1.

Arrests –

1. Nature and Requirements for Issuance of a Warrant

A. Applicable Rules
RULE 113 – Rules of Court
Arrest

Section 1. Definition of arrest. - Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.

Section 2. Arrest; how made. - An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall not be subject to a greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention.

Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. - It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver
him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary delay.

Section 4. Execution of warrant. - The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered for execution shall cause
the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer
to whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his failure to execute
the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor.

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Rule 112. Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace office
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with
this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence
of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen
(15) days from its inception.
Set B

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5)
days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
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defense as provided in this Rule. (7a; sec. 2, R.A. No. 7438)

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Section 6. Time of making arrest. - An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.

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Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. - When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform
the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when
he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil
the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)

Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. - When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall inform the
person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an
offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so
to inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. - When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to be arrested
of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is
pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (9a)

Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. - An officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon as many persons as he
deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the
arrest when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself.

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed as such xxx A person who, by direct
provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader
and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. (RPC)

Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. - An officer, in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant,
or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is
reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose.

Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. - Whenever an officer has entered the building or enclosure in
accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom when necessary to liberate himself.

Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. - If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately
pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines.

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. - Any member of the Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the
person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any
other place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested can
also exercise the same right.

B. General Distinctions between Search Warrant and Warrant of Arrest

1. Probable Cause:

Probability of guilt of a specific offender need not be established in search

warrants, unlike that of the warrant of arrest.
Set B

Specifically, probable cause to warrant arrest requires "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested." (Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 653
2

[1995])
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The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched". Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14,
1989

2. Validity. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date.
Thereafter it shall be void. Arrest warrants do not become stale.

3. When served. Search warrants must direct that it be served in the day time,
unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. An arrest may be made on any day
and at any time of the day or night.

C. Particularity of Description in Warrants of Arrest

Rule: John Doe warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties,
which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence
to technicality or farfetched judicial interference. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the
best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended,
and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon
whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities,
give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he
can be identified. G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISLANDS vs. JOSE MA. VELOSO

D. Probable Cause for Warrants of Arrest

The determination of probable cause: executive and judicial

Rule: (T)he conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the
existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon
evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or
she shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.

Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

In People v. Castillo and Mejia, (607 Phil. 754 (2009) this court has stated:
Set B

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It
is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion
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to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,

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 such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge
to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. In People v. Inting:

x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of
probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation
proper—whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the Prosecutor.

While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence
on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review
the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of
probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding. G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC.

Rule: There are two kinds of determination of probable cause; 1. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is
a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held
for trial. 2. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced
Set B

to issue the arrest warrant.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
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of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains

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the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to proceed with resolving
respondent's Petition for Review pending before her. It would be more prudent to
refrain from entertaining the Petition considering that the trial court already issued
a warrant of arrest against respondent. The issuance of the warrant signifies that
the trial court has made an independent determination of the existence of probable
cause. January 11, 2016 G.R. No. 209330 SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA vs.
MARIO JOEL T. REYES

E. Personal Examination

For warrants of arrest, the judge need not conduct a personal examination of
the applicant and his witnesses, he may rely on affidavits of the witnesses, as
well as the findings of the prosecutor.

Rule: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure;
otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts. G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES,
FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS vs. THE HON. RAMON P.
MAKASIAR

Rule: The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where
the judge has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of
probable cause by the judge ex parte. G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014 ALFREDO C.
MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC

Rule: Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is mandated
to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the
prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. These provisions
command the judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor’s findings
and to conduct his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties.
Set B

Section 5(a) of Rule 112 grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint
or information. He may:
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a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;

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b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or

c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause.

In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-
accused. To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the
requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage,
the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.
In doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing; he only needs to personally review the
prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. In a criminal

prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages. The first is at the executive level, where
determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary investigation, before the filing of
the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level, undertaken by the judge before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014 MA. GRACIA HAO and
DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

General Concepts: Some Cases:

Case: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza,, a traffic enforcer, testified that, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet; that he invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-
like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones,
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked
the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover
and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of
the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which
were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu

Was there a valid search incident to an arrest?

Rule: Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge
was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can
a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
Set B

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there
is intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
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officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for
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the same violation.

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Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being
flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if
any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this
case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after
petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person
apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce
or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures"
"generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist,"
and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are
by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a
traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to
be arrested for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he
was already in their custody. G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012 Rodel Luz y Ong vs. People
of the Philippines

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America
and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish
laws. These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 3737 of Act
No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest
without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo1, et al., the Court held that in the absence of any
provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar
functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England
Set B

and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
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1 G.R. No. 4367

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The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos2 that the rules on warrantless
arrest were based on common sense and reason. It further held that warrantless
arrest found support under the then Administrative Code which directed
municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.3

In United States v. Fortaleza4, the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of
the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions
taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court
and jurisprudence.5

Case: To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances. People vs. Kagui Malasugui. 63 Phil. 221.

Arrest without warrant; when lawful.6 - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense7;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it8; and

2 G.R. No. 12779 September 10, 1917

3 The Common Law rule as to the arrest without warrant of suspicious night-walkers is of particular interest.
Blackstone says, "Watchmen, either those appointed by the statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I, c. 4) to keep
watch and ward in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants to be constable,
may virtute offici (by virtue of their office) arrest all offenders, and particularly night-walkers, and commit
them to custody till the morning." (II Cooley's Blackstone, p. 1445.) The cases hold that a peace officer
might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is
reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed: but
the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of
suspicion to mislead the officer. (Miles vs. Weston [1871], 60 Ill., 361, citing English decisions.) The reason
of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about streets and uninhabited premises at
midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crimes is just as
commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officers must not be forced to await the commission
of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the necessities of life.
The foregoing are the applicable principles of the American and English Common Law as to the powers of
peace officers. The principles of the Spanish law are not essentially different. (See. U. S. vs. Sanchez
Set B

[1914], 27 Phil. Rep., 442.) Both rest upon the same foundation of reason and common sense.
4 G.R. No. L-4596 January 13, 1909
5 G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS et al vs. MORENO

GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

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6 Section 5., Rule 113

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7 In flagrante delicto
8 Possibly Hot Pursuit

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 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with section 7 of Rule 1129.

(a) WHEN, IN HIS PRESENCE, THE PERSON TO BE

ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED, IS ACTUALLY
COMMITTING, OR IS ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT AN
OFFENSE;

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an “in flagrante delicto” arrest.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two
requisites must concur:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and

(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.

Case: At around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on
his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters,
holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit in Caloocan City, alighted from his
motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously
arrested for illegal drug possession.

Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help
of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board
appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then
they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet.

Rule: On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon,
even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from

9 When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability
Set B

of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace office directly with
the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person (Section 7.,
Rule 112)
Inquest Proceedings - is the informal and summary investigation conducted by an inquest prosecutor in
9

criminal cases involving a person arrested, without the benefit of a warrant issued by the court, and
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thereafter detained, for the purpose of determining whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid, said
arrested person should remain under custody, and be correspondingly charged in court.

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a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible
and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held
by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient
to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be
properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he
(appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per
se of walking along the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts,
or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for
PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAZARENO
VILLAREAL y LUALHATI

Case: The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20, 2002,
an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug
pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team
was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-
appellant. They shouted "Boy Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself
Boy Bicol you have a warrant of arrest.)" Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout
and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant (Dela Cruz) was seen holding a shotgun through a
window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his firearm at him. The team
entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected
shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the
table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag
containing the seized drug.

Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the hideout was sent
to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for examination and tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of RA
9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.

The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but
convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.

Accused appealed to the CA. The CA sustained accused-appellant's conviction.

Rule: In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner
of the nipa hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control
over the nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not
disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was
merely a guest of Boy Bicol.
Set B

The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecution's evidence, that accused-appellant was
part of a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, the
prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drug-dealing. He was not even in
10

possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found inside a room with shabu, not as the
room's owner or occupant but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust
Page

team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly
used.

Pascua 2023
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his
subsequent arrest was also invalid.

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and

(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been sufficient
basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately prove
that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied
possessing the firearm, the prosecution's charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged
firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His arrest,
independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was
not proved to be committing any offense.

In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession by accused-
appellant of the seized shabu and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal
with the other issue raised. People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008, 571
SCRA 469, 475

Case: Members of the Mayor’s Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City, were on routine
patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon two individuals chanting
and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers introduced themselves and then
inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out from his possession three strips
of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic
sachet which contained white crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the
substance was "shabu", he confiscated the plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who
was later identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of the
plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three strips of aluminum foil also yielded positive for
traces of shabu.

On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further investigated by the City Prosecutor’s
Office. They were convicted both on trial and on appeal.

Issue: Petitioner challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest by asserting that at the time he
Set B

was apprehended, he was not committing or attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner argues
that since his arrest was illegal, the eventual search on his person was also unlawful.
11

Rule: Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
effected under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The MAC team
Page

witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing their suspicion that the
sachet contains shabu, team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their

Pascua 2023
motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the plastic
sachet because of their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members introduced themselves.
Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of
aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a distance, PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in
possession of the plastic sachet which contains white crystalline substance. There and then,
petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto
as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the
arresting team. Thus, his case comes under the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the attendant search and seizure were
admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged. Jurisprudence is settled that the
arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to search on the belongings
of the offender and confiscate those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense. x
x x Rebellion v. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 343, 348.

*Case: In a buy bust operation, PO2 Damasco and the informant went near the appellants who
were standing just outside their house. The informant and appellants exchanged greetings. After
a short conversation, Botong went inside their house. The informant introduced PO2 Damasco
to Malou by saying, "I-score itong kaibigan ko. Baka meron ka dyan." Malou then asked PO2
Damasco, "I-score ka na ba." After Malou asked PO2 Damasco, "Magkano," the latter
immediately gave her the marked P100 bill.

Malou called Botong and when the latter came out, Malou handed to him the marked money.
Botong then gave Malou a plastic sachet which she handed to PO2 Damasco.

After examining the plastic sachet, PO2 Damasco immediately gave the pre-arranged signal to
the other members of the team who thereafter rushed to the scene. PO2 Damasco arrested
Malou while SPO2 Zigapan arrested Botong.

Rule: The Court holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of
arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was
definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust
operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal
and has been proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.

In People v. Villamin, involving an accused arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust
operation, the Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified under
Set B

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the instant case. When
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially sanctioned
method of apprehending those involved in illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment,
12

as the idea to commit a crime comes not from the police officers but from the accused himself.
The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of
Page

a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. G.R. No. 191064
October 20, 2010 People of the Philippines vs. Rolando A. Araneta and Marilou T. Santos

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Case: According to the prosecution the policemen received a call from an infonnant regarding
an ongoing illegal numbers game at the residence of Bonaobra. Upon arrival at the target area,
the team parked their service vehicle (15 to 20 meters from the premises) outside the
compound fenced by bamboo slats installed two inches apart which allowed them to see the
goings on inside. According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting
bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers
placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting money
bets. When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as police
officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting to ₱l,500.00
in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone, and a pen. Petitioners
were then brought arrested and investigated for illegal gambling.

Rule: Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and
the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a
criminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest thereafter. The police officers even
admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7" to 5'9" in height, which
made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It appears that the police
officers acted based solely on the information received from PD Peñaflor's informant and not on
personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed, was actually being committed, or
was about to be committed in their presence. The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers
witnessed any overt act before entering the private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding
the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that from his position outside the compound, he could
not read the contents of the so-called "papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers
and money on the table, he readily concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalia. March
22, 2017 G.R. No. 200396 MARTIN VILLAMOR, and VICTOR BONAOBRA vs PEOPLE

Case: On February 2, 2007, at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, SP01 Metodio Aparis (SPO 1
Aparis), together with P03 Macarinas and P02 Tremaine Sotto (P02 Sotto), conducted a roving
patrol at Garfield Street, Barangay Suba, Cebu City. While doing the same, SPO 1 Aparis
noticed the accused-appellant, who was holding two pieces of white transparent sachets in his
right hand, in an alley. SPOl Aparis suspected that the sachets are dangerous drugs; and so,
he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired what the accused-appellant was holding.
Accused-appellant replied that somebody just asked him to buy shabu.

Rule: The factual circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused-appellant and the
subsequent seizure of the illegal drugs lead Us to conclude that the exception applies, as

(1) the apprehending officers were conducting a roving patrol on Garfield St. because of
the rampant drug-trafficking in said area;
(2) SPOl Aparis saw the accused-appellant holding transparent sachets, containing a
white crystalline substance;
(3) SPO1 Aparis identified himself as a police officer and inquired about the substance
Set B

which accused-appellant was holding; and

(4) upon SPOl Aparis' inquiry, accused-appellant replied that somebody just asked him
to buy what he was holding.
13

Accused-appellant's act of holding sachets of white crystalline substance, in an area where

Page

drug-trafficking is prevalent, was seen by SPOl Aparis' naked eye as it was plainly exposed to
the latter's view. Also, it is to be noted that he tried to exculpate himself from the liability when

Pascua 2023
he was confronted by a police officer. Thus, accused-appellant's argument that he was just
merely walking, and not committing a crime when he was arrested by SPOl Aparis, is flimsy and
unlikely. G.R. No. 219590 PEOPLE vs. MARCIAL M. PARDILLO

(b) WHEN AN OFFENSE HAS JUST BEEN COMMITTED,

AND HE HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE BASED ON
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS OR
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED
HAS COMMITTED IT;

This is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests. Here, two elements
must also concur prior to the arrest:

(1) “offense has in fact been committed,"

(2) the arresting officer has “probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it”

Case: In this case, a judicious review of the records show that while P02 Torculas was cruising
on his motorcycle, he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been
taken from a parked vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, P02 Torculas told petitioners to halt,
prompting the latter to speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of
the vehicle, Dombase, approached P02 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that
petitioners broke the window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners'
sudden flight upon being flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what
had just transpired is enough to provide P02 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating
that a crime had just been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover,
upon gaining such personal knowledge, not only did P02 Torculas chase petitioners until they
entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then
and there until they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances
indubitably show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to
effectuate a valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that P02 Torculas
obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he did not waver in
his continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing,
the Court concludes "that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless-arrest
on petitioners. Tulilik vs. People, G .R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019

In Posadas v. Ombudsman10, the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994.

It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On
the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis
Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this
Set B

set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the
warrantless arrest.
14
Page

10 G.R. No. 131492, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 388

Pascua 2023
Similarly, in People v. Burgos11, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA,
with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was
dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid
considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the
information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as
regards the commission of a crime.

Some more cases:

Case: At around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on
his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters,
holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit in Caloocan City, alighted from his
motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously
arrested for illegal drug possession.

Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help
of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board
appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then
they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet.

Rule: Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of
Section 5, Rule 113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed
and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had
committed it.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge
that a crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de
Leon was merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge G.R.
No. 201363 March 18, 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y
LUALHATI

Case: The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the
Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla, who was ambushed in broad
daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.

As a result of follow-up operations, Joel de Jesus, alias "Tabong," was apprehended, and
Set B

admitted that the ambush-slay of Abadilla was planned by the group whom he named, 3 days
before. In his second statement, Joel pointed to his cohorts in a police line-up inside the CID-
CPDC, PNP-NCR, Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he positively identified Rameses de Jesus
15

("Ram"), Cesar Fortuna, Lenido Lumanog and PO2 Romeo Costibolo as among those who
participated in the ambush-slaying of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The afore-named suspects
Page

11 G.R. L-68995, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1

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identified by Joel were apprehended during further follow-up operations conducted on June 20,
1996 by "Task Force Rolly" subsequently formed by the PNP after the lead initially provided by
him.

Rule: Once again, this Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons
under custodial investigation.

The police arrested Joel, without any warrant, on 19 June 1996 or six days after the killing. Six
days is definitely more than enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yet the police opted to arrest
Joel and the other accused, without any warrant, claiming that it was conducted in "hot pursuit."
In law enforcement, "hot pursuit" can refer to an immediate pursuit by the police such as a car
chase. Certainly, the warrantless arrest of Joel, made six days after the murder, does not fall
within the ambit of "hot pursuit." The question now is whether the successive warrantless arrests
of the accused are legal. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
on warrantless arrest provide:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b) When an offense
has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

None of the above instances is present in this case: (1) the accused were not arrested in flagrante
delicto; (2) the arrest was not based on personal knowledge of the arresting officers that there is
probable cause that the accused were the authors of the crime which had just been committed;
(3) the accused were not prisoners who have escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while their case is pending. There is no question that all the accused were
apprehended several days after the crime while doing ordinary and unsuspicious activities. There
is also no question that the police had no personal knowledge of probable cause that the accused
were responsible for the crime which had been committed. The third situation is inapplicable
since the accused are not prison escapees. Considering these facts, there is indeed no
justification for the warrantless arrests effected by the police in their so-called "hot pursuit." Such
warrantless arrest, therefore, amounts to a violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

The police investigation work in this case, which led to the unlawful warrantless arrest of the
accused, is nothing but sloppy: (1) they chose to rely solely on the sworn statement of one
eyewitness (Alejo); (2) they failed to obtain any description of the suspects from other
eyewitnesses, including the owner of the Kia Pride which was forcefully obtained by the suspects
as a get-away car; (3) they showed Alejo a picture of Joel to assist him in identifying the "suspect";
and (4) they arrested the other accused based entirely on the illegally extracted extrajudicial
confession of Joel.
Set B

Worse than their illegal warrantless arrest, the accused reportedly underwent unspeakable
torture in the hands of the police. While the Commission on Human Rights, "in its Resolution
16

dated July 16, 1996, did not make any categorical finding of physical violence inflicted on the
appellants by the police authorities, the CHR found prima facie evidence that the police officers
Page

could have violated Republic Act No. 7438, particularly on visitorial rights and the right to counsel,
including the law on arbitrary detention, x x x."

Pascua 2023
The speedy resolution of a crime is never a license for the police to apprehend any person and
beat him to admit his participation in a gruesome crime. In this case, without any credible
evidence linking the accused to the murder, the police blindly resorted to careless investigation
and unlawful apprehension of innocent men. Worse, the police apparently tortured the accused
to answer for the brutal slaying of Abadilla. Lumanog v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
182555, September 7, 2010, 630 SCRA 42, 130-131

Case: On August 23, 1999, a civilian informant, reported the drug trading activities of appellant
to Police Chief Inspector Ablang. Alonzo narrated that appellant agreed to sell him 200 grams of
shabu for P70,000.00 on a 50% cash and 50% credit basis. The sale was to take place in front
of the Mercado Hospital in Tanauan, Batangas, on August 27, 1999 at 11:30 p.m. Ablang formed
a team to conduct the buy-bust operation.

