relatively non-observant religiously,104 quantification posed
challenges. The Jewish Year Book was the traditional source of population
estimates, which were based upon information supplied by a nominated
person (often the rabbi) in each local community, a system which tended to
break down when a community was too large or where spatial dispersal was
taking place.105 Alternative methods of calculation were therefore sought by
Jewish demographers, the most favoured being derived from Jewish mortality.
This pointed to a Jewish population falling from 410,000 in 1960–5 to 336,000
in 1975–9 to 308,000 in 1984–8, or by 1 per cent per annum, with a somewhat
faster rate of decrease in the provinces than in Greater London (where more
than two-thirds of Jews were concentrated).106 The causes of this declension
were primarily to be found in an excess of deaths over births, associated with a
top-heavy age pyramid, but emigration was also an increasing factor.107 In
particular, emigration to Israel (Aliyah) increased in scale. In the four years
1969–72, 5,759 Jews left Britain for Israel, more than in the period 1951–68,
with emigrants to Israel also topping 1,000 a year in 1978–9 and 1982–3. The
British-born population of Israel rose by 379 per cent between 1961 and

102
The difficulties of quantifying NRMs are discussed by E. Barker, New Religious Move-
ments: A Practical Introduction (London: HMSO, 1989), 149–55. Cf. K. Knott, ‘New Religious
Movements’, in T. Thomas, ed., The British: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 1800–1986
(London: Routledge, 1988), 158–77; G. Parsons, ‘Expanding the Religious Spectrum: New
Religious Movements in Modern Britain’, in Parsons, The Growth of Religious Diversity: Britain
from 1945, Volume 1: Traditions, 275–303.
103
The classic sociological account is E. Barker, The Making of a Moonie: Choice or Brainwashing?
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
104
S. Sharot, ‘Secularization, Judaism, and Anglo-Jewry’, in Hill, A Sociological Yearbook of
Religion in Britain, 4, 121–40.
105
S. J. Prais and M. Schmool, ‘The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population,
1960–65’, Jewish Journal of Sociology 10 (1968): 5–34 at 7–8; Gay, Geography of Religion, 203–4.
106
Prais and Schmool, ‘Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population’, 5–34;
S. Haberman, B. A. Kosmin, and C. Levy, ‘Mortality Patterns of British Jews, 1975–79: Insights
and Applications for the Size and Structure of British Jewry’, Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society, Series A 146 (1983): 294–310; S. Haberman and M. Schmool, ‘Estimates of the British
Jewish Population, 1984–88’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A 158 (1995): 547–62.
107
S. Waterman and B. A. Kosmin, British Jewry in the Eighties: A Statistical and Geograph-
ical Guide (London: Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1986), 10–11, 16–19.
 Belonging—Denominations and Faiths 79

1983.108 The contraction of Judaism was mirrored in falling numbers of

congregations and synagogue members revealed by three surveys in 1970,
1977, and 1983.109

ORGANIZED IRRELIGION

In 1963, the year to which Callum Brown has traced the onset of revolutionary
secularization in Britain, there were five national membership associations for
organized irreligion. In order of their foundation, they were the National
Secular Society (NSS, 1866); the Ethical Union (EU, 1896); the Rationalist
Press Association (RPA, 1899); the University Humanist Federation (UHF,
1960); and the British Humanist Association (BHA, 1963). The last four were
all humanist in character by 1963 while the NSS, although having a humanist
component, was still primarily secularist. In the winter of 1963–4, Colin
Campbell surveyed the membership of all five bodies. Collectively, they had
5,837 members, but, as many individuals had multiple memberships, the
number of unique members could not have exceeded 3,500–4,000, the over-
whelming majority of them men and disproportionately living in London and
the South-East and working in professional or technical occupations.110 The
RPA was by far the largest association, with 3,387 British members (i.e.
excluding overseas subscribers) in 1963, seemingly on a par with levels in
the 1950s. Turnover was high, over half of the members surveyed in 1961
having joined the RPA during the previous five years. Total RPA membership,
deduplicating the BHA element, fell from 3,687 in 1966 to 2,076 in 1970.111
The BHA, formed as a common front for the RPA and EU, was next in size,

108
Annual Aliyah statistics were collected by the Jewish Agency for Israel and are available
at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Immigration/immigration_by_country2.html>.
109
S. J. Prais, ‘Synagogue Statistics and the Jewish Population of Great Britain, 1900–1970’,
Jewish Journal of Sociology 14 (1972): 215–28; B. A. Kosmin and D. de Lange, Synagogue
Affiliation in the United Kingdom, 1977 (London: Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British
Jews, 1978); B. A. Kosmin and C. Levy, Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom, 1983
(London: Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1983).
110
C. B. Campbell, ‘Membership Composition of the British Humanist Association’, Socio-
logical Review 13 (1965): 327–37; idem, ‘Humanism and the Culture of the Professions: A Study
of the Rise of the British Humanist Movement, 1954–63’ (PhD thesis, University of London,
1967), especially 231–81, 415–17; idem, ‘Humanism in Britain: The Formation of a Secular
Value-Oriented Movement’, in Martin, A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 2, 157–72;
idem, Toward a Sociology of Irreligion (London: Macmillan, 1971). Cf. S. Budd, ‘The Humanist
Societies: The Consequences of a Diffuse Belief System’, in B. R. Wilson, ed., Patterns of
Sectarianism: Organisation and Ideology in Social and Religious Movements (London: Heine-
mann, 1967), 366–405; idem, Varieties of Unbelief: Atheists and Agnostics in English Society,
1850–1960 (London: Heinemann, 1977).
111
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 194.
80 Secularization in the Long 1960s

with 1,236 members in 1963, climbing to 4,179 in 1967 (when there was
intensive advertising), before falling to 3,020 in 1970.112 Then came the NSS,
historically committed to militant atheism and with a more working-class
following, which Campbell reported as only having 551 members in 1963.
The EU, which no longer had a separate existence after 1967, had 502
members in 1963 according to Campbell, consistent with 417 in 1959.113
The UHF had 161 in 1963.
Post-1970 membership figures are less readily accessible, and the NSS in
particular seems to have been sensitive about disclosing its own numbers. It is
likely that they could be reconstructed in time through intensive research in
the relevant archives, at the Bishopsgate Institute (for the BHA and RPA) and
Conway Hall (NSS), a task which was beyond the scope of this study. How-
ever, there is no reason to think that the 1970s witnessed any notable advances
by organized irreligion, notwithstanding NSS claims for membership growth
by the end of the decade.114 On the contrary, the BHA annual reports make it
clear that it was struggling in the late 1970s, membership falling from 2,587 in
1974 to 1,712 in 1977 on the back of subscription increases and reduced press
advertising, which was no longer deemed cost-effective. A particular source of
regret for the BHA was that less than half the members of local humanist
groups joined the national body.115 There was also continuing low public
awareness of ‘any organization which represents the views of humanists,
agnostics, and atheists’, probably still no more than the 1 per cent recorded
by NOP in 1964.116
Formal irreligion thus singularly failed to capitalize on the declining for-
tunes of large sections of institutional Christianity. It had not benefited at all
from secularization. Writing in 1981, one of its historians offered a bleak
assessment of its prospects:
At the present time, freethought in the United Kingdom is in a relatively weak
condition. Membership in the RPA and NSS are far below their highest levels.
The British Humanist Association is having financial difficulties and the South
Place Ethical Society is threatened with the possible loss of Conway Hall. It is not
the brightest picture . . . 117

112
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 194–5.
113
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 194, although this source cites
918 in 1963.
114
National Secular Society Ltd Annual Report (1980–1), 9.
115
British Humanist Association Annual Report 12 (1974–5), 4; 14 (1976–7), 4–5; 15 (1977),
3; 17 (1979), 3.
116
‘National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys’ [May 1964], dataset at UKDA,
SN 64009.
117
G. Stein, Freethought in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth: A Descriptive
Bibliography (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 113–14.
 4

Behaving—Churchgoing

I N T R O D U C TI O N

Chapter 3 has emphasized that, in matters of religious belonging, there is no

common criterion of membership across denominations and faiths, thereby
making aggregation and comparison of data difficult. When it comes to
religious behaving, church attendance appears to pose fewer consistency
problems since, for Christian Churches, it was a universal measure, recognized
by them as a valid and necessary public expression of religious commitment.
It had also, for centuries, been subject to enforcement by the state, the last
anomalous legislative restriction not being swept aside until 1969.1 Unfortunately,
evidence about churchgoing levels in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s is less
plentiful than for church membership and raises its own methodological and
interpretative challenges. The main contemporary synthesis was by the soci-
ologist Bill Pickering, who concluded that attendance held up fairly well
between the end of the Second World War and the early 1960s but, in the
absence of much hard data, inferred from contextual changes that there must
have been some decrease thereafter.2 One widely circulated (but unsubstanti-
ated) statistic in the mid-1960s was that there were then some 11,800,000
regular churchgoers in the British Isles, 5,000,000 of whom were Roman
Catholic, 4,000,000 in the Free Churches, and 2,800,000 Anglican.3
In advancing his case for revolutionary secularization in the 1960s, Callum
Brown is somewhat ambivalent about the centrality of churchgoing. In one

1
C. D. Field, ‘A Shilling for Queen Elizabeth: The Era of State Regulation of Church
Attendance in England, 1552–1969’, Journal of Church and State 50 (2008): 213–53.
2
W. S. F. Pickering, ‘Who Goes to Church?’, in C. L. Mitton, ed., The Social Sciences and the
Churches (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1972), 181–97 at 182–3.
3
J. McNicol, ed., Free Church Directory, 1965–66 Edition (Morden: Crown House Publications,
[1965]), 313; H. W. Coxill and K. Grubb, eds., World Christian Handbook, 1968 (London: Lutter-
worth Press, 1967), 195. It is unclear whether the reference to the ‘British Isles’ implies that the figures
relate to the United Kingdom and Ireland.
82 Secularization in the Long 1960s

place, he writes of its ‘sudden collapse’ during the decade,4 yet in another he
concedes that the fall in church attendance in the 1960s was ‘merely a
continuation of an existing trend which stretched back until at least the
1890s’ and was thus ‘not epoch-making for the Christian religion nationally’.5
Moreover, Brown is critical of exponents of the ‘gradualist’ school of secular-
ization for an overdependence on churchgoing data.6 One such would be
Robin Gill, who has demonstrated that, relative to population, attendances
in the Church of England and Congregationalism had been decreasing from
the 1850s and in the Free Churches generally since the 1880s.7 The progressive
nature of Protestant churchgoing decline is also suggested by the present
author’s previous studies of five shorter periods in the twentieth century.8
Here we add a sixth, for the 1960s and 1970s, systematically reviewing all
available material. It divides into two main types, church counts and sample
surveys, each of which subdivides into national and local sources.

NATIONAL CHURCH DATA

There has only ever been one simultaneous national census of churchgoing
across the whole of Britain, organized by the government in 1851. It proved
very controversial, and subsequent disagreements between the established
Churches in England and Scotland on the one hand and Free Churches on
the other frustrated attempts to replicate it. Individual denominations did not
rush to fill the data void, prioritizing the collection of membership and
financial statistics.

4
C. G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800–2000, 2nd
edn. (London: Routledge, 2009), 214.
5
C. G. Brown, ‘The Secularisation Decade: What the 1960s Have Done to the Study of
Religious History’, in D. H. McLeod and W. Ustorf, eds., The Decline of Christendom in Western
Europe, 1750–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29–46 at 31.
6
C. G. Brown, Religion and the Demographic Revolution: Women and Secularisation in
Canada, Ireland, UK, and USA since the 1960s (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 39, 43, 88n29.
7
R. Gill, The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
8
(1901–14) C. D. Field, ‘ “The Faith Society”? Quantifying Religious Belonging in Edwardian
Britain, 1901–1914’, Journal of Religious History 37 (2013): 39–63 at 41–53, 61; (1914–18) idem,
‘Keeping the Spiritual Home Fires Burning: Religious Belonging in Britain during the First
World War’, War & Society 33 (2014): 244–68 at 247–58; (1918–39) idem, ‘Gradualist or
Revolutionary Secularization? A Case Study of Religious Belonging in Inter-War Britain,
1918–1939’, Church History and Religious Culture 93 (2013): 57–93 at 62–78, 90; (1939–45)
idem, ‘Puzzled People Revisited: Religious Believing and Belonging in Wartime Britain, 1939–45’,
Twentieth Century British History 19 (2008): 446–79 at 462–6, 473; (1945–63) idem, Britain’s
Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing in the Long 1950s
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 49–58, 101–4.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 83

In the Church of England, it was not until the 1960–4 Paul Report on clergy
deployment and payment that the need was felt to obtain the facts about
church attendance. Paul commissioned a 10 per cent sample survey of parishes
in 1962, asking them to estimate Average Sunday Attendance at all services
and arriving at a scaled-up figure of 3,000,000 exclusive of non-parochial
places of worship.9 This seems an implausibly high total, indicative of some
deficiency in sampling technique, especially in rural dioceses, and possibly also
inflated by the inclusion of Sunday scholars.10 Its credibility is further under-
mined by the Church of England’s first return of its all-age Usual Sunday
Attendance in 1968, when it stood at 1,606,000 or 3.5 per cent of the English
population. Usual Sunday Attendance was intended as a record of all those
who normally frequented at least one of the services each Sunday, omitting
Sunday schools but including children present at actual services. Ideally, the
Church’s chief statistician would have liked it to exclude twicers (those
worshipping more than once on Sunday and thus double-counted) but ac-
cepted that this was probably not feasible in large congregations.11 Usual
Sunday Attendance was subsequently returned at two- or three-yearly inter-
vals, initially dropping by 22 per cent to reach 1,247,000 by 1976, then slowing
to 1,222,000 in 1980.12
The Church of England was not the first denomination routinely to collect
attendance statistics centrally, having been pipped to the post by the Roman
Catholic Church in England and Wales. Counts of Mass attendance (includ-
ing children) on a typical Sunday were initially organized at diocesan level,
with results sometimes (but not always) published in the relevant diocesan
directory. By 1956, eleven of the eighteen dioceses were enumerating Mass
attendance which, scaling up for the other seven (on the basis of the ratio of
Mass-goers to Catholic population for the eleven dioceses), may have been
around 1,650,000 in that year.13 National arrangements for an annual census
of Mass attendance were put in place from 1959, first under the auspices of
the NDS (until 1962) and then, from 1965, by the Catholic Education
Council (there were no counts in 1963 or 1964). Notwithstanding careful
evaluation in 1961 of the advantages and disadvantages of staging the census

9
L. Paul, The Deployment and Payment of the Clergy: A Report (London: Church Informa-
tion Office, 1964), 26, 56–7, 64, 67, 80, 224–5, 241, appendix 3. The original parochial returns
survive as Lambeth Palace Library MSS 3449–55.
10
Gill, ‘Empty’ Church Revisited, 161; Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 50.
11
Church Times, 3 April 1969. Not until 1986 was Usual Sunday Attendance split into
categories for persons under 16 and 16 and over.
12
Series published in Church of England Year Book and Central Board of Finance of the
Church of England, Church Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about the Church of England.
13
M. McNarney, ‘La vie paroissiale’, in Catholicisme anglais (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1958),
146–70 at 168–9.
84 Secularization in the Long 1960s

on or around particular dates,14 its timing was not standardized (to October)
until the late 1970s.
Discounting any possible effects of seasonal fluctuations, Catholic church-
going in England and Wales (including at Saturday evening vigil Masses)
peaked at 2,114,000 in 1965, mirroring growth in the Catholic population to
that point. By the early 1960s, it was reckoned that 41 per cent of Catholics
aged 7 and over attended Mass weekly.15 This proportion accorded both with
the guesstimate of Catholic Truth and with censuses conducted in thirteen
English parishes in the early 1960s.16 Decline then set in, to 1,900,000 in 1970,
1,791,000 in 1975 (albeit a recovery from 1,753,000 in 1974), and 1,644,000 in
1980 (22 per cent less than fifteen years before).17 It should be noted that these
official figures only formally entered the public domain in 2006 and that Mass
attendance was not published in the Catholic Directory until its 1993 edition.
Twicing was negligible among Catholics, and thus attendance broadly equated
to attenders.
The Methodists were the first of the Free Churches regularly to enumerate
their congregations, in 1972, the United Reformed Church not following suit
until 1990 and the Baptist Union until 1992. The Methodist count was
triennial, of morning, afternoon, and evening services in October. Uncorrect-
ed for twicers, there were 504,000 Methodist worshippers in England and
Wales in 1972 (12 per cent less than the membership), falling by 11 per cent to
446,000 in 1980.18 If the member/attendance ratio in Methodism held good
for the other Free Churches, which may possibly not have been the case, then
there would have been approximately 1,450,000 Free Church attendances in
England in 1970. Adding 1,542,000 Anglican and 1,830,000 Catholic attend-
ances (having removed Mass-goers in the Dioceses of Cardiff and Menevia),
we arrive at an estimate of 4,822,000 attendances in England each Sunday
in 1970 or about 10.5 per cent of the population. The comparative total for
1960 was 5,500,000 (comprising a very tentative 2,000,000 in the Church of

14
A. E. C. W. Spencer, The Selection of a Date for the Annual Count of Mass Attendance
(Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2005). The report was actually written in 1961.
15
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘The Demography and Sociography of the Roman Catholic Commu-
nity of England and Wales’, in L. Bright and S. Clements, eds., The Committed Church (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 60–85 at 78; idem, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic
Community of England & Wales, 1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral
Services, Evangelisation, and Education (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007), 75, 81–3.
16
Anon., ‘How Many Catholics in England and Wales?’, Catholic Truth 6 (1962): 5;
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘An Evaluation of Roman Catholic Educational Policy in England and
Wales, 1900–1960’, in P. Jebb, ed., Religious Education: Drift or Decision? (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1968), 165–221 at 188, 198.
17
Series available in Catholic Education Council, Pastoral & Demographic Statistics of the
Catholic Church in England & Wales, 1963–1991, ed. A. E. C. W. Spencer (Taunton: Russell-
Spencer, 2006); A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Report to the Catholic Clergy of England & Wales on the
Parish Register Returns for 1961’ (2009, unpublished).
18
Series published in Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 85

England, 2,000,000 in the Catholic Church, and 1,500,000 in the Free

Churches) or 13 per cent of the population.19 In other words, overall church-
going in England may have decreased by 12 per cent during the 1960s,
affecting all three denominational clusters. The decline was steepest in the
Church of England and, paradoxically, least in the Free Churches. However,
the latter’s modest 3 per cent contraction was only achieved because strong
growth in the Pentecostal/Holiness, Independent, and parts of the non-
Trinitarian church-sectors offset falls in the historic Free Churches. All stat-
istics are uncorrected for twicing, which, although on the wane, remained a
significant phenomenon in Free Church circles.
English churchgoing in the late 1970s is illuminated by a census undertaken
in November 1979 by the Bible Society, through Peter Brierley as programme
director, on behalf of the Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism. Data collection
was by means of a postal questionnaire sent to all Trinitarian places of
worship, seeking information about church membership and attendance in
1975 and 1979; the membership data have already been briefly noted
(Table 2.10). This was a hugely ambitious venture but it fell short of perfection,
not helped by severe time constraints and the failure to computerize the schedules
(which were analysed manually, with consequential errors). The response rate
was also disappointing (39 per cent overall, but as low as 3 per cent for African/
West Indian congregations). Although it was nominally raised to 74 per cent
by extracting some data from central Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, and
Roman Catholic records, there were still many missing observations, while
the scaling applied to ensure consistency with information from other
sources ‘may have added credence to mistaken previous results’. The two
most problematical elements were perhaps the attendance statistics for 1975,
which will doubtless have been little more than informed guesses in most cases
(despite being used as the basis for calculating church growth rates), and the
profiling of worshippers by gender and age in 1979.20
The two volumes of published findings of the 1979 census therefore need to
be approached with a degree of circumspection.21 The first iteration of results
which they reflected is summarized in Table 4.1. It should be noted that the
data relate to attendances and not to attenders, since no attempt was made to
identify twicers. This did not happen until the census was replicated in 1989,
when it was suggested that twicing in 1979 was probably around 20 per cent of
adults, but with a wide denominational variation (as in 1989, when the overall

19
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 51.
20
For a critique of the census methodology, see A. Isaacson, ‘NIE Research Project: 1979
Census of Churches in England’ (1980, unpublished)—he was the research officer for the project—
and C. D. Field’s review of the second volume of results in Church Growth Digest 5/3 (1984): 8.
21
Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties: From a Census of the
Churches in 1979, 2 vols. (London: Bible Society, 1980–3).
86 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 4.1 Church attendance, England, 1975–9
1975—child 1975—adult 1975—total 1979—child 1979—adult 1979—total

Episcopal 445,000 1,302,000 1,747,000 445,000 1,256,000 1,701,000

Methodist 208,000 454,000 662,000 174,000 447,000 621,000
Baptist 92,000 193,000 285,000 87,000 203,000 290,000
URC/ 55,000 150,000 205,000 51,000 139,000 190,000
Congregational
Independent 93,000 167,000 260,000 93,000 206,000 299,000
African/ 39,000 55,000 94,000 41,000 66,000 107,000
West Indian
Pentecostal/ 30,000 78,000 108,000 33,000 88,000 121,000
Holiness
Other Protestant 44,000 122,000 166,000 43,000 128,000 171,000
Roman Catholic 474,000 1,418,000 1,892,000 476,000 1,310,000 1,786,000
Orthodox 3,000 6,000 9,000 3,000 7,000 10,000
Total 1,483,000 3,945,000 5,428,000 1,446,000 3,850,000 5,296,000

Notes: Based upon responses from 74 per cent of churches and estimates for the remainder. Figures relate to
attendances, with no deduction for twicers.
Source: Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties: From a Census of the Churches in 1979,
2 vols. (London: Bible Society, 1980–3), I, 23–4.

figure was 14 per cent).22 It also needs to be borne in mind that the church-
going of children (under 15) included attendance at Sunday school as well as
at church services. This will be a major factor in explaining why total attend-
ance in 1979 (5,296,000) exceeded the estimate of 4,822,000 for 1970, discussed
earlier. Using this broader definition, Brierley calculated that 14 per cent of the
child population of England in 1979 attended church on a normal Sunday
compared with 11 per cent of adults.23
A second iteration of the 1979 results appeared in 1991, when the 1989 English
census was published. The 1979 total was then raised by 3 per cent, to 5,441,000,
largely on account of an upward adjustment by 11 per cent of Catholic attend-
ances, to 1,991,000, notwithstanding the Catholic Church’s official count of
Mass-going for 1979 is now known only to have been 1,675,000 (including
Wales).24 It was further stated that the 1979 statistics then related to attenders
rather than attendances, implying that they had been abated to ensure twicers
were only counted once, which cannot have been the case.25 However, the
original gender and age profiles (Table 4.2) were not altered. At 58 per cent,
females were over-represented in congregations, especially African/West Indian

22
P. W. Brierley, ‘Christian’ England: What the 1989 English Church Census Reveals (London:
MARC Europe, 1991), 47–50.
23
Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties, I, 23–4.
24
In a letter to the author, dated 30 December 2015, P. W. Brierley acknowledged that this over-
estimation of Roman Catholics arose from what was essentially a double-count of their children.
25
P. W. Brierley, ed., Prospects for the Nineties: Trends and Tables from the 1989 English
Church Census (London: MARC Europe, 1991), 20.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 87
Table 4.2 Gender and age distribution of church attendance (England) and attenders
(Wales and Scotland), 1979–84 (percentages down)
England, England, Wales, Wales, Scotland, Scotland,
1979 1979 1982 1982 1984 1984
Churchgoers Population Churchgoers Population Churchgoers Population

Gender
Male 45 49 38 49 37 48
Female 55 51 62 51 63 52
Age
Under 15 26 21 26 21 25 21
15–19 9 8 7 8 5 9
20–29 11 14 8 14 9 15
30–44 16 19 14 19 15 19
45–64 20 23 22 23 24 22
65+ 18 15 23 15 22 14
Sources: Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties: From a Census of the Churches in
1979, 2 vols. (London: Bible Society, 1980–3), I, 23; P. W. Brierley and B. Evans, Prospects for Wales: Report of
the 1982 Census of the Churches (London: Bible Society, 1983), 28; P. W. Brierley and F. Macdonald, Prospects
for Scotland: Report of the 1984 Census of the Churches (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1985), 60.

(59 per cent) and Methodist (60 per cent); the proportions would probably have
been higher had they been calculated on the basis of adults alone. The age spread
is likewise distorted by the inclusion of children, but, relative to society at large,
there were fewer than expected worshippers aged 20–64 and more of pensionable
age. In the Methodist and United Reformed/Congregational clusters as many as
one-quarter was 65 years and above. Not until 2014 were further revised statistics
published for the 1979 English Church Census, correcting for twicing, over-
estimation of Catholics, and other factors; the new total for usual Sunday
attendance in England c.1980 was given as 4,477,300 or 10 per cent of the
combined child and adult population (including 12 per cent of children
alone).26 This revised figure was 7 per cent less than our earlier estimate for
1970, which was unadjusted for twicing.
In Wales the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire obtained estimates
from the principal denominations (Anglican, Catholic, and four Free Church)
in 1961 of the number of communicants and ‘regular worshippers’ (defined as
frequenting twelve services a year). This was effectively an index of worship-
ping constituency. The resultant total was, accordingly, bigger than attendance
on a typical Sunday might have been: 576,000 (167,000 Anglican, 340,000 Free
Church, and 69,000 Catholic), equivalent to 22 per cent of the Welsh popu-
lation, perhaps 600,000 if allowance is made for smaller denominations.27

26
P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Church Statistics, Number 2, 2010 to 2020 (Tonbridge: ADBC
Publishers, 2014), 16.8.
27
Council for Wales and Monmouthshire, Report on the Welsh Language Today, House of
Commons Papers, Session 1963–4, Cmnd. 2198 (London: HMSO, 1963), 80–3.
88 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 4.3 Church attenders, Wales, 1978–82
1978—child 1978—adult 1978—total 1982—child 1982—adult 1982—total

Church in Wales 27,400 75,500 102,900 32,700 80,700 113,400

Presbyterian 17,700 39,400 57,100 17,000 37,000 54,000
Church of
Wales
Baptist 16,300 32,600 48,900 15,750 31,200 46,950
Union of Welsh 9,150 25,700 34,850 9,700 25,100 34,800
Independents
Methodist 9,300 18,400 27,700 8,700 17,600 26,300
Other Protestant 14,900 29,000 43,900 17,250 31,700 48,950
Roman Catholic 19,050 56,700 75,750 19,200 56,700 75,900
Total 113,800 277,300 391,100 120,300 280,000 400,300

Notes: Based upon responses from 70 per cent of churches and estimates for the remainder. Figures relate to
attenders, deducting twicers.
Source: P. W. Brierley and B. Evans, Prospects for Wales: Report of the 1982 Census of the Churches (London:
Bible Society, 1983), 28.

In May 1982 Brierley, who had by then moved to MARC Europe, teamed up
with the Bible Society to enumerate Welsh churchgoing, refining the meth-
odology used in the 1979 England census, one of the enhancements being
computerization of the data. There was a 70 per cent response from Trinitar-
ian places of worship. Statistics were requested on church membership and
attendance (including Sunday school) for 1978 and 1982 and of adults present
at both morning and evening services.
It was ascertained that as many as 25 per cent of worshippers in Wales were
twicers in 1982 (26 per cent in 1978), dropping to 2 per cent for Catholics but
rising to 35 per cent in the Presbyterian Church of Wales, 38 per cent for the
Union of Welsh Independents, and 39 per cent among Baptists. The published
figures (Table 4.3) were stated to relate to attenders and not attendances, with
21 per cent of Welsh children and 13 per cent of adults being at church on a
normal Sunday in 1982. Except for Welsh-speaking churches, a marginal
overall improvement was reported in absolute numbers of both child and
adult attenders between 1978 and 1982, the Church in Wales seemingly
performing especially well. However, the 1978 Welsh data are probably as
approximate as those for England in 1975, and the trend since 1961 was still
implicitly downwards. At 62 per cent, the profile of Welsh attenders was more
feminine than in England, reaching 64 per cent among Baptists and 65 per
cent among Methodists. At 23 per cent, the proportion aged 65 and over was
eight points higher than in the civil population, peaking at 33 per cent for the
Methodists.28 See also Table 4.2.

28
P. W. Brierley and B. Evans, Prospects for Wales: Report of the 1982 Census of the Churches
(London: Bible Society, 1983), passim.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 89

Scottish evidence at the start of the 1960s derives from a study conducted by
John Highet in 1959, using a combination of sample survey and information
from denominational headquarters. Respondents were asked to provide de-
tails of attendances at all Sunday services under ‘normal conditions’ and of the
incidence of twicing. From these data, Highet calculated that the number of
adult (aged 20 and over) ‘oncers’ was 911,000 or 26 per cent of Scottish adults,
perhaps rising to 930,000 if smaller denominations were factored in. The
breakdown of these churchgoers was: 443,600 in the Church of Scotland;
334,300 in the Roman Catholic Church; and 133,100 other Protestants.
The trends which most stood out were declines in evening worship and in
twicers.29 Scottish Mass attendance, including by children, was returned as
435,300 in 1967, being the average of three Sundays,30 but, the Diocese of
Motherwell excepted, the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland did not other-
wise routinely gather statistics on the subject until 1981.
A further census of Scottish churchgoing did not occur until March 1984, as
a collaboration between Peter Brierley of MARC Europe and the National
Bible Society of Scotland. Returns of Trinitarian membership and attendance
were sought both for that year and 1980, together with estimates of adult twicers,
the response rate being 75 per cent. Twicing was practised by 13 per cent of all
Scottish churchgoers, ranging from 3 per cent of Catholics to 51 per cent of
Conservative Presbyterians, with 11 per cent in the Church of Scotland.
Results, for attenders as opposed to attendances, are presented in Table 4.4,
which shows the Scottish churchgoing scene dominated by the Church of
Scotland and Roman Catholic Church in roughly equal numbers. The pro-
portion of Scottish children at church on a normal Sunday in 1984 was 19 per
cent and of adults 17 per cent, making Scotland the most churchgoing of the
three home nations in terms of adults but coming second to Wales in respect
of children (reflecting the historic strength of Sunday schools in the princi-
pality). Nevertheless, the adult rate was 9 per cent less than recorded by
Highet. Scotland also had the greatest ratio of female worshippers (63 per cent
in 1984) and 8 per cent more churchgoers aged 65 and over than in the civil
population (Table 4.2).31

29
J. Highet, The Scottish Churches: A Review of their State 400 Years after the Reformation
(London: Skeffington, 1960), 59–69; idem, ‘Church Membership in Scotland and Some Com-
parisons in England’, British Weekly, 15 February 1962: 5–6; idem, ‘Trends in Attendance and
Membership’, in P. W. Brierley and F. Macdonald, Prospects for Scotland: Report of the 1984
Census of the Churches (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1985), 8–13.
30
A. E. C. W. Spencer, Report on the Parish Register, Religious Practice & Population Statistics
of the Catholic Church in Scotland, 1967 (Harrow: Pastoral Research Centre, 1969), 17–20,
38–43.
31
Brierley and Macdonald, Prospects for Scotland, passim.
90 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 4.4 Church attenders, Scotland, 1980–4
1980—child 1980—adult 1980—total 1984—child 1984—adult 1984—total

Church of 98,360 272,660 371,020 95,040 266,300 361,340

Scotland
Conservative 4,280 18,930 23,210 3,920 17,130 21,050
Presbyterian
Episcopal 3,390 14,530 17,920 4,170 15,830 20,000
Church of
Scotland
Baptist 7,910 22,280 30,190 7,790 21,450 29,240
Independent 13,250 28,130 41,380 12,320 27,050 39,370
Other 10,910 25,360 36,270 11,140 25,610 36,750
Protestant
Roman 71,050 296,030 367,080 68,880 286,990 355,870
Catholic
Total 209,150 677,920 887,070 203,260 660,360 863,620

Notes: Based upon responses from 75 per cent of churches and estimates for the remainder. Figures relate to
attenders, deducting twicers.
Source: P. W. Brierley and F. Macdonald, Prospects for Scotland: Report of the 1984 Census of the Churches
(Bromley: MARC Europe, 1985), 60.

LOCAL CHURCH COUNTS

The heyday of local counts of churchgoing in Britain was in the late Victorian
and Edwardian eras. They were mostly organized under the auspices of
newspapers. This newspaper tradition effectively came to an abrupt halt in
1913 when concerted Anglican and Free Church opposition frustrated an
attempt by the Daily News and Leader to replicate a census of church
attendance in London taken in 1902–3, seemingly for fear that it might reveal
a similar scale of decline to that reported in the latest (1912) in a series of
decennial censuses in Liverpool.32 After the First World War, local counts
were few and far between, usually undertaken by social investigators or
ecumenical consortia. There were several such during the 1960s, which are
summarized in Table 4.5, expressed as percentages of the local population. All
set out to establish attendance levels at morning and evening services on an
ordinary (non-festival) Sunday, and none of the results has been adjusted for
twicing. Where separately enumerated, Sunday schools have been excluded.
Returns were of general congregations, apart from two places where only
adult congregants were recorded (calculated as a proportion of the adult
inhabitants). Beyond these common factors, varying methodologies and tim-
ings in the year were employed, so strict comparability of results cannot be

32
C. D. Field, ‘ “A Tempest in the Teapot”: London Churchgoing in 1913—The Census that
Never Was’, London Journal 41 (2016): 82–99.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 91
Table 4.5 Church attendance as percentage of population, English communities,
1959–68
Place Year Anglican Catholic Free Church Total
attendance attendance attendance attendance

General congregations
Birmingham (suburb) 1963–4 4.3 7.8 5.9 18.0
Bolton 1960 3.4 7.5 5.6 16.5
Congleton 1968 4.0 3.1 3.9 11.0
Hemel Hempstead 1967 3.5 3.4 3.3 10.2
Kirkby Stephen 1965 4.2 1.2 11.3 16.7
Liverpool (four wards) 1964 1.9 14.1 1.3 17.3
Rotherham 1963 2.2 NA NA NA
Sheffield 1965–6 2.1 NA 2.9 NA
South Norfolk 1962 9.8 1.1 4.9 15.8
Swindon 1966 5.0 5.8 5.1 16.0
Adult congregations
Banbury 1968 2.0 5.3 4.9 12.2
Billingham 1959 3.4 9.3 2.9 15.6
Billingham 1966 2.2 7.9 2.2 12.4

Note: Figures are uncorrected for twicing and relate to attendances and not attenders.
Sources: (Banbury) C. R. Bell, ‘Church Attendance in a Small Town’, New Society, 30 May 1968: 801–2;
(Billingham-on-Tees) P. R. Kaim-Caudle, Religion in Billingham, 1957–59 (Billingham-on-Tees: Billingham
Community Association, 1962), 5–9, idem, ‘Church & Social Change: A Study of Religion in Billingham,
1959–66’, New Christian, 9 March 1967: 11–14 at 12; (Birmingham) K. A. Busia, Urban Churches in Britain:
A Question of Relevance (London: Lutterworth Press, 1966), 27, 111, 153; (Bolton) C. D. Field, ‘Worktown Religion
in 1960’ (2015, unpublished); (Congleton) W. B. Stephens, R. W. Dunning, J. P. Alcock, and M. W. Greenslade,
‘Religion in Congleton’, in W. B. Stephens, ed., History of Congleton (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1970), 201–71 at 205; (Hemel Hempstead) P. Bridges, ‘Congregational Cluster Patterns in Hemel Hempstead New
Town’, Research Bulletin, Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham
(1971): 20–37 at 22; (Kirkby Stephen) D. Middleton, ‘A Social Anthropological Study of Kirkby Stephen’ (PhD
thesis, University of Durham, 1971), 212–14; (Liverpool) W. D. Shannon, ‘A Geography of Organised Religion in
Liverpool’ (BA dissertation, University of Liverpool, 1965), 38–49, R. Gill, The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited (Alder-
shot: Ashgate, 2003), 154–5; (Rotherham) P. Dodd, ‘Census of Attendance in Anglican Churches in the County
Borough of Rotherham’ (1964, unpublished), idem, ‘Who Goes to Church?’, New Society, 29 April 1965: 22;
(Sheffield) M. Reardon, Christian Unity in Sheffield (Sheffield: Sheffield Council of Churches, 1967), chart I; (South
Norfolk) P. D. Varney, ‘Religion in Rural Norfolk’, in D. A. Martin and M. Hill, eds., A Sociological Yearbook of
Religion in Britain, 3 (London: SCM Press, 1970), 65–77 at 67–70; (Swindon) R. G. Gregory-Stevenson, ‘Analysis
of Church Allegiance in Swindon, Wiltshire’ (1966, unpublished), K. Hudson, An Awkward Size for a Town:
A Study of Swindon at the 100,000 Mark (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1967), 174–7.

guaranteed. Some censuses were also incomplete, in failing to secure data from
some of the smallest denominations.
Table 4.5 therefore incorporates a rather disparate set of statistics, but
several observations can still be made. First, total attendances on an ordinary
Sunday, uncorrected for twicing, nowhere represented more than 18 per cent
of the population. This is consistent with previous research which has dem-
onstrated that the fall in weekly churchgoing was a long-term phenomenon; in
no way was it a sudden response to a religious crisis in the 1960s. Second, there
was ongoing decline, exemplified in the three-point fall in adult congregations
92 Secularization in the Long 1960s

at Billingham between 1959 and 1966, affecting all three denominational

clusters. Third, in urban environments, higher levels of attendance were
associated with a strong Catholic presence, as in Billingham, the Birmingham
suburb, Bolton, and the four wards of Liverpool (Abercromby, Childwall,
South Scotland, and Speke). Indeed, in Billingham and Liverpool, Catholics
accounted for the majority of all worshippers, while at Bolton the growth in
the Catholic community was actually responsible for an increase in the total
rate of churchgoing between 1937–8 and 1960.33 Fourth, if south Norfolk was
typical, then overall attendance was also higher in rural districts than in
towns and cities. However, there was an exceptionally wide range (from 4 to
38 per cent) in attendance ratios for individual parishes in south Norfolk,
suggesting that rurality itself was not the only factor at play.34 Anglican
congregations were likewise at their relative peak in the countryside and
otherwise did not exceed 5 per cent of the population, even in historic
cathedral cities such as York.35 Fifth, the lowest level of churchgoing was
in Hemel Hempstead New Town, reinforcing evidence from the 1950s that
post-war urban redevelopment disrupted religious practice36 and underscor-
ing Christian concerns about the problems as well as opportunities which New
Towns posed to the faith.37
These local counts from the 1960s add to our knowledge of other aspects of
church attendance. They confirm, for instance, that women predominated
among worshippers, accounting for 59 per cent of congregants in Banbury,
Billingham, Birmingham, Hemel Hempstead, and Rotherham combined;
60 per cent in the Church of England; 59 per cent in the Free Churches; and
56 per cent in the Roman Catholic Church. Adults in the pews also seemed to
be getting older: in Banbury and Billingham just over two-fifths were aged 45

33
T. Harrisson, Britain Revisited (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), 74, 78; C. D. Field,
‘Religion in Worktown: Anatomy of a Mass-Observation Sub-Project’, Northern History 53
(2016): 116–37 at 121; idem, ‘Worktown Religion in 1960’ (2015, unpublished).
34
P. D. Varney, ‘Religion in Rural Norfolk’, in D. A. Martin and M. Hill, eds., A Sociological
Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 3 (London: SCM Press, 1970), 65–77 at 70. This may have been
probed further in the 1964 MA thesis on which this essay was based, but it has proved impossible
to locate a copy. More isolated examples of levels of churchgoing in the East Anglian countryside
can be found in P. F. Jennings, The Living Village: A Report on Rural Life in England and Wales,
Based on Actual Village Scrapbooks (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968), 175; R. E. Pahl,
‘Newcomers in Town and Country’, in L. M. Munby, ed., East Anglian Studies (Cambridge:
W. Heffer & Sons, 1968), 174–99 at 184; R. Blythe, Akenfield: Portrait of an English Village
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), 64, 68–9.
35
Gill, ‘Empty’ Church Revisited, 248–9. 36
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 57.
37
Evangelical Alliance New Towns Study Group, Evangelical Strategy in the New Towns
(London: Scripture Union, 1971); C. R. T. Nankivell, ‘Religion and the New Towns: A Survey of
the Interaction between the Religious Organizations and the English New Towns’ (MSocSc
thesis, University of Birmingham, 1979); R. W. Frost, ‘The Response of the Methodist Church
Home Mission Division to the British New Town Movement from 1960 to 1980, with Special
Reference to its Attempts to Plant New Churches in Skelmersdale and Milton Keynes’ (PhD
thesis, University of London, 1995).
 Behaving—Churchgoing 93

and over, rising to 55 per cent in the Free Churches, while in Bradford, Derby,
and Lambeth in the early 1970s one-half of all places of worship had less than
one-quarter of their adult congregations under 40.38 Twicing remained sur-
prisingly resilient, especially in the Church of England, with one-quarter of
individual attenders in south Norfolk frequenting two services on Sunday
and one-fifth in Rotherham; this was better than the 17 per cent achieved by
Manchester’s Congregationalists in 1966–7, despite the reputation of the Free
Churches for diligence in twicing.39 Regularity of attendance week-by-week
was less often studied, although in Preston in 1968, where a census was held on
four Sundays, it was found that only 21 per cent of Anglican worshippers had
been present on all four occasions, with a plurality of 46 per cent attending on
just one of the four Sundays (with 21 per cent coming twice and 12 per cent
three times).40
Irregularity was often associated with festival services, which tended to have
greater appeal than more ‘ordinary’ acts of worship. Festivals were of varying
types, ranging from milestones in the ecclesiastical calendar (such as Christ-
mas or Easter) to more community-focused events such as harvest festivals,
Remembrance Sunday, carol services, and—in the Free Churches—chapel or
Sunday school anniversaries. Collectively, they helped define the cycle of the
year for many people and triggered folk religious sentiments.41 In south
Norfolk, factoring in this full spectrum of services, Varney found that 33 per
cent of the population were at public worship on festivals, twice the proportion
on a typical Sunday in the Church of England and the Free Churches, with
89 per cent achieved in one parish. The Catholics of south Norfolk were the
exception in reporting a more modest churchgoing uplift of one-fifth arising
from festivals, and at Billingham in 1959 and 1966 their Easter Sunday
attendance was no different than on an ordinary Sunday. For the town’s
Anglicans, by contrast, Easter swelled congregations by 114 per cent and
even in the Free Churches the Easter boost was 22 per cent, albeit it was a
more modest 8 per cent among Manchester’s Congregationalists.42

38
A. Holmes, Church, Property, and People: A Study of the Attitudes of Churches to their
Property in Three Multi-Racial, Multi-Faith Areas—Bradford, Derby, and Lambeth (London:
British Council of Churches, 1973), 9–10.
39
P. L. Sissons, ‘Ethical, Social, and Theological Diversity in Contemporary Manchester
Congregationalism’ (MA thesis, University of Manchester, 1967), 350.
40
A. Mercer, J. S. O’Neil, and A. J. Shepherd, ‘The Churching of Urban England’, in
J. Lawrence, ed., OR69: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Operational Research
(London: Tavistock, 1970), 725–39 at 728–9; A. B. Miskin, ‘Attendance in the Church of
England: A Pastoral Analysis’ (PhD thesis, University of Surrey, 1977), 128–9.
41
See, in general, R. Hutton, The Stations of the Sun: A History of the Ritual Year in Britain
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and, for a case study from the 1970s, D. Clark, Between
Pulpit and Pew: Folk Religion in a North Yorkshire Fishing Village (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), especially 91–109.
42
Sissons, ‘Ethical, Social, and Theological Diversity’, 350.
94 Secularization in the Long 1960s

The single local count hitherto identified from the 1970s is for Machynlleth
in 1974, where 18 per cent of adults were churchgoers.43 This apparent dearth
of local information for the decade might not be thought problematical given
there were national censuses of attendance in England in 1979, Wales in 1982,
and Scotland in 1984, as discussed previously. Unfortunately, there was no
disaggregation of results from these censuses beyond the county level which,
for most purposes, is too large and undifferentiated a spatial unit for commu-
nity analysis. Not until the English church census of 1989 and the Scottish census
of 1994 were breakdowns included for environment (on the urban–rural con-
tinuum) within counties, and not until 1989 were statistics gathered by local
authorities in England.
There are only two qualifications to this generalization. One was that the
Greater London returns for 1979 were re-examined and attempts made to
compute adult attendance in inner Greater London. The final figures from this
calculation (210,000 in 1975 and 199,000 in 1979, the latter equivalent to 10
per cent of the adult population) can be compared with 680,000 worshippers
(excluding children) in the same area when last enumerated in 1902–3.44 The
other exception was in Scotland in 1984 where adult attenders (rather than
attendances) were given for four cities: 15,190 in Aberdeen (representing 9 per
cent of adult residents); 17,760 in Dundee (12 per cent); 42,040 in Edinburgh
(12 per cent); and 115,710 in Glasgow (19 per cent).45 The high rate of practice
in Glasgow reflected the strength of Catholicism, which provided 63 per cent
of all attenders in the city, against just 13 per cent in Aberdeen. Even so,
Glaswegians had become rather less observant than in 1954, when adult
participation had been 20 per cent at just the main (invariably morning)
services of the eight principal denominations.46 For comparative data for
Aberdeen and Dundee, it is necessary to travel even further back in time, to
1911 and 1901, respectively, when one-fifth of adults in each case worshipped
in the morning.47

43
G. Day and M. Fitton, ‘Religious Organization and Community in Mid-Wales’, in
G. Williams, ed., Social and Cultural Change in Contemporary Wales (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1978), 242–52 at 246.
44
Variant versions of 1979 figures in Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the
Eighties, II, 74; P. W. Brierley, ‘Greater London’, Church Growth Digest (Spring 1982): 14–17, 22;
and idem, Prospects for the Nineties, 296–9. 1902–3 data from R. Mudie-Smith, ed., The Religious
Life of London (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1904), 270–1.
45
Brierley and Macdonald, Prospects for Scotland, 70–1, 76–7, 90–1, 98–9.
46
Glasgow Herald, 11 October 1954, 23 September 1955; British Weekly, 10 and 17 November
1955, 22 August 1957; J. Highet, ‘The Churches’, in J. Cunnison and J. B. S. Gilfillan, eds., The
Third Statistical Account of Scotland: Glasgow (Glasgow: Collins, 1958), 713–50 at 728–34,
956–7; idem, Scottish Churches, 62–3, 103–4.
47
Field, ‘ “Faith Society”?’, 48–9.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 95

NATION AL SA MPLE SURVEYS

The British Institute of Public Opinion seems to have been the first survey
agency to have included a question about churchgoing in a poll of a repre-
sentative sample of adult Britons, in 1937. The topic was explored on many
occasions thereafter, although it never became a standard background variable
in any pollster’s work. There is a published checklist (not guaranteed to be
complete) of relevant sample surveys to 1982.48 Two main considerations
impact the utility of these data.
First, there is a lack of methodological standardization, which makes trend
analysis of polls on churchgoing problematical, even within those conducted
by the same organization or within a single series. There was considerable
variation in the wording of the questions which were asked and, in some
studies, ambiguity about whether attendance solely for the rites of passage
(services of baptism, marriage, and burial) counted or not. Given that, accord-
ing to MORI, by 1981 no fewer than 42 per cent of adults admitted they
attended church solely for these rites,49 this was a material consideration. The
coding of the frequency of churchgoing was also not constant, often necessi-
tating compression of response codes in order to secure comparability over
time, albeit at the loss of granularity of results. Some questions were only put
to interviewees who had previously declared a denominational allegiance,
meaning that religious nones were denied the opportunity to record any
residual involvement they may have had in public worship. This was the
approach adopted, for example, in nine Gallup investigations for the European
Economic Community between 1973 and 1980 (shown, in collapsed version,
in Table 4.6). Some potentially useful sources exhibit a changing combination
of several of these issues, notably a superficially attractive series from BES.50
Alongside such methodological inconsistency, which will account for much
of the apparent volatility of results between different surveys, we must addition-
ally reckon with people’s tendency to over-report their churchgoing frequency
(as well as many other aspects of ‘virtuous’ behaviour). As we have noted in
Chapter 1, this is a well-known international phenomenon, which was already
manifest in British polls during the long 1950s.51 Faced with a question on their

48
C. D. Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, in W. F. Maunder, ed., Religion, Reviews of
United Kingdom Statistical Sources 20 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), 389–404.
49
Unpublished.
50
I. Crewe, A. Fox, and N. Day, The British Electorate, 1963–1992: A Compendium of Data
from the British Election Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 458, 476–7.
The churchgoing data from these studies have been used by J. R. Tilley, ‘Secularization and Aging
in Britain: Does Family Formation Cause Greater Religiosity?’, Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 42 (2003): 269–78; idem, ‘ “We Don’t Do God”? Religion and Party Choice in Britain’,
British Journal of Political Science 45 (2015): 907–27.
51
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 55–6.
96 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 4.6 Claimed church attendance, adults, Great Britain, 1973–80
(percentages across)
N= Weekly Less often Never No religion

1973 1,933 16 38 21 26
1975 1,138 15 41 16 26
1976 2,079 16 37 17 29
1977 2,177 17 35 18 29
1978 2,157 14 39 20 27
1980 1,135 17 35 19 29

Note: The question was: ‘Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religion? [If so] Do you go
to religious services . . . ?’
Sources: (1973) ‘European Communities Study, 1973’, dataset at UKDA, SN 864; (other
years) Centre for Comparative European Survey Data Information System, <http://www.
ccesd.ac.uk>.

religious attendance, respondents occasionally sought refuge in a ‘don’t know’

option (selected by as many as one-third of the sample in a survey by NOP in
1972),52 or they were tempted to answer in an aspirational fashion. They
implicitly said what they judged they ought to be doing or would like to be
doing, or what they felt others expected them to be doing, rather than what they
had actually done in the recent past. Therefore, the findings which are assem-
bled in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, from reasonably comparable surveys of British adults
in the 1960s and 1970s, should not necessarily be taken at face value.
If regular church attendance is defined as once a month or more often, then
one-fifth to one-quarter of Britons self-assigned themselves as regular church-
goers throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s (Table 4.7). The proportion
fluctuated but there seems to have been a distinct dip from the level prevailing
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Discounting monthly attenders, the number
claiming to worship weekly from the mid-1960s was approximately one in
seven, the percentage generally being a little higher in the European Economic
Community polls (Table 4.6) than in the miscellaneous polls (Table 4.7).
A similar proportion emerged from a different question, inviting respondents
to select from a list of activities they had undertaken on the Sunday prior
to interview, rather than to report how often they went to church. In Britain
14 per cent of adults informed Gallup they had worshipped the previous
Sunday in 1957, 12 per cent in 1958, 14 per cent in 1968, and 14 per cent
still in 1985;53 in England where, as noted earlier, churchgoing was lowest
among the three home nations, it was 10 per cent in 1963–4.54 ORC returned a

52
NOP Political Bulletin 110 (1972): 19.
53
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 403–4, 467; News Chronicle, 22 May 1958; Sunday Telegraph, 14 April
1968; G. Heald and R. J. Wybrow, The Gallup Survey of Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 227.
54
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion (London: University of London Press,
1964), 19–22, 117.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 97
Table 4.7 Claimed church attendance, adults, Great Britain, 1957–80 (percentages
across)
Year Agency N= Weekly Monthly Weekly/ Less often Never Less often/
monthly never

1955 Daily Express ? 24 7 31 49 20 69

1957 Gallup 2,261 NA NA 28 33 39 72
1961 ITA 700 NA NA 29 13 58 71
1963 BMRB 2,009 17 10 27 50 23 73
1966 Gallup 1,501 20 6 26 42 32 74
1968 Gallup 1,000 NA NA 21 36 43 79
1970 Harris 2,472 15 6 21 49 30 79
1970 NOP 1,396 17 11 28 18 53 71
1971 SCPR 2,030 14 10 24 56 20 76
1973 SCPR 1,319 15 8 23 54 23 77
1974 LHR 1,093 14 7 21 37 42 79
1978 Gallup 11,061 13 6 19 49 32 81
1978 NOP 3,837 13 7 20 26 54 80
1979 Marplan 988 17 6 23 18 59 77
1979 RSL 1,893 14 7 21 58 18 76
1981 MORI 1,886 14 8 22 62 17 79
1981 NOP 1,991 12 8 20 24 56 80
1982 Gallup 5,800 15 9 24 32 44 76
Sources: Unpublished except for: (1961) Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Inde-
pendent Television (London: the Authority, 1962), 56; (1963) ‘Political Change in Britain, 1963–1970’, dataset
at UKDA, SN 44; (1966) ‘This is Your Sunday’, Sunday 1/1 (1966): 4–6 at 5; (1968) Sunday Telegraph, 14
April 1968; (1971) ‘Britain in the Seventies, 1971’, dataset at UKDA, SN 84; (1973) ‘Britain and the Seventies,
1973’, dataset at UKDA, SN 117; (1979, Marplan) ‘Now! Religion Survey, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1366;
(1979, RSL) ‘British Election Study, May 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1533; (1981, NOP) Political, Social,
Economic Review 35 (1982): 21–3.

figure of 16 per cent attending ‘last Sunday’ in 1968,55 but IPC Surveys
Division in the same year recorded only 9 per cent as present at church on
some part of the previous Sunday, during both winter and summer, based
upon a half-hourly audit of what people said they had been doing.56
Three-quarters to four-fifths of Britons were not regular churchgoers. They
comprised persons who worshipped less than monthly and those who never
attended church. In the miscellaneous polls (Table 4.7) there was a huge
variation in the balance between these two categories. This is probably ex-
plained by differences in approach towards the inclusion or exclusion, and
placing, of churchgoing solely in connection with rites of passage. In the
European Economic Community surveys (Table 4.6), by contrast, there was
a more constant ratio of about one-fifth who never attended plus one-quarter
who had no religion, the majority of whom—presumably—never attended,

55
Sunday Times, 22 December 1968.
56
IPC Surveys Division, How People Spend Their Sundays (London: IPC Surveys Division,
1968), viii, appendix B.
98 Secularization in the Long 1960s

also. Gallup surveys in 1957 and 1963–4 revealed that, of non-attenders who
had previously gone to church, more than half dropped out between the ages
of 10 and 20; and that busyness and loss of habit were given as the principal
reasons for abandoning public worship.57 The position of non-attenders
derived moral support from an overwhelming conviction among the British
public that it was not necessary to go to church in order to be a Christian (a
view held by 85 per cent in 1957) nor to lead a good and useful life (95 per cent
in 1963–4), with a corresponding denial by 78 per cent in 1963–4 that
churchgoers led better lives than non-churchgoers.58
A substantial component of less than monthly worshippers consisted of
those who frequented services just at Christmas and/or Easter. Gallup dis-
covered in 1975 that 9 per cent of all adults stated they had last been to church
for one of these two festivals.59 Questioned in the run-up to Christmas, 30–40
per cent of Britons in eight polls between 1964 and 1981 reported that they
expected to go, or normally went, to church over the Christmas period. Even
interviewed after the event, so as to take account of unrealized good intentions,
the proportion claiming actually to have attended Christmas worship was not
significantly lower (for instance, 27 per cent in 1968 and 38 per cent in 1982).
Factoring in that many people would not have frequented a Christmas service
every year, the ranks of those who could reasonably profess to be Christmas
worshippers at some stage in the recent past were swollen to an absolute
majority of the population, 75 per cent according to LHR in 1969.60 No less
inflated claims were advanced in relation to Easter church attendance, 27 per
cent of all Britons anticipating worshipping at Easter 1968, 32 per cent of
Protestants in 1970, and 28 per cent of English residents in 1982. These claims
seem hard to reconcile with the evidence already reviewed regarding Easter
communicants and attendances in the Church of England, to which, of all
denominations, Easter gave the greatest uplift in religious practice.61
Self-reported churchgoing on ordinary Sundays was not likely to have been as
much overstated as at the great festivals. The three national censuses at the end
of our period—in England in 1979, Wales in 1982, and Scotland in 1984—
provide a means of independent verification of, and challenge to, the polling
data. In Table 4.8 the proportion of adults present at worship on census Sunday
is contrasted with claims made for weekly attendance in sample surveys for each

57
News Chronicle, 17 April 1957; Gallup, GIPOP, I, 404; Social Surveys (Gallup Poll),
Television and Religion, 58–9, 128.
58
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 405; Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 37–8, 54–6,
122, 126.
59
Unpublished.
60
C. D. Field, ‘When a Child is Born: The Christian Dimension of Christmas in Britain since
the 1960s’, Modern Believing 40/3 (1999): 29–40 at 33–6.
61
C. D. Field, ‘ “It’s All Chicks and Going Out”: The Observance of Easter in Post-War
Britain’, Theology 101 (1998): 82–90 at 85–7.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 99
Table 4.8 Claimed versus actual church attendance, adults, England, Wales, and
Scotland, 1976–87 (percentages across)
Country Year Agency N= Weekly or Monthly Less often
more or more or never

Claimed attendance from sample surveys

England 1978 Gallup 9,478 12 6 82
England 1978 NOP 3,290 12 7 81
England 1981 NOP 1,692 12 7 81
Wales 1978 Gallup 578 12 6 83
Wales 1979 Gallup 858 17 8 75
Scotland 1976 System Three 1,044 20 13 67
Scotland 1978 Gallup 1,005 19 10 71
Scotland 1979 RSL 729 23 10 67
Scotland 1980 System Three 1,014 20 14 66
Scotland 1983 System Three 1,044 20 10 69
Scotland 1987 System Three 1,037 20 7 72
Actual attendance from church censuses
England 1979 11 NA NA
Wales 1982 13 NA NA
Scotland 1984 17 NA NA
Sources: Sample surveys unpublished except for: (Wales, 1979) ‘Welsh Election Study, 1979’, dataset at
UKDA, SN 1591; (Scotland, 1976) Glasgow Herald, 11 October 1976; (Scotland, 1979) ‘Scottish Election
Study, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1604; (Scotland, 1980) Glasgow Herald, 27 October 1980; (Scotland, 1983)
Sunday Standard, 24 April 1983.

of the three home nations around the same time. In England congregations on
census day amounted to 11 per cent of the adult population, perhaps reduced to
9 per cent if twicers are deducted, whereas the three surveys showed 12 per cent
professing to be at worship each week plus one-quarter of the monthly church-
goers who might have been expected to be present on any one Sunday.
Therefore, surveys over-reported attendance by around one-half. In Wales
attenders at the census amounted to 13 per cent of adults in the principality,
corrected for twicing. This was 6 per cent less than the higher of two sample
surveys for the principality, 17 per cent claiming to go weekly plus one-quarter
of the 8 per cent going monthly—another exaggeration of the order of one-half.
In Scotland 17 per cent of adults were attenders at the 1984 census while the six
surveys returned approximately one-fifth at worship each week plus one-quarter
of the 10 per cent or so recorded as monthly churchgoers, representing an
overstatement by about one-third.
There is insufficient evidence to say whether over-claiming of churchgoing
in the polls was practised by some sections of society more than others. What
is clear from sample surveys is that reports of attendance frequency varied by
demographics, as they had done in the long 1950s.62 In the interests of

62
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 56–8.
100 Secularization in the Long 1960s

economy, Table 4.9 summarizes data from just one of many surveys which
could have been cited to illustrate demographic effects, a cumulation of Gallup
polls for 1978 with a combined sample of 11,000 individuals.
Women were 10 points more likely than men to be regular (monthly or
more) attenders and 13 points less likely never to attend. Non-attenders
peaked at 41 per cent among young adults (aged 16–24) and progressively
declined until the 55–64 cohort before rising to 30 per cent among the over-
65s, even though the latter had the highest proportion (27 per cent) of regular
churchgoers. The elderly’s propensity for religious attendance was confirmed
in several detailed studies during the 1960s and 1970s,63 and the number of
non-attenders may well have been as much a consequence of health con-
straints as of disinclination. In terms of social grade, regular attendance was
greatest among the ABs (upper, professional, and higher managerial classes)
and lowest with the C2s (skilled manual workers), closely followed by DEs
(semi- and unskilled manual workers and those on subsistence income).
Reflecting this, council tenants had the smallest proportion of regular church-
goers and those who had already bought their houses the most (14 per cent
versus 26 per cent, respectively).
Regionally, the highest levels of claimed regular attendance were
recorded in Scotland (29 per cent) and the North-West (22 per cent).
Historically, Greater London had a reputation for non-churchgoing, but
it was no longer in bottom position by 1978; indeed, fuelled by immigra-
tion, it was already on its way to becoming what it is today, arguably the
most churchgoing part of England.64 East Anglia, the East Midlands, extra-
metropolitan southern England, and the North-East were the regions with
proportionately fewest regular worshippers. The North-West’s relatively
strong performance exemplified the concentration of Roman Catholicism
there, Catholics being, according to the polls, the most practising of all
denominations, one-half attending church weekly or monthly, four times
more than in the Church of England. With 38 per cent regular church-
goers, the Free Churches were the next most observant group, and religious
nones the least, albeit 15 per cent were occasional worshippers. The Free
Church tradition of voting Liberal probably explains why that party out-
scored the Conservatives and Labour in the churchgoing league table,
notwithstanding Labour’s strong appeal to Catholics.