On August 27, 1999, the team proceeded to Mercado Hospital. The team members immediately
took strategic positions. Alonzo stayed in an eatery in front of the hospital.

Agojo arrived at 11:30 p.m. aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer. Appellant then approached Alonzo
to ask if the latter had the money. Alonzo handed appellant the marked money. Appellant took a
VHS box from his car and handed it to Alonzo. Appellant and Alonzo then walked along the
hospital gate near the emergency room. Appellant then entered the hospital.

Alonzo examined the VHS box then took off his cap to signal the buy-bust team. The buy-bust
team immediately proceeded to the scene. Alonzo told the team that appellant had entered the
hospital. Alonzo handed the VHS box to Ablang. Upon examination, the box was found to contain
four (4) plastic bags of a crystalline substance which the team suspected was shabu. Ablang
instructed Salazar to inform the appellant that his car had been bumped.

Appellant then exited from the hospital via the emergency room door. Salazar introduced himself
as a policeman and attempted to arrest him. Appellant resisted, but the other team members
handcuffed appellant. The team recovered P10,000.00 of the buy-bust money. Ablang opened
appellant’s Lancer and recovered a .45 caliber pistol containing seven (7) bullets and a
Panasonic cellular phone from the passenger seat.

Issue: Was Accused legally arrested?

Rule: Appellant’s assertion that he was framed-up has no merit. In almost every case involving
a buy-bust operation, the accused puts up the defense of frame-up. This court has repeatedly
emphasized that the defense of "frame-up" is viewed with disfavor, since the defense is easily
concocted and is a common ploy of the accused. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence of
the frame-up must be shown for such a defense to be given merit.

In this case, appellant points to the arrest not being in flagrante delicto, the existence of
discrepancies in the serial numbers of the buy-bust money and a prior attempt to frame him up
Set B

as proofs of the frame-up. However, the fact that the arrest was not in flagrante delicto is of no
consequence. The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, (Arrest without warrant; when lawful …b. When an offense has in fact been
17

committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it):
Page

Pascua 2023
From the spot where the buy-bust team was, they definitely witnessed the sale of shabu took
place. So, too, there was a large measure of immediacy between the time of commission of the
offense and the time of the arrest. G.R. No. 181318 April 16, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. GERMAN AGOJO y LUNA

*Rule: The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) (When an
offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and)
necessitates two stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:

(1) an offense has just been committed; and

(2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.

Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case. The police officers present
in Magallanes Commercial Center were able to witness the pay-off which effectively
consummates the crime of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car trunk
of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other police officers stationed in Fort
Bonifacio where appellant was expected to pass by.

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission
of the offense with their own eyes.

It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours
long enough for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This
is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause. G.R. No. 178039 January 19,
2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO UYBOCO y RAMOS

Case: Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to report the incident. Acting on
this report, SPOJ Monsalve and SP02 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and to render
assistance. SP02 Javier, together with personnel from the Airforce, A2C Sayson and Galvez,
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw
Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled
him.

Was there personal information that was the basis for the warrantless arrest?
Set B

Rule: The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso
of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
18

and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible
for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same
Page

neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers,

Pascua 2023
they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the
police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police
officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it
is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the
police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its
occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation
that took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper.
Consequently, the inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under
the circumstances. G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014 JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT
MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ vs. MORENO
GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

An Offense Has “Just Been Committed”

Rule: The requirement that an offense has just been committed means that there must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest.
If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of arrest must be secured. - People v. del Rosario 365 Phil. 292, 312 (1999).

In People v. Cendana, (268 Phil. 571, 576 -1990). the accused was arrested one (1) day after
the killing of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The
unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA, (G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992) the arrest of the accused six (6) days
after the commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been
committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim.

In People v. Tonog, Jr., (G.R. No. 94533, February 4, 1992) the warrantless arrest which was
done on the same day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts
Set B

which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused was
one of the perpetrators.
19

In People v. Gerente, (G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993) the policemen arrested Gerente
only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held
Page

Pascua 2023
that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid

(C) WHEN THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED IS A

PRISONER WHO HAS ESCAPED FROM A PENAL
ESTABLISHMENT OR PLACE WHERE HE IS SERVING
FINAL JUDGMENT OR IS TEMPORARILY CONFINED
WHILE HIS CASE IS PENDING OR HAS ESCAPED
WHILE BEING TRANSFERRED FROM ONE
CONFINEMENT TO ANOTHER.

Other Cases on Warrantless Arrests

Case: A concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in
the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon receipt of
the report, policemen and members of SWAT team headed to the house of Gonzales was located.

As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando Doria coming out
of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales,
the other co-accused. The four were surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were
open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces
of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct.

Rule: Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise
such issue before arraignment. However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.

This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a
plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions
to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for
the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful.

A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject items were
confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of the apprehending officers, they
proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house. Their arrest is illegal. First, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants
had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable
ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not
prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Set B

It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds
20

of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently
Page

strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. G.R. No.
191366 December 13, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y

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NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN

*Case: A police informer reported that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with
a specific plate number would deliver shabu, at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas to Michael
Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list.

PO3 Galvez and six other police officers went to the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit at
Burol 2nd, watching out for the owner type jeep mentioned. Since the informer did not give the
exact time of the delivery of shabu, the police officers staked out the expressway exit until late
afternoon. Later, such a jeep, bearing the reported plate number and with two men and a woman
on board, came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the two men as accused Eusebio
Quebral, who drove the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman as
accused-appellant Zenaida Quebral. The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the town
proper of Balagtas and entered a Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway.

After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused- appellant Michael Salvador
alighted. He walked towards the jeep and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed
a white envelope to him. On seeing this, PO3 Galvez, who was watching from about 15 meters
in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to move. The police officers alighted from their
vehicles and surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Michael, opened it, and saw
five plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he believed was shabu.

Rule: The accused claim that since the police did not have valid ground to arrest them, their
subsequent search of them was illegal and the evidence of the seized shabu cannot be admitted
in evidence against them. With the exclusion of the seized drugs, there would not be proof that
they were passing them

The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even without a warrant
only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, b) if he has just committed a crime and the
arresting officer pursued him, or c) if he escaped from a legal confinement. But in the first two
instances, the officer must have personal knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The target
person’s observable acts must clearly spell a crime. If no crime is evident from those acts, no
valid arrest can be made. An informant whispering to the police officer’s ear that the person
walking or standing on the street has committed or is committing a crime will not do. The arresting
officer must himself perceive the manifestations of a crime.

The accused-appellants point out that in this case the police officers cannot say that what they
saw from a distance constituted a crime. Two men and a woman arrived on board a jeep at the
gas station. A third man approached the jeep, spoke to the woman and she handed him a folded
white envelope that appeared to contain something. These acts do not constitute a crime per se.
Consequently, their arrest at this point was illegal. The subsequent search of their persons, not
being based on a valid arrest, was itself illegal.
Set B

But, actually, it was more of a search preceding an arrest. The police officers had information that
two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas and hand over a
consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to a known drug dealer whose name was on the
21

police watch list. When these things unfolded before their eyes as they watched from a distance,
the police came down on those persons and searched them, resulting in the discovery and seizure
Page

of a quantity of shabu in their possession. In such a case, the search is a valid search justifying
the arrest that came after it.

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As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law enforcers already had an inkling of the personal
circumstances of the persons they were looking for and the criminal act they were about to
commit. That these circumstances played out in their presence supplied probable cause for the
search. The police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed. Since the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is
admissible in evidence against the accused. G.R. No. 185379 November 27, 2009 PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDA QUEBRAL y MATEO, FERNANDO LOPEZ y AMBUS and
MICHAEL SALVADOR y JORNACION

*Rule: Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed
engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on
a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw
petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case,
it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his
part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee
after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic
sachet all the more pricked his curiosity. G.R. No. 182010 August 25, 2010 SUSAN ESQUILLO
Y ROMINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Other instances of a valid warrantless arrest;

1. Section 13, Rule 113: Arrest after escape or rescue – “If a person lawfully
arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may immediately pursue or retake
him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines.”

2. Section 23, Rule 114 (Par 1): Arrest of accused out on bail. - “For the purpose
of surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon written
authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking, cause him to be
arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion.”

3. Section 23, Rule 114 (Par 2): Arrest of accused out on bail. - “An accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where
the case is pending”

Rule: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed
upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
Set B

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.

If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the
22

court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of
Page

the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter G.R. No. L-62100 May 30,
1986 RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

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a. Exceptions to the Strict Enforcement Rule

*Case: SPO3 Competente narrated that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of
marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Agravante, chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team. The team
boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They
overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found
marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The
amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant's possession. The police officers confiscated
these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where
he was booked

The trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425,

Rule: Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated on lack of a warrant
of arrest. The OSG correctly justifies the failure to apply for an arrest warrant because at that
point, time was of the essence in appellant's apprehension, noting in the same breath that there
is no law requiring investigation and surveillance upon receipt of tips from assets before
conducting police operations.

The police were tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting marijuana to
Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already
in transit and already committing a crime12. The arrest was effected after appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence,
demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed. Under the circumstances, the
police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the
warrantless arrest is justified. G.R. No. 175604 April 10, 2008 THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR PEÑAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO

*Rule: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as
a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving appellant,
deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and
seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search,
incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that
the sachets of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and
were properly admitted in evidence against him. G.R. No. 185848 August 16, 2010 PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL SEMBRANO y CASTRO

b. Waiver of the Illegality of the Arrest

Rule: Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest – before her arraignment.
Set B

Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue
12 Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states: Sale, Administration,
23

Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
Page

who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such transactions. x x x.

Pascua 2023
of warrantless arrest – as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion
thereof– for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court. By such omissions, she is
deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest. G.R. No. 182010 August
25, 2010 SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

*Case: A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The agent gave the police the appellant’s
name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in
Baler, Aurora the following day.

On the following day, appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped
T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora.
At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted
from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having
alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring
him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied
the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen
was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and
with appellant’s name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165. Hence this appeal.

Rule: The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled
with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates
that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have
waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal G.R.
No. 186529 August 3, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JACK RACHO y RAQUERO

*Case: Branch 86 of the Quezon City RTC, by Decision of October 9, 2000, found Pepino and
Daisy Balaan guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accomplice, respectively, of the
crime of kidnapping.

Co-accused Daisy Balaan, having failed to attend the promulgation of judgment, a warrant for her
Set B

arrest was issued. It appears that she has remained at-large. Despite her flight, she moved for
reconsideration of the decision which the trial court, by Order of January 9, 2001, denied. She
thereafter filed a notice of appeal which was given due course by the trial court.
24

Pepino assails his conviction on, in the main, the following grounds: lack of positive proof that he
Page

actually participated in the crime; error in appreciating against him the alleged confession-letter
of the now deceased Pelinio; and the illegality of his arrest

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Rule: As for Balaan: Since she, without proferring any justifiable cause, failed to attend the
promulgation of judgment and continues to be a fugitive from justice to date, her appeal must be
dismissed. So Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court instructs:

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.—The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the

presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

x x x x.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice.

As for Pepino: The damaging evidence against Pepino notwithstanding, he did not at all offer any
controverting evidence. He merely relied on the alleged illegality of his arrest to escape criminal
liability

It is settled that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused should be timely raised in a
motion to quash the Information at any time before arraignment, failing which he is deemed to
have waived. Since Pepino did not raise such alleged irregularity early on, he is now estopped.
G.R. No. 183479, June 29, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY R. PEPINO and
DAISY M. BALAAN

c. Effect of declaration of Illegal Arrest

Case: AAA, while taking care of her one-year-old sister, was abused by her own father when he
entered the room and touched her genitals, after which he told her to lie down on the floor.

Overcome by fear, AAA did lie down on the floor as told. Appellant was not able to fully penetrate
AAA’s vagina, however, as her elder sister BBB went up the second floor and saw appellant
sitting in front of AAA who was lying down, face up. Appellant immediately warned BBB not to tell
their mother about what she just saw. After BBB left, appellant inserted his penis inside AAA’s
vagina.

BBB lost no time to report that same day to her mother CCC, live-in partner of appellant, what
she saw. CCC thus immediately confronted AAA who did confirm that appellant had inserted his
Set B

penis inside her vagina that afternoon, and that appellant had been doing the same act to her
since she was nine years old. Incensed, CCC accompanied AAA the following day, December 6,
2000, to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to report the incident.
25
Page

Pascua 2023
From the DSWD, AAA and her mother, accompanied by a social worker, proceeded to the police
station of San Mateo, Rizal where they lodged a complaint against appellant. At the police station,
AAA and CCC were interviewed by PO1 Florescita S. Javier.

PO1 Javier, together with AAA and CCC thereafter proceeded to the family home, and on their
way, they met appellant. PO1 Javier at once informed him of his rights, arrested him, and brought
him to the police station. AAA’s and CCC’s statements were thereupon taken.

Rule: Appellant claims that his arrest was illegal because a "warrantless arrest was effected even
before the statement of the private complainant was taken." Objections to the legality of arrests
must, however, be made prior to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are considered
waived

We have ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he
fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused,
any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court as what was done by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter their
pleas during arraignment, but they also actively participated during the trial which constitutes a
waiver of any irregularity in their arrest. G.R. No. 167670 December 7, 2007 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO BIYOC y WENCESLAO

That the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction
duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:

Case: Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting
the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union
together with Aratas and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-
bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be
looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run
away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of
Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado
to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of
eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.

Accused, after convicted, argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest
effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his
bag that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Rule: It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of
these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear
to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify
Set B

petitioner’s warrantless arrest.

Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding
26

his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached
him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
Page

knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to

Pascua 2023
engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in
fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to
the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation
in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot,
in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.

Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they
were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. When petitioner was arrested without a
warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected
in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest. G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
Arseniq Vergara Valdez vs. People of the Philippines

*Rule: The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest People v. Racho, G.R.
No. 186529, August 3, 2010. quoted also in G.R. No. 191366 December 13, 2010 PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y ANGELES

Note: Possible Remedies: Motion to Quash the Information, Damages (Art 32

CC), Administrative Cases

Bar Exam (November 4, 2018)

XVIII - Two police teams monitored the payment of ransom in a kidnapping case.

The bag containing the ransom money was placed inside an unlocked trunk of a car which was parked
at the Angola Commercial Center in Mandaluyong City.

The first police team, stationed in an area near where the car was parked, witnessed the retrieval by the
kidnappers of the bag from the unlocked trunk. The kidnappers thereafter boarded their car and
proceeded towards the direction of Amorsolo St. in Makati City where the second police team was
waiting.

Upon confirmation by radio report from the first police team that the kidnappers were heading towards
their direction, the second police team proceeded to conduct surveillance on the car of the kidnappers,
Set B

eventually saw it enter Ayala Commercial Center in Makati City, and the police team finally blocked it
when it slowed down. The members of the second police team approached the vehicle and proceeded
to arrest the kidnappers.
27

Is the warrantless arrest of the kidnappers by the second police team lawful? (5%)
Page

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2. Immunity of Arrest from Members of Congress

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session… (Art VI)

Related Cases:

- G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
- G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008 ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, vs. HON. OSCAR
PIMENTEL

B. Privacy

1. Privacy in General

“Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository
of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom”
Public Utilities Commission v Pollak, 343 US 451, 467 (1952).

The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." The right of privacy has
grown to defend the freedom of individuals to autonomy, to decide on whether
or not to implement certain acts or allow themselves to participate to certain
affairs. This personal autonomy has grown into a freedom secured by law.

There are three overlapping clusters of privacy claims:

 Informational privacy involves control over information about oneself.

 Accessibility privacy is the limited-access conception: It focuses not
merely on information or knowledge but more centrally on
observations and physical proximity.
 Expressive privacy protects a realm for expressing one's self-identity
or personhood through speech or activity.

Thus, these combines three theories of privacy:

(1) control over information;

(2) limited access; and
Set B

(3) personhood. (Solove, 2002: 1125)

According to BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES13, if we extend our judicial

28

gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
Page

13 G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

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provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in the Bill of Rights, to
wit;

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may
be provided by law.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws.

The Civil Code provides that;

a. "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.
(Art. 26)
Set B

“Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
29

constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action damages, prevention and
other relief:
Page

Pascua 2023
 (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.”

b. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person (Art.
32), and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.
(Art. 723)

The Revised Penal Code makes a crime

a. the violation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229),

b. the revelation of trade and industrial secrets (Art. 290-292), and
c. trespass to dwelling (Art. 280).

Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like

a. The Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200),

b. The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (R.A. 1405), and
c. The Intellectual Property Code (R.A. 8293).
d. The Data Privacy Act RA. 10173
e. Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 RA 10175

The Rules of Court on privileged communication (Sec 24, Rule 130 [C], Revised
Rules on Evidence) likewise recognize the privacy of certain information14.

14 Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information
which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information
Set B

was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined
as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional character in the course
30

of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications
Page

made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.

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Some Cases:

The source of the right to privacy governing bank deposits is statutory, and not Constitutional.
Congress may validly carve out exceptions to the rule of Bank secrecy, as Section 11, of RA
9160. which provides that the AMLAC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or
investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any
competent court in cases of violation of this Act when it has been established that there is
probable cause that the deposits or investments involved are in any way related to a money
laundering offense. G.R. No. 174629 February 14, 2008 REPUBLIC vs. ON. ANTONIO M.
EUGENIO, JR

*Case: Petitioner Ople prays for the invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the
rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

Rule: We prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified
by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed
as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His
transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of
the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse,
a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction
or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system.

The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed
on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses
that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
Set B

We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court
to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
31

The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
Page

short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic

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disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.

Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces
of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society. G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998 BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES

Case: Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task.

The constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the
Senate’s power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution15.

Rule: Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction
that the right to privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”

Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to
determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed.”
Section 2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.”
Section 3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and correspondence” and further
cautions that “any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”

In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion

This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling
state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe, employed the rational
Set B

basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual’s right to
privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and
minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service,
32

15Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
Page

inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.

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and promote morality in public administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court remarked that
as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny.
Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information
on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.

Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress
but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right
to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely
depend on the information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to
information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the government. Section 4(b)
limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information
and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. IN THE
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO
L. SABIO G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006

Case: Petitioner seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c),
(d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 to wit;

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by
the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public
and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension
or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx
Set B

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
undergo a mandatory drug test;
33

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
Page

government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

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In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative
power?

Rule: For Testing of Students: The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues
raised in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (515 U.S. 646 (1995), 661.), considered the
following:

(1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students;

(2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less
privacy rights;
(3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the former observe communal
undress before and after sports events;
(4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree
of school supervision and regulation;
(5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student’s privacy since a student need not undress
for this kind of drug testing; and
(6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the
young.