63
For details, see Field, ‘Non-Recurrent Christian Data’, 269–71.
64
Cf. C. D. Field, ‘Faith in the Metropolis: Opinion Polls and Christianity in Post-War
London’, London Journal 24 (1999): 68–84 at 72–5. For the most recent London church census,
see P. W. Brierley, Capital Growth: What the 2012 London Church Census Reveals (Tonbridge:
ADBC Publishers, 2013).
 Behaving—Churchgoing 101
Table 4.9 Claimed church attendance by demographics, adults, Great
Britain, 1978 (percentages across)
Weekly or more Monthly or more Occasionally Never

Total 13 6 49 32
Gender
Men 9 4 48 39
Women 15 8 52 26
Age
16–24 10 4 45 41
25–34 9 7 49 36
35–44 12 7 52 28
45–54 13 7 53 28
55–64 14 8 53 26
65+ 20 7 43 30
Social grade
AB 17 10 44 28
C1 15 7 49 30
C2 10 5 51 34
DE 12 5 49 34
Housing tenure
Owners—paid for 17 9 48 26
Owners—buying 11 6 53 30
Renters—council 10 4 50 36
Renters—private 11 5 45 39
Region
North 13 7 49 32
North-East 11 5 54 30
North-West 17 5 47 31
East Midlands 10 5 54 32
West Midlands 10 7 54 29
East Anglia 8 6 55 31
Greater London 14 6 44 36
Rest of South 10 6 50 34
South-West 12 8 52 28
Wales 12 6 50 33
Scotland 19 10 38 33
Religion
Church of England 6 6 58 30
Church of Scotland 12 10 47 31
Free Church 28 10 46 17
Roman Catholic 42 8 32 18
Other 26 7 38 30
None 2 0 13 85
Voting intention
Conservative 13 8 52 27
Labour 10 4 49 36
Liberal 17 6 48 30
Source: Gallup, unpublished, N = 11,061.
102 Secularization in the Long 1960s

LOCAL SAMPLE SURVEYS

Frequency of churchgoing was also investigated in local sample surveys, and a

selection of these is summarized in Table 4.10. Priority has been given to
academic community studies employing a recognized sampling methodology,
and potentially unrepresentative church-led house-to-house surveys of par-
ticular neighbourhoods have been omitted. Preference has also been shown to
studies based on interviews with more than 500 respondents and which
covered an entire community. This latter criterion has excluded some impor-
tant research, such as a cluster of projects examining socially and ethnically
diverse districts of Birmingham.65 As with the national polls, question-
wording varied, typically falling into one of two types, either asking how
often respondents attended religious services or when they had last done so.
The metropolitan region was full of contrasts, and nowhere was this more
evident than in the divergent claimed church attendance of residents in two
Essex suburbs which became part of Greater London in 1965. Dagenham was
a predominantly working-class area centred on the Becontree (council) estate,
with no more than 8 per cent of its adults reporting monthly or more public
worship in 1958–9 and 82 per cent saying they never attended services.
In middle-class Woodford, by contrast, monthly or more attenders formed
27 per cent of the population in 1959, with far fewer (46 per cent) never
worshipping. The position in Greater London as a whole in 1960 was illumi-
nated in the unpublished Third Londoner Survey by David Glass. Professed
monthly or more churchgoing was perhaps then of the order of 20 per cent,
including 14 per cent weekly; regrettably, Glass did not have a response code
for monthly, only for fortnightly (2 per cent). The monthly or more figure
remained unchanged, at 20 per cent, in 1978 (Table 4.9) and probably in 1981,
when 15 per cent of Londoners still claimed they attended weekly.
The pattern in England outside London is less obvious, partly because of a
lack of replication of surveys in the same place, and partly through methodo-
logical differences. Continuing higher churchgoing in rural than in urban

65
In addition to the Small Heath survey (Table 4.10), see C. R. Hinings, ‘The Balsall Heath
Survey: A Report’, Research Bulletin, Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architec-
ture, University of Birmingham (1967): 56–72 at 61; idem, ‘Church and Community: The Hodge
Hill Survey’, Research Bulletin, Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture,
University of Birmingham (1968): 21–37 at 26; J. A. Rex and R. S. Moore, Race, Community, and
Conflict: A Study of Sparkbrook, reprinted with corrections (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), 78–9, 96–7, 114, 129, 173; C. S. Rodd, ‘Religiosity and its Correlates: Hall Green,
Birmingham’, in A. Bryman, ed., Religion in the Birmingham Area: Essays in the Sociology of
Religion (Birmingham: Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University
of Birmingham, 1975), 99–111 at 102; P. Ratcliffe, Racism and Reaction: A Profile of Handsworth
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 82–6; M. R. D. Johnson, ‘ “Race”, Religion, and
Ethnicity: Religious Observance in the West Midlands’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 8 (1985):
426–37 at 430–2.
 Behaving—Churchgoing 103
Table 4.10 Claimed church attendance, adults, English and Welsh communities,
1958–81 (percentages across)
Year Place N= Weekly Monthly Weekly/ Less Never Less often/
monthly often never

London area
1958–9 Dagenham 877 NA NA 8 10 82 92
1959 Woodford 939 15 12 27 26 46 72
1960 Greater London 4,979 14 2 16 57 26 83
1981 Greater London 2,734 15 NA 15 23 62 85
Rest of England
1959–60 Newcastle-under-Lyme 883 NA NA 36 NA NA 64
(borough)
1959–60 Newcastle-under-Lyme 633 NA NA 47 NA NA 53
(rural)
1962 Gloucester ? NA NA 33 14 53 67
1965 Hampshire villages 1,694 16 15 31 23 45 68
1970 Salford 604 17 8 25 24 50 74
1973–4 Stoke-on-Trent 753 5 9 14 11 75 86
1973–4 Sunderland 770 5 11 16 11 74 85
1974 Birmingham (Small 1,744 25 9 34 NA NA 66
Heath)
1974 North-East New Towns 679 NA NA 12 NA NA 88
Wales
1960 Swansea 1,957 23 12 35 NA NA 65
c.1970 Diocese of Bangor 2,504 34 22 56 NA NA 45
1971 Cardiganshire 713 37 15 52 15 33 48
Sources: (Birmingham, Small Heath) J. Morton-Williams and R. Stowell, Inner Area Study, Birmingham—
Small Heath, Birmingham: A Social Survey (London: Department of the Environment, 1975), 32, ‘Small
Heath, Birmingham: An Inner Area Study, 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 717; (Cardiganshire) P. J. Madgwick, with
N. Griffiths and V. Walker, The Politics of Rural Wales: A Study of Cardiganshire (London: Hutchinson, 1973),
66–7, 72, 77, 84, 254, ‘Political Culture of Cardiganshire, 1971’, dataset at UKDA, SN 71006; (Dagenham)
P. Willmott, The Evolution of a Community: A Study of Dagenham After Forty Years (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1963), 86, 140; (Diocese of Bangor) C. C. Harris, Facing the Future Together: The Report of the Bangor
Diocesan Survey (Bangor: Church in Wales Diocesan Office, [1973]), 175–7, 181–90; (Gloucester) A. T. Allen, ‘An
Investigation into the Social Structure of the Population of Gloucester CB’ (MLitt thesis, University of Durham,
1964), 193–200; (Greater London, 1960) unpublished; (Greater London, 1981) The Standard, 24 September 1981;
(Hampshire villages) Mass-Observation, Village Life in Hampshire: A Report by Mass-Observation Ltd and
Hampshire County Planning Department (Winchester: Hampshire County Council, 1966), 14–15, ‘Village Life
in Hampshire, 1965’, dataset at UKDA, SN 65006; (Newcastle-under-Lyme) F. Bealey, J. Blondel, and
W. P. McCann, Constituency Politics: A Study of Newcastle-Under-Lyme (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), 423;
(North-East New Towns) M. P. A. Macourt, Church Attenders: Their Identification and their Characteristics,
North-East Area Study Working Papers 27 (Durham: University of Durham North-East Area Study, 1976), ‘North
East Area Study, 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 522; (Salford) ‘Salford Participation Survey’, dataset at UKDA, SN
70003; (Stoke-on-Trent) ‘Quality of Life’, dataset at UKDA, SN 250; (Sunderland) ‘Quality of Life’, dataset at
UKDA, SN 251; (Swansea) C. Rosser and C. C. Harris, The Family and Social Change: A Study of Family and
Kinship in a South Wales Town (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 122, 128–9, 132; (Woodford) P. Willmott
and M. Young, Family and Class in a London Suburb (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 93, 116.

communities seems to be confirmed by studies of the rural wards in

Newcastle-under-Lyme parliamentary constituency and of Hampshire villages.
The extremely low weekly rate of 5 per cent in Stoke-on-Trent and Sunderland
may be related to the fact that the question about attendance at religious services
104 Secularization in the Long 1960s

and meetings was not asked in isolation but as part of a long matrix of leisure
time activities.66 The monthly or more figure of 12 per cent for three New Towns
in the North-East (Newton Aycliffe, Peterlee, and Washington) is probably
artificially depressed by the application of a three-hurdle test. Regular attenders
in this project were restricted to those who said they had last attended within the
past month at an ordinary service or a religious festival, who could name the
denomination of the church holding that service, and who signalled an inten-
tion of worshipping again within the ensuing month. At the other end of the
scale, overseas immigrants accounted for the abnormally high practice in the
inner-city area of Birmingham, Small Heath; 66 per cent of the Irish (invariably
Catholic), 50 per cent of the Asians (predominantly Muslim), and 30 per cent
of West Indians attended services once a week or more. In Sheffield in 1967, 36
per cent of residents self-reported as churchgoers ‘these days’, doubtless a
combination of the weekly, monthly, and less often categories.67
Claimed church attendance in Wales was much higher among Welsh-speakers
than English-speakers. Strongly linked to the tradition of Welsh-speaking
Nonconformity, this correlate explains why the majority of the adult popula-
tion of Cardiganshire and the Diocese of Bangor was returned as monthly or
more churchgoers, whereas in the much more English-speaking Swansea the
proportion was only 35 per cent. Information regarding Scotland is imperfect.
The most substantive published contemporary description of Scottish reli-
gious community life did not feature a proper cross-sectional survey of the
inhabitants of the town concerned, Falkirk.68 The one large-scale study in
Edinburgh was confined to the generally very affluent West End in 1974 and,
unsurprisingly, showed weekly attendance at 36 per cent, with a further 11 per
cent worshipping monthly.69 In Glasgow, in 1973, a question about church-
going was only put to those in a city-wide sample who professed to belong to
some religion. It was also rather vague in nature, 39 per cent of Glaswegians
stating they had attended church ‘in the last few weeks’.70 They would have
been disproportionately Catholic.

66
J. Hall and N. Perry, Aspects of Leisure in Two Industrial Cities (London: SSRC Survey Unit,
1974), 27–8.
67
W. A. Hampton, Democracy and Community: A Study of Politics in Sheffield (London:
Oxford University Press, 1970), 148–9.
68
P. L. Sissons, The Social Significance of Church Membership in the Burgh of Falkirk
(Edinburgh: Church of Scotland, 1973).
69
R. Gill, ‘Who Goes to Church in Scotland? A Further Sociological Perspective’, Liturgical
Review 6 (1976): 48–53.
70
‘Local Government Services: Strathclyde Area Survey, 1973’, dataset at UKDA, SN 321.
 5

Behaving—Other Practices

RITES OF P ASSAGE

Rites of passage were associated with the major milestones in life—birth,

marriage, and death—and had traditionally been inextricably bound up with
religion, often marked by a religious service which attracted as attenders many
close family and friends who were not otherwise regular churchgoers. Birth
was marked by two rites—baptism (generally performed on infants) and the
churching of mothers after childbirth. Not all Christian denominations per-
formed infant baptisms, some (notably the Baptists) only practising believer’s
baptism, but they mostly offered some form of alternative service of welcome
for the new-born which carried fewer theological connotations about entry
into the Church. On account of fluctuations in the birth rate, absolute figures
of infant baptisms have only limited value. They need to be related to the
number of live births in the same year and, since infant baptisms were usually
performed several weeks or months after birth, ideally to the number of live
births adjusted for early neonatal mortality, to exclude babies who died before
they had the opportunity of baptism.1
Callum Brown views baptism as a key religious performance indicator
whose serious decline commenced in the 1960s, which ‘was clearly a sharp
turning point in the history of Christian baptism in Scotland and England
from which there has been no remission but instead a deepening crisis’.2 This
is something of an overstatement as, in the Church of England (the biggest
single denominational provider of infant baptisms) at least, the relative fall
pre-dated the Second World War.3 Nevertheless, the take-up of infant baptism

1
This ultimately proved too complicated an adjustment to make with any precision here, but
it has been done for a long-term study of Church of England baptisms: D. Voas, ‘Intermarriage
and the Demography of Secularization’, British Journal of Sociology 54 (2003): 83–108 at 98–101.
2
C. G. Brown, Religion and the Demographic Revolution: Women and Secularisation in
Canada, Ireland, UK, and USA since the 1960s (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 215.
3
R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England, Number 3 (London: Church
Information Office, 1965), 54; Voas, ‘Intermarriage and the Demography of Secularization’,
98–101.
106 Secularization in the Long 1960s

undoubtedly remained impressive in the long 1950s,4 and in 1961 even the
majority of disbelievers in God said they had or would have their children
baptized.5 It is significant that the leading proponent of secularization theory
in the mid-1960s (Bryan Wilson) had to focus his efforts on explaining the
persistence of baptism in England. He attributed its continuing popularity to
‘a child-centred society’ (‘baptism is another of the welfare services to which
children can be exposed certainly without harm, and possibly with benefit’);
and the prevalence of superstitious reasons in working-class communities
(‘a child who is unbaptized will always be unlucky, it is said’).6 The folk
religious and social custom components of the celebration of birth were still
evident in diverse local environments during the 1960s and early 1970s.7
Turning to hard data, Table 5.1 presents statistics of infant baptism for the
major denominations (Church of England, Church of Scotland, Methodist
Church, and Roman Catholic Church) for the years between 1958 and 1980
when Church of England returns were made. It will be seen that, relative to live
births, there was a continuous drop in the figures, from 75 per cent at the start
of the period to 51 per cent at the end. The steepest proportionate decline
occurred, not in the early 1960s, as one might have anticipated from Brown’s
arguments, but thereafter. Indeed, in absolute terms, 1964 was something of a
high-point for infant baptisms in the Church of England, the Roman Catholic
Church in England and Wales, and the Methodist Church, whereas the peaks
in the Church of Scotland and the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland
occurred in 1962. Between 1964 and 1980 infant baptisms in these major
denominations decreased by 47 per cent in the aggregate; 48 per cent in the
Church of England; 45 per cent in the Roman Catholic Church in England and
Wales; 45 per cent in the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland; 39 per cent in
the Methodist Church; and 52 per cent in the Church of Scotland.
Allowance obviously needs to be made for infant baptisms (or equivalent
birth recognition rites) in the smaller denominations. Peter Brierley has made
several attempts to produce estimates of infant baptisms per live births in the
United Kingdom for decennial years in the twentieth century, but they are all
too low. For example, his most recent calculation resulted in figures of 74 per
cent in 1960, 64 per cent in 1970, and 53 per cent in 1980, which are very close

4
C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing
in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 62.
5
NOP, unpublished.
6
B. R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment (London: C. A. Watts,
1966), 10, 12.
7
R. P. M. Sykes, ‘Popular Religion in Dudley and the Gornals, c.1914–1965’ (PhD thesis,
University of Wolverhampton, 1999), 96–101, 176–80; P. Jarvis, ‘Towards a Sociological Under-
standing of Superstition’, Social Compass 27 (1980): 285–95 at 289; D. Clark, Between Pulpit and
Pew: Folk Religion in a North Yorkshire Fishing Village (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 113–26.
 Behaving—Other Practices 107
Table 5.1 Infant baptisms, four major denominations, Great Britain, 1958–80
Church of Roman Roman Methodist Church of Total Total as
England Catholic Catholic Church Scotland % of live
Church Church births
Area England England and Scotland Great Scotland Great Great
Wales Britain Britain Britain

1958 405,663 113,623 24,163 42,000 44,029 629,478 75

1960 411,650 123,425 24,567 43,193 45,305 648,140 73
1962 422,667 134,289 26,015 46,653 46,915 676,539 72
1964 437,274 137,673 25,871 48,405 43,759 692,982 71
1966 412,961 131,890 22,806 46,747 39,461 653,865 69
1968 381,447 120,794 22,492 43,423 36,776 604,932 66
1970 347,167 108,187 20,633 39,405 33,262 548,654 63
1973 297,580 86,391 16,159 34,356 27,721 462,207 62
1976 236,648 71,432 14,005 27,758 22,555 372,398 57
1978 216,650 72,029 13,587 26,484 21,582 350,332 53
1980 226,450 76,352 14,334 29,511 21,144 367,791 51

Note: The Methodist figure for 1958 has been estimated.

Sources: (Church of England) R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England, Number 3
(London: Church Information Office, 1965), 54, R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and
Churchgoers: Patterns of Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977),
167–8, Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Church Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about
the Church of England, 1983 Edition (London: CIO Publishing, 1983), 24; (Roman Catholic Church, England
and Wales) A. E. C. W. Spencer, ‘Demography of Catholicism’, The Month 2nd New Series 8 (1975): 100–5 at
101, Catholic Education Council, Pastoral & Demographic Statistics of the Catholic Church in England &
Wales, 1963–1991, ed. A. E. C. W. Spencer (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2006), 1–31, idem, ed., Digest of
Statistics of the Catholic Community of England & Wales, 1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital
Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation, and Education (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007), 35; (Roman
Catholic Church, Scotland) P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 4, 2003/2004
(London: Christian Research, 2003), 4.12; (Methodist Church) Minutes of the Annual Conference of the
Methodist Church; (Church of Scotland) Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 4, 4.12.

to the totals just for the major denominations in Table 5.1.8 A contemporary
sociologist of religion thought the proportion of children baptized as infants
was of the order of 90 per cent in 1961 and still at least 80 per cent in 1974.9 In
Billingham-on-Tees it was demonstrated to be 94 per cent in 1957, 93 per cent
in 1964, and 88 per cent in 1965.10 On the Roseworth Estate, Stockton-on-Tees

8
P. W. Brierley, A Century of British Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley:
MARC Europe, 1989), 36–40; idem, Religion in Britain, 1900 to 2000 (London: Christian
Research, 1998), 10; idem, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed. with J. Webb, Twentieth-Century
British Social Trends (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 650–74 at 664–5; idem, ed., UK Christian
Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 3, 2002/2003 (London: Christian Research, 2001), 2.2.
9
W. S. F. Pickering, ‘The Present Position of the Anglican and Methodist Churches in the
Light of Available Statistics’, in W. S. F. Pickering, ed., Anglican–Methodist Relations: Some
Institutional Factors (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961), 1–36 at 11; idem, ‘The Persistence
of Rites of Passage: Towards an Explanation’, British Journal of Sociology 25 (1974): 63–78 at 63–4.
10
P. R. Kaim-Caudle, Religion in Billingham, 1957–59 (Billingham-on-Tees: Billingham
Community Association, 1962), 3–4; idem, ‘Church & Social Change: A Study of Religion in
Billingham, 1959–66’, New Christian, 9 March 1967: 11–14 at 11.
108 Secularization in the Long 1960s

in the early 1960s a mere 0.2 per cent of individuals had not been baptized.11
On the whole, factoring in early neonatal mortality, perhaps a maximum of
85 per cent of infants were baptized in Britain in 1960 and a maximum of 60
per cent by 1980, a very substantial reduction. In England, 1968 was the first
year in which the Church of England baptized less than half of live births, the
proportion falling to 37 per cent in 1980. In Scotland at no time since the
union with the United Free Church of Scotland in 1929 had the Church of
Scotland baptized a majority of live births, coming closest in 1959, and by
1980 the figure had dropped to 31 per cent.12
Whatever uncertainties may surround the overall picture, the incomplete data
in Table 5.1 conclusively point to a declining take-up of infant baptism. This
could have arisen from either or both of two factors, one supply- and one
demand-related. On the supply side, it is probably the case, certainly in the
Church of England, that some clergy, particularly evangelicals, progressively
wished to see a more restrictive policy on the provision of baptism. As early as
1965, 87 per cent of one group of evangelical Anglican clergy expressed their
dissatisfaction with arrangements for infant baptism, 59 per cent wanting it
reserved for children of confirmed members.13 However, surveys in the early
1980s showed that any proposed linkage of infant baptism to regularity of
churchgoing on the part of parents was deeply unpopular, not just with parents
but with ordinary church attenders.14 Clergy of a more radical bent even favoured
believer’s baptism, and it is significant in this regard that the Alternative Service
Book 1980 permitted a service of thanksgiving for infants in place of baptism.
So, the explanations for the decline in infant baptism are more likely to be
found on the demand side. The increase in the non-Christian population
during the 1960s and 1970s could only have played a minor part, leaving the
primary cause as some facet of secularization. Infant baptism had still been
considered the ‘right’ thing to do by the public at the start of our period (82 per
cent of adults agreeing with it in a national poll in 1957),15 but it was ceasing to
be normative by 1980. Voas has contended that the diminishing number of

11
L. Paul, The Deployment and Payment of the Clergy: A Report (London: Church Informa-
tion Office, 1964), 28, 287.
12
P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 4, 2003/2004 (London:
Christian Research, 2003), 4.12.
13
Church of England Newspaper, 5 February 1965. A self-selecting sample of 341 clergy and
727 laity responded to the newspaper’s questionnaire on infant baptism, and many also added
comments or sent letters, a large selection of which was published in the editions for 5 and
12 February.
14
R. Kingsbury, ‘Great Expectations: A Summary of What the Ordained Minister Exists to
Do and to Be in Today’s Changing Relationship between Church and State (Using Attitudes to
Infant Baptism as a Case-Study)’ (Research Project, Mid-Service Clergy Course, St George’s
House, Windsor Castle, 1980), 3, AP5; J. Astley and W. S. F. Pickering, ‘Who Cares about Baptism?’,
Theology 89 (1986): 264–8 at 265.
15
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 407. Unfortunately, this question was not replicated in any subsequent
survey.
 Behaving—Other Practices 109

religiously homogeneous couples undermined the predisposition to infant

baptism.16
The second rite associated with childbirth was the churching of women, a
service of purification, blessing, and thanksgiving in celebration of a mother’s
successful delivery of a child. Churching had both biblical and pagan roots,
although its liturgical expression in England can only be traced from the
twelfth century. It emanated from a time when death in childbirth and infant
mortality were commonplace and the Church’s attitudes to even marital sex
were ambiguous. Churching was less pervasive than infant baptism but still
widely observed, by just over one-half of mothers, in the mid-twentieth
century, according to the principal secondary study of the subject, by Margaret
Houlbrooke.17 Sundry local, testimony-based investigations have corrobo-
rated its vitality in the 1950s and much of the 1960s.18 However, its appeal
diminished rapidly from the late 1960s, attributed by Houlbrooke to the
collapse of matriarchy (a woman’s mother and grandmother being strong
influences in perpetuating the tradition); growing female independence; im-
provements in the management of childbirth; the decay of religious affiliation;
and liturgical revision.19 The Churches had long been ambivalent about
churching, not least about the ‘crudest superstitions’ which had become
popularly associated with the purification aspects of the rite,20 and regarded
it as ‘a common problem’ in terms of the liturgical and theological issues
which it raised for them.21 The Church of England and Methodist Church
developed alternative occasional offices to express thanksgiving for the gift of a
child, while after the Second Vatican Council the Roman Catholic Church
largely replaced churching with a blessing at the end of the baptismal service.
Nevertheless, old-style churchings were found to be still widely practised in
two working-class districts in North-East England in the late 1970s,22 and they
even lingered on spasmodically thereafter in both urban and rural areas.23

16
Voas, ‘Intermarriage and the Demography of Secularization’.
17
M. Houlbrooke, Rite Out of Time: A Study of the Ancient Rite of Churching and its Survival
in the Twentieth Century (Donington: Shaun Tyas, 2011), 50, 137.
18
For example, M. Young and P. Willmott, Family and Kinship in East London (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), 39–40; Clark, Between Pulpit and Pew, 119, 122–4; E. Roberts,
Women and Families: An Oral History, 1940–1970 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 99; Sykes, ‘Popular
Religion’, 180–5, 328–31; D. H. McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 109–10; Houlbrooke, Rite Out of Time, 101–24.
19
Houlbrooke, Rite Out of Time, 125–36.
20
S. H. Mayor, ‘The Religion of the British People’, Hibbert Journal 49 (1960–1): 38–43 at 42.
21
D. Tripp and J. Cameron, ‘ “Churching”: A Common Problem of the English Churches’,
Church Quarterly 3 (1970–1): 125–33.
22
M. W. Staton, ‘The Rite of Churching: A Sociological Analysis, with Special Reference to an
Urban Area in Newcastle upon Tyne’ (MA thesis, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1980),
196–273 (Byker, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1978–9), 288–300 (Consett, County Durham, 1975–7).
23
D. Cressy, ‘Purification, Thanksgiving, and the Churching of Women in Post-Reformation
England’, Past and Present 141 (1993): 106–46 at 144n111; Houlbrooke, Rite Out of Time, 134.
110 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 5.2 Marriages by mode of solemnization, England and Wales, 1957–80
(percentages across)
N= Civil Church of England/ Roman Other denominations/ All
Church in Wales Catholic faiths religious

1957 346,903 28.0 49.6 11.5 10.9 72.0

1962 347,732 29.6 47.4 12.3 10.7 70.4
1965 371,127 31.8 46.3 11.6 10.3 68.2
1970 415,487 39.5 41.0 10.5 9.0 60.5
1975 380,620 47.8 35.0 8.5 8.8 52.2
1980 370,022 49.6 33.3 7.7 9.4 50.4
Source: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Marriage and Divorce Statistics: Historical Series of
Statistics on Marriages and Divorces in England and Wales, 1837–1983, Series FM2, No. 16 (London:
HMSO, 1990), 108.

Table 5.3 Marriages by mode of solemnization, Scotland, 1955–80 (percentages

across)
N= Civil Church of Roman Other denominations/ All
Scotland Catholic faiths religious

1955 43,199 19.3 56.0 15.6 9.1 80.7

1960 40,103 17.9 56.6 16.9 8.5 82.1
1965 40,475 22.9 52.6 16.5 7.9 77.1
1970 43,203 28.5 47.8 16.4 7.2 71.5
1975 39,191 35.4 43.1 15.3 6.2 64.6
1980 38,501 39.2 39.9 14.7 6.1 60.8

Note: A tiny number of irregular marriages is included in the civil figure.

Sources: R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church Growth in the
British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 228–9; Scotland’s Population: The Registrar General’s
Annual Review of Demographic Trends.

Downturns in the proportion of infant baptisms and of mothers undergoing

churching after childbirth were matched by declines in a third rite of passage,
marriages solemnized in religious ceremonies. This index had been compiled
by the state since the early Victorian era, as part of the separate civil registra-
tion systems in England and Wales and in Scotland.24 Aggregating these two
sets of national data, marriages celebrated in places of worship decreased in
Britain from 73 per cent of the total in 1957 to 51 per cent in 1980, or by
almost one-third. The principal fall came, not in the early 1960s, but in the ten
years between 1965 (69 per cent) and 1975 (53 per cent). Disaggregated
statistics for select years appear in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. In England and Wales
(Table 5.2) the proportion of civil weddings, which were held in registry

24
For a general survey, see J. C. Haskey, ‘Marriage Rites: Trends in Marriages by Manner of
Solemnisation and Denomination in England and Wales, 1841–2012’, in J. Miles, P. Mody, and
R. Probert, eds., Marriage Rites and Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), 19–56.
 Behaving—Other Practices 111

offices,25 had reached almost one-half by 1980, forcing the share of religious
weddings down by nearly 22 points since 1957. The fall affected all denomi-
nations but especially the Church of England and Church in Wales, which
between them still provided almost one-half of all ceremonies in 1957 but
only one-third in 1980. In Scotland (Table 5.3), there had traditionally been
relatively more religious marriages than in England and Wales, reflecting
Scotland’s superior performance on other religious indicators, such as church
adherence and attendance, yet even here the proportion of civil weddings
doubled over the quarter-century from 1955 to 1980, and religious weddings
declined from four-fifths to three-fifths of all marriages. Again, all denomin-
ations were impacted, but particularly the Church of Scotland, which had lost
its majority provider position by 1969.
This broad-brush picture needs to be nuanced in several respects. Civil
weddings cannot be taken as a pure index of secularization. A couple’s deci-
sion to marry in a civil rather than religious ceremony may not necessarily
have implied rejection of religion. In fact, many ostensibly religious people
married in registry offices. This was sometimes because their own place of
worship may not have been licensed to conduct weddings, in which case a
religious ceremony there may have followed, immediately or eventually, on a
registry office wedding, which was necessary for the legal formalities. Hence
Roman Catholics and Jews, who maintained their own record of marriages
conducted according to their respective rites, reported a somewhat greater
number than appeared in the Registrar General’s return.26 Likewise, among
people of South Asian origin, notably Muslims, it was fairly uncommon at
this time for marriages to be solemnized in places of worship, not least
because those places were few and largely temporary.27 So far as the state
was concerned, where both a civil and religious wedding occurred, only the
former event counted for statistical purposes, even though the scenario
had been recognized in the Marriage Act 1949, which had consolidated
previous legislation.
Additionally, some couples whose preference may have been for a white
wedding in church could have been deterred by its relatively greater cost than
that of a civil ceremony. More commonly, given the exponential increase in
divorce (from an average of 27,500 petitions per annum in the late 1950s in
England and Wales to 162,500 per annum in the late 1970s), couples where

25
Civil marriages in hotels, stately homes, and other approved premises did not become legal
in England and Wales until the Marriages (Approved Premises) Regulations 1995.
26
A. E. C. W. Spencer, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community of England & Wales,
1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation, and
Education (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007), 53; B. A. Kosmin, ‘Judaism’, in W. F. Maunder,
ed., Religion, Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical Sources 20 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987),
507–60 at 522–3.
27
J. S. Nielsen, ‘Other Religions’, in Maunder, ed., Religion, 563–621 at 576.
112 Secularization in the Long 1960s

one or both parties were divorced, and who may have wished to marry in
church, often found their hopes dashed by ecclesiastical opposition to the
remarriage of divorcees. This was not least in the Church of England, whose
policy was not officially changed until 2002. As a consequence, couples in such
a position typically opted for civil ceremonies, the majority of which by the
late 1970s involved a divorced party or parties, in striking contrast to religious
weddings which were overwhelmingly first marriages for both bride and
groom.28 Alternatively, they sought out the services of a minister in the Free
Churches, where there was often greater tolerance or understanding of the
remarriage of divorcees. Methodism, as the largest Free Church, was very
prominent in this regard; in the years 1974–80, 42 per cent of marriages in
Methodist churches involved divorced parties and in the following decade the
majority.29
On the other hand, it has to be conceded that many people who did marry
in a place of worship perhaps did so for reasons which had nothing to do with
religion, including tradition, family expectation, or ambience. Even in the
1960s ‘a church wedding was a mark of respectability and moral probity’ in
the eyes of many.30 A poll for the BBC in 1977 revealed that no more than a
plurality of 45 per cent agreed that religion was an essential underpinning of
marriage, with a peak of 63 per cent among convinced believers in God and 67
per cent of over-65s. For 41 per cent marriage was just a legal arrangement in
which religion played no part.31 It also has to be acknowledged that the
nuptiality rate fell from the early 1970s. Therefore, not only was the religious
share declining of marriages which were taking place, but there was a loss to
religion from the growing number of relationships involving cohabitation and
the begetting of children outside wedlock. This trend particularly affected the
younger age cohorts who, as the 1977 poll confirmed, were also the least likely
to have married in church, if they had married at all.
For a fourth rite of passage, funerals, there is unfortunately no quantitative
evidence to speak of. The state only recorded deaths, as did a handful of
Christian denominations (principally Catholics and Methodists) and Jews.
Even the Church of England, which was by far and away the single biggest
provider of funerals (perhaps accounting for three-quarters or more),32 did
not begin to enumerate them until 2000.

28
J. C. Haskey, ‘Trends in Marriages: Church, Chapel, and Civil Ceremonies’, Population
Trends 22 (1980): 19–24 at 20–1; idem, ‘Remarriage of the Divorced in England and Wales:
A Contemporary Phenomenon’, Journal of Biosocial Science 15 (1983): 253–71.
29
C. D. Field, ‘Demography and the Decline of British Methodism: I. Nuptiality’, Proceedings
of the Wesley Historical Society 58 (2011–12): 175–89 at 180, 187.
30
Sykes, ‘Popular Religion’, 101–4. 31
ORC, unpublished.
32
W. S. F. Pickering, ‘The Development of the Diocese of Newcastle, 1: An Overall View’, in
W. S. F. Pickering, ed., A Social History of the Diocese of Newcastle, 1882–1982 (Stocksfield: Oriel
Press, 1981), 104–28 at 121. A survey of clergy in one Anglican diocese in 1982 discovered that
 Behaving—Other Practices 113

Nevertheless, it is clear from contemporary anecdote and academic com-

mentary that religious funerals remained the norm throughout the 1960s
and 1970s and did not suffer the attrition which befell the other rites of
passage. ‘There is no doubt that religious rites at burials are universal,’ Peter
Kaim-Caudle concluded on the basis of two surveys of Billingham-on-Tees in
the late 1950s and mid-1960s.33 ‘In no other area of British life has religion
such a near monopoly . . . death is a religious preserve,’ wrote Geoffrey Gorer
in 1965, his verdict sustained by an opinion poll he had commissioned in 1964
which revealed that, of 359 individuals who had lost a close relative during the
previous five years, only two cases were found of funerals without a religious
service.34 The next year Bryan Wilson, arch-proponent of secularization, had
to concede the ubiquity of religious funerals: ‘a man needs extraordinary
presence of mind at death if he is to avoid religious officiation at his burial.’35
For Bill Pickering in 1974: ‘Personal observation and experience suggest
that nearly all committals at the present time are conducted by a priest or
minister.’36 Two social psychologists of religion estimated that in Britain in
1975 ‘at least 95 per cent of those who die have a religious funeral’, adding that,
according to a survey sponsored by the ITA in 1968, ‘religion is seen by many
people primarily as a means of dealing with death.’37 Still in 1982, ‘few are
buried without a minister of religion taking a service’,38 while a decade later
‘almost all the funerals in the Sheffield area are conducted as “religious”
ceremonies, mostly Christian.’39
Unsurprisingly, given the weight of this opinion, even Callum Brown has
accepted that the 1960s had no great impact in this respect: ‘there was a
continuing recourse until very late in the twentieth century by more than
90 per cent (perhaps close to 100 per cent) of British families to religious

71 per cent took 30 or more funerals a year, with the overall average being one every nine days:
P. Longbottom, ‘The Role of the Clergyman in Bereavement’, Bereavement Care 5/1 (1986):
4–5, 12.
33
Kaim-Caudle, Religion in Billingham, 3–4; idem, ‘Church & Social Change’, 12.
34
G. E. S. Gorer, Death, Grief, and Mourning in Contemporary Britain (London: Cresset
Press, 1965), 30, 140–1. Original papers from this survey are at The Keep, Brighton, Geoffrey
Gorer Archive, SxMs52/1/7/8/4.
35
Wilson, Religion in Secular Society, 17–18.
36
Pickering, ‘Persistence of Rites of Passage’, 68–9. Cf. idem, ‘Development of the Diocese of
Newcastle’, 121: ‘undertakers and registrars frequently assert that 99.9 per cent of burials are
conducted by a priest, minister, or someone deputed to perform a religious ceremony.’
37
M. Argyle and B. Beit-Hallahmi, The Social Psychology of Religion (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1975), 56. For the survey, see Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain
and Northern Ireland: A Survey of Popular Attitudes (London: the Authority, 1970), 21, 26–7.
38
R. H. Preston, ‘The Church of England’, in R. E. Davies, ed., The Testing of the Churches,
1932–1982: A Symposium (London: Epworth Press, 1982), 60–86 at 67.
39
J. L. Hockey, Making the Most of a Funeral (Richmond upon Thames: Cruse-Bereavement
Care, 1992), vi–viii.
114 Secularization in the Long 1960s

celebration of lives at death . . . A change towards secular (often humanist)

celebration of death seems to have become significant only in the 1980s and
1990s.’40 The National Secular Society had certainly commenced formal
provision of non-religious officiants at funerals by the end of the 1970s,
launching the first Humanist Funerals Officiators group in Sussex.41 The
British Humanist Association followed suit with practical guidance on the
arrangement of ‘funerals without God’ in the 1980s.42 Yet, take-up was
extremely limited. This reflected not so much any residual power wielded by
organized religion, as the inertia which was built into the death industry, in
particular, the reluctance of funeral directors to contemplate change.
The decisive role played by funeral directors was illustrated in fieldwork
undertaken by Maura Naylor in Leeds during 1982–4, which demonstrated
that the city’s funeral directors failed to promote the availability of non-
religious services and took conventional religious disposal for granted when
seeking instructions from clients, the only discretionary element being the
choice of denomination. In other words, most bereaved families would have
had to have taken active steps to opt out of a religious funeral. Given the force
of tradition, the role of funerals as communal gatherings,43 a sense of duty to
the departed, and the desire not to cause offence to any mourners, the cards
were heavily stacked against such families exercising an opt-out.44 Moreover,
Leeds funeral directors mostly also continued to observe the ‘unofficial con-
tract’ of notifying deaths to the incumbent of the parish in which the deceased
had resided. This was notwithstanding evidence from both sides of multiple
tensions between funeral directors and Anglican clergy over their respective
duties, with the former often showing a distinct preference for engaging ‘tame
vicars’ (who would go anywhere at any time) or Free Church ministers as an
alternative to parochial incumbents.45
The reason why the stance taken by funeral directors was so critical was
because the growing professionalization of death had concentrated much of
the power and control for the disposal of the dead in their hands; no longer

40
C. G. Brown, ‘The Secularisation Decade: What the 1960s Have Done to the Study of
Religious History’, in D. H. McLeod and W. Ustorf, eds., The Decline of Christendom in Western
Europe, 1750–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29–46 at 32.
41
National Secular Society Ltd Annual Report (1979–80), 9, (1980–1), 8.
42
British Humanist Association, Guidelines for Officiants at Non-Religious Funerals (London:
the Association, 1984); J. W. Willson, Funerals without God: A Practical Guide to Non-Religious
Funerals (London: British Humanist Association, 1989).
43
In one market town in the mid-1960s, ‘funerals are the largest social gatherings in the
community’: D. Middleton, ‘A Social Anthropological Study of Kirkby Stephen’ (PhD thesis,
University of Durham, 1971), 239–40 and, more generally on death, 278–84.
44
Cf. Mayor, ‘Religion of the British People’, 41.
45
M. J. A. Naylor, ‘The Funeral: The Management of Death and its Rituals in a Northern,
Industrial City’ (PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1989), 120–1, 176–7, 206–30, 249–53, 356–61.
 Behaving—Other Practices 115

were undertakers simply the suppliers of coffins and transportation.46 This

development had been greatly facilitated by two factors: the changed location
of death, from home to hospital, after the formation of the National Health
Service; and the rapid increase in cremations (which had been equivalent to
just 24 per cent of deaths in Britain in 1955 but reached 65 per cent by 1980),
entailing a significant shift in the venue for the service, away from individual
places of worship towards chapels in local authority crematoria.47 This had
obvious financial implications for religious bodies, as the vicar of Deane parish
church in Bolton (where a crematorium had opened in 1954) lamented in
1960: ‘we are losing a lot of revenue. This also affects the minister’s stipend.
We cannot turn ourselves into a business company to compete.’48 But the
trend had much more serious status implications for the clergy, who, in their
conduct of funerals, were increasingly transformed into subcontractors to
funeral directors. Their more subordinate standing in the management of
funerals was also exemplified in the Leeds research.

RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING

Rites of passage had an obvious relationship with churchgoing, in that their

public performance invariably took place in places of worship, even if only
crematoria chapels. No such direct link existed in the case of religious pro-
grammes broadcast on radio or television, which crossed over into the world
of private religious practices, listened to or viewed in the comfort of people’s
homes.49 Indeed, far from wholeheartedly embracing religious broadcasts as

46
The professionalization of death is a major theme in J. Litten, The English Way of Death:
The Common Funeral since 1450 (London: Robert Hale, 1991) and is also explored in a local
study of Staithes by Clark, Between Pulpit and Pew, 127–43. For the enhanced role of under-
takers, see B. Smale, ‘Deathwork: A Sociological Analysis of Funeral Directing’ (PhD thesis,
University of Surrey, 1985); B. Parsons, ‘Change and Development in the British Funeral
Industry during the 20th Century, with Special Reference to the Period 1960~1994’ (PhD thesis,
University of Westminster, 1997).
47
The ‘popularization’ of cremation after 1952 is considered by P. C. Jupp, From Dust to Ashes:
Cremation and the British Way of Death (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 156–84.
48
The Keep, Brighton, Mass-Observation Archive, SxMOA1/5/19/65/C/1.
49
There is, as yet, no full account of the history of religious broadcasting in Britain during the
1960s and 1970s, although several essays provide some of the context: K. M. Wolfe, ‘Television, the
“Bartered Bride”, Broadcasting, Commerce, and Religion: Transatlantic Perspectives’, in
B. R. Wilson, ed., Religion: Contemporary Issues—The All Souls Seminars in the Sociology of
Religion (London: Bellew Publishing, 1992), 168–91, 281–3; A. Briggs, ‘Christ and the Media:
Secularization, Rationalism, and Sectarianism in the History of British Broadcasting, 1922–1976’,
in E. Barker, J. A. Beckford, and K. Dobbelaere, eds., Secularization, Rationalism, and Sectarianism:
Essays in Honour of Bryan R. Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 267–86; and C. Noonan,
‘Piety and Professionalism: The BBC’s Changing Religious Mission (1960–1979)’, Media History
19 (2013): 196–212. For a Scottish perspective, see C. MacLean, ‘Marvellous New Trumpets: The
116 Secularization in the Long 1960s

an evangelistic opportunity, there had initially been much debate in the

Churches during the inter-war years about whether such broadcasts (then
entirely radio-based) were partly responsible for a fall in church attendance,
through creating a competitor ‘attraction’ and potential ‘substitute’ for genu-
ine public worship, especially on Sundays.50
To an extent, this debate remained live after 1945, with ecclesiastical
concerns seemingly substantiated by a variety of hard evidence from the
television era. For a start, some surveys suggested that churchgoing was greater
in households which did not possess a television set than in those which did,51
albeit a further study in 1961 claimed the difference to be negligible.52 Then
there was the agreement, in 1963–4, of 38 per cent of the English population
that watching televised religious services was a surrogate for churchgoing
for persons who might otherwise have gone (as opposed to 55 per cent
describing it as ‘something quite different’).53 A small, but not insubstantial,
minority of Britons (7 per cent in 1957 and 4 per cent in 1968) admitted
that their ‘church attendance’ was limited to listening to broadcast religious
services only.54 More generally, in Britain-wide polls in 1968 and 1987, it
was felt that, although the primary purpose of religious television should be
to provide services for those who could not get to church, in practice its
consumers were judged far more likely to be regular churchgoers than non-
churchgoers,55 a fact confirmed by research in Gloucester in 1962.56 During the
1960s it was common for religious leaders to lament that television had diminished
congregations on Sunday evenings, especially after the BBC’s Sunday evening
repeat of The Forsyte Saga in 1968–9. Certainly, in 1966 television-viewing by

Media, 1920s–2001’, in C. MacLean and K. Veitch, eds., Scottish Life and Society: A Compendium of
Scottish Ethnology—Religion (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2006), 413–29. Wolfe’s projected second
volume of The Churches and the British Broadcasting Corporation, 1922–1956: The Politics of
Broadcast Religion (London: SCM Press, 1984) never materialized, while the fifth and final volume
of The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom by Briggs (London: Oxford University Press,
1961–95), covering the years 1955–74, had very little to say about religion. The same was true of
the equivalent Independent Television in Britain by B. Sendall, J. Potter, and P. Bonner, 6 vols.
(London: Macmillan, 1982–2003), whose first four volumes relate to the period 1946–80.
50
C. D. Field, ‘Gradualist or Revolutionary Secularization? A Case Study of Religious
Belonging in Inter-War Britain, 1918–1939’, Church History and Religious Culture 93 (2013):
57–93 at 69–71.
51
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 60–1.
52
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television
(London: the Authority, 1962), 14.
53
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion (London: University of London Press,
1965), 97, 131–2.
54
(1957) Gallup, unpublished; (1968) Sunday Telegraph, 14 April 1968.
55
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 40–2; M. Svennevig, I. R. Haldane,
S. Spiers, and B. Gunter, Godwatching: Viewers, Religion, and Television (London: John Libbey,
1988), 7, 53.
56
A. T. Allen, ‘An Investigation into the Social Structure of the Population of Gloucester CB’
(MLitt thesis, University of Durham, 1964), 204–8.
 Behaving—Other Practices 117

regular churchgoers on the previous Sunday was only slightly less (65 per cent)
than the average (72 per cent).57 By 1987, 28 per cent of Britons agreed that
television did indeed stop people going out to worship.58
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the golden age of religious radio had
already passed in terms of audience impact.59 This was notwithstanding the
maintenance of religious broadcasting hours on BBC national radio at eight or
nine each week until the late 1970s60 and the furore sparked by Margaret
Knight’s two talks on ‘Morality without Religion’ on the Home Service in
1955, a backlash of such ferocity as might suggest that Christianity’s domi-
nance of radio was still secure.61 Listening data, however, told another story,
with all the regular religious broadcasts peaking during the 1940s. The People’s
Service on the Light Programme fared best, drawing 15 per cent of the
audience in 1955 and 12 per cent in 1963 before plunging to just over 4 per
cent in 1970. Sunday Half Hour (of hymn-singing) had attracted more than 26
per cent of the audience in 1950 but was reduced to 14 per cent in 1955, under
5 per cent in 1960, and 1 per cent in 1970. One in seven (14 per cent) of the
population had tuned in to Sunday morning worship on the Home Service in
1944, yet only 3 per cent in 1955 and less than 2 per cent in 1970. Sunday
evening worship, again on the Home Service, peaked at 11 per cent in 1945,
also stood at 3 per cent in 1955, and then lost so much ground that it had to be
discontinued in 1967. The Daily Service achieved audiences of 9 per cent in
1941 before falling below 2 per cent in 1951 and 1 per cent in 1960.62 Of
course, individual viewers listened to multiple religious programmes, so the
aggregate audience would have been much less than the sum of each of the
parts. The most detailed investigation of the audience for religious radio
broadcasts, by Gallup for the BBC in 1954, classified 37 per cent of Britons
as frequent listeners of religious broadcasts (with highs of 44 per cent among
housewives and 54 per cent of over-65s), 31 per cent as occasional listeners,
and 32 per cent as non-listeners (rising to 50 per cent of the 16–20 age group).
The frequent listeners included just 28 per cent non-churchgoers, while there
were 57 per cent non-churchgoers among the non-listeners.63

57 58
Sunday 1/1 (1966): 5. Insight Social Research, unpublished.
59
For an introduction to religious radio, see M. Dinwiddie, Religion by Radio: Its Place in
British Broadcasting (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968).
60
There would have been additional religious output on BBC local radio, which commenced
in 1967.
61
C. G. Brown, ‘ “The Unholy Mrs Knight” and the BBC: Secular Humanism and the Threat
to the “Christian Nation”, c.1945–60’, English Historical Review 127 (2012): 345–76.
62
R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church
Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 89, 235–6. All the
estimates relate to February of each year.
63
British Broadcasting Corporation Audience Research Department, Religious Broadcasts
and the Public: A Report on a Social Survey of the Differences between Non-Listeners and Listeners
to Religious Broadcasts (London: the Department, 1955).
118 Secularization in the Long 1960s

The travails of religious radio were, in substantial part, naturally sympto-

matic of the eclipse of radio by television. By 1957, 48 per cent of households
had acquired a broadcast licence for television, by 1967 88 per cent, and by
1977 99 per cent. Religious programmes had been relatively quick to appear
on television, introduced in 1956 by both the BBC and Independent Televi-
sion, each channel offering up to three hours a week by the 1970s. In principle,
the public did not object, 90 per cent interviewed in 1961 considering them
desirable64 and 88 per cent in 1968 disagreeing with the proposition that
‘religion is not the sort of thing that should be on TV’.65 Moreover, no more
than 10 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, in two polls in 1980 complained
that there was too much religious programming on television.66
Measuring the audience for such programmes, however, is relatively prob-
lematical, for several reasons. Not until 1981 was an industry standard televi-
sion audience measurement service established in the form of the
Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board, using a national panel of homes
whose television sets were metered and whose members also completed
time-segment diaries. Before then, both the BBC and Independent Television
maintained separate audience research departments, utilizing different meth-
odologies and often reporting different results.67 Such data as they collected
did not readily enter the public domain and then only selectively.68 Although
there were a few long-running programmes, of which Songs of Praise (com-
munity hymn-singing) on BBC is perhaps best known (launched in 1961
and still being broadcast),69 there was a large and very diverse religious output
whose audiences are hard to analyse collectively over time, even though the
public apparently had little difficulty in distinguishing those programmes
which were intended by the producers as religious.70 The range is exempli-
fied in two snapshots of the content of religious broadcasts taken by William

64
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television,
13, 55.
65
ORC, unpublished.
66
The first, unpublished, was conducted by BMRB, the second by MORI: Sunday Times,
8 June 1980; Survey Research Consultants International, Index to International Public Opinion,
1980–1981, ed. E. H. Hastings and P. K. Hastings (Oxford: Clio Press, 1982), 253.
67
Broadcasting Commission of the General Synod of the Church of England, Broadcasting,
Society, and the Church (London: Church Information Office, 1973), 100–2.
68
However, there are some pre-1970 data in Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and
Churchgoers, 90, 235–7.
69
T. Barnes, Songs of Praise: Celebrating 50 Years (Oxford: Lion, 2011). That book does not
shed light on the number of viewers for the programme. Although the present author ap-
proached Songs of Praise for trend audience data, the request was declined on contractual
grounds.
70
A topic explored in ORC, ‘Reactions to Religious Programmes, Carried Out for Indepen-
dent Broadcasting Authority’ (1973, unpublished).
 Behaving—Other Practices 119

Temple College in 1963 and 1965.71 Audiences for individual programmes

inevitably overlapped, for instance by 60 per cent in 1961 between The Sunday
Break (designed for young people) and About Religion (for adults).72
Important though these methodological limitations were, they paled into
insignificance compared with the absence of a level playing-field for television
programmes during prime time early Sunday evening viewing. Religious
output was in a privileged position thanks to the existence of the ‘closed
period’, or ‘God slot’, which ensured there would be no competition to
religious programmes on either of the main television channels for its dura-
tion. This protection, which was first laid down by the authority of the
Postmaster General and then preserved voluntarily by the broadcasters from
1972 until 1993, was augmented by religious programmes inheriting audiences
already tuned in for late afternoon television and/or switching on early in
anticipation of the post-‘God slot’ high-appeal drama and light entertainment
programmes. Amazingly, only 19 per cent of viewers disapproved of the closed
period in 1961, while 67 per cent approved.73 However, its effect was to
manipulate the market in favour of religious programmes, boosting their
audiences to levels which would doubtless not have been achieved had they
been forced to compete with secular alternatives.
The ‘God slot’ also accentuated the natural tendency for a hierarchy of
religious programming to emerge.74 Producers were understandably anxious
to maximize the advantages which it presented them. In practice, there was
a huge variation in the size of audiences, from hundreds of thousands
to millions, according to the genre and scheduling of each programme.
Traditional church services, always broadcast outside the ‘God slot’, were the
least attractive format, usually securing less than half a million viewers. Factual
or discussion programmes about religion held out middling appeal, perhaps

71
William Temple College, Mainstream Religion: A Study of the Content of Religious Broad-
casting during June 1963 (Rugby: the College, 1963); idem, The Faith and the Fringe: A Sequel to
‘Mainstream Religion’, being a Study of Some Religious Broadcasting during February, March,
and April 1965 (Rugby: the College, 1966). The 1963 study is summarized in F. Matchett,
‘Religion on the Air’, New Society, 4 March 1965: 22–3. A survey of religious broadcasting in
1973 can be found in Broadcasting Commission of the General Synod of the Church of England,
Broadcasting, Society, and the Church, 37–64. Lastly, there is also an annual schedule of Sunday
religious programmes for the first week in October between 1965 and 1987 in N. A. Simpson, ‘A
Study of Religious Television Programmes in the UK: Communicators of Challenge or Agents of
Reinforcement?’ (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989), 246–50.
72
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television, 15.
73
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television, 55.
74
Audience size data in the following paragraphs are summarized from: Independent Tele-
vision Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television, 53; Currie, Gilbert, and
Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 90, 235–7; B. Gunter, ‘The Audience and Religious Televi-
sion’ (Independent Broadcasting Authority Audience Research Department, 1984, unpublished),
7–11, 17–19, 68; B. Gunter and S. Fazal, Audiences for Religious Broadcasts on Television,
1983–1984 (London: Independent Broadcasting Authority Research Department, 1984), 6;
Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers, and Gunter, Godwatching, 10.
120 Secularization in the Long 1960s

the biggest success story of these years being the BBC’s Meeting Point, which
aired on Sunday evenings between 1956 and 1968 and reached 9 per cent of
the audience in 1963, even receiving the accolade of a late evening repeat
showing; by this time just 40 per cent of adults claimed never to have seen an
edition, with 32 per cent having seen one within the past month.
Most popular of all were religious music programmes, jewels in the ‘God
slot’ crown and liked by 58 per cent in one poll in 1980.75 Songs of Praise has
already been mentioned in this regard, its audience share being 11 per cent in
1965–6 and 17 per cent (equivalent to 8,900,000 viewers) in 1983. A still
greater pull was exerted by Independent Television’s Stars on Sunday
(1969–79), a blend of sentimental music (only some of which was religious),
Bible readings, and conversations.76 Initially produced and presented by Jess
Yates, it survived his fall from grace in 1974, when it was revealed he had been
having an affair, and his contract was terminated. Stars on Sunday was the first
religious series to enter the top twenty television charts, attracting 12–15
million viewers (three-quarters the audience for the soap Coronation Street).
This was despite acerbic criticism from the Churches.77
More generally, the absolute size of audiences for televised religious
programmes increased over time, but relative to the growth in the number
of television licences and of households capable of receiving Independent
Television (70 per cent in 1960, 85 per cent in 1970, and 97 per cent in
1975), there was a decline, especially in the 1970s. Audiences were also much
higher in the winter than the summer months; unsurprisingly, it tended to
be the former (typically January or February) figures which were quoted in
the literature. For instance, on Independent Television in 1959–61 the
summer audience for Sunday Break was 43 per cent down on the winter
level, for About Religion 51 per cent lower, and for the church service
reduced by 26 per cent. This seasonal fluctuation exemplified how loyalty
to viewing particular programmes could be fairly low, in that only a minority
watched them week in, week out. This was even true of Songs of Praise,
which an implausibly high 17 per cent in England said they had last viewed
on the previous Sunday in 1963–4, a further 17 per cent during the past
month, 10 per cent between one and three months ago, and 14 per cent
more than three months ago. In 1983, 43 per cent of adults reported seeing
one of the four transmissions of Songs of Praise in February, yet a mere 4
per cent had seen all of them.
Low levels of viewer loyalty reflected the passivity and opportunism of the
audience for religious television programmes. This was apparent as early as

75
BMRB, unpublished.
76
P. Max-Wilson, Stars on Sunday (Pinner: Pentagon, 1976).
77
Broadcasting Commission of the General Synod of the Church of England, Broadcasting,
Society, and the Church, 37, 49–51.
 Behaving—Other Practices 121

1961 when the ITA concluded from a poll it had commissioned that ‘in the
great majority of cases no special effort is made to watch the programme, the
set being already switched on’, adding despairingly that ‘a high proportion of
our regular viewers . . . lap up our mixed brew of religious ideas as readily as
they lap up tea and with no more significant results.’78 The ITA’s subsequent
polls, in 1968 and 1987, revealed that diminishing minorities of adults, 34 per cent
and 29 per cent respectively, were actually prepared to switch on their
television set to view a religious programme, the majority (60 per cent and
68 per cent) admitting they would not do so. In the event of the set already
being on when a religious programme screened, 40 per cent in 1968 and 53 per
cent in 1987 either switched it off, changed the channel, or left the programme
running without paying attention to it.79
Perhaps the ultimate litmus-test of the success of religious television broad-
casts was whether they widened the demographic profile of people engaged
with Christianity beyond that achieved by churchgoing.80 Church attenders
were disproportionately female and elderly, and the same was true of religious
television according to the ITA’s 1961 poll. Only in extending the reach to
semi-skilled and unskilled workers did religious television perform better,
attracting them proportionate to their presence in the population, albeit
subsequent research revealed that among the lowest (DE) social group, this
was largely accomplished through religious music programmes. Later polling
likewise confirmed that the audience for religious television output continued
to be skewed by gender and, particularly, age. In 1980, for example, hymns and
religious music programmes were enjoyed by 84 per cent of over-55s and just
34 per cent of under-35s, documentaries and news programmes about reli-
gious issues by 52 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively. Religious television
also held particular appeal for the most religious elements in society, as the
ITA’s 1968 and 1987 surveys demonstrated through a four-level religiosity
scale. In 1968 the most religious were 52 points more likely than the least
religious to pay attention when a religious programme came on screen and
64 points more likely in 1987. Lonely people were equally avid viewers of
religious television, according to a 1978 poll in Greater London, although they
tended to be very religious as well.

78
Independent Television Authority, Religious Programmes on Independent Television,
14–15, 54.
79
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 38–40; Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers,
and Gunter, Godwatching, 16–17, 27.
80
Audience profile data in this paragraph are taken from: Independent Television Authority,
Religious Programmes on Independent Television; Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and
Religion; Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain; I. R. Haldane, ‘Who and What Is
Religious Broadcasting For?’, Independent Broadcasting 18 (1978): 13–16; Svennevig, Haldane,
Spiers, and Gunter, Godwatching; and unpublished reports and tables from these surveys.
122 Secularization in the Long 1960s

O TH E R RE LI G I O U S P R A C T I C E S

Three other religious practices also merit attention: prayer; Bible-centrism; and
festival observance. Statistically speaking, prayer was one of the most under-
researched aspects of religion during the 1960s and 1970s.81 The baseline
position in the early 1950s was that 69 per cent of adults believed in prayer
(1950),82 71 per cent thought God answered prayer (1954),83 and 86 per cent
deemed it appropriate for children to be taught to say prayers (1957).84
Self-reported frequency of private prayer was affected by variant question-
wording and response options, as well as, almost certainly, by some degree of
exaggeration. In 1950, 48 per cent stated that some adult in their home prayed
regularly (undefined).85 By 1961, four-fifths of Britons prayed at some stage,
including 56 per cent on a regular basis, the remainder only occasionally or in
moments of crisis.86 In England (then still the least religious home nation of
the British Isles) in 1963–4, 43 per cent told their interviewers that they said
their prayers regularly.87 In Britain in 1970, 34 per cent said they prayed daily,
a further 17 per cent at least once a week, 30 per cent less often, and 16 per cent
never.88 In 1972, 28 per cent of Britons recalled saying a prayer on the day
prior to interview,89 while in 1981 49 per cent admitted to taking ‘moments of
prayer, meditation, or contemplation, or something like that’.90 If we accept
weekly or more as a working definition of regularity, then the national surveys
suggest that one-half or fractionally less of the population claimed to pray
regularly during the 1960s and 1970s, with no obvious trend discernible from
these patchy data. Several local studies in the 1960s pointed to a similar
conclusion,91 although at Leeds in 1982 the proportion praying at least weekly

81
See, further, C. D. Field, ‘Britain on its Knees: Prayer and the Public since the Second World
War’, Social Compass 64 (2017), forthcoming.
82
News Chronicle, 9 February 1950; Gallup, GIPOP, I, 218.
83
British Broadcasting Corporation Audience Research Department, Religious Broadcasts
and the Public, 38.
84 85
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 407. News Chronicle, 9 February 1950; Gallup, GIPOP, I, 218.
86
NOP, unpublished.
87
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 27–9, 131. For prayer frequency
among a sample of recently bereaved persons in 1963, see Gorer, Death, Grief, and Mourning,
31–3, 165–6.
88 89
NOP, unpublished. Sunday Times, 22 April 1973.
90
EVS (excluding Northern Ireland). Calculated from Centre for Comparative European
Survey Data Information System, <http://www.ccesd.ac.uk>.
91
C. R. Hinings, ‘The Balsall Heath Survey: A Report’, Research Bulletin, Institute for the
Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham (1967): 56–72 at 62;
idem, ‘Religiosity and Attitudes towards the Church in a Rural Setting: The Clun Valley’, in
A. Bryman, ed., Religion in the Birmingham Area: Essays in the Sociology of Religion (Birming-
ham: Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham,
1975), 112–22 at 117; G. K. Nelson and R. A. Clews, Mobility and Religious Commitment
(Birmingham: Institute for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of
Birmingham, 1971), 20, 25, 31–2, 38; P. D. Varney, ‘Religion in Rural Norfolk’, in
 Behaving—Other Practices 123

was somewhat lower (38 per cent).92 All the investigations revealed that
women, the elderly, churchgoers, and professed Roman Catholics were the
most predisposed to pray.
The Leeds survey confirmed that, overwhelmingly, people did not use any
set or written prayers but communicated their own thoughts, and that they
prayed at home and on their own. Communal household prayers, such as
grace at mealtimes, had mostly become a thing of the past.93 Altruistic themes
were judged to be the most suitable subjects of prayer by Britons in 1968: peace
(86 per cent); the life of a sick friend or relative (84 per cent); help for other
people (84 per cent); and a happier family life (71 per cent). It was considered
much less acceptable by the public at large to pray for victory in war
(48 per cent); success in one’s job (44 per cent); and relief from money
problems (38 per cent). Curiously, the main exception to this came from
those rated most religious on a four-point scale, majorities of whom felt
even these topics were a good thing to pray for, by, respectively, 27 per cent,
49 per cent, and 38 per cent more than the least religious. The overall pattern
of replies had changed very little when the question, which was put solely to
those who believed there may be a God, was replicated in 1987.94 To set
matters in a wider context, the same two polls also asked respondents to define
the most important part of religion. Only 12 per cent in 1968 and 11 per cent
in 1987 selected ‘praying to God’ as their answer; ‘what you believe’ and ‘what
you do to others’ were the first and second priorities by a long way in 1968 (the
order being reversed in 1987).95 So, prayer does not seem to have been
regarded by the populace as a key religious barometer.
The Bible is the cornerstone of the Christian faith, at once its inspiration,
authority, and evidential basis. As well as offering a spiritual route-map for the
faithful, it has provided the moral framework for Judaeo-Christian civil
societies. Therefore, the extent to which the Bible is owned, used, and believed
is critical to an understanding of the process of secularization in contemporary

D. A. Martin and M. Hill, eds., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 3 (London: SCM
Press, 1970), 65–77 at 75; N. Abercrombie, J. Baker, S. Brett, and J. Foster, ‘Superstition and
Religion: The God of the Gaps’, in Martin and Hill, Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 3,
93–129 at 106–8, 115–17.
92
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
H. Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds: Interview Schedule—Basic
Frequencies by Question, University of Leeds Department of Sociology Religious Research Papers
12 (Leeds: the Department, [1983]), 64–6; P. W. Brierley, What Are Churchgoers Like? (Bromley:
MARC Europe, 1986), 21–2.
93
Nelson and Clews, Mobility and Religious Commitment, 32–3, 38, 62; ‘Religion and
Community in Mid-Wales, 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 714.
94
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 23–4; Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers,
and Gunter, Godwatching, 32–3.
95
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 22; Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers, and
Gunter, Godwatching, 33–4.
124 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Britain. The full story, as reflected in opinion poll data, has been set out
elsewhere.96 A selection only of this material for the 1960s and 1970s is
summarized here, concentrating on surveys of the general adult population
and omitting discussion of religious samples (which were included in the
longer report), as well as of studies of children’s attitudes.97 Three questions
are addressed: how far was the Bible to be found in private homes; how often
was it read; and was it considered credible?
The overwhelming majority of British households contained a copy of the
Bible: 90 per cent in 1954;98 84 per cent in 1959;99 86 per cent in 1973;100
84 per cent in 1976;101 and 84 per cent in 1982.102 The number of individuals
possessing their own Bible was slightly smaller but still significant, although
few had bought it themselves, more than three-quarters having acquired it
passively, as a gift (perhaps via school or Sunday school or at baptism or
confirmation) or passed on by a family member. Personal ownership in
Britain was 76 per cent in 1973;103 71 per cent in 1976;104 and 71 per cent in
1982,105 being at least 10 points more among women than men, the eldest than
the youngest age cohort, and the top (AB) than the bottom (DE) social group.
Regionally, Scotland recorded the highest levels of personal ownership, de-
nominationally, adherents of the Free Churches. Roman Catholics had the
least (seemingly placing more reliance on the Magisterium of their Church).
Unsurprisingly, weekly churchgoers were most likely to possess a Bible, but
not universally (the proportion being 86 per cent in 1982).
Regular reading of the Bible was the activity of a diminishing minority. This
was true even before allowing for the inflated claims made about the habit
which are suggested by the inability of very many self-identified Bible readers
(in polls in 1973, 1976, and 1982) to recall the passage of the Bible they had

96
C. D. Field, ‘Is the Bible Becoming a Closed Book? British Opinion Poll Evidence’, Journal
of Contemporary Religion 29 (2014): 503–28. Some aspects of this research have subsequently
been further developed in B. Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs and Religious Debates in Post-
War Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 63–72.
97
Examples include D. Wright and E. Cox, ‘Changes in Attitudes towards Religious Educa-
tion and the Bible among Sixth-Form Boys and Girls’, British Journal of Educational Psychology
41 (1971): 328–31 and P. R. May, ‘Pupil Attitudes to the Bible’, Spectrum 10/2 (1978): 31–3.
98
News Chronicle, 8 March 1954; Gallup, GIPOP, I, 316.
99 100
GPI 371 (1991): 51. NOP, unpublished.
101
P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium
Edition (London: Christian Research, 1999), 6.4.
102
Gallup, unpublished. A separate survey the same year, also by Gallup but confined to
England, reported a figure of 81 per cent: J. Harrison, Attitudes to Bible, God, Church: Research
Report (London: Bible Society, 1983), 17, 38, 41, 52, 62–3, 69.
103
Central Statistical Office, Social Trends, No. 10 (London: HMSO, 1979), 245.
104
Methodist Recorder, 30 September 1976; Central Statistical Office, Social Trends, No. 10,
245; Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 6.4.
105
Central Statistical Office, Social Trends, No. 14 (London: HMSO, 1983), 142. For the 1982
England survey, where personal ownership of the Bible was 62 per cent, see Harrison, Attitudes
to Bible, God, Church, 17, 38, 41, 52, 62–3, 69.
 Behaving—Other Practices 125
Table 5.4 Last occasion of reading the Bible by members of households possessing a
copy, Great Britain, 1954–82 (percentages down)
1954 1973 1976 1982

Within past day NA 7 4 8

Within past week NA 9 8 10
Within past month NA 8 8 9
Within past three months NA 5 6 8
Within past six months NA 5 5 5
Within past six months (cumulative) 53 34 31 40
Longer ago than six months 47 66 69 60
N= 2,000 2,033 2,055 1,910
Sources: (1954) British Broadcasting Corporation Audience Research Department, Religious Broadcasts and
the Public: A Report on a Social Survey of the Differences between Non-Listeners and Listeners to Religious
Broadcasts (London: the Department, 1955), 36–7; (1973 and 1976) NOP, unpublished; (1982) Gallup,
unpublished.

read most recently. In the Bible-owning households of Britain, one-quarter of

adults in 1954 admitted they had never read it since leaving school,106 while a
separate study the same year revealed that for 47 per cent it had been longer
ago than six months (Table 5.4). By the 1970s and early 1980s the latter
proportion had increased to three-fifths or more, with consultation of the
Bible at least once a week (which might be taken as a mark of serious
commitment) by under one-fifth (Table 5.4). In England in 1963–4, ‘regular’
Bible-reading was claimed by only 12 per cent, one-quarter of whom did not
say their prayers regularly;107 and in 1982 the identical percentage was re-
corded for weekly reading, most of those who had stopped reading the Bible
being unable to give any reason for doing so.108 In all the studies the more
frequent Bible-readers were disproportionately female, elderly, from higher
social grades, and affiliates of the Free Churches, while a majority of regular
churchgoers read the Bible weekly or more often.
A major reason for the Bible being less read was that its authority and
authenticity were increasingly doubted. As Table 5.5 shows,109 a shrinking
minority subscribed to a literal view of the Old and New Testaments during
the 1960s and 1970s, and there was a particularly sharp rise (of around 20

106
News Chronicle, 8 March 1954; Gallup, GIPOP, I, 316.
107
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 29–30, 131.
108
Harrison, Attitudes to Bible, God, Church, 18–20, 39, 41–2, 52–4, 63, 69–70.
109
The table omits an additional data point for 1979: see GPI 225 (1979): 15; Survey Research
Consultants International, Index to International Public Opinion, 1978–1979, ed. E. H. Hastings
and P. K. Hastings (London: Macmillan, 1980), 227; I. Reid, Social Class Differences in Britain,
2nd edn. (London: Grant McIntyre, 1981), 254. The series continued beyond 1981: Clements,
Surveying Christian Beliefs, 66–9. A slightly different question about the Old Testament was
asked in 1954: British Broadcasting Corporation Audience Research Department, Religious
Broadcasts and the Public, 37.
126 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 5.5 Attitudes to the authority of Old and New Testaments, adults, Great Britain,
1960 and 1981 (percentages down)
1960 1981

Old Testament
Of divine authority and its commands should be followed without question 19 14
Mostly of divine authority but some of it needs interpretation 41 34
Mostly a collection of stories and fables 22 42
Don’t know 18 10
New Testament
Of divine authority and its commands should be followed without question 25 14
Mostly of divine authority but some of it needs interpretation 43 39
Mostly a collection of stories and fables 13 34
Don’t know 19 14
N= 1,500 994
Sources: (1960) GPI 225 (1979): 15; (1981) Sunday Telegraph, 19 April 1981, GPI 248 (1981): 12, N. Webb and
R. J. Wybrow, The Gallup Report: Your Opinions in 1981 (London: Sphere Books, 1982), 152–3, Survey
Research Consultants International, Index to International Public Opinion, 1980–1981, ed. E. H. Hastings and
P. K. Hastings (Oxford: Clio Press, 1982), 381.

points) in those thinking that each was ‘mostly a collection of stories and
fables’. In the case of the Old Testament, this was the position adopted by a
plurality by 1981. Men and the under-25s were particularly likely to regard
both Old and New Testaments as stories and fables, while the over-65s,
adherents of the Free Churches, and regular churchgoers were disproportion-
ately fundamentalist in their outlook. Taking the Bible as a whole, 14 per cent
in 1987 took a literalist line, 46 per cent regarded it as the inspired word of
God but not always to be taken literally, and 28 per cent described it as an
ancient book of history, legends, and moral precepts recorded by humans.110
There was a parallel declining belief in the certainty of miracles in the Bible
(25 per cent in 1968 and 18 per cent in 1987) and even in their probability
(45 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively).111 Already in the mid-1950s four-fifths
of Britons saw no contradiction in stating one could be a Christian without
believing all the Bible to be true.112 All in all, it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the Bible did not feature prominently in the lives of Britons during the
1960s and 1970s. Apart from the very devout, it was already a closed book,
notwithstanding several new translations into modern language, commencing
with the New English Bible (1961–70).

110
Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers, and Gunter, Godwatching, 35–6.
111
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 26–7; Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers,
and Gunter, Godwatching, 36. For a local study of attitudes to miracles in the Bible, see Nelson
and Clews, Mobility and Religious Commitment, 54, 67–8, 71, 73.
112
(1954) British Broadcasting Corporation Audience Research Department, Religious
Broadcasts and the Public, 37–8; (1957) News Chronicle, 15 April 1957, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 405.
 Behaving—Other Practices 127

With regard to the observance of major Christian festivals, Chapter 4 has

already considered the specific matter of churchgoing at Christmas and Easter,
where we have noted the inflated claims made about attendance at public
worship at those times. But, as a final example of religious behaving, it is also
appropriate to review the extent to which Christmas and Easter were more
generally perceived, and observed, as religious festivals.113
Since the ‘invention’ of the modern British Christmas by the Victorians, it
had always had a strong social and holiday dimension, and this was accentu-
ated after the Second World War as it became more cosmopolitan, more
commercialized, more dominated by television, and ultimately more secular-
ized.114 As a leading broadsheet newspaper commented in 1972: ‘In their
desire for a quiet holiday in small family groups watching TV, very few see
the churches as essential contributors to the Christmas spirit.’115 Two-thirds
of respondents to a poll in 1963 felt that Christmas had become less religious
compared with their childhood, and by 1969–70 it was three-quarters; the
number thinking it more religious was a low single digit. Asked to identify
the primary purpose of Christmas, only 9 per cent in 1969 and 11 per cent in
1972 said it was religious, the majority judging it about family and enjoyment
(53 per cent and 59 per cent, respectively), with the remainder assessing it
about both these aspects or giving other replies. Even in the six surveys
between 1964 and 1976 which offered a more nuanced set of options, and
the chance to pick more than one, recognition of Christmas as a religious
festival was never much more than one-third, with half or more regarding it as
a holiday or an opportunity to meet family and friends. For one in ten, it was
nothing other than an occasion for eating and drinking.116 Women and the
over-65s accorded a higher than average priority to the religious significance
of Christmas.117
Although Easter had likewise long had a holiday dimension, and been asso-
ciated with secular customs,118 this aspect was initially seen as complementing,

113
There is less evidence about the observance of other religious festivals, but for a note about
Lent, see C. D. Field, ‘Who’s for Lent?’, Quadrant (March 1998): 2–3.
114
For this wider context, see the later sections of the standard social histories of the British
Christmas: J. A. R. Pimlott, The Englishman’s Christmas: A Social History (Hassocks: Harvester
Press, 1978), 148–72; J. M. Golby and A. W. Purdue, The Making of the Modern Christmas
(London: Batsford, 1986), 81–112; M. Connelly, Christmas: A Social History (London:
I. B. Tauris, 1999), 205–13.
115
Sunday Times, 24 December 1972.
116
The foregoing Christmas poll data are summarized from C. D. Field, ‘When a Child is
Born: The Christian Dimension of Christmas in Britain since the 1960s’, Modern Believing 40/3
(1999): 29–40 at 30–1.
117
Sunday Telegraph, 27 December 1964; Daily Telegraph, 23 December 1969; NOP Political
Bulletin (December 1969), supplement, 1.
118
C. Hole, Easter and its Customs: A Brief Study (London: Richard Bell, 1961); R. Hutton,
The Stations of the Sun: A History of the Ritual Year in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), 179–213.
128 Secularization in the Long 1960s

rather than competing with, its spiritual function. As late as 1968, Easter was
regarded primarily as a religious festival by 55 per cent of Britons, although 36
per cent already saw it mainly as a holiday. In deference to its religious overtones,
many made a conscious attempt to avoid doing things on Easter Sunday which
would compromise its sacred character, with, for example, fewer people than on
an ordinary Sunday at the time of year going to work, reading a newspaper or
book, or gardening.119
Thereafter, the religious component of the Easter weekend was marginal-
ized, partly under commercial pressures. Thus, for a long while, there had been
a tradition that shops did not open on Good Friday, apart from bakers selling
hot cross buns and fishmongers retailing fresh fish. However, supermarkets
and then, from 1970 when Woolworths became the first of the non-food
chains to trade, other retailers broke with convention. By 1975, 22 per cent
of shops in ten towns were already open on Good Friday and by 1985 44 per cent.120
Another trend was a greater emphasis on family outings and vacations, made
possible by the democratization of private car ownership and advent of cheap
package holidays and by a coinciding with schools’ Easter breaks. This bur-
geoning market could be affected by the vagaries of the Easter weather, which
tied up with the longstanding lunar determination of the date of Easter, placing
it as early as 22 March. Consequently, there were growing demands, from both
the public and tourism and leisure industries alike, for Easter to be fixed for
mid-April, when a better weather outcome might be anticipated. Such a change
was envisaged in the Easter Act 1928, but the agreement of all Churches was
required for implementation and has not hitherto been forthcoming. As early as
1963, 65 per cent of Britons supported a fixed Easter.121

119
Sunday Telegraph, 14 April 1968; Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1968.
120
S. Burton-Jones, New Facts for Auld (Cambridge: Jubilee Centre, 1989), 60–2.
121
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 715. For a broader discussion of Easter, see C. D. Field, ‘It’s All Chicks
and Going Out: The Observance of Easter in Post-War Britain’, Theology 101 (1998): 82–90.
 6

Believing—Beliefs and Experience

MEASURING RELIGIO US BELI EFS

The development of the sample survey made it possible to investigate the

extent of religious believing representatively rather than anecdotally. Before
then, evidence about the prevalence of belief mostly derived from samples
which were, to a greater or lesser extent, self-selecting and demographically
skewed.
Correspondence had been one traditional means of airing opinions when
some theological matter was being contested. Often this was directed to the
letters pages of newspapers, although, after the Second World War, there was
nothing quite on the scale of the debate Do We Believe?, which resulted in
9,000 letters being sent to the editor of The Daily Telegraph in 1904.1 The
major correspondence generated during the 1960s and 1970s was initially
expressed privately: 4,000 letters were sent to John Robinson, Bishop of
Woolwich, in response to his Honest to God (1963);2 and 27,000 went to
Donald Coggan, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1975, answering the ‘Call to the
Nation’ he had jointly issued with the Archbishop of York, albeit the explicitly
religious element of the ‘call’ was limited, as many correspondents lamented.3
Besides opening up their letters pages to expressions of belief, secular and
religious newspapers printed questionnaires for their readers to complete and
post back. Sometimes, these were simply market research exercises, designed
to gauge satisfaction with the content of the newspaper and to collect reader
demographic information in order better to attract and target advertising.
Occasionally, religious beliefs and opinions were sought from readers as a

1
Do We Believe? A Record of a Great Correspondence in ‘The Daily Telegraph’, October,
November, December 1904 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905) includes a selection.
2
Subsequently analysed by R. C. Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of
Conventional Religion (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), with a content analysis of
themes at 120–6.
3
An overview of the letters appeared in J. Poulton, Dear Archbishop (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1976).
130 Secularization in the Long 1960s

proxy of national views, most famously, perhaps, by The Daily News in 1926,4
although the genre survived the advent of opinion polling in the late 1930s, as
witnessed by a much-cited study of readers of The People in 1951.5 In time, the
editors and proprietors of secular newspapers came to realize that more
representative data could be obtained by commissioning commercial agencies
to take proper cross-sections. A series of multinational religion polls, pio-
neered by affiliates of the American Gallup Poll, including in Britain, in 1947,
helped establish pollsters’ religious credentials with the general media.6 Reli-
gious newspapers, however, continued to rely upon reader questionnaires
since these remained the most cost-effective method of reaching minority
populations. Readership surveys of the Catholic Herald and Scottish Catholic
Observer in 1977 were especially large.7
There have been several previous attempts to collate the findings of specif-
ically British post-war surveys on religious belief. In a somewhat neglected
article, William Kay usefully abstracted data about belief in God, concluding
that belief in a personal God had declined, atheism had increased, and a
generalized theism had remained roughly constant.8 However, his work was
quickly eclipsed by more wide-ranging research from Robin Gill and collab-
orators across the full spectrum of what were described as ‘traditional’ and
‘non-traditional’ beliefs. Their analysis suggested there had been a steady
decrease in belief in God from the 1960s, followed by more general and
precipitous falls in traditional religious beliefs during the 1970s, which then
plateaued out.9 Gill’s summary table of the weighted averages for individual
beliefs by decade (except for the 1940s and 1950s, which were combined) has
been widely quoted in the secondary literature, notwithstanding potential
difficulties which might stem from merging the outcomes of so many diverse
survey methodologies and questions. The approach subsequently adopted by
Ben Clements, in mainly adhering to more genuine time series of British
religious belief data, has much to commend it and is also greatly enriched by
a profusion of breaks by demographics. Inevitably, though, it majors on the

4
Reported in R. B. Braithwaite, The State of Religious Belief: An Inquiry Based on ‘The Nation
and Athenaeum’ Questionnaire (London: Hogarth Press, 1927).
5
G. E. S. Gorer, Exploring English Character (London: Cresset Press, 1955). Another example
in a secular tabloid newspaper is to be found in The Sun, 27 June 1967, summarizing replies from
over 12,000 of its readers to a short questionnaire about belief in God.
6
L. Sigelman, ‘Multi-Nation Surveys of Religious Beliefs’, Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 16 (1977): 289–94.
7
Catholic Herald, 25 March, 1 and 8 April, 12 and 19 August 1977; Scottish Catholic Observer,
25 March, 1 and 8 April 1977.
8
W. K. Kay, ‘Belief in God in Great Britain, 1945–1996: Moving the Scenery Behind
Classroom RE’, British Journal of Religious Education 20 (1997–8): 28–41.
9
R. Gill, C. K. Hadaway, and P. L. Marler, ‘Is Religious Belief Declining in Britain?’ Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion 37 (1998): 507–16. The statistics were subsequently twice updated
in R. Gill, Churchgoing and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
67–82 and idem, The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 150–3, 214, 250–1.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 131

period since the 1980s, and the analysis does not extend to non-traditional
beliefs, as defined by Gill.10
Possible distortions arising from variations in sample design, fieldwork
practice, and question-wording are best minimized for the 1960s and 1970s
by examining the results reported by each polling agency separately, and by
concentrating on establishing the overall direction of travel. So far as practi-
cable, this is the emphasis in the following account, although, as we shall see
from some of Gallup’s results, they are extremely sensitive to changes in
question-wording. There are also other problems which affect the interpreta-
tion of belief data. In a society where active church membership and, more
especially, regular churchgoing were relatively low, religious beliefs did not
routinely intrude on the everyday lives of most Britons and were perhaps not
always readily understood, certainly not in any conventional theological sense.
Confronted by questions about religious beliefs, therefore, a fairly widespread
tactic was to register as a ‘don’t know’, the proportion falling into this category
sometimes exceeding one-quarter or more. For this reason, ‘don’t knows’ are
shown in the tables in this chapter. Moreover, of those offering a reply, it is
likely that many may not have thought deeply about their answers11 nor
necessarily have held the belief with any degree of conviction, except in the
case of individuals who scored highly on other indicators of religiosity. From
this perspective, it is unsurprising that one of the rare attempts during the
1960s and 1970s to examine religious beliefs collectively rather than severally,
a replication of a religious orthodoxy index pioneered by Charles Glock and
Rodney Stark in America, revealed that orthodoxy was most strongly related
to church membership and attendance, albeit it proved impossible to establish
which was the cause and which the effect.12
That particular investigation was limited, temporally (to 1969), spatially
(to Dawley, Shropshire), and numerically (just 327 adults being interviewed).
Other efforts to cross-check the consistency of beliefs were few and far
between. The replication in 1960 of Mass-Observation’s ground-breaking
1944–5 sample survey of the London borough of Hammersmith apparently
uncovered a similar state of confusion, contradiction, and superficiality as had

10
B. Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs and Religious Debates in Post-War Britain
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 12–79, 116–19.
11
For instance, at Leeds in 1982, 28 per cent admitted to never thinking whether there was a
God or not and 22 per cent to never thinking whether there was a life after death or not:
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
H. Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds: Interview Schedule—Basic
Frequencies by Question, University of Leeds Department of Sociology Religious Research Papers
12 (Leeds: the Department, [1983]), 46, 49.
12
G. K. Nelson and R. A. Clews, Mobility and Religious Commitment (Birmingham: Institute
for the Study of Worship and Religious Architecture, University of Birmingham, 1971), espe-
cially 65–75.
132 Secularization in the Long 1960s

been found in the original research, published as Puzzled People (1947).13

Unfortunately, the raw material from the restudy is not in the Mass-
Observation Archive, and only a few snippets were ever reported at the
time, for instance about the many disbelievers in God who prayed, went to
church, and believed in life after death and the divinity of Christ.14 Another
London-based survey, in Islington in 1968, was essentially a research methods
training project for taught postgraduate students, employing a small (181
informants) and not fully representative sample and an experimental meth-
odology. These factors inevitably restricted the validity of the attempt
to quantify the overlap between religious beliefs and (what the team of
researchers termed) ‘superstitiousness’, which was said to be particularly
large for those whose religious beliefs were not associated with church mem-
bership and attendance.15 Beyond the metropolis, a study of conventional and
folk religiosity in a West Midlands town in 1974 was likewise derived from a
small (172 respondents) and non-random sample.16
National polling also had limitations, particularly in terms of depth of
analysis. The ITA’s study of religion in 1968 was analysed with the help of
an innovative nine-item religiosity scale, demonstrating in matrix form the
relationship between one variable and another, but not all the items were
belief-related, and those which were just concerned belief in God.17 Despite its
frequent enquiries, there is seemingly only one published record for this
period of Gallup cross-analysing the incidence of religious beliefs, a single
table for 1973 showing the number of believers in God, heaven, life after death,
reincarnation, hell, and the devil who also believed in each of the other five.18
Nor can the deficiency generally be made good by secondary analysis of Gallup
datasets, which are poorly archived in Britain. The sole exception is for a 1975
survey which fortuitously covered both ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’
beliefs, which Ben Clements has scored and typologized, along the lines of
Tom Rice’s research into religious and paranormal beliefs in the United States.
Among Clements’s findings are that just 14 per cent of Britons in 1975 (9 per
cent of men and 19 per cent of women) subscribed to both traditional religious

13
Mass-Observation, Puzzled People: A Study in Popular Attitudes to Religion, Ethics, Pro-
gress, and Politics in a London Borough (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947).
14
T. Harrisson, Britain Revisited (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), 256–8.
15
N. Abercrombie, J. Baker, S. Brett, and J. Foster, ‘Superstition and Religion: The God of the
Gaps’, in D. A. Martin and M. Hill, eds., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 3
(London: SCM Press, 1970), 93–129 at 110–20; J. Baker, ‘Who Is It Who Believes in Luck?’,
New Society, 23 October 1975: 199–200.
16
P. Jarvis, ‘A Preliminary Investigation into Folk Religion in an Urban Industrial Town’
(1975, unpublished). Only a few results eventually appeared in idem, ‘Towards a Sociological
Understanding of Superstition’, Social Compass 27 (1980): 285–95 at 289.
17
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland: A Survey of
Popular Attitudes (London: the Authority, 1970), 53–4.
18
Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 133

beliefs and to classic paranormal phenomena, the majority (52 per cent) not
fully believing in either.19

BELIEF IN LIFE FORCES

A simple, binary question about belief in an undefined concept of God appears

to have been first put by David Glass in the Associated Rediffusion Area,
somewhat broader than Greater London, in 1960. This returned an 85 per cent
belief in God, with 78 per cent for men and 91 per cent for women, but no
difference between non-manual and manual occupations. The figure reached
96 per cent for Catholics, but even 25 per cent of those professing no religion
counted themselves among the believers.20 Country-wide surveys by NOP
found 91 per cent belief in God in 1961, 90 per cent in 1964, and 88 per cent in
1970, suggesting a stable picture in the 1960s, although there appears to have
been a modest underlying shift towards probable rather than certain believers;
as many as one-quarter of believers in 1961 acknowledged they had experienced
moments of disbelief. The number of disbelievers at the time of interview was
7 per cent in 1961 and 1970 but had jumped to 17 per cent by 1980, when the
question was elaborated to encompass God or a supreme being (in which 74
per cent believed), with 10 per cent undecided.21 Among young persons aged
12–20, it had reached 22 per cent as early as 1967, with believers on 68 per
cent.22 Four-fifths of Britons interviewed by ORC in 1968 and 1977 claimed
belief in God, but more than one-third of them were uncertain. By 1987,
when the survey was replicated by Insight Social Research, believers had
reduced to 69 per cent. Disbelievers, whether definite or qualified, numbered
9 per cent in 1968, 12 per cent in 1972, and 16 per cent in 1977.23 Marplan
placed belief in God in Britain at 73 per cent in 1979, with 15 per cent

19
B. Clements, ‘Re-Examining Religious and Paranormal Beliefs in Mid-1970s Britain’,
British Religion in Numbers, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/2016/re-examining-religious-and-paranormal-
beliefs-in-mid-1970s-britain/>; ‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330.
20
Unpublished. Believers in God were asked six supplementary questions exploring whether
they also believed in a God who created the universe; would change the laws of the universe; laid
down laws of human conduct; punished people if these laws were disobeyed; and punished and
rewarded actions in this or a later life.
21
(1961) unpublished; (1964) ‘National Opinion Polls National Political Surveys, May 1964’,
dataset at UKDA, SN 64009; (1970) New Society, 18 December 1975; (1980) Political, Social,
Economic Review 26 (1980): 33.
22
Daily Mail, 28 November 1967.
23
(1968) Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 13–14, 19; (1972) Sunday
Times, 22 April 1973 (a poorly and ambiguously worded report); (1977) unpublished; (1987)
M. Svennevig, I. R. Haldane, S. Spiers, and B. Gunter, Godwatching: Viewers, Religion, and
Television (London: John Libbey, 1988), 27–8.
134 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 6.1 Belief in God and the Devil, adults, Great Britain, 1968–81 (percentages down)
1968 1973 1975 1979 1981

God
Yes 77 74 72 76 73
No 11 12 17 15 19
Don’t know 12 14 11 9 8
Devil
Yes 21 18 20 22 21
No 60 69 72 68 73
Don’t know 19 13 8 10 7
N= 1,000 892 958 918 994

Note: The questions were: ‘which of the following do you believe in—God?’ and ‘which of the following do
you believe in—the Devil?’
Sources: (1968) GPI 98 (1968): 69, GPI 100 (1968): 112, Sunday Telegraph, 21 July 1968, Gallup, GIPOP, II,
995; (1973) GPI 154 (1973): 95, Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1251; (1975) GPI 179
(1975): 9, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1418, ‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330; (1979) GPI 225
(1979): 15, Sunday Telegraph, 15 April 1979, I. Reid, Social Class Differences in Britain, 2nd edn. (London:
Grant McIntyre, 1981), 254; (1981) GPI 248 (1981): 12, Sunday Telegraph, 19 April 1981.

disbelievers,24 twice as many as in Scotland in 1976, where System Three

recorded believers at 85 per cent.25
Given that it had been polling since 1937, it comes as something of a
surprise that Gallup posed no binary question about belief in God until
1968, from which date there is a short series (Table 6.1). In the thirteen
years to 1981, belief in God hovered around three-quarters, albeit there was
some movement from the ranks of the ‘don’t knows’ to the camp of disbe-
lievers (who had grown to 19 per cent by 1981). Believers were dispropor-
tionately women, over 65 years of age, from the lowest (DE) social grade, and
Roman Catholic, biases which held good for religious belief data in general.26
A second Gallup question, first asked in 1947, was in a non-binary format,
enquiring about the nature of God (a person versus a life force) and also
providing an extended ‘don’t know’ option (Table 6.2). With the partial
exception of 1963, aggregate believers were still around three-quarters, but
support for a personal God lost ground, a plurality favouring a life force by
1979 and 1981, while disbelievers doubled from 6 per cent in 1957 to 12 per cent
in 1981.27 Among believers in God, NOP also registered a decline in belief in a

24
Now!, 21 December 1979; ‘Now! Religion Survey, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1366.
25
Glasgow Herald, 11 October 1976.
26
For a fuller analysis of the demographics of belief in God, see Clements, Surveying Christian
Beliefs, 13–15.
27
Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs, 22–4 for a demographic analysis. Gallup asked a
different question in England in 1963–4, resulting in higher aggregate belief in God of 84 per
cent: Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion (London: University of London Press,
1965), 45–7, 127.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 135
Table 6.2 Belief in God and the divinity of Jesus Christ, adults, Great Britain, 1957–81
(percentages down)
1957 1963 1979 1981

God
There is a personal God 41 38 35 36
There is some sort of spirit or life force 37 33 41 37
I don’t really think there is any sort of God or life force 6 9 8 12
I don’t know what to think 16 20 17 15
Jesus Christ
Son of God 71 60 55 52
Just a man 9 16 25 31
Just a story 6 7 7 5
Don’t know 14 17 13 11
N= 2,261 1,076 918 994

Sources: (1957) News Chronicle, 15, 17 April 1957, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 405; (1963) GPI 39 (1963): 75, B. Martin,
‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain
[1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 146–97 at 151–4, 178, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 682; (1979) GPI 225 (1979): 15,
Sunday Telegraph, 15 April 1979, I. Reid, Social Class Differences in Britain, 2nd edn. (London: Grant
McIntyre, 1981), 254; (1981) GPI 248 (1981): 12, Sunday Telegraph, 19 April 1981.

personal God, from 63 per cent in 1961 to 45 per cent in 1970, with a
corresponding increase in those believing in an impersonal force from 24
per cent to 42 per cent, the remainder being undecided.28 In both 1968 and
1974 ORC already had believers in a life force outnumbering those in a
personal God,29 although a different question in 1970 elicited 48 per cent
belief in a personal God who can respond to individual human beings.30
Some other dimensions of belief in God were explored in the 1968 and 1987
surveys for the ITA.31 During this nineteen-year period there was a steep fall,
from 68 per cent to 44 per cent, in Britons agreeing with the statement that
‘without belief in God life is meaningless’. However, among believers in God
there was little change between 1968 and 1987 in those sensing God watched
what each person did and thought (just under one-half) and those who
disagreed (one-quarter). In both years, believers were rather more likely to
think of God when they were worried rather than happy, with death, serious
illness, and other difficulties affecting respondents and their immediate circles
being the commonest situations for thinking about God. Indeed, in 1968 death
(64 per cent) and serious illness (47 per cent) headed the list of words or
phrases adults most associated with God. Punishment (9 per cent) and reward

28
NOP, unpublished.
29
(1968) Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 18–20; (1974) Sunday Times,
13 October 1974.
30
Daily Express, 13 May 1970.
31
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 19–21, 26–7; Svennevig, Haldane,
Spiers, and Gunter, Godwatching, 26, 28–30, 46.
136 Secularization in the Long 1960s

(7 per cent) came towards the bottom, echoing Glass’s findings in the Asso-
ciated Rediffusion Area in 1960 that belief in a judgemental God was the least
prevalent of all sub-beliefs about God, apart from with Roman Catholics. God
as judge was also a relatively uncommon image of the deity for believers in
God in Leeds in 1982, love, creator, protector, father, and redeemer offering a
more attractive picture.32 As NOP lamented in 1961: ‘The God of Christianity
has been stripped of all but a few of the most acceptable and undemanding
of His characteristics; the figure that remains is a very limited sort of God.’33 In
fact, by 1979, as religious diversity increased in Britain, there was even a tiny
minority which recognized the existence of more than one god.34
The authority of God was further undermined by decreasing public recogni-
tion that Jesus Christ was the Son of God. Although there was no significant
movement in the numbers identifying with the figure of Christ in some way,
which exceeded four-fifths in Britain throughout the quarter-century covered by
Table 6.2, there was a substantial fall of 19 points in acceptance that He was the
Son of God and a corresponding rise of 22 points in those regarding Him as just
a man.35 At Leeds in 1982, no more than 43 per cent viewed Him as the Son of
God, 30 per cent as an ordinary human being, and 12 per cent as a prophet.36
The decline was less steep in nationwide polling for the ITA, 85 per cent
agreeing that Jesus was the Son of God in 1968 and 74 per cent in 1987, but
this high level of belief reflected the fact that a binary question had been asked,
with respondents given no alternative descriptions of Christ to select. There was
much less certainty about the statement that ‘people who believe in Jesus as the
Son of God can expect salvation’, with which 66 per cent concurred in 1968 and
47 per cent in 1987.37 Women, over-65s, members of the DE social group, and
Roman Catholics were again the strongest believers.38

32
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 47; P. W. Brierley, What Are
Churchgoers Like? (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1986), 18–20.
33
NOP, unpublished.
34
World Opinion Update 5/3 (1981): 64; Survey Research Consultants International, Index to
International Public Opinion, 1980–1981, ed. E. H. Hastings and P. K. Hastings (Oxford: Clio
Press, 1982), 534–5.
35
England-only results in 1963–4 were: Son of God 64 per cent; just a man 16 per cent; just a
story 5 per cent—Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 47–8, 127. It might be
speculated that the increased popularity of ‘just a man’ responses owed something to the runaway
success of the musical Jesus Christ, Superstar, by Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice, which
opened on Broadway in 1971 and in the West End in 1972. One of the show’s top songs, I Don’t
Know How to Love Him, featured the lyrics ‘he’s a man, he’s just a man’.
36
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 48; Brierley, What Are Church-
goers Like?, 19–20.
37
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 26–7; Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers,
and Gunter, Godwatching, 31.
38
Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs, 69–70 for demographics of the 1979 and 1981
Gallup data.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 137

However, God’s hegemony was not greatly challenged by the Devil, in

whom only a minority believed. In the early 1960s, this was around one-
third in surveys specifically asking about belief in the Devil, by Gallup in 1957
(34 per cent) and 1963 (35 per cent)39 and by NOP in 1961 (31 per cent).40
When Gallup abandoned this direct question in favour of inviting interviewees
to select from a list of religious beliefs those which they believed in, the
proportion of believers in the Devil dropped to one-fifth between 1968 and
1981 (Table 6.1), deniers tending to increase at the expense of the ‘don’t
knows’. There were smaller, and less consistent, variations by demographics
for belief in the Devil than for other religious beliefs.41 Only among believers
in hell was the Devil given much credence (72 per cent in 1973), falling to
24 per cent for believers in God.42 When NOP returned to a more specific
question in 1980, widening it to include either the Devil or ‘an identifiable
force of evil’, believers reached 40 per cent, albeit still outnumbered by
disbelievers on 50 per cent.43

B E L I E F I N L I F E A F T E R DE A T H

Tony Walter has argued that there has been an ‘eclipse of eternity’ in the
modern world, with the hereafter increasingly blocked from the public stage.44
Belief in life after death was certainly less pervasive than belief in God in
Britain during the 1960s and 1970s. Just how much so was partly dependent
upon question-wording, as Table 6.3, which presents a fairly long time series
from Gallup, demonstrates. In the earliest surveys, up to 1963, a question
about life after death was asked in isolation, with about one-half the popula-
tion saying they believed, which was also the case in England in 1963–4.45
From 1968 respondents in Britain were mostly asked to select the things they
believed in from a list of beliefs, in some cases traditional religious beliefs and

39
(1957) News Chronicle, 15 April 1957, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 405; (1963) GPI 39 (1963): 75,
B. Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological
Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 146–97 at 155–6, 179, Gallup,
GIPOP, I, 683. The figure was 28 per cent for England in 1963–4: Social Surveys (Gallup Poll),
Television and Religion, 49–50, 127.
40 41
Unpublished. Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs, 61–2.
42
Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973.
43
Political, Social, Economic Review 26 (1980): 33.
44
T. Walter, The Eclipse of Eternity: A Sociology of the Afterlife (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1996), including, at 27–48, a review of empirical evidence about belief in the afterlife, mostly
post-1980.
45
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 50–1, 127.
138 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 6.3 Belief in life after death, adults, Great Britain, 1939–81 (percentages across)
N= Yes No Don’t know

1939 1,761 48 34 18
1947 2,000 49 27 24
1957 2,261 54 17 29
1960 1,000 56 18 26
1963 1,076 53 22 25
1968 1,000 38 35 27
1973 892 37 39 24
1975 958 35 45 20
1978 1,000 36 47 17
1979 987 46 23 31
1981 968 40 42 18

Note: The question was either ‘do you believe in life after death?’ (until 1963) or ‘which of these do you believe
in—life after death?’ (from 1968).
Sources: (1939) News Chronicle, 27 April 1939, ‘British Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) Polls, 1938–1946’,
dataset at UKDA, SN 3331; (1947) News Chronicle, 13 January 1948, H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), 33, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 166; (1957) News Chronicle, 15 April 1957,
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 405; (1960) P. Alan, ‘The Statistics of Belief ’, The Humanist 76 (1961): 169–71 at 169–70;
(1963) GPI 39 (1963): 75, B. Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A
Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 146–97 at 154–5, 179, Gallup,
GIPOP, I, 682; (1968) GPI 98 (1968): 69, GPI 100 (1968): 112, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 995; (1973) GPI 154 (1973):
95, Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1250–1; (1975) GPI 179 (1975): 9, Gallup, GIPOP, II,
1417, ‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330; (1978) GPI 212 (1978): 14, G. H. Gallup, The
International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion, 1978 (London: George Prior, 1980), 329; (1979) Survey Research
Consultants International, Index to International Public Opinion, 1980–1981, ed. E. H. Hastings and
P. K. Hastings (Oxford: Clio Press, 1982), 534–5; (1981) GPI 256 (1981): 11, Sunday Telegraph, 27 December
1981, World Opinion Update 6/2 (1982): 44, N. Webb and R. J. Wybrow, The Gallup Report: Your Opinions in
1981 (London: Sphere Books, 1982), 174.

in others paranormal beliefs, which introduced further variability in the

results. On this formulation, believers in life after death dropped to around
two-fifths. It is hard to detect any very obvious trend, apart from disbelievers
outnumbering believers from 1973, except in 1979 when the question about
life after death differed again, being asked as one of a list of statements about
religion. The proportion of ‘don’t knows’ was very substantial at all dates,
while believers were most likely to be found among women and the over-65s.46
Broadly speaking, other polling companies reported a similar range of results.
NOP recorded belief in life after death at 50 per cent in 1970 and 42 per cent in
1980,47 ORC at 41 per cent in 1970 and 39 per cent in 1974, with 27 per cent as
‘don’t knows’ at the latter date.48 Believers in life after death numbered 53 per cent

46
On demographics, see Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs, 48–9.
47
(1970) New Society, 18 December 1975; (1980) Political, Social, Economic Review 26
(1980): 33.
48
(1970) Daily Express, 13 May 1970; (1974) Sunday Times, 13 October 1974.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 139

in Britain in 1979, according to Marplan,49 while in Scotland in 1976 they

represented 49 per cent of adults in a poll by System Three.50
A generic weakness of surveys about life after death, as about religious
beliefs more generally, was that it was left to interviewees to define concepts.
The afterlife was whatever individuals imagined it to be, and they were rarely
invited to elaborate on their answers. If they were, as in Geoffrey Gorer’s study
of a sample of bereaved persons in 1963, a diversity of opinion about the
precise form of life after death was surfaced.51 Marplan’s 1979 study was a
conspicuous exception in this regard, forcing believers in life after death, or
those undecided about it, to choose a sub-option to describe its likely nature.
One-half selected the soul living on following the death of the body. A further
20 per cent thought that heaven or hell awaited in perpetuity, 14 per cent
believed in reincarnation, and 16 per cent rejected all the sub-options.52
Gallup investigated the incidence of belief in heaven, hell, and reincarnation
in a series of polls between 1968 and 1981 (Table 6.4). Belief in a soul did not
appear on the same list, although Gallup’s fieldwork for the first EVS in 1981
established that it was held by 59 per cent of Britons,53 while another Gallup
enquiry from 1979 had discovered 44 per cent agreement with the proposition
that ‘there is a soul separate from the body in the human being’.54
A comparison of Table 6.4 with the corresponding data points in Table 6.3
immediately reveals that more Britons (about one-half) believed in heaven
than in a life after death, implying that for many heaven did not constitute part
of the hereafter, even though it might easily have been rationalized as a
‘reward’ for good behaviour during life on earth. This was notwithstanding
that 67 per cent of Britons told ORC in 1968 that a person who led a good life
would be rewarded in a future life, a conviction which had weakened (to 48 per
cent) by 1987.55 There was some increase in disbelievers in heaven during the
thirteen years covered by Table 6.4, seemingly stemming from a reduced
number of ‘don’t knows’. Believers were disproportionately female, over 65,
and from the DE social grade.56
Heaven’s polar opposite, hell, was emphatically rejected, with no more than
one-fifth of Britons believing in it, according to Table 6.4, 30 points or so less
than believed in heaven. NOP reported a slightly higher (32 per cent), but still

49
Now!, 21 December 1979; ‘Now! Religion Survey, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1366.
50
Glasgow Herald, 11 October 1976.
51
G. E. S. Gorer, Death, Grief, and Mourning in Contemporary Britain (London: Cresset
Press, 1965), 33–40, 166–8.
52
Now!, 21 December 1979; ‘Now! Religion Survey, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1366.
53
D. Gerard, ‘Religious Attitudes and Values’, in M. Abrams, D. Gerard, and N. Timms, eds.,
Values and Social Change in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), 50–92 at 60.
54
World Opinion Update 5/3 (1981): 64.
55
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 26–7; Svennevig, Haldane, Spiers,
and Gunter, Godwatching, 36.
56
Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs, 55–7.
140 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 6.4 Belief in heaven, hell, and reincarnation, adults, Great Britain, 1968–81
(percentages down)
1968 1973 1975 1979 1981

Heaven
Yes 54 51 49 57 53
No 27 31 36 31 37
Don’t know 19 18 14 12 10
Hell
Yes 23 20 20 22 21
No 58 67 71 66 72
Don’t know 19 13 9 12 7
Reincarnation
Yes 18 22 22 28 28
No 52 51 58 51 57
Don’t know 30 27 20 21 15
N= 1,000 892 958 918 994

Sources: (1968) GPI 98 (1968): 69, GPI 100 (1968): 112, Sunday Telegraph, 21 July 1968, Gallup, GIPOP, II,
995; (1973) GPI 154 (1973): 95, Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1251; (1975) GPI 179
(1975): 9, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1418, ‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330; (1979) GPI 225
(1979): 15, Sunday Telegraph, 15 April 1979, I. Reid, Social Class Differences in Britain, 2nd edn. (London:
Grant McIntyre, 1981), 254; (1981) GPI 248 (1981): 12, Sunday Telegraph, 19 April 1981.

minority, incidence of belief in hell in 1970.57 Clearly, a theological ‘pick-and-

mix’ was in operation, with people selecting only those tenets they felt most
comfortable with. This generalization probably applied less to women, whose
greater prevalence of belief in hell than among men was the principal secular
demographic to stand out,58 and to the most religiously devout, notably
Roman Catholics (43 per cent of whom believed in hell in 1975). However,
it was significant that, among believers in God in 1961, only 26 per cent also
believed in hell and just 6 per cent thought disbelievers in God were automat-
ically destined for hell.59 By 1973, the proportion of believers in God who also
believed in hell remained at one-quarter, with believers in the Devil much
more likely to believe in hell (79 per cent).60
Although the majority of the population as shown in Table 6.4 did not
believe in reincarnation, it had an expanding support base, up from 18 per
cent in 1968 to 28 per cent in 1979 and 1981. This growth, which was achieved
by halving the number of ‘don’t knows’, perhaps reflected the spread of
Eastern religious influences, specifically Hindu and Buddhist, in Britain during
the 1970s, reincarnation eventually becoming a core belief of (but not coter-
minous with) the New Age and an alternative to the Christian notion of life

57 58
New Society, 18 December 1975. Clements, Surveying Christian Beliefs, 52–3.
59 60
NOP, unpublished. Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 141

after death.61 As such, it assumed more of the characteristics of ‘non-traditional’

beliefs which, unlike ‘traditional’ religious beliefs, often appealed to younger
cohorts. In the first EVS in 1981, for example, somewhat more Britons under
25 claimed to believe in reincarnation than the average (29 per cent versus
27 per cent).62

ALTERNATIVE BELIEFS

With the exception of reincarnation, beliefs in life forces and life after death
could be accommodated within the framework of traditional Christian teach-
ings. But there was also a bundle of alternative beliefs, which the Churches
would have branded as heterodox, and which have been variously labelled by
commentators over the years as constituting superstition, paranormal beliefs,
folk religion, common religion, and, in David Martin’s memorable phrase,
subterranean theologies. These alternative beliefs had manifold origins, did
not comprise a coherent intellectual system, have mostly defied classification
into a proper taxonomy or typology, and—relative to institutional forms of
religion—have not been intensively researched by social historians of contem-
porary Britain nor by sociologists of religion. The number and variety of
the beliefs precludes a comprehensive review of them here, but some account
is given of those for which there is statistical information during the 1960s
and 1970s. In terms of polling, Gallup was the most active organization, and
its series of surveys into paranormal beliefs and experiences between 1973
and 1981 is summarized in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, respectively,63 to be drawn
upon shortly.
Together with other pollsters, Gallup had also investigated the prevalence of
superstition, the principal finding being the excess of Britons who practised

61
H. Waterhouse, ‘Reincarnation Belief in Britain: New Age Orientation or Mainstream
Option?’, Journal of Contemporary Religion 14 (1999): 97–109; T. Walter and H. Waterhouse, ‘A
Very Private Belief: Reincarnation in Contemporary England’, Sociology of Religion 60 (1999):
187–97; T. Walter and H. Waterhouse, ‘Lives-Long Learning: The Effects of Reincarnation Belief
on Everyday Life in England’, Nova Religio 5 (2001): 85–101.
62
Calculated from Centre for Comparative European Survey Data Information System,
<http://www.ccesd.ac.uk>.
63
The series continued after 1981, until 1995. The later figures can be found in C.D. Field,
Religion in Great Britain, 1939–99: A Compendium of Gallup Poll Data (Manchester: Cathie
Marsh Institute for Social Research, University of Manchester, 2015), available at <http://www.
brin.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Religion-in-Great-Britain-1939-99-A-Compendium-
of-Gallup-Poll-Data.pdf>. The series also included belief in life after death, the results for which
(for 1973–81) have been more logically reported in Table 6.3, alongside other Gallup polling on
the subject.
142 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 6.5 Paranormal beliefs, adults, Great Britain, 1973–81 (percentages down)
1973 1975 1978 1981

Hypnotism
Yes 42 42 41 42
No 50 48 53 48
Don’t know 7 10 7 10
Black magic
Yes 10 14 10 9
No 83 78 85 86
Don’t know 7 8 5 5
Horoscopes
Yes 22 27 20 20
No 73 66 76 77
Don’t know 5 7 4 3
Thought transference between two people
Yes 45 48 49 53
No 42 37 38 37
Don’t know 14 15 13 10
Ghosts
Yes 18 18 20 24
No 74 72 72 70
Don’t know 9 10 8 6
Flying saucers
Yes 15 20 27 24
No 75 65 61 64
Don’t know 10 14 12 12
Faith healing
Yes 38 42 44 43
No 48 43 42 44
Don’t know 14 15 13 13
Being able to forecast something is going to happen before it actually happens
Yes 46 51 48 54
No 44 36 43 41
Don’t know 11 12 10 5
Lucky charms or lucky mascots
Yes 16 21 15 16
No 79 74 83 82
Don’t know 5 5 2 2
Exchanging messages with the dead
Yes 12 12 9 13
No 77 77 83 80
Don’t know 11 11 7 7
N= 1,000 958 1,000 968

Sources: (1973) GPI 159 (1973): 186, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1282–3; (1975) GPI 179 (1975): 9, Gallup, GIPOP, II,
1417–18, ‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330; (1978) GPI 212 (1978): 14, G. H. Gallup, The
International Gallup Polls: Public Opinion, 1978 (London: George Prior, 1980), 329–30; (1981) GPI 256
(1981): 11, Sunday Telegraph, 27 December 1981, World Opinion Update 6/2 (1982): 44, N. Webb and
R. J. Wybrow, The Gallup Report: Your Opinions in 1981 (London: Sphere Books, 1982), 173–5.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 143
Table 6.6 Paranormal experiences, adults, Great Britain, 1973–81
(percentages down)
1973 1975 1978 1981

Experience of déjà vu
Yes 50 56 55 62
No 43 39 38 36
Don’t know 8 5 7 2
Seen a ghost
Yes 4 5 7 9
No 93 90 90 88
Not sure 3 5 4 3
Paid to have fortune told
Yes 30 34 23 24
No 70 66 77 76
N= 1,000 958 1,000 968

Sources: As Table 6.5.

superstitions over those who professed to believe in them.64 According to

Gallup, believers in superstitions numbered 35 per cent in 1946 and 26 per
cent in 1984, while 32 per cent described themselves as superstitious to
Marplan in 1979. As many as 57 per cent were willing to admit to NOP in
1970 that they were at least a bit superstitious, yet, when confronted with a list
of nineteen superstitions, only 7 per cent denied holding any of them. At Leeds
in 1982, 19 per cent self-identified as superstitious yet 43 per cent practised
superstitions.65 The three commonest superstitions were: touching wood
(practised by 38 per cent in 1946, 58 per cent in 1979, and 51 per cent in
1984); avoiding walking under ladders (50 per cent in 1946, 33 per cent in
1968, 45 per cent in 1979, and 44 per cent in 1984); and throwing spilt salt
over the shoulder (30 per cent in both 1946 and 1984, 37 per cent in 1968,
and 36 per cent in 1979). In an experiment in Sheffield in 1960, 77 per cent
of individuals (among them several clergy) were seen deliberately walking
around a ladder positioned over a pavement, even when it was not safe to do

64
The following national polls are drawn upon in this paragraph: (1946, Gallup) H. Cantril,
ed., Public Opinion, 1935–1946 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 836, Gallup,
GIPOP, I, 133–4, ‘British Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) Polls, 1938–1946’, dataset at
UKDA, SN 3331; (1968, ORC) Evening Standard, 27 February 1968; (1970, NOP) Daily Mail,
5 January 1971; (1979, Marplan) Now!, 29 February 1980; (1984, Gallup) GPI 292 (1984): 15. See
also H. M. Reynolds, ‘Magic and Superstition in Contemporary British Society’ (MSocSc thesis,
University of Birmingham, 1978).
65
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 80–1. For another local study, see
Abercrombie, Baker, Brett, and Foster, ‘Superstition and Religion’, 98–9.
144 Secularization in the Long 1960s

so, rather than pass underneath it.66 All the surveys revealed that women were
about twice as superstitious as men, but a more surprising discovery was that
the older age cohorts were not necessarily more superstitious than the young,
reflecting how superstitions continued to be handed down between the gen-
erations. The continued driver for practising them was as a possible insurance
against bad luck or an encourager of good luck, which also explains why
around one person in seven in the 1970s still believed in lucky charms or
lucky mascots (Table 6.5), the same proportion possessing one in 1970 (up
from 12 per cent in 1951).67 In Leeds in 1982, 13 per cent still had a lucky
mascot or similar.68
The identical ‘just in case’ mentality accounts for the persistence of astrol-
ogy, especially the continuing popularity of horoscopes, which were read by
far more people than claimed to believe in them.69 The number of Britons who
said they looked at their horoscope in a newspaper or magazine at least
sometimes, which had been 71 per cent in 1951, rose from 65 per cent in
1968 to 70 per cent in 1972 to 84 per cent in 1979, with about one-third
reading them on a daily basis in 1972 and 1979. Far fewer, approximately one
in five, actually believed in horoscopes (Table 6.5), and fewer still, one in 20 in
1972 and 1979, let their lives be regulated by them. As with superstition, the
appeal of horoscopes to the young as well as to women stood out (Table 6.7),
exemplified by the International Publishing Corporation’s launch of a month-
ly astrology magazine (Destiny) in 1972, which quickly built up a predomin-
antly female and working-class readership of 150,000, four-fifths of whom
were under 30 years of age.70
Horoscope-reading was a passive and probably not wholly serious form of
engagement, whereas paying to have one’s fortune told required a conscious
investment of time and money. An ORC poll in 1968 reported that 33 per cent
of Britons believed that certain individuals could tell fortunes accurately,
13 points more than had so believed in 1951,71 with 30 per cent in 1968
having visited a fortune teller at some stage, the same as in 1973 (Table 6.6)
and similar to 28 per cent in 1951.72 The figure had reduced to 24 per cent by
1981, although many visits appear to have been in the distant past. In 1979,
just 6 per cent had consulted a fortune teller or astrologist during the previous

66
K. Garwood, ‘Superstition and Half Belief ’, New Society, 31 January 1963: 120–1.
67
Gorer, Exploring English Character, 464.
68
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 80.
69
The following national polls on horoscopes and/or fortune telling are drawn upon: (1951,
Odhams Press) Gorer, Exploring English Character, 477, 479, 481; (1968, ORC) Sunday Times, 5
May 1968; (1970, NOP) Daily Mail, 5 January 1971, New Society, 22 March 1973; (1972, ORC)
Sunday Times, 22 April 1973; (1979, Marplan) Now!, 29 February 1980.
70
New Society, 22 March 1973.
71
News Chronicle, 11 August 1951; Gallup, GIPOP, I, 242.
72
Gorer, Exploring English Character, 470, 472, 474.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 145
Table 6.7 Paranormal beliefs by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1975
Belief in Hypnotism Horoscopes Thought Faith healing Premonition
transference

Total 41 28 48 43 51
Gender
Men 40 15 43 38 45
Women 42 39 52 47 56
Age
16–24 50 31 48 38 57
25–34 54 26 53 38 58
35–44 48 23 44 35 49
45–54 40 31 50 51 44
55–64 33 28 52 51 52
65+ 20 27 40 45 45
Social grade
AB 54 20 59 44 50
C1 48 22 58 50 57
C2 43 25 44 38 49
DE 31 38 40 42 49
Religion
Church of 42 29 49 47 54
England
Church of 35 42 35 33 40
Scotland
Free Church 35 29 57 49 56
Roman 35 21 46 29 50
Catholic
Other 47 35 55 53 59
None 48 17 39 32 34

Note: Secondary analysis of this dataset has sometimes generated slightly different total figures than were
published at the time.
Source: ‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330, N = 958, adapted from analysis by B. Clements.

year, of whom three-quarters considered the prediction to be very or quite

accurate, even though a mere one in eight judged the fortune teller to have had
a lot of influence on their everyday life. Women were twice as likely to believe
in fortune telling as men. At Leeds in 1982, 35 per cent stated their fortune had
been told, mostly by palmistry, three-quarters of whom viewed it as harmless
fun even though three-fifths simultaneously judged it could be dangerous.73
Fortune telling was one example of an alternative belief which required
third-party intermediation. Spiritualism, a core tenet of which was that spirits
of the dead have both the ability and inclination to communicate with
the living, was another example, usually requiring the services of a medium.

73
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 38–44.
146 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Far more people believed in the possibility of exchanging messages with the
dead than were members of the various Spiritualist associations, which we saw
from Chapter 3 were measured in only five figures. In seven national polls
between 1940 and 1981, the median percentage of believers in exchanging
messages with the dead was 12 to 15,74 while in Leeds in 1982 it was 26 per
cent.75 Faith healing was a further mediated belief, held by a steady two-fifths
of adults in five national surveys in the late 1960s and 1970s, albeit just 3 per
cent had been to a faith healer themselves in 1968.76 Hypnotism attracted the
same two-fifths level of belief (Table 6.5).
Other alternative beliefs could be experienced at a more personal level.
Three were especially popular, appealing to half the population. They were:
thought transference between two people (telepathy), belief in which rose
from 39 per cent in 1949 to 45 per cent in 1968 to 53 per cent in 1981;77 the
ability to forecast something is going to happen before it does (premonition),
held by 46 per cent in 1973 and 54 per cent in 1981 (Table 6.5), with two-fifths
claiming to have done so;78 and the sense of déjà vu, an experience recorded by
50 per cent in 1970 and 1973 but by 62 per cent in 1981.79 It is possible that the
strong support commanded by these particular beliefs reflected a perception
that they were mostly positive and benign.
Beliefs which were more unpleasant and/or threatening tended to be
rejected by the majority of the population, although some gained ground
during the period. Thus, belief in ghosts grew from 10 per cent in 1950 to
18 per cent in 1973 and 1975 and to 24 per cent in 1981, while reported
sightings of a ghost were up from 2 per cent in 1950 to 9 per cent in 1981.80
In Leeds in 1982, 36 per cent believed in ghosts or poltergeists, 20 per cent
knew somebody close who had seen one, and 14 per cent had encountered
one themselves, mostly only once.81 Flying saucers, too, seemed ominous but

74
Table 6.5 for the final four data points. For 1940 and 1957, see Gallup, GIPOP, I, 32, 405.
For 1968, see Sunday Times, 5 May 1968.
75
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 11–13.
76
Sunday Times, 5 May 1968; Table 6.5.
77
(1949) News Chronicle, 26 October 1949, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 208; (1968) Sunday Times, 5
May 1968; Table 6.5. In Leeds in 1982 the figure was 61 per cent: ‘Conventional Religion and
Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988; Krarup, Conventional Religion
and Common Religion in Leeds, 8–9.
78
Daily Mail, 5 January 1971; Abercrombie, Baker, Brett, and Foster, ‘Superstition and
Religion’, 101. In Leeds in 1982, 52 per cent believed in premonition: ‘Conventional Religion
and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988; Krarup, Conventional
Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 7–8.
79
Daily Mail, 5 January 1971; Table 6.6.
80
(1950) News Chronicle, 12 June 1950, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 219; Tables 6.5 and 6.6. NOP
recorded belief in ghosts at over one-quarter in 1970: Daily Mail, 5 January 1971. For local
evidence, see Nelson and Clews, Mobility and Religious Commitment, 21, 46, 55, 58, 71, 75.
81
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 56–60.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 147

scientific advances and science fiction made them seem increasingly plausible,
believed in by 15 per cent in 1973 but by 27 per cent six years later (Table 6.5),
with 30 per cent in 1971 thinking there was some truth in reports of flying
saucers and unidentified flying objects generally.82 Only black magic, believed
in by around one person in ten (Table 6.5), failed to make much headway,
perhaps on account of its correlation, as for believers in ghosts and in exchang-
ing messages with the dead, with believers in the Devil and hell in 1975.83
Generalization about such alternative beliefs is difficult. Some, such as
Spiritualism, veered towards a distinctly religious end of the belief spectrum
while others interfaced more with science. Yet others occupied a middle
ground where hope (or fear) rather than reason reigned. Some beliefs appealed
to as few as one in ten, others to more than one in two. But what is interesting
is that, in the more scientific, rational, and secular age of the 1960s and 1970s,
none of these beliefs actually declined much and some grew in popularity.
Their persistence owed a great deal to their ability to develop a following
among young people, as well as among women who were the bedrock of all
‘religious’ beliefs. As Table 6.7 suggests, social class effects were not constant,
some beliefs (such as hypnotism) appealing disproportionately to the middle
class, others (such as horoscopes) to the semi- and unskilled working class.
Neither do the effects of religious affiliation seem consistent, possibly because
of the small size of several of the subgroups, although the 32 per cent of
religious nones who believed in faith healing in 1975 is an intriguing result.

RELIGIOUS E XPERIENCE

Religious and other transcendent experience, existing beyond the boundaries

of normal perception, became more prominent as a discrete area of study
during the 1960s and 1970s. Made famous by William James, it had long acted
as a bridge between traditional and alternative beliefs, between Christianity
and other faiths (the latter increasing in importance in Britain at this time),
and—to an extent—between science and religion. The field had once been
dominated by psychologists and social anthropologists but was given a fresh
lease of life with the establishment of the Religious Experience Research Unit
at Manchester College, Oxford in 1969 (now the Alister Hardy Religious
Experience Research Centre at the University of Wales Trinity Saint David
in Lampeter), Hardy (an eminent zoologist) being the founding director.84

82
Daily Express, 15 April 1971.
83
‘Gallup Poll, May 1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330.
84
For the history of the Centre, see J. Franklin, Exploration into Spirit: A Power Greater
than…: The History of the Alister Hardy Religious Experience Research Centre and Society:
148 Secularization in the Long 1960s

The research of the Unit initially revolved around the collection, classification,
and analysis of a vast internationally sourced archive of first-hand accounts of
religious or spiritual experiences. These were decidedly not representative of
the general public, respondents being at once self-selecting and predominantly
elderly and female. However, the Unit soon developed a quantitative strand in
conjunction with David Hay of the University of Nottingham, who had
independently started to research religious experience and later (1985–9)
became the Unit’s director.85
Religious experience was a diffuse phenomenon and not readily susceptible
to statistical measurement, certainly not via opinion polls, which, by their very
nature, necessitated a relatively simplified methodology. Nevertheless, Hay
deemed it essential to establish its approximate incidence in Britain, to parallel
emerging American findings, so in 1976 he commissioned NOP to include a
series of questions in one of their regular omnibus surveys. Two formulations
were used, one replicating the approach in some of the United States research:
‘have you ever felt as though you were very close to a powerful spiritual force
that seemed to lift you out of yourself?’ Just under one-third (31 per cent) of
Britons replied in the affirmative, somewhat to Hay’s surprise, since the
equivalent American figure in 1973 had only been 35 per cent, even though
the United States scored more highly than Britain in terms of church atten-
dance and other religious performance indicators.86 Five years later, the
question reappeared in the first EVS, when far fewer in Britain, just 19 per cent,
responded positively, 79 per cent denying they had ever felt close to a powerful
spiritual force that seemed to lift them out of themselves. Since a fall of
12 points in five years seems implausibly big, some doubt must be cast on the
robustness of the question and the ease of its interpretation. The other three
experiences enquired about in 1981 were somewhat more tangible: a sense
of being in touch with someone who was far away (reported by 36 per cent);
a feeling of being in touch with someone who had died (26 per cent); and the
witnessing of events occurring at a great distance as they were happening
(14 per cent).87

Origins, Development, and Vision, 2nd edn. (Lampeter: Alister Hardy Society for the Study of
Spiritual Experience, 2014). For biographies of Hardy, see J. Keeble, ‘This Unnamed Something’:
A Personal Portrait of the Life of Professor Sir Alister Hardy, FRS, 1896–1985 (Lampeter:
Religious Experience Research Centre, 2000) and D. Hay, God’s Biologist: A Life of Alister
Hardy (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 2011).
85
The Unit’s achievements during its first eight years are described in A. Hardy, The Spiritual
Nature of Man: A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
86
D. Hay and A. M. Morisy, ‘Reports of Ecstatic, Paranormal, or Religious Experience in
Great Britain and the United States: A Comparison of Trends’, Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 17 (1978): 255–68 at 261–2; D. Hay, Exploring Inner Space: Scientists and Religious
Experience (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 118–19.
87
Survey Research Consultants International, Index to International Public Opinion,
1982–1983, ed. E. H. Hastings and P. K. Hastings (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 537–8;
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 149

The second question fielded by Hay in 1976 was one devised by Hardy in
1971 as the basis for soliciting accounts of religious experience: ‘have you ever
been aware of, or influenced by, a presence or power, whether you call it God
or not, which is different from your everyday self?’ The results of this question,
and of its replication in 1985 by Gallup on behalf of the Religious Experience
Research Unit, are presented in Table 6.8. It will be seen that, on this defi-
nition, a religious experience was reported by about one-third of adults
(36 per cent in 1976 and 33 per cent in 1985), albeit one-half of this subgroup
had only experienced it once or twice. Women were more likely to have had a
religious experience than men, older age cohorts than the under-25s, profes-
sionals and managers more than manual workers, and the best educated than
those who had left school at the minimum leaving age. In 1976, claimed levels
of experience were highest in Wales (46 per cent), South-West England
(41 per cent), and Scotland (40 per cent). There was also a marked correlation
with strength of religious commitment in terms of church attendance and the
degree of importance attached to the spiritual side of life, which accounts for
experience being less common among Anglicans (many of whom would have
been nominal in their allegiance) and religious nones.
Although surprised, Hay was also convinced by more localized and in-
depth research he had conducted in Nottingham during the late 1970s that the
proportion claiming a religious experience was underestimated in these na-
tional polls. Among postgraduate students he found it to be 65 per cent,88
while for a random sample of the city’s residents it was 62 per cent.89 Both
these investigations had been able to explore the nature, duration, context, and
effect of religious experience and were thus considered to embody a more
nuanced and self-validating approach than a single question. Although not in
the public domain at this time, the Leeds survey in 1982 also exemplified
how the single (and, in this instance, rather obscure) question could produce
erratic results. Asked ‘have you ever had an experience of great insight or
awakening, or an experience of being lifted out of yourself in some way?’, just
11 per cent of Leeds citizens said they had.90 Accordingly, in 1986, Hay
returned to the national polling fray again, requesting Gallup to test the preva-
lence of nine specific instances of ‘religious’ experience. Individual experiences

S. Harding and D. Phillips with M. Fogarty, Contrasting Values in Western Europe: Unity,
Diversity, and Change (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 54–7.
88
D. Hay, ‘Religious Experience amongst a Group of Post-Graduate Students: A Qualitative
Study’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 18 (1979): 164–82.
89
A. M. Morisy, ‘The Problems of a Sociological Definition of Religious Experience’ (MPhil
thesis, University of Nottingham, 1980); Hay, Exploring Inner Space, 130–47, revised edn.
(Oxford: Mowbray, 1987), 135–52; D. Hay and A. M. Morisy, ‘Secular Society, Religious
Meanings: A Contemporary Paradox’, Review of Religious Research 26 (1984–5): 213–27.
90
‘Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 1982’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1988;
Krarup, Conventional Religion and Common Religion in Leeds, 60–4.
Table 6.8 Religious experience by demographics, adults, Great Britain, 1976 and 1985
(percentages down)
1976 1985

Total 36 33
Gender
Men 31 21
Women 41 33
Age
16–24 29 25
25–34 35 31
35–44 33 35
45–64 39 36
65+ 47 34
Social grade
AB 49 44
C1 41 35
C2 31 29
DE 32 28
Terminal education age
13–15 34 NA
16 37 NA
17–19 44 NA
20+ 56 NA
Churchgoing other than rites of passage
Yes 56 NA
No 26 NA
Importance of spiritual side of life
Very 74 NA
Fairly 40 NA
Slightly 26 NA
Not 11 NA
Religion
Church of England 33 NA
Free Church 44 NA
Roman Catholic 41 NA
Other Christian 68 NA
Non-Christian 50 NA
Agnostic/atheist/don’t know 23 NA
N= 1,865 1,030

Note: The question was: ‘have you ever been aware of, or influenced by, a presence or power, whether you call
it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?’
Sources: (1976) D. Hay, ‘Religious Experience’, The Tablet, 23 July 1977: 694–5, D. Hay and A. M. Morisy,
‘Reports of Ecstatic, Paranormal, or Religious Experience in Great Britain and the United States:
A Comparison of Trends’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 17 (1978): 255–68, A. Hardy, The
Spiritual Nature of Man: A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979),
126–30, D. Hay, Exploring Inner Space: Scientists and Religious Experience (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1982), 118–29, revised edn. (Oxford: Mowbray, 1987), 123–34, idem, ‘Religious Experience and its Induction’,
in L. B. Brown, ed., Advances in the Psychology of Religion (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985), 135–50 at 137–9,
idem, Religious Experience Today: Studying the Facts (London: Mowbray, 1990), 79–80, 82–3, idem, ‘The
Bearing of Empirical Studies of Religious Experience on Education’, Research Papers in Education 5 (1990):
3–28 at 6–11; (1985) GPI 297 (1985): 16, Hay, Religious Experience Today, 79, 81, 83, idem, ‘Bearing of
Empirical Studies’, 6–8, 10, Gallup, unpublished.
 Believing—Beliefs and Experience 151
Table 6.9 Religious experience, adults, Great Britain, 1986 (percentages)
Ever had Of whom describe
experience experience as religious

Knowing that something is going to happen 38 18

beforehand, a premonition
A patterning of events in your life that convinces you 29 32
that in some strange way they were meant to happen
An awareness of the presence of God 27 80
An awareness that you are receiving help in answer to 25 79
prayer
An awareness of a kindly presence looking after you or 22 58
guiding you
An awareness that you are in the presence of someone 18 35
who has died
An awareness of a sacred presence in nature 16 61
An awareness of an evil presence 12 38
Experiencing in an extraordinary way that all things 5 55
are ‘one’

Note: N = 985.
Sources: GPI 310 (1986): 31–2; D. Hay and G. Heald, ‘Religion is Good for You’, New Society, 17 April 1987:
20–2; D. Hay, Religious Experience Today: Studying the Facts (London: Mowbray, 1990), 79, 83–4; idem, ‘The
Bearing of Empirical Studies of Religious Experience on Education’, Research Papers in Education 5 (1990):
3–28 at 6–7, 11–12, 16–18.

were reported by between 5 per cent and 38 per cent of respondents (Table 6.9),
with 48 per cent noting one or more of the experiences. However, there
was wide variation in the extent to which the experiences were perceived to
be religious, and this should instil a certain caution in utilizing religious
experience data as an unqualified guide to the spiritual state of society.
 7

Believing—Attitudes

I N F LU EN C E OF RE L IGI O N AN D T H E CH U R C H E S

Secularization has often been defined as the diminishing social significance of

religion. So far, we have assessed its prevalence in the Britain of the 1960s and
1970s in terms of the strength of people’s individual religious attachments,
practices, and beliefs. But it also needs to be measured in the light of their
attitudes to the role and influence of religion and the Churches in society as a
whole and of the extent to which opinions on ostensibly secular issues were
shaped by religious allegiances. These themes will be examined in this chapter.
Opinion polls of the period included a range of questions exploring
perceptions of the standing of religion and its institutional expressions. As
Table 7.1 indicates, according to Gallup a majority of Britons sensed that religion
was losing its influence on British life, the number peaking at 70 per cent in the
mid-1970s. Men read the prospects more pessimistically than women, with
Roman Catholics being among the most optimistic about an enlarged scope
for religion (albeit a plurality even of them saw it as in retreat). Only once, in
England in 1963–4, did Gallup ask its respondents what they felt about the
trend, discovering that three-fifths of adults actually wanted religion to have
more influence, ten times more than said the opposite.1 Interviewed in two
separate studies in 1968 and 1969, the same proportion suggested to Gallup
that the British people were getting worse ‘from the point of view of its attitude
to religion’, just one-tenth detecting an improvement and one-fifth no
change.2 At the same time, there was growing acceptance that religion was
largely old-fashioned and out-of-date, and that it could no longer answer all or
most contemporary problems, the number saying so standing at 27 per cent in
Britain in 1957 but at 45 per cent in England in 1963–4, with a corresponding

1
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion (London: University of London Press,
1965), 40–2, 123.
2
(1968) GPI 98 (1968): 69 and 100 (1968): 114–15; (1969) Sunday Telegraph, 23 March 1969,
Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1041–2.
 Believing—Attitudes 153
Table 7.1 Extent to which religion was perceived as increasing or losing its influence
on British life, adults, Great Britain, 1957–82 (percentages across)
N= Increasing No change Losing Don’t know

1957 2,261 17 18 52 13
1965 1,000 11 21 54 14
1967 1,000 9 19 65 7
1973 892 10 11 70 9
1975 958 12 12 70 6
1982 1,032 14 13 67 6
Sources: (1957) Gallup, GIPOP, I, 406; (1965) GPI 61 (1965): 80, B. Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll
Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968),
146–97 at 163–4, 182; (1967) Sunday Telegraph, 14 May 1967, GPI 85 (1967): 77, Martin, ‘Comments on
Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, 163–4, 182, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 929; (1973) Sunday Telegraph, 13 May 1973, GPI
154 (1973): 95, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1251; (1975) GPI 179 (1975): 9, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1418, ‘Gallup Poll, May
1975’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1330; (1982) GPI 260 (1982): 18.

reduction from 46 per cent to 40 per cent in those pinning faith on religion’s
problem-solving attributes.3
One area which Gallup did not investigate in the 1960s and 1970s was
whether Britain was or should be a Christian country. This remains a con-
tested topic even in the early twenty-first century, but it has also been
suggested recently that there was decreasing buy-in to the concept as early
as the post-Second World War era.4 NOP probed the matter in 1965, when
80 per cent of adults still claimed that Britain was a Christian country (with highs
of 85 per cent among Anglicans, 84 per cent for Northerners, and 83 per cent of
over-65s), 19 per cent disagreeing.5 Not until 1989 was a similar question
posed by Gallup, by which point the figure had decreased to 71 per cent, with
an apparent consensus for this group that Britain ought to remain a Christian
country.6 Framing its enquiry rather more theoretically, ORC asked in 1968
about how important it was that Britain should be a Christian country, four-
fifths of its sample saying that it was very (48 per cent) or quite (33 per cent)
important, rising to 95 per cent in the most religious quartile.7 A replication of
this question by Insight Social Research in 1987 revealed a fall of 12 points
during the intervening nineteen years, to 69 per cent, with a decline of 10 points

3
(1957) News Chronicle, 15 April 1957, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 406; (1963–4) Social Surveys
(Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 42–4, 122–3.
4
A. Chapman, ‘The International Context of Secularization in England: The End of Empire,
Immigration, and the Decline of Christian National Identity, 1945–1970’, Journal of British
Studies 54 (2015): 163–89.
5
R. J. Goldman, ‘Do We Want Our Children Taught about God?’, New Society, 27 May 1965:
8–10 at 9.
6
GPI 352 (1989): 10–11.
7
Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland: A Survey of
Popular Attitudes (London: the Authority, 1970), 16–17.
154 Secularization in the Long 1960s

for those saying very important.8 This was broadly in line with the 67 per cent
reported by Harris Research Centre in 1984.9
Underpinning the concept of Britain as a Christian country were its Churches
and clergy, which provided, alongside the Bible, the practical source of authority
for, and guidance in, the Christian faith. Modern Britain has never experienced the
level and extremity of anti-clericalism which can be found in, for example, France
or Spain, but there was some erosion in the public standing of both Churches and
clergy during the 1960s and 1970s, albeit nowhere near as pronounced as it was to
become in Britain immediately before and after the millennium.10
Commencing with the Church (or Churches—pollsters sometimes used the
singular and sometimes the plural form), it can be noted that a series of seven
Gallup surveys between 1963 and 1982 discovered that only around one in
seven Britons considered the Church had a lot of influence on the country’s
future, ranging from 10 per cent in 1968 to 17 per cent in 1973; somewhat
more than two-fifths thought it had a little influence on the national future
and about one-third none at all. Nor was there much desire by the public for
the Church to increase its influence, according to Gallup in 1969. NOP
likewise reported in 1970 that although three-quarters believed the Church
should have played an important role in British society, just one-fifth assessed
it did so in practice;11 ten years later, the same agency placed the Church
bottom of eight institutions for its influence over British life.12
When it came to confidence in the Church, a great deal of confidence was
expressed by 26 per cent in 1973 and 22 per cent in 1974 (in ORC studies) and
by 19 per cent in 1981 (in a Gallup poll, with an additional 29 per cent having
quite a lot of confidence and one-half not very much or none). Overall, 52 per
cent perceived the Church as complacent, old-fashioned, and out-of-touch in
1979 (Marplan). More specifically, the Church was felt to be failing to give
adequate answers to the problems facing Britain. Even when it came to
meeting people’s spiritual needs, only a plurality (42 per cent) in 1981 judged
it successful; 44 per cent found it wanting in addressing problems of family
life, 45 per cent in tackling moral problems, and 57 per cent in facing social
problems, statistics which would surely have been much worse had one-
quarter of the sample not taken refuge in ‘don’t know’ replies.

8
M. Svennevig, I. R. Haldane, S. Spiers, and B. Gunter, Godwatching: Viewers, Religion, and
Television (London: John Libbey, 1988), 21.
9
The Observer Magazine, 16 September 1984.
10
The next paragraphs summarize the relevant evidence in C. D. Field, ‘Another Window on
British Secularization: Public Attitudes to Church and Clergy since the 1960s’, Contemporary
British History 28 (2014): 190–218, to which (unless otherwise specified) the reader is referred for
details of sources.
11
New Society, 18 December 1975; M. Charlot, L’Angleterre cette inconnue: une société qui
change (Paris: Armand Colin, 1980), 241.
12
Political, Social, Economic Review 26 (1980): 24–5.
 Believing—Attitudes 155

As for the clergy, the majority of adults claimed to have met their local
minister or priest, 67 per cent in 1963–4 (Gallup), 57 per cent in 1979
(Marplan), and 61 per cent in 1984 (Harris Research Centre), women being
more likely to have done so than men. However, encounters appear to have
been relatively infrequent and mostly in connection with religious services or
social functions at a place of worship. Certainly, with the conspicuous excep-
tions of religious problems and cases of death and grave illness, fewer than one
in ten of the general population appear to have consulted the clergy about
personal difficulties, according to ORC in 1968 and 1974,13 NOP in 1970,14
Marplan in 1979, and Gallup in 1981 and 1985.
Perceptions of the clergy seem to have been most favourable in the Gallup
survey of 1963–4, when they were regarded as the group of public servants
having the greatest influence for good in the community, and being most
altruistic, marginally ahead of doctors on both counts. They were also over-
whelmingly seen as sincere (90 per cent) and carrying out a lot of useful work
(83 per cent), and often as overworked (61 per cent) and underpaid (46 per
cent), albeit slow to accept new ideas (48 per cent). Although still praised for
doing a good job (by 83 per cent in a NOP survey of 1970) and for their
altruism (by 63 per cent in a Gallup poll of 1974), they subsequently lost
ground to other professions. This was less so in terms of the admiration or
respect in which they were held, where they typically occupied fourth or fifth
position (according to Gallup in 1964, ORC in 1968, and Interscan in 1969),
than for their usefulness, which was deemed to be quite limited relative to that
of other groups (according to NOP in 1968, BMRB in 1979, and Gallup in
1981). Trustworthiness to tell the truth was the clergy’s remaining trump card,
as they topped MORI’s first veracity index in 1983, with a score of 85 per cent.

RE L I G I O US P R E J U D I C E

Notwithstanding Catholic advances and the spread of non-Christian faiths

(reviewed in Chapter 3), Protestantism continued to dominate the British
religious landscape numerically. This dominance was partly secured by the
persistence of an Established Church in England, legally intertwined with
monarchy and state, a link which the majority of the British public wished
to see preserved in Harris polls in 1970 and 1984. Indeed, there appeared to be
less public appetite for disestablishment than there had been in the 1950s.15

13
(1968) Independent Television Authority, Religion in Britain, 34–5; (1974) unpublished.
14
Church Times, 28 May 1971; New Society, 18 December 1975.
15
C. D. Field, ‘ “A Quaint and Dangerous Anachronism”? Who Supports the (Dis)establishment
of the Church of England?’, Implicit Religion 14 (2011): 319–41 at 322.
156 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Although the nation’s Protestant traditions and ethos were greatly diminished
by 1960, as Simon Green has argued,16 traces were very much evident. One of
the more negative manifestations of this survival was the prejudice which was
still to be found against religious ‘outsiders’, people who were not Protestants.
In this section, we will summarize the suspicion of and hostility towards
Catholics, Jews, and atheists which existed in the 1960s and 1970s, focusing
on national-level opinion polls, but without rehearsing the specific issue of
sectarianism in Scotland, which has already been intensively studied.17
Institutionalized discrimination against Roman Catholics had mostly long
since ended, the last Catholic Relief Act being passed in 1926,18 but popular
tropes about Catholics and the Catholic Church had not entirely died out,
reinforced by the latter’s association with ‘foreignness’. As a Congregational
minister remarked: ‘The Englishman is still a natural Protestant. Militant
antipathy to the Roman Catholic Church is largely a spent force, but in English
society that Church still seems to many people something alien. Most agnos-
tics are at least Protestant agnostics.’19 The bias was reflected in the admission
to Gallup by 17 per cent of Britons in 1957 of a dislike for the Catholic faith
and in rejection by the majority of Britons of perceived illiberal Catholic
teaching on artificial birth control (Gallup, 1965 and 1968; NOP, 1968 and
1982), the celibacy of the priesthood (NOP, 1970 and 1982), and the remar-
riage of divorcees (MORI, 1978; NOP, 1982).
Prejudice against the Catholic Church also surfaced, at least until the 1960s,
in a lower level of endorsement of church unity negotiations between
Catholics and Protestants than between Anglicans and Nonconformists, as
documented by Gallup (Table 7.2). The gap narrowed over time and had
disappeared by 1982, when Pope John Paul II visited Britain, although one-
fifth continued to object to Protestant/Catholic unity, opposition being more
pronounced among the over-65s, regular churchgoers, and affiliates of the

16
S. J. D. Green, The Passing of Protestant England: Secularisation and Social Change,
c.1920–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
17
See, in particular, S. Bruce, No Pope of Rome: Anti-Catholicism in Modern Scotland
(Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1985); T. Gallagher, Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace—Religious
Tension in Modern Glasgow (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); idem, Divided
Scotland: Ethnic Friction and Christian Crisis (Glendaruel: Argyll Publishing, 2013); G. Walker
and T. Gallagher, eds., Sermons and Battle Hymns: Protestant Popular Culture in Modern
Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990); T. M. Devine, ed., Scotland’s Shame?
Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2000);
S. Bruce, T. Glendinning, I. Paterson, and M. Rosie, Sectarianism in Scotland (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2004); M. Rosie, The Sectarian Myth in Scotland: Of Bitter Memory
and Bigotry (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); S. Bruce, Politics and Religion in the United
Kingdom (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 52–72.
18
The only continuing example of lawful ‘discrimination’ of any note was (and is) the
prohibition of a Catholic acceding to the throne.
19
S. H. Mayor, ‘The Religion of the British People’, Hibbert Journal 49 (1960–1): 38–43 at 40.
 Believing—Attitudes 157
Table 7.2 Attitudes to Anglican/Nonconformist and Catholic/Protestant unity nego-
tiations, adults, Great Britain, 1949–82 (percentages down)
1949 1961 1963 1967 1968 March 1982 June 1982

Anglican/Nonconformist unity
Approve 45 54 61 59 NA 45 45
Disapprove 19 15 10 14 NA 14 12
Neither/don’t mind 24 18 12 18 NA 30 31
Don’t know 12 13 17 9 NA 11 12
Catholic/Protestant unity
Approve 23 40 53 49 49 44 47
Disapprove 48 33 18 26 21 22 20
Neither/don’t mind 17 15 10 15 21 28 27
Don’t know 12 12 19 10 9 7 6
N= 2,000 1,000 1,072 1,000 1,000 1,032 1,000

Note: Fieldwork in March 1982 was conducted before and in June 1982 after the visit of Pope John Paul II to
Britain.
Sources: (1949) Gallup, GIPOP, I, 216; (1961) GPI 23 (1961): 44, Catholic Herald, 12 January 1962, Gallup,
GIPOP, I, 606–7; (1963) Sunday Telegraph, 14 July 1963, GPI 42 (1963): 129, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 697; (1967)
GPI 82 (1967): 34, B. Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological
Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 146–97 at 157–60, 181, Gallup, GIPOP, II,
915; (1968) GPI 100 (1968): 107, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1005–6; (March 1982) The Universe, 26 March 1982, The
Tablet, 3 April 1982, GPI 260 (1982): 17; (June 1982) The Universe, 30 July 1982.