The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth and
14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v.

Earls, et al., the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for
high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the
show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that
the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments.
As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before
their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among
non-athletes on the basis of the school’s custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said
court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of
the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the
Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need
Set B

to engage.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
34

provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
Page

condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.

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To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.

For Testing of Officers and Employees: Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody
to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the
individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes
unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right
to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities. And while
there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted
search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from
C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to
certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of
the government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for
employees––and students for that matter––under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,”
the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis
of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged
law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
Set B

formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search “narrowly drawn” or
“narrowly focused”?
35

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
Page

towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under
a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under

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the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165
itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect
as much as possible the employee’s privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law
specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But
the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.] In addition, the
IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know”
basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

For Testing of the Accused:- Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the
case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
Set B

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
36

imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
Page

mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They

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are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent
to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves. G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008 SOCIAL
JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)

2. Privacy of Communications

Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. (Art III)

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy:

(a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of
the right to be let alone, and

(b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.

In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these
zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.

Rule: The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the right
to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of
constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy."
The Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Sabio v. Senator Gordon“ the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Set B

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process.
37

The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right
to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our
Page

adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be

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subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.“Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, 11 February 2014

Prisoners / Inmates

Case: We now pass upon petitioners’ argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees’ right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters
handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners
point out that the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no
envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the
infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not
deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.

Rule: Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the
detainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication.
The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure
as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters
between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as
their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were
not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but
only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as
to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention,
pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis
would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative
solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO

Wire Tapping
Set B

Rule: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
38

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
Page

communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or

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 arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word
by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being
overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable
fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to
expose. Free conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of
life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals —
free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S. GARCIA

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200

AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication
or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Sec. 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

Sec. 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be
Set B

unlawful in the preceding Sec. or who violates the provisions of the following Sec. or of any order issued thereunder, or aids,
permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or
more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a
public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation
39

proceedings.
Page

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Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by
a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding Sections in cases involving
the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and
other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority
shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any
person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available
for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic
communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer
authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense
or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for
the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended
or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.

All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order,
be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace
officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the
number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part
thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with
the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their
contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.

The court referred to in this Sec. shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the
acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding Sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Sec. 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.

Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1965

*Case: In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
Set B

of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
40

advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. According to the request, appellant went
Page

to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. When complainant called up,
Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a

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telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Appellant heard complainant enumerate the conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault., including the condition that P5,000.00 be paid for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his
client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office, among others

Later, when he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary.

Issue: The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening
to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the
extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.

Rule: The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning
of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a
device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to
six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or
deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are
sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use
of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or
arrangement under the law?

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or

the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive
to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main
line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.

The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 EDGARDO A.
GAANAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Set B

Case: On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan
Paguia, released an alleged authentic tape recording of a wiretap. Included in the tapes were
41

purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.
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On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons
included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing
said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal
knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.

On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release;

“Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily
aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations and television network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides
that said companies shall not use [their] stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false
information or willful misrepresentation. Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the
[NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversations which they
claim involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC
regarding supposed violation of election laws. …. The [NTC] will not hesitate, after
observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force the provisions of said
Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators.”

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents
Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, "praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the
unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents."

Rule: The records of the case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.
Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed
to the public two versions, one supposed to be a "complete" version and the other, an "altered"
version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping
act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable
whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

The petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying
the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on
airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for
constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press. G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES
Set B

Mail Matter / Documents

Rule: Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
42

constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
Page

her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be

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enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding." G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996 CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

RA 10173 The Data Privacy Act

CHAPTER III
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

Section 11. General Data Privacy Principles. – The processing of personal information shall be allowed, subject to compliance with
the requirements of this Act and other laws allowing disclosure of information to the public and adherence to the principles of
transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality.

Personal information must, be:

(a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and declared before, or as soon as reasonably practicable after
collection, and later processed in a way compatible with such declared, specified and legitimate purposes only;

(b) Processed fairly and lawfully;

(c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it is to be used the processing of personal information, kept up
to date; inaccurate or incomplete data must be rectified, supplemented, destroyed or their further processing restricted;

(d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and processed;

(e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes for which the data was obtained or for the
establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or for legitimate business purposes, or as provided by law; and

(f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data
were collected and processed: Provided, That personal information collected for other purposes may lie processed for historical,
statistical or scientific purposes, and in cases laid down in law may be stored for longer periods: Provided, further, That adequate
safeguards are guaranteed by said laws authorizing their processing.

The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal information processing principles set out herein.

Section 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. – The processing of personal information shall be permitted
only if not otherwise prohibited by law, and when at least one of the following conditions exists:

(a) The data subject has given his or her consent;

(b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the fulfillment of a contract with the data subject or in
order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;

(c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal information controller is subject;
Set B

(d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the data subject, including life and health;

(e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to comply with the requirements of public order and
safety, or to fulfill functions of public authority which necessarily includes the processing of personal data for the fulfillment of its
43

mandate; or
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(f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the personal information controller or by a
third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by fundamental rights and freedoms
of the data subject which require protection under the Philippine Constitution.

Section 13. Sensitive Personal Information and Privileged Information. – The processing of sensitive personal information and
privileged information shall be prohibited, except in the following cases:

(a) The data subject has given his or her consent, specific to the purpose prior to the processing, or in the case of privileged
information, all parties to the exchange have given their consent prior to processing;

(b) The processing of the same is provided for by existing laws and regulations: Provided, That such regulatory enactments
guarantee the protection of the sensitive personal information and the privileged information: Provided, further, That the consent
of the data subjects are not required by law or regulation permitting the processing of the sensitive personal information or the
privileged information;

(c) The processing is necessary to protect the life and health of the data subject or another person, and the data subject is not
legally or physically able to express his or her consent prior to the processing;

(d) The processing is necessary to achieve the lawful and noncommercial objectives of public organizations and their associations:
Provided, That such processing is only confined and related to the bona fide members of these organizations or their associations:
Provided, further, That the sensitive personal information are not transferred to third parties: Provided, finally, That consent of the
data subject was obtained prior to processing;

(e) The processing is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, is carried out by a medical practitioner or a medical treatment
institution, and an adequate level of protection of personal information is ensured; or

(f) The processing concerns such personal information as is necessary for the protection of lawful rights and interests of natural or
legal persons in court proceedings, or the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or when provided to government or
public authority.

Section 14. Subcontract of Personal Information. – A personal information controller may subcontract the processing of personal
information: Provided, That the personal information controller shall be responsible for ensuring that proper safeguards are in place
to ensure the confidentiality of the personal information processed, prevent its use for unauthorized purposes, and generally,
comply with the requirements of this Act and other laws for processing of personal information. The personal information processor
shall comply with all the requirements of this Act and other applicable laws.

Section 15. Extension of Privileged Communication. – Personal information controllers may invoke the principle of privileged
communication over privileged information that they lawfully control or process. Subject to existing laws and regulations, any
evidence gathered on privileged information is inadmissible.

CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT

Section 16. Rights of the Data Subject. – The data subject is entitled to:

(a) Be informed whether personal information pertaining to him or her shall be, are being or have been processed;

(b) Be furnished the information indicated hereunder before the entry of his or her personal information into the processing system
of the personal information controller, or at the next practical opportunity:
Set B

(1) Description of the personal information to be entered into the system;

44

(2) Purposes for which they are being or are to be processed;

Page

(3) Scope and method of the personal information processing;

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(4) The recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed;

(5) Methods utilized for automated access, if the same is allowed by the data subject, and the extent to which such access is
authorized;

(6) The identity and contact details of the personal information controller or its representative;

(7) The period for which the information will be stored; and

(8) The existence of their rights, i.e., to access, correction, as well as the right to lodge a complaint before the Commission.

Any information supplied or declaration made to the data subject on these matters shall not be amended without prior notification
of data subject: Provided, That the notification under subsection (b) shall not apply should the personal information be needed
pursuant to a subpoena or when the collection and processing are for obvious purposes, including when it is necessary for the
performance of or in relation to a contract or service or when necessary or desirable in the context of an employer-employee
relationship, between the collector and the data subject, or when the information is being collected and processed as a result of
legal obligation;

(c) Reasonable access to, upon demand, the following:

(1) Contents of his or her personal information that were processed;

(2) Sources from which personal information were obtained;

(3) Names and addresses of recipients of the personal information;

(4) Manner by which such data were processed;

(5) Reasons for the disclosure of the personal information to recipients;

(6) Information on automated processes where the data will or likely to be made as the sole basis for any decision significantly
affecting or will affect the data subject;

(7) Date when his or her personal information concerning the data subject were last accessed and modified; and

(8) The designation, or name or identity and address of the personal information controller;

(d) Dispute the inaccuracy or error in the personal information and have the personal information controller correct it immediately
and accordingly, unless the request is vexatious or otherwise unreasonable. If the personal information have been corrected, the
personal information controller shall ensure the accessibility of both the new and the retracted information and the simultaneous
receipt of the new and the retracted information by recipients thereof: Provided, That the third parties who have previously received
such processed personal information shall he informed of its inaccuracy and its rectification upon reasonable request of the data
subject;

(e) Suspend, withdraw or order the blocking, removal or destruction of his or her personal information from the personal information
controller’s filing system upon discovery and substantial proof that the personal information are incomplete, outdated, false,
unlawfully obtained, used for unauthorized purposes or are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected. In
this case, the personal information controller may notify third parties who have previously received such processed personal
information; and
Set B

(f) Be indemnified for any damages sustained due to such inaccurate, incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully obtained or
unauthorized use of personal information.
45

Section 17. Transmissibility of Rights of the Data Subject. – The lawful heirs and assigns of the data subject may invoke the rights
Page

of the data subject for, which he or she is an heir or assignee at any time after the death of the data subject or when the data
subject is incapacitated or incapable of exercising the rights as enumerated in the immediately preceding section.

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Section 18. Right to Data Portability. – The data subject shall have the right, where personal information is processed by electronic
means and in a structured and commonly used format, to obtain from the personal information controller a copy of data undergoing
processing in an electronic or structured format, which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject. The
Commission may specify the electronic format referred to above, as well as the technical standards, modalities and procedures for
their transfer.

Section 19. Non-Applicability. – The immediately preceding sections are not applicable if the processed personal information are
used only for the needs of scientific and statistical research and, on the basis of such, no activities are carried out and no decisions
are taken regarding the data subject: Provided, That the personal information shall be held under strict confidentiality and shall be
used only for the declared purpose. Likewise, the immediately preceding sections are not applicable to processing of personal
information gathered for the purpose of investigations in relation to any criminal, administrative or tax liabilities of a data subject.

III – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. (Art III)

Section 18. … No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations. (Art III)

Protected Speech includes all kinds of expression. written, oral, print, or recorded,
as well as symbolic. This guarantee only includes core speech as those that
advance religious, political and social ideal.

The citizen can articulate his views, for whatever they may be worth, through the
many methods by which ideas are communicated from mind to mind. Thus, he
may speak or write or sing or dance, for all these are forms of expression
protected by the Constitution. So is silence, which "persuades when speaking
fails." Symbolisms can also signify meanings without words, like the open hand
of friendship or the clenched fist of defiance or the red flag of belligerence.

The individual can convey his message in a poem or a novel or a tract or in a

public speech or through a moving picture or a stage play. In such diverse ways
may he be heard. There is of course no guaranty that he will be heeded, for a
acceptability will depend on the quality of his thoughts and of his persona, as well
as the mood and motivation of his audience. But whatever form he employs, he
is entitled to the protection of the Constitution against any attempt to muzzle his
thoughts.16 This is unless the same is contrary to law, public order or public
policy, as in seditious speeches, slanderous or libelous remarks and indecent or
immoral expression that may corrupt the public (especially the youth).
Set B

Case: Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech. Communication

exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because
he or she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the
46
Page

16 G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (Cruz
J)

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 manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,]
the hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims or
opposing them with criticism or requests for justification." Bishop Vicente M. Navarra v.
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

COMMERCIAL SPEECH is entitled to lesser protection compared to other

constitutionally guaranteed expression;17 It is communication which involves
only the commercial interests of the speaker and the audience such as
advertisements. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed.,P. 1529) Commercial s entitled
to lesser protection compared to other constitutionally guaranteed expression;
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 259 SCRA 529 Yet, it is entitled to
constitutional protection. (Ayer Productions Pty., Ltd Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA
861.) It may be required to be submitted to a government agency for review to
protect public interest by preventing false or deceptive claims. (Pharmaceutical
And Health Care Association Of The Philippines vs. Duque, 535 SCRA 265.)

Symbolic expression’

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of

speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’" such that "‘when ‘speech’
and ‘non-speech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the
‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the
[right to freedom of expression].’"

The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of

speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as
a symbolic manner of communication. (Bishop Vicente M. Navarra v. G.R. No.
205728, January 21, 2015)

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech

sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’"such that "‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’
elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the
conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’" Joshua
Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1847 (1997).

In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (G.R. No. 95770

March 1, 1993) , in the concurring opinion, Justice Cruz he discussed how the
salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of expression. He
adds that freedom of speech includes even the right to be silent:

“Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights
Set B

that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him

17Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to protect low value
47

speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still
applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile
Page

audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. IGLESIA NI
CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 259 SCRA 529

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 the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of
communication that conveys its messageas clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid
form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of
valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to
deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of
conscience has no place in the free society.”

Why do we need to protect this freedom?

In Bishop Vicente M. Navarra v. G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, the
Supreme Court discussed that there are several theories and schools of thought
that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including
the right to criticize government actions.

Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place
of ideas.

Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This
right is "a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment."

Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.

Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals
and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework
[of democratic governance].

Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.

BASES AND LIMITATION OF THE RIGHT

A. Philosophic Basis

Free expression is rooted not only on legal grounds, but in rather more personal,
practical, and socio political premises.

1. Market Place of Ideas. freedom of speech is important because, in a

marketplace of ideas, the better ideas eventually prevail through competition.
It is modeled both on laissez faire in the economic realm and on scientific
experimentation. Under this rationale there is no hierarchy of speech. The
Set B

value of different kinds of speech depends solely on the marketplace’s

assessment.18
48
Page

18 http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-speech/

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 Protecting speech, even speech in error, is necessary to the eventual
ascertainment of the truth, through conflict of ideas in the marketplace, a view
skeptical of our ability to ever know the truth.19

2. Discovery of Political Truth. – Guaranteed is the right of every citizen to

express their sentiments and raise their concerns with the government and
the entire political structure. With the long history of corruption and experience
of dictatorship, transparency and public inquisitiveness on state affairs is
deemed necessary.

3. For Self Government - Citizens are to engage in self-government by using

reason and practical judgment. Accordingly, one rationale of freedom of
speech is that it is indispensable for self-government. People communicate on
political matters so that they can intelligently participate in the democratic
process.

Under this rationale, political speech ranks at the top of the hierarchy, with
other kinds of speech ranked in a derivative manner based on their relation to
political speech.20

4. For individual Perfection - Freedom of expression is necessary to promote

individual self-fulfillment, such as the concept that when speech is freely
chosen by the speaker to persuade others it defines and expresses the ''self,''
promotes his liberty, or the concept of ''self- realization,'' the belief that free
speech enables the individual to develop his powers and abilities and to make
and influence decisions regarding his destiny. 21

This rationale treats freedom of speech as promoting every individual’s self-

fulfillment and autonomy.

Under this rationale, non-political speech such as artistic expression is fully

covered; as with the marketplace of ideas rationale, there is no hierarchy of
speech. On the other hand, under this approach one wonders what is so special
about freedom of speech inasmuch as other provisions of the Constitution–
think substantive due process–similarly promote self-fulfillment and
autonomy.22

B. Restrictions to Free Speech - Prior Restraint and Subsequent punishment

Set B

19 The ''marketplace of ideas'' metaphor is attributable to Justice Holmes' opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 519 (1979). The theory has been the dominant one in scholarly and judicial writings. Baker,
49

Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 967-74 (1978).
20 http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-speech/
Page

21 Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982).
22 http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-speech/

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a. Prior Restraint - Restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 2003 ed., p. 225.)

Examples: A system of licensing administered by an executive officer;

Judicial prior restraint which takes the form of an injunction against
publication; The imposition of license taxes that renders publication or
advertising more burdensome.

b. Subsequent punishment - The imposition of liability to the individual exercising

his freedom. It may be in any form, such as penal, civil or administrative penalty.

Like any other manifestations of freedom, reasonable restrictions, may be

imposed on personal and collective freedoms. According to the popular maxim
“sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” (use [what is] yours so as not to harm [what
is] of others) and the expression, “your freedom ends where my freedom begins”,
freedom in society can never be absolute.

Free expression may thus be restricted by prior restraint, and subsequent

punishment. Generally, these promote state survival, and public welfare that is,
social order.

However, prior restraint and subsequent punishment cannot be taken lightly,

freedom of expression being a preferred right.

Prior restraint is generally understood as an imposition in advance of a limit upon

speech or other forms of expression. In determining whether a restriction is a
prior restraint, one of the key factors considered is whether the restraint prevents
the expression of a message. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, the U.S.
Supreme Court declared:

A prior restraint… by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be

said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior
restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.

As an aspect of freedom of expression, prior restraint should not be confused with

subsequent punishment. In Alexander v. U.S ,petitioner’s complaint was that the RICO
forfeiture provisions on businesses dealing in expressive materials constituted "prior
restraint" because they may have an improper "chilling" effect on free expression by
deterring others from engaging in protected speech. 23
Set B

Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression,

and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
Indeed, “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing
50

a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” The Government “thus

Page

23 G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES,

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carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such
restraint.” There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that
inheres in every legislation." 24

Subsequent punishment is likewise seen as a threat to legitimate expression.

There is logic in the proposition that the liberty of the press will be rendered
a "mockery and a delusion" if, while every man is at liberty to publish what he
pleases, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless
publications. In this regard, the fear of subsequent punishment has the same
effect as that of prior restraint.25

Case: Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with
political advertisements. Specifically, the petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations
placed on aggregate airtime allowed to candidates and political parties, as well as the
requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the same, and the sanctions imposed
for violations.

Petitioners ABS-CBN ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, and RMN are owners/operators of radio and
television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner KBP is the national organization of
broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and television stations
and said stations themselves.

All of the petitioners assail the requirement of prior notice to the COMELEC for TV guestings, and
the following provisions of the Resolution:

c) Section 14,10 which provides for a candidate's "right to reply", to wit;

SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups or coalitions
and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges published or aired against
them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio station
which first printed or aired the charges with the same prominence or in the same page or
section or in the same time slot as the first statement.