Church of Scotland. Moreover, there was a minority (never exceeding one in

six) who were hostile to the papal visit itself.
To judge from Gallup polls, some prejudice against Catholics as individuals
likewise remained throughout the 1960s. Thus, 16 per cent of Britons in both
1958 and 1965 indicated unwillingness to vote for a Catholic as a parliamen-
tary candidate nominated by their political party; the number thinking
Catholics had more power than they should was 31 per cent in 1959, falling
to 20 per cent in 1969; 13 per cent in 1961–2 and 15 per cent in 1967 held a
poor or very poor opinion of Catholics; and 24 per cent in 1968 disagreed with
mixed Catholic/Protestant marriages, reducing to 15 per cent in 1973. On the
other hand, hardly anybody (2 per cent in 1963–4) expressed concerns about a
practising Catholic as their neighbour.20
If anti-Catholicism had its roots in the Reformation, anti-Semitism had
medieval origins.21 Despite the Holocaust, anti-Semitism appears to have
grown in Britain during the immediate post-war era,22 and one-fifth of adults

20
The foregoing paragraphs summarize evidence presented in C. D. Field, ‘No Popery’s
Ghost: Does Popular Anti-Catholicism Survive in Contemporary Britain?’, Journal of Religion in
Europe 7 (2014): 116–49.
21
A substantial, if partisan, overview is A. Julius, Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-
Semitism in England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
22
C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing
in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 84–5.
158 Secularization in the Long 1960s

still reckoned it was on the increase as late as 1960. As Gallup demonstrated in

a series of polls, its actual extent varied according to the question asked,
affecting between one-tenth and one-third of the population. In 1958, for
instance, 27 per cent stated they would not vote for a Jewish parliamentary
candidate, a figure which fell only marginally to 24 per cent in 1965. In 1959,
34 per cent of Britons reckoned that Jews wielded more power than they
should, albeit this had dropped to 16 per cent ten years later. In 1961–2, 12
per cent admitted to having a poor or very poor attitude towards Jews,
virtually unchanged at 11 per cent in 1967. In 1964, distaste was expressed
about the possibility of having Jews as friends by 11 per cent; as fellow workers
by 12 per cent; as school fellows to their children by 12 per cent; as neighbours
by 14 per cent; as their employer by 21 per cent; as their daughter-in-law by 30
per cent; and as their son-in-law by 31 per cent.23 Reactions to the latter two
scenarios were consistent with the opposition to marriage between Jews and
non-Jews explicitly articulated by 23 per cent of adults in 1968 and 16 per cent
in 1973 and implied in a NOP survey of 1971 by the fact that just 42 per cent
were prepared to admit a Jew into a close relationship by marriage.
There is no direct statistical evidence to link such negative opinions of Jews
with perceptions of Israel and its role in the Middle East conflict at this time.
In general, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, among those in Britain who were
willing to take sides, there was far more public sympathy with the Israeli cause
than with that of the Arabs/Palestinians, and this was especially true around
the Six Day War (1967) and Yom Kippur War (1973). Although such sym-
pathy did not preclude criticism of specific Israeli actions, which can be found
in the polls, not until after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was there a
sustained collapse in Israel’s image in Britain.24
Prejudice against members of other world faiths, besides Judaism, cannot
easily be quantified for the 1960s and 1970s since it is mostly impossible to
distinguish from racist sentiment. These non-Jewish religious minorities
had historically been numerically insignificant, and, although growing,
their spatial concentration meant that direct acquaintance with them by
most Britons would have been limited. Education in world faiths had not
traditionally been offered in schools, and, during the late 1950s and early
1960s, majority public opinion was, in any case, still against the teaching of

23
These figures are the sum of those replying ‘would rather not’ and ‘would strongly dislike
it’. An England-only survey in 1963–4 (Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion,
35–6, 121) reported somewhat less opposition to Jews as neighbours but still concluded: ‘Of
those practising their religion, the Jews are both negatively the most often rejected, and positively
the least welcome as neighbours.’
24
The preceding paragraphs are drawn from C. D. Field, ‘John Bull’s Judeophobia: Images of the
Jews in British Public Opinion Polls since the Late 1930s’, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 15
(2006): 259–300.
 Believing—Attitudes 159

comparative religion.25 Curriculum reform to incorporate multi-faith content

only occurred in the 1960s and, especially, the 1970s, as recent research by Rob
Freathy and Stephen Parker has demonstrated.26 This restricted knowledge
of, and familiarity with, religions other than Christianity and Judaism was
reflected in minimal media coverage of them as late as 1982.27 Their profile
remained low until Muslim grievances spilled over into the public sphere with
the campaign for separate Muslim schools in the mid-1980s and the Salman
Rushdie affair of 1988–9. It is from this point that an embryonic Islamophobia
becomes visible, progressively transforming Muslims into the principal reli-
gious outsiders of the early twenty-first century.28
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was, in fact, far greater concern
about atheists than there was about most religious groups, notwithstanding
that, as we noted in Chapters 2 and 6, respectively, individuals professing
no religion and disbelieving in God were in a distinct minority. Only a
relatively small subset of this minority were self-identified ‘convinced’ atheists,
typically no more than one person in twenty even in the 1980s.29 Therefore,
throughout the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s being an atheist was never the
norm, as Margaret Knight found to her cost in making her humanistic BBC
broadcasts in 1955, incurring condemnation from most of the print media and
some elements of the public.30
Asked by Gallup in 1958 whether they would vote for an atheist as a
parliamentary candidate if nominated by their party, most Britons (51 per
cent) said no. They would much have preferred voting for a Catholic, Jew,
woman, or—unusually for that time—a coloured person. The 45 per cent
disposed to countenance an atheist candidate were disproportionately
Liberal (57 per cent) and least likely to be Catholic (28 per cent).31 Seven years

25
Exemplified in the following surveys: (1957) Gallup, GIPOP, I, 407; (1963–4) Social Surveys
(Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 87–9, 130; (1965, NOP) Goldman, ‘Do We Want Our
Children Taught about God?’, 10.
26
See references at 17n83, above.
27
K. Knott, E. Poole, and T. Taira, Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred:
Representation and Change (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 80.
28
C. D. Field, ‘Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain: The Evidence of the Opinion Polls,
1988~2006’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 18 (2007): 447–77; idem, ‘Revisiting Islamo-
phobia in Contemporary Britain, 2007–10’, in M. Helbling, ed., Islamophobia in the West:
Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes (London: Routledge, 2012), 147–61.
29
C. D. Field, Religion in Great Britain, 1939–99: A Compendium of Gallup Poll Data
(Manchester: Cathie Marsh Institute for Social Research, University of Manchester, 2015),
table 7. For a more general discussion of the incidence of atheism, see B. Clements, Surveying
Christian Beliefs and Religious Debates in Post-War Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2016), 34–9.
30
C. G. Brown, ‘ “The Unholy Mrs Knight” and the BBC: Secular Humanism and the Threat
to the “Christian Nation”, c.1945–60’, English Historical Review 127 (2012): 345–76.
31
News Chronicle, 6 February 1959; The Scotsman, 6 February 1959; R. Glass, Newcomers:
The West Indians in London (London: Centre for Urban Studies, 1960), 248–50; Gallup, GIPOP,
I, 545.
160 Secularization in the Long 1960s

later, opposition to an atheist parliamentary candidate was still running at 42

per cent but support had crept up to 58 per cent, being especially strong
among men, those aged 25–44, the upper class, and—in particular—religious
nones (78 per cent). Atheists then commanded the same appeal as parliamen-
tary candidates as coloureds but continued to lag well behind the other three
groups.32 Public opinion was less entrenched about the prospect of an atheist
as a neighbour, albeit this was deemed the most objectionable of the six
religious categories on offer in 1963–4.33 Pollsters rather lost interest in
atheism after the early 1960s, except as a by-product of questions about belief
in God, and the topic was not particularly newsworthy in the early 1980s.34

SUNDAY OBSERVANCE

In most cases, negativity towards religious outsiders was doubtless more the
outgrowth of popular culture than a deliberate ecclesiastical strategy. The
preservation of a Sabbatarian ethos in the country, by contrast, remained a
key goal for most Churches, especially Protestant ones.35 They were deter-
mined to resist moves to undermine Sunday as a day of rest and religious duty
and to curb the spread of ‘the weekend habit’ or ‘continental Sunday’ (the
latter especially feared following the United Kingdom’s accession to the
European Economic Community in 1973). Sunday observance was naturally
driven by the fourth of the Ten Commandments but was underpinned also by
a raft of secular legislation, some of it centuries-old, designed to ensure that
Sunday remained ‘special’.36 While the enforcement of these laws was ulti-
mately the responsibility of the state, several religious agencies, notably the
Lord’s Day Observance Society, exercised vigilance and intervened whenever

32
B. Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological
Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968), 146–97 at 174–5, 190; Gallup,
GIPOP, II, 829.
33
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 33–7, 121.
34
Knott, Poole, and Taira, Media Portrayals of Religion, 104, 199, 203.
35
The following paragraphs draw upon C. D. Field, ‘ “The Secularised Sabbath” Revisited:
Opinion Polls as Sources for Sunday Observance in Contemporary Britain’, Contemporary
British History 15 (2001): 1–20. For more contemporary sociological reflections, see
W. S. F. Pickering, ‘The Secularized Sabbath: Formerly Sunday, Now the Weekend’, in M. Hill,
ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain, 5 (London: SCM Press, 1972), 33–47.
36
For an overview, see St J. A. Robilliard, Religion and the Law: Religious Liberty in Modern
English Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 46–58. For Scotland, see
C. G. Brown, T. Green, and J. Mair, Religion in Scots Law: The Report of an Audit at the University
of Glasgow (Edinburgh: Humanist Society Scotland, 2016), 323–35, <https://www.humanism.
scot/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Religion-in-Scots-Law-Final-Report-22-Feb-16.pdf>.
 Believing—Attitudes 161

Sunday was perceived as under threat.37 The Society did not shy away from
remonstrating anybody for falls from Sabbatarian grace, even Church leaders,
as the Bishop of Coventry discovered in 1958 when he sponsored a ballet
concert to raise funds for the new Coventry Cathedral, the Society’s condem-
nation incurring the disapproval of the majority of Britons.38 Speaking in the
House of Lords in 1965, the Bishop of Leicester suggested that the Society’s
‘propaganda’ was ‘a little anachronistic’ and did not represent the official
positions of the Churches.39
The campaign to ‘brighten up’ Sunday and ease some of the restrictions on
permitted out-of-home activities had already gained momentum during the
long 1950s, through the combined weight of public opinion and the work of
pressure groups such as the Sunday Freedom Association and the Better
Sunday Society.40 With the failure in Parliament of various private bills to
effect specific reforms, hopes were pinned on the appointment of a Royal
Commission to enquire more generally into the statutes affecting Sunday, a
proposal backed by 56 per cent of the public in 1958.41 This never material-
ized, but the government did consent to establish a Home Office Departmental
Committee in 1961. Chaired by Lord Crathorne, it reported in 1964 and
recommended significant deregulation.42
By the time of the report’s publication, about half the population, according
to Gallup, wished to see Sunday treated like any other day of the week so far as
the law was concerned, with two-fifths favouring continuing special restric-
tions on what people were permitted to do on a Sunday.43 Predictably,
churchgoers were more likely than average to endorse restrictions, albeit
other research revealed that, apart from religious practice, there were far
fewer differences than one might have imagined between them and non-
churchgoers in the ways in which Sundays were spent.44 Overall, just 44 per
cent of Britons supported Sunday observance in 1973,45 with only 25 per cent

37
The Society’s casework in the 1960s and 1970s is described in part 5 (243–336) of
H. J. W. Legerton, For Our Lord and His Day: A History of the Lord’s Day Observance Society
(Leicester: printed by Oldham & Manton, [?1993]). Legerton was General Secretary of the
Society from 1952 until 1977.
38
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 467.
39 40
The Times, 18 March 1965. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 80–2.
41
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 466; Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee on the Law on
Sunday Observance, House of Commons Papers, Session 1964–5, Cmnd. 2528 (London: HMSO,
1964), 71.
42
Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee. For the political background, see
M. Jarvis, Conservative Governments, Morality, and Social Change in Affluent Britain, 1957–64
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 86–93.
43
(1958) Gallup, GIPOP, I, 467, Home Office, Report of the Departmental Committee, 71;
(1965) Daily Telegraph, 22 February 1965, GPI 58 (1965): 12, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 792.
44
W. Hodgkins, Sunday: Christian and Social Significance (London: Independent Press,
1960), 126–9, 226–34; Daily Mail, 5 April 1960; Sunday 1/1 (1966): 5–6.
45
GPI 151 (1973): 38; Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1229.
162 Secularization in the Long 1960s

in 1981 accepting that the fourth Commandment applied fully to them and a
further 24 per cent to a limited extent.46 Even in Presbyterian Scotland, 61 per
cent of adults (and 76 per cent of under-35s) by 1980 wanted a continental-
style Sunday, with most shops, bars, and recreational facilities open.47
Temperance-based Sabbatarianism now seemed particularly unacceptable.
At the start of the long 1960s, Sunday licensing hours were curtailed in
England, while in Wales (including Monmouthshire) and Scotland public
houses were completely shut by law on Sundays. Two-thirds of adults in
1959 thought that public houses and other licensed premises should be
allowed to open on Sundays across the whole of Britain,48 and a steadily
increasing number wanted their opening hours to be the same as on weekdays:
39 per cent in 1958 and 1965; 45 per cent in 1969; 50 per cent in 1970; and
55 per cent in 1984.49
The Sunday Closing (Wales) Act 1881 was repealed by the Licensing Act
1961, which provided for local authorities to hold referenda on the subject in
the principality at septennial intervals. In the first such referendum, in 1961,
47 per cent of the Welsh electorate turned out, of whom 54 per cent voted ‘wet’
and 46 per cent ‘dry’. There were ‘wet’ majorities in all four county boroughs
and five of the thirteen counties, three more counties going ‘wet’ in 1968. Local
government reorganization in 1974 meant that the 1975 referendum was held
on a district basis, following which just six of thirty-seven districts remained
‘dry’, reducing to two (Ceredigion, formerly Cardiganshire, and Dwyfor) at the
fourth referendum in 1982.50 Attitudes in Cardiganshire are illuminated by a
sample survey in 1971,51 while national Welsh polling in 1968 (by ORC) and

46
D. Gerard, ‘Religious Attitudes and Values’, in M. Abrams, D. Gerard, and N. Timms, eds.,
Values and Social Change in Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), 50–92 at 77–83; Survey
Research Consultants International, Index to International Public Opinion, 1982–1983, ed.
E. H. Hastings and P. K. Hastings (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 535.
47
System Three poll in Glasgow Herald, 27 October 1980.
48
Gallup, GIPOP, I, 521.
49
(1958, 1965, 1969) Table 7.3; (1970) M. Bradley and D. Fenwick, Public Attitudes to Liquor
Licensing Laws in Great Britain (London: HMSO, 1974), 34–7, 129–35; (1984) GPI 291 (1984):
14. The question was asked throughout Britain except in 1970, when it was confined to England.
50
A. J. James and J. E. Thomas, Wales at Westminster: A History of the Parliamentary
Representation of Wales, 1800–1979 (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 1981), 277–8; Daily Telegraph, 5
November 1982. For analysis and commentary, see H. Carter and J. G. Thomas, ‘The Referen-
dum on the Sunday Opening of Licensed Premises in Wales as a Criterion of a Culture Region’,
Regional Studies 3 (1969): 61–71; H. Carter, ‘Y Fro Gymraeg and the 1975 Referendum on
Sunday Closing of Public Houses in Wales’, Cambria 3 (1976): 89–101; C. M. Wilson, ‘The
Sunday Opening Referenda, 1961–1989: A Study in Social and Cultural Change in Wales’ (MPhil
thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1993); L. Wigley, ‘Sych ar y Sul: refferenda 1961 a 1968
ac agweddau at yfed a’r dafarn yng Nghymru Gymraeg y 1960au’, Welsh History Review 27
(2014–15): 755–83.
51
P. J. Madgwick, with N. Griffiths and V. Walker, The Politics of Rural Wales: A Study of
Cardiganshire (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 74–6, 78, 251, 253; ‘Political Culture of Cardigan-
shire, 1971’, dataset at UKDA, SN 71006.
 Believing—Attitudes 163

1979 (by Gallup) revealed that opposition to the Sunday opening of public
houses came disproportionately from Nonconformists and Welsh-speakers.52
In Scotland, where Sunday opening of public houses had been illegal since
1853,53 opinion was finely balanced in 1970 about whether it should be
allowed again, 50 per cent of adults being against and 48 per cent for
(among them 68 per cent of men and 57 per cent of under-35s).54 However,
there was a majority (54 per cent) in favour by 1975,55 and, following the
Clayson Committee (1971–3), the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 permitted
Sunday opening. Subsequent surveys in the four principal cities and the
central belt in 1978 and 1984 demonstrated that more, and a growing pro-
portion of, Scots judged this to have been a good thing than not.56
When it came to places of entertainment, prior to (respectively) the Sunday
Theatre Act 1972 and Sunday Cinema Act 1972, it had been illegal for theatres
to open on Sundays, while cinemas could only open in accordance with the
local option arrangements introduced by the Sunday Entertainments Act
1932.57 The latter arrangements were abolished in 1972, and theatres were
permitted to open in the afternoon and evening on Sundays. Prior to the new
legislation, a growing majority of the public (50 per cent in 1958, rising to
65 per cent in 1969) considered that places of entertainment should be allowed
to open for the same hours on Sundays as weekdays (Table 7.3). Rather more,
74 per cent, in 1968 agreed with their opening after 2 o’clock on Sundays,
which was the proposal in the Sunday Entertainments Bill, then under par-
liamentary consideration.58 Approval for Sunday theatres alone increased
from 55 per cent in 1957 (Gallup) to 76 per cent in 1984 (NOP).59 In 1966,
even 27 per cent of regular churchgoers said they would pay to attend a theatre
on Sunday if the law was changed, compared with 38 per cent of all adults.60
Public support for professional sport on Sundays also grew throughout the
1960s and 1970s, partly in response to the opportunities being created by
various sports bodies to watch such sport on Sundays. These were facilitated
by the repeal in 1969 of the Sunday Observance Act 1625, which had made it

52
(1968) Western Mail, 24 October 1968; (1979) ‘Welsh Election Study, 1979’, dataset at
UKDA, SN 1591.
53
It should be noted that the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1962 restricted Sunday opening to
hotels and certain premises providing meals and did not extend to public houses.
54
Bradley and Fenwick, Public Attitudes to Liquor Licensing Laws, 37–8.
55
System Three poll in Glasgow Herald, 6 October 1975.
56
(1978) I. Knight and P. Wilson, Scottish Licensing Laws: A Survey Carried Out on Behalf of
the Scottish Home and Health Department (London: HMSO, 1980), 43, 45, 47–8, 59; (1984)
E. Goddard, Drinking and Attitudes to Licensing in Scotland: The Report of Two Surveys Carried
Out on Behalf of the Scottish Home and Health Department (London: HMSO, 1986), 21–30.
57
However, restrictions had been eased temporarily during the Second World War.
58
Daily Telegraph, 31 January 1968; GPI 93 (1968): 215; Gallup, GIPOP, II, 967.
59
(1957) News Chronicle, 16 April 1957, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 407; (1984) Political, Social,
Economic Review 47 (1984): 25.
60
Sunday 1/1 (1966): 6.
164 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 7.3 Attitudes to the deregulation of Sunday activities, adults,
Great Britain, 1958–69 (percentages down)
1958 1965 1969

Public houses—same hours as weekdays

Approve 39 39 45
Disapprove 44 50 36
Don’t know 17 11 19
Places of entertainment—open as weekdays
Approve 50 56 65
Disapprove 39 37 26
Don’t know 11 7 9
Professional sport—allowed on Sundays
Approve 46 53 65
Disapprove 41 39 26
Don’t know 13 8 9
N= 1,000 1,000 1,000
Sources: (1958) The Scotsman, 15 May 1958, Home Office, Report of the Departmental
Committee on the Law on Sunday Observance, House of Commons Papers, Session
1964–5, Cmnd. 2528 (London: HMSO, 1964), 71, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 467; (1965) Daily
Telegraph, 22 February 1965, GPI 58 (1965): 12, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 792; (1969) GPI 107
(1969): 53, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1045–6.

illegal to assemble outside one’s own parish to play sport, and by workarounds
to the Sunday Observance Act 1780, pioneered by professional cricket and
rugby league, whereby no charge was levied for admission to matches but
spectators had to pay heavily for services such as car-parking and programmes.
Gallup recorded a jump in approval for professional sport on Sunday from
46 per cent in 1958 to 65 per cent in 1969 (Table 7.3), with 63 per cent
endorsing the plan in the Sunday Entertainments Bill 1968 to allow profes-
sional sport after 2 o’clock on Sundays.61 NOP documented 75 per cent
support for professional sport on Sundays in 1966, but its fieldwork on this
occasion was confined to England and conducted in the afterglow of England’s
victory in the football World Cup.62 In its Britain-wide poll three years later,
the figure had reduced to 60 per cent,63 which had only modestly increased to
62 per cent in 1977, albeit its question then was somewhat elaborated,
specifically referencing horse-racing and league football among the profes-
sional sports to be permitted on Sundays.64
Regarding individual sports, the case for playing league football matches on
Sundays was given a boost during the power crisis of 1974, when 72 per cent
judged it appropriate, with 60 per cent wanting it to carry on after the crisis

61
Daily Telegraph, 31 January 1968; GPI 93 (1968): 215; Gallup, GIPOP, II, 967.
62 63
Daily Mail, 10 February 1967. Daily Mail, 28 February 1969.
64
Daily Mail, 18 February 1977.
 Believing—Attitudes 165

had passed.65 Support had fallen to 51 per cent in Britain in 1980, when there
was more demand for test cricket on Sundays than for football.66 In Scotland
the same year, just 36 per cent agreed that there should be regular professional
football on Sundays, and no more than 46 per cent even among men, who
were generally keenest on Sunday sport.67 Backing for Sunday horse-racing,
which did not come about until 1992, was relatively small, 29 per cent in 1957
and 38 per cent in 1980.68 Such reticence may possibly have been on anti-
gambling grounds, since horse-racing implied on- and off-course betting.
Certainly, there was little enthusiasm overall for betting shops to be open
on Sunday, a proposal endorsed in NOP surveys by 31 per cent in 1977 and
24 per cent in 1980.69
As for Sunday trading, Part IV of the Shops Act 1950 was the relevant
legislation applicable to England and Wales, imposing a general prohibition
on Sunday opening of shops but allowing limited exemptions for particular
types of goods or localities. Despite increasingly variable enforcement, this was
still found to be effective in ensuring the closure of 92 per cent of English
shops on Sunday mornings as late as 1985.70 Several attempts were made in
Parliament from 1956 onwards to repeal or substantially amend the Shops Act
1950, but none was successful until 1994, such was the political controversy
generated by Sunday trading, which was fiercely resisted by shopworkers as
well as religious interests. Part IV of the Act never extended to Scotland, nor
was there any alternative Scottish legislation to speak of, Scotland’s strong
Sabbatarian tradition having once been thought sufficient to inhibit Sunday
trading. So there were few barriers to the emergence of Sunday opening of
shops in Scotland, which slowly spread from the 1960s and already affected
18 per cent of Scottish retail establishments by 1980 and 39 per cent by 1985.71
In terms of public opinion, two-thirds of Britons interviewed in two Gallup
studies in 1962 and 1965 did not consider it wrong in principle to buy things
on Sunday, with one-quarter disagreeing.72 The first substantive survey on the
subject, in 1970, found that, among informants mainly responsible for house-
hold shopping and living in England and Wales, 51 per cent viewed the
Sunday trading laws as stupid or outdated, 32 per cent wanting shops to sell
what they liked at any time, while 34 per cent indicated their opposition to

65
NOP Political Bulletin 122 (1974): 19.
66
Daily Mail, 19 December 1980; Political, Social, Economic Review 29 (1981): 27–8.
67
System Three poll in Glasgow Herald, 27 October 1980.
68
(1957) Gallup, GIPOP, I, 407; (1980) Daily Mail, 19 December 1980, Political, Social,
Economic Review 29 (1981): 27–8.
69
(1977) Daily Mail, 18 February 1977; (1980) Daily Mail, 19 December 1980, Political,
Social, Economic Review 29 (1981): 27–8.
70
S. Burton-Jones, New Facts for Auld (Cambridge: Jubilee Centre, 1989), 36.
71
R. P. Lang, Scotland’s Sunday under Pressure: Survey of the Extent and Growth of Sunday
Trading in Scotland, 1977–1988 (Cambridge: Jubilee Centre, 1989), 23–6.
72
GPI 58 (1965): 12; Gallup, GIPOP, II, 792.
166 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Sunday opening.73 In practice, however, popular demand for extended Sunday

trading was not overwhelming in the 1970s, seemingly deterred in part by
fears of higher prices. In a poll for the Consumers’ Association in 1974, it was
explicitly sought by merely one in twenty Britons and no more than one in six
of the Association’s own membership.74 Chemists (22 per cent) and food
shops (21 per cent) were the outlets most likely to be visited on Sundays, if
they were able to open, according to NOP in 1978.75
That survey, commissioned by the National Consumer Council, did not
directly ask respondents about their attitudes to Sunday trading, an omission
made good in the next poll, sponsored by retailer Dickie Dirts and undertaken
by MORI in 1981 to coincide with Lady Trumpington’s Shops Bill. By then,
63 per cent of Britons favoured a change in the law to allow all shops to open
on Sundays, 33 per cent being against, with support being strongest among
men and the under-35s, and falling to 49 per cent among over-65s.76 The two-
thirds majority for legislative reform was a constant outcome of intense
polling throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, with less than one-quarter of
the population wanting the Shops Act 1950 to be enforced and prosecutions
brought against retailers trading on Sundays. From the mid-1980s, at least
one-half of adults shopped on Sundays with varying degrees of regularity.77

RELIG ION AND MORALITY

Besides being on the back foot over Sunday observance, the Churches also
found themselves challenged along a broader moral front. The 1960s and
1970s witnessed, not simply changing personal social and sexual behaviour
and outlooks, summed up as the ‘permissive society’, but liberalization of the
civil and criminal law, with landmark reforms in areas such as gambling
(1960); capital punishment (1965); abortion (1967); homosexuality (1967);
family planning (1967); and divorce (1969).78 Opinion pollsters and their

73
M. Bradley and D. Fenwick, Shopping Habits and Attitudes to Shop Hours in Great Britain
(London: HMSO, 1975), 153–5.
74
‘Shop Hours’, Which? (1974): 196–201 at 200.
75
National Consumer Council, Sunday Trading: The Consumers’ View ([London]: the Council,
1979), 7–8.
76
Public Opinion in Great Britain 1 (1982); Survey Research Consultants International, Index
to International Public Opinion, 1981–1982, ed. E. H. Hastings and P. K. Hastings (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1983), 12.
77
Field, ‘ “Secularised Sabbath” Revisited’, 7, 12, 16n11.
78
The literature on this subject is obviously enormous, but a useful starting-point is
M. Collins, ed., The Permissive Society and its Enemies: Sixties British Culture (London: Rivers
Oram Press, 2007), which includes a substantial introduction by the editor (1–40) and a thematic
select bibliography (225–42). For more purely ecclesiastical implications, see C. Davies, ‘Religion,
 Believing—Attitudes 167

clients were naturally drawn to investigate the ‘new morality’, a fair number of
their surveys disaggregating responses by religious affiliation. It would be
impossible to summarize all their findings in this short section, which is
confined to four of the topics that were studied on multiple occasions: capital
punishment; homosexuality; abortion; and assisted dying.
The legislative reforms of the 1960s were variably popular with the elec-
torate. Perhaps most out of step with the public mood was the abolition of the
death penalty (temporarily in 1965 and permanently from 1969).79 Polling
during the long 1950s had ascertained that people overwhelmingly favoured
the retention of capital punishment, this also being the position of adherents
of the main Christian groups, although the nones were a partial exception.80
Abolition made no difference to this prevailing view for a long while, with the
extension of the Irish Republican Army’s campaign of violence to mainland
Britain after 1974 hardening opinion. As four cross-sectional waves (1963,
1969, 1979, and 1983) of BES demonstrated, majorities of the population as a
whole and of individual Christian groups continued to favour capital punish-
ment, although their precise size fluctuated from survey to survey dependent
upon question-wording. Professing Anglicans were consistently most sup-
portive of the death penalty, and even nones (then a very small number)
were only against or undecided in 1963 and 1969. Analysis by frequency of
churchgoing, from regularly to never, also produced large majorities for
capital punishment in each of the categories used, albeit it was somewhat
smaller among the most frequent churchgoers (whose endorsement dropped
to under half in 1983).81
It was a similar story with the first BSA survey in 1983, which asked
respondents whether they supported the death penalty in three scenarios: for

Politics, and the “Permissive” Legislation’, in P. Badham, ed., Religion, State, and Society in
Modern Britain (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), 321–42; G. I. T. Machin, ‘British
Churches and Moral Change in the 1960s’, in W. M. Jacob and W. N. Yates, eds., Crown and
Mitre: Religion and Society in Northern Europe since the Reformation (Woodbridge: Boydell
Press, 1993), 223–41; idem, Churches and Social Issues in Twentieth-Century Britain (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998), 175–231; and G. Parsons, ‘Between Law and Licence: Christianity,
Morality, and Permissiveness’, in G. Parsons, ed., The Growth of Religious Diversity: Britain
from 1945, Volume II: Issues (London: Routledge, 1994), 231–66.
79
For the broader context, see H. Potter, Hanging in Judgment: Religion and the Death
Penalty in England from the Bloody Code to Abolition (London: SCM Press, 1993), 153–203;
B. P. Block and J. Hostettler, Hanging in the Balance: A History of the Abolition of Capital
Punishment in Britain (Hook: Waterside Press, 1997); and N. Twitchell, The Politics of the Rope:
The Campaign to Abolish Capital Punishment in Britain, 1955–1969 (Bury St Edmunds: Arena,
2012).
80
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 86–8.
81
I. Crewe, A. Fox, and N. Day, The British Electorate, 1963–1992: A Compendium of Data
from the British Election Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 410;
B. Clements, Religion and Public Opinion in Britain: Continuity and Change (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 108–9.
168 Secularization in the Long 1960s

a murder committed during the course of a terrorist act; for the murder of
a police officer; and for all other murders. Majorities of all religious groups
(including nones on this occasion) agreed with capital punishment for each
scenario, with Anglicans being most supportive (83 per cent in the case of
terrorism-related murders) and Catholics the least (but still 52 per cent for
instances of other murders). Churchgoing frequency did little to dent the
extent of these majorities, albeit regular church attenders were again some-
what less hawkish than infrequent attenders or non-attenders.82
The easing of legal restrictions on homosexuality, initiated in 1967 with the
decriminalization of homosexual activities in private between consenting men
over 21 years of age, was also not in complete accord with public thinking.83 The
1967 reform was a much delayed response to the Wolfenden Report (1957),
whose recommendations inspired a question in a Gallup survey of England in
1963–4 about whether society should condemn homosexuals and punish them
by law, merely condemn them, or be tolerant of them. Overall, 53 per cent
condemned homosexuals, but the proportion rose to 58 per cent for Roman
Catholics and 63 per cent for regular Mass-goers; religious nones were least
condemnatory (47 per cent) and most tolerant (41 per cent).84 NOP likewise
found relatively weak support for decriminalization among the Catholics they
interviewed in 1965,85 while 55 per cent of English and Welsh Catholics still
agreed in 1978 that the Church could never approve homosexual acts.86
Whatever the teachings of the major religions, two-thirds of Britons in 1977
and three-quarters in 1979 and 1981 saw no incompatibility between a person
being homosexual and also being a good Christian, Jew, or other faith mem-
ber, but a plurality was opposed to homosexuals becoming clergy, with two-
fifths in favour.87 The first EVS in 1981 asked Britons whether homosexuality

82
Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 113–17.
83
For long-term trends in public opinion, see B. Clements and C. D. Field, ‘Public Opinion
toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights in Great Britain’, Public Opinion Quarterly 78 (2014):
523–47. For religious opinion after 1980, see Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 164–96. For
general background, see H. M. Hyde, The Other Love: An Historical and Contemporary Survey of
Homosexuality in Britain (London: Mayflower, 1972); J. Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual
Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present, revised edn. (London: Quartet
Books, 1990); S. Jeffery-Poulter, Peers, Queers, and Commons: The Struggle for Gay Law Reform
from 1950 to the Present (London: Routledge, 1991); P. Higgins, Heterosexual Dictatorship: Male
Homosexuality in Postwar Britain (London: Fourth Estate, 1996); H. David, On Queer Street:
A Social History of British Homosexuality, 1895–1995 (London: HarperCollins, 1997); A. Jivani,
It’s Not Unusual: A History of Lesbian and Gay Britain in the Twentieth Century (London:
Michael O’Mara Books, 1997); and M. Cook, ed., A Gay History of Britain: Love and Sex between
Men since the Middle Ages (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2007).
84
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 82; unpublished.
85
NOP Bulletin (November 1965), supplement, 1.
86
M. P. Hornsby-Smith and R. M. Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion: A Study of Roman Catholics
in England and Wales in the 1970s ([Guildford]: Department of Sociology, University of Surrey,
1979), 192.
87
Clements and Field, ‘Public Opinion toward Homosexuality’, 532–3.
 Believing—Attitudes 169

could ever be justified, measuring responses on a scale running from 1 (never)

to 10 (always). Opinions were generally found to be in inverse relationship to
religious commitment, being more positive among nones than those professing
a faith, self-designated irreligious persons or atheists than religious, disbelievers
than believers in God, non-attenders than attenders at religious services, and
non-members than members of religious groups.88 A similar effect was evident
in the first BSA survey of 1983, with nones and non-attenders at worship being
somewhat better disposed than people of faith to same-sex relationships in
general and to the recruitment of homosexuals in particular professional roles.
However, the difference was relative, since a majority of those professing no
religion and neglecting religious services still regarded same-sex relationships as
wrong, with no significant impact at all from religious variables when it came to
adoption of children by gays and lesbians.89
In terms of the number of polls to which it gave rise, abortion was arguably
a more contentious subject even than capital punishment and homosexuality,
especially after the Abortion Act 1967 had extended the grounds on which
abortion would no longer be illegal.90 Although plentiful, polls on abortion did
not always ask standardized questions, often reported seemingly inconsistent
results (perhaps linked to the fact that many were commissioned by rival pro-
and anti-abortion campaigning organizations), and only infrequently included
breaks by religious variables (and then normally just religious affiliation).
As indicated by Table 7.4, summarizing some of the surveys conducted before
the 1967 legislation, two-thirds of the population took a conditional approach
to abortion in 1965, saying that it should be legal under certain circumstances,
with the remaining one-third adopting an absolutist position, indicating that
it should be legal or, more typically, illegal in all cases. The major Protestant
groupings conformed to this pattern but Catholics were more likely than
average to consider abortion always wrong, albeit a majority (53 per cent)
still favoured abortion under certain circumstances.
Of the various scenarios canvassed, there was most support for abortion
when the health of the mother was in danger, there was a serious risk of the
child being born severely disabled, or the pregnancy resulted from rape. There
was comparatively less sympathy for families who felt they could not afford
another child or for women who feared they could not cope with one. Again,

88
Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 175–7.
89
Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 166–8, 174–5, 182–91.
90
S. Pomiès-Maréchal and M. Leggett, ‘The Abortion Act 1967: A Fundamental Change?’, in
T. Harris and M. O’Brien Castro, eds., Preserving the Sixties: Britain and the ‘Decade of Protest’
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 51–72. For the wider background, see J. Keown,
Abortion, Doctors, and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of Abortion in England
from 1803 to 1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); B. L. Brookes, Abortion in
England, 1900–1967 (London: Routledge, 2013); and C. Francome, Abortion in the USA and the
UK (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).
170 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 7.4 Attitudes to abortion by religion, adults, Great Britain, 1965–7 (percentages
down)
Total Church of Church of Scotland/ Free Roman
England Presbyterian Church Catholic

(NOP, 1965) Abortion should be . . .

Legal in all cases 6 6 4 5 7
Legal in some cases 66 69 61 63 53
Illegal in all cases 24 21 31 31 36
(Gallup, 1967) If health of mother in danger
Legal 86 90 96 88 64
Illegal 7 5 3 4 24
(NOP, 1967) If woman unable to cope with any more children
Legal 65 70 64 62 44
Illegal 24 20 29 25 49
(Gallup, 1967) If family not have enough money to support another child
Legal 37 38 30 41 20
Illegal 46 44 60 40 61
(Gallup, 1967) If child may be born deformed
Legal 76 82 75 78 49
Illegal 13 9 18 9 35
(NOP, 1967) If serious risk child be born deformed
Legal 81 84 86 82 59
Illegal 11 9 9 10 35
(NOP, 1967) If pregnancy result of rape or other sexual crime
Legal 81 84 82 80 63
Illegal 10 8 12 10 29

Notes: Don’t knows not shown. All fieldwork was undertaken prior to the passage of the Abortion Act 1967.
N = 1,997 (1965), 1,000 (1967, Gallup), 1,899 (1967, NOP).
Sources: (NOP, 1965 and 1967) unpublished; (Gallup, 1967) B. Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll
Statistics’, in D. A. Martin, ed., A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain [1] (London: SCM Press, 1968),
146–97 at 164–8, 186.

Protestant views adhered fairly closely to the national norm, while propor-
tionately fewer Catholics answered legal, and more illegal, for each scenario.
A dedicated poll of Catholics in 1967 broadly confirmed this position: 69 per
cent agreed that abortion should be legal when the health of the mother was in
danger; 47 per cent when the child may have been born deformed; and a mere
11 per cent when the mother wanted an abortion (respondents choosing illegal
being 19 per cent, 35 per cent, and 73 per cent, respectively, and somewhat
more among regular Mass-goers).91
The 1967 legislation did not settle the matter, for there were no fewer than
nine parliamentary attempts to amend it between 1969 and 1979, with a view to

91
Sunday Telegraph, 26 March 1967; Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’,
168–9, 195.
 Believing—Attitudes 171

making it more restrictive, perhaps the most prolonged battle being over the Bill
proposed by John Corrie in 1979–80.92 These efforts were in considerable part a
response to the trebling in the annual number of legal abortions in England and
Wales between 1969 (the first full year after the 1967 Act commenced) and 1980.
A substantial amount of new polling was commissioned during the decade,
much of whose content was specific to the particular Bill under consideration
at any given time. Table 7.5 summarizes some of the more general questions,
from which it will be seen that there was a significant minority wishing to make
abortion more difficult to obtain, apparently peaking at 44 per cent in 1972 and
1973 before reducing to 33 per cent in 1979 and 29 per cent in 1980.
Protestant attitudes once more tended to reflect those of Britons as a whole,
but nones favoured further liberalization while Catholics demanded stronger
regulation of abortion, including very many who wanted it to be prohibited
altogether. This negativity was also reflected in two Gallup polls of Catholics in
1978 in which 65 per cent of those in England and Wales agreed that abortion
was wrong except where the life of the mother was at risk,93 and 77 per cent of
their Scottish co-religionists selected ‘condemns abortion’ as a defining char-
acteristic of being a Catholic.94 The conservative sentiments of Catholics and
the liberal opinions of nones on abortion likewise emerged as the two opposite
ends of the spectrum from rigorous secondary analysis by Ben Clements of a
trio of recurrent academic sample surveys: the BES for 1974, 1979, and 1983;
the first EVS in 1981; and the first BSA survey in 1983. Less liberal views
towards abortion were additionally associated in these studies with regular
churchgoing, self-assessed religiosity, and belief in God.95
Voluntary euthanasia was another contentious moral issue of the 1960s and
1970s, although, unlike capital punishment, homosexuality, and abortion,
there was no reforming legislation at that time. Its legalization had long
been an ambition of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (founded in 1935),
but, while the Suicide Act 1961 had decriminalized suicide, it remained an
offence to ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another’ (a clause not
amended until 2009).96 Following the failure of the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill
in 1969, efforts shifted towards building a public opinion-led case for what is
now more usually termed assisted dying. As Clements has shown, a range of

92
The subject of D. Marsh and J. Chambers, Abortion Politics (London: Junction Books,
1981).
93
Hornsby-Smith and Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion, 192.
94
The Tablet, 28 April 1979; Flourish, 29 April 1979.
95
Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 127–63. Cf. B. Clements, ‘Religion and the Sources of
Public Opposition to Abortion in Britain: The Role of “Belonging”, “Behaving”, and “Believing” ’,
Sociology 48 (2014): 369–86.
96
For historical background, see N. D. A. Kemp, ‘Merciful Release’: The History of the British
Euthanasia Movement (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); J. O. Byrne, ‘A Dis-
cussion on Euthanasia since 1935 in British Christianity with Special Reference to the Roman
Catholic Tradition’ (MPhil thesis, University of Birmingham, 2007).
172 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 7.5 Attitudes to abortion by religion, adults, Great Britain, 1970–80 (percentages
down)
Total Church of Church of Free Roman Other None
England Scotland Church Catholic

(NOP, 1970) Should the law be . . .

Left as it is 40 40 45 44 27 41 42
Changed to make abortion 15 16 14 13 15 12 23
easier
Changed to make abortion 38 37 32 35 55 35 29
more difficult
(NOP, 1972) Should the law be . . .
Left as it is 30 31 34 31 21 NA NA
Changed to make abortion 17 18 11 9 12 NA NA
easier
Changed to make abortion 44 42 44 51 61 NA NA
more difficult
(Gallup, 1973) Abortion should . . .
Be available on demand 17 18 19 8 11 15 22
Only be allowed in 57 61 60 62 44 46 48
particular circumstances
Never be allowed in any 14 9 14 18 40 15 14
circumstances
(Gallup, 1973) To obtain an abortion is . . .
Too difficult 12 12 17 6 10 13 17
Too easy 44 43 37 52 65 33 36
About right 23 26 24 17 15 19 20
(Gallup, 1979) Present law on abortion . . .
Is satisfactory 31 29 27 41 31 32 41
Should be altered to make 33 35 34 29 40 33 13
abortion more difficult
Should be altered to make 22 23 26 16 16 12 34
abortion easier
(MORI, 1980) Should the law be . . .
Left as it is 37 38 NA NA 20 NA NA
Changed to make abortion 13 12 NA NA 14 NA NA
easier
Changed to make abortion 29 27 NA NA 50 NA NA
more difficult
(MORI, 1980) Abortion should be made legally available for all who want it
Agree 54 55 NA NA 34 NA NA
Neither agree nor disagree 9 9 NA NA 8 NA NA
Disagree 36 33 NA NA 56 NA NA

Notes: Don’t knows not shown. In 1980 the Church of England column is for Church of England and other
Christian. N = 1,705 (1970), 2,344 (1972), 1,085 (1973), 1,004 (1979), 1,090 (1980).
Sources: Unpublished except for: (NOP, 1970) ‘National Opinion Polls National Political Survey, January
1970’, dataset at UKDA, SN 62; (NOP, 1972) NOP Political Bulletin 108 (1972): 15–20, ‘NOP Abortion
Survey’, New Humanist 88 (1972–3): 30–3; (Gallup, 1973) The Times, 22 January 1974.
 Believing—Attitudes 173
Table 7.6 Attitudes to voluntary euthanasia by religion, adults, Great Britain, 1976–85
(percentages down)
Total Church of Church of Free Roman Other Atheist/
England Scotland Church Catholic agnostic

1976
Agree strongly 33 33 39 34 25 18 47
Agree moderately 36 39 38 30 29 22 37
Disagree moderately 7 7 4 10 7 12 5
Disagree strongly 10 6 11 14 26 25 5
Don’t know 14 15 9 12 12 23 6
1978
Agree strongly 24 26 20 26 13 11 34
Agree 38 42 41 29 28 26 40
Neither agree nor disagree 7 6 9 8 11 9 7
Disagree 11 11 13 15 15 23 7
Disagree strongly 11 8 7 14 28 26 9
Don’t know 8 7 11 7 5 5 3
1985
Agree strongly 34 35 27 29 28 26 46
Agree moderately 38 40 38 40 26 29 41
Disagree moderately 10 9 9 12 13 10 8
Disagree strongly 11 8 14 11 26 23 3
Don’t know 8 8 11 8 6 12 2

Notes: The questions were: (1976, 1985) ‘People say that the law should allow adults to receive medical help to
an immediate peaceful death if they suffer from an incurable physical illness that is intolerable to them, provided
they have previously requested such help in writing. Looking at this card, please tell me whether you agree or
disagree with this.’ (1978) ‘Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement: “if a patient is
suffering from a distressing and incurable physical illness, a doctor should be allowed to supply that patient with
the means to end his own life if the patient wishes to.” ’ N = 2,121 (1976), 1,942 (1978), 1,712 (1985).
Source: NOP, unpublished.

sample survey evidence is available from the 1970s and 1980s, from NOP,
EVS, and BSA surveys, all including breaks by religious variables.97
Table 7.6 summarizes results from the first three NOP polls (for 1976, 1978,
and 1985), which concern physician-assisted suicide for patients suffering
incurable illnesses. It should be noted that the 1978 survey used a slightly
different question and included an additional response code, so it is not strictly
comparable with the other two years. Taking 1976 and 1985, it will be seen

97
B. Clements, ‘Religion and Attitudes towards Euthanasia in Britain: Evidence from Opin-
ion Polls and Social Surveys’, British Religion in Numbers, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/2014/religion-
and-attitudes-towards-euthanasia-in-britain-evidence-from-opinion-polls-and-social-surveys/>.
BSA surveys have also been examined by A. Danyliv and C. O’Neill, ‘Attitudes towards Legalis-
ing Physician Provided Euthanasia in Britain: The Role of Religion over Time’, Social Science and
Medicine 128 (2015): 52–6. The following paragraphs draw on both these publications as well as
upon analysis of merged data from the 1983–4 surveys extracted from British Social Attitudes
Information System, <http://www.britsocat.com>.
174 Secularization in the Long 1960s

that about seven in ten Britons supported physician-assisted suicide, the

proportion being similar among the various Protestant groups, but rising to
84 per cent (in 1976) and 87 per cent (in 1985) with atheists and agnostics,
and falling to 54 per cent in both years among Catholics (one-third or more
of whom were in disagreement). Enquiries conducted by Gallup just with
Catholics in 1978 revealed even lower levels of support for euthanasia at the
patient’s request: 44 per cent in England and Wales (40 per cent against) and
22 per cent in Scotland (58 per cent against, including 70 per cent of weekly
Mass-goers).98
Pooled data for the 1983 and 1984 BSA surveys showed that 76 per cent of
all adults favoured physician-assisted suicide solicited by patients with incur-
able conditions, with the same two extremes: a much reduced majority of
58 per cent for Catholics and 86 per cent endorsement among religious nones.
Opposition by frequent attenders at religious services reached the same two-
fifths level as for Catholics, which was virtually double the national average;
indeed, according to multivariate analysis, such religious variables constituted
the most significant determinants of hostility to euthanasia. However, the
public in 1983–4 overwhelmingly rejected physician-assisted suicide for pa-
tients who were not incurably sick but simply tired of living; 87 per cent of all
Britons disagreed with this, Catholics and regular churchgoers still more so,
and even 81 per cent of nones.
The EVS question was less well-defined, asking whether ‘euthanasia (ter-
minating the life of the incurably sick)’ was justifiable, and not limiting it to
physician-assisted suicide. It also deployed a 10-point scale (rather than binary
answers) from which mean scores can be calculated: the higher the score,
the greater the acceptance of euthanasia. In 1981 the British range was from
3.36 for Catholics to 5.51 for nones, and from 3.56 for frequent attenders to
4.94 for non-attenders. The score was also greater for the irreligious/convinced
atheists (5.00) than religious persons (4.00), disbelievers in God (5.51) than
believers (4.08), and non-members (4.69) than members (3.49) of religious
organizations.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

The legislative regulation of Sunday observance and morality, as well as the

persistence of an Established Church in England, statutory provision for
religious education in schools, and state funding of faith schools, all exempli-
fied the continuing interconnectedness of religion and politics. Religion was

98
(England and Wales) Hornsby-Smith and Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion, 192; (Scotland)
The Tablet, 28 April 1979, Flourish, 29 April 1979.
 Believing—Attitudes 175

perceived as the junior partner in this relationship, according to Britons

interviewed by Gallup in 1957 and 1964, a plurality believing that politics
had the greater influence over people’s lives.99 They seemed content to keep
things that way and to minimize the extent to which organized religion and
politics mixed. Gallup reported an increasing majority wishing to see the
Church keep out of politics and to avoid taking sides: 53 per cent in 1957;
60 per cent in 1968; 65 per cent in 1969; and 69 per cent in 1984. Those arguing
for ecclesiastical intervention reduced from 36 per cent to 25 per cent over the
same period.100 A feature of the 1984 poll had been that the clergy were more
amenable to seeing the Church involved in politics than the population at
large, and this was also the case in a Marplan survey in 1979, in which 50 per
cent of adults pleaded for less engagement of the Church in politics, a mere
7 per cent desiring more.101 By the time Harris replicated the question in 1984,
the first figure had risen to 55 per cent, including 66 per cent of Conservatives,
reflecting the commencement of tussles between Church and government
during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership.102 Later BSA surveys likewise con-
firmed that the majority of people did not want religious leaders to try and
influence government decisions, nor to influence how electors voted.103
Notwithstanding the electorate’s apparent desire to separate religion from
politics, political partisanship actually continued to be shaped in part by
religious allegiances. Following the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872,
and the consequent disappearance of poll books, the extent to which this was
the case could initially only be enumerated indirectly, by correlating voting

99
(1957) Gallup, GIPOP, I, 406; (1964) GPI 52 (1964): 84.
100
(1957) News Chronicle, 16 April 1957, Gallup, GIPOP, I, 406; (1968) GPI 100 (1968): 107,
Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1005; (1969) GPI 114 (1969): 196, Gallup, GIPOP, II, 1074; (1984) GPI 293
(1985): 23, G. Heald and R. J. Wybrow, The Gallup Survey of Britain (London: Croom Helm,
1986), 223.
101
Now!, 21 December 1979; ‘Now! Religion Survey, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1366. The
greater willingness of Anglican clergy than laity to see the Church involved in politics is
documented in C. D. Field, ‘Rendering unto Caesar? The Politics of Church of England Clergy
since 1980’, Journal of Anglican Studies 5 (2007): 89–108.
102
Unpublished. For background, see G. Moyser, ed., Church and Politics Today: Essays on
the Role of the Church of England in Contemporary Politics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985);
K. Medhurst and G. Moyser, Church and Politics in a Secular Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1988); D. Martin, ‘The Churches: Pink Bishops and the Iron Lady’, in D. Kavanagh and
A. Seldon, eds., The Thatcher Effect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 330–41; D. L. Baker,
‘Turbulent Priests: Christian Opposition to the Conservative Government since 1979’, Political
Quarterly 62 (1991): 90–105; H. Clark, The Church under Thatcher (London: SPCK, 1993);
F. Bown, ‘Influencing the House of Lords: The Role of the Lords Spiritual, 1979–1987’, Political
Studies 42 (1994): 105–19; A. Partington, Church and State: The Contribution of the Church of
England Bishops to the House of Lords during the Thatcher Years (Milton Keynes: Paternoster,
2006); M. Grimley, ‘Thatcherism, Morality, and Religion’, in B. Jackson and R. Saunders, eds.,
Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 78–94, 295–9; and
E. Filby, God and Mrs Thatcher: The Battle for Britain’s Soul (London: Biteback Publishing,
2015).
103
Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 32–9.
176 Secularization in the Long 1960s

behaviour with social and religious indicators at the local level. Indeed, this
technique was adopted by Bill Miller in the comparatively recent past in his
study of religious alignment at English general elections between 1918 and
1974, with the number of clergy in three denominational groups recorded at
the 1921 and 1931 censuses used as a proxy for religiosity.104 However, after
the Second World War sample surveys mostly offered a more promising and
direct avenue for ascertaining voting patterns and broader political attitudes.
Some of the more in-depth investigations were carried out in particular
constituencies or communities, and examples of this approach could still be
found in the 1960s and early 1970s, in places as diverse as Newcastle-under-
Lyme, Sheffield, Chorley and Salford, Cardiganshire, Glasgow, and Dundee.105
Their very diversity doubtless explains the fluctuating results obtained with
regard to religious voting patterns, suggesting recourse to national surveys in
order to provide a more balanced picture.
Although opinion pollsters had routinely covered politics, including party
choice, from the late 1930s onwards, their surveys rarely contained any
religious variables nor were sample sizes sufficiently large to permit much
disaggregation of results by background characteristics.106 The situation
changed in 1964 when Gallup, which had been polling for The Daily Telegraph
since 1961, ran a series of polls during the general election campaign, using a
fixed battery of questions (including one on religious affiliation), which were
cumulated and cross-tabulated after the campaign. The practice continued at
subsequent general elections, albeit topline results for 1966 and 1970 have
proved hard to trace. What was being measured, of course, was vote intention
rather than an actual vote cast at the ballot box. Results could also have been
affected by electors switching parties during the course of the campaign or
ultimately failing to turn out to vote.
Bearing these caveats in mind, data are summarized in Table 7.7, from
which it can be deduced that: Anglicans were more likely than average to
vote Conservative and generally less likely to vote for other parties; Roman

104
W. L. Miller and G. Raab, ‘The Religious Alignment at English Elections between 1918 and
1970’, Political Studies 25 (1977): 227–51 at 237–51; W. L. Miller, ‘The Religious Alignment in
England at the General Elections of 1974’, Parliamentary Affairs 30 (1977): 258–68; idem,
Electoral Dynamics in Britain since 1918 (London: Macmillan, 1977).
105
F. Bealey, J. Blondel, and W. P. McCann, Constituency Politics: A Study of Newcastle-
Under-Lyme (London: Faber and Faber, 1965); W. A. Hampton, Democracy and Community:
A Study of Politics in Sheffield (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); J. A. Borland, ‘Religion
and Politics: A Case Study of Chorley and Salford, 1965–74’ (MA thesis, University of Wales,
Bangor, 1983); (Cardiganshire) Madgwick, Politics of Rural Wales; (Glasgow) I. Budge and
D. W. Urwin, Scottish Political Behaviour: A Case Study in British Homogeneity (London:
Longmans, 1966), ‘Scottish Political and Social Attitudes in the Glasgow Parliamentary Con-
stituency of Craigton’, dataset at UKDA, SN 65004; (Dundee) J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver,
‘Religion and Voting: A Critical Review and a New Analysis’, Political Studies 18 (1970): 205–19.
106
A conspicuous exception being two large-scale polls of 6,000+ interviews by Mass-Observation
in 1948 and 1955–6 tabulated by Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?, 89.
 Believing—Attitudes 177
Table 7.7 Voting intention in advance of general elections by religion,
adults, Great Britain, 1964–79 (percentages down)
Total Conservative Labour Liberal

1964, quota
Church of England 61 68 58 55
Church of Scotland 8 7 8 5
Free Church 11 10 12 19
Roman Catholic 10 7 12 10
Other 4 4 4 5
None 6 4 6 6
1964, random
Church of England 64 69 61 64
Church of Scotland 8 7 9 4
Free Church 10 11 9 19
Roman Catholic 9 6 12 6
Other 4 4 4 3
None 5 3 5 4
1974, February
Church of England 61 67 58 60
Church of Scotland 7 7 7 3
Free Church 7 7 6 10
Roman Catholic 11 9 15 10
Other 6 6 6 9
None 8 6 9 9
1974, October
Church of England 60 67 58 61
Church of Scotland 7 6 6 4
Free Church 6 6 5 9
Roman Catholic 11 9 14 9
Other 7 5 7 7
None 9 7 10 10
1979
Church of England 61 69 57 58
Church of Scotland 7 5 8 6
Free Church 7 7 6 11
Roman Catholic 12 9 15 8
Other 5 4 5 9
None 8 6 9 9

Notes: No aggregate data have been traced for Gallup’s polling at the 1966 and 1970 general
elections. N = 6,693 (1964, quota), 4,577 (1964, random), 9,540 (February 1974), 8,428
(October 1974), 11,097 (1979).
Sources: Gallup. (1964) Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), The Gallup Election Handbook, March
1966 (London: Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), 1966), B8, ‘Gallup General Election Surveys,
1964’, dataset at UKDA, SN 2051; (1974, February) GPI 163 (1974): 253, ‘Gallup General
Election Surveys, February 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 658; (1974, October) GPI 171 (1974):
12, ‘Gallup General Election Surveys, October 1974’, dataset at UKDA, SN 659; (1979) GPI
225 (1979): 21, ‘Gallup General Election Surveys, 1979’, dataset at UKDA, SN 1352.
178 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Catholics were more likely to vote Labour and less likely to vote Conservative;
adherents of the Free Churches were more likely to vote Liberal but otherwise
tended to follow the norm; Church of Scotland affiliates were less likely to vote
Liberal; and nones were less likely to vote Conservative and somewhat more
likely to support other parties. This pattern broadly reflected the legacy of
close bonds between the Church of England and the Conservative Party, the
Catholic Church and the Labour Party, and the Free Churches and the Liberal
Party. It is not to say, however, that majorities in these three denominational
blocs opted for the political party with which they had traditionally been
linked, only that there was a disproportionate predisposition to do so.
The same pattern was revealed in BES, another, this time academically led,
recurrent series of general election studies which has focused less on vote
intention than on actual voting as ascertained by post-election interviews.
It was initiated in 1963 by David Butler and Donald Stokes with a national
cross-section of Britons, who were re-interviewed in 1964 alongside new
respondents, so as to enhance the sample’s representativeness. In 1966, the
panellists of 1963–4 were re-interviewed with further new respondents.
In 1969, an entirely new sample was drawn, while in 1970 there were
re-interviews of the 1963–4 and 1969 respondents plus additional new inter-
views. Thereafter, fresh national cross-sections were taken at each general
election. As well as capturing respondent voting behaviour, BES usefully
recorded parental voting behaviour as recalled by the respondent.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s BES questionnaire topics included reli-
gious profession (but only asked of new respondents in 1964, 1966, and 1970
and not asked at all in February 1974) and frequency of attendance at religious
services (but only asked of new respondents in 1964, 1966, and 1970 and not
asked at all in February and October 1974). Regrettably, the affiliation ques-
tion was not standardized, the adoption of a ‘belonging’ formulation after 1970
leading to big reductions in professing Anglicans and large increases in nones,
with consequential loss of strict comparability. Another weakness of BES was
the relatively small sample sizes, which inhibited meaningful breaks of results
for two of the three home nations, compensated for in part by commissioning
separate cross-sections for Scotland in October 1974 and 1979 and for Wales
in 1979. The former revealed, for example, that support for the Scottish
National Party was at its highest among nones and lowest among Catholics.107
Limited sample sizes also rendered it impossible to examine the partisanship
of ‘other religions’, especially non-Christian ones, which were numerically
small and, often, spatially concentrated. Fortunately, the political behaviour of
the Jews, Britain’s most longstanding religious minority, was illuminated by
Geoffrey Alderman’s research, which contrasted their majority endorsement

107
W. L. Miller, The End of British Politics? Scots and English Political Behaviour in the
Seventies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 144–7.
 Believing—Attitudes 179

of the Conservatives after the Second World War with their predominantly
pro-Liberal stance in the late nineteenth century and pro-Labour leaning in
the early twentieth century.108
When Butler and Stokes came to review the findings for 1963–70, they
confirmed the respective predispositions of Anglicans to vote Conservative
(accentuated among more frequent churchgoers), Catholics to vote Labour,
and followers of the Free Churches to vote Liberal. Nevertheless, analysis of
the data by seven cohorts (including fathers of the two earliest cohorts, thereby
projecting as far back as those who came of age in the 1880s), and controlling
for social class, led them to conclude that there had been a ‘marked attenu-
ation of religious differences’ over time as ‘the class alignment became more
predominant’. This process had been carried furthest with the working classes,
the vestiges of religious cleavages being most likely to persist among the
middle classes.109
With the benefits of hindsight, and a much longer run of BES statistics,
subsequent generations of political scientists have been much more struck
by the resilience of religious alignment, especially between Anglicans and
Conservative voting and Catholics and Labour voting, with parental transmis-
sion of party allegiances within denominations identified as a key factor
in preserving the historical associations between individual Churches and
particular parties. Although these later writers have often conceded that
secularization has diminished the number of people coming under the influ-
ence of such associations, they are still thought to be a large enough body for
religion to be a significant predictor of voting patterns.110

108
G. Alderman, ‘Not Quite British: The Political Attitudes of Anglo-Jewry’, British Political
Sociology Yearbook 2 (1975): 188–211; idem, The Jewish Vote in Great Britain since 1945
(Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1980); idem, ‘The
Jewish Vote: Time to Grow Up’, Immigrants and Minorities 1 (1982): 176–92; idem, The Jewish
Community in British Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); idem, ‘The Assimilation of
Politics: Anglo-Jewry and the British Political Process since 1945’, Australian Journal of Jewish
Studies 6 (1992): 23–42; idem, ‘The Jewish Dimension in British Politics since 1945’, New
Community 20 (1993–4): 9–25; idem, ‘Jewish Political Attitudes and Voting Patterns in England,
1945–87’, in R. S. Wistrich, ed., Terms of Survival: The Jewish World since 1945 (London:
Routledge, 1995), 241–60; idem, ‘The Political Conservatism of the Jews in Britain’, in
P. Y. Medding, ed., Values, Interests, and Identity: Jews and Politics in a Changing World (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 101–16. Cf. B. A. Kosmin, Jewish Voters in the United Kingdom:
The Question of a Jewish Vote (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1980).
109
D. H. E. Butler and D. E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral
Choice, 2nd edn. (London: Macmillan, 1974), 156–65. Their data were re-analysed by Miller and
Raab, ‘Religious Alignment’, 229–37; Miller, Electoral Dynamics, 138–42; and J. D. Stephens,
‘Religion and Politics in Three Northwest European Democracies’, Comparative Social Research
2 (1979): 129–57.
110
More recent secondary analysis of religious alignment in BES has included: B. Cautres,
‘Religion et comportement électoral en Grande-Bretagne’, in M. Charlot, ed., Religion et politique
en Grande-Bretagne (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1994), 165–90; L. A. Kotler-
Berkowitz, ‘Structuring Electoral Behavior: Religious Contexts in the United States and Great
Britain’ (PhD thesis, Brown University, 1998), 160–225; D. Seawright, ‘A Confessional Cleavage
180 Secularization in the Long 1960s

The analyses and arguments deployed in this more recent literature are too
detailed and complex to be susceptible to summation here. However, some
elementary statistics from BES can be presented in Table 7.8, up to and
including the 1979 general election (the 1983 general election has been
excluded on account of the change to the political landscape brought about
by the birth of the Social Democratic Party in 1981). Table 7.8 is a useful
reminder that the predisposition of a particular religious group to favour one
political party did not necessarily translate into a majority of that group voting
for that party. For instance, only in 1970 and 1979 (when the Tories won the
general elections) did a majority of Anglicans vote Conservative, while in 1966
(when Harold Wilson achieved a 98-seat majority for Labour) half turned
socialist. Similarly, Free Church voters may have been disproportionately
Liberal, but the majority in 1964 and 1966 followed the country in voting
Labour, a plurality having turned Conservative in 1974 and 1979. Roman
Catholics were solidly Labour in the first four of the general elections, broadly
in line with national surveys of Catholics in 1967 and 1978,111 but even they
had succumbed to the Conservative tide in 1979. The majority of nones for
Labour also disappeared in 1979. A plurality of regular churchgoers supported
the Conservatives, except in 1966 when the plurality transferred to Labour,
while the majority of non-churchgoers voted Labour until 1970 and a plurality
in 1979.112
BES further reported on the strength of partisanship by religious affiliation
and frequency of attendance at religious services, attachment to the party
in question being rated as very, fairly, or not very strong; no distinctive
and consistent trend emerged.113 What BES did not illuminate during the
1960s and 1970s were the religious correlates of the three ideological scales

Resurrected? The Denominational Vote in Britain’, in D. Broughton and H.-M. ten Napel, eds.,
Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe (London: Routledge, 2000), 44–60;
C. Raymond, ‘The Continued Salience of Religious Voting in the United States, Germany, and
Great Britain’, Electoral Studies 30 (2011): 125–35; M. H. M. Steven, Christianity and Party
Politics: Keeping the Faith (London: Routledge, 2011), 21–44; B. Clements and N. Spencer,
Voting and Values in Britain: Does Religion Count? (London: Theos, 2014), 27–44; Clements,
Religion and Public Opinion, 48–63, 78–9; and J. R. Tilley, ‘ “We Don’t Do God”? Religion and
Party Choice in Britain’, British Journal of Political Science 45 (2015): 907–27. The British
Household Panel has also been used to demonstrate the enduring influence of religion on voting:
L. A. Kotler-Berkowitz, ‘Structuring Electoral Behavior’, 160–225, 252–70 and ‘Religion and
Voting Behaviour in Great Britain: A Reassessment’, British Journal of Political Science 31 (2001):
523–54. BSA surveys have been used in this way too: Clements, Religion and Public Opinion,
63–8 and Tilley, ‘ “We Don’t Do God”?’, 907–27.
111
(1967) Martin, ‘Comments on Some Gallup Poll Statistics’, 196; (1978) Hornsby-Smith
and Lee, Roman Catholic Opinion, 37–9, 174–5. More generally on Catholics and politics, see
M. P. Hornsby-Smith, Roman Catholics in England: Studies in Social Structure since the Second
World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 157–81.
112
Churchgoing had also impacted party preferences in England in 1963–4: Social Surveys
(Gallup Poll), Television and Religion, 16–17.
113
Crewe, Fox, and Day, British Electorate, 105–8.
 Believing—Attitudes 181
Table 7.8 Reported voting at general elections by religion, adults, Great
Britain, 1964–79 (percentages down)
1964 1966 1970 October 1974 1979

Church of England
Conservative 45 42 51 44 55
Labour 44 50 42 35 31
Liberal 10 7 7 20 14
Free Church
Conservative 32 28 38 34 48
Labour 53 60 43 33 31
Liberal 16 11 12 32 21
Roman Catholic
Conservative 26 26 31 26 49
Labour 65 71 62 60 43
Liberal 9 4 6 11 8
No religion
Conservative 27 32 29 30 42
Labour 50 55 61 51 43
Liberal 21 13 7 15 13
Regular churchgoers
Conservative 47 42 43 NA 49
Labour 39 48 42 NA 33
Liberal 14 9 10 NA 17
Non-churchgoers
Conservative 38 34 36 NA 37
Labour 55 60 54 NA 48
Liberal 6 6 8 NA 11

Notes: Votes for other parties and intermediate churchgoing frequencies are not shown.
N = 1,828 (1964), 2,082 (1966), 3,242 (1970), 2,365 (1974), 1,893 (1979).
Sources: I. Crewe, A. Fox, and N. Day, The British Electorate, 1963–1992: A Compendium of
Data from the British Election Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 41–2.
Relevant datasets are available at UKDA as follows: (1964–70) ‘Political Change in Britain,
1963–70’, SN 44; ‘British Election Study, October 1974’, SN 666; ‘British Election Study, May
1979’, SN 1533.