Respondent sees no prior restraint in the provisions requiring notice to the COMELEC for
appearances or guestings of candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It points out that the fact
that notice may be given 24 hours after first broadcast only proves that the mechanism is for
monitoring purposes only, not for censorship. Further, respondent argues, that for there to be
prior restraint, official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression must
be done in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Moreover, petitioners are only required
to inform the COMELEC of candidates'/parties' guestings, but there is no regulation as to the
content of the news or the expressions in news interviews or news documentaries. Respondent
then emphasized that the Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech and the press may be
Set B

limited in light of the duty of the COMELEC to ensure equal access to opportunities for public
service.
51

24 Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 585 (2001); Under other circumstances,
State action and legislation are deemed to be “not unconstitutional”, The burden of proof rests on he who
Page

alleges that the measure is against the Fundamental Law.

25 G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

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With regard to the right to reply provision, respondent also does not consider it as restrictive of
the airing of bona fide news broadcasts. More importantly, it stressed, the right to reply is
enshrined in the Constitution, and the assailed Resolutions provide that said right can only be had
after going through administrative due process

Rule: Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry

The requirement of prior notice to the COMELEC for TV guestings etc. is a reasonable means
adopted by the COMELEC to ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunities
to promote their respective candidacies. The directive to give prior notice is not unduly
burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it be characterized as prior restraint since there
is no restriction on dissemination of information before broadcast.

“Prior approval” invites a charge of prior restraint, here” prior notice” is more in the nature of a
content-neutral regulation designed to assist the poll body to undertake its job of ensuring fair
elections without having to undertake any chore of approving or disapproving certain expressions.
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014 GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS.

Case: The Trial Court upheld the denial of the issuance of the sought after mayor’s permit unless
Petitioners were duly satisfied that the subject property where their radio stations were operated
has been classified as commercial in nature

Rule: The fundamental constitutional principle that informs our analysis of both petitions is the
freedom of speech, of expression or the press. Free speech and free press may be identified with
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and
punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent
liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.

Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right
to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They admit that in
2001, Bombo Radyo " was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela
that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty."
Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he
was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager
at petitioners’ own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is
owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a 20 February
2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending "to file
disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM."

The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are
Set B

authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City and had been doing so for some years
undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have
taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely
52

broadcast, if not broadcast at all.

Page

These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those
stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the

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weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An
elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free
speech animates these cases.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we
can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of
prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy
burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.

Nonetheless, there are added legal complexities to these cases which may not be necessarily
accessible to the layperson. The actions taken by respondents are colored with legal authority,
under the powers of local governments vested in the Local Government Code (LGC), or more
generally, the police powers of the State. We do not doubt that Local Government Units (LGU)
are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or permits by businesses,
a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as "trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a
means of livelihood or with a view to profit."

It emerges then that there exists tension between petitioners’ right to free expression and
respondents’ authority by law to regulate local enterprises.

Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-
defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more
suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation
of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech
are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.

Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates
has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-
neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business
enterprise within the LGU.

However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a
content-based restraint. First, the only rival station of the Petitioner is owned by respondent.
Second, Petitioner is a critic of the respondent. All those circumstances lead us to believe that
the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioner’s radio station were
ultimately content-based.

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a
long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental
Set B

action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental
action directed at most other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: "Because of
the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, ‘any system of prior restraints
53

of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
Page

. . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint.’ There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every

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legislation." G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009 NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING
NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., vs. HON. CEASAR
G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE
CITY OF CAUAYAN

Case : Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa

putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng
lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong
ito. x x x”

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section
3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter
XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of
the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5 The same order also set the case for preliminary
investigation.

Petitioner posits that the order of preventive suspension promulgated by respondent [MTRCB]
dated 16 AUGUST 2004 against the television program ANG DATING DAAN x x x is null and
void for violative of freedom of speech and expression

Rule: Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or
subsequent punishment that, however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.

After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in
Ang Dating Daan.

To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed
unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are
movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people,
including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech.
PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or
broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can
cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.
Set B

It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures
come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. Each method
54

though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children,
tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media,
Page

of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. Just as settled is the rule
that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or

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threat of cancellation of license / franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage
suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of
expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of expression, as
with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be
regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being
protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. In the oft-quoted expression of
Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee "obviously was not intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language." From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: "[T]he freedom to express
one’s sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and
integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper
regard for the rights of others.

Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.

The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech
or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national
security.

The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech.

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit:

(a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal
that to an average adult, the utterances "Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae
x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They
can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were used,
they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged
statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general viewership,
and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children. G.R. No. 164785
Set B

April 29, 2009 ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

*Case: Petitioner seeks reconsideration on the following grounds or issues: (1) the suspension
55

thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint;

Page

Rule: Petitioner’s threshold posture that the suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint
and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a mere rehash of

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the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his
memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and some of the citations of decisional law,
Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed
in some detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little sense to
embark on another lengthy discussion of the same issues and arguments.

Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under
the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent
punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the
program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the fact of his having
made statements on the air that were contextually violative of the program’s "G" rating. To merit
a "G" rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages," which, in turn, means that the "material
for television [does not], in the judgment of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for
children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision." As previously
discussed by the Court, the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television can in no
way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children. More
importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of
speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program
producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast
industry. G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010 ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P.
LAGUARDIA

*Case: The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System.

Rule: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing
free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify
the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
Set B

imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
56

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.

Page

[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner

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 as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of
duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner
to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by
said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be
limited.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject
to limitations imposed by law. x x x

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in
the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner
has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioner’s fundamental rights. G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections

C. Content Based Restrictions

Content Based and Content Neutral Restraint - A content-based restraint is aimed

at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint
intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-
defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint
on the message of the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to strict
scrutiny.

I - Some tests of validity of content-based restrictions

1. Dangerous Tendency26 - By enacting the present statute the State has

determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the
overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means,
are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive
evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That
determination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be
indulged in favor of the validity of the statute. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
661. And the case is to be considered "in the light of the principle that the
State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of public
Set B

safety and welfare;" and that its police "statutes may only be declared
unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to exercise
authority vested in the State in the public interest." Great Northern Ry. v.
57

Clara City, 246 U.S. 434, 439. The statute being constitutional, it may
Page

26 focus on content

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 constitutionally be applied to every utterance -- not too trivial to be beneath
the notice of the law -- which is of such a character and used with such intent
and purpose as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute; and the
question whether the specific utterance in question was likely to bring about
the substantive evil aimed at by the statute, is not open to consideration. 27

If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It
is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary
that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which
the legislative body seeks to prevent.28

2. Clear and Present Danger 29- The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.30

Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently
clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to
be stilled.31

The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the
comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high" before an utterance can be punished.

3. Balancing of Interests32 - Briefly stated, the "balancing" test requires a court

to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation. The Court must, therefore,
undertake the delicate and difficult task to weigh the circumstances and to Set B

27 Gitlow v. New York No. 19 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 268 U.S. 652 Argued April
12, 1923
28 Cabansag v. Fernandez 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957)
58

29 focus on content and context

30 Schenck v. U.S. , 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
Page

31 G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992 BLO UMPAR ADIONG, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
32 focus on weighing between government and private interests

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 appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.33

Distinctions

Dangerous Tendency Test (Bad tendency) –

- It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence,

or unlawfulness be advocated.

- It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms.

- Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to

incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness.

- It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance

be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.

- The evil consequence need not actually result therefrom

- Even if threat was not immediate. (Even if the speech only creates danger
at some remote time thereafter)

Clear and Present Danger Test

- Not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the
evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.

- Note : Schenck v. United States . Focus on Content and Context. E.g. in

times of war, what could have been legally said in times of peace cannot
be uttered in times of war if it obstructs the war efforts.
- If the speech produces an evil that can be legally prevented

Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting

rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary
between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the
"clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule.
Set B

"Clear and present danger" as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the
evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished.
59

The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented.

Page

33 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 339 U.S. 382 American Communications Assn. v. Doubs

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And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of justice." This
test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice.

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases
where extreme difficulty is confronted determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.
There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule
lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition
for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute.
They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection
of the courts against contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to
incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.).34

Other Tests

1. Direct Increment - Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio

(395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.35

2. Grave but Improbable Danger - The Court rule affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner, a leader of the Communist Party in the United States. Dennis had
been convicted of conspiring and organizing for the overthrow and destruction
of the United States government by force and violence under provisions of the
Smith Act. In affirming the conviction, a plurality of the Court adopted Judge
Learned Hand's formulation of the clear and present danger test: “In each case
Set B

[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its
60
Page

34 G.R. No. L-8974 October 18, 1957 APOLONIO CABANSAG vs. GEMINIANA MARIA FERNANDEZ,
35 G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 JOVITO R. SALONGA, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

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 improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the
danger.” 36

II - Content Based Restrictions

a. Freedom of Expression and National Security

In principle, freedom of expression may be curtailed in furtherance of national

security. Peace may be preserved by limiting expression;

Art. 138. Inciting a rebellion or insurrection. — The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being in open hostility
against the Government, shall incite others to the execution of any of the acts specified in
article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners
or other representations tending to the same end.

Art. 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals. — The penalty of reclusion temporal
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee, and that of prision mayor upon any
private individual, who, by unlawful or unauthorized acts provokes or gives occasion for a war
involving or liable to involve the Philippine Islands or exposes Filipino citizens to reprisals on
their persons or property. (Revised Penal Code)

And

Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and
a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any
direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the
acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems,
cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or
persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous
libels against the Government (of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth)
of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities
or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices.

b. Freedom of Expression and criticism of Official Conduct

Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending
Set B

to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. (RPC)

Based on this definition, the Supreme Court has held that four elements constitute
61

the crime of libel, namely

Page

36 341 U.S. 494 Dennis v. United States

Pascua 2023
 (a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt;
(b) malice, either in law or in fact;
(c) publication; and
(d) identifiability of the person defamed.

Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed and implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the
libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.

Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. Malice in law is a

presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise
the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive
malice, legal malice, or implied malice.

In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code, which also enumerates exceptions thereto:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions. (RPC)

There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory

imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive
for making such imputation.

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a

valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means
that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved,
and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
Set B

discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity,

it is not necessarily actionable.
62

In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable,

it must either be;
Page

Pascua 2023
  a false allegation of fact or
 a comment based on a false supposition.

If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is

immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the fact.37

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and,
moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants
shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted. (RPC)

Art. 362. Libelous remarks. — Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter
privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author
thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability. (RPC)

Actual Malice - The actual malice standard requires that the plaintiff in a
defamation or libel case prove that the publisher of the statement in question
knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity.

In New York Times v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
existing common law of defamation violated the guarantee of free speech under
the First Amendment of the Constitution. It held that the citizen's right to criticize
government officials is of such tremendous importance in a democratic society
that it can only be accommodated through the tolerance of speech which may
eventually be determined to contain falsehoods. The solution adopted was to do
away with the common law presumptions of falsity and malice and place the onus
on the plaintiff to prove that, at the time the defamatory statements were made,
the defendant either knew them to be false or was reckless as to whether they
were or not

*Rule: As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of
facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence
Set B

of the parties.
63

37
G.R. No. 141994 January 17, 2005 FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO MEDICAL
Page

AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and

ANGELITA F. AGO,

Pascua 2023
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I am fully in accord with an all-out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which tend
to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads the
investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so
terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations
of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.

I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals
and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.

xxx

This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977])
that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter
of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not be allowed to
continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous,
there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of
newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in
society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column,
the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press
would be highly injurious.

Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I must
call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed
in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez
v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN vs. THE HON. RAMON P.
MAKASIAR

*Case: A series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a
conference” without naming or identifying private respondent.

Private respondent reacted to the articles, insisting that he was the "organizer" (of the first National
Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT)38) alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns and
instituted against him a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case.
Set B

After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
64
Page

38 To be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned
in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis.

Pascua 2023
Rule: The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that
the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown
that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably,
these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The event had several organizers
and that Respondent was only a part of the organization.

The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles are
privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which state
—

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:

1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty; and,

2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.

Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the exceptions
described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private communications" nor "fair
and true report . . . without any comments or remarks." But this is incorrect.

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.

Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has
acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts
a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable
motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks."

Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of
The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private
communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However, this does
not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is
not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters
of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis
not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of
speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Cañete, this Court ruled that
Set B

publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure
of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.
65

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
Page

defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed

Pascua 2023
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it
is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.

There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.

Also, in the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the
New York Times ruling. At any rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers Production Pty.,
Ltd. v. Capulong as —

. . . . a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or

calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has
become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this
category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public,
as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The
list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war
heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Great Exalted
Ruler of the lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public
attention is focused upon him as a person.

But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied
in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not
validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public
figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of
public or general interest, it cannot suddenly became less so merely because a private individual
is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant
and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety.

The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice is always presumed in the publication of
defamatory matters in the absence of proof to the contrary, the question of privilege is immaterial.

We reject this postulate. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving
actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to
the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.

Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Set B

Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.

In the milieu obtaining, can it be reasonably inferred that in writing and publishing the articles in
66

question petitioner Borjal acted with malice?

Page

Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was
animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles were written

Pascua 2023
and published without good motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal
to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as
a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public
deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good
name and reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this
case nor abused his press freedom.

Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been
written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether
they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the defendant
entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity. G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999 ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a.
ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO
WENCESLAO

*Case: Petitioner is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and
some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General
Manager regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After the
meeting, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the
NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, a news article appeared in the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. This highlighted the allegation that Olmedo, through connivance
with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in
a number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) while quoting
the Petitioner.

Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that
the latter's statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.

The trail court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto

Rule: On the main issue whether petitioner is guilty of libel, petitioner contends that what he said
was true and was made with good motives and for justifiable ends.

To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements
must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the

possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.

There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that the
Set B

person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third
person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which
others hold him in, not the good opinion which he has of himself."
67

On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third
Page

person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.

Pascua 2023
Finally, malice or ill will must be present.

In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present.

The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be
presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art.
361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statements is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown,
the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends

In this case, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His
allegation that, through connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to
several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of NHA Inspector General
Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioner's counsel which mentions the irregular consolidations of the
lot in Tondo to Jaime and Victoria Olmedo,

With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that
what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner,
gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman
but these had all been dismissed. Petitioner was able to show that Olmedo's involvement in the
theft of fighting cocks was the subject of an affidavit-complaint, dated October 19, 1983, Likewise,
petitioner presented a resolution, dated March 10, 1988, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
in TBP-87-03694, stating that charges of malversation and corrupt practices had been filed
against Olmedo and nine (9) other barangay officials but the same were dismissed

It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner "only tried to prove that the complainant
[barangay chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that the
complainant committed the crimes." For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang
Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed against the barangay official, not the truth of
such charges, was the issue.

For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to
official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statements was made with
actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,
which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decision. This is the rule of "actual
malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner
were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether they were false or not.

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct
and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary
to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally
Set B

guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties
as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of
our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public
68

discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people." G.R. No.
118971September 15, 1999 RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Page

Pascua 2023
*Case: An Article was published in the Peoples Journal about a Swiss national who shoots the
pets of his neighbors in BF Homes, which happen to enter his property. Mentioned also was the
desire of the neighbors to have the latter deported., The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen,
is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with his Filipina wife and their children.
Claiming that the report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in
failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages against
herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter
Cristina Lee.

The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation, acquired a copy of the complaint letter of the homeowners from
a trusted source in the CID’s Intelligence Division. They claimed to "have reasonable grounds to
believe in the truth and veracity of the information derived (from their) sources. They claimed to
"have reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the information derived (from
their) sources.

It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline, which
categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of shooting pets, was
untrue Moreover, it is immediately apparent from a comparison between the above letter and the
news item in question that while the letter is a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status,
Lee wrote that residents of BF Homes had "asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss
who allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets." No complaints had in fact been lodged against him by any
of the BF Homeowners, nor had any pending deportation proceedings been initiated against him
in the Bureau of Immigration.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners saying that there
is no malice on the part of the defendants in publishing the news item done in the exercise of their
profession as journalists reporting to the people on matters of public interest. The news report
was based on an official communication filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

On appeal, the court a quo reversed the trial court

Rule: The constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of speech and the press against
liability for damages does not extend to the petitioners in this case

Libel is not protected speech. For there to be libel, malice or ill will must be present. As a general
rule, malice is presumed. However, the article is not a privileged communication for it is neither
"private communication" nor a fair and true report without any comments or remarks.

In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the spurious Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the
newspaper and circulated among the general population. A written letter containing libelous
matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated in public, which was
what the petitioners did in this case.
Set B

Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article
69

related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions, for it concerns
only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet life. G.R. No. 143372
Page

December 13, 2005 PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLE’S JOURNAL), ZACARIAS

NUGUID, JR. and CRISTINA LEE vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

Pascua 2023
Case: Published in “REMATE” were articles by Tulfo which imputed against ATTY. CARLOS
"DING" SO acts of corruption as an employee of the Bureau of Customs and depicted as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth.

The RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court

In essence, Tulfo argues before the SC that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged
communication" under Borjal and that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not
apply. He argues that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.

Rule: This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being that Borjal
stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel and was not a criminal case. Second, the
ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant, which shall be
differentiated from the present case in discussing the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third,
the subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject is a public
official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were "fair commentaries
on matters of public interest."

There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the
Bureau of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted
that the goings-on at the Bureau of Customs, a government agency, are matters of public interest.
It is now a matter of establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as qualified privileged
communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be liable.

In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalist’s Code of Ethics and
exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.

In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being
involved in criminal activities and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even
further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang
pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito." He accused Atty. So of stealing from the
government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit against him,
Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So
dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity
alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly
free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not
be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice
of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only
by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
Set B

critical agencies in our democracy.

Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with
70

good faith and reasonable care." This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject
articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his
Page

responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed
an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin does not expand

Pascua 2023
to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their
profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.

To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous
statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate
margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York
Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be
imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous
statement

Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of Customs
and relied only on this source for his columns, but did no further research on his story. The records
of the case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be.
Tulfo’s articles related no specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt
public official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official. Although wider
latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to
their performance of official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public interest
involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech.

Tulfo’s articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged communication under the
second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the presumption of malice "a fair
and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative,
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements which must be present
in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can be
dissected as follows:

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the
following conditions must exist:

(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;

(b) That it is made in good faith; and

(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.

The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide
no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless
accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed
Set B

to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to
attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion and the
legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is
present in Tulfo’s articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are qualified privileged
71

communications under the RPC.

Page

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Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true," Tulfo’s articles do not
meet the standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and honesty. "True" is
defined as "conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest." Tulfo failed to satisfy
these requirements, as he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been
shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports," but merely
wild accusations.

Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged
communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.

In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues that
the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon the
prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there
should have been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject articles.

The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and reiterated in Flor
v. People, which should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.

The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with reckless
disregard of whether the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There was the
finding that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he based his writings, and that the
defense presented no evidence to show that the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo
cannot argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was no malice
attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the "reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed
to meet that test.

The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered
as further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo, wherein publication after the
commencement of an action was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to injure the
victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue
defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter
the cost, and is proof of malice. G.R. No. 161032 September 16, 2008 Erwin Tulfo vs. People
of the Philippines

c. Freedom of Expression and the right to privacy

*Case: A proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the Movie
Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted.
General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It would be
essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed
to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating
four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
Set B

as background.

Private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use,
72

appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his
family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
Page

exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or
exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should

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not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to
them.

Enrile filed a Complaint seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie and alleged that
petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his
objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.

Rule: The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply drawn.
Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their
freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon
the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the
projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to
enjoy.

Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in
respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be
reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day
Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
private respondent's "right of privacy."

The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of government
that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train of events which
led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern.
Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The subject thus relates to a highly critical
stage in the history of this country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the public
domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of
mass media. The subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted
above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent
Ponce Enrile.

The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce
Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile
in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in February 1986.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and
Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:" A public figure has been defined as a person who,
by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which
gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a
'public personage.'

Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a
principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986
Set B

To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to
the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be
73

regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a
license from private respondent. G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY.
Page

LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG
and JUAN PONCE ENRILE

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*Rule: Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is
the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions, for it
concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet life.

As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure. We are
persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability,
for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.

Three reasons were advanced by Justice Powell for making a distinction between private
individuals on one hand and public officers and public figures in the other.

First, public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels
of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.

Second, an individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary
consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than
might otherwise be the case. Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position. For the
most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs
of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment.

Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which publications
address issues of "general interest" and which do not. Even if the foregoing generalities do not
obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that
public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a
private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an "influential role in ordering
society." (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no part of his
interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call
on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.

Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public
figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLE’S JOURNAL), ZACARIAS NUGUID, JR. and
CRISTINA LEE vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
Set B

d. Freedom of Expression and the administration of justice

THE SUB-JUDICE RULE

74

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
Page

proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or

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 obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one
liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair
the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice.

As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of

the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve
as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two
right. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm
the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through
the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the
utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration
of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.39

Nature

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.40

This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority
of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration
of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.

Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished

for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it. 41

Rationale

Rule: For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such
does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to
be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by
bias, prejudice or sympathies. G.R. No. 205956 February 12, 2014 P/SUPT. HANSEL M.
MARANTAN vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O

*(SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION BRION, J.) In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be
Set B

shielded from embarrassment or influence in its all-important duty of deciding the case. Any
publication pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the
counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy,
75

39 Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957)

Page

40 Soriano v. CA, G.R. No. 128938, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 1, 7.

41 People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 999 (1995).

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is contempt of court and is punishable. The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of speech
because of the sub judice rule is necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to
uphold the rights of the accused and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice. G.R.
No. 176389 December 14, 2010 ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

How Committed

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice. Rule 71, (Rules of Court)

In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two classes of publicized speech

made during the pendency of the proceedings can be considered as
contemptuous:

 first, comments on the merits of the case, and

 second, intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts
with respect to the case.

Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those aired or printed in

the various forms of media such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and
internet, and excludes discussions, in public or in private, between and among
ordinary citizens. The Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to speech,
not the right to unrestricted publicized speech.

 Comments on the MERITS of the case may refer to

- the credibility of witnesses,

- the character of the accused,
- the soundness of the alibis offered,
- the relevance of the evidence presented, and
- generally any other comment bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

The danger posed by this class of speech is the undue influence it may directly
exert on the court in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly through the
public opinion it may generate against the accused and the adverse impact this
Set B

public opinion may have during the trial.

The significance of the sub judice rule is highlighted in criminal cases, as the
76

possibility of undue influence prejudices the accused’s right to a fair trial. "The
principal purpose of the sub judice rule is to preserve the impartiality of the
Page

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judicial system by protecting it from undue influence." Public opinion has no place
in a criminal trial.

 Comment on the CONDUCT OF THE COURTS with respect to the case becomes
subject to a contempt proceeding when

- it is intemperate,
- is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon the dignity of the court.

Rule: A comment that impairs of the dignity of the court "excites in the mind of the people a
general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey
them[.]"1 If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades the administration of justice,
then the speech constitutes contempt. "Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence
therein." Without the sub judice rule and the contempt power, the courts will be powerless to
protect their integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly and effective
dispensation and administration of justice. disrepute. G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010
ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

INTEPERATE SPEECH: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM –

MEMBERS OF THE BAR -

Case: This refers to the statent of some members of the UP Law Faculty published on August 9,
2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court".
This refers to allegations of plagiarism in a decision by its ponente of Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)

Rule: Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to
rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using
intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’
invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely
lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that
respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly
motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
Set B

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution,
has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It
appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that
77

this Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this
Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as
Page

a "legitimate public issue."

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This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged
one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the
criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels
in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending
case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.

Included in the statement of these professors were as follows;

- An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who
had suffered abuse during a time of war. …….

- they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

- Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and non-chalance, belies a more alarming
lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect

The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del
Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an
established fact, but a truth" when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations." It was also pointed out in the
Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision. The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to
explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x
x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
Set B

the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming
lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
78

respect.
Page

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression
when it stated that:

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While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many
types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence
of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if
the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would
fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they
have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice

Note: (At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as
an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court) RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT"A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

e. Symbolic Expression (Flag Burring Case)

The prohibition of flag burring cannot be simply content neutral, due to the high
respect afforded to our symbol of nationhood. The flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect.42

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was an important decision by the US
Supreme Court and changed the perspective as to prohibitions on desecrating the
American flag. It held that the defendant Gregory Lee Johnson's act of flag
burning was protected speech under the First Amendment

Case: During the 1984 Republican National Convention, respondent Johnson participated in a
political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some Dallas-
based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an American flag
while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although several
witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of
Set B

a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a state court of appeals affirmed.
79
Page

42Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of
Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960)

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Rule: Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct,
permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The State conceded that the conduct was
expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican
National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional
and overwhelmingly apparent. Texas v. Johnson (No. 88-155) 491 U.S. 397 (1989),

Our Constitution however states that

The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars, as
consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law. (Sec 1, Art XVI)

As such, the Philippines, a different stance is taken as enshrined in REPUBLIC ACT

NO. 8491 "Flag and Heraldic Code of the Philippines."

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8491 "Flag and Heraldic Code of the Philippines."

SECTION 2. Declaration of policy. - Reverence and respect shall at all times be accorded the flag, the anthem, and other national
symbols which embody the national ideals and traditions and which express the principles of sovereignty and national solidarity.
The heraldic items and devices shall seek to manifest the national virtues and to inculcate in the minds and hearts of our people a
just pride in their native land, fitting respect and affection for the national flag and anthem, and the proper use of the national motto,
coat-of-arms and other heraldic items and devices.

xxx

SECTION 14. A flag worn out through wear and tear, shall not be thrown away. It shall be solemnly burned to avoid misuse or
desecration. The flag shall be replaced immediately when it begins to show signs of wear and tear.

xxx

SECTION 34. It shall be prohibited:

a) To mutilate, deface, defile, trample on or cast contempt or commit any act or omission casting dishonor or ridicule upon the flag
or over its surface;

b) To dip the flag to any person or object by way of compliment or salute;

c) To use the flag:

1) As a drapery, festoon, tablecloth;

2) As covering for ceilings, walls, statues or other objects;
3) As a pennant in the hood, side, back and top of motor vehicles;
4) As a staff or whip;
5) For unveiling monuments or statues; and
6) As trademarks, or for industrial, commercial or agricultural labels or designs.

d) To display the flag:

Set B

1) Under any painting or picture;

2) Horizontally face-up. It shall always be hoisted aloft and be allowed to fall freely;
3) Below any platform; or
80

4) In discotheques, cockpits, night and day clubs, casinos, gambling joints and places of vice or where frivolity prevails.
Page

e) To wear the flag in whole or in part as a costume or uniform;

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f) To add any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawings, advertisement, or imprint of any nature on the flag;

g) To print, paint or attach representation of the flag on handkerchiefs, napkins, cushions, and other articles of merchandise;

h) To display in public any foreign flag, except in embassies and other diplomatic establishments, and in offices of international
organizations;

i) To use, display or be part of any advertisement or infomercial; and

j) To display the flag in front of buildings or offices occupied by aliens.

xxx

SECTION 48. Failure or refusal to observe the provisions of this Act; and any violation of the corresponding rules and regulations
issued by the Office of the President, shall after proper notice and hearing, shall be penalized by public censure which shall be
published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the Commission on Higher Education, upon the recommendation of the
Institute and after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of any private educational
institution which fails or refuses to observe the provisions of this Act for the second time.

SECTION 49. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Commission on Higher Education shall ensure
that the National Anthem, as adopted by law, shall be committed to memory by all students of both public and private educational
institutions, and performed during the flag ceremony conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the Office
of the President. In addition, they shall make available the vocal, piano or band scores of the National Anthem, as adopted by law,
to all private and public schools, as well as the general public.

SECTION 50. Any person or juridical entity which violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by
a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), or by imprisonment for not
more than one (1) year, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court: Provided, That for any second and
additional offenses, both fine and imprisonment shall always be imposed: Provided, further, That in case the violation is committed
by a juridical person, its President or Chief Executive Officer thereof shall be liable.

Approved: February 12, 1998

f. Freedom of Expression and Public Service

In general, public servants are prohibited from certain expressions due to the
prohibition for them to engage in partisan political activities. Partisan political
expressions are excluded from their exercise of their rights.

“No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.” Sec 2(4), Article IX-B, Constitution

Elected officials however are not as similarly restricted. In QUINTIO vs

COMELEC43 the Court clarified that;
Set B

Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply
only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban
81

does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
Page

43 G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

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 government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."44 This is because
elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political
activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period.45 Political
partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included.46

The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed
to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names
of certain candidates for public office whom they support.47

Member of the Judicary however, have greater restrictions. Aside from being
politically neutral in their expressions, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins them
to be discreet with their expressions.

Case: Judge Romeo Atillo posted on his Facebook account photos of himself, half dressed,
showing his uppoer body. This was brought to the attention of the OCA. The judge contend that
his account was earlier hacked to change his privacy settings. His photod were never intended to
be made public, but were intended for his own private viewing and that of his friends.

Rule: The Court has often reminded judges to always conduct themselves irreproachably, and in
a manner exemplifying integrity honesty, and uprightness, not only in the discharge of their official
duties, but also in their personal lives.. In other words, their conduct must be guided by strict
propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust
in the judiciary.

As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of
conduct and this must accordingly comport themselves. Judge Atillo failed to the standard set for
judges under OCA circular 173-2017 which mandates all judges who participates in social media
to be cautious and circumspect in posting photos, liking posts, and making comments in social
media. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Romeo M. Atillo, Jr., Executive Judge and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. RTJ-21-018.
September 29, 2021

D. Content Neutral Restrictions

The O'Brien Test

A government regulation is sufficiently justified

[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;

[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
Set B

and
82

44 Section 2(1), Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution.

45 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Page

46 Dissenting Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales,

47 Qionto v COMELEC

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[4] if the incidental restriction on speech expression and press is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367)

This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from
content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review
of such laws."

Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental

interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated
to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated
to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if
the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve
the governmental purpose in question. Hence, as sort of “double effect” here
results.

*Issue: The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private,
and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes per Resolution
No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.

Rule: The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by
the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined
in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant
the kind of restriction involved in this case.

There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted
as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.

All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free
speech the status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945];
Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])

This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
[1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and
to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
Set B

We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.
83

Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst
v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many restrictions will deny to people
Page

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the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections
will truly be free, clean and honest.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-32717
November 26, 1970)

The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of
his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always
a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one
hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election
campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on
Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.

The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National
Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion
cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of
election campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free and honest
elections. In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the preferred
status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of campaigns through
political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go on a case to case basis.

There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is
fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive
regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.

For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem
inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process,
by its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on
knee-jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time
which is of the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may
have been lost.

When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining
clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.
For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not
antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the
freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.

There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on Elections
(207 SCRA 1) case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has its limits.
We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits of free speech. The carefully worded opinion
Set B

of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of election campaign activity
may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in
its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her
84

qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear
and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
Page

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Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather strong
dissents, in National Press Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a different category.
The promotion of a substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the

Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466
US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by
such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled:

The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom
secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what standard governs the choice . . .

For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other context
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These rights
rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion
and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger,
actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 -1945).

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much
that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his
private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of
anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long
as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we
sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by
Set B

an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property. G.R. No. 103956 March
31, 1992 BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

1. Freedom of Expression and National Security

85
Page

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In principle, freedom of expression may be curtailed by Content Neutral
Restrictions in furtherance of national security. For instance, correspondence can
be limited in times of war;

Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country. — Any person who in time of war, shall have
correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be
punished:

1. By prision correccional, if the correspondence has been prohibited by the Government;

2. By prision mayor, if such correspondence be carried on in ciphers or conventional signs;
and
3. By reclusion temporal, if notice or information be given thereby which might be useful to
the enemy. If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such notice or information,
he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to death. (Revised Penal Code)

2. Regulation of Political Campaign Activity

*Case: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or giving
free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Commission on Elections.

Rule: Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions

In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign
signs on public property:

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the

Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])

This test was actually formulated in United States v. O'Brien. It is an appropriate test for
restrictions on speech which, like §11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions,
they are not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral
restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad
v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either
for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not
pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore
they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition. they will be tested for
Set B

possible overbreadth and vagueness.

It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations which, like
§11(b), are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations need only a
86

substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of review will suffice to
test their validity.
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Justice Panganiban's dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that "media
ads do not partake of the 'real substantive evil' that the state has a right to prevent and that justifies
the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access
to information." The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign remedy for all free
speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was
originally formulated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech cases. For
the criminal law is necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a
guilty conspiracy or attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the
constitutional validity of laws which, like §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the
content of political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to
such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular
hammer is all that is needed.

The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-
based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed
because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-
neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under
B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the O'Brien test in this case, we find that
§11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of
communication or information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for
political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any
restriction on freedom of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve
the purpose of promoting equality.

The Court is just as profoundly aware as anyone else that discussion of public issues and debate
on the qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the
government established by our Constitution. But it is precisely with this awareness that we think
democratic efforts at reform should be seen for what they are: genuine efforts to enhance the
political process rather than infringements on freedom of expression. The statutory provision
involved in this case is part of the reform measures adopted in 1987 in the aftermath of EDSA. A
reform-minded Congress passed bills which were consolidated into what is now R.A No. 6646
with near unanimity. The House of Representatives, of which petitioner Pablo P. Garcia was a
distinguished member, voted 96 to 1 (Rep. Eduardo Pilapil) in favor, while the Senate approved
it 19-0.

In his recent book. The Irony of Free Speech, Owen Fiss speaks of "a truth that is full of irony and
contradiction: that the state can be both an enemy and a friend of speech; that it can do terrible
things to undermine democracy but some wonderful things to enhance it as well." We hold R.A.
No. 6646, §11(b) to be such a democracy-enhancing measure. For Holmes's marketplace of ideas
can prove to be nothing but a romantic illusion if the electoral process is badly skewed, if not
corrupted, by the unbridled use of money for campaign propaganda. G.R. No. 132231March 31,
1998 EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

*Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission
Set B

on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said
Resolution, the poll body
87

RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Page

Honorable Chairman to issue the same.

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Is this Unconstitutional?

Rule: Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any
restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed;
rather the presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such
presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows, so it has been
said.

To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown.
Thus:

A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the

government, if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.

Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.

Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech and of
the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character
that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec cannot be justified since there
is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting
centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters
near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. G.R. No. 133486 January
28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

*Case: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
enforcing §5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:

Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore
an election.

The term "election surveys" is defined in §5.1 of the law as follows:

Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as
regards a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion
in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly
discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter referred to as "Survey").

The implement §5.4, Resolution 3636, §24(h), dated March I, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins
Set B

Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an
88

election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election.
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Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey
as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand,
states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May
14,2001.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint.

Rule: Using the O Brien Test

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because
of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the
same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion takers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not
viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."

Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression
of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails
to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is
necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of
last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing"
candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as
these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental
right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts,
rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.

To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to
be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. G.R.
No. 147571 May 5, 2001 SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and
KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

3. Freedom of Assembly

Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
Set B

consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be

accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a
89

clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
Page

fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a

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 character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.48

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION
THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free
exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on any
particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the
government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed
by local ordinances: Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be faithfully
observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees
resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the Batas Pambansa
Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza,
square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping authorities
shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or
street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize
and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made
in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which
shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
Set B

assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.
90

48G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its
Page

National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA

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 (b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity
is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall
cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification
of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant
may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting
such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of time, of
any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction
so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.

Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly to
take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance
with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;

Set B

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the
public assembly;
91

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held
Page

peacefully;

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 (d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of other
persons not participating in the public assembly.

Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a
public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible
police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.

Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is
requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection
to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this end, law
enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot
sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the
leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police or
at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after
allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during
the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended:

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for
dispersal.

Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit is
required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
Set B

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that
92

written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any place
other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable for
Page

participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

Pascua 2023
 (b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
other official acting in his behalf.

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public assembly
or on the occasion thereof;

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

1. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

2. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

3. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns
and loud sound systems.

Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately preceding
Section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and
one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act establish
or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall 49 in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be
centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time without the need of any prior
permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the period of
six months from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality
Set B

of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are
93

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Page

49 a sheltered walk or promenade.

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Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

--------------------------------------------

A.M. 98-7-02-SC dated July 7, 1998

Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies

and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All Other Courts

En Banc.

Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial
administration of justice and the constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and complementing further
the Per Curiam Resolution of the Court in the case of Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, et al., dated September
30, 1987, the Court resolves to adopt formally the following policy and procedural guidelines, regarding the conduct of
demonstrations, pickets, rallies and other similar gatherings in the vicinity of the grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme Court
and all other courts:

1. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights, especially their freedom of expression and assembly. Free speech and
peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.

These freedoms, however, are not absolute. The right of a citizen to use the streets for communication of views on national
questions must be balanced with the need of our courts for an atmosphere that will enable them to dispense justice free from bias
and unnecessary pressure. The courts would not exist and survive to protect the people's most revered rights if they were unable
to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the institution from all forms of distracting, degrading and
prejudicial influences that threaten the fair and orderly administration of justice.

2. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and
streets adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court
Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala. Such activities unquestionably interrupt
and hamper the working condition in the salas, offices and chambers of the courts.

3. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers must keep all public thoroughfares free and unimpeded to allow the
smooth flow of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. At no time should ingress to and egress from the premises of the courts and the
offices of the courts and the offices of the justices, judges, and court officials and employees be obstructed.

4. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers are prohibited from camping out on the streets, sidewalks or pavement
adjacent to, in front of, or within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court Building, any
Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court sala. No provisional shelters and kitchens, pickets'
quarters, and other similar makeshift structures shall be established in said areas.

5. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper
attitude toward courts of justice when engaged in demonstrations, pickets, rallies and similar activities. As officers of the court,
they must help to preserve the dignity of the courts and to insulate the courts from all forms of influence that may adversely affect
judicial impartiality and violate a party's right to due process.

6. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of court. Members of the Bar violating this resolution may, in
addition, be subject to the administrative sanctions of fine, imprisonment, suspension from the practice of law or disbarment as
Set B

circumstances may warrant.

The Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith cause publication of these Guidelines in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. The
94

Guidelines shall take effect upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days after such publication.
Page

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The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all lower courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the PNP, and all agencies of
local governments in charge of issuing permits to hold demonstrations, rallies, pickets and similar activities, around the vicinity of
courts of justice with copies of this Resolution.

Very truly yours,

[Sgd.] LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

*Case: The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4,
5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of
rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the Calibrated Preemptive Response” policy then
recently announced.

Petitioners Bayan, et al. contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral
as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause,"
"opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies
against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without
a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere
regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Rule: The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
Set B

Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.

It is very clear, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
95

simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.

Page

Pascua 2023
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it
content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not
be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and
benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.

As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard –
the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an
inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under
Republic Act No. 71602 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings and was not
pursued by the parties in their arguments.

Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through
the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition
at any time: G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006 BAYAN vs EDUARDO ERMITA

*Case: On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed
with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers
and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date
but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the
IBP received on June 19, 2006.

The Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose
"Lito" Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one
applied for by the IBP

Rule: The Court finds for petitioners. Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
Set B

warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.
96

xxx
Page

e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

Pascua 2023
 xxx

(f) A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall,
be immediately executory.

Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of
a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably
occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly
is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA

4. Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike in the Public Sector

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. (Art III)

Section 2. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (ART
IX, B)
Set B

Section 3. The State … guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
97

and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (ART XIII)
Page

Pascua 2023
*Case: A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout
waged/held in front of the GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all. Forming
a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel,
among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
("KMG" or the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from
other government agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass action's target
appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of
Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was
not covered by a prior approved leave.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum
directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged
administratively for their participation in said rally.

The CA enjoined Petitioner from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other
formal charges arising from the same facts and events.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate court in granting
the petition for prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of authority on their part.

Rule: We resolve to GRANT the petition.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights
of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security . . .

It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action
that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike.

To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual
level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and
wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond
the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to
mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS

*Case: On 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched
Set B

to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having
surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
98

Some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and
Page

defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R.
Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to

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Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees;

Respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316,
dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass
Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the
work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.

Rule: On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of whether
or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316. Stated differently,
whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity
or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:

Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or mass
action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession,
economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. It shall include
mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political
rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must
be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the
GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even
badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are
there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass
undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our
brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice
out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil
Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by
joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty.
This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away. G.R. No. 180291
July 27, 2010 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. DINNAH
VILLAVIZA

Are the actions of the striking public-school teachers content based?

Set B

*Case: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by
99

then Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
Page

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The herein Petitioner participated in the mass action/illegal strike in Sept. 19-21, 1990 and
subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990 issued by this Office,
which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law,
Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official
leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines.

Rule: Can public school teachers strike for economic reasons?

As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila
Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr., and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon.
Isidro Cariño that the mass actions staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to
a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out
for essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure the Government to correct what,
among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of
the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in
payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition
of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours."50

In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the teachers were thereby
denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised
within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school teachers
in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable
limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging
the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even
after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time — recess, after
classes, weekends or holidays — to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper
authorities within the bounds of law, no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme
Court — could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions.

With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
invoked by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan case that the PBM
ruling - that the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they
occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties — was not applicable to defend the
validity of the 1990 mass actions because what were pitted therein against the rights of free
expression and of assembly were inferior property rights while the higher consideration involved
in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which must, at the very least,
be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. G.R. No. 126183 March 5, 1999 LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE
LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO, CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA, ROSALINA JINGCO,
Set B

LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA PIZARRO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE
AND SPORTS51
100

50 Note the concept of “public service” and the basis for the salaries of teachers which is by law and not by
Page

negotiations like CBAs for the private sector

51 Compensation of public school teachers are determined by law and not by CBA.

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5. Censorship

Case: The dispute between the parties has been narrowed down. The motion picture in question,
Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only." There is the further issue then, also one of first
impression, as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of the objections raised.
Thus the relevance of this constitutional command: "Arts and letters shall be under the patronage
of the State.

Rule: There is some difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is persuasiveness to the
approach followed in Roth: "The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be
judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina
v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions
have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient52
interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most
susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must
be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press. On the other
hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of
constitutional infirmity.

This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there was a grave
abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the
light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified
as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes
obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an abuse
of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be
considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. This conclusion finds support in this
explanation of respondents in its Answer to the amended petition: "The adult classification given
the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are
not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good
portion of the film shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly
naked, on the theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and
caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive
violence attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and
imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes." Further: "Respondents further
stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-
General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence
in the film." Petitioners, however, refused the "For Adults Only" classification and instead, as
noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.

All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable
to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
Set B

patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then
will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. As was observed by
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the
101

sexual fantasies of the adult population. it cannot be denied though that the State as parens
patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. G.R. No. L-
Page

52 Having or encouraging an excessive interest in sexual matters. Characterized by an inordinate interest

in sex

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69500 July 22, 1985 JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW
KATIGBAK

*Case: Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted
to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law.": Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its
TV program and in x-rating them.

Rule: Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the
rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about
the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent,
i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public
welfare.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking" either
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-
called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented
as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and
good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This
ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion

The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be
justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Set B

it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger
102

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
Page

appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing

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whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground. G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996 IGLESIA NI CRISTO,
(INC.) vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING
PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA

In the concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban in the above case, he maintains

that;

“In Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak and Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans, Jr., this
Court early on acknowledged the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcast and electronic
media in the lives of everyone, and the easy accessibility of television and radio to just about
anyone, especially children. Everyone is susceptible to their influence, even "the indifferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set." And these
audiences have less opportunity to cogitate, analyze and reject the utterances, compared to
readers of printed material”

He continues by saying that it is precisely because the State as parens patriae is

"called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young” that
the State's power of review and prohibition via the MTRCB must be retained.
High-minded idealism in the staunch defense of the much-vaunted freedoms
cannot but be admired.

6. Radio Broadcast

*Case: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station
DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.

The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere
allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. The petitioner also raised
the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge
of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it
stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public
affairs.

Rule: Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among

qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without
regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.

All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression
clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
Set B

lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens,
Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy
103

of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion
picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
Page

same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out.

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Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the
poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are
low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their
humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.

The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast
media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-
regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to
violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal
the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio
and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland,
obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and
popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special
protection.

The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative

democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already
stressing that.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be
exalted. G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985 EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(DYRE) vs. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS

7. Freedom of Information

In judicial review, Citizens may have standing if what is threatened is their

freedom to be informed.

Rule: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. (Article III, Sec. 7 of
Set B

the 1987 Constitution) Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real
parties in interest are the people themselves. G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998 FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
104

Can the right to be informed be restricted?

Page

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*Case: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President
has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) “Ensuring Observance
of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took
effect immediately.

The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with

Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on
the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.

Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and
another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the
meeting [regarding the North Rail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent
of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required
consent from the President."

Rule: In Chavez v. PCGG, (360 Phil. 133 (1998).) the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes
the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters." The
same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right
to information.
Set B

Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (433 Phil. 506 (2002).), the Court ruled that the
right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the
separation of powers," by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences,
105

and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and
diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of
Page

crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from
the right to information.

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While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege
may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in
the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
Thus, the case holds:

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open
by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and
Judicial power.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned
by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the
Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice. G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R.
ERMITA

*Case: In Chavez v. PCGG, this Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters."
Set B

In Chavez v. PEA, there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations,

correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the
concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed.
106

As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
Page

Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our
Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,

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and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. G.R. No. 180643 March
25, 2008 NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE

*Rule: Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the
presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far
from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, affirmed that the presidential
communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon
by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in
which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA. The Court
articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may
withhold from the public, " that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and
that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’
under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings." . G.R. No. 180643
September 4, 2008 NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE

Read

Hilado vs. Reyes 496 SCRA 262

Bantay RA 7491 vs. COMELEC 523 SCRA 1
Annotation 299 SCRA 782
CPEG vs. COMELEC 631 SCRA 41

E. Cybercrime

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

[ Republic Act No. 10175]

AN ACT DEFINING CYBERCRIME, PROVIDING FOR THE PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION, SUPPRESSION AND THE
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Set B

SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012″.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the vital role of information and communications industries such as content
107

production, telecommunications, broadcasting electronic commerce, and data processing, in the nation’s overall social and
economic development. The State also recognizes the importance of providing an environment conducive to the development,
acceleration, and rational application and exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) to attain free, easy, and
Page

intelligible access to exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protect and safeguard the integrity of computer,

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computer and communications systems, networks, and databases, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse, abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct or
conducts. In this light, the State shall adopt sufficient powers to effectively prevent and combat such offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and
reliable international cooperation.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms are hereby defined as follows:

(a) Access refers to the instruction, communication with, storing data in, retrieving data from, or otherwise making use of any
resources of a computer system or communication network.

(b) Alteration refers to the modification or change, in form or substance, of an existing computer data or program.

(c) Communication refers to the transmission of information through ICT media, including voice, video and other forms of data.

(d) Computer refers to an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing or communications device, or
grouping of such devices, capable of performing logical, arithmetic, routing, or storage functions and which includes any storage
facility or equipment or communications facility or equipment directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device. It
covers any type of computer device including devices with data processing capabilities like mobile phones, smart phones, computer
networks and other devices connected to the internet.

(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for processing in a computer
system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a function and includes electronic documents and/or
electronic data messages whether stored in local computer systems or online.

(f) Computer program refers to a set of instructions executed by the computer to achieve intended results.

(g) Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a
program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with data processing capabilities including, but not
limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device consisting of hardware and software may include input, output and storage
components which may stand alone or be connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage
devices or media.

(h) Without right refers to either: (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of authority; or (ii) conduct not covered by established
legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or relevant principles under the law.

(i) Cyber refers to a computer or a computer network, the electronic medium in which online communication takes place.

(j) Critical infrastructure refers to the computer systems, and/or networks, whether physical or virtual, and/or the computer
programs, computer data and/or traffic data so vital to this country that the incapacity or destruction of or interference with such
system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national or economic security, national public health and safety,
or any combination of those matters.

(k) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets.

(l) Database refers to a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which are being prepared,
processed or stored or have been prepared, processed or stored in a formalized manner and which are intended for use in a
Set B

computer system.

(m) Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the content of communications, including procuring
108

of the content of data, either directly, through access and use of a computer system or indirectly, through the use of electronic
eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the same time that the communication is occurring.
Page

(n) Service provider refers to:

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(1) Any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of a computer system; and

(2) Any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or users of such service.

(o) Subscriber’s information refers to any information contained in the form of computer data or any other form that is held by a
service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content data and by which identity can be established:

(1) The type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of service;

(2) The subscriber’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access numbers, any assigned network address,
billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement; and

(3) Any other available information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available on the basis of the service
agreement or arrangement.

(p) Traffic data or non-content data refers to any computer data other than the content of the communication including, but not
limited to, the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.

CHAPTER II
PUNISHABLE ACTS

SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

(2) Illegal Interception. – The interception made by technical means without right of any non-public transmission of
computer data to, from, or within a computer system including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system
carrying such computer data.

(3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

(4) System Interference. — The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or interference with the functioning of a
computer or computer network by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing
computer data or program, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right or authority, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.

(5) Misuse of Devices.

(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation, distribution, or otherwise making available, without right,
of:

(aa) A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any
of the offenses under this Act; or

(bb) A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a computer system
Set B

is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under
this Act.
109

(ii) The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs 5(i)(aa) or (bb) above with intent to use said devices for
the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this section.
Page

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation,
and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

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 (i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government
agency at the time of the domain name registration:

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

(b) Computer-related Offenses:

(1) Computer-related Forgery. —

(i) The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer data without right resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it
be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, regardless whether or not the data is directly
readable and intelligible; or

(ii) The act of knowingly using computer data which is the product of computer-related forgery as defined herein, for the
purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent or dishonest design.

(2) Computer-related Fraud. — The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of computer data or program or interference in
the functioning of a computer system, causing damage thereby with fraudulent intent: Provided, that if no damage has yet
been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of
identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided, that if no damage has yet
been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.

(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one
degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of
computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject.
Set B

receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message;
110

and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of
Page

the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

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 (4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

SEC. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in
this Act shall be held liable.

SEC. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and
with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, as the case may be.

SEC. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

CHAPTER III
PENALTIES

SEC. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall
be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine
of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least
Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be
imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment
of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties
as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the “Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009″: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto
mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos
(PhP250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree
lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not
exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
Set B

SEC. 9. Corporate Liability. — When any of the punishable acts herein defined are knowingly committed on behalf of or for the
benefit of a juridical person, by a natural person acting either individually or as part of an organ of the juridical person, who has a
111

leading position within, based on: (a) a power of representation of the juridical person provided the act committed falls within the
scope of such authority; (b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the juridical person: Provided, That the act committed falls
within the scope of such authority; or (c) an authority to exercise control within the juridical person, the juridical person shall be
Page

held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of Ten million pesos
(PhP10,000,000.00).

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If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined was made possible due to the lack of supervision or control by a
natural person referred to and described in the preceding paragraph, for the benefit of that juridical person by a natural person
acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in
Section 7 up to a maximum of Five million pesos (PhP5,000,000.00).

The liability imposed on the juridical person shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural person who has
committed the offense.

CHAPTER IV
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 10. Law Enforcement Authorities. — The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of the provisions of this Act. The NBI and the PNP shall organize
a cybercrime unit or center manned by special investigators to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.

SEC. 11. Duties of Law Enforcement Authorities. — To ensure that the technical nature of cybercrime and its prevention is given
focus and considering the procedures involved for international cooperation, law enforcement authorities specifically the computer
or technology crime divisions or units responsible for the investigation of cybercrimes are required to submit timely and regular
reports including pre-operation, post-operation and investigation results and such other documents as may be required to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for review and monitoring.

SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or
record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of
a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but
not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the above-
stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed:
(2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for,
or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining
such evidence.

SEC. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication
services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction.
Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities
requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer data
preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider
Set B

of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the
termination of the case.
112

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.

SEC. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order
Page

requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its

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possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and
assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

SEC. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law
enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the computer
system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary
information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data storage
medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the court.

SEC. 16. Custody of Computer Data. — All computer data, including content and traffic data, examined under a proper warrant
shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed therein, be deposited with the court in a sealed package,
and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the law enforcement authority executing it stating the dates and times covered by the
examination, and the law enforcement authority who may access the deposit, among other relevant data. The law enforcement
authority shall also certify that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such
duplicates or copies are included in the package deposited with the court. The package so deposited shall not be opened, or the
recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or then contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted
except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications
have been recorded.

SEC. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers
and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a
preservation and examination.

SEC. 18. Exclusionary Rule. — Any evidence procured without a valid warrant or beyond the authority of the same shall be
inadmissible for any proceeding before any court or tribunal.

SEC. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

SEC. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement
authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum
period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued
Set B

by law enforcement authorities.

CHAPTER V
113

JURISDICTION

SEC. 21. Jurisdiction. — The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of this Act. including
Page

any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements
was committed within the Philippines or committed with the use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or

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when by such commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed, was
in the Philippines.

There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.

CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Sec. 22. General Principles Relating to International Cooperation — All relevant international instruments on international
cooperation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the
widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to computer systems
and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal, offense shall be given full force and effect.

CHAPTER VII
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES

SEC 23. Department of Justice (DOJ). — There is hereby created an Office of Cybercrime within the DOJ designated as the central
authority in all matters related to international mutual assistance and extradition.

SEC. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. — There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation
and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

SEC. 25. Composition. — The CICC shall be headed by the Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology
Office under the Department of Science and Technology (ICTO-DOST) as Chairperson with the Director of the NBI as Vice
Chairperson; the Chief of the PNP; Head of the DOJ Office of Cybercrime; and one (1) representative from the private sector and
academe, as members. The CICC shall be manned by a secretariat of selected existing personnel and representatives from the
different participating agencies.

SEC. 26. Powers and Functions. — The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance for the suppression of real-time commission of
cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT);

(b) To coordinate the preparation of appropriate and effective measures to prevent and suppress cybercrime activities as provided
for in this Act;

(c) To monitor cybercrime cases being bandied by participating law enforcement and prosecution agencies;

(d) To facilitate international cooperation on intelligence, investigations, training and capacity building related to cybercrime
prevention, suppression and prosecution;

(e) To coordinate the support and participation of the business sector, local government units and nongovernment organizations
in cybercrime prevention programs and other

related projects;
Set B

(f) To recommend the enactment of appropriate laws, issuances, measures and policies;

(g) To call upon any government agency to render assistance in the accomplishment of the CICC’s mandated tasks and functions;
114

and

(h) To perform all other matters related to cybercrime prevention and suppression, including capacity building and such other
Page

functions and duties as may be necessary for the proper implementation of this Act.

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CHAPTER VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 27. Appropriations. — The amount of Fifty million pesos (PhP50,000,000.00) shall be appropriated annually for the
implementation of this Act.

SEC. 28. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — The ICTO-DOST, the DOJ and the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall jointly formulate the necessary rules and regulations within ninety (90) days from approval of this Act, for
its effective implementation.

SEC. 29. Separability Clause — If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the other provisions not affected shall remain in full force
and effect.

SEC. 30. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees or rules inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33(a) of Republic Act No. 8792 or the “Electronic Commerce Act” is hereby modified accordingly.