(left–right, libertarian–authoritarian, and welfarist–individualist) which are

central to more contemporary political science scholarship in Britain. Data
to construct these are mainly available after the mid-1980s, especially from
BSA surveys.114 The only partial exception is the left–right self-placement
scale in the 1981 EVS, where a rating of 1 represented the most left-wing

114
Clements and Spencer, Voting and Values, 13–19, 68–118; Clements, Religion and Public
Opinion, 80–105. Although a retrospective libertarian–authoritarian scale has been devised from
BES data after 1974, it does not seem to have been analysed by religion: J. R. Tilley, ‘Research
Note: Libertarian–Authoritarian Value Change in Britain, 1974–2001’, Political Studies 53
(2005): 442–53.
182 Secularization in the Long 1960s

position and 10 the most right-wing. Nones were the most left-wing religious
group in Britain, with a score of 4.50, followed by Catholics on 5.36, other
Christians on 5.74, with Anglicans the most right-wing on 5.91. Frequent
churchgoers were also more right-wing than non-attenders (6.10 versus 5.39),
religious persons more than the irreligious/convinced atheists (5.93
against 5.36), and believers in God more than disbelievers (5.90 and 5.07,
respectively).115

115
Clements, Religion and Public Opinion, 88–9.
 8

Institutional Measures

PLACES OF W ORSHIP

Hitherto, we have evaluated religious change during the 1960s and 1970s with
reference to individuals, in terms of their religious belonging, behaving, and
believing. But transformations in the religious landscape also potentially
impacted the material fortunes of organized religion, particularly the Christian
Churches. Is evidence for a religious crisis to be found there? A comprehensive
treatment of this subject would require a monograph in its own right, as well
as extensive primary research (since there is so little secondary literature to fall
back on). The discussion in this chapter is therefore confined to an initial
overview of statistics of places of worship, religious personnel, and religious
finance, in the hope of encouraging other scholars to investigate these aspects
in far greater detail.
It might be thought that the number of places of worship would be readily
available, being the most basic and seemingly least sensitive of religious
indicators. In fact, it is somewhat problematical to arrive at a comprehensive
picture. This is notwithstanding that this was one of the few areas of religion
where the state collected some statistics, through a process of certification to
the Registrar General laid down by the Places of Worship Registration Act
1855. This is a valuable source of data but has certain limitations. The Act only
applied to England and Wales and did not extend to the Church of England
and Church in Wales. Certification of a place of worship was optional and
required payment of a fee, but it conferred certain financial advantages
(including exemption from local taxation) and was a prerequisite for subse-
quent registration of a building for the solemnization of marriages. Where
like-for-like comparisons are possible with denominational figures, the offi-
cial certified total is usually lower, for example, by as much as 17 per cent for
the Roman Catholic Church in 1951, albeit the gap had narrowed to 4 per cent
by 1980.1 In particular, transitory house-based places of worship, which

1
Annual returns of churches and chapels published in the Catholic Directory of England
and Wales.
184 Secularization in the Long 1960s

became increasingly important during the 1960s and 1970s (both for newer
manifestations of Christianity and non-Christian faiths), would rarely have
been certified. While the Act made provision for cancellation of certification,
this depended upon notification of the Registrar General, which perhaps did
not always happen in a timely fashion, so the register of places of worship in
any given year probably contained a certain amount of ‘dead wood’. Moreover,
summary statistics of certification were initially only published intermittently
and with variable denominational categorization.
Bearing these constraints in mind, several conclusions still emerge from
Table 8.1 in respect of non-Anglican forms of Christianity. Overall, there was
a reduction of 18 per cent in places of worship between 1951 and 1980, the
steepest net losses (over 350 per annum) occurring between 1962 and 1972
and between 1976 and 1980. The Roman Catholic Church bucked the trend,
achieving sustained growth over the three decades, cumulatively amounting
to 50 per cent (albeit slowing after 1967), as its building programme sought
to keep pace with its increased population, which we noted in Chapter 3.
Some non-mainstream denominations, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses,
also advanced. However, the traditional Free Churches experienced decline,
commencing sooner in some cases than others, but mostly at a relatively
modest level. The principal exceptions were the Salvation Army, which
apparently lost one-fifth of its citadels between 1951 and 1957 and another
fifth between 1962 and 1972, and the Methodist Church.

Table 8.1 Certified places of worship by denomination, England and Wales, 1951–80
1951 1957 1962 1967 1972 1976 1980

Roman Catholic Church 2,418 2,770 3,124 3,379 3,502 3,612 3,630
Methodist Church 13,251 12,841 12,505 11,299 10,001 9,567 8,693
Congregationalists 3,623 3,787 3,791 3,593 3,369 1,483 1,432
United Reformed Church NA NA NA NA NA 2,078 1,945
Baptists 3,601 3,732 3,788 3,675 3,594 3,567 3,427
Calvinistic Methodists 1,419 1,468 1,463 1,431 1,339 1,322 1,255
Presbyterians 463 425 421 419 404 NA NA
Unitarians 195 227 225 209 192 199 186
Religious Society of Friends 421 398 407 379 368 368 355
Salvation Army 1,573 1,267 1,289 1,154 1,055 1,063 958
Brethren NA 1,041 1,107 1,060 1,016 986 945
Other denominations 7,780 5,345 5,857 5,539 5,516 5,962 5,831
Christian sub-total 34,744 33,301 33,977 32,137 30,356 30,207 28,657
Jews 427 377 400 332 320 348 335
Other non-Christians NA 315 340 326 341 415 502
Total 35,171 33,993 34,717 32,795 31,017 30,970 29,494

Note: In 1951 both Brethren and, presumably, other non-Christians were included with other denominations.
Sources: Registrar General, The Registrar General’s Statistical Review of England and Wales; Office of
Population Censuses and Surveys, Marriage and Divorce Statistics (Series FM2).
 Institutional Measures 185

Besides grappling with the general consequences of secularization, which

shrank its congregations and membership, the Methodist Church was belated-
ly implementing large-scale reorganization and deduplication consequent
upon the reunion in 1932 of the Wesleyan, Primitive, and United Methodist
Churches. This had left Methodism with a huge problem of overlap, in both
urban and rural areas, the tackling of which was delayed, first by the Second
World War and then often by fierce local resistance, which even ‘the processes
of mortality’ had failed to solve; ‘this is the greatest weakness of modern
Methodism’, wrote one of its leaders in 1963.2 Harsh realities were eventually
confronted by a concerted initiative taken at connexional level in the early
1960s. From 1960 to 1980 the Methodist Church reported a Britain-wide net
loss of 3,875 places of worship (a fall of 34 per cent) and 1,177,500 church
sittings (down by 44 per cent). Since 782 new churches had been built during
the 1960s and 1970s, there must have been 4,657 actual closures.3 These data
accord with Table 8.1 which shows a net reduction of 3,812 churches between
1962 and 1980; the total certified fell by 628 in just one year (1979–80).
Individual denominations such as the Methodists were the principal alter-
native to the state as sources of information about places of worship through
their published directories or private briefings, but not all of them provided
data and the several attempts made to collate their returns were unsatisfactory
in varying degrees. The World Christian Handbook passed through three
editions during the period under review (in 1957, 1962, and 1967), but its
tables were confined to Protestant denominations, contained many omissions,
were seriously out-of-date (with the same figure sometimes repeated from one
edition to the next), and (for 1962 and 1967) over-estimated the Church of
England and the Methodist Church, the country’s two largest groups. All that
can be said with a measure of confidence is that the Handbook pointed to
approximately 50,000 Protestant churches in Britain in the 1960s.4 A team of
academics led by Robert Currie fared little better when trying to assemble
quinquennial data on places of worship before 1970, covering only ten de-
nominations by the early 1960s, from which no firm conclusions could be
drawn.5 The World Christian Encyclopedia, published in 1982 but researched

2
R. E. Davies, Methodism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 189–90.
3
For background, see G. T. Brake, Policy and Politics in British Methodism, 1932–1982
(London: Edsall, 1984), 698–701, 718. For statistics of churches and seating, see Methodist
Church Department for Chapel Affairs Report (1964), 117 and Methodist Church Property
Division, The 1990 Statistical Returns of Chapels, Manses, and Other Accommodation in the
Circuits, Part 1 (Manchester: the Division, 1992), 1.
4
E. J. Bingle and K. G. Grubb, eds., World Christian Handbook, 1957 Edition (London: World
Dominion Press, 1957), 13–14; H. W. Coxill and K. G. Grubb, eds., World Christian Handbook,
1962 Edition (London: World Dominion Press, 1962), 208–10; H. W. Coxill and K. G. Grubb,
eds., World Christian Handbook, 1968 (London: Lutterworth Press, 1967), 194–5.
5
R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church
Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 213–15.
186 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 8.2 Estimated number of church buildings or congregations by denomination,
Great Britain, 1950–80
1950 1960 1970 1980

Groupings
Anglican 20,435 20,170 19,921 18,937
Methodist 8,933 9,310 9,680 8,269
Baptist 4,994 4,819 3,507 3,229
Congregational/Reformed 4,613 4,414 4,414 3,187
Presbyterian 4,201 3,920 3,822 3,403
Independent 7,287 7,181 7,280 4,294
New Churches NA NA 1 205
Pentecostal 809 1,092 1,357 1,808
Other Trinitarian Protestant 4,705 4,843 4,450 4,304
Roman Catholic 3,441 3,540 3,613 3,697
Orthodox 33 92 124 154
Non-Trinitarian Churches 2,121 2,440 2,673 3,090
Christian sub-total 61,572 61,821 60,842 54,577
Non-Christian faiths NA 548 855 1,233
Total 61,572 62,369 61,697 55,810
Major denominations
Church of England 18,220 17,973 17,760 16,884
Church in Wales 1,774 1,783 1,780 1,697
Methodist Church of Great Britain 8,611 8,997 9,383 7,990
Baptist Union of Great Britain 3,277 3,215 2,085 1,872
Congregational Union of England and Wales 3,271 3,130 3,032 NA
United Reformed Church NA NA NA 1,936
Church of Scotland 2,340 2,093 2,119 1,852
Presbyterian Church of Wales 1,439 1,410 1,300 1,169
Brethren 2,337 2,404 2,408 2,229
Salvation Army 1,638 1,597 1,065 966
Roman Catholic Church—England and Wales 2,913 3,005 3,087 3,189
Source: P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition
(London: Christian Research, 1999).

in the 1970s, was seemingly more comprehensive, suggesting 63,000 congre-

gations across 500 denominations in Britain and Northern Ireland, yet its
figures were of uncertain currency and some were clearly broad estimates.6
By far the best-known collations of data derived from individual denomi-
nations and faiths are those prepared by Peter Brierley after the mid-1970s.
Table 8.2 presents a compressed version of one of his more recent and most
granular attempts to quantify places of worship at decennial intervals between
1950 and 1980, showing figures for both religious categories and the largest
denominations, and relating to Britain alone (rather than the United Kingdom

6
D. B. Barrett, ed., World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and
Religions in the Modern World, AD 1900–2000 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 706–8.
 Institutional Measures 187

in Brierley’s own aggregates). It should be noted that several other versions of

his calculations are available, containing discrepancies from Table 8.2, often of
a relatively minor nature but occasionally more fundamental.7 Brierley
sourced his post-1970 statistics from original research supplemented by esti-
mation. The pre-1970 data appear to have been compiled from a combination
of Currie’s work (revised in some instances), original research, and back-
projection. Several of his methods seem curious, such as the downward
adjustment of some Free Church series to exclude places of worship which
were ‘chapels’, as opposed to ‘churches’.
A handful of Brierley’s findings seem counter-intuitive and contestable,
including his suggested increase in Methodist churches during the 1960s,
when, as just discussed, the reality was decline. Others are more in line with
expectation, such as growth in the Roman Catholic Church and among
Pentecostals and Holiness Churches, groups which the published state certi-
fication data only separately identified in 1957, 1962, and 1967. The more
radical discontinuity on the Baptist Union line between 1960 and 1970
perhaps in part reflects the changed practice of recording Baptist churches
in the Baptist Handbook, on which we commented in Chapter 3. Significant
contraction in the Congregational/Reformed tradition followed the reorgan-
ization and splits stemming from the creation of the United Reformed Church
in 1972. Although the exact figures differ from Table 8.1, on account of
alternative geographical coverage and time-points, the scale of Salvation
Army losses is confirmed.
The fairly small reduction in the Church of England in Table 8.2 needs to be
understood within the context of its longstanding difficulties in declaring
churches redundant, only eased with the enactment of the Pastoral Measure
1968, which resulted in the establishment of a Redundant Churches
Fund (in partnership with the state) and an average of 79 church closures

7
These variants on the data will be found in: P. W. Brierley, UK Protestant Missions
Handbook, Volume 2: Home (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1977), 10–15; idem, ed., UK
Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1982), 14–28; idem, ed., UK
Christian Handbook, 1985/86 Edition (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1984), 110–18; idem, ed.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88 Edition (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1986), 132–48; idem, ed.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1989/90 Edition (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1988), 144–76; idem,
‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed., British Social Trends since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social
Structure of Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 518–60 at 526; idem, A Century of British
Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1989), 66–79;
P. W. Brierley and V. Hiscock, eds., UK Christian Handbook, 1994/95 Edition (London:
Christian Research, 1993), 246–81; P. W. Brierley and H. Wraight, eds., UK Christian Handbook,
1996/97 Edition (London: Christian Research, 1995), 240–83; P. W. Brierley, Religion in Britain,
1900 to 2000 (London: Christian Research, 1998), 12; H. Wraight and P. W. Brierley, eds., UK
Christian Handbook, 2000/01 Millennium Edition (London: Christian Research, 1999), 26; and
P. W. Brierley, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed. with J. Webb, Twentieth-Century British Social
Trends (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 650–74 at 666–9.
188 Secularization in the Long 1960s

per annum in the 1970s and a peak of 106 in 1973–4.8 According to the
Church of England’s own statistics, its parochial churches and chapels
dropped from 17,973 in 1961 to 16,806 in 1981, or by 6 per cent.9 Even
then, sales to non-Christian faiths remained highly controversial, as causes
célèbres in Dewsbury in 1972 (involving Muslims) and Bedford in 1977–8
(involving Sikhs) demonstrated.10 A further complication was the touristic
value and potential, as visitor attractions, of thousands of historic parish
churches, which there was growing interest in developing.11
Overall, according to Brierley, the number of Christian places of worship in
Britain rose very slightly (by less than half a per cent) in the 1950s, before
declining by 2 per cent in the 1960s and 10 per cent (equivalent to a net 630
churches each year) in the 1970s. Once Northern Ireland is factored in,
Brierley’s total of 61,000 Trinitarian and non-Trinitarian places of worship
in 1970 is consistent with the World Christian Encyclopedia. His 1980 figure of
51,500 Trinitarian churches can be compared with the total of 49,100 obtained
from the three censuses of membership and attendance which Brierley organ-
ized in England in 1979, Wales in 1982, and Scotland in 1984. These had been
preceded by careful research to identify all places of worship to which postal
questionnaires were subsequently sent, so there can be a high degree of confidence
in the accuracy of the buildings data. The returns are summarized in Table 8.3,
from which it will be seen that Wales was the most ‘churched’ of the three
home nations, with one place of worship for every 376 adults, in stark contrast
to one in 928 in England and 974 in Scotland. This partly reflected the need to
make separate provision for Welsh- and English-speaking worshippers.12 In
consequence, the average adult congregation in Wales was only half the size of
that in England and Britain as a whole.

8
P. Brown, ‘The Pastoral Measure 1968 and the Conversion of Redundant Churches to
Alternative Use’ (MLitt thesis, University of Bristol, 1974); A. Chandler, The Church of England
in the Twentieth Century: The Church Commissioners and the Politics of Reform, 1948–1998
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), 220–39, 290–6.
9
R. F. Neuss, ed., Facts and Figures about the Church of England, Number 3 (London:
Church Information Office, 1965), 14; Central Board of Finance of the Church of England,
Church Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about the Church of England, 1983 Edition (London:
CIO Publishing, 1983), 27.
10
Chandler, Church of England, 233–9 (on Dewsbury); J. Maiden, ‘ “What Could Be More
Christian than to Allow the Sikhs to Use It?” Church Redundancy and Minority Religion in
Bedford, 1977–8’, in C. Methuen, A. Spicer, and J. R. Wolffe, eds., Christianity and Religious
Plurality, Studies in Church History 51 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2015), 399–411.
11
M. Hanna, English Churches and Visitors: A Survey of Anglican Incumbents (London: English
Tourist Board, 1984).
12
The level of duplication for reasons of language can be inferred from the data in
C. C. Harris and G. Hughes, ‘The Church in the Zone’, in V. Jones, ed., The Church in a Mobile
Society: A Survey of the Zone of Industrial South West Wales (Swansea: Christopher Davies,
1969), 57–77.
 Institutional Measures 189
Table 8.3 Places of worship by denomination and home nation, Great
Britain, 1979–84
Churches Average adult Adult population
attendance per church

England, 1979
Episcopal 14,899 84
Methodist 9,073 49
Baptist 2,472 82
Congregational/Reformed 2,226 62
Independent 3,630 57
African/West Indian 701 94
Pentecostal/Holiness 850 104
Other Protestant 1,648 78
Roman Catholic 3,673 357
Orthodox 97 72
Total 39,269 98 928
Wales, 1982
Church in Wales 1,675 48
Presbyterian Church of Wales 1,169 32
Baptist 833 37
Union of Welsh 746 34
Independents/
Congregational
Methodist 553 32
Other Protestant 590 54
Roman Catholic 206 275
Total 5,772 49 376
Scotland, 1984
Church of Scotland 1,790 149
Conservative Presbyterian 292 59
Episcopal Church of Scotland 306 52
Baptist 186 115
Independent 438 62
Other Protestant 445 58
Roman Catholic 606 474
Total 4,063 163 974
Great Britain total 49,104 98 867
Sources: Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism, Prospects for the Eighties: From a Census of the
Churches in 1979, 2 vols. (London: Bible Society, 1980–3); P. W. Brierley and B. Evans,
Prospects for Wales: Report of the 1982 Census of the Churches (London: Bible Society, 1983);
P. W. Brierley and F. Macdonald, Prospects for Scotland: Report of the 1984 Census of the
Churches (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1985).

With regard to non-Christian places of worship, numbers of synagogues

were recorded by both the Registrar General (Table 8.1) and the Jewish Year
Book, albeit not entirely consistently. They are believed to have peaked in
the early or mid-1940s, in consequence of the many temporary Jewish com-
munities which were set up at the beginning of the Second World War
by evacuees from the major conurbations. These communities were mostly
190 Secularization in the Long 1960s

disbanded after the war. There seems to have been a continuous net decline in
synagogues from the early 1950s, closely associated with the loss of one-
quarter of the Jewish population over three decades, but this did not preclude
the construction or acquisition of 67 new buildings during the 1960s. The
synagogues which closed or amalgamated were mainly of smaller than average
size and located either in the provinces or the East End of London. Research by
Jewish social scientists revealed 345 synagogues in Britain in 1970, 315 in
1977, and 295 in 1983. However, the total of Jewish congregations was rather
higher (368 in 1970, 351 in 1977, and 328 in 1983), including the minyanim
usually meeting in private houses, particularly in London.13 According to the
Registrar General (Table 8.1), synagogues had been overtaken by other non-
Christian places of worship by the 1970s, and, by 1981, 149 Muslim mosques,
69 Sikh gurdwaras, and 25 Hindu mandirs had been certified.14 There were
doubtless many additional premises being used for religious worship and
meetings by Asian immigrants for which registration had yet to be sought.
Counting places of worship tells only part of the story about overall
provision for public religious services since these buildings varied greatly in
size. Unfortunately, there appears to be very little published information about
the number of sittings in these places of worship. Even the Church of England
seems not to have disclosed any figures after 1960, when its 18,051 parochial
churches could seat a maximum of 5,403,200 individuals, or about 300 each,
equivalent to one-eighth of England’s residents.15 The Methodist Church in
Britain had half as many sittings, 2,658,500, in the same year, or 230 per
chapel, but this had reduced to 1,481,000 by 1980, or 190 per chapel, suggest-
ing that it was disproportionately the larger (and, presumably, least occupied
and most uneconomic) buildings which were being closed.16 The Roman
Catholics, who were still growing, continued to build larger churches, which
they used more efficiently than most other denominations by offering a
succession of Sunday Masses to differing congregations; this is reflected
in their very much higher average attendance per church (Table 8.3). The
accommodation of British synagogues is known only for 1970, when there
were 126,000 seats, of which 73,000 were reserved for men.17

13
S. J. Prais, ‘Synagogue Statistics and the Jewish Population of Great Britain, 1900–1970’,
Jewish Journal of Sociology 14 (1972): 215–28 at 216–17, 223–8; B. A. Kosmin and D. de Lange,
Synagogue Affiliation in the United Kingdom, 1977 (London: Research Unit, Board of Deputies of
British Jews, 1978), 1; B. A. Kosmin and C. Levy, Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom,
1983 (London: Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1983), 31.
14
C. Peach and R. Gale, ‘Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs in the New Religious Landscape
of England’, Geographical Review 93 (2003): 469–90 at 470, 477–9.
15
Neuss, Facts and Figures, 16. The absence of later data was confirmed by B. Botting, Head
of Research and Statistics for the Church of England, in an email to the author, 25 February 2016.
16
Methodist Church Department for Chapel Affairs Report (1964), 117; Methodist Church
Property Division, 1990 Statistical Returns, 1.
17
Prais, ‘Synagogue Statistics’, 216–20.
 Institutional Measures 191

RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL

Religious personnel comprised both stipendiary (either full- or part-time) and

voluntary workers. Paid staff were mostly clergy, ministers, or priests who
were set apart for (or ‘called to’) this vocation, usually following a period of
formal training at college and an official process of recognition, often known
as ordination. There were somewhat fewer clergy than there were places of
worship, mainly because it was not cost-effective for the smallest congrega-
tions to be served by their own full-time ordained minister; they had to be
content with sharing a minister, sometimes supplemented by lay auxiliaries.
A few religious groups also had theological objections to a separated ministry.
The number of clergy, ministers, and priests is not known exactly.
A potential state source of information, the occupational tables from the
decennial censuses of population, ceased to be of much use after the 1951
census since they no longer distinguished between clergy in different denom-
inational groupings. As with buildings, therefore, reliance has to be placed on
faith-based evidence, especially directories. Yet many denominations did not
publish figures about their clergy, exemplified in the inability of Currie’s team
to assemble time series for more than nine bodies by the 1960s.18 Those which
did often failed to distinguish between categories of ministry. Some clergy
exercised pastoral duties in a local situation and were responsible for the care
of a particular congregation or congregations; these are naturally of greatest
interest in the current context. However, others discharged duties of a non-
parochial nature within or beyond their denomination (including overseas or
with a secular employer at home, such as in teaching or chaplaincy roles).
Others still were retired, a generally increasing proportion as life expectancy
improved and the practice of ministering beyond state retirement age became
less widespread. For example, of the clergy working or residing in the Church
of England in 1968, 69 per cent were parochial, 10 per cent non-parochial, and
21 per cent retired or serving in some other non-full-time capacity.19
Producing totals of ministers therefore entails much guesswork and compari-
sons made not on a strictly like-for-like basis, with consequent variability in
results. The World Christian Handbook reported just under 37,000 ‘ordained
staff ’ in Britain’s Protestant Churches in 1957 and 1967 but an inexplicably much
smaller number in 1962.20 The first edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia
in 1982 contained no aggregate figure for United Kingdom clergy alone.21

18
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 196–212.
19
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 199, 201.
20
Bingle and Grubb, World Christian Handbook, 1957 Edition, 13–14; Coxill and Grubb,
World Christian Handbook, 1962 Edition, 208–10; Coxill and Grubb, World Christian Handbook,
1968, 194–5.
21
However, there was a figure for full-time Christian personnel: Barrett, World Christian
Encyclopedia, 803.
192 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 8.4 Estimated number of clergy, ministers, priests, or other full-time religious
leaders by denomination, Great Britain, 1950–80
1950 1960 1970 1980

Groupings
Anglican 15,364 14,407 14,400 12,142
Methodist 3,563 3,464 2,937 2,298
Baptist 2,829 2,951 2,398 2,333
Congregational/Reformed 2,801 2,596 2,451 1,680
Presbyterian 3,493 3,061 2,273 1,925
Independent 3,046 2,987 3,044 1,274
New Churches NA NA 20 156
Pentecostal 652 960 1,362 2,279
Other Trinitarian Protestant 3,113 2,597 2,235 2,040
Roman Catholic 7,690 8,631 8,814 8,297
Orthodox 26 77 108 135
Non-Trinitarian Churches 3,641 6,189 8,083 10,431
Christian sub-total 46,218 47,920 48,125 44,990
Non-Christian faiths NA 814 1,795 3,188
Total 46,218 48,734 49,920 48,178
Major denominations
Church of England 14,095 13,151 13,080 11,053
Church in Wales 920 925 1,004 800
Methodist Church of Great Britain 3,210 3,140 2,690 2,102
Baptist Union of Great Britain 1,907 2,049 1,555 1,386
Congregational Union of England and Wales 2,067 1,899 1,749 NA
United Reformed Church NA NA NA 1,228
Church of Scotland 2,353 2,094 1,754 1,536
Presbyterian Church of Wales 913 759 346 220
Salvation Army 2,893 2,267 1,724 1,451
Roman Catholic Church—England and Wales 6,563 7,159 7,515 7,090
Source: P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition
(London: Christian Research, 1999).

As ever, Peter Brierley did not balk at the task of attempting a more
comprehensive picture, producing a series of estimates during the final quarter
of the twentieth century. There were some (perhaps inevitable) discrepancies
between these,22 so his most recent and most granular statistics have been
summarized in Table 8.4. The basis for his calculations is clearer and more
plausible in some cases than others. For the Church of England, he appears to
have used figures for parochial clergy, which seems sensible. For the Roman

22
These variant data will be found in: Brierley, UK Protestant Missions Handbook, Volume 2,
10–15; idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition, 14–28; Central Statistical Office, Social
Trends, No. 13, 1983 Edition (London: HMSO, 1982), 151; Brierley, UK Christian Handbook,
1985/86 Edition, 110–18; idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88 Edition, 132–48; idem, UK
Christian Handbook, 1989/90 Edition, 144–76; idem, ‘Religion’, 525; idem, Century of British
Christianity, 51–65; Brierley and Hiscock, UK Christian Handbook, 1994/95 Edition, 246–81; and
Brierley and Wraight, UK Christian Handbook, 1996/97 Edition, 240–83.
 Institutional Measures 193

Catholic Church, he seems to have included both secular and regular priests,
which is more debatable; presumably, his rationale for adding in the regulars is
that most of them did provide some pastoral services in churches open to the
public, even though that was not their primary function.23 With regard to the
Free Churches, Brierley’s totals for Methodist ministers (and for those of several
other denominations) only make sense if we assume that they omit retired
ministers, many of whom continued to conduct public worship.24 His figures for
the Salvation Army are also significantly less than those quoted by Currie,
Brierley’s approach, which is again open to dispute, being to isolate the officers
engaged in evangelistic activities and exclude those involved in social work.25
For the Presbyterian Church of Wales, he has followed Currie for 1950 and 1960
but produced implausibly low estimates for 1970 and 1980. Brierley’s data for
non-Christian leaders seem to rest on especially uncertain foundations.
With these non-trivial caveats in mind, it will be seen from Table 8.4 that
there were, in round terms, 46,000 Christian ministers in Britain in 1950,
48,000 in 1960 and 1970, and 45,000 in 1980. Overall, for a period of
supposedly rapid religious change, this particular performance indicator did
not swing wildly. Moreover, for all the contemporary talk about a crisis in
ministerial morale, and notwithstanding the relatively modest remuneration,
vocation to the full-time ministry among those already in it remained quite
strong. In a 1976 survey by Money Which?, clergymen emerged as the lowest-
paid job, with an average annual salary of £2,500 compared with a national
figure for all occupations of £5,800 (presumably, the benefit of free ministerial
housing was not taken into the reckoning). However, clergymen were the
group most likely to say they were very satisfied with their job, 58 per cent
against the national mean of 24 per cent. Similarly, they were the group most
likely to indicate they would choose the same occupation if they were starting
their working life all over again: 86 per cent versus 64 per cent nationally. They
were also most likely to think they would continue with their present job even
if they were to win £250,000 on the football pools: 89 per cent compared with
53 per cent for all forms of employment.26
Nevertheless, changes were afoot and these affected some denominations
more than others. This is illustrated in Table 8.5, also derived from Brierley’s
research, and which relates the numbers of members and ministers to produce

23
The number of secular priests alone in English and Welsh dioceses was 4,356 in 1958 and
4,469 in 1980: A. E. C. W. Spencer, ed., Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community of England
& Wales, 1958–2005, Volume 1: Population and Vital Statistics, Pastoral Services, Evangelisation,
and Education (Taunton: Russell-Spencer, 2007), 100.
24
For the Methodists, see Table 8.6. For the Free Churches generally, Brierley’s figures for
1980 are invariably much lower than appear in Free Church Federal Council Annual Report
(1981), 28.
25
Brierley, Century of British Christianity, 60.
26
‘How You Rate Your Jobs’, Money Which? (1977): 489–93.
194 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 8.5 Members per minister, major denominations, Great Britain, 1950–80
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Church of England 210 219 218 201 196 159 164

Methodist Church 160 165 160 158 153 144 139
Baptist Unions of Great Britain, Wales, 175 165 152 138 134 133 121
and Scotland
Congregational Unions of England and 177 180 191 195 178 171 150
Wales and Scotland and Union of
Welsh Independents
Church of Scotland 540 588 621 635 658 656 621
Presbyterian Church of Wales 175 179 181 185 312 341 377
Roman Catholic Churches in England 456 471 506 524 553 612 665
and Wales and Scotland
Source: P. W. Brierley, A Century of British Christianity: Historical Statistics, 1900–1985 (Bromley: MARC
Europe, 1989), 53, 55, 58, 61.

a crude index of ministerial workload. As we have noted in Chapter 3, the

concept of membership is not consistent across denominations, so care should
be taken in making interdenominational comparisons. However, use of the
index is appropriate over time within denominations and demonstrates that,
among the four Protestant bodies which were concentrated in England, the
rate of membership decline was faster than for ministers; therefore, ministerial
workloads could be said to have eased somewhat. In the principal Presbyterian
Churches of Wales and Scotland, by contrast, workloads grew. For the Pres-
byterian Church of Wales, the scale of the increase is magnified by Brierley’s
underestimation of ministers, noted earlier. In the Church of Scotland, outflows
from the ministry regularly exceeded inflows, accompanied by a marked nega-
tive skew in age distribution.27 The steepest rise in the index was experienced by
Roman Catholic priests, particularly in England and Wales, where growth in the
Catholic population outstripped clerical manpower. The situation was exacer-
bated by the expanding proportion of retired secular priests, up from just 3 per
cent of the total in 1958 to 9 per cent by 1980.28
Developments can be examined in greatest detail in the Church of England.29
According to Brierley’s figures (Table 8.4), which differ a little from the

27
J. N. Wolfe and M. Pickford, The Church of Scotland: An Economic Survey (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1980), 154–65.
28
Spencer, Digest of Statistics, 100. Age profiles of priests can be found in Spencer, Digest of
Statistics, 112–13 and in Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, A Time for
Building: Report of the Joint Working Party on Pastoral Strategy (Abbots Langley: Catholic
Information Services, [?1977]), 43.
29
For background on the Church of England ministry in the 1960s and 1970s, see L. Paul, The
Deployment and Payment of the Clergy: A Report (London: Church Information Office, 1964);
idem, A Church by Daylight: A Reappraisement of the Church of England and its Future (London:
Geoffrey Chapman, 1973), 165–75, 209–29; S. Ranson, A. Bryman, and C. R. Hinings, Clergy,
Ministers, and Priests (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); R. C. Towler and A. P. M. Coxon,
 Institutional Measures 195

Church’s returns, there were 22 per cent fewer parochial clergy in 1980 than in
1950 and 16 per cent less than in 1960, notwithstanding English population
growth of 10 per cent over the three decades. The decline is explained by
a combination of diminished recruitment and more retirements. Whereas
during the quinquennium 1959–63 the average number of deacons ordained
into the stipendiary ministry had been 601 per annum, by 1976–80 it was half
that level (301). Similarly, while ordinations in 1959–63 surpassed retirements
by 85 per cent, in 1976–80 retirements exceeded ordinations by 57 per cent.30
Although the average age of stipendiary parochial clergy was the same
(49 years) in 1980 as it had been in 1963, this was only because there had
been simultaneous reductions in those under 40 and over 65 which had
cancelled each other out.31
Relative to burgeoning professional opportunities in the secular world,
which commanded greater status, better pay and conditions, and securer
institutional futures, the Church of England struggled to attract the requisite
number and calibre of candidates to be its clergy of the future. Unwilling to
contemplate much of the radical agenda for reform outlined in the Paul
Report (1964), the Church had to resort to other palliative measures, such as
the use of non-stipendiary ministry, officially recognized in 1970.32 Yet, as
the outcome of the General Synod debate in 1978 showed, it was not yet
ready to contemplate the ordination of women.33 This was despite adoption
of the practice in other parts of the Anglican Communion in the 1970s, as
well as by the major Free Churches,34 and its overwhelming popularity
in Britain, approved by 81 per cent of the general public, 85 per cent of

The Fate of the Anglican Clergy: A Sociological Study (London: Macmillan, 1979); and A. Russell,
The Clerical Profession (London: SPCK, 1980), 261–306.
30
Neuss, Facts and Figures, 44, 51; Central Board of Finance of the Church of England,
Statistical Supplement to the Church of England Yearbook, 1981 (London: CIO Publishing, 1981),
16–17; idem, Church Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about the Church of England, 1987
(London: Central Board of Finance, 1987), 7.
31
Neuss, Facts and Figures, 20; Brierley, ‘Religion’, 546; Central Board of Finance of the
Church of England, Statistical Supplement to the Church of England Yearbook, 1981, 6.
32
A history (by P. H. Vaughan) of non-stipendiary ministry in the Church of England forms
part of M. Hodge, Non-Stipendiary Ministry in the Church of England (London: CIO Publishing,
1983), 9–24. See also W. H. Saumarez Smith, An Honorary Ministry (London: Advisory Council
for the Church’s Ministry, 1977), a survey of the first non-stipendiary ministers.
33
For the history of Anglican debates on the ordination of women, see S. Gill, Women and the
Church of England: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (London: SPCK, 1994), 232–76.
34
Female (and male) Free Church ministers were surveyed by P. Jarvis, ‘A Profession in
Process: The Relationship Between Occupational Ideology, Occupational Position, and the Role
Strain, Satisfaction, and Commitment of Protestant and Reformed Ministers of Religion’ (PhD
thesis, Aston University, 1977); idem, ‘Job Satisfaction and the Protestant and Reformed
Ministry’, Research Bulletin, University of Birmingham Institute for the Study of Worship and
Religious Architecture (1978): 36–55; and idem, ‘Men and Women Ministers of Religion’,
Modern Churchman, New Series 22 (1979): 149–58.
196 Secularization in the Long 1960s
Table 8.6 Methodist ministers, Great Britain, 1955–80
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

Active ministers and probationers 3,414 3,448 3,408 2,975 NA NA

Supernumeraries 1,199 1,169 1,030 1,047 NA NA
All ministers 4,613 4,617 4,438 4,022 3,768 3,506
Members per minister 161 159 158 153 144 139
Ministers received on trial 122 86 55 42 49 53
Ministers received in full connexion 68 100 76 76 55 51
Ministers becoming supernumeraries 75 66 61 95 99 81
Ministers died 94 93 95 77 81 61

Note: The split between active ministers and supernumeraries in 1970 has been estimated on the basis of the
proportions in 1972.
Source: Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church.

professing Anglicans, and 77 per cent of Anglicans attending church once a

month or more.35
The experience of the Methodist Church (Table 8.6) was very similar to that
of the Church of England, with the notable exception that it did accept the
ordination of women in 1973, the first ordinations taking place in 1974, the
pre-existing Wesley Deaconess Order providing a natural pool of talent. Given
the tradition of itinerant female ministry in two early nineteenth-century
Methodist denominations, the move might have been expected to have
taken place much earlier, but it was inhibited by the eventually abortive
Anglican–Methodist Conversations on possible reunion.36 Nevertheless,
when it came, the advent of women presbyters could only blunt, but not
prevent, a reduction of 24 per cent in the number of Methodist ministers
between 1955 and 1980, the major fall occurring from the late 1960s. This was
10 points less than the decline in Methodist membership, the ratio of members
to ministers consequently improving from 161:1 to 139:1. The downturn was
first visible in ministers received on trial, prior to theological training, a cause
of concern to Conference (the Methodist Church’s governing body) as early
as 1953–5 and eventually necessitating college mergers and closures.37
Candidates offering for the ministry in the 1960s were 41 per cent fewer than

35
NOP, 1978, unpublished (covered in headline in Church Times, 1 September 1978;
Christian World, 7 September 1978). Comparable results were obtained by Marplan in 1979:
B. Clements, ‘Changing Attitudes towards Gender Equality and the Ordination of Women’,
Modern Believing 55 (2014): 16–21 at 17–18.
36
J. Field-Bibb, Women towards Priesthood: Ministerial Politics and Feminist Praxis (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7–66; E. D. Graham, Saved to Serve: The Story of the
Wesley Deaconess Order, 1890–1978 (Peterborough: Methodist Publishing House, 2002),
390–412.
37
Brake, Policy and Politics in British Methodism, 233–87.
 Institutional Measures 197

in the 1950s and those accepted 38 per cent less.38 This trend then translated
into a decrease in ministers received in full connexion (after training and
probation), who, by the 1970s, were no longer offsetting losses through
retirement. From the same point, ministers superannuating exceeded those
who died, in seeming confirmation of the claim for ‘long-living Methodists’.39
In all Christian denominations, ordained ministers were supplemented
to a greater or lesser degree by the voluntary labours of lay officials. In the
Protestant tradition the single most ubiquitous and numerous of these offices
had formerly been that of Sunday school teacher. As we noted in Chapter 2,
with the Sunday school movement in deep recession by the 1960s, metrics
about it (including returns of teachers) were decreasingly collected and pub-
lished. However, the scale of decline was exemplified in the Methodist Church,
the second largest provider of Sunday schools after the Church of England,
where the number of Sunday school teachers slumped from 127,000 in 1955,
equivalent to one member in six (albeit many teachers were adherents rather
than members), to 85,000 when last recorded in 1966.40 Similarly, the Church
of Scotland lost more than one-quarter of its teachers between 1957 (when
there were 41,200) and 1973 (30,500).41 It seems probable that the growing
shortage of teachers was an important contributory cause of the decline in
Sunday scholars.
Besides this common denominator role of Sunday school teacher, most
bodies had more specific auxiliary lay functionaries. In the Church of England,
licensed reader was the main office, with 6,581 in post in 1963 and 6,791 in
1980.42 In the Free Churches, lay preachers filled many pulpits on Sundays, the
total reducing by one-third between 1960 and 1980, from 30,690 to 20,750.43
The vast majority were in the Methodist Church, which would have been
incapable of operating without their services, especially in the countryside; the
number of fully accredited Methodist local preachers fell by 33 per cent in the
1960s and 1970s (from 22,300 in 1960 to 14,850 in 1980) and of preachers ‘on
trial’ by 55 per cent.44 On one reading of rather more ambiguous statistics, the

38
B. E. Jones, ‘Another Decade of Methodism: Facts and Figures about British Methodism,
with Special Reference to the Sixties (1960–70)’ (1971, unpublished), 29.
39
C. D. Field, ‘Long-Living Methodists’, British Religion in Numbers, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/
2010/long-living-methodists/>; idem, ‘Demography and the Decline of British Methodism:
III. Mortality’, Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society 58 (2011–12): 247–63.
40
Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church (1956), 94, (1967), 110.
41
Wolfe and Pickford, Church of Scotland, 175–6.
42
Neuss, Facts and Figures, 52; Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Statistical
Supplement to the Church of England Yearbook, 1982 (London: CIO Publishing, 1982), 21.
43
Free Church Federal Council Annual Report (1961), 27, (1981), 28.
44
Minutes of the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church (1951), 196–7, (1961), 120–1,
(1981), 48; Jones, ‘Another Decade of Methodism’, 31; Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches
and Churchgoers, 206; Brierley, Century of British Christianity, 53; idem, ed., UK Christian
Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 2000/01 Millennium Edition (London: Christian Research,
1999), 9.11.
198 Secularization in the Long 1960s

decrease in Baptist lay preachers was at least one-half over the same period.45
Deacons or elders were also important in Baptist churches, as in the Church of
Scotland, where there were actually 17 per cent more elders in 1973 than in
1957, albeit this rise was substantially in compensation for the increasing
proportion of elders who were inactive through age or infirmity, elders
being ordained for life.46 By contrast, the 44 per cent growth in lay catechists
in the Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales between 1969 and 1980
can probably be seen as a more genuine trend towards greater use of lay
ministry, doubly significant in that 83 per cent of these catechists in 1980 were
women, at a time when the Church was resolutely opposed to female priests.47
As well as at home, ministry and laity worked alongside each other on the
overseas mission field. Despite the dismantling of the British Empire, and the
emergence of ‘reverse mission’ (whereby overseas nationals embarked on
evangelism in Britain),48 there remained a strong (if diminishing) commit-
ment to foreign missions, with 200 British societies active, half Protestant and
half Catholic. A full picture of their outreach is not available for the 1960s, but
from the 1970s the UK Christian Handbook, edited by Peter Brierley, is a
major source, mostly based upon information supplied by the missionary
societies with estimates calculated by Brierley for missing data. This can be
supplemented after 1979 by annual Catholic returns by the National Mission-
ary Council of England and Wales (later the Catholic Missionary Union)
which were published in Our Missionaries.
Brierley’s profiles of all missionary personnel are summarized in Table 8.7,
which reveal that Protestant and Catholic societies combined still employed
10,800 people in 1982, of whom 5,800 were abroad at any one time. The
Protestant data suggest a downward trend in absolute numbers, together
with a slight reduction in those serving abroad (from 57 per cent in 1972 to
52 per cent in 1982) and an increase in retirees (from 12 per cent to 20 per
cent). Short-term as opposed to the traditional career missionaries also made
an appearance, accounting for 31 per cent of the total by 1982.49 A majority
(55 per cent) of missionaries in 1982 was female, 56 per cent of Protestants
and 53 per cent of Catholics, reflecting the opportunities which overseas
mission afforded for Christian service when women were still largely barred

45
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers, 210–11; Brierley, Century of
British Christianity, 58; idem, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 9.4.
46
Wolfe and Pickford, Church of Scotland, 175–6.
47
Spencer, Digest of Statistics, 119.
48
Barrett (World Christian Encyclopedia, 709) cites statistics for 1973 of ‘foreign missionaries
and personnel (aliens from abroad)’.
49
Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition, 32; Brierley and Wraight, UK Christian
Handbook, 1996/97 Edition, 506; P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends,
No. 1, 1998/99 Edition (London: Christian Research, 1997), 3.9; idem, UK Christian Handbook,
Religious Trends, No. 2, 3.7.
 Institutional Measures 199
Table 8.7 Overseas missionary society personnel, Great Britain, 1972–82
Protestant Protestant Protestant Protestant Catholic Total
1972 1976 1980 1982 1982 1982

Abroad 5,300 5,212 4,416 4,617 1,202 5,819

Furlough/home leave 800 579 492 443 172 615
Secondments 100 70 60 89 0 89
UK executive staff 800 797 476 504 409 913
UK office staff 700 688 823 1,022 40 1,062
Associates 500 327 266 432 55 487
Retired 1,100 1,178 1,427 1,740 71 1,811
Total 9,300 8,851 7,960 8,847 1,949 10,796
Sources: P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1982), 29;
idem, ed., UK Christian Handbook, 1985/86 Edition (London: Evangelical Alliance, 1984), 275; idem, ed.,
UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88 Edition (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1986), 331; idem, ed., UK Christian
Handbook, 1989/90 Edition (Bromley: MARC Europe, 1988), 431; idem, ‘Religion’, in A. H. Halsey, ed.,
British Social Trends since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure of Britain (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1988), 518–60 at 556.

from the ordained ministry at home.50 More than half (54 per cent) of
Protestant missionaries in 1982 served with interdenominational societies,
22 per cent with Anglican ones, 15 per cent with other denominational
agencies, while 9 per cent were sent directly by individual places of worship,
particularly by the Brethren.51 Indeed, relative to the size of their membership,
Brethren and Baptists punched well above their weight in recruiting mission-
aries.52 Even in 1982, Africa remained the principal mission field, where 40 per
cent of all missionaries were deployed (including 52 per cent of Catholics), but
Protestants had begun shifting resources towards Europe, which accounted for
one-fifth of missionaries and where Catholics already had 26 per cent of their
overseas personnel.53

50
P. W. Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Volume 1: Overseas (London: Evangelical Missionary
Alliance, 1980), 10; Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition, 12–13, 32–3.
51
P. W. Brierley, ed., UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 3, 2002/2003 (London:
Christian Research, 2001), 3.3. The figures in this source exclude Roman Catholic missionaries
serving in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom Salvation Army officers serving in other
countries. They thus supersede earlier versions to be found in Brierley and Wraight, UK
Christian Handbook, 1996/97 Edition, 503; Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends,
No. 1, 3.5; and Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Religious Trends, No. 2, 3.2.
52
Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition, 35.
53
Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition, 31; idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1985/86
Edition, 277; idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1987/88 Edition, 333; idem, UK Christian Hand-
book, 1989/90 Edition, 433; P. W. Brierley and D. Longley, eds., UK Christian Handbook, 1992/93
Edition (London: MARC Europe, 1991), 441. Another source suggested that 72 per cent of
Catholic missionaries from England and Wales laboured in Africa in 1982: National Missionary
Council of England and Wales, Our Missionaries, 1989 (London: Mission Secretariat for Catholic
Missionary Education Centre, 1989), 55.
200 Secularization in the Long 1960s

RELIGIOUS F INANCE

Paradoxically, of all religious performance indicators, measures of institution-

al financial well-being, although at one level numerous and by definition
statistical, are the most difficult to quantify and assess in the aggregate. They
have also invariably been neglected by historians and sociologists writing
about religious change in modern Britain. This is notwithstanding the chal-
lenge thrown down by Bryan Wilson, the arch-exponent of secularization
theory, who envisaged the willingness to invest in religious bodies as, poten-
tially, the ultimate test of their acceptability. In the published version of his
1974 Riddell Lectures, and with Britain clearly in mind, he wrote:
Religious economics is a neglected field, but it can readily be stated that the
proportion of the Gross National Product devoted to the supernatural has
diminished in the course of the centuries. If one took this argument further and
compared tribal societies with advanced societies, the disproportion would be
even greater. It is a plausible hypothesis that the more developed the economic
techniques of a society, and the more affluent its circumstances, the lower the
proportion of its productive wealth will be devoted to the supernatural. If that
hypothesis is not disconfirmed, it might be taken as our best indicator of
secularization, showing what man chooses to do with his resources, his energies,
and, by implication, his time.54
The lack of scholarly attention paid to British religious finance may perhaps
partly be explained by the subject’s limited intellectual appeal and the per-
ceived requirement for accounting skills in order to study it. However, the
principal obstacle to its exploration lies in the diversity, complexity, and
incompleteness of the evidence base. Overviews of ecclesiastical finance were
rarely attempted, apparently limited in the 1960s and 1970s to a tabulation by
the Wells Group of the income of major Christian Churches in 1973.
A simplified version of the Group’s data appears in Table 8.8, but even the
compilers acknowledged it to be rather ‘arbitrary’, with ‘many unsupported
and probably some very erroneous assumptions and estimates’.55
The dearth of such overviews reflected the difficulties in assembling them,
for no Church had a truly consolidated set of accounts covering all its
activities. Records, often employing differing accounting conventions and
terminology, were maintained at national, regional, and local levels of the
particular denomination, while investment and trust funds were separately

54
B. R. Wilson, Contemporary Transformations of Religion (London: Oxford University
Press, 1976), 25.
55
D. Perman, Change and the Churches: An Anatomy of Religion in Britain (London: Bodley
Head, 1977), 160–1. Regrettably, it has proved impossible to locate a copy of the original report:
Wells Group, A 1973 Supplemental Edition of the 1971 Wells Collection of UK Charitable Giving
Reports (London: Wells Group, 1973).
 Institutional Measures 201
Table 8.8 Estimated income of major Christian Churches, United Kingdom, 1973
Income from Income from % income from Mean offering
all sources (£) members’ members’ per member (£)
offerings (£) offerings

Anglican Churches 74,060,000 26,058,000 35 7.82

Methodist Churches 7,842,000 6,180,000 79 9.05
Baptist Churches 2,130,000 2,054,000 96 7.34
Congregational/Reformed 5,015,000 2,432,000 48 8.08
Churches
Presbyterian Churches 15,617,000 11,726,000 75 8.42
Other Protestant Churches 3,243,000 2,585,000 80 5.89
Roman Catholic Churches 20,200,000 15,125,000 75 5.00
Orthodox Churches 200,000 120,000 60 4.80
Total 128,307,000 66,280,000 52 6.99
Source: Wells Group, calculated from D. Perman, Change and the Churches: An Anatomy of Religion in
Britain (London: Bodley Head, 1977), 161.

managed. A multitude of Christian agencies were to be found alongside

the Churches, some fully integrated with them, others more detached and
autonomous, and others interdenominational. The extent to which accounts
were placed in the public domain varied enormously, with the Roman Catholic
Church and many of the sects especially renowned for their secrecy. Where
there was more transparency, denominational directories are a useful first port
of call for specific financial information, supplemented by annual reports filed
with the Charity Commission for England and Wales and (as it now is)
Scottish Charity Regulator and (for agencies) the first two editions of the UK
Christian Handbook, which frequently gave income or turnover for, respect-
ively, 1978 and 1981.56 In making over-time comparisons, statistics naturally
need to be adjusted to allow for the rate of inflation.
As Table 8.8 indicates, a majority of ecclesiastical income derived from
congregational giving, the partial exception being the Church of England,
which relied significantly upon investments and endowments managed by
the Church Commissioners (albeit not to the extent implied by the Wells
Group). After the Second World War concerted efforts were made by most
denominations to augment congregational giving, and to put it on a more
predictable basis, through a range of Christian stewardship initiatives, some-
times effectively outsourced to commercial partners, including the Wells
Group, which ‘put a bomb under the movement’ after its arrival in Britain

56
P. W. Brierley, UK Christian Handbook, Volume 3: Agencies (London: Evangelical Alliance,
1980); idem, UK Christian Handbook, 1983 Edition. UK Christian Handbook data for 1981, 1983,
and 1985 form the basis of D. J. Tidball, Financial Trends in Christian Organisations (Bromley:
MARC Europe, 1987).
202 Secularization in the Long 1960s

in 1955.57 Despite criticisms, these generally appear to have met with initial
success. For example, when Mass-Observation resurveyed places of worship in
Bolton in 1960, it was struck by how much more financially secure they were,
and how much less reliant upon one-off fundraising efforts, than when it had
investigated them in 1937–8.58 Kofi Busia’s survey of the financial arrange-
ments of churches in a Birmingham suburb in 1963–4 also highlighted the
increased dependence upon Christian stewardship.59
However, progress was undermined by inflationary pressures from the late
1960s, fairly modest at first but very steep after the commencement of the
oil crisis in 1973, the latter accompanied by a general economic downturn,
including rising unemployment and industrial strife. When David Perman,
journalist turned radio producer, took stock of the state of Church finances in
1977, crisis was a recurring theme: inflation was a ‘veritable hurricane of
change which has swept through all denominations, flattening long-standing
values and structures which will possibly never stand upright again’.60 The
recession likewise affected the income from investments, many of which were
simultaneously requiring to be reviewed on ethical grounds, not least those in
South Africa (which had become ‘tainted’ by association with apartheid).61
These general trends can be fleshed out through case studies of the Church of
England and the Church of Scotland.
Financial arrangements and outcomes in the Church of England were
outlined in a series of reports by the Church itself,62 but they were also subject
to independent academic scrutiny by Richard Laughlin in the early 1980s.63

57
See the account of stewardship in P. Ferris, The Church of England, revised edn.
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), 212–22.
58
T. Harrisson, Britain Revisited (London: Victor Gollancz, 1961), 78, 83–4.
59
K. A. Busia, Urban Churches in Britain: A Question of Relevance (London: Lutterworth
Press, 1966), 78–86.
60
Perman, Change and the Churches, 146 and, more generally, 146–68.
61
For a brief introduction to the history of ethical investment and the British Churches, see
N. Kreander, K. McPhail, and D. Molyneaux, ‘God’s Fund Managers: A Critical Study of Stock
Market Investment Practices of the Church of England and UK Methodists’, Accounting,
Auditing, and Accountability Journal 17 (2004): 408–41 at 409–12. For a case study of the ethics
of investment in relation to the Church Commissioners during the 1970s and 1980s, see
Chandler, Church of England, 163–71, 271–84, 299–312.
62
Particularly those prepared by the Joint Liaison Committee of the Central Board of Finance
and the Church Commissioners, established in 1977: A Resourceful Church? A Report on the
Finances of the Church of England, 1976–1979 (London: Church Information Office, 1978); A
Giving Church? A Report on the Finances of the Church of England, 1978–1981 (London: CIO
Publishing, 1980); and A Responding Church: The Finances of the Church of England, 1980–1983
(London: Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, 1982).
63
R. C. Laughlin, ‘The Design of Accounting Systems: A General Theory, with an Empirical
Study of the Church of England’ (PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 1984); idem, ‘Accounting in
its Social Context: An Analysis of the Accounting Systems of the Church of England’, Account-
ing, Auditing, and Accountability Journal 1 (1988): 19–42; idem, ‘A Model of Financial
Accountability and the Church of England’, Financial Accountability and Management 6
(1990): 93–114.
 Institutional Measures 203

In brief, the Church had four main financial units at that time: Church
Commissioners; Central Board of Finance; dioceses; and parishes. Collectively,
they generated a total income of £78 million in 1973 and £255 million in 1983,
overwhelmingly derived from giving in the parishes (54 per cent in 1983) or
investments by the Church Commissioners (30 per cent), the balance coming
from other investments or income earned in the parishes (such as fees for
conducting rites of passage). A growing proportion of this income (14 per cent
in 1973 and 42 per cent in 1983) was recycled internally between these
four units. Transfers from parishes to dioceses and the Central Board of
Finance rose most notably, from 9 per cent of total income in 1964 to
10 per cent in 1973 and 34 per cent in 1983. An increasing amount of
expenditure was ministry-related (48 per cent in 1973, 54 per cent in 1983),
and a decreasing share (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively) was on
worship and buildings, the remainder being absorbed in administrative costs
or gifts beyond the Church. More than nine-tenths of expenditure was on
activities at parochial level.
Unpacking the statistics, Table 8.9 summarizes the ordinary annual income
of parochial church councils in England between 1964 and 1980, expressed,
not in cash terms, but as an index (with 1964 as the base), in order to facilitate
comparison with the Retail Price Index (RPI) as a scale of inflation. Four
incremental measures of income are shown, whose scope is defined in the
notes to Table 8.9, each of which constantly lagged behind RPI, with an
ever widening gap. The purchasing power of the Church of England in
the parishes was thus diminished, necessitating cut-backs in activity or
draw-downs on reserves. Individual giving was particularly affected, the

Table 8.9 Ordinary annual income of Church of England parochial church councils,
indexed (1964 = 100), 1964–80
Planned giving Direct giving Voluntary income Total income Retail Price Index

1964 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1966 103.4 103.3 106.0 107.4 108.8
1968 102.6 103.9 110.7 114.4 116.8
1970 103.9 105.9 110.4 119.4 131.0
1973 121.5 127.3 134.1 147.9 167.6
1976 181.1 190.1 206.0 221.7 281.5
1978 233.2 242.6 261.4 275.5 353.2
1980 337.7 344.4 363.4 388.5 472.6

Notes: Planned giving = net covenants and uncovenanted planned giving; direct giving = planned giving plus
church collections and boxes; voluntary income = direct giving plus income tax on covenants, net proceeds
from gift days, fetes, and bazaars, net profits from magazines and bookstalls, and sundry donations; total
(ordinary) income = voluntary income plus fees, dividends, and interest, net surplus on church halls and
property, trust income, and grants.
Source: Central Board of Finance of the Church of England, Church Statistics: Some Facts and Figures about
the Church of England, 1983 Edition (London: CIO Publishing, 1983), 25.
204 Secularization in the Long 1960s

proportion of ordinary parochial income accounted for by planned giving

dropping from 42 per cent in 1964 to 37 per cent in 1980, and from 68 per cent
to 60 per cent in the case of all direct giving. These declines can be explained
by the amount of giving falling behind the increase in personal incomes
(through wage rises) and by an absolute reduction in the number of Anglican
members and attenders. Planned giving subscribers climbed from 752,000 in
1956 to a peak of 1,155,000 in 1964, before descending steadily to 891,000 in
1980; they never represented more than half the names on the Church of
England electoral rolls.64
Degrees of giving varied considerably by diocese, a phenomenon explored
by J. F. Pickering in the early 1980s, who used multiple regression analysis to
isolate the determinants of variability, which he identified as ‘economic
factors, the effects of “mission”, the level of involvement by the local commu-
nity in the life of the Church, and the level of historic resources available to a
diocese’. These findings he deemed consistent with an underlying economic
model of consumer behaviour and with other studies concerning the low
income elasticity of charitable giving.65
The financial position of the Church of Scotland was also subject to
academic evaluation by two economists in 1972–7, albeit their project was
funded by the Church and overseen by a steering committee drawn from the
Church. Their principal published output, a book of 457 pages incorporating
141 tables and 29 figures, comprised both an historical review of all aspects
of the Church’s finances (with special reference to 1960–75) and a series of
forecasts and recommendations designed to enhance its prospects, including
identification of £33.1 million of savings (at 1975 prices) which could poten-
tially be realized between 1976 and 1985.66 The overwhelming impression left
by the book, yet not articulated by its authors, is of the difference of scale
between the Church of Scotland and the Church of England. Membership of
the former was about half or two-thirds that of the latter, depending upon
which Anglican membership criterion is used (electoral rolls or communi-
cants), but the financial disparity was much greater. Total Church of Scotland
income in 1975 was only £17.6 million, scarcely one-third that of Anglican
parochial church councils at the same time, without factoring in the Church of
England’s other substantial sources of revenue.

64
Data for 1956–62 can be found in Neuss, Facts and Figures, 73.
65
J. F. Pickering, ‘Giving in the Church of England: An Econometric Analysis’, Applied
Economics 17 (1985): 619–32. Diocesan variations were also highlighted by J. Smallwood, Slothful
Stewards? Giving in the Church of England, 1978, 1980, 1982—An Analysis and Commentary on
National and Diocesan Progress (Brockham: the author, [1985]).
66
Wolfe and Pickford, Church of Scotland. The ensuing paragraphs mainly draw on their
chapters on income and expenditure (98–153). For a local study of Church of Scotland finance,
see the second volume of J. F. Kirk, ‘A Comparative Statistical Analysis of the Churches of the
Presbytery of Edinburgh from 1960 to 1974’, 2 vols. (PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1978).
 Institutional Measures 205

Around seven-tenths of the Church of Scotland’s income derived from its

congregations, particularly from the liberality of its members through the
collection plate and covenants, while the remainder came from donations,
grants, trusts, bequests, investments, and feuduties (analogous to a tax on
land) received by the Church’s general treasurer and usually disbursed via the
Church’s central departments. Although the overall proportion of income
attributed to congregations was fairly constant during the period, there was
a relative decline in ordinary income after 1971 and a greater dependence
upon non-recurrent sources. In real terms, adjusting for RPI, total income of
the Church fell by 15 per cent between 1948 and 1953, rose by 50 per cent
from 1953 to 1967, and declined steadily after 1967 (by 13 per cent until 1975),
apart from an upturn in 1973. This decrease coincided with, and was materi-
ally caused by, an accelerated reduction of communicant numbers from 1967,
which we noted in Chapter 3, as well as by the unsteady growth in real
personal disposable income resulting from the adverse economic climate.
Expenditure in the Church of Scotland was divided between three agencies:
congregations (for which no firm data are available); the Church and Ministry
Department (responsible for the stipends and expenses of ministers); and the
committees in the Mission and Service Fund (with a brief for the Church’s
outreach beyond the parishes). Expenditure peaked in real terms in 1968, one
year after income, with the Mission and Service Fund subsequently facing
the greatest challenges. Notwithstanding mounting financial pressures, the
Church as a whole achieved a small surplus of income over expenditure in
most years (averaging less than 1 per cent), except for deficits in 1964–6
stemming from a church building programme. These surpluses were achieved
through belt-tightening, not least the merging of congregations and the
shrinking of the ministerial workforce, alluded to earlier in this chapter.
 9

Conclusion

The preceding seven chapters have scrutinized the principal quantitative

indicators of British religion during the 1960s and 1970s. A summative
assessment of the evidence is now appropriate, relating the conclusions to
the ongoing historiographical debate about the nature and chronology of
secularization in modern Britain. In particular, it will be important to test
the two key elements of Callum Brown’s interpretation of religious develop-
ments in the long 1960s: that Britain underwent a process of ‘revolutionary’
secularization, with 1963 the definitive turning-point; and that gender was its
fundamental cause, with a simultaneous depietization of femininity and defem-
inization of piety. We will not be addressing Brown’s subsidiary argument,
about a preceding religious revival in the aftermath of the Second World War,
which has been substantively considered, and largely rebutted, elsewhere.1 The
summation will proceed through a recapitulation of the findings for each of
the four genres of religious statistical measures (belonging, behaving, believ-
ing, and institutional), cross-referencing tables but not textual analysis and
commentary, and without rehearsing again methodological issues surround-
ing particular sources. Finally, an attempt will be made to produce a religious
balance-sheet of the 1960s and 1970s, showing where this period fits into the
overall picture of Britain’s secularization history.

BELONGING

In terms of religious profession, the position nationally was remarkably stable

during the 1960s and 1970s, as recorded in the standard opinion poll question
(‘what is your religion?’ or variants thereon) in Tables 2.1 and 2.3. The
Anglican market share remained at three-fifths, the Free Churches lost some
ground, the Roman Catholics gained some, and the proportion of religious

1
C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging, Behaving, and Believing
in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
 Conclusion 207

nones stayed at well under one-tenth, not rising above it until the late 1980s.
There was inevitably some fluctuation at community level (Table 2.7).
Belonging-type questions, first introduced in the 1970s, took nones up to
one-quarter of the population and particularly reduced the Anglican share
(Tables 2.2 and 2.4). However, there is no reason to think that, had this
formulation been used in previous decades, the results would have been
significantly different.
Rearrangement of BSA data for 1983–2008 by respondents’ years of birth
and cohorts also identified no period effect for the 1960s but a steadier pattern
of growth in no religionism over time. This is consistent with a progressive,
rather than revolutionary, chronology of secularization and with an intergen-
erational causation of the decline in religious allegiance. The National Survey
of Health and Development panel confirmed that the majority of those
disaffiliating from religion in the 1960s were men, not women, although it
did suggest that the flight from faith was particularly associated with youth.
Both these demographic traits were revealed in Gallup polls (Table 2.6). It is
important to note that, as documented in the chapters on behaving and
believing, nones were not wholly irreligious, minorities expressing belief in
God, attending church occasionally, and so forth.
National self-rating measures of the personal saliency of religion only
became available from the late 1960s. They do not suggest that any catastrophic
collapse in individual religiosity was occurring in these years, the tipping-
point for these indicators seemingly coming in the 1990s. During the 1970s,
Britons were roughly evenly divided between those who regarded religion as
important and those who did not, with those judging it very important
numbering only about one-quarter (Table 2.8). There was a similar division
between those who considered themselves religious or not, albeit the self-
described very religious numbered less than one in ten. Religion did not
appear to have had a significant impact on everyday life, to judge from a series
of Advertising Association polls for 1972–84, which showed it was a regular
topic of conversation for a diminishing minority of people and also not a topic
about which strong opinions were held.
Church membership statistics are hard to aggregate on account of differing
denominational criteria of membership, but none of the series point to a
marked 1963 effect. This was even the case in Scotland (Table 2.11), where
much of Brown’s research has been conducted, and which had by far the
highest per capita church membership of any of the three home nations,
England having the lowest (Table 2.10). Peter Brierley’s overall figures for
the United Kingdom (Table 2.9) pinpoint the early 1970s, not the early
1960s, as the quinquennium with the heaviest absolute and relative falls in
church membership, but they also underline the fact that, even in the 1950s
(when Brown argues religion was in the ascendancy), three-quarters of
British adults were not church members. From this perspective, the 1960s
208 Secularization in the Long 1960s

and 1970s could hardly be regarded as the transition from a ‘religious’ to a

‘secular’ society.
The totals naturally conceal some denominational diversity. Relative decline
for the mainstream Protestant Churches had mostly long pre-dated the 1960s.
Scotland apart, it also often started from a low initial baseline (as a proportion
of the relevant population). This was especially true of the Church of
England’s two main membership criteria, Easter communicants and electoral
rolls, the ostensibly dramatic fall in the latter during the 1970s being linked to
the introduction of tighter arrangements in 1972. The absolute reduction in
Anglican communicants between 1960 and 1980 was around one-quarter
(Table 3.1), but more ominous in terms of the future was the virtual halving
of confirmands from 1955 to 1980, with particularly heavy losses in the late
1960s (Table 3.2). The traditional Free Churches also experienced substantial
decreases in their memberships over the same quarter-century, mostly
from the late 1960s (Table 3.6). This was by around one-third in the case of
the Methodists, Baptists, and Salvation Army, but approached one-half for
the Congregational and Reformed cluster of denominations and for Welsh
Nonconformity. The reduction for Scottish Presbyterians was 27 per cent,
with the Church of Scotland suffering accelerating losses from 1967. The
inability to recruit new members and rising mortality, as existing members
aged, were major factors behind these declines. An excess of deaths over births
and a top-heavy age pyramid, coupled with emigration to Israel, similarly
explained the contraction in the Jewish population from its all-time peak in
the early 1950s; by the mid-1970s, Muslims had overtaken Jews as Britain’s
largest non-Christian community.
To many commentators, the developing membership malaise in leading
Protestant Churches had been foreshadowed by the recession in the Sunday
school movement, which was widely regarded as both a vital mechanism for
the religious socialization of children and as a stepping-stone for eventual
church membership (even though all the evidence pointed to its poor track
record as a recruitment agency, the rate of attrition being huge). This recession
was already in full swing by the start of the 1960s. The number of Sunday
scholars had failed to keep pace with population increase since the 1880s,
although this relative decline was only modest until after the First World War.
Considerable ground was lost between the wars, especially during the 1930s,
and the movement was further disrupted by the evacuation of children during
the Second World War.
The post-war ‘baby boom’ (most pronounced in 1946–8) had held out the
prospect of resurgence, and there was, in reality, some absolute growth in
many Free Church and Presbyterian Sunday schools for a few years. Rapid and
continuous decline then ensued from the late 1950s, even though there was a
further spurt in the crude birth rate in the early 1960s. According to Peter
Brierley, the proportion of scholars relative to the under-15 population
 Conclusion 209

slumped by two-thirds between 1955 and 1980 (when Sunday schools had
often been rebranded as junior church), from 30 per cent to 9 per cent
(Table 2.12). This was notwithstanding that the overwhelming majority of
parents in the 1960s and 1970s had attended Sunday school themselves and
still paid lip-service to the importance of sending their own children. Rival
attractions were widely blamed for the collapse of Sunday schools, notably the
advent of television and the big jump in ownership of motor cars, facilitating
family outings on Sundays.
These membership (and pre-membership) losses in one part of the Chris-
tian forest were partly mitigated by gains elsewhere. In terms of baptized
population, the Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales continued its
advance, both absolute and relative (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). However, the pace of
growth slowed from the early 1960s as a result of diminishing fertility (and
hence fewer baptisms), lower immigration from Ireland, more mixed mar-
riages, and fewer converts; there was also an upsurge in ‘leakage’, reflected in
the Sacramental Index (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). The various Orthodox Churches
were growing too, notably in the 1970s, partly through conversions but
principally on the back of immigration. Immigration similarly fuelled the
rapid expansion in Pentecostal and Holiness Churches (especially from the
mid-1960s), Churches for overseas nationals, and major world faiths (Islam,
Hinduism, and Sikhism). Other Trinitarian Protestant groups to flourish
included the Fellowship of Independent Evangelical Churches, House
Churches, and New Churches, while Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses
prospered among Non-Trinitarian denominations, the former particularly in
the early 1960s (Table 3.6). Despite their media notoriety, New Religious
Movements gained few members. Also failing to capitalize on the religious
churn of the 1960s and 1970s were the various societies constituting organized
irreligion, whose combined membership never exceeded four figures, a tiny
fraction of those who professed no religion in society at large.
Squaring the circle, sundry calculations of religious community—the num-
ber of people (adults and children) touched by institutional religion in some
way, however tangentially or far removed in time—bring us back to propor-
tions not far short of those revealed by religious profession. Brierley’s esti-
mates (Table 2.13) put religious community as three-quarters of the United
Kingdom population, dropping only four points (from 79 per cent to 75 per cent)
between 1955 and 1980, factoring in non-Christian religions, although
Christian market share dipped by five points from 1960 to 1980. It is likely
that the biggest single loss was of adherents in the Free Churches, who had
been declining rapidly since the First World War yet had far from disappeared
altogether by the 1960s and 1970s. The Church of England was negatively
impacted by the fall in baptisms and confirmations, yet its legacy position
remained strong, with 58 per cent of the English population having
been baptized into the Church of England when the figure was last reported
210 Secularization in the Long 1960s

in 1979 (against 63 per cent in 1958) and 19 per cent confirmed (compared
with 23 per cent in 1958).

BEHAVING

Unlike membership, where different criteria applied, church attendance was a

common denominator of religious practice, universally accepted as important,
and mandatory for their followers, by all Christian bodies. In advancing his
case for revolutionary secularization in the 1960s, Callum Brown has been
somewhat ambivalent about the centrality of churchgoing. In one place, he
wrote of its ‘sudden collapse’, yet elsewhere he conceded that the fall was
‘merely a continuation of an existing trend which stretched back until at least
the 1890s’. It was the second scenario which was correct, for, as Robin Gill has
demonstrated, attendances relative to population had been decreasing in the
Church of England and Congregationalism continuously from the 1850s and
in the Free Churches generally since the 1880s. Only Roman Catholics sig-
nificantly bucked the trend, and even their Mass-going peaked absolutely in
1965 in England and Wales, standing 22 per cent lower 15 years later.
In Britain overall, discounting local variations (exemplified in Tables 4.5
and 4.10), about one person in seven went to a place of worship on an
‘ordinary’ Sunday in 1960 (obviously, more went at religious festivals, such
as Easter, and on special communal occasions, particularly in Protestant
Churches). Based on various ecclesiastical counts, augmented by estimates,
congregations in England reduced by a further 12 per cent during the 1960s,
certainly serious but hardly a ‘sudden collapse’. By the end of the 1970s
(Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4), derived from the three home nation censuses
arranged by Peter Brierley, 11 per cent of adults worshipped each Sunday in
England in 1979 (in reality, probably nearer 9 per cent as a deduction has to be
made for twicing), 13 per cent in Wales in 1982, and 17 per cent in Scotland in
1984 (down on the 26 per cent recorded in 1959). Those censuses, when
compared with the claims made by the public in opinion polls, suggest that the
latter overstated usual Sunday attendance by one-half in England and Wales
and by one-third in Scotland (Table 4.8). By their own admission, almost half
of adults in the 1960s and 1970s were never at public worship (Tables 4.6 and
4.7), but this was no new state of affairs—the flight from the pews was a
progressive phenomenon, and these two decades did not make a truly dra-
matic difference.
Far more serious and sudden was the diminished take-up of infant baptism,
attributed by David Voas to a reduction in religiously homogeneous couples.
Extrapolating from four major denominations (Table 5.1), it seems likely that
a maximum of 85 per cent of British babies were still being baptized in 1960
 Conclusion 211

but only 60 per cent of those born in 1980. Although this broadly confirms
Brown’s suggestion of a serious decline in this key rite of passage, the steepest
decrease in baptisms relative to live births did not occur in the early 1960s but
later, with the Church of England, Methodist Church, and Roman Catholic
Church in England and Wales all achieving peaks in 1964, one year after
Brown’s annus horribilis for organized religion. A tipping-point for the
Church of England was 1968, representing the first time it had baptized a
minority of babies. This was regarded as a cause of grave concern, perhaps
unlike the churching of women after childbirth, an occasional office which
disappeared rapidly (albeit not completely) from the late 1960s, but about
which Churches had long been ambivalent on account of its folk superstitious
associations.
The decline in the proportion of marriages solemnized in religious cere-
monies was on a similar scale to that of baptisms, starting from a slightly lower
base, from 73 per cent in 1957 to 51 per cent in 1980, the figures being
higher in Scotland than in England and Wales (Tables 5.2 and 5.3). The
principal decrease was again, not in the early 1960s, but between 1965 and
1975. Contributing factors were rises in both the divorce rate (the Church of
England and some other denominations being reluctant to remarry divorcees)
and in cohabitation, avoiding marriage altogether. Couples marrying in civil
ceremonies, then entirely in registry offices, were not necessarily irreligious, as
there were several practical reasons for choosing the ostensibly secular option.
On the other hand, the near universality of religious funerals, notwithstanding
the emergence of secular alternatives by the late 1970s, cannot simply be
interpreted at face value as a positive expression of faith. Given the growing
professionalization of funerals, the apparent monopoly of religious rites at
death reflected, not so much the residual power wielded by organized religion,
as the inertia which was built into the death industry and, in particular, the
reluctance of funeral directors to contemplate change.
On the surface, audiences for religious broadcasts on radio or television
seemed impressive. Fairly predictably, the number of listeners to radio religious
broadcasts peaked during the 1940s and fell away thereafter, as radio itself lost
appeal in the light of the doubling (from 48 per cent to 99 per cent) between
1957 and 1977 of households with television licences. Television offered far
fewer religious broadcasting hours each week than radio had done. Although
the absolute size of the audiences for televised religious programmes increased
over time, the figure actually declined, especially in the 1970s, relative to the
growth in both television licences and the proportion of households capable of
receiving Independent Television. These audiences were also artificially
inflated by the existence of the ‘God slot’, which ensured there would be no
competition to religious programmes on either of the main television channels
during prime time early Sunday evening viewing. The most popular offerings
of this ‘closed period’ were religious music programmes, notably the BBC’s
212 Secularization in the Long 1960s

Songs of Praise and Independent Television’s Stars on Sunday, the latter’s

sentimentality and limited religious content making it deeply unpopular with
many Church leaders. Audiences for religious broadcasts were much higher
in the winter than the summer months, and viewer loyalty was otherwise
reasonably low, passive, and opportunistic.
Although religious broadcasts, like other private religious practices, had the
potential to extend the reach of the Church’s message beyond the ranks of
regular churchgoers, the latter provided a significant share of the market for all
such practices. This was self-evidently true of private prayer, which one-half or
fractionally less of the population claimed (doubtless with a degree of exag-
geration) to perform regularly (weekly or more) during the 1960s and 1970s.
The data are too patchy to discern any obvious trend over time. There is more
certainty with regard to household ownership of bibles, which was well over
four-fifths, with individual ownership at a slightly lower level but still more
than seven in ten, albeit most bibles were acquired passively (as hand-me-
downs or gifts). Regular reading of the Bible was the activity of a diminishing
minority, even before allowing for likely inflated claims made about the habit
(Table 5.4). A major reason for the Bible being less read was that its authority
and inspiration were increasingly doubted, a shrinking minority subscribing
to a literal view of the Old and New Testaments, with a particularly sharp
rise in those thinking each was ‘mostly a collection of stories and fables’
(Table 5.5). All in all, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Bible did
not feature prominently in the lives of Britons during the 1960s and 1970s.
Apart from the very devout, it was already a closed book, despite several new
translations into modern language.
This limited impact of religion on everyday life was corroborated by
evidence about the public’s observance of the two principal religious festivals,
Christmas and Easter. Since the ‘invention’ of the modern British Christmas
by the Victorians, it had always had a strong social and holiday dimension,
and this was accentuated after the Second World War as it became more
cosmopolitan, more commercialized, more dominated by television, and
ultimately more secularized. The polls confirmed that an overwhelming ma-
jority of the population sensed that Christmas was becoming less religious
than in the days of their own childhood, but, deep down, few seemed to
regret the fact. Asked about the primary purpose of Christmas, family and
enjoyment topped the list, with no more than one-third recognizing Christ-
mas as still essentially a religious festival, the claims made about Christmastide
churchgoing seemingly inflated. It was much the same trend with Easter,
especially in the 1970s, the arrival of better weather (at least in most years)
and the democratization of private car ownership and advent of cheap
package vacations encouraging outings and holidays away from home, and
the sacred character of Good Friday being undermined by the widespread
opening of shops.
 Conclusion 213

BELIEVING

The realm of popular belief was a curious hybrid of orthodoxy, heterodoxy,

and folklore, individually or communally customized in a ‘pick-and-mix’ of
convictions and habits, and often only loosely connected with the world of
institutional religion. This had possibly always been the case, at least among
the working classes, as revealed in archival sources and oral testimony exam-
ined by historians and folklorists, and exemplified in the study by Sarah
Williams of popular culture in the London borough of Southwark before the
Second World War.2 But only with the introduction of sample surveys was it
possible to probe this vortex of belief with quantitative precision, the approach
being pioneered by Mass-Observation in another London borough, this time
Hammersmith, in 1944–5, revealing a ‘puzzled people’ in some intellectual
muddle so far as religion was concerned.3 Although the national opinion polls,
which we have largely utilized in this book, do not establish the definitive
picture, and are especially deficient in showing correlations between individ-
ual beliefs, they do not suggest that Britons were wholesale casting the
supernatural aside in favour of secular ideologies during the 1960s and 1970s.
Belief in God certainly remained high, at three-quarters or more according
to series from NOP, ORC, and Gallup (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). While the number
of disbelievers grew in the 1970s, many seem to have come across from the
ranks of ‘don’t knows’ rather than believers, and disbelievers still constituted
under one-fifth of adults by 1980. However, support for the concept of a
personal God did diminish, with a plurality endorsing the notion of a life force
by 1980 (Table 6.2). In similar vein, even though overall recognition of Jesus
Christ remained steady at four in five persons, there was decreasing public
acceptance that He was the Son of God in favour of regarding Him as just a
man (Table 6.2). These shifts are in line with those noted earlier, concerning
greater doubts about the authority and inspiration of the Bible. Arguably, they
reflected adjustments being made in the face of scientific and technological
progress and educational advances more generally, albeit the secularizing
effects of science and reason should not be overstated. For similar motives,
and also from a desire to shut out tenets which seemed unpleasant or
threatening, it was no longer fashionable to believe in the Devil (Table 6.1).
Paradoxically, at least for some observers, belief in an afterlife was less
pervasive than belief in God, held by between two-fifths and one-half of
the population (Table 6.3). Slightly more Britons (about half) in Table 6.4
expressed belief in heaven than in life after death, almost as if the former was

2
S. C. Williams, Religious Belief and Popular Culture in Southwark, c.1880–1939 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
3
Mass-Observation, Puzzled People: A Study in Popular Attitudes to Religion, Ethics, Progress,
and Politics in a London Borough (London: Victor Gollancz, 1947).
214 Secularization in the Long 1960s

somehow detached from the latter, with disbelievers again being progressively
swollen from the ranks of ‘don’t knows’. But hell was emphatically rejected, no
more than one in five believing in it, the remainder finding it too unpalatable or
too implausible a concept for a modern society (Table 6.4). Partly associated
with greater influences from the East, reincarnation attracted a growing minor-
ity as one possible form which the afterlife might take (Table 6.4).
Reincarnation might be considered as some kind of border between ortho-
doxy and heterodoxy. Paranormal beliefs (Table 6.5) and practices (Table 6.6)
were explored by Gallup in more systematic ways than Mass-Observation had
ever done in the late 1930s and 1940s, but the meaning of its results was not
necessarily any easier to fathom. Some specific beliefs appealed to as few as one
in ten, others to as many as one in two. Especially strong, and generally
increasing, were beliefs in hypnotism, thought transference between two
people, faith healing, and the ability to forecast something before it happened.
Also growing were beliefs in ghosts and unidentified flying objects, an interest
fostered by contemporary creative literature, film, and television. Moreover,
far more individuals paid lip-service to certain phenomena than were pre-
pared to admit to an interviewer they believed in them, and this was notably
true of the practice of superstitions and the reading of horoscopes, to which
they were drawn by a combination of curiosity and a ‘just in case’ mentality
born of hope (or fear). The persistence of these alternative beliefs and practices
owed much to their ability to develop and sustain a following among young
people (Table 6.7).
Religious and other transcendent experience, existing beyond the bounda-
ries of normal perception, had long acted as a bridge between traditional and
alternative beliefs, between Christianity and other faiths, and—to an extent—
between science and religion. Investigation of it was refreshed in Britain
during the 1970s and 1980s, notably through asking national cross-sections
whether they had ‘ever been aware of, or influenced by, a presence or power,
whether you call it God or not, which is different from your everyday self?’ On
this definition, a religious experience was initially reported by about one-third
of adults, albeit one-half of this subgroup had only experienced it once or twice
(Table 6.8). A bigger proportion, almost one-half, reported one or more of
nine specific instances of ‘religious’ experience, but there was wide variation in
the extent to which the experiences were actually perceived to be religious
(Table 6.9).
A further dimension of believing can be found in people’s attitudes to the
role and influence of religion and the Churches in society as a whole, and in
the extent to which their opinions on ostensibly secular issues were shaped by
religious allegiances. Although most Britons sensed that religion was losing its
influence on national life, peaking at seven-tenths in the mid-1970s
(Table 7.1), the overwhelming majority continued to regard Britain as a
Christian country and a diminishing majority thought it important that it
 Conclusion 215

should remain so. There was some erosion in the public standing of both
Churches and clergy during the 1960s and 1970s, albeit nowhere near as
pronounced as it was to become immediately before and after the millennium.
A series of Gallup surveys between 1963 and 1982 revealed only around one in
seven adults considered the Church had a lot of influence on the country’s
future, somewhat more than two-fifths a little influence and about one-third
none at all. One-quarter or less expressed a great deal of confidence in the
Church, and it was a widely held view that it was failing to give adequate
answers to the problems facing Britain. The clergy lost ground to other
professions, less so in terms of the admiration or respect in which they were
held, or their perceived trustworthiness, than for their usefulness, which was
deemed to be quite limited.
The diminished status of Church and clergy rarely translated into anti-
clericalism, a tradition which was largely absent from Britain. Other forms
of religious prejudice persisted into the 1960s but generally lessened in the
1970s. This was the case, for instance, in terms of ‘Protestant’ prejudice
against Catholics as individuals and against the Catholic Church. The latter
surfaced in a lower level of endorsement of church unity negotiations between
Catholics and Protestants than between Anglicans and Nonconformists
(Table 7.2), but the gap narrowed over time and had disappeared by 1982,
when Pope John Paul II visited Britain. Anti-Semitism affected from one-tenth
to one-third of the population, depending upon the question asked, but did
not particularly correlate with attitudes to Israel and its role in the Middle East
conflict at this time, the Israeli cause attracting far more sympathy than that of
the Arabs/Palestinians. Islamophobia had yet to emerge as an issue. During
the late 1950s and early 1960s there was, in fact, far greater concern about
atheists than there was about most religious groups.
The weakened influence of the Churches was especially visible when it
came to Sunday observance. The campaign to ‘brighten up’ Sunday and ease
some of the statutory restrictions on permitted out-of-home activities had
already gained momentum during the long 1950s, through the combined
weight of public opinion (Table 7.3), the activities of pressure groups, and
the recommendations of the Crathorne Committee (1964). Liberalization
took effect on most fronts in the 1960s and 1970s. When it came to public
houses, a steadily increasing number of individuals (a majority from the
1970s) wanted their opening hours to be the same on Sundays as on
weekdays; Sunday opening was permitted in Wales after 1961 (incremental-
ly, by local option) and in Scotland after 1976. The growing public clamour
for places of entertainment to be allowed to open on Sundays as on
weekdays was addressed in 1972 when the existing local option arrange-
ments for cinema opening were abolished and, for the first time, theatres
were permitted to open in the afternoon and evening on Sundays. Support
for professional sport being played on Sundays also rose throughout the
216 Secularization in the Long 1960s

1960s and 1970s, partly in response to the opportunities being created by the
administrators of sports such as cricket and rugby league to watch matches
on the day, but the enthusiasm did not yet extend to horse-racing on
Sundays, still less to the opening of betting shops. Successive parliamentary
attempts to amend the Shops Act 1950 to permit universal Sunday trading
in England and Wales failed, but enforcement was variable, leading to some
incidence of illegal opening by the late 1970s, albeit less prevalent than in
Scotland (to which the Act did not apply). It was mainly in the early 1980s
that consumer demand for Sunday shopping strengthened.
The Churches mostly spoke with one voice when it came to Sunday
observance, but there were differences on moral questions, and religious
opinions among the public, as recorded in polls, did not always take their
cue from the respective ecclesiastical leadership. In general, across the four
issues examined, Protestant views matched those of the population as a whole,
with Catholics and religious nones occupying outlying positions, the former
towards the conservative end of the spectrum and the latter towards the
liberal. On capital punishment (abolished temporarily in 1965 and permanently
from 1969) and homosexuality (decriminalized in 1967), most Christians were
out of step with legislative change, opposing reform. On abortion (legalized
in 1967) and voluntary euthanasia (still illegal), most Christians took a condi-
tionally liberal stance. Catholics, however, were disproportionately inclined to
moral absolutism on abortion, wishing it to be unlawful under all circum-
stances or at least to be more tightly regulated, whereas nones sought greater
liberalization (Tables 7.4 and 7.5). The same was true of voluntary euthanasia
(Table 7.6), where there was a 30-point variation in support for physician-
assisted suicide between atheists and agnostics on the one hand and Catholics
on the other.
This oversight of moral behaviour by statute, coupled with the existence
of an Established Church in England, meant that religion could not be kept
entirely apart from politics. Electors, however, mostly preferred to see them
separated so far as practicable, and, according to Gallup, an increasing
majority wished the Church to remain aloof from party politics and avoid
taking sides. In practice, the public’s own voting patterns continued to be
shaped in part by religious allegiances, particularly by the historically close
bonds between the Church of England and the Conservative Party, the
Catholic Church and the Labour Party, and the Free Churches and the
Liberal Party. Although majorities in these three denominational blocs
may not have opted for the political party with which they had traditionally
been linked, there was certainly a disproportionate predisposition to do so,
reflected in both pre-election (Table 7.7) and post-election data (Table 7.8).
Parental transmission of party allegiances within denominations has also
been identified as a key factor in preserving the significance of religion as a
predictor of voter alignment.
 Conclusion 217

INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES

Hitherto, we have evaluated religious change during the 1960s and 1970s with
reference to individuals, but the material fortunes of organized religion,
particularly the Christian Churches, also need to be factored in. Some reduc-
tion in the number of places of worship certainly occurred. For non-Anglican
places of worship in England and Wales, the Registrar General’s records
(Table 8.1) point to a decline of 18 per cent between 1951 and 1980, the
steepest net losses occurring between 1962 and 1972 and in 1976–80. Within
the total, the Roman Catholic Church bucked the trend, achieving sustained
growth over the three decades, cumulatively amounting to 50 per cent (albeit
slowing after 1967). The traditional Free Churches experienced decline, com-
mencing sooner in some cases than others, but mostly it was at a relatively
modest level. The principal exceptions were the Salvation Army and the
Methodist Church, the latter belatedly implementing a large-scale closure
programme consequent upon an earlier reunion of three Churches. The picture
is broadly confirmed by Peter Brierley’s combination of actual and estimated
data (Table 8.2), which also includes Anglicans, and suggesting a decrease of
2 per cent in Christian places of worship in the 1960s followed by one of 10
per cent in the 1970s (by which time the Pastoral Measure 1968 had made it
easier for the Church of England to declare buildings redundant). The most
accurate statistics of all derive from the three censuses which Brierley organized
in England in 1979, Wales in 1982, and Scotland in 1984, which collectively
identified 49,100 Trinitarian churches (Table 8.3).
The 1970s (but apparently not the 1960s) also witnessed a 7 per cent drop in
the number of Christian ministers, according to Brierley’s calculations, the
basis for which is clearer and more plausible in some cases than others
(Table 8.4). Generally speaking, at least in England, the decline in church
membership outpaced the contraction of the ministerial workforce, with the
consequence that ministerial workloads (expressed as the ratio of members
per minister) eased somewhat (Table 8.5). Notwithstanding, the seeds were
already being sown for future personnel problems, as consideration of the
Church of England and the Methodist Church (Table 8.6) revealed, with
diminished ministerial recruitment and more retirements. This impending
crisis was mitigated in part by recourse to non-stipendiary ministry and, in
some denominations (but not the Church of England), women ministers. The
position with lay staff, who were mostly voluntary, can only be partially
established, but numbers were certainly declining sharply for groups such as
lay preachers and Sunday school teachers, with recruitment a major challenge.
The picture for overseas missionaries is also incomplete (Table 8.7).
This infrastructure, of places of worship and ministry, had to be paid for.
Even though Bryan Wilson, the arch-exponent of secularization theory, en-
visaged the individual’s willingness to invest in religious bodies as, potentially,
218 Secularization in the Long 1960s

the ultimate test of their acceptability, very little research has been undertaken
into institutional religious finance. This partly reflects the immense difficulty
in building a holistic overview, given the diversity, complexity, and—in many
cases—non-disclosure of accounts. One bold but imperfect attempt to do
so, by the Wells Group in 1973 (Table 8.8), suggested that a majority of
ecclesiastical income derived from congregational giving, the major exception
being the Church of England, which relied significantly upon investments
and endowments managed by the Church Commissioners. After the Second
World War concerted efforts were made by most denominations to augment
congregational giving, and to put it on a more predictable basis, through a
range of Christian stewardship initiatives. These endeavours met with some
initial success, but progress was undermined by inflationary pressures from
the late 1960s, fairly modest at first but very steep after the commencement of
the oil crisis in 1973, the latter accompanied by a general economic downturn,
which also diminished the return on investments. Combined with the adverse
revenue implications of falling membership and attendance, the recession
created a financial crisis for most Churches which constrained investment
and outreach and necessitated cost-cutting and/or draw-downs on reserves in
order to balance the books. These general trends are fleshed out through case
studies of the Church of England (Table 8.9) and the Church of Scotland.

FINAL RECKONING

Accounting imagery is, perhaps, a suitable note on which to begin this

penultimate section of the book. We are now, hopefully, in a sufficiently
well-informed position to undertake the final reckoning and summation of
the quantitative evidence, and to prepare a balance-sheet of religious change in
Britain during the 1960s and 1970s. This will respond specifically to the two
key elements of Callum Brown’s interpretation of religious developments
in the long 1960s: that Britain underwent a process of ‘revolutionary’ secular-
ization, with 1963 the definitive turning-point; and that gender was its
fundamental cause, with a simultaneous depietization of femininity and defe-
minization of piety, thereby ending women’s longstanding role as the bulwark
of organized religion and disrupting the intergenerational transmission
of faith.
Taking chronology first, it seems hard to accept that 1963 was the single
most important annus horribilis in Britain’s secularization history. Short of
war (civil or an external attack), politico-constitutional revolution, or natural
catastrophe, none of which applied to Britain in 1963, socio-cultural change
and the overthrow of tradition has rarely happened that fast. Similar objec-
tions can be raised to claims, not based on religion, advanced by other authors
 Conclusion 219

to have discovered the birth of modern Britain, Christopher Bray (for instance)
tracing it to 1965,4 Andy Beckett to 1980–2.5 Ultimately, in justification of his
argument, Brown has been able to do little more than point to a miscellany of
unconnected events and movements associated with 1963, some of them
religious and some not, which he (and some contemporaries) deemed signifi-
cant, but without explaining, still less demonstrating beyond reasonable doubt,
how the immediacy of their impact can be measured.6
In essence, the presumed criticality of 1963 is little more than an act of faith.
As Duncan MacLaren has contended in relation to British religion, that year is
‘only of symbolic significance; it does not constitute an explanation for
decline’.7 In the absence of concrete proof, questions must surely be raised
about the legitimacy of such exuberant language as ‘death’ or ‘revolution’. In
fact, quantitative substantiation of Brown’s claims for 1963 would be a near
impossible task, for relatively few complete religious statistical time series are
available. Even some of those on church membership, generally the best
covered topic, are partially discontinuous, notably for the Church of England,
which did not seek parochial returns annually. Therefore, it would be exceedingly
difficult to establish that, relative to population, the fortunes of institutional
Christianity were dramatically worse in, say, 1964 or 1965 than they had
been in 1962 or 1963. All that can be meaningfully discerned are trends,
some covering a handful of years, others a decade or more.
In practice, discounting denominational variations for the moment, the key
religious performance measures started from different bases (absolutely and
relatively) and declined from different points and at different rates. Regular
churchgoing, for example, had been reducing for the best part of a century
and, while this persisted throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the pace was not
especially dramatic. Scotland apart, church membership had probably always
constituted a minority of adults, with an absolute peak for the major Protes-
tant bodies already reached by the late 1920s.8 Net membership decreases
certainly quickened from the late 1960s, but they were offset in part by growth
for some Trinitarian and non-Trinitarian movements and non-Christian
faiths—in short, by a strengthening of religious pluralism.9

4
C. Bray, 1965: The Year Modern Britain was Born (London: Simon & Schuster, 2014).
5
A. Beckett, Promised You a Miracle: UK 80–82 (London: Allen Lane, 2015).
6
The case for 1963 is most fully articulated in C. G. Brown, Religion and Society in Twentieth-
Century Britain (Harlow: Pearson, 2006), 224–5.
7
D. MacLaren, Mission Implausible: Restoring Credibility to the Church (Eugene: Wipf &
Stock, 2012), 3.
8
R. Currie, A. D. Gilbert, and L. Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church
Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 25, 31–2.
9
By the late 1970s, also, church growth principles were being taken up in British Churches and
a British Church Growth Association had been formed. Cf. J. Bronnert, ‘The Value of Church
Growth Thinking in Contemporary Britain’ (MA thesis, University of Manchester, 1983).
220 Secularization in the Long 1960s

By far the most serious aspects of statistical decline in the 1960s and 1970s,
especially from the late 1960s, were in numbers of: infant baptisms; Sunday
school enrolments; adolescents or young adults added to membership (such as
confirmands); and religious marriages. Even allowing for smaller family size as
a contributory factor, these changes were, perhaps, on a sufficiently large scale
to warrant the appellation of ‘crisis’, impacting recruitment and the transmis-
sion of faith, and thus the longer-term viability of Churches. From the 1970s,
reductions in places of worship and ministers also took effect, the former a
belated response to longstanding over-supply (as asserted by Robin Gill),10
the latter a consequence of a more recent trend for retirements and deaths
to exceed new entrants as vocations dropped. An economic downturn in
the second half of the 1970s put religious finances under immense pressure,
perhaps of ‘crisis’ proportions.
In continuation of pre-existing trends, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed
further incremental diminution in: religious socialization of children, both
by parents and in state schools (as less exclusively Christian curricula for
religious education took hold); religious observance of Sunday and festivals
such as Christmas and Easter; the status of clergy and Church in the eyes of the
public; audiences for religious broadcasts; belief in a personal God, the divinity
of Jesus, biblical literalism, and Protestant convictions; and the influence of
religion on day-to-day lives. On the other hand, there was stability, or merely
limited decrease, during the 1960s and 1970s in: religious profession; the
personal saliency of religion; religious community; religious funerals; owner-
ship of bibles; the importance attached to Britain being a Christian country;
and overall belief in God, Jesus, an afterlife, and the paranormal. Although
purists might dismiss much of this religiosity as nominalism, no religionism
had singularly failed to achieve a breakthrough by 1980.
This note of caution is reinforced by Table 9.1, which pulls together data on
religious profession, church membership, and church attendance to produce a
composite religious profile of the adult population in c.1980, with comparable
information for three earlier data points in the twentieth century, arising from
the author’s previous research. It is readily conceded that this is a rather
approximate exercise, necessitating some degree of conjecture and guesstima-
tion, but the table does underscore that the pace of post-war religious change
was relatively slow. If this reading of events is anywhere near correct, then the
biggest single development of the 1960s and 1970s was the ground lost by the
Free Churches and Presbyterian Churches, equating to 5 per cent of their
combined market share, distributed across the three categories of members,
adherents, and nominal affiliates. Anglicans were less likely to practise than
before, yet their religious profession figures were holding up. Catholics were

10
R. Gill, The ‘Empty’ Church Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
 Conclusion 221
Table 9.1 Conjectural religious profile of adult population, Great Britain, c.1914,
c.1939, c.1963, and c.1980 (percentages down)
1914 1939 1963 1980

Anglicans
Communicants 9 7 7 4
Other regular churchgoers 15 8 2 1
Occasional churchgoers/nominal affiliates 40 40 52 55
Sub-total 64 55 61 60
Roman Catholics
Baptized persons known to priests 6 6 8 8
Nominal affiliates NA 5 2 4
Sub-total NA 11 10 12
Free Churches and Presbyterians
Members 13 10 9 7
Adherents 11 4 2 1
Nominal affiliates 4 16 11 9
Sub-total 28 30 22 17
Others
Non-Christians 1 1 1 2
No religion 1 4 6 8
Sub-total 2 5 7 10

Note: Deductions have been made for children in the case of Roman Catholic baptized persons and non-
Christians, whose raw data relate to the all-age community rather than just adults.
Sources: (c.1914, c.1939, and c.1963) C. D. Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival? Quantifying Belonging,
Behaving, and Believing in the Long 1950s (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 103; (c.1980) extracted
and extrapolated from the text of this book, utilizing a combination of data on religious profession, church
membership, and church attendance.

also veering towards nominalism but could still report overall advance. Rises of
one point for non-Christians and two points for religious nones were significant
but not transformative. Table 9.1 is a salutary reminder to corral master narra-
tives of secularization and to maintain a proper sense of perspective.
Cumulatively, therefore, it can be concluded that, while there were compo-
nents of a religious crisis in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, it was nowhere
near a universal one (in the sense of affecting all dimensions of religion), and
that no marked period effect in the early 1960s can be identified. If there was
any particular concentration of decline at this time, then Hugh McLeod was
probably closer to the truth in pinpointing it to the ‘late 1960s’ (which he
defined as 1967–74).11 However, most facets of decline were not new, but
simply continuations or accelerations of existing patterns, suggesting that
secularization in Britain as a whole is still best regarded as a progressive,
rather than revolutionary, phenomenon. The process was quite well advanced

11
D. H. McLeod, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
222 Secularization in the Long 1960s

by the 1960s and 1970s, with the hard core of ‘very religious’ perhaps already
reduced to a small minority (whose size depended upon the precise measure
used), with religion intruding but little into the everyday lives of the rest of the
population, whatever their nominal attachments and beliefs.
It is possible that Brown’s interpretation of the decade has been unduly
shaped by his intimate knowledge of Scotland, which has undoubtedly secu-
larized quite late but fairly rapidly. Certainly, Brown’s own index of Scottish
‘church adherence’ (a hybrid measure of communicants, members, Sunday
scholars, and estimated religious populations) does appear to show that per
capita decline has been relentless from the 1960s.12 The same may have been
true of Wales, which has attracted less scholarly treatment.13 There is ample
scope for the picture being refined through further research at home nation,
region, and community levels.
So, viewed statistically, Brown’s proposed chronology requires significant
qualification. His suggested (gendered) causation, by contrast, has to be
rejected. All the available religious indicators from the 1960s and 1970s
which disaggregate by sex (including counts of membership and attendance
and polls of practices, beliefs, and attitudes) reveal women to be dispropor-
tionately more religious than men, as they had been before and were to be
afterwards. This is a well-observed generic psychological and sociological
phenomenon, although its theorization is debated.14 There is no quantitative
evidence which we have yet uncovered to suggest that women were leaving, or
not joining, the Churches in greater numbers than men in the 1960s. Brown’s
quantitative case on gender appears to rest entirely upon his perception of a
female recruitment crisis in 1960–2, as manifested in confirmation, triggering
a wider collapse of the Church of England. Yet, as shown in presenting and
discussing Table 3.2, the overall fall in confirmation rates between 1955 and
1979 was actually greater for men than women; while there was some move-
ment towards male candidates in the early 1960s, it was tiny and short-lived.
It was the combination of masculinity and youth which largely fuelled the
incremental growth in no religionism in Britain, although a wider range of
demographics impacted religious belonging, behaving, and believing more
generally, as our data have occasionally illustrated.