SEC. 31. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in
at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: SEP 12 2012

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines

The SC ruled that the controversial provision on online libel is constitutional, but
is subject to one condition: only the original author, not those who receive or
react to the post, can be penalized

Meanwhile, 3 provisions were voted down as categorically UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. — The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

Set B

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for
the recipient to reject. receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the
same source;
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(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of
the electronic message; and
Page

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 (cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data

SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in
real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses
he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any
of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about
to be committed: (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be
obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
obtaining such evidence.

Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data

SEC. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When a computer data is prima
facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to
restrict or block access to such computer data.

The SC decided that granting power to the Department of Justice to restrict

computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence was not
in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in
Section 19 of the cybercrime prevention law.

*Case: Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette
Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6,
7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for
Set B

violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the
Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the
Cybercrime Act.
116

Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the
Page

Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

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ISSUES / GROUNDS: Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the
petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double
jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure

• Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for
any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double
Jeopardy;

• Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to
engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge,
violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;

• Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to
block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the
law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of
the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and
freedom of expression; and

• Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased
the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10
years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the
press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order
directed at service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial
or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also
restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly
libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon
protected speech.

No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is
therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the
Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.

PRAYER:

- Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA
10175;
- Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
- Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and
19 of RA 10175; and
Set B

- Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises

Rule: In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(153) that calls for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved
117
Page

53(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

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in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals
who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target
systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and report
back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be
remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an
organization to verify its bookkeeping records

Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to

the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred
to as the "get out of jail free card." Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from
the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(354) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms.
There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6)55 or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in
that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate
as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device. For example, supposing there exists a well-known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio
Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name
because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it
happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction
between the two, the law should recognize the difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real
name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the
law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful

54 (3) Data Interference. — The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of
Set B

computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or
transmission of viruses.
55 Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead,

destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
118

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
Page

name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

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opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on
ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) 56violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence and transgresses the freedom of the press.

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his
residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any,
his occupation, and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying
information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how
government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists
would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure
information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the
law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for
an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the
user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.

The subject of Section 4(c)(1)57—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not
novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a
person to engage in prostitution or pornography." The law defines prostitution as any act,
transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration

On Section 4(c)(3)58 of the Cybercrime Law: To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.

56 Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without
right: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree
lower.
57 Cybersex. — The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any

lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.
58 Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under

this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products
Set B

and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
119

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
Page

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and

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Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate
forms of expression.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who
willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated
as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression.

The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement,
"Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in
the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand
is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like
this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing
the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement
with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting
libel in the physical world is a crime.

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like,
Comment and Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or
haphazardly of their response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting?
And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding
"Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to
who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse.
Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover,
cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and
friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to
regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation
and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await
internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be
threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The
terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who
express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section
5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
Set B

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet
by liking it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what
is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s
comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?
120
Page

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information
in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

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Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether
new defamatory story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be
considered an original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime
law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations
that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under
certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social or economic groups,
races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension
on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in
a fuzzy way.

What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless
consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of
responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography,
cannot stand scrutiny. G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014 JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR.,
ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR.,
vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

F. Academic Freedom

1. Goals of the state in education

 Quality education for all levels

 Affordable and accessible education
 Education that is relevant to the needs of the people and society

“Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.” Section 5,
Article XIV

Note that the 1973 COnstituin provides that

Section 8. All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. (ARTICLE
XV) 1973 Constitution

“In all” now includes the faculty, not just the school, under the 1987 Constitution, thus;
Set B

A. Academic Freedom of SCHOOLS

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all 0institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right
121

of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best
to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
Page

overriding public interest calls for some restraint.

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According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be
admitted to study.59

“Who may be admitted to study “

Rule: The Loyola School of Theology, is a seminary for the priesthood; and petitioner is
admittedly and obviously disqualified and is not studying, for the priesthood, she being a
laywoman and therefore not eligible for admission; It only remains to be added that the futility that
marked the persistence of petitioner a woman. to continue her studies in the Loyola School of
Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to
be construed as in any way reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the
part of respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained
in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well
as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continues her graduate work elsewhere.
There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be
that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the
legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this decision. G.R. No. L-40779 November
28, 1975 EPICHARIS T. GARCIA vs. THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein represented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO

Case: Reynaldo Borja y Torres, who is assisted in this complaint (for damages) by his parents,
was enrolled in defendant's institution as second year high school (student) day session, in the
school year 1979-80; At the end of the school year he failed in 3 academic disciplines—
Mathematics, Pilipino and Practical Arts. His failure in the last subject was reconsidered, to make
hi(m) pass, under such circumstances as the parties will prove in the trial; That he took the 1980
summer classes at the National University in the two subjects he failed and obtained passing
grades thereat; That attempts on the part of the father-parent of the plaintiff to enroll him for the
school year 1980-1981 failed because the defendant refused and still refuses to admit him.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable in damages for its refusal to admit the complainant
as a regular third year high school student

Rule: The dropping of the private respondent from the petitioner's roll of students was not done
precipitately. Private respondent's grades were of his own making. He failed in Practical Arts
because he did not submit a required project. His teacher saw fit to fail him for his non-compliance.
At the end of the last grading period, the Committee on Admission deliberated on the school
standing of students who incurred failures in three academic subjects and among them was the
private respondent. With regard to the latter, the Committee resolved that he be made to transfer
to another school in line with the petitioner's policy. This recommendation was adopted by
Set B

petitioner. We fail to see any irregularity involved herein. In the absence of substantial evidence
showing arbitrariness or malice on the part of the petitioner, We will not disturb its decision. In his
concurring opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, et al., the late Chief Justice
122
Page

59G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS,

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Claudio Teehankee supplied the rationale underlying Our attitude towards academic decisions or
policies, to wit:

Only . . . when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment
of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant
for enrollment. The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute
themselves as Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning and
to substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted Admission Committees of such
educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be swamped with
petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands
who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their
grades. (G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, 289).

While such opinion relates to schools of higher learning, by analogy the same could also apply in
this case. G.R. No. 84401 May 15, 1991 SAN SEBASTIAN COLLEGE vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND REYNALDO BORJA y TORRES

“What to teach”

*Case: Respondents are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De
La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of
their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux
Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity

They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion by DLSU.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be
reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded

Issues: 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating
disciplinary rules.

2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.

2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

Set B

2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
123

3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Page

Rule: It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary
cases decided by institutions of higher learning.

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R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to
affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that
education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting
academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual
growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible
and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the
enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.

It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware
that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future,
which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to
academic freedom.

Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes
determination of who to admit for study.

It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach." Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982
that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can
very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission
to its school. G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC.,
EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA
QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
WILFREDO D. REYES

“Who may teach”

*Case: The petitioners executed individual Teacher’s Contracts for each of the trimesters that
they were engaged to teach, with the following common stipulation:

“POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the
College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given
a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO”

For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth
in its Guidelines on the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla. Under the new screening
guidelines, teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience,
capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. The performance
Set B

standards under the new screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty
members’ entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based
on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase
124

The petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th month pay,
Page

and for discriminatory practices. On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a

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memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources Supervisor informing them that with the
expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be renewed.

The NLRC dismissed the complaint. Elevated,, the CA dismissed the petitioners’ complaint for
illegal dismissal.

Rule: It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since
quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable
and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside. Schools cannot be required to adopt
standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition.

The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and
conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor
Code. Academic freedom, too, is not the only legal basis for AMACC’s issuance of screening
guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management prerogative
– the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to
prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding
transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of
workers. Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-term
employment contracts as its medium for hiring its teachers. It also acted within the terms of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the petitioners to be merely on
probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters. G.R. No. 183572 April 13, 2010
YOLANDA M. MERCADO, CHARITO S. DE LEON, DIANA R. LACHICA, MARGARITO M.
ALBA, JR., and FELIX A. TONOG vs. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-PARAÑAQUE CITY, INC.

B. FACULTY MEMBERS have academic freedom in the following;

a. Full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of their other academic duties
b. Freedom in the classroom in discussing their subjects, but they should be careful not to
introduce into their teaching controversial matters which has no relation to their subjects
c. When faculty members speak or write in their capacity as citizens, then they are free from
institutional censorship or discipline.

C. STUDENTS and Academic Freedom

They have the right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the bill of rights

D. LIMITATIONS of Academic Freedom

a. Dominant police power of the state

b. Social interest of the community
Set B

E. Academic freedom and Civil Service

*Case: three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty
125

members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:
Page

1. Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service filed by Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay. It was alleged that respondent

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approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of the required Plantilla and
Salary Adjustment Form and valid appointments.

2. Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents filed by Jocelyn
Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent maliciously allowed the
antedating and falsification of the reclassification differential payroll, to the prejudice of instructors
and professors who have pending request for adjustment of their academic ranks.

Issues: Is the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction
constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?

Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate
academic freedom?

Rule: 1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service.
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing
board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the
chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is
a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC

2. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service laws
and rules.

Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that institutions of higher learning has the
freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from
outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires. They have the
independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be compelled
by mandamus to enroll a student.

That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the
matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the
administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing
charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as grave offenses under
civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.

This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the
unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a school official,
who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service
rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom.
G.R. No. 168766 May 22, 2008 THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HENRY A. SOJOR

F. BUDGETARY PRIORITY
Set B

“The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.” ARTICLE XIV, Section 5
126

(5)
Page

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Education must be assigned the highest budgetary priority. However, Congress
is free to determine what should be given budgetary priority in order to enable to
respond to the imperative of national interest and for the attainment of other
state objectives and policies

Case: This is a case whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. Allegedly, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990 budget.
Is the said appropriation for debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, viod.

Rule: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated
to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract
and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest
and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid
constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.

Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by
its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt,
the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter
of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991 GUINGONA, JR.
vs. CARAGUE

IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights. (Art III)

Case: Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams,
or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. The
Set B

religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is
regulated by law.
127

The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a
bishop amounts to religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners’ claim
that "the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of
Page

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Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and
moral teachings. . . .

The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that
every act can be motivated by moral, ethical, and religious considerations. In
terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts range from belief, to
expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secular
character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same
faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any religious bearing.

Definitely, the characterizations of the religious of their acts are not conclusive
on this court. Certainly, our powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by bare
claims that acts are religious in nature. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra v. G.R. No.
205728, January 21, 2015

Clauses in Section 5;

1. Non-establishment – “No law shall be made respecting an establishment

of religion”

2. Free exercise – No law shall be made … “prohibiting the free exercise

thereof.

Case: Religion as a social institution is deeply rooted in every culture; it predates laws and
survives civilizations. In the Philippines, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions were crafted in
full acknowledgment of the contributions of religion to the country through the enactment of
various benevolent provisions. In its present incarnation, our fundamental law, by "imploring the
aid of Almighty God," makes manifest the State's respect and recognition of the collective
spirituality of the Filipino. Such recognition is embodied in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution:

SEC. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

In Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, the Court discussed the two-fold nature of the free-exercise
clause enshrined in the cited provision:

[T]he constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to
Set B

preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so
exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.
128

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order
that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly
Page

to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which

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he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.

In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the freedom to
act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to protect the rights of
others and in the interest of public welfare.

Today, religion has transcended mere rubric and has permeated into every sphere of human
undertaking. As a result, religious freedom, to a limited extent, has come under the regulatory
power of the State. G.R. No. 217453 DENMARK S. VALMORES vs. DR. CRISTINA
ACHACOSO, in her capacity as Dean of the College of Medicine, and DR. GIOVANNI
CABILDO, Faculty of the Mindanao State University

A. NON- ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

US Jurisprudence:

Rule: In discussing the reach of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment the Court said:

"Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different
kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. This is not to
say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not
involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."

The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.

The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from legislative
power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise [374 U.S. 203, 223] of
religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive
effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction
between the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on
coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended. SCHOOL DISTRICT
Set B

OF ABINGTON TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. v. SCHEMPP ET AL. APPEAL FROM

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA. No. 142. Argued February 27-28, 1963. Decided June 17, 1963. *
129

The non-establishment clause prohibits the following;

Page

1. Excessive state entanglement with religious institutions

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2. State endorsement or approval of religion

“The right to religious profession and worship; to believe, and to act on one’s
belief”

*Case: In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M.
Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in
the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:

1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;

2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during
the entire calendar year.

With respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office
hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan, such n is well
taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No.
322, The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the
Muslim employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow
them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. No law mentions "Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day" as one
of the recognized holidays.

The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:

This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise
clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free
exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine
that:

“The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.”

Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may
indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all;
embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to
Set B

his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul – in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they
be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not
130

be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after
all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Everyone has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
Page

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(2) Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be,
religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious
freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this
is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for
the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma

The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to
other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise
of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of
the law, including civil service laws. A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005 RE: REQUEST
OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE
HOURS)

*Case: Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled / excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church for reasons of; disobedience inciting dissension, for threatening to forcibly
occupy the Parish Church

Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages

with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao
City. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.

Rule: The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to
hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

We rule that the courts do not.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and
canons, of said institution / organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the
members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
Set B

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith
or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding
from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
131

matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
DOMINADOR L. TARUC vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ
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Case: In question is the allegation of immorality against the Respondent court employee.
Respondent testified that when she entered the judiciary she was already a widow. She admitted
that she has been living with her partner. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that
they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed a "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness”, “Same marital arrangement is recognized allegedly as a binding tie before
"JEHOVAH" God and before all persons to be held to and honored in full accord with the principles
of God's Word.”

Escritor's partner, Quilapio, executed a similar pledge on the same day. At the time Escritor
executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman. Quilapio was
likewise married at that time but had been separated in fact from his wife. During her testimony,

Not represented by counsel, respondent, in layman's terms, invokes the religious beliefs and
practices and moral standards of her religion, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting that her
conjugal arrangement with a man not her legal husband does not constitute disgraceful and
immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable. While not articulated by
respondent, she invokes religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct." To resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine the sub-issue of whether
or not respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held administratively liable.

Rule: In resolving claims involving religious freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion
clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondent’s plea of exemption based on the Free
Exercise Clause (from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling
state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.

The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent's claim of religious
freedom to the "compelling state interest" test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e.
entertaining the possibility that respondent's claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out
an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be
unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest.

Thus, the case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), so it can:

(a) examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice;

(b) present evidence on the state’s "compelling interest" to override respondent’s religious belief
and practice; and
Set B

(c) show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent’s religious freedom. A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 ALEJANDRO ESTRADA
vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
132

*Rule: Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
Page

fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in
the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of

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Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our
Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific
terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious
freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right
by itself.

As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she
had was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,"

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent
Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld
must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect
the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed. A.M. No. P-02-1651 June
22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR

Case: Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section
Set B

3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter
XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of
the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
133

Rule: The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come
within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom.
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There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out
with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them
the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot
be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in
context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious
conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his statements
respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language
used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements
in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation
of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner
had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have
chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors but opted for the low road. G.R. No. 164785
April 29, 2009 ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

*Rule: The Honorable Court should have rendered its decision in light of the surrounding
circumstances why and what prompted herein petitioner to utter those words. Clearly, he was
provoked because of the malicious and blatant splicing by the INC ministers of his recorded
voice. Verily, Petitioner submits that the choice of words he used has been harsh but strongly
maintains that the same was consistent with his constitutional right of freedom of speech and
religion.

Contrary to petitioner’s impression, the Court has, in fact, considered the factual antecedents
of and his motive in making his utterances, and has found those circumstances wanting as
defense for violating the program’s "G" rating

We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent [MTRCB]. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children.
The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State
when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State
is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive
to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and
continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore,
the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering
our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these
beliefs. x x x For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still
G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010 ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

Case: Before us is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) praying for the declaration of nullity of Executive Order (EO) 46, s. 2001
Set B

and the prohibition of herein respondents Office of the Executive Secretary and Office of Muslim
Affairs (OMA) from implementing the subject EO.

On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
134

Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
Page

certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

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Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation
of Church and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and
guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."

Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards
used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to
classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State
has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal
food.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL
AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from enforcing the same. G.R. No.
153888 July 9, 2003 ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. OFFICE
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and the OFFICE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

Case: Petitioner Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose

fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. As such,
petitioner Valmores joins the faithful in worshipping and resting on Saturday, the seventh day
of the week, and refrains from non-religious undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of
Saturday.

Prior to the instant controversy, petitioner Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student at the
MSU-College of Medicine for Academic Year 2014- 2015.7 To avoid potential conflict between
his academic schedule and his church's Saturday worship, petitioner Valmores wrote a letter to
respondent Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from attending his classes in the event
that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a Saturday. At the same time, petitioner
Valmores expressed his willingness to make up for any missed activity or session due to his
absence.

Petitioner’s requests fell on deaf ears. Hence, aggrieved by respondents' lack of consideration,
petitioner Valmores elevated the matter before the CHED. Despite this, petitioner’s request still
went unheeded.

Petitioner Valmores brings his cause before the Court based on his constitutional right to
Set B

freedom of religion, which he argues was violated by respondents when they refused to enforce
the 2010 CHED Memorandum, as follows: (i) by refusing to excuse petitioner Valmores from
attending classes and taking examinations on Saturdays, and (ii) by disallowing petitioner
Valmores to take make-up examinations in order to comply with the academic requirements of
135

his course.
Page

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Rule: In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down guidelines for the exemption of
teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related activities due to
compliance with religious obligations, as follows:

FOR : ALL CHED REGIONAL OFFICE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE

SUBJECT : REMEDIAL WORK FOR TEACHERS, PERSONNEL AND STUDENTS TO

BE EXCUSED DUE TO COMPLIANCE WITH RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS

DATE : November 15, 2010

xxxx

Our fundamental Law explicitly provides under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights that "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed." In this regard, the Commission is obligated to
ensure that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to this
constitutional right, while at the same time acknowledging the exercise of their academic
freedom also guaranteed under the Constitution.

The Commission therefore clarifies that in implementing the aforementioned policy,

[higher education institutions] shall be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from
attendance/participation in school or related activities if such schedule conflicts with the
exercise of their religious obligations, and (2) allow faculty, personnel and staff to forego
attendance during academic and related work and activities scheduled on days which
would conflict with the exercise of their religious freedom. Instead, the affected students,
faculty, personnel and staff may be allowed to do remedial work to compensate for
absences, within the bounds of school rules and regulations without their grades being
affected, or with no diminution in their salaries or leave credits or performance
evaluation/assessment, provided they submit a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest, minister or religious leader for
periods of absence from classes, work or school activities.

For your guidance and strict compliance.

At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed
upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes precedence over his
academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to
exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities
interfere with their religious obligations.

Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within the bounds of school rules and
Set B

regulations," the same relates only to the requirement of remedial work, which, based on the
language used, is merely optional on the part of the HEI. Neither can such phrase be said to
have conferred discretion as the use of the words "shall be enjoined" and "strict compliance"
denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI to excuse its students upon submission of the
136

certification prescribed in the same memorandum.