12
The most recent version of this index appeared in C. G. Brown, Religion and the Demo-
graphic Revolution: Women and Secularisation in Canada, Ireland, UK, and USA since the 1960s
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), 90.
13
D. D. Morgan, The Span of the Cross: Christian Religion and Society in Wales, 1914–2000
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999). P. Chambers, Religion, Secularization, and Social
Change in Wales: Congregational Studies in a Post-Christian Society (Cardiff: University of Wales
Press, 2005) has a contemporary, rather than historical, focus.
14
See M. Trzebiatowska and S. Bruce, Why Are Women More Religious than Men? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012). There is an overview of research findings in L. J. Francis, ‘The
Psychology of Gender Differences in Religion: A Review of Empirical Research’, Religion 27
(1997): 81–96.
 Conclusion 223

If the causative significance of gender is dismissed, were there other par-

ticular accelerants of religious decline in the 1960s and 1970s? Intellectual
forces seem to have played only a limited part, since there is no compelling
statistical evidence for the widespread undermining of popular faith by theo-
logical liberalism of the Honest to God variety or by scientific research calling
received truths into question. Rather, as we have intermittently noted, the
factors weakening the hold of religion on the nation tended to be practical
developments affecting legislation, leisure, and demography/family. The lib-
eralizing statutes of the period gave people more control over their lives and
created a climate where they could exercise freedom and choice over how they
spent their time, especially with regard to Sunday observance. Leisure oppor-
tunities were transformed by the democratization of possession and enjoy-
ment of televisions inside the home and private cars outside it, curbing the role
of places of worship as recreational destinations, in a similar way that the
extension of the welfare state had already curtailed their social capital func-
tions.15 Demographic patterns (notably fewer marriages, greater religious
intermarriage, lower fertility, and more divorce) negatively impacted the
future flow of children into organized religion. This was compounded by a
progressive redefinition of parent/child relationships, the more child-centred
focus enabling children to take greater responsibility for decisions about
attending Sunday school or church or even whether to believe in Christianity
at all. Whatever continuing parental aspirations may have been claimed, there
was less emphasis on the religious socialization of children in the home, and
the slack was not taken up by state schools in which Christian religious
instruction was giving way to comparative religious education curricula.

SECULARIZATION REDIVIVUS

Statistics thus point to a far more nuanced interpretation of the pace and
nature of religious change in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s than has been
offered in the historiography, whether by Brown or several other scholars.
Secularization may have acquired prominence, even becoming fashionable, in
the 1960s, not least as a thesis, theory, or paradigm, but the phenomenon was
not invented then. Perhaps too much attention has been paid to contemporary
narratives of decline in the 1960s, and to their presumed influence, as though
clerical or media complaint literature about the state of religion had not
existed in one form or another for centuries past. There are also difficulties
in over-reliance on other and more retrospective qualitative sources, such as

15
The subject of F. Prochaska, Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The
Disinherited Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
224 Secularization in the Long 1960s

autobiography and oral history, which have been mined by Brown and others
in support of the alleged (but still heavily contested) death of a hegemonic
Christian culture as the dominant discourse of British life. In the absence of
application of corpus linguistic techniques to a large body of textual data
(which is increasingly feasible as more historical primary sources are digi-
tized),16 a task which Brown has apparently yet to undertake, the representa-
tiveness of such evidence must be open to question. It can certainly be readily
contradicted, as a recent testimony-led demythologization of the ‘swinging
Sixties’ and women demonstrates.17
The appropriateness and potential of qualitative approaches cannot be
denied, and the limitations of quantitative ones must be constantly borne in
mind, but the numbers should warn us against generalizing a religious crisis in
Britain during the 1960s and 1970s. They should also caution us to contex-
tualize these decades within a much longer-term timeframe, extending both
backwards and forwards and taking account of an increasing body of research
which suggests that the process of secularization, as distinct from the thesis,
has been evolutionary and incremental, albeit uneven. Thus, we now have
broad estimates of religious community and membership in England and
Wales stretching as far back as 1680–1840, which already begin to show a
diminishing Anglican market share and increasing nominalism,18 while
Church of England visitation returns for the eighteenth century likewise reveal
that irregular or non-churchgoing was nothing new.19 For the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, Gill has demonstrated that attendances relative to
population decreased continuously in the Church of England and Congrega-
tionalism from the 1850s and in the Free Churches generally since the 1880s.20
For church membership, according to the definitive compilation of historical
data from the late nineteenth century onwards, significant absolute growth
among major Protestant denominations had ended by the Edwardian era, with

16
For an example of the application of corpus linguistic techniques to British religion, see
P. Baker, C. Gabrielatos, and T. McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Represen-
tation of Islam in the British Press (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) which, despite
its mainly contemporary focus, also analyses representations of Islam and Muslims in English
books from 1475 to 1720 and nineteenth-century British newspapers.
17
S. Hardy, Women of the 1960s: More than Mini Skirts, Pills, and Pop Music (Barnsley: Pen &
Sword History, 2015).
18
C. D. Field, ‘Counting Religion in England and Wales: The Long Eighteenth Century,
c.1680–c.1840’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 63 (2012): 693–720.
19
C. D. Field, ‘A Godly People? Aspects of Religious Practice in the Diocese of Oxford,
1738–1936’, Southern History 14 (1992): 46–73 at 49–54; idem, ‘Counting the Flock: A Note on
Religious Practice in the Late Eighteenth-Century Diocese of Norwich’, Norfolk Archaeology 43
(1998–2001): 317–26; idem, ‘Churchgoing in the Cradle of English Christianity: Kentish Evi-
dence from the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Centuries’, Archaeologia Cantiana 128 (2008): 335–63
at 339–47; idem, ‘Status animarum: A Religious Profile of the Diocese of Salisbury in the 1780s’,
Wiltshire Archaeological and Natural History Magazine 106 (2013): 218–29.
20
Gill, ‘Empty’ Church Revisited.
 Conclusion 225

some signs of relative decline apparent even before then.21 A potentially

critical period for the fortunes of institutional Christianity may turn out to
be the fin de siècle (1885–1901), whose religious significance in Britain is only
just beginning to be explored in depth.22
For the twentieth century, the present author’s previous studies have em-
pirically tested Brown’s suggested periodization of British religious change.23
Principally using data on church adherence and attendance, he has substan-
tially augmented and qualified the picture painted by Brown before 1945, not
least for Edwardian Britain (which Brown portrayed as a ‘faith society’), and
revealed continuing secularization, albeit the effects of the First and Second
World Wars were by no means as cataclysmic as might be imagined.24 He has
also argued for, in the main, ongoing secularization during the long 1950s,
largely refuting Brown’s claims that the immediate post-war era was one of
religious resurgence,25 thereby complementing this book’s dismissal of Brown’s
contention that the 1960s were a period of revolutionary secularization. As
for the most recent half-century, the author’s study, as yet unpublished, of
a basket of twenty-five key performance indicators (KPIs) of religious belong-
ing, behaving, and believing has revealed that all bar one (belief in an afterlife,
which has remained stable) declined relative to population, although not
necessarily in tandem with each other nor interlinked in coherent and logical
ways.26 The KPIs generally do not exhibit any sharp spike in secularization
associated with particular crises or events. There has been no revolutionary

21
Currie, Gilbert, and Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers.
22
F. Knight, Victorian Christianity at the fin de siècle: The Culture of English Religion in a
Decadent Age (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016). Cf. the chapter on the late Victorian religious crisis in
D. H. McLeod, Religion and Society in England, 1850–1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996),
169–220.
23
As set out in Brown, Religion and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain.
24
All the following by C. D. Field: ‘ “The Faith Society”? Quantifying Religious Belonging in
Edwardian Britain, 1901–1914’, Journal of Religious History 37 (2013): 39–63; ‘Keeping the
Spiritual Home Fires Burning: Religious Belonging in Britain during the First World War’,
War and Society 33 (2014): 244–68; ‘Gradualist or Revolutionary Secularization? A Case Study of
Religious Belonging in Inter-War Britain, 1918–1939’, Church History and Religious Culture 93
(2013): 57–93; and ‘Puzzled People Revisited: Religious Believing and Belonging in Wartime
Britain, 1939–45’, Twentieth Century British History 19 (2008): 446–79.
25
Field, Britain’s Last Religious Revival?
26
These twenty-five KPIs addressed the following questions. Who professes a religion? Who
professes to belong to a religion? Who identifies as being religious? Who identifies as being
spiritual rather than religious? For whom is religion important? Who is a member of a Christian
Church? Who is part of the wider Christian community? Who claims to attend church? Who
actually attends church? Who gets their children baptized? Who gets married in church? Who
has a religious funeral? Who claims to pray? Who claims to read the Bible? Who claims to watch
religious broadcasts? Who observes Christian festivals? Who observes Sunday? Who claims to
believe in God? Who claims to believe in Jesus? Who claims to believe in an afterlife? Who thinks
the Bible is true? Who respects the Church? Who respects the clergy? Who thinks Britain is a
Christian country? Who thinks religion is a force for good?
226 Secularization in the Long 1960s

transition from a faith society to a secular society in Britain. Rather, the

process of secularization has mostly been gradualist and is still ongoing.
Notwithstanding the weight of such evidence for cumulative secularization in
Britain, in the sense of the diminishing social significance of religion in general
and Christianity in particular, there are still some historians, sociologists, and
practical theologians who appear to question, or at least minimize, its reality.
There is even some talk of desecularization or resacralization. Within Britain,
four principal but loosely defined schools of thought have emerged, sharing a
common feature: religion is changing rather than declining.
First, we are told, the Churches have started to grow again. In parallel, there
have been attempts to rejuvenate the church growth movement, which had
lost momentum in Britain after first becoming fashionable here in the late
1960s and 1970s. The Centre for Church Growth Research at Cranmer Hall,
Durham, which was established in 2013, has been instrumental in this renais-
sance. It is energetically led by David Goodhew.27 Unfortunately, church
growth advocates tend to become so buoyed up by apparent advances in
particular denominations and localities that they fail to recognize that any
gains are still insufficient to counteract losses elsewhere and thus do not
contradict the overall picture of decline. They mostly also have insufficient
grounding in historical developments, failing to understand that there have
always been annual inflows to, and outflows from, the Church which get lost
when the net figures (stocks) are calculated. Church growth is a constant of
ecclesiastical life, usually still occurring in some degree even at periods of net
declension.28
Second, many observers point to the undoubted progress of non-Christian
faiths in Britain during the past quarter-century, especially evident with
Muslims, viewing it as a potentially counter-secularizing force. The trend
has been fuelled by immigration and above-average fertility within largely
Asian communities and by a limited number of conversions from the indig-
enous population. A variant on this theme is Eric Kaufmann’s Shall the
Religious Inherit the Earth? (2010). This anticipates moderate religion being
‘squeezed between the Scylla of secularism and the Charybdis of fundamen-
talism’, with secularism increasingly losing out to a ‘demographically turbo-
charged piety’. Kaufmann’s key contention is that ‘religious fundamentalists
are on course to take over the world through demography’, because, unlike the
secularists and many moderate religious, their fertility alone surpasses the

27
D. Goodhew, ed., Church Growth in Britain, 1980 to the Present (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012);
idem, ed., Towards a Theology of Church Growth (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).
28
See, especially, the debate in Journal of Religion in Europe 6 (2013): S. Bruce, ‘Secularization
and Church Growth in the United Kingdom’, 273–96; D. Goodhew, ‘Church Growth in Britain’,
297–315; and S. Bruce, ‘Further Thoughts on Church Growth and Secularization’, 316–20. Cf.
the review of Goodhew’s 2012 book by C. D. Field, ‘Church Growth in Britain since 1980’, British
Religion in Numbers, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/2012/church-growth-in-britain-since-1980/>.
 Conclusion 227

replacement level. He rather struggles to substantiate this case in the British

context where, notably, Muslim fertility is falling.29 In general, growth in the
non-Christian population in Britain has nowhere near offset decreases among
nominal Christians (as the 2001 and 2011 censuses revealed), while there are
signs that, as many non-Christians integrate and become more Westernized,
they, too, are prone to secularize.
Third, other commentators emphasize a shift from religion (which is said to
be widely seen as ‘toxic’ by ordinary folk) to spirituality, such as that associated
with New Age movements. The phenomenon of ‘spiritual but not religious’
(SBNR) has become an influential strand in the contemporary (mainly
American) literature,30 but, largely informed by research in Kendal, even
two eminent British sociologists of religion have written of a ‘spiritual revo-
lution’ in train.31 Their claims of a ‘luxuriant undergrowth of spirituality’ have
clearly discomforted some British Church leaders, who regard spirituality as
an inseparable part of Christianity.32 Whatever the rights and wrongs of that
argument, there is no compelling statistical evidence that communal, authori-
tative, hierarchical, and dogmatic forms of religion have substantially given
way to a more individualistic, relativistic, egalitarian, and liberal spirituality.
Such newer forms have not yet proved ‘popular’ enough even to begin to fill
the gap left by the decline of the old ones.33
Fourth, some scholars have sought to broaden traditional understandings of
what constitutes ‘religion’ and the ways it influences society. The concept of
‘diffused religion’ is now well established in the sociological canon, thanks
largely to the theoretical and empirical research of Roberto Cipriani, but it had
been anticipated by historians. Thus, ‘diffusive Christianity’ has appeared in
the historiography of British religion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth

29
E. Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? Demography and Politics in the Twenty-
First Century (London: Profile Books, 2010). Reviewed by C. D. Field, ‘Shall the Religious Inherit
the Earth?’, British Religion in Numbers, <http://www.brin.ac.uk/2010/shall-the-religious-
inherit-the-earth/>.
30
See references in C. D. Field, ‘Secularising Selfhood: What Can Polling Data on the
Personal Saliency of Religion Tell Us about the Scale and Chronology of Secularisation in
Modern Britain?’, Journal of Beliefs and Values 36 (2015): 308–30 at 317. A recent British
book in the populist SBNR mould is A. Klaushofer, The Secret Life of God: A Journey through
Britain ([no place]: Hermes Books, 2015).
31
P. Heelas and L. Woodhead, The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to
Spirituality (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). Their evidence is critiqued by D. Voas and S. Bruce, ‘The
Spiritual Revolution: Another False Dawn for the Sacred’, in K. Flanagan and P. C. Jupp, eds.,
A Sociology of Spirituality (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 43–61.
32
A. Brown and L. Woodhead, That Was the Church, that Was: How the Church of England
Lost the English People (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 181–3.
33
S. Bruce, C. D. Field, T. Glendinning, and D. Voas, ‘Religion in Britain: Declining or Just
Changing?’ (2016, unpublished). Cf. S. Bruce, Secular Trumps Spiritual: The Westernization of
the Easternization of the West (forthcoming).
228 Secularization in the Long 1960s

centuries.34 More contemporaneously, there are several variants on the ‘dif-

fused religion’ approach, of which there is space to mention just three ex-
amples. A group of leading critics of Brown’s thesis of the ‘death’ of
Christianity in Britain has emphasized instead its persistence as a diffusive
and discursive influence in public culture and identity formation.35 Likewise,
in Edward Bailey’s concept of ‘implicit religion’, which has many British
adopters, religious meaning has been attached to purely secular phenomena.36
Grace Davie has even formulated the notion of ‘vicarious religion’, whereby
religious duty is performed by proxy, by a minority on behalf of the silent
majority.37 All such theories are speculative and often conveniently shift the
debate beyond the bounds of quantitative scrutiny or alternative means of
empirical validation. In reality, they are tantamount to a rejection of secular-
ization through moving the goalposts.
At the end of the day, none of these counter-secularizing alternatives is
evidentially persuasive. Recourse to a ‘change, not decline’ lens for viewing
Britain’s contemporary religious landscape often has to be a matter of faith
rather than proof. Religious pluralism and diversification may have been a
significant force in recent times but they have not yet been transformative. For
the rest, the statistics clearly show that the standing of Christianity, both as
organized religion and as belief system, in Britain has suffered progressive
erosion, before, during, and after the long 1960s. The underlying demograph-
ics of the situation also suggest decline will be ongoing, since recruitment is
decreasing, notably as a consequence of diminished religious socialization of
youth by parents, schools, and churches; conversions in later life are com-
paratively rare; and losses are growing, either through disaffiliation or death.
Generational replacement has been an especially powerful instrument of
secularization.38 No human can discount the possibility of an outpouring
of the Holy Spirit to reverse the trend, but, short of that, the Church in Britain

34
For example, J. L. Cox, The English Churches in a Secular Society: Lambeth, 1870–1930
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 90–105; M. F. Snape, God and the British Soldier:
Religion and the British Army in the First and Second World Wars (London: Routledge, 2005),
19–58; H. Schlossberg, Conflict and Crisis in the Religious Life of Late Victorian England (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 211–52.
35
J. Garnett, M. Grimley, A. Harris, W. Whyte, and S. C. Williams, eds., Redefining Christian
Britain: Post-1945 Perspectives (London: SCM Press, 2007).
36
E. Bailey, Implicit Religion: An Introduction (London: Middlesex University Press, 1998).
Most research in this area has been published or noted in the journal Implicit Religion since its
launch in 1998.
37
G. Davie, ‘Vicarious Religion’, in N. Ammerman, ed., Everyday Religion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 21–35; idem, ‘Vicarious Religion’, Journal of Contemporary Religion 25
(2010): 261–6 (a response to the critique in S. Bruce and D. Voas, ‘Vicarious Religion’, Journal of
Contemporary Religion 25 (2010): 243–59); idem, Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox,
2nd edn. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 81–8.
38
A. Crockett and D. Voas, ‘Generations of Decline: Religious Change in 20th-Century
Britain’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 45 (2006): 567–84.
 Conclusion 229

must probably brace itself for an even more marginal role in future.39
Secularization will continue to be debated as a thesis (with its accompanying
intellectual baggage) but, viewed objectively as a set of quantitative indicators,
its reality is harder to gainsay. Whatever the imperfections of the data, religion
in modern Britain can be numerated with a reasonable degree of certainty,
and, overall, the statistics reveal it to have been in long-term decline.

39
See the predictions in S. Bruce, ‘The Demise of Christianity in Britain’, in G. Davie,
P. Heelas, and L. Woodhead, eds., Predicting Religion: Christian, Secular, and Alternative Futures
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 53–63 at 60–2.
 Select Bibliography

The footnotes and the source notes for the tables provide a comprehensive record of
the primary and secondary sources which have been utilized in the preparation of this
monograph. This bibliography is more selective in its approach, focusing on published
works which readers may wish to consult for fuller treatments of particular topics.
Articles in newspapers and magazines, theses, datasets at UKDA, websites, and
unpublished material in the author’s possession are omitted entirely, as is all but the
most substantive report literature. Arrangement is by format, since, in a book devoted
to the 1960s and 1970s, the distinction between primary and secondary sources often
becomes so blurred, because so many serve a dual purpose, that it reaches the point of
being meaningless.

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 Index

The index references significant and specific terms (people, places, institutions, subjects, and
concepts) appearing in the text, tables, and – to a lesser extent – footnotes, apart from in purely
bibliographical elements. However, since the entire volume is about secularization in Great
Britain in the long 1960s from a statistical perspective, indexing of more generic content which is
all pervasive or implicit is restricted.

Aberdare Valley 46 Archbishops’ Commission on Church and

Aberdeen 94 State 11
abortion 166, 169–72, 216 Archer-Dean-Cox Crude Cohort Method 58
Abortion Act 1967 166, 169, 171 Argyle, Michael 113
About Religion 119–20 armed forces 9
adherents 47–8, 74, 197, 209, 220–1 Assemblies of God 71
Advertising Association 37, 207 assisted dying see voluntary euthanasia
Africa 199 astrology see horoscopes
afterlife see life after death atheists 23–4, 26, 169, 174, 182, 215–16
age and religion: prejudice against 159–60
Bible 124–6 see also irreligion, organized; nones
church attendance 87–9, 92–3, 100–1
members 68–71, 74–5, 78 Bailey, Edward 228
prayer 123 Banbury 28, 31–2, 91–2
religious attitudes 153, 156, 160, 163, 166 baptism:
religious beliefs 133–4, 136, 138–9, 141, believer’s 69, 105, 108
144–5, 147, 214 infant 47, 49, 57–8, 62, 105–9, 210–11, 220
religious broadcasting 121 Baptist Handbook 68–9, 187
religious experience 149–50 Baptist Revival Fellowship 69
religious profession 29–30, 33, 207 Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland
self-assessed religiosity 34–7 see Baptists
Sunday schools 46 Baptist Union of Scotland 69
Alderman, Geoffrey 178–9 Baptist Union of Wales 69
alienation see Roman Catholic Church Baptists:
(England and Wales) adherents 48
Alister Hardy Religious Experience Research church attendance 84, 86, 88, 90
Centre 147 finance 201
Aliyah 78–9 lay preachers 198
Alternative Service Book 1980 108 members 66, 68–9, 208
Anglican-Methodist Conversations 196 ministers 192, 194
Anglicans: missionaries 199
church attendance 81, 100–1, 221 places of worship 184, 186–7, 189
professing 24–33, 206–7, 221 Sunday schools 44
religious attitudes 153, 167–8, 170, 172–3, Bardsley, Cuthbert 161
176–7, 179–82, 216 Barker, Jean A., Baroness Trumpington 166
religious beliefs 145 Barrett, David B. 14
religious experience 149–50 BBC see British Broadcasting Corporation
see also Church in Wales; Church of Beckett, Andy 219
England; Episcopal Church of Scotland Bedford 188
anti-Catholicism 156–7, 215 Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin 113
anti-clericalism 154, 215 Better Sunday Society 161
anti-Semitism 157–8, 215 Betting and Gaming Act 1960 166
Anwar, Muhammad 77 betting shops 165, 216
260
Bible 123–4, 160
authority of 125–6, 212–13
ownership 124, 212, 220
readership 124–5, 212
Bible Society 14, 43, 85, 88
Billingham 91–3, 107, 113
Birmingham 29, 102
Balsall Heath 45, 102, 122
‘Brookton’ 91–2, 202
Hall Green 102
Handsworth 102
Hodge Hill 45–6, 102
Small Heath 32, 102–4
Sparkbrook 102
birth control 43, 58–9, 156, 166, 223, 226–7
see also abortion
Bishop’s Stortford 13, 28, 31–2
Bishopsgate Institute 80
Black Churches 71–3, 86, 189
Black Country 6
black magic 142, 147
Board of Deputies of British Jews 12
Bolton 43, 91–2, 115, 202
Boulard, Fernand 11
Bradford 93
Bray, Christopher 219
Brethren 74, 184, 186, 199
Brewitt-Taylor, Sam 2
Brierley, Peter W. 8, 14
baptism 106
church attendance 85–6, 88–9, 210
church membership 38–41, 64–5, 74, 76, 207
clergy 192–4, 217
missionaries 198–9
places of worship 186–8, 217
religious community 49, 209
Sunday schools 45, 208–9
Bristol 68
British Broadcasting Corporation 36, 112,
116–18, 120, 159, 211
British Council of Churches 13
British Election Study 24–6, 28, 95, 97, 167,
171, 178–81
British Empire 7
British Household Panel 180
British Humanist Association 79–80, 114
British Institute of Public Opinion see Social
Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd.
British Market Research Bureau 15, 36, 97,
118, 120, 155
British Nationality Act 1948 76
British Religion in Numbers 15
British Social Attitudes Survey 25, 27, 167–9,
171, 173–5, 180–1, 207
British Sociological Association Sociology of
Religion Study Group 19
Index
Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board 118
Brown, Callum G.:
baptism 105, 211
church adherence in Scotland 41, 222
churchgoing 7–8, 81–2, 210
definition of 1960s 19
funerals 113–14
gender and secularization 4, 6–7, 20–1, 33,
53, 206, 218, 222
hegemonic Christian culture 4, 8, 223–4
religious revival in 1950s 3, 5–7, 206–7, 225
revolutionary secularization in 1960s 4–7,
20, 23, 27, 81–2, 206, 210, 218–22
Bruce, Steve 6–7, 19, 22
Buddhists 77
Busia, Kofi A. 202
Butler, David H. E. 178–9
Calvinistic Methodists see Presbyterian
Church of Wales
Campbell, Colin B. 79–80
capital punishment 166–8, 216
Cardiganshire 103–4, 162, 176
cars, secularizing effects of ownership 42–3,
128, 209, 212, 223
Catholic Directory for Scotland 56, 63
Catholic Directory of England and Wales 56,
58, 84
Catholic Education Council 11, 56–8,
61–2, 83
Catholic Herald 130
Catholic Missionary Union 198
Catholic Tridentine Church 63
Catholic Truth 84
Catholic Truth Society 56–7, 84
celibacy of priesthood 156
Centre for Church Growth Research 226
Channel Islands 14
Chapman, Alister 7, 153
Charity Commission for England and
Wales 201
children and adolescents:
church attendance by 85–90
religious socialization of 5–6, 27, 42, 61,
208, 220, 223, 228
surveys of 17–18, 21, 43–4, 124
see also baptism, infant; religious education;
Sunday schools
Chorley 176
Christadelphians 75
Christian Brethren see Brethren
Christian country 7, 153–4, 214–15, 220
Christian Economic and Social Research
Foundation 13
Christian Research 14
Christian Science 75
 Index 261
Christian stewardship 201–2, 218 Church of Scotland:
Christmas: adherents 48
church attendance 98 baptism 106–8
communicants 51–2 church attendance 89–90, 101
observance of 127, 212, 220 elders 198
Church: finance 204–5, 218
and politics 175 marriage 110–11
as source of religious statistics 10–14 members 41, 66, 70–1, 208
attitudes to 154, 215, 220 ministers 192, 194
church attendance 81–104, 210, 219, 224–5 places of worship 186, 189
correlate of religious behaviour 34, 117, professing 24–5, 27, 29–31
123–6, 149–50, 156, 161, 163, 167–9, 171, religious attitudes 157, 170, 172–3, 177–8
174, 179–82 religious beliefs 145
effects of religious broadcasting on 115–16 Sunday school teachers 197
local church counts 90–4 Sunday schools 42, 44
local sample surveys 102–4 church unity 156–7, 196, 215
national church data 82–90 Churches and Churchgoers 10, 14, 38, 185,
national sample surveys 16, 95–101 187, 191, 193
see also England; Scotland; Wales churchgoing see church attendance
Church Commissioners 201, 203, 218 churching of women 109, 211
church growth 68–9, 85, 219, 226 cinemas 163, 215
Church in Wales: Cipriani, Roberto 227
church attendance 87–8 Clayson Committee (1973) 163
clergy 192 Clements, Ben 130–3, 171
communicants 51 clergy:
Diocese of Bangor 103–4 and politics 175
marriage 110–11 attitudes to 155, 168, 215, 220
places of worship 186, 189 contact with 155
religious profession 31 homosexual 168
church membership 10, 37–41, 50–80, 194, job satisfaction 193
207–9, 219, 224–5 member/minister ratio 193–4
Church of England: number 191–7, 217, 220
baptism 47, 49, 105–8, 209–11 proxy for religious density 176
church attendance 82–4, 86, 91–3, 210, 224 retired 191, 193–7
churching 109 rites of passage 108–9, 112, 114–15
clergy 191–2, 194–6, 217 closed period 119, 211
communicants 50–2, 208 Clun Valley 31–2, 46, 122
confirmation 47, 50, 53–5, 208–10, Coggan, Donald 129
220, 222 cohabitation 112, 211
Diocese of Southwark 10, 52, 129 Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 76
Diocese of Worcester 44, 53 communicants 38, 50–2, 71, 87, 98, 204, 208,
disestablishment 155 221–2
divorce 112 confirmation 47, 50, 53–5, 62, 124, 208–10,
electoral roll 52–3, 208 220, 222
finance 115, 201–4, 218 Congleton 91
funerals 112, 114–15 Congregational Federation 44, 48, 70
marriage 110–11 congregational giving 201, 218
missionaries 199 Congregational Union of England and
places of worship 186–90, 217 Wales 44, 66, 69–70, 93, 184, 186, 192,
readers 197 194, 201
statistical unit 3, 10 Congregational Union of Scotland 66, 70
Sunday schools 43–5 Conservative Party 100–1, 176–81, 216
see also Anglicans Consett 109
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Consumers’ Association 166
Saints 67, 75, 209 continental Sunday 160, 162
Church of Scientology 75 contraception see birth control
262
conversation about religion 37, 207
conversion 60–2, 65, 77, 209
Conway Hall 80
Coronation Street 120
corpus linguistics 8, 224
Corrie, John 171
Council for Wales and Monmouthshire 87
Coventry 36, 161
Cox, Edwin 18
Cox, Jeffrey L. 22
Crathorne Committee (1964) 161, 215
cremation 115
cricket 164–5, 216
Crisis for Confirmation 54
Cunningham, Richard F. 62
Currie, Robert 10, 185, 187, 191, 193
Daily Express Poll 15, 97
Daily News and Leader 90, 130
Daily Service, The 117
Daily Telegraph, The 129, 176
Darragh, James 63
Davie, Grace 228
Davies, Rupert E. 185
Dawley 122–3, 131
death see funerals; mortality
Death of Christian Britain, The 4, 6
death penalty see capital punishment
decline narratives 1, 223
déjà vu 143, 146
Derby 93
Destiny 144
Devil 134, 137, 213
Dewsbury 188
Dickie Dirts 166
diffused religion 227
diffusive Christianity 227–8
discursive Christianity 6
disestablishment 155
divorce 111–12, 156, 166, 211, 223
Divorce Reform Act 1969 166
Do We Believe? 129
Donnelly, Mark 19
Dundee 28, 94, 176
Durham 68
Cranmer Hall 226
Dwyfor 162
East Anglia 29–30, 100–1
Easter:
church attendance 93, 98, 210
communicants 50–2, 208
date of 51, 128
observance of 127–8, 212, 220
Easter Act 1928 51, 128
Economic and Social Research Council 8
Index
Edinburgh 94, 104
Education Act 1944 17, 42
education and religion 17 see also religious
education
elders 198
electoral roll see Church of England
Elim Church 71
emigration 78, 208
England:
church attendance 84–7, 98–9, 210
church census (1979) 13–14, 40, 85–7, 94,
98–9, 188–9, 210, 217
church membership 40
opinion polls 28–30, 40, 96, 120, 122,
124–5, 134, 136–7, 152–3, 158, 164, 168
places of worship 188–9, 217
see also Church of England; Presbyterian
Church of England
England and Wales:
marriage 9, 110–12, 211
places of worship 183–4, 217
shopping on Sundays 165–6, 216
see also Roman Catholic Church (England
and Wales)
Episcopal Church of Scotland 51, 53, 90, 189
Erdozain, Dominic 7
Escott, Phillip 74
ethical investment 202
Ethical Union 79–80
ethnicity and religion 19, 71–3, 104
Eurobarometer 26–7, 34–5, 95–7
European Economic Community 26, 34, 60,
95–7, 160
European Values Study 20, 122, 139, 141, 148,
168–9, 171, 173–4, 181–2
Evangelical Fellowship of Congregational
Churches 70
exchanging messages with the dead 142,
145–6
Facts and Figures about the Church of
England 10
faith healing 142, 145–6, 214
Falkirk 104
family church 43
Fellowship of Independent Evangelical
Churches 73, 209
fertility 2, 55, 58, 60, 62, 76, 209, 223, 226–7
see also birth control
festivals 93 see also Christmas; Easter
fin de siècle 225
finance see religious finance
flying saucers 142, 146–7, 214
football 164–5
Forsyte Saga, The 116
fortune telling 143–5
 Index 263
France 154 Goodhew, David 226
Francis, Leslie J. 18 Gorer, Geoffrey E. S. 113, 130, 139
Freathy, Rob J. K. 17, 159 Graham, Billy 38, 69
Free Church Federal Council 64 Greater London see London
Free Church of Scotland 48 Greater World Christian Spiritualist
Free Churches: League 74
adherents 47–8, 221 Greek Orthodox Patriarchate 64
Bible 124–6 Green, Simon J. D. 1, 7, 156
church attendance 81–2, 84–5, 87, 91–3, Grimley, Matthew 6, 228
100–1, 210 Gross National Product 200
members 65–76, 208, 221 Gunstone, John 10
ministers 192–4
professing 24–5, 27, 29–33, 206 Hampshire 103
religious attitudes 170, 172–3, 177–81, 216 Hardy, Alister 147
religious beliefs 145 Harman, Leslie 10
religious experience 150 Harris, Alana 6, 228
Free Methodist Church 65 Harris, Jeffrey W. 12
Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland 48 Harris, Trevor 20
funeral directors 114–15, 211 Harris Research Centre 154–5, 175
funerals 112–15, 211, 220 see also mortality Hastings, Adrian 3
Hay, David 148–9
Gale, Richard 77 heaven 139–40, 213
Gallup Poll see Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Heelas, Paul 227
Ltd. hell 139–40, 214
gambling 166 Hemel Hempstead 91–2
Garnett, Jane 6, 228 Highet, John 9, 18, 40–1, 70, 89
gender and religion: Hill, Clifford 72
Bible 124–6 Hindus 77, 190, 209
church attendance 86–9, 92, 100–1 holidays away from home 128, 212
churching 109 Holiness Churches 66, 71, 85–6, 187,
clergy 195–6 189, 209
confirmation 53–5 Home Office see Crathorne Committee (1964)
converts 61 homosexuality 166, 168–9, 216
members 68–71, 74, 79 Honest to God 1, 3, 129, 223
missionaries 198–9 Hornsby-Smith, Michael P. 12, 19
prayer 123 horoscopes 142, 144–5, 214
religious attitudes 152, 160, 163, 165–6 horse-racing 164–5, 216
religious beliefs 132–4, 136, 138–40, Horsley, Lee 10
144–5, 147 Houlbrooke, Margaret 109
religious experience 149–50 House Churches 73, 209
religious profession 28–30, 33, 207 Huddersfield 35
self-assessed religiosity 34–7 Humanae vitae 59
see also Brown, Callum G.; ordination humanism 17, 79–80, 114 see also Knight,
of women Margaret
general elections 176–81 Hungary 64
geography and religion 16 hypnotism 142, 145–6, 214
ghosts 142–3, 146, 214
Gilbert, Alan D. 3, 10 immigration 7, 59–60, 63–4, 71–3, 76–7,
Gill, Robin 50, 82, 130, 210, 220, 224 209, 226
Glasgow 29, 94, 104, 176 implicit religion 228
Glass, David V. 31, 33, 35, 102, 133, 136 importance of religion 34–5, 149–50, 207
Glock, Charles 131 Independent Churches 85–6, 90, 186,
Gloucester 31–2, 46, 103, 116 189, 192
God 130, 133–6, 140, 169, 213, 220 see also Independent Methodist Churches 65
life forces Independent Television 31, 116, 118, 120,
Good Friday 128, 212 211–12
264 Index
Independent Television Authority: Knight, Margaret 117, 159
Bible 126 Knott, Kim 77
church attendance 97 Kosmin, Barry A. 12
prayer 123 Krausz, Ernest 9
religious attitudes 113, 153, 155
religious beliefs 132–3, 135–6, 139 Labour Party 100–1, 177–81, 216
religious broadcasting 116, 118–19, 121 Lampeter, University of Wales Trinity Saint
religious profession 37 David 147
self-assessed religiosity 35–7 Laughlin, Richard C. 202
Sunday schools 46 lay catechists 198
India 76 lay preachers 197–8, 217
inflation 202–4, 218 Le Bras, Gabriel 11
influence of religion on national life 152–3, leakage see Roman Catholic Church (England
214, 220 and Wales)
Insight Social Research 36, 116–17, 121, 123, Lebanon 158
126, 133, 135–6, 139, 153–4 Leeds 114–15, 122–3, 131, 136, 143–6, 149
Institute of Jewish Affairs 12 left-right self-placement scale 181–2
Inter-Churches Research Group 12–13 Liberal Catholic Church 63
interest in religion 35 Liberal Party 100–1, 177–81, 216
International Publishing Corporation Licensing Act 1961 162
97, 144 Licensing (Scotland) Act 1962 163
Ireland 60, 209 Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 163
Irish Republican Army 167 life after death 137–40, 213, 220 see also
irreligion, organized 79–80, 209 heaven; hell; reincarnation
Isaacson, Alan 85 life forces 133–7 see also God
Islam see Muslims Liverpool 68, 90–2
Islamophobia 159, 215 London 29–34, 90, 94, 100–3, 121, 133,
Isle of Man 14 136, 190
Israel 78, 158, 208, 215 Dagenham 102–3
Hammersmith 131–2, 213
James, William 147 Islington 132
Jehovah’s Witnesses 67, 75, 184, 209 Lambeth 93
Jesus Christ 135–6, 213, 220 Southwark 213
Jesus Christ, Superstar 136 Woodford 102–3
Jewish Agency for Israel 79 lonely people 121
Jewish Journal of Sociology 12–13 Lord’s Day Observance Society 160–1
Jewish Year Book 78, 189 Louis Harris Research 15, 36, 97–8, 155
Jews: lucky charms 142, 144
deaths 78, 112 Lutherans 73
marriage 111
politics 178–9 Machin, G. Ian T. 3
population 78, 208 Machynlleth 94
prejudice against 157–8, 215 MacLaren, Duncan 219
statistics 12–13 McLeod, D. Hugh 5, 19–20, 42, 221
synagogues and congregations 79, 184, Manchester 68, 93
189–90 MARC Europe 14, 88–9
John Paul II, Pope 156, 215 Market and Opinion Research
Jones, Bernard E. 12 International 15, 95, 97, 118, 155–6,
Judaism see Jews 166, 172
Marplan 15, 97, 133–4, 138–9, 143–4, 154–5,
Kaim-Caudle, Peter 113 175, 196
Kaufmann, Eric 226–7 marriage:
Kay, William K. 130 mixed 28, 60–1, 109, 157–8, 209–10, 223
Kendal 227 solemnization 9, 110–12, 211, 220
Kenya 77 Marriage Act 1949 111
Kirkby Stephen 32, 91, 114 Martin, David A. 2–3, 13, 54, 141
 Index 265
Marwick, Arthur 19 National Bible Society of Scotland 89
Mass-Observation 15, 43, 92, 103, 115, 131–2, National Christian Education Council 43
176, 202, 213–14 National Consumer Council 166
matriarchy 109 National Health Service 115
Mayor, Stephen H. 156 National Health Service (Family Planning)
media portrayals of religion 2, 8, 90, 129–30, Act 1967 166
159–60, 224 see also religious National Missionary Council of England and
broadcasting Wales 198
Meeting Point 120 National Opinion Polls 15
Merseyside 29, 31 church attendance 96–7, 99
Methodist Church Conference Agenda 68 religious attitudes 17, 46, 59, 80, 106,
Methodist Church of Great Britain: 153–6, 158–9, 163–6, 168, 170, 172–4,
baptism 106–7, 211 195–6
Bristol District 68 religious beliefs 133–40, 143–4, 146, 213
church attendance 84, 86–8 religious experience 148–50
churching 109 religious practices 122, 124–5, 127
community roll 48 religious profession 24, 26
deaths 112 self-assessed religiosity 34
Durham and Deerness Valley Circuit 68 National Secular Society 79–80, 114
finance 201 National Sunday School Union 43
Liverpool District 68 National Survey of Health and
local preachers 197 Development 28, 207
Manchester and Stockport District 68 Nationwide Initiative in Evangelism 13, 85
marriage 112 Naylor, Maura 114
members 48, 65–6, 68, 208 neighbours 157–8, 160
ministers 192–4, 196–7, 217 Neuss, Ronald F. 10, 43, 83
places of worship 184–7, 189–90, 217 New Age 140, 227
South Shields Circuit 68 New Churches 73, 186, 192, 209
statistics 3, 10, 12 New English Bible 126
Sunday school teachers 197 New Religious Movements 19, 75, 77–8, 209
Sunday schools 42–5 New Testament see Bible
York Wesley Circuit 68 New Testament Church of God 71
Methodist Sociological Group 12 New Towns 32, 91–2, 103
Middle East 158, 215 Newcastle-under-Lyme 103, 176
Midlands, East 30, 100–1 Newcastle-upon-Tyne 61, 109
Midlands, West 29–30, 101, 132 Newman Demographic Survey 11, 56–9, 83
Miller, William L. 176 Newton Aycliffe 103–4
ministers see clergy non-Christians 49, 76–9, 150, 184, 186,
miracles 126 192–3, 221
missionaries 198–9, 217 non-denominational Christians 25
Money Which? 193 non-stipendiary ministers 195, 217
Month, The 62 non-Trinitarian Churches 67, 74, 85, 186, 192
Moonies see Unification Church Nonconformists see Free Churches
morality and religion 117, 166–74, 216 nones 23
MORI see Market and Opinion Research church attendance 96, 101
International number 24–33, 206–7, 221
Mormons see Church of Jesus Christ religious attitudes 160, 168–9, 171–4,
of Latter-Day Saints 177–8, 180–2
Morris, Jeremy 6 religious beliefs 133, 145, 147, 216
mortality 58, 62, 68–70, 78, 105, 108–9, 185, religious experience 149–50
208 see also funerals NOP Market Research see National Opinion
multiculturalism 17 Polls
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act Norfolk 91–3, 122
1965 166 North-East England 30, 100–1, 103
Muslims 32, 76–7, 111, 159, 188, 190, 208–9, North-West England 29–31, 100–1
226–7 Northern England 29–30, 101, 153
266
Northern Ireland 9, 20, 40, 186, 188
Nottingham 149
University of 148
nuptiality 62, 112
O’Brien Castro, Monia 20
occupation see social class
oil crisis 202, 218
Old Roman Catholic Church 63
Old Testament see Bible
opinion polls 15–16
church attendance 95–104
limitations of 15–16, 24–5, 95–6, 99,
131, 210
religious attitudes 152–82
religious beliefs 129–47
religious experience 147–51
religious practices 115–28
religious profession 23–33
self-assessed religiosity 33–7
Opinion Research Centre 15
church attendance 96–7
religious attitudes 59, 112–13, 153–5,
162–3
religious beliefs 126, 132–3, 135–6, 138–9,
143–4, 213
religious practices 116, 118, 121, 123
religious profession 28
self-assessed religiosity 35–7
ordination of women 195–6, 198, 217
Orthodox Churches 39–40, 64, 86, 186, 189,
192, 201, 209
Our Missionaries 198
Oxford, Manchester College 147
Palestinians 158, 215
paranormal 142–3, 145, 214, 220
Parker, John 9
Parker, Stephen G. 17, 159
parliamentary candidates 157–60
parochial church councils 203
Parsons, Gerald 3
Pastoral Measure 1968 187, 217
Pastoral Research Centre 11, 56, 59
Paul, Leslie 10, 13, 83
Paul Report (1964) 10, 83, 195
Paul VI, Pope 59
Peach, Ceri 77
Pentecostal Churches 66, 71–2, 85–6, 186–7,
189, 192, 209
People, The 130
People’s Service, The 117
Perman, David 202
permissive society 166
Peterlee 103–4
physician-assisted suicide 173–4, 216
Index
Pickering, John F. 204
Pickering, William S. F. 81, 107, 113
Pickford, Michael 204
places of entertainment 163–4, 215
places of worship 183–90, 217, 220
sittings in 190
Places of Worship Registration Act
1855 183–4
politics and religion 174–82, 216
relationship between 174–5, 216
voting 100–1, 157–60, 175–81, 216 see also
Conservative Party; Labour Party; Liberal
Party
Population Investigation Committee 35
Postmaster General 119
power of religious groups 157–8
Prais, Sigbert J. 12
prayer 122–3, 212
premonition 142, 145–6, 214
Presbyterian Church of England 44, 66,
70–1, 184
Presbyterian Church of Wales 44, 47, 67, 73,
88, 184, 186, 189, 192–4
prestige effect 16, 95–6
Preston 31–2, 93
Primitive Methodist Church 185
prisoners 9
Protestant Churches 38–40, 48–9, 185, 191,
198–9
psychology and religion 16
public houses 162–4, 215
Puzzled People 132, 213
Quakers see Religious Society of Friends
race see ethnicity and religion
Rationalist Press Association 79–80
redundant churches 187–8, 217
Redundant Churches Fund 187
Registrar General 110–11, 183–4, 189–90,
217
reincarnation 139–41, 214
relevance of religion 152–3
Religion in Secular Society 2
religiosity see self-assessed religiosity
religious affiliation see religious profession
religious attitudes 152–82, 214–16
religious beliefs 129–47, 213–14, 220
alternative 141–7, 214, 220
measurement of 129–33
orthodox 133–41, 213–14, 220
religious broadcasting 115–21, 159, 211–12,
220 see also British Broadcasting
Corporation; Independent Television
religious census 9, 13, 82 see also England;
Scotland; Wales
 Index
religious community 46–9, 209–10, 220
religious crisis 2, 5–6, 24, 27, 49, 91, 183,
221, 224
Religious Crisis of the 1960s, The 5
religious education 17–18, 43–4, 158–9, 174,
220, 223
religious experience 147–51, 214
Religious Experience Research Unit 147–9
religious finance 200–5, 217–18, 220
religious membership see church membership
religious personnel 191–9, 217
religious prejudice 155–60, 215
religious profession 9, 16, 23–33, 178,
206–7, 220
religious revival of 1950s see Brown, Callum G.
religious socialization see children and
adolescents
Religious Society of Friends 47–8, 67, 74, 184
Research Services Ltd. 15, 97, 99
Reviews of United Kingdom Statistical
Sources 8, 15
revolutionary secularization see Brown,
Callum G.
Rice, Tom 132
rites of passage 2, 95, 105–15, 210–11, 220
see also baptism; churching of women;
funerals; marriage
Robinson, John A. T. 1–2, 129
Roman Catholic Church (England and
Wales):
baptism 57–8, 62, 106–7, 211
church attendance 83–8, 91–3, 210
churching 109
confirmation 62
converts 60–2, 209
deaths 58, 62, 112
fertility 58–9, 62
finance 201
immigration 59–60, 63–4, 209
lay catechists 198
leakage 61–3, 209
marriage 110–11
mixed marriages 60–1, 209
places of worship 183–4, 186–7,
189–90, 217
population 55–63, 209, 221
priests 192–4
see also Newman Demographic Survey;
Roman Catholics
Roman Catholic Church (Scotland):
baptism 106–7
church attendance 89–90, 94
marriage 110
places of worship 189
population 41, 59, 63
Roman Catholic Relief Act 1926 156
267
Roman Catholics:
Bible 124
church attendance 81, 100–1
prayer 123
prejudice against 156–7, 215
professing 24–7, 29–33, 206
religious attitudes 152, 159, 168–74,
176–82, 216
religious beliefs 133–4, 136, 140, 145, 216
religious community 49
religious experience 150
self-assessed religiosity 35
Rotherham 50, 91–2
Royal Statistical Society 8
rugby league 164, 216
Runcorn 32
rurality 29, 31–2, 91–3, 102–3, 197
Rushdie, Salman 159
Sacramental Index 57–8, 62–3, 209
Salford 103, 176
Salvation Army 73–4, 184, 186–7, 192–3, 208,
217
same-sex relationships see homosexuality
sample surveys see opinion polls
Schmool, Marlena 12
science 146–7, 213–14, 223
Scientology see Church of Scientology
Scotland 18
adherents 48
Bible 124
church attendance 87, 89, 98–101, 210
church census (1984) 40, 87, 89–90, 98–9,
188–9, 210, 217
church membership 40–1, 207, 219, 222
marriage 110–11, 211
places of worship 188–9, 217
religious attitudes 162, 178
religious beliefs 134, 139
religious experience 149
religious profession 28–31
sectarianism 156
Sunday observance 162–3, 165, 215–16
see also Church of Scotland; Congregational
Union of Scotland; Free Church of
Scotland; Free Presbyterian Church of
Scotland
Scottish Catholic Observer 130
Scottish Charity Regulator 201
Scottish Episcopal Church see Episcopal
Church of Scotland
Scottish National Party 178
seasonality 72, 97, 120, 212
Second World War 6–7, 42, 163, 185, 189,
208, 225
sectarianism 156
268
secular society 1–2, 208, 226
secularism 17, 79–80, 226
secularization:
chronology of 218–26
definitions of 2, 21, 23, 152, 200
historiography of 1–7
refutations of 22, 226–8
theory of 6, 21–2
see also Bruce, Steve; Wilson, Bryan R.
self-assessed religiosity 33–7, 207, 220
Seventh-Day Adventist Church 73
Sexual Offences Act 1967 166
Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? 226
Sheffield 91, 104, 113, 143, 176
University of 21
Sheppard, David S. 52
shopping hours 128, 165–6, 212, 216
Shops Act 1950 165–6, 216
Sikhs 77, 188, 190, 209
Six Day War 158
Sixties, The 19
Slack, Kenneth 1
Social and Community Planning Research
32, 97
social capital 223
social class and religion:
Bible 124–5
church attendance 100–1
religious attitudes 160, 179
religious beliefs 133–4, 136, 139,
144–5, 147
religious broadcasting 121
religious experience 149–50
religious profession 29–30, 33
self-assessed religiosity 34, 36
social crises 7
Social Democratic Party 180
social scientists, as source of religious
statistics 16–19
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd. 15
Bible 124–6, 212
church attendance 95–101, 210
prayer 122
religious attitudes 59, 61, 152–65, 168–72,
174–8, 180–2, 214–16
religious beliefs 131–47, 213–14
religious broadcasting 116–17, 121
religious experience 148–51, 214
religious festivals 127–8
religious profession 24–31, 33, 206–7
rites of passage 108
self-assessed religiosity 34–5
Sunday schools 45–6
Socio-Religious Research Services 13
Sociological Yearbook of Religion in
Britain, A 18–19
Index
sociologie religieuse 11
Sociology of English Religion, A 2–3
sociology of religion 2, 18–19
Songs of Praise 118, 120, 212
soul 139
sources of religious statistics 8–19
South Africa 202
South Place Ethical Society 80
South Shields 68
South-West England 30, 101, 149
Southern England 29–30, 100–1
Spain 154
Spencer, Anthony E. C. W. 11–13, 56–63
Spencer Specific Cohort Method 57–9, 62
spiritual but not religious (SBNR) 227
Spiritualism 74–5, 145–7
Spiritualist Association of Great Britain 74–5
Spiritualists’ National Union 74
spirituality 227
sport, professional 163–5, 215–16
Stark, Rodney 131
Stars on Sunday 120, 212
state, as source of religious statistics 9
Stein, Gordon 80
Stockton-on-Tees 107–8
Stoke-on-Trent 32, 103–4
Stokes, Donald E. 178–9
strength of opinion about religion 37, 207
Strict and Particular Baptists 69
Student Christian Movement 2
Suicide Act 1961 171
Sunday Break, The 119–20
Sunday Cinema Act 1972 163
Sunday Closing (Wales) Act 1881 162
Sunday Entertainments Act 1932 163
Sunday Freedom Association 161
Sunday Half Hour 117
Sunday observance 160–6, 215–16, 220, 223
Sunday Observance Act 1625 163
Sunday Observance Act 1780 164
Sunday schools:
attendance 86
schools and scholars 42–6, 208–9, 220
teachers 197, 217
Sunday Theatre Act 1972 163
Sunderland 32, 103–4
superstition 106, 109, 141, 143, 214
Survey Application Trust 14
Swansea 103–4
Swindon 91
Sykes, Richard P. M. 6
System Three 99
Tablet, The 62
Tanzania 77
Taylor, Wallis 9
 Index 269
telepathy see thought transference places of worship 188–9, 217
television, secularizing effects of religious experience 149
ownership 42, 116–17, 209, 223 religious profession 28–31
Ten Commandments 160 Sunday observance 162–3, 215
Thatcher, Margaret 175 see also Church in Wales; Presbyterian
theatres 163, 215 Church of Wales; Union of Welsh
Third Londoner Survey see Glass, David V. Independents
thought transference 142, 145–6, 214 walking under ladders 143–4
throwing spilt salt 143 Wallis, Roy 19
Times, The 25 Walter, Tony 137
touching wood 143 Wasdell, David 11
tourism 188 Washington 103–4
twicing 83–90, 93 welfare state 223
Tyneside 29 Wellingborough 46
Wells Group 200–2, 218
Uganda 77 Welsh Election Study 28, 99, 163
UK Christian Handbook 14, 64–5, 74, 76, Welsh language and religion 88, 104, 163, 188
198, 201 see also Union of Welsh Independents
UK Church Statistics 14 Wesley Deaconess Order 196
Ukraine 64 Wesleyan Methodist Church 185
unidentified flying objects see flying saucers Wesleyan Reform Union 65
Unification Church 78 West Indian and African Churches see Black
Union of Welsh Independents 66, 70, 88, 189 Churches
Unitarians 75–6, 184 West Indians 71–2
United Free Church of Scotland 70 Whyte, William 6, 228
United Kingdom 13–15, 38–9, 45, 49, 80, William Temple College 118–19
106–7, 160, 201, 207, 209 Williams, Ronald 161
United Methodist Church 185 Williams, Sarah C. 6, 213, 228
United Reformed Church 44, 48, 66, 70, 84, Wilson, Bryan R. 2, 22, 106, 113, 200, 217
86–7, 184, 186–7, 189, 192 Wolfe, James N. 204
United States of America 2, 34, 68, 132, 148 Wolfenden Report (1957) 168
University Humanist Federation 79–80 Wollaston, Barbara K. 13
university students 21, 149 Woodhead, Linda 227
Urban Church Project 11 Woolworth, F. W. & Co. Ltd. 128
World Christian Encyclopedia 14, 49, 63–4,
Varney, Peter D. 93 185–6, 188, 191
vicarious religion 228 World Christian Handbook 14, 38, 48–9,
Voas, David 108–9, 210 185, 191
voluntary euthanasia 171, 173–4, 216 World War II see Second World War
Voluntary Euthanasia Society 171 Wright, Derek 18
voting see politics and religion
Yates, Jess 120
Wales: Yates, W. Nigel 6
church attendance 87, 98–9, 101, 210 Yom Kippur War 158
church census (1982) 40, 87–8, 98–9, York 68, 92
188–9, 210, 217 University of 11
church membership 40 Yorkshire 29