Page

Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute discretion to grant
or deny requests for exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum only imposes

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minimum standards should HEIs decide to require remedial work, i.e., that the same is within
the bounds of school rules and regulations and that the grades of the students will not be
affected.

Here, in seeking relief, petitioner Valmores argues that he is bound by his religious convictions
to refrain from all secular activities on Saturdays, a day that is deemed holy by his church.

On the other hand, respondents' refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from Saturday classes
and examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other Seventh-day
Adventists who had successfully completed their studies at the MSU-College of Medicine

Without more, respondents' bare arguments crumble against constitutional standards. As

discussed above, the Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their individual
beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless necessary to protect its citizens from
injury or when public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires it. Thus, as faculty
members of the MSU-College of Medicine, respondents herein were duty-bound to protect and
preserve petitioner Valmores' religious freedom.

Even worse, respondents suggest that the "sacrifices" of other students of the common faith
justified their refusal to give petitioner Valmores exceptional treatment. This is non-sequitur.
Respondents brush aside petitioner Valmores' religious beliefs as if it were subject of
compromise; one man's convictions and another man's transgressions are theirs alone to bear.
That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their creed is irrelevant to the case at hand,
for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general rule, and compromise, the exception.

Every person is free to tread the far territories of their conscience, no matter where they may
lead - for the freedom to believe and act on one's own convictions and the protection of such
freedom extends to all people, from the theistic to the godless. The State must, as a matter of
duty rather than consequence, guarantee that such pursuit remains unfettered.

As representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the religious
freedom of their students. Thus, to such end, our schools carry the responsibility to restrict its
own academic liberties, should they collide with constitutionally preferred rights. G.R. No.
217453 DENMARK S. VALMORES vs. DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO, in her capacity as Dean
of the College of Medicine, and DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, Faculty of the Mindanao State
University

Case: In his first Letter,to the Court, Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice
of Quezon City had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table,
images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed
that such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State
and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the
benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that
Set B

the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor
Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees;

Rule: The Roman Catholics express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these
137

would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim
brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their Allah even during office
Page

hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering
Saturday duty because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians

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have been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All these have been
allowed in respect of the workers' right to the free exercise of their religion. Clearly, allowing the
citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a fusion of Church and State.

Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is a compelling state
interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the
masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the
judges and employees in the performance of their official functions.

As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being conducted only
during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services. The court proceedings were not
being distracted or interrupted and that the performance of the judiciary employees were not
being adversely affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has
been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no
state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious freedom in the halls of
justice.

Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these
measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of
the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such
right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS

RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY

1. Operation of Sectarian Schools

“Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission
boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens.
The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all
educational institutions. The control and administration of educational institutions shall
be vested in citizens of the Philippines.” (Section 4, par 2, ARTICLE IV)

2. Religious Instruction in Public Schools

Religion may be taught in public schools subject to the following requisites

Express written option of the student and guardians

Set B

a.
b. Taught within regular school hours
c. Instructors are designated and approved by the proper religious authorities
Without additional cost to the government
138

d.

“3. At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be
Page

allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools

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 within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious
authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost
to the Government.”60

“Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For
this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible:

(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction
shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian xxx61

3. Tax Exemption

“Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxation.” 62 Section 29, Par 2, Article VI

*Case: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva
Segovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets. On the south side is a part of the
churchyard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable garden, containing an area
off 1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent. In the
center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the north is an old cemetery with
two of its walls still standing, and a portion where formerly stood a tower, the base of which still
be seen, containing a total area of 8,955 square meters.

As required by the defendants, on July 3, 1925 the plaintiff paid, under protest, the land tax on
the lot adjoining the convent and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with the portion where
the tower stood.

The plaintiff filed this action for the recovery of the sum paid by to the defendants by way of
land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. The lower court absolved the
defendants from the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining convent and declared that the tax
collected on the lot, which formerly was the cemetery and, on the portion, where the lower
stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed from this judgment.

Rule: The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c]
Administrative Code) refers to the home of the parties who presides over the church and who
has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. In therefore must, in the sense,
include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the adjacent ground destined
to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities where the density of the population
and the development of commerce require the use of larger tracts of land for buildings, a
vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, it use is limited to the
Set B

necessities of the priest, which comes under the exemption.

In regard to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither
139

is it used for commercial purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being used as a
60 Section 3. ARTICLE XIV
Page

61 New Civil Code

62 Section 29, Par 2, Article VI

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lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities, which constitutes an
incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the exemption.

The judgment appealed from is reversed in all it parts and it is held that both lots are exempt
from land tax and the defendants are ordered to refund to plaintiff whatever was paid as such
tax, without any special pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. L-27588 December 31, 1927
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA, as representative of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ILOCOS NORTE, ET AL.

*Rule: The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is
mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior
restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling
goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is
unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income
or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil.
386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those
engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on
the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right
to propagate.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods
or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more
than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its
freedom under the Constitution.

Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to
those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while
reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise
of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other
economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments
would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.

On the other hand, the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by §107 of the NIRC, as amended
by §7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in §108 of the
NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not
Set B

excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether
the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed
this tax by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
140

4. Public Aid to Religion

Page

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 Section 29. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. (Par 2, Art VI)

Requisites for government aid to be allowable;

1. Must be for a secular purpose

2. Its primary effect must not inhibit or advance any religion
3. No excessive entanglement with recipient institutions

In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 20163, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which
appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of
postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in
1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.

The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines.
The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the
Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent
Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps.

It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an
event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic
Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.

In that case, the Court declared that

“Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the
Set B

postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination.
The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
141

Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
Page

63Quoted from G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981 ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO
OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, , vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

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 church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of
June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the
only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took
advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity
to the Philippines and its people" … It is significant to note that the stamps as
actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as
originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the
City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat
of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps
in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the
opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply
because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose
had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to
mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U.
S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)”

Case: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro
Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia
Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential
Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was,
on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion
No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative.

Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix
Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This
attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what
should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might
follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines,
rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. G.R. No.
106440 January 29, 1996 ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and
LEONICA MANOSCA, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO
Set B

A. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

142

1. Flag Salute
Page

*Case: The petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu
for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as

Pascua 2023
required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions.

Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship"
or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except
God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the
Constitution protect against official control.

Issue: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled
from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

Held: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator.

“The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the
expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.”(Teehankee)

The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen
who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of
those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes". What the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also
receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for
Set B

human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral
and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling
or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this
Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through their on hand of the law,
143

to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love
of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.
Page

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Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled
violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to “protect and promote
the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1,
Art. XIV) EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU G.R.
No. 95770 March 1, 1993

2. Freedom to Propagate Religious Doctrines

Case: In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines and translating the same into
several Philippine dialects. The City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of the City Ordinances, and required plaintiff to
secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees,

Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that the Ordinances are
unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for religious
censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, are constitutional and valid;

Rule: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of such right
can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a
clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Tañada
and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the
license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and
other religious literature:

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
For this reason, We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession
and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. G.R. No. L-9637 April 30,
1957 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA

*Case: The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a
civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive
for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin
Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that
Set B

the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
144

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against
petitioner for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the
Municipal Trial Court. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
Page

Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.

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Rule: The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On
the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two
concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible
end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order
that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens
from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly
to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which
he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.

It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a
legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free
exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents
of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which
does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of
funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious
purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free exercise
of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise. To conclude, solicitation for
religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police
power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose
are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner
cannot be held criminally liable therefor. G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN
CENTENO vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS

*Rule: According to Cruz, where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that
affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as
this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can
be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere
invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the
general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical
to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction
and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Set B

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma.
145

Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety
Page

a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical command to
"go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in violation of the

Pascua 2023
laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it would be against
his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot express
in his disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The police power can validly
asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born of deep religious conviction, that calls on
the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband. G.R. No. 119673\ July 26, 1996
IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.) vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

3. Exemption from Union Shop

A union-shop clause has been defined as a form of union security provision (in
the CBA) wherein non-members may be hired, but to retain employment must
become union members after a certain period.64

All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA
with management are subject to its terms. However, under law and
jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage,
namely,

1. employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona
fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from
joining labor unions on religious grounds

2. employees already in the service and already members of a union other than
the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect;

3. confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining
unit;

4. and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the
agreement.

Case: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had
been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action
was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in
view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
Set B

Rule: Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
146

of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
Page

64
G.R. No. 164301 August 10, 2010 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.BPI EMPLOYEES UNION-
DAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK

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bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace
Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the
different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and
contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to. It is, therefore,
the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and
should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join;
and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time.

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the
employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any
labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed
shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that
the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating
with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious
sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither
does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association. G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974 BENJAMIN VICTORIANO vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC

Rule: This Court's decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54,
upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being
contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own
union. The public respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect ...
should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation. "G.R. No. 82914 June 20, 1988 KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND
CANNING DIVISION (TUPAS Local Chapter No. 1027) vs. THE HONORABLE BLR
DIRECTOR PURA FERRER CALLEJA, MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION UNIVERSAL
ROBINA CORPORATION

4. Disqualification from Government Office

Set B

*Case: The novel question raised in this certiorari proceeding concerns the eligibility of an
ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga,
was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he
147

was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for
the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall
there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
Page

persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right

Pascua 2023
of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was
impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal
by petitioner.

Rule: The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and set aside.
Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the municipality
of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect.

(This issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote
of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional.
For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed
and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.)

(BARREDO, J., concurring:) I just cannot imagine how a duly ordained minister of God whose
sacred life mission is supposed to be to serve God and to advance and defend the interests of
His church above all other interests can properly act as a government official committed to enforce
state policies which may conflict with the fundamental tenets of that church.

(MAKASIAR, J., concurring)… No doubt Section 2175 was designed to preserve the indestructible
wall of separation between Church and State the basic pillar of our democratic regime. The no-
religious test clause of the Constitution only implements and supplements one's freedom to
entertain views of his relations to his Creator and to preach, propagate and evangelize his
religious belief. But such no-religious test does not guarantee him the right to run for or be
appointed to a public office and thereafter to use such public office to compel the citizenry to
conform to his religious belief, thereby to gain for his Church dominance over the State.

A priest or minister, once elected or appointed to a municipal office, necessarily enjoys the salary
pertaining to the office. This would be a direct violation of the prohibition under Section 18(2) of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which was contained in paragraph 3 of Section 23 of Article
VI of the 1935 Constitution. Not only public funds will be appropriated for his salary but the priest
or minister thus elected or appointed as a municipal officer employee will also directly or indirectly
enjoy the use or benefit of any property of the municipality. The only exception where such
appropriation of public money or property can be validly made in favor of such priest or minister
is when he is assigned to the Armed Forces or to any penal institution or government orphanage
or leprosarium.

What will necessarily follow would be the Church fielding its own candidates for municipal offices
all over the country even without registering as a political party. Such support by the Church,
although not registered as a political party, remains a circumvention of the absolute prohibition
specified in Section 8 of Article XII of the 1973 Constitution. And when the majority of the winning
candidates for elective offices in tile towns all over the country are supported by the Church, these
officials will naturally be beholden to the Church and will utilize — covertly or overtly — their office
to further the interests of the Church. When the Church achieves such political dominance, then
Set B

the Church will have the power to persuade the electorate or citizenry to amend the Constitution
to eliminate all the provisions on separation of Church and State, the establishment of state
religion and the utilization of public funds or property by the Church or by any of its priests or
ministers and the prohibition against the registration of a religious sect as a political party. G.R.
148

No. L-34854 November 20, 1978 FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C.
TELERON
Page

V. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL

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 Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. (Art III)

Guaranteed by Section 6, Art III Curtailment

are the freedoms to;
Choose and Change one’s place
of abode
Travel within the country and
abroad
 By the lawful order of the
court and within the limits
of law
 By the lawful order of the
court
 By administrative officers
in the interest of national
security (passport), public
safety, public health
(quarantine), as may be
provided by law

1. Travel within the country and abroad

The right is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that "neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by law." Some of these
statutory limitations are the following65:

1] The Anti-Terrorism Act Of 2020 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11479, Section 34.
The law restricts the right to travel of an individual charged with the crime of
terrorism.

2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized consular officer may refuse the
issuance of, restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen.

3] The "Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A. No. 9208. Pursuant to
the provisions thereof, the Bureau of Immigration, in order to manage migration
and curb trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order No. 2011-011,12
allowing its Travel Control and Enforcement Unit to "offload passengers with
fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including possible
Set B

victims of human trafficking" from our ports.

149

65
A.M. No. P-11-2927 December 13, 2011 LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-
Page

OCA vs. WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City,
Respondent.

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4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue deployment permit to a
specific country that effectively prevents our migrant workers to enter such
country.

5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262. The law
restricts movement of an individual against whom the protection order is
intended.

6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the
Inter-Country Adoption Board may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee’s right to
travel "to protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or
sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful,
detrimental, or prejudicial to the child."

*Rule: Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its function conformably to the
mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights
of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration
of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of 'the ban on
international travel. There should be fidelity to such a pronouncement. It is the experience of the
undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United States as well as in Malaysia,
Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present emergency
regime had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and the academe in
foreign lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law
Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with
law and that the Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the
executive branch, therefore, the Travel Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the
impression be created that such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more
than munificent bequests in a pauper's will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified, the more so in the
light of the Answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his
prayer in his Manifestation and Reply 'that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition,
Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents
have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the Answer. G.R. No. L-53622
April 25, 1980 JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL
PROCESSING CENTER, and GENERAL FABIAN VER

*Case: After having been exiled to Hawaii, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation
of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
Set B

the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
150

implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Page

Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the

Pascua 2023
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance
the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or
civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.

Rule: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally
distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus,
the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right
to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international
law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived"
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the
framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no
other? Are these numerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? It would not
be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Set B

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus,
in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
151

implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things,
Page

and adhere to them.

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Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles
in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the
President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare
and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being
an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common good.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as
steward of the people. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA
R. MARCOS vs. RAUL MANGLAPUS

*Case: On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Yet, Pres. Aquino
maintains that “In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely
and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time
as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.”

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners of the September 15,
1989 Decision.

Rule: The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not
changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis
for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is
Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the
matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."

Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power
is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
Set B

decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision G.R. No. 88211 October
27, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS vs. HONORABLE RAUL
MANGLAPUS
152

*Case: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for
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his provisional liberty.

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More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines
filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or
public health,

Rule: The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty
of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may
be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the
effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at
all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to
travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of
a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution.
Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in
People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof
by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued.
Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to
leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an
accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt
Set B

with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the
Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes. G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991 RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE
153

COURT OF APPEALS
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*Case: This petition seeks to dismiss for a case against him violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended now pending before respondent Sandiganbayan Further, he prays for

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the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondent Sandiganbayan from further enforcing and or implementing its order which bans
petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said court..

Petitioner filed a motion reiterating his application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with urgent motion for hearing thereon citing the urgency of lifting the travel
restriction on him in view of the various problems involving the investments of San Miguel
Corporation (SMC) abroad which must be immediately attended to by petitioner as duly elected
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SMC. Petitioner asserts that quite often, it becomes
necessary for him to attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must be
confirmed promptly. Considering that he must first secure the permission of respondent
Sandiganbayan before he can travel abroad and abide by the conditions imposed by said court
upon the grant of such permission, petitioner contends that it becomes impossible for him to
immediately attend to the aforecited tasks.

Issue: Whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner should be vacated to enable
petitioner to go abroad without prior permission of and other restrictions imposed by the
respondent Sandiganbayan

Rule: The travel ban should be lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing.

The rule laid down by this Court is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
released on bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel, the reason being that a person's
right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding
the system of justice. But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation
indicated that it is not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that he be allowed to travel
abroad based on the following considerations:

. . . (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, including the second
paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that
the petitioner has always returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of his allowed
travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman of the Board of San Miguel Corporation, may be
constrained to leave the country for business purposes, more often than he had done in the past,
....

It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to three (3) months instead
of six (6) months as requested by petitioner and that the latter should be required to post an
additional cash bond equivalent to the present cash bond posted by him.

Moreover, prescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against
petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and
compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad.
Admittedly, all of petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad has been granted and that, as
Set B

confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always returned to the
Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further denying
petitioner's right to travel abroad, with attendant restrictions, appears less than clear. The risk of
flights is further diminished in view of petitioner's recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief
154

Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, though he has now more justification to travel so as
to oversee the entire operations of that company. In this regard, it has to be conceded that this
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assumption of such vital post has come at a time when the current economic crisis has adversely
affected the international operations of many companies, including San Miguel. The need to travel

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abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to formulate and implement the necessary corporate
strategies and decisions, could not be forestalled. These considerations affecting the petitioner's
duties to a publicly held company, militate against imposing further restrictions on petitioner's right
to travel abroad. G.R. No. 134307 December 21, 1998 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Case: Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator, received respondent’s leave application for foreign. Respondent left for abroad
without waiting for the result of her application. It turned out that no travel authority was issued in
her favor because she was not cleared of all her accountabilities.

Rule: In this case, respondent knew that she had to secure the appropriate clearance as to money
and property accountability to support her application for travel authority. She cannot feign
ignorance of this requirement because she had her application for clearance circulated through
the various divisions. She, however, failed to secure clearance from the Supreme Court Savings
and Loan Association (SCSLA) where she had an outstanding loan.

There is no dispute, therefore, that although respondent submitted her leave application for
foreign travel, she failed to comply with the clearance and accountability requirements. As the
OCA Circular specifically cautions that "no action shall be taken on requests for travel authority
with incomplete requirements," it was expected that her leave application would, as a
consequence, be disapproved by the OCA.

The exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom to move from one place to another, as assured
by the Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations
regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that "neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law." A.M. No. P-11-2927 December 13, 2011 LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OCA vs. WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS, Clerk IV
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Respondent.

MEANS OF TRAVEL, USE OF TOLL WAYS

*Case: Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly
deprive them of their right to travel.

We are not persuaded.

Rule: A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to
certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest
and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary
roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
Set B

The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right
to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way
any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the
155

right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll way,
much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to the
manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
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Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that
these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies
as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not
entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination.
The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes,
construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone.

Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s license from the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all
kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to
drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to drive
motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver’s license issued by
the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or
operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the
other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the
government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles. G.R. No. 158793
June 8, 2006 JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON MOTORCYCLISTS
FEDERATION, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

2. Choose and Change one’s place of abode

*Rule: The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner,
are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at
the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is
merely required to inform the court in case he does so. G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Set B
